Analysis of Strategic Domains

President University – International Relations Study Program 20212 - Defense Class

Dynamics of Middle East and Its Impact On Regional Security; Study Case of Iran-Saudi
Arabia
A Take-home Paper – Final Examination

Lecturer:

Dr. Jeane Francoise

Submitted by:

Petrasia Depe Gani 016202100154

Date of Exam:

May, 12th 2023

Introduction
The Middle East is the most complex region in the world due to its long-standing
conflicts of interest and overlapping causes of problems. Many scholars have considered this
region as a creator and spreader of regional and international instability. Middle East is a new
geopolitical conception that emerged after the end of the Second World War and the Cold War.
Geographically, the Middle East is located in the most critical region, the world's largest energy
supplier. The region inward from the Gulf states accounts for about 20% of the world's energy.
Furthermore, the region contains the world's largest single oil reserve, making it a frequent target
of foreign intervention in the post-World War II era. Due to its geographical and strategic
uniqueness, every tremendous historical power has sought to advance its regional interests. Any
inter- and intra-state conflict in the Middle East can destabilize the region, disrupt the regional
balance of power, and undermine global stability.
The author believes that to comprehend the situation in the Middle East fully, we have to
examine a single significant variable, precisely the underlying causes of problems that originate
in the dynamics of the relationship between the two major power countries, Iran and Saudi
Arabia. Given that they have their bloc involving other international actors such as superpower
countries such as the United States, Russia, China, and other international organizations, the
dynamics of their relationship are central in the analysis of Middle East regional security.
Moreover, the Iran-Saudi Arabia relationship is significant due to their involvement in proxy
wars in the Middle East region, directly impacting regional instability and extensive external
interventions. Consequently, the author applies the three levels of analysis typology and the
theory of neorealism in this paper to examine the complexities of the Iran-Saudi Arabia
relationship and its impact on regional security. Hence, the author expects this paper to provide
fresh perspectives into the underlying causes of these frequently misunderstood issues and
additional details on the two countries' relationship. The author will additionally provide some
predictions about what might happen if the situation in the Middle East continues to fail to
stabilize.

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Origin of the Relations
We can first examine how these two countries dominated the Middle East. The Arabian
Peninsula was a patchwork of tribes controlled by the Ottoman Empire in the early 1900s.
However, following World War I, the empire crumbled, leaving all the tribes combating
influence. The Al-Saud, an interior tribe, eventually conquered most of the Peninsula. The world
recognized them as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. Six years later, Saudi Arabia
discovered massive oil reserves, and the monarch became wealthy. They also began to tie their
relations with the United States and built infrastructure. Another country was emerging on the
eastern side of the Persian Gulf but was having a much more difficult time. Iran also had massive
oil reserves and an enormous Muslim population. However, foreign intervention was causing
havoc. Russia and the British Empire had been invading Iran since the 18th century. In 1953, the
US staged a covert coup to depose a popular Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddesh. As a
result, Reza Shah rose to power and aggressively portrayed Iran as a secular, Westernized nation.
This historical context assisted us in understanding the origins of the relationships.
Before the two countries rivalry escalated, Saudi Arabia and Iran had developed a sound and
cooperative friendship. Iran and Saudi Arabia signed a Treaty of Friendship on August 24, 1929,
which included mutual recognition and the beginning of full bilateral ties. At the same time, the
Pahlavi dynasty and Al-Saud, also known as Saudi Arabia, agreed that peace is absolute and that
genuine friendship will endure. It demonstrates a commitment made from the start of the two
countries' diplomatic relations. History also shows that over the last 90 years, both sides' efforts
to keep commitments and agreements have met with some success. Other agreements signed by
the two countries between the early 1950s and the late 1970s include the Commercial Agreement
(1953), the Agreement on al-'Arabiya and Farsi Islands (1969), and the Agreement to Divide the
Neutral Zone (1978). Furthermore, in the 1960s, Iran and Saudi Arabia established OPEC and
the Arab-Iranian Friendship Organization.
The friendly relations between the two countries after the Second World War and before
1979 were also inseparable from US interference. The United States even said that Iran and
Saudi Arabia were the twin pillars and closest allies in the Middle East region to prevent the
expansion and influence of the Soviet Union into the region. Therefore, we can analyze and
explain their relationship and interaction in the international system with the concept of polarity.
The concept of polarity helps us understand the distribution of power and behavior in a

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large-scale international system, where these great poles or great powers influence political
workings. In recent decades, the concept has been used to explain "changes" within the
international system, such as power shifts, free trade, developments in information technology,
and many more that lead to a multipolar system. Mearsheimer argues that in this position where
Saudi Arabia and Iran are both on the American pole or side, they are less likely to oppose each
other. This means that as Iran and Saudi Arabia accept American dominance, they will
complement each other and put aside issues that could divide them, including sectarian divisions.
However, the Iranian-Arab relationship in the American mantle only lasts for a while when
mapping out its foreign policy. This independent foreign policy was why the two sides
eventually turned against each other and triggered the Iranian revolution in 1979.

The Turning Point; From Friend To Enemy

Nothing lasts forever, and the harmonious ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia are no
exception. Despite their proximity, these two countries are distinct international entities and
subjects. Positive ties will only last if the two countries share similar interests and visions.
Consequently, when a conflict of interest arises, there is a high likelihood that the relationship
will fail or, worse, become hostile. This happened in 1979 in the relationship between Iran and
Saudi Arabia. Iran has a majority Islamic (Shia) population, and Saudi Arabia, which has a Sunni
majority, had different impacts and influences, resulting in each population feeling differently.
The Saudi government maintains excellent control and affection for its people. Iran, on the other
hand, does not have the same level of control and affection. The Iranians felt constrained by the
Shah's reforms and decided to overthrow the regime in power, resulting in the Iranian Revolution
of 1979.
The Iranian Revolution was one of the key moments that marked the culmination of
escalation and a historic turning point in Iran-Saudi Arabia relations. It is regarded as an essential
turning point due to the massive movement that increased tensions between the two countries
and resulted in real rivalry. When examining the Iranian Revolution, many scholars emphasize
how Islam (Shi'a) was the main driving force behind the revolution. This is only partially
accurate. Religion was one of them, along with additional variables such as Iranian national
culture and the political environment of the 1978-1979 uprising. However, focusing on the

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religious aspect is needed to understand the analysis, undermining other aspects that were the
primary motivation for the revolution and even covering up the truth.
Retrospectively, this revolution was a response and protest by Iranians to the Shah's white
revolution in 1963. Iran's six-point program aimed to modernize and westernize the country.
Although these reforms resulted in rapid economic growth, they also caused social instability,
rapid urbanization, and the ruling elite's adoption of Western habits and customs, alienating
traditional and religious elements in Iranian society. The reforms also threatened the country's
Islamic values, which are central to its identity. Furthermore, by bringing in foreign workers,
Shah's modernization plans increased opportunities for acculturation. As a result, wage
disparities existed, with foreigners earning more. Some Iranians became dissatisfied as a result.
This modernization decreased a few expectations, and a large portion of the population,
particularly the educated middle class, became disappointed. Furthermore, the economic
downturn in the mid-1970s contributed to growing dissatisfaction during heightened
expectations, catalyzing the revolution. The idea that Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution brought a
new era of foreign policy is widely accepted.
The revolution had an impact not only on Iran-Saudi Arabia relations but also on Iran-US
relations. As a result, we can see the distinction between domestic and systemic power during
this period. As an emerging Middle Eastern great power, Iran wished to challenge the status quo
by moving away from the polar United States and away from the Soviet Union. On November 4,
1979, 52 American diplomats were captured at the US Embassy in Tehran, marking a significant
turning point. It demonstrated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had abandoned its alliance with
the United States, which it shared with Saudi Arabia. Iran, represented at the time by Ayatollah
Khomeini, stated that the Islamic world must achieve freedom and independence by ignoring the
Soviet Union and creating a new foreign policy. There was only the Islamic Republic, no East or
West. The ratification of the new Islamic constitution in a national referendum on December 2-3,
1979, as well as presidential and parliamentary elections in January and March 1980,
respectively, marked the end of the Islamic Republic of Iran's initial period of consolidation. As a
result, this new order included three components: a revisionist and pro-Soviet Iraq, a
pro-American Saudi Arabia that supported the status quo, and an Iran that was beholden to
neither. At the same time, none of these regional actors can become a hegemon.

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 Moreover, the success of the Iranian people in this revolution created fear in the
governing body of Saudi Arabia. This is because, in the country, there are also minority groups,
including the Shi'a, who have the potential to do the same thing. There is a Saudi Arabian
monarchy. Consequently, after 1979, both Iran and Saudi Arabia started falling apart. They both
set out on a quest to build influence. By using the sectarian split as a political construct, they
seek to rule at home and neighbors. Arab Spring in 2011 intensified the rivalry even further,
resulting in massive political revolutions across West Asia and Africa. The government fell in
Tunisia and Egypt, and a crisis erupted in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, leading to a vacuum of power
in those respective regions. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran perceived these circumstances as an
opportunity to fill the void. Their rivalry is reflected throughout the region, and the Middle East
is their battlefield. Now, the battle of influence has just begun.

Theoretical Framework
Neorealism
Neorealism, also known as structural realism, is a realism adaptation from the 1990s. It
explains patterns of international events in terms of the international power distribution system
rather than the internal structure of individual states. Compared to traditional realism, neorealism
is more "scientific" because it proposes general laws to explain events. However, it needs more
of the richness of traditional realism, which considers many complex elements (geography,
political will, diplomacy, etc.). Furthermore, neoclassical realists have recently attempted to
recover some of these lost aspects. In developing a theory of international politics, neorealism
maintains the primary principles of realpolitik, but means and ends and causes and effects are
viewed differently. The international power distribution system, rather than the internal structure
of individual states, explains patterns of international events in Neorealism. Neorealism is more
"scientific" than traditional realism because it proposes general laws to explain events.
Furthermore, in developing a theory of international politics, Neorealism adheres to the basic
principles of realpolitik while viewing means and ends and causes and effects differently.
Morgenthau saw power as a tool to achieve a goal. On the other hand, power is viewed as a
potentially helpful tool by Neorealism, with states putting themselves at risk if they have too
little or too much of it. Excessive weakness may invite an attack that a more powerful opponent
would have avoided. Excessive strength may compel other states to arm and join forces against

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the dominant state. Because power can be beneficial, wise leaders strive for an appropriate
amount.
Three levels of analysis
The Three-Levels of Analysis can be perceived as a typology rather than a theory.
However, its importance in categorizing the complex causes of war has remained strong.
Three-Levels of Analysis were pioneered by Kenneth Waltz's 1959 book "Man, State, and War,"
which featured the three "images" of war. It was used to refer to the individual, the nation-state,
and the international system. Many scholars have come to refer to this as the "level" of analysis
after J. David Singer launched his work in 1961. The first level is the systemic level, according
to J. David Singer, this is the most comprehensive level of analysis. The characteristics of this
level are that it encompasses the totality of interaction within the system and its environment.
The pattern of behavior can be seen in the form of alliances, power distribution, international
rule establishment, and intergovernmental organizations. Aside from the systemic level, there is
also a state-level analysis that emphasizes the national interest, domestic and foreign policies,
government structure, and political system of a state. Examining this level of analysis, it allows
us to investigate the decision-making process within the state.
Last but not least is the individual level of analysis. Due to its abstraction of concepts and
patterns of human behavior, the individual level of analysis is the most difficult to analyze. If, at
the state level, we focus on a state's domestic and foreign policies, at this level, we will focus on
the policy-making and decision-making processes carried out by the leader or state's actor.

Analysis of the Iran - Saudi Arabia Relations; Battle of Influence

The proxy war accurately analyzes the Iran - Saudi Arabia relationship and rivalry in the
Middle East. This phenomenon is complex to investigate from a single point of view due to its
massive political, religious, economic, and military involvement. The Arab Spring in 2011 was
perceived as a momentum for Saudi Arabia and Iran to fight for dominance even further. This
event also complicated the situation, which led them to be involved in a more dangerous
situation: a proxy war in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. Both Teheran and Riyadh have never actually
declared war on each other. Instead, they fight indirectly by supporting opposing sides in other
countries and stirring up the conflict, resulting in a proxy war that devastated regional security.
Countries, especially the poor ones, cannot function well if larger countries pull strings within

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their borders. In strategic, military, and security studies, Proxy war involves more than two state
and non-state actors in an armed conflict in a country. Proxy wars have a higher complexity level
than conventional wars due to the invisible but profound involvement of third parties. A proxy
war is even considered a new strategy for superpowers to influence and dominate without
receiving international condemnation or sanctions from the United Nations. If seen from the
many cases of proxy wars, the war represents the interests of the actors or third parties involved
rather than the interests of the conflicting combatants. Complexity in proxy wars can lead to
more extended armed conflicts. This is due to the prolonged uncertainty and instability in a
conflict-affected region. As a result, the region will experience much destruction or a situation
that is much more difficult to resolve completely. Proxy wars in the Middle East are a way to
support efforts to create an arms market for the third countries involved. Their involvement can
take the form of sending financial aid and weapons as well as deep intelligence operations
involved in the fighting. In general, Arab and Iranian relations can be analyzed from the
perspective of neo-realism with the assistance of three levels of analysis in its classification
which refer to the individual, the nation-state, and the international system.
Systemic Level
According to the neorealism perspective, at this level, the state will act under systemic
pressure within the international system. As explained earlier, the neorealist view is that states
interact under the pressure of an anarchic international system. Therefore, balance of power,
survival, security, and material capability are critical aspects in this context. At the systematic
level, patterns of state behavior can be seen in the form of alliances, power distribution,
international rule-making, and intergovernmental organizations. In the case of Iran and Saudi
Arabia, most of the proxy wars involving them in the Middle East are due to the polarity and
division of power in the international system. Superpowers like the US and Russia do this. The
pattern is clear America will be on the side of Saudi Arabia, and Russia will be on the side of
Iran. According to neorealists, this behavior is natural due to each bloc's common interests or
goals. Another reason is the security dilemma. The opposition fears Iran's emergence as a new
significant power in the Middle East as it threatens the status quo. The proxy war in Iraq was an
example. In these circumstances, especially after the fall of Saddam Hussain, Iran started to
support the Shiite insurgent group. This is the thing that cannot be done when Saddam is still in
power. The Iranian influence in Iraq was perceived as a threat to Saudi Arabia. However, they

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could not do much because they did not want to undermine its relations with the United States.
Therefore, the primary outcome is evident that Iran enjoys a significant share in the Iranian
domestic level of foreign policy making. From this, we can understand that the American and
Saudi response by allying is an effort to prevent Iran from gaining more power. This is because if
so, the international order, as believed by neorealists, will be destroyed or not reach equilibrium
due to power imbalance. Unfortunately, at this level, we do not know enough about the proxy
war case involving Iran and the Arabs. This is because, at this level, we only focus on the big
picture on the international stage.
Nation-state level
This level emphasizes the national interest, domestic and foreign policies, government
structure, and political system of a state. According to neorealism, structural factors are crucial in
determining the scope of a country's foreign policy behavior in the international system. When
analyzing the behavior of Iran and Saudi Arabia, the structural level has significant explanatory
power. When it comes to foreign policy, it is clear that these two countries are different. As a
country that opposes the status quo, it will undoubtedly reject America's presence in its territory,
unlike Saudi Arabia, whose foreign policy supports the interests of the American state.
Furthermore, to get a complete picture of the two countries' foreign policy behavior, we must
assess the relevant variable at the state level, state identity.
The conflict between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran necessitates an
understanding of state identity, including Shia Islam. Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, which
overthrew the US-backed secular Shah and replaced him with a clerical regime, Iranian identity
has been an essential part of Iranian identity. Saudi Arabia follows Wahhabism, an
ultraconservative Sunni Islamic doctrine, and has formed alliances in the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) with other Sunni Arab states in the Gulf region. The fear that Iran was attempting
to export its revolutionary ideas and mobilize Shiite forces in the Arab world has guided the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's regional policy.
Individual Level
According to neorealists, state leaders' perceptions should be used to understand state
behavior in the international system. As a result, we must understand how Iranian and Saudi
leaders perceive and interpret systemic pressures before acting on them. This is an important
consideration when evaluating the KSA's foreign policy. Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi

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crown prince who now de facto runs the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy, has
concentrated significant power in his own hands. He has, however, chosen a series of foreign
policy moves that many believe are ineffective and demonstrate his recklessness. These include
the Saudi-led coalition offensive in Yemen, the failed attempt to depose Lebanon's Prime
Minister Hariri, and the GCC blockade of Qatar. In Yemen, the coalition campaign has
transformed what was once a little Iranian foothold into a more robust strategic alliance with the
Houthis, resulting in a wider spread of Iranian-backed proxies. These actions can be attributed to
the coalition's carelessness and miscalculation of the Iranian threat. These examples demonstrate
how influential a country's leader's ideas and perceptions are in determining a country's foreign
policy. It is doubtful that the KSA will pursue the same foreign policy under a different Saudi
leader.
President Rouhani and Ayatollah Khamenei have opposing views on how Iran's foreign
policy should be carried out. It is critical to comprehend this duality in Iran's foreign policy
decision-making process, as well as how the opposing ideas of the two key decision-makers
clash. Rouhani is widely regarded as a pragmatic reformer who emphasizes (at least to some
extent) dialogue-oriented foreign policy ideas. In contrast, supreme leader Khamenei has
traditionally maintained a more hostile discourse and openly contrasts Islam and the West.
Khamenei has publicly threatened Saudi rulers for allying with the US, pursuing a more
aggressive foreign policy, and renewing nuclear ambitions. The Ayatollah's vision of an
independent and strong Iran has suppressed Rouhani's ideas of restoring Iran's international
respectability and attracting foreign investment. Realists might question whether Iran's
aggressive regional foreign policy is rational, beneficial, and compatible with systemic pressures.
In short, Ayatollah Khamenei's revisionist ideas have resulted in policy responses that may be at
odds with systemic imperatives and unfavorable to Iran in the long run (Lobell et al., 2016). This
is an excellent example of how key decision-makers' ideas can lead to foreign policies that are
only sometimes entirely rational due to systemic pressures.

Impact on Regional Security

The dynamic relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which has yet to find a bright
spot, will directly impact the Middle East region's security. The escalation of tensions between
these two major powers and their involvement in proxy wars has exacerbated the region's

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situation. Interventions from outside parties, such as the United States, Russia, and even the
United Nations, cannot end the Middle Eastern civil wars. Yemen's proxy war is a prime
example.
Yemen had always been under Saudi influence before the 2014 uprising. After 2011,
when Yemen was on the verge of a political crisis, Iran and Saudi Arabia escalated their proxy
war in Yemen. Protests on the streets destabilized President Saleh's government, resulting in his
resignation and power transfer to Abd. Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. In contrast to Ali Abdullah Saleh,
Mansur Hadi was pro-Arab and anti-Houthi, giving Iran another opportunity to continue its
support for the Houthis against Hadi's government. Empowering the Houthi rebel group has
always posed a security risk to Saudi Arabia, as the Houthis are a Shia group backed by Iran and
popular among Yemenis. Unlike the Saudis, Iran has always supported the Houthi movement,
even providing financial and military aid in their fight against the Yemeni government. Iran
believes that the Houthis are the legitimate owners of Yemen. Relations between Iran and Saudi
Arabia were strained when the Houthis invaded Yemen's capital, Sana'a, in September 2014 and
declared a takeover of the entire country, followed by a coup. Saudi Arabia saw it as a
provocative action that jeopardized their security. In response, Saudi Arabia formed a coalition
with nearly 39 member countries. They sent soldiers, while others offered logistical and financial
assistance, planes, and ships. They attacked Houthi targets with airstrikes in Yemeni areas where
the Houthis are based. The Houthis attacked Saudi checkpoints and killed Saudi border security
officers in response. The poor local population has suffered dramatically due to this proxy
conflict, which will worsen as Yemen's power struggle continues. This, of course, can have a
domino effect means that it affects not only the military sector of a state but also the politics,
economy, environment, and human security.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the major Middle Eastern powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, significantly
impact regional stability and security. Their involvement in proxy wars is not a solution but a
disaster and a nightmare for the people of the Middle East. The rivalry is not solely due to Sunni
or Shia competition. The intertwining of political, economic, and geostrategic interests is a
triggering factor that worsens the situation. But one thing is certain, the conflict became a
humanitarian tragedy when hundreds of thousands of people died as a result of the conflict and
millions of others became refugees. The region, rich in oil resources, may need to fully realize

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that they have been exploited and become a swamp for global elites and Western countries to
carry out their business interests. The author believes that the Middle East's future will be dark if
there is a conflict of interests and influence from third parties.

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