MODULE 2-A-2.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

46) TUA VS. MANGROBANG (G.R. NO. 170701, JANUARY 22, 2014)

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Decision dated October
28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 89939.

On May 20, 2005, respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua (respondent) filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite a Verified Petition for herself and in behalf of her minor children,
Joshua Raphael, Jesse Ruth Lois, and J ezreel Abigail, for the issuance of a protection order,
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act
of 2004, against her husband, petitioner Ralph Tua. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
0464-05 and raffled-off to Branch 22. Respondent claimed that she and her children had
suffered from petitioner’s abusive conduct; that petitioner had threatened to cause her and the
children physical harm for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; that she was
actually deprived of custody and access to her minor children; and, that she was threatened to
be deprived of her and her children’s financial support.

Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10, 1998 in Makati City. They have three
children, namely, Joshua Raphael born on February 9, 1999, Jesse Ruth Lois, born on June 27,
2000, and Jezreel Abigail, born on December 25, 2001. In her Affidavit attached to the petition,
respondent claimed, among others, that: there was a time when petitioner went to her room and
cocked his gun and pointed the barrel of his gun to his head as he wanted to convince her not to
proceed with the legal separation case she filed; she hid her fears although she was scared;
there was also an instance when petitioner fed her children with the fried chicken that her
youngest daughter had chewed and spat out; in order to stop his child from crying, petitioner
would threaten him with a belt; when she told petitioner that she felt unsafe and insecure with
the latter's presence and asked him to stop coming to the house as often as he wanted or she
would apply for a protection order, petitioner got furious and threatened her of withholding his
financial support and even held her by the nape and pushed her to lie flat on the bed; and, on
May 4, 2005, while she was at work, petitioner with companions went to her new home and
forcibly took the children and refused to give them back to her.

On May 23, 2005, the RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), which we quote in full:

Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women
and their Children Act of 2004, a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) effective for thirty (30) days
from date of receipt is hereby issued against respondent Ralph P. Tua.
For the purpose of the implementation of the Temporary Protection Order, the respondent
(herein petitioner Ralph) is hereby ordered to:

1. Enjoin from committing and threatening to commit personally or through another, physical,
verbal and emotional harm or abuse against the herein petitioner (respondent) and other family
and household members;

2. Restrain from harassing, annoying, texting, telephoning, contacting or otherwise

communicating with the petitioner (respondent) whether directly or indirectly or engaged in any
psychological form of harassment;

VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.

The Sheriff of this Court, the PNP Imus, Cavite, or any Officers of the Law are hereby
commanded to effect this Order immediately and to use necessary force and measures under
the law to implement this Order.

Let the hearing for Permanent Protection Order be set on June 9, 2005 at 2:00 o’clock in the
afternoon.

SO ORDERED.

In his Comment to respondent's Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO, petitioner denied
respondent’s allegations and alleged, among others, that he had been maintaining a separate
abode from petitioner since November 2004; that it was respondent who verbally abused and
threatened him whenever their children's stay with him was extended; that respondent had been
staying with a certain Rebendor Zuñiga despite the impropriety and moral implications of such
set-up; that despite their written agreement that their minor children should stay in their conjugal
home, the latter violated the same when she surreptitiously moved out of their conjugal dwelling
with their minor children and stayed with said Zuñiga; and, that respondent is mentally,
psychologically, spiritually and morally unfit to keep the children in her custody. Petitioner
contended that the issuance of the TPO on May 23, 2005 is unconstitutional for being violative
of the due process clause of the Constitution.

Without awaiting for the resolution of his Comment on the petition and motion to lift TPO,
petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and hold
departure order assailing the May 23, 2005 TPO issued by the RTC.

On June 9, 2005, the CA, in order not to render the petition moot and to avoid grave and
irreparable injury, issued a temporary restraining order to temporarily enjoin the parties and their
agents from enforcing the assailed May 23, 2005 TPO issued in Civil Case No. 0464-05.

Petitioner later filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with
Manifestation, praying that the enforcement of all orders, decision to be issued by the RTC and
all the proceedings therein be restrained. A hearing was, subsequently, conducted on the
motion.
On October 28, 2005, the CA issued its assailed decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Temporary Protection Order dated May 23, 2002 (sic) issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22 in Civil Case No. 0464-05 is UPHELD.

In so ruling, the CA found that the petition filed by respondent under RA 9262 is still pending
before the RTC; thus, the factual matters raised therein could not be passed upon in the petition
for certiorari filed with it. The CA noted that during the pendency of the herein proceedings,
petitioner filed an urgent motion to quash warrant issued by the RTC and which matter could not
also be a subject of this petition which assails the TPO dated May 23, 2005 and that the motion
to quash should have been filed with the RTC.

The CA found that the TPO dated May 23, 2005 was validly issued by the RTC and found no
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance thereof as the same were in complete accord with the
provision of RA 9262.

As to petitioner's argument that there was no basis for the issuance of the TPO, considering that
the provision authorizing such issuance is unconstitutional, the CA ruled that since the matter
raised herein was the RTC’s alleged grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO, such matter
could be resolved without having to rule on the constitutionality of RA 9262 and its provisions.
And that the requisites that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of the
case was absent.

Dissatisfied, petitioner files the instant petition raising the following issues:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WITH DUE RESPECT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

HOLDING AND FINDING IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED RULES AND
JURISPRUDENCE THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED NO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN THE LATTER ISSUED THE TEMPORARY PROTECTIVE ORDER (TPO)
DATED 23 MAY 2005 WITHOUT OBSERVING DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND
CONSIDERATIONS OF JUSTICE AND BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN REFUSING TO RULE ON THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROVISIONS OF RA 9262 HAS DECIDED THE CASE IN A
MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH ESTABLISHED LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE
CONSIDERING THAT CONTRARY TO ITS FINDINGS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
SAID LAW IS THE LIS MOTA OF THE CASE.

Petitioner claims that contrary to the stance of the CA in not deciding the issue of the
constitutionality of RA 9262, the issue presented is the very lis mota in the instant case.

The issue of constitutionality of RA 9262 was raised by petitioner in his Comment to

respondent's Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO dated May 23, 2005 filed with the RTC.
However, without awaiting for the resolution of the same, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA assailing the TPO issued for violating the due process clause of the Constitution.
Contrary to the CA's finding that the matter raised in the petition filed with it was the RTC’s
alleged grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO which could be resolved without having to
rule on the constitutionality of RA 9262 and its provisions, we find that since petitioner is
assailing the validity of RA 9262 wherein respondent's right to a protection order is based upon,
the constitutionality of the said law must first be decided upon. After all, the alleged
unconstitutionality of RA 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance
of a protection order. Notwithstanding, however, we still find no merit to declare RA 9262
unconstitutional.

Petitioner particularly directs his constitutional attack on Section 15 of RA 9262 contending that
had there been no ex parte issuance of the TPO, he would have been afforded due process of
law and had properly presented his side on the matter; that the questioned provision simply
encourages arbitrary enforcement repulsive to basic constitutional rights which affects his life,
liberty and property.

We are not impressed.

Section 15 of RA 9262 provides:

SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. – Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to
the protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte
determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of
the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall
schedule a hearing on the issuance of a [Permanent Protection Order] PPO prior to or on the
date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal service of the
TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement
agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of
the issuance of a PPO.
In Garcia v. Drilon, wherein petitioner therein argued that Section 15 of RA 9262 is a violation of
the due process clause of the Constitution, we struck down the challenge and held:

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is
to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life
and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.

The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party
is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This
serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any
designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It
also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from
violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein.
Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," the court
is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life,
limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the
order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to
prevent such violence, which is about to recur.

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order.
The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her
witnesses' affidavits to the petition.

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have
suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice
and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that
notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5)
days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be
served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for
thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and
service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within
five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits
shall likewise be indicated on the notice.

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied
by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection
order should not be issued.

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. x x x.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process.

Petitioner also assails that there is an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and to
barangay officials to issue protection orders.

Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the Congress shall have the
power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof."
Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency
of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the
issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies
or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or
the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.

As to the issuance of protection order by the Punong Barangay, Section 14 pertinently provides:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection
Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the
perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong
Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant
on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong
Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon
by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order
must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay
was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15)
days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay
Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay
official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the
Punong Barangay.

Hence, the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available
Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to
the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm.

Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his
duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain
public order in the barangay."

Petitioner assails that the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the TPO dated May 23, 2005 as the petition was bereft of any indication of
grounds for the issuance of the same. Petitioner claims that while the issuance of the TPO is ex
parte, there must be a judicial determination of the basis thereof. He contends that the
allegations in respondent's affidavit attached to the petition, and without admitting the same to
be true, are nothing more than normal or usual quarrels between a husband and wife which are
not grave or imminent enough to merit the issuance of a TPO.

We are not persuaded.

We quote again Section 15 of RA 9262 for ready reference, thus:

SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. – Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to
the protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte
determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of
the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall
schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the
TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the
court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO
shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.

Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the application after ex
parte determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the
respondent need not be notified or be present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus,
it is within the court’s discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to
determine that the violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO have
been committed.

And Section 5 of the same law provides:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;

(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/his
family;

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due
her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity or controlling the victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or
common money, or properties;

(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her
actions or decisions;

(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity
which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation
directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that
alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This
shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against
her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the
woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.

In this case, the alleged acts of petitioner among others, i.e., he cocked the gun and pointed the
same to his head in order to convince respondent not to proceed with the legal separation case;
feeding his other children with the food which another child spat out; and threatening the crying
child with a belt to stop him from crying which was repeatedly done; and holding respondent by
her nape when he got furious that she was asking him not to come often to their conjugal home
and hold office thereat after their agreed separation and threatening her of withholding half of
the financial support for the kids, while not conclusive, are enough bases for the issuance of a
TPO. Petitioner's actions would fall under the enumeration of Section 5, more particularly,
paragraphs a, d, e (2), f, h, and i.

It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion when there is a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it
must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.18 We find that the CA did
not err when it found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in the issuance of the
TPO.

The factual matters herein raised by petitioner should be presented during the hearing on the
merits on the issuance of the Permanent Protection Order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 28, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 89939, upholding the Regional Trial Court's issuance of the
Temporary Protection Order dated May 23, 2005, is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of

Imus, Cavite is hereby ORDERED to resolve with dispatch respondent's Petition for a
Permanent Protection Order.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice
47) ESTRADA VS. OMBUDSMAN (G.R. NO. 212140, JANUARY 21, 2015)

FACTS:

Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2)
criminal complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents
in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March
2014.

On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-
Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the
“Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to
examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’
(Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’
(Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”

The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present
certiorari case.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law

HELD:

NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.

First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies
of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.

The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as well as Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman, for ready reference.

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents violates his constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to
specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a
preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of
his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports
Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is
for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting
affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the
respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses] have
been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the
affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there is still no counter-
affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-
affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No
grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27
March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.

Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the
determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and
should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial
and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the
right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of
a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining

whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation
is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission
of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of
such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state
prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of petitioner’s
involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence
presented and the facts obtaining therein.

Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and
control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary
investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict
application of the evidentiary rules.

Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in

administrative proceedings as laid down in the landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of
evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed in a
preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima
facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial
evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or
‘less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States, from where we
borrowed the concept of probable cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is
accordingly correlative to what must be proved.
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause
in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not
finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where
rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which
cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as
substantial evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial
basis can include hearsay evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required in determining
probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt.

Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with copies
of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents whom he specifically named, as well as the
counter-affidavits of some of other co-respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint Order, the
Ombudsman even held in abeyance the disposition of the motions for reconsideration because
the Ombudsman granted Sen. Estrada five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint Order to
formally respond to the claims made by his co-respondents. The Ombudsman faithfully
complied with the existing Rules on preliminary investigation and even accommodated Sen.
Estrada beyond what the Rules required. Thus, the Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave
abuse of discretion. Since this is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, the Petition fails in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.

The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are
not applicable to preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to
mere statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary investigations without running afoul of the
constitutional requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS.
The present procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply and were never intended to
comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with
finality rights and obligations of parties, while administrative investigations governed by Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial
evidence for a decision against the respondent in the administrative case.In preliminary
investigations, only likelihood or probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang Tibay, as amplified
in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required to establish
probable cause. The respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified
in GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. In
preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such rights.

Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing officer
must be impartial and cannot be the fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same
time. In preliminary investigations, the same public officer may be the investigator and hearing
officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and hearing officer may be under the
control and supervision of the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or Secretary of Justice.
This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, does not apply to preliminary investigations.
To now declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental and
essential requirements in preliminary investigations will render all past and present preliminary
investigations invalid for violation of constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for
reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all courts throughout the country. No
preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law designates a public officer, outside of the
prosecution service, to determine probable cause. Moreover, those serving sentences by final
judgment would have to be released from prison because their conviction violated constitutional
due process.

Thus, petition dismissed for being premature and it constitutes forum shopping.

48) DIONA VS. BALANGUE (G.R. NO. 173559, JANUARY 7, 2013)

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The great of a relief neither sought by the party in whose favor it was given not supported by the
evidence presented violates the opposing party’s right to due process and may be declared void
ab initio in a proper proceeding.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the November 24, 2005 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) issued in G.R. SP No. 85541 which granted the Petition for Annulment of
Judgment filed by the respondents seeking to nullify that portion of the October 17, 2000
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, Valenzuela City awarding petitioner 5%
monthly interest rate for the principal amount of the loan respondent obtained from her.

This Petition likewise assails the CA’s June 26, 2006 Resolution5 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.

Factual Antecedents

The facts of this case are simple and undisputed.

On March 2, 1991, respondents obtained a loan of ₱45,000.00 from petitioner payable in six
months and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-square meter property located in
Marulas, Valenzuela and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-12296. When the
debt became due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Thus, on September 17,
1999, petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint praying that respondents be ordered:

(a) To pay petitioner the principal obligation of ₱45,000.00, with interest thereon at the rate of
12% per annum, from 02 March 1991 until the full obligation is paid.

(b) To pay petitioner actual damages as may be proven during the trial but shall in no case be
less than ₱10,000.00; ₱25,000.00 by way of attorney’s fee, plus ₱2,000.00 per hearing as
appearance fee.
(c) To issue a decree of foreclosure for the sale at public auction of the aforementioned parcel
of land, and for the disposition of the proceeds thereof in accordance with law, upon failure of
the respondents to fully pay petitioner within the period set by law the sums set forth in this
complaint.

(d) Costs of this suit.

Other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.
(Emphasis supplied)

Respondents were served with summons thru respondent Sonny A. Balangue (Sonny). On
October 15, 1999, with the assistance of Atty. Arthur C. Coroza (Atty. Coroza) of the Public
Attorney’s Office, they filed a Motion to Extend Period to Answer. Despite the requested
extension, however, respondents failed to file any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon motion of
the petitioner, the RTC declared them in default and allowed petitioner to present her evidence
ex parte.

Ruling of the RTC sought to be annulled.

In a Decision dated October 17, 2000, the RTC granted petitioner’s Complaint. The dispositive
portion of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, ordering the respondents
to pay the petitioner as follows:

a) the sum of FORTY FIVE THOUSAND (₱45,000.00) PESOS, representing the unpaid
principal loan obligation plus interest at 5% per month [sic] reckoned from March 2, 1991, until
the same is fully paid;

b) ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus cost of suit;

c) in the event the [respondents] fail to satisfy the aforesaid obligation, an order of foreclosure
shall be issued accordingly for the sale at public auction of the subject property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-12296 and the improvements thereon for the satisfaction of
the petitioner’s claim.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, alleging that respondents did not interpose
a timely appeal despite receipt by their former counsel of the RTC’s Decision on November 13,
2000. Before it could be resolved, however, respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment
dated January 26, 2001, claiming that not all of them were duly served with summons.
According to the other respondents, they had no knowledge of the case because their co-
respondent Sonny did not inform them about it. They prayed that the RTC’s October 17, 2000
Decision be set aside and a new trial be conducted.

But on March 16, 2001, the RTC ordered15 the issuance of a Writ of Execution to implement its
October 17, 2000 Decision. However, since the writ could not be satisfied, petitioner moved for
the public auction of the mortgaged property, which the RTC granted. In an auction sale
conducted on November 7, 2001, petitioner was the only bidder in the amount of ₱420,000.00.
Thus, a Certificate of Sale was issued in her favor and accordingly annotated at the back of TCT
No. V-12296.

Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale
dated December 17, 2001, claiming that the parties did not agree in writing on any rate of
interest and that petitioner merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her Complaint.
Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60% per annum) from March 2, 1991
until full payment. Resultantly, their indebtedness inclusive of the exorbitant interest from March
2, 1991 to May 22, 2001 ballooned from ₱124,400.00 to ₱652,000.00.

In an Order dated May 7, 2002, the RTC granted respondents’ motion and accordingly modified
the interest rate awarded from 5% monthly to 12% per annum. Then on August 2, 2002,
respondents filed a Motion for Leave To Deposit/Consign Judgment Obligation in the total
amount of ₱126,650.00.

Displeased with the RTC’s May 7, 2002 Order, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On August 5, 2003, the CA rendered
a Decision declaring that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the 5% monthly interest
but at the same time pronouncing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in subsequently
reducing the rate of interest to 12% per annum. In so ruling, the CA ratiocinated:

Indeed, We are convinced that the Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it granted 5%
monthly interest instead of the 12% per annum prayed for in the complaint. However, the proper
remedy is not to amend the judgment but to declare that portion as a nullity. Void judgment for
want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of
any obligation (Leonor vs. CA, 256 SCRA 69). No legal rights can emanate from a resolution
that is null and void (Fortich vs. Corona, 312 SCRA 751).

From the foregoing, the remedy of the respondents is to have the Court declare the portion of
the judgment providing for a higher interest than that prayed for as null and void for want of or in
excess of jurisdiction. A void judgment never acquire[s] finality and any action to declare its
nullity does not prescribe (Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez vs. CA, 255 SCRA 672).

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition having merit, is hereby GIVEN DUE
COURSE. Resultantly, the challenged May 7, 2002 and September 5, 2000 orders of Public
Respondent Court are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. No costs.

SO ORDERED. (Emphases in the original; italics supplied.)

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

Taking their cue from the Decision of the CA in the special civil action for certiorari, respondents
filed with the same court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Execution Sale with
Damages. They contended that the portion of the RTC Decision granting petitioner 5% monthly
interest rate is in gross violation of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and of their right
to due process. According to respondents, the loan did not carry any interest as it was the
verbal agreement of the parties that in lieu thereof petitioner’s family can continue occupying
respondents’ residential building located in Marulas, Valenzuela for free until said loan is fully
paid.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Initially, the CA denied due course to the Petition. Upon respondents’ motion, however, it
reinstated and granted the Petition. In setting aside portions of the RTC’s October 17, 2000
Decision, the CA ruled that aside from being unconscionably excessive, the monthly interest
rate of 5% was not agreed upon by the parties and that petitioner’s Complaint clearly sought
only the legal rate of 12% per annum. Following the mandate of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court, the CA concluded that the awarded rate of interest is void for being in excess of
the relief sought in the Complaint. It ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, respondents’ motion for reconsideration is GRANTED and our resolution dated
October 13, 2004 is, accordingly, REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is
entered ordering the ANNULMENT OF:

(a) public respondent’s impugned October 17, 2000 judgment, insofar as it awarded 5% monthly
interest in favor of petitioner; and

(b) all proceedings relative to the sale at public auction of the property titled in respondents’
names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-12296 of the Valenzuela registry.

The judgment debt adjudicated in public respondent’s impugned October 17, 2000 judgment is,
likewise, ordered RECOMPUTED at the rate of 12% per annum from March 2, 1991. No costs.

SO ORDERED. (Emphases in the original.)

Petitioner sought reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its June 26, 2006 Resolution.

Issues

Hence, this Petition anchored on the following grounds:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR

OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
JUDGMENT AS A SUBSTITUTE OR ALTERNATIVE REMEDY OF A LOST APPEAL.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR
AND MISAPPREHENSION OF LAW AND THE FACTS WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS’
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF VALENZUELA, BRANCH 75 DATED OCTOBER 17, 2000 IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 241-V-99, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID DECISION HAS BECOME FINAL AND
ALREADY EXECUTED CONTRARY TO THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT.

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner claims that the CA erred in partially annulling the RTC’s October 17, 2000 Decision.
She contends that a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be availed of only when the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the claimant. In the present case, however, respondents had
all the opportunity to question the October 17, 2000 Decision of the RTC, but because of their
own inaction or negligence they failed to avail of the remedies sanctioned by the rules. Instead,
they contented themselves with the filing of a Motion to Set Aside Judgment and then a Motion
to Correct/Amend Judgment and to Set Aside Execution Sale.

Petitioner likewise argues that for a Rule 47 petition to prosper, the same must either be based
on extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. However, the allegations in respondents’ Rule 47
petition do not constitute extrinsic fraud because they simply pass the blame to the negligence
of their former counsel. In addition, it is too late for respondents to pass the buck to their
erstwhile counsel considering that when they filed their Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and
To Set Aside Execution Sale they were already assisted by their new lawyer, Atty. Reynaldo A.
Ruiz, who did not also avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal, etc. As to the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, petitioner posits that there is no reason to doubt that the RTC had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case and over the persons of the respondents.

While conceding that the RTC patently made a mistake in awarding 5% monthly interest,
petitioner nonetheless invokes the doctrine of immutability of final judgment and contends that
the RTC Decision can no longer be corrected or modified since it had long become final and
executory. She likewise points out that respondents received a copy of said Decision on
November 13, 2000 but did nothing to correct the same. They did not even question the award
of 5% monthly interest when they filed their Motion to Set Aside Judgment which they anchored
on the sole ground of the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the persons of some of the
respondents.

Respondents’ Arguments

Respondents do not contest the existence of their obligation and the principal amount thereof.
They only seek quittance from the 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum imposed by the RTC.
Respondents contend that Section (3)d of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is clear that when the
defendant is declared in default, the court cannot grant a relief more than what is being prayed
for in the Complaint. A judgment which transgresses said rule, according to the respondents, is
void for having been issued without jurisdiction and for being violative of due process of law.

Respondents maintain that it was through no fault of their own, but through the gross negligence
of their former counsel, Atty. Coroza, that the remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief
from judgment were lost. They allege that after filing a Motion to Extend Period to Answer, Atty.
Coroza did not file any pleading resulting to their being declared in default. While the said
lawyer filed on their behalf a Motion to Set Aside Judgment dated January 26, 2001, he
however took no steps to appeal from the Decision of the RTC, thereby allowing said judgment
to lapse into finality. Citing Legarda v. Court of Appeals, respondents aver that clients are not
always bound by the actions of their counsel, as in the present case where the clients are to
lose their property due to the gross negligence of their counsel.

With regard to petitioner’s invocation of immutability of judgment, respondents argue that said
doctrine applies only to valid and not to void judgments.

Our Ruling

The petition must fail.

We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to due
process and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

Annulment of judgment under Rule 47; an exception to the final judgment rule; grounds therefor.

A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted
only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail
of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies.
Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost
due to the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the same. "The underlying reason is
traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of
judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause
involved therein should be laid to rest."

While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may
be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence
recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court
of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if,
upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without
jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.

Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum interest sought in the
Complaint and smacks of violation of due process.

It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what
is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the
evidence presented in support thereof. Due process considerations require that judgments must
conform to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court. In Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, this Court expounded that:

Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which
exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing
party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of
the requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to
prevent surprise to the defendant.

Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant
who was declared in default than of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance,
amendment to conform to the evidence presented during trial is allowed the parties under the
Rules. But the same is not feasible when the defendant is declared in default because Section
3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits the relief that may be granted by
the courts to what has been prayed for in the Complaint. It provides:

(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. – A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not
exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.

The raison d’être in limiting the extent of relief that may be granted is that it cannot be presumed
that the defendant would not file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in default had he
known that the plaintiff will be accorded a relief greater than or different in kind from that sought
in the Complaint. No doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to
safeguard defendant’s right to due process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment.
This, to the mind of this Court, is akin to the very essence of due process. It embodies "the
sporting idea of fair play" and forbids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant was not
given the opportunity to be heard thereon.

In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported both by the
allegations in the pleadings and the evidence on record. The Real Estate Mortgage executed by
the parties does not include any provision on interest. When petitioner filed her Complaint
before the RTC, she alleged that respondents borrowed from her "the sum of FORTY-FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (₱45,000.00), with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum" and
sought payment thereof. She did not allege or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither
did she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly, the RTC’s award of 5% monthly interest
or 60% per annum lacks basis and disregards due process. It violated the due process
requirement because respondents were not informed of the possibility that the RTC may award
5% monthly interest. They were deprived of reasonable opportunity to refute and present
controverting evidence as they were made to believe that the complainant petitioner was
seeking for what she merely stated in her Complaint.

Neither can the grant of the 5% monthly interest be considered subsumed by petitioner’s
general prayer for "other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises x x x." To
repeat, the court’s grant of relief is limited only to what has been prayed for in the Complaint or
related thereto, supported by evidence, and covered by the party’s cause of action. Besides,
even assuming that the awarded 5% monthly or 60% per annum interest was properly alleged
and proven during trial, the same remains unconscionably excessive and ought to be equitably
reduced in accordance with applicable jurisprudence. In Bulos, Jr. v. Yasuma, this Court held:

In the case of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, citing the cases of Medel v. Court of Appeals, Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, Spouses Bautista v. Pilar Development Corporation and the recent case of
Spouses Solangon v. Salazar, this Court considered the 3% interest per month or 36% interest
per annum as excessive and unconscionable. Thereby, the Court, in the said case, equitably
reduced the rate of interest to 1% interest per month or 12% interest per annum. (Citations
omitted)

It is understandable for the respondents not to contest the default order for, as alleged in their
Comment, "it is not their intention to impugn or run away from their just and valid obligation."
Nonetheless, their waiver to present evidence should never be construed as waiver to contest
patently erroneous award which already transgresses their right to due process, as well as
applicable jurisprudence.

Respondents’ former counsel was grossly negligent in handling the case of his clients;
respondents did not lose ordinary remedies of new trial, petition for relief, etc. through their own
fault.

Ordinarily, the mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds the client. This is
based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied
authority is regarded as an act of his client. A recognized exception to the rule is when the
lawyers were grossly negligent in their duty to maintain their client’s cause and such amounted
to a deprivation of their client’s property without due process of law. In which case, the courts
must step in and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby.

The manifest indifference of respondents’ former counsel in handling the cause of his client was
already present even from the beginning. It should be recalled that after filing in behalf of his
clients a Motion to Extend Period to Answer, said counsel allowed the requested extension to
pass without filing an Answer, which resulted to respondents being declared in default. His
negligence was aggravated by the fact that he did not question the awarded 5% monthly
interest despite receipt of the RTC Decision on November 13, 2000. A simple reading of the
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision readily reveals that it awarded exorbitant and
unconscionable rate of interest. Its difference from what is being prayed for by the petitioner in
her Complaint is so blatant and very patent. It also defies elementary jurisprudence on legal rate
of interests. Had the counsel carefully read the judgment it would have caught his attention and
compelled him to take the necessary steps to protect the interest of his client. But he did not.
Instead, he filed in behalf of his clients a Motion to Set Aside Judgment dated January 26, 2001
based on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction, oblivious to the fact that the erroneous award of
5% monthly interest would result to his clients’ deprivation of property without due process of
law. Worse, he even allowed the RTC Decision to become final by not perfecting an appeal.
Neither did he file a petition for relief therefrom. It was only a year later that the patently
erroneous award of 5% monthly interest was brought to the attention of the RTC when
respondents, thru their new counsel, filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set
Aside Execution Sale. Even the RTC candidly admitted that it "made a glaring mistake in
directing the defendants to pay interest on the principal loan at 5% per month which is very
different from what was prayed for by the plaintiff."

"A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that
nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law." Judging
from how respondents’ former counsel handled the cause of his clients, there is no doubt that
he was grossly negligent in protecting their rights, to the extent that they were deprived of their
property without due process of law.

In fine, respondents did not lose the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other
remedies through their own fault. It can only be attributed to the gross negligence of their
erstwhile counsel which prevented them from pursuing such remedies. We cannot also blame
respondents for relying too much on their former counsel. Clients have reasonable expectations
that their lawyer would amply protect their interest during the trial of the case. Here,
"respondents are plain and ordinary people x x x who are totally ignorant of the intricacies and
technicalities of law and legal procedures. Being so, they completely relied upon and trusted
their former counsel to appropriately act as their interest may lawfully warrant and require."

As a final word, it is worth noting that respondents’ principal obligation was only ₱45,000.00.
Due to their former counsel’s gross negligence in handling their cause, coupled with the RTC’s
erroneous, baseless, and illegal award of 5% monthly interest, they now stand to lose their
property and still owe petitioner a large amount of money. As aptly observed by the CA:

x x x If the impugned judgment is not, therefore, rightfully nullified, petitioners will not only end
up losing their property but will additionally owe private respondent the sum of ₱232,000.00 plus
the legal interest said balance had, in the meantime, earned. As a court of justice and equity, we
cannot, in good conscience, allow this unconscionable situation to prevail.

Indeed, this Court is appalled by petitioner’s invocation of the doctrine of immutability of

judgment. Petitioner does not contest as she even admits that the RTC made a glaring mistake
in awarding 5% monthly interest. Amazingly, she wants to benefit from such erroneous award.
This Court cannot allow this injustice to happen.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed November 24, 2005 and
June 26, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85541 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

49) MALIKSI VS.COMELEC (G.R. NO. 203302, APRIL 13, 2013)

FACTS:
 During the 2010 Elections, Saquilayan was proclaimed as winner for the position of Mayor of
Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, brought
an election protest in the RTC in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the
counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes,
and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus
commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office.
Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi's motion for
execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.

The COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots
through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order
dated requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the
decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued another order for Saquilayan to
augment his cash deposit.

The First Division nullified the decision of the RTC and declared Saquilayan as the duly elected
Mayor.

Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due
process because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the
resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been
unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been
preserved.

The COMELEC En Banc denied Maliksi's MR.

Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections to the
decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to him, and to the
use of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount proceedings conducted by the First
Division.

The Supreme Court via petition for certiorari dismissed the same. The Court then pronounced
that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead of
the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot images were not secondary images,
but considered original documents with the same evidentiary value as the official ballots under
the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the First Divisions finding that the ballots and the
ballot boxes had been tampered had been fully established by the large number of cases of
double-shading discovered during the revision.

ISSUE:

Whether the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the instant petition despite a clear violation of
petitioner's constitutional right to due process of law considering that decryption, printing and
examination of the digital images of the ballots were done inconspicuously upon motu propio
directive of the COMELEC First Division sans any notice to the petitioner and for the first time
on appeal.

HELD:

The decision of the court a quo is granted. Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of
Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on Elections, the power of the COMELEC to adopt
procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after
giving to all the parties the opportunity to be heard on their opposing claims. The parties right to
be heard upon adversarial issues and matters is never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be
treated so lightly because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to
the parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc should not have upheld the First
Divisions deviation from the regular procedure in the guise of speedily resolving the election
protest, in view of its failure to provide the parties with notice of its proceedings and an
opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements of due process.

The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the equivalents
of the original official ballots themselves.In Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 199149, January 22, 2013the Court held that "the picture images of
the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise official ballots that faithfully
capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No.
9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out
by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest."

That the two documents the official ballot and its picture image are considered "original
documents" simply means that both of them are given equal probative weight. In short, when
either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as weightier than the other.

But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral
Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the ballots in
the proceedings had before them without notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative
weight accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the
revision of ballots adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be
the primary or best evidence of the voters will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots
are to be used only when it is first shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has
been compromised.

50) RODRIGUEZ AND TULALI VS. JUDGE BLANCAFLOR (G.R. NO. 190171, MARCH 14,
2011
FACTS:

Previously pending before Judge Blancallor was Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson (arson
case), entitled People of the Philippines v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial prosecutor.

During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy involving an alleged
bribery initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancallor under the
payroll of the Office of the Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez), to
assure the acquittal of the accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and the dismissal of the arson case.

On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the arson case,
Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said case to prevent
any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion. He attached to the said manifestation a copy of
the administrative complaint against Awayan filed (but eventually withdrawn) by his superior,
Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of Palawan. On June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor
rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson.

Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Awayan and Rodriguez,
Judge Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard their testimonies. On
July 30, 2009, he issued an order summoning Rodriguez to appear before him for the purpose
of holding an inquiry on matters pertaining to his possible involvement in Tulali's filing of the ex-
parte manifestation and the administrative complaint against Awayan, among others

On August 7, 2009. Rodriguez filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose of Judge
Blancallor's continued inquiries considering that the decision in the arson case had already
been promulgated

After the submission of petitioners respective position papers, Judge Blancallor issued the
assailed October 13, 2009 Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt. The penalty of
indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a fine of P100,000.00 each were imposed
upon them.

Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for contravening their rights to
due process of law. They claim that they were denied their rights to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against them, to confront the witnesses and present their own
evidence. According to petitioners, Judge Blancaflor's disregard of due process constituted
grave abuse of discretion which was further aggravated by the unlawful manner of
simultaneously conducting suspension and contempt proceedings against them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Blancaflor did not observe due process in conducting the suspension and
contempt proceedings against Rodriguez and Tulali

RULING:
Yes, Judge Blancallor did not observe due process in conducting the suspension and contempt
proceedings against Rodriguez and Tulali. It must be emphasized that direct contempt is
adjudged and punished summarily pursuant to Section I, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings
and opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely unnecessary in the same vein, the
petitioners alleged "vilification campaign" against Judge Blancaflor cannot be regarded as direct
contempt.

The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in
judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However, judges are
enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end
in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not
for retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the power to declare a person in
contempt of court must be exercised on the preservative, not the vindictive principle; and on the
corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of punishment.[6] Such power, being drastic and
extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.
[7]

In this case, the Court cannot sustain Judge Blancaflor's order penalizing petitioners for direct
contempt on the basis of Tulali's Ex-Parte Manifestation.

Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or

interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an
affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.[8]

Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Tulali in filing the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be
construed as contumacious within the purview of direct contempt. It must be recalled that the
subject manifestation bore Tulali's voluntary withdrawal from the arson case to dispel any
suspicion of collusion between him and the accused. Its filing on the day before the
promulgation of the decision in the pending criminal case, did not in any way disrupt the
proceedings before the court. Accordingly, he should not be held accountable for his act which
was done in good faith and without malice.

Neither should Rodriguez be liable for direct contempt as he had no knowledge of, or
participation in, the preparation and filing of the subject manifestation. It was signed and filed by
Tulali alone in his capacity as the trial prosecutor in the arson case. The attached complaint
against Awayan was filed with the Office of the Palawan Governor, and not with the RTC.
Apparently, Judge Blancaflor's conclusion, that the subject manifestation containing derogatory
matters was purposely filed to discredit the administration of justice in court, is unfounded and
without basis. There being no factual or legal basis for the charge of direct contempt, it is clear
that Judge Blancaflor gravely abused his discretion in finding petitioners guilty as charged.

51) PITC VS. ANGELES [263 SCRA 421 (1996)]

FACTS:

The Petitioner Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) issued Administrative Order
No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, 1 under which, applications to the PITC for importation from the
People's Republic of China (PROC, for brevity) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed
Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the improper himself or through
a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from
PROC being applied for, or, simply, at one is to one ratio.

Private respondents Remington and Firestone individually applied for authority to import from
PROC with the petitioner. They were granted such authority after satisfying the requirements for
importers, and after they executed respective undertakings. Subsequently, for failing to comply
with their undertakings to submit export credits equivalent to the value of their importations,
further import applications were withheld by petitioner PITC from private respondents, such that
the latter were both barred from importing goods from PROC. As a result, the private
respondents filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against the PITC.

The court ruled that declared the Administrative Order to be null and void, since the same was
not published, contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether the Administrative Order issued by PITC is null and void on the ground that it was not
published in accordance with Article 2 of the New Civil Code.

HELD:

Yes. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the
context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is
otherwise provided. . . .
The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed
their applications for importation, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-
01 were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register,
does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. The Administrative Order under consideration is
one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to
enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation
to LOI 444 and EO 133.

52) EQUITABLE PCI BANKING CORPORATION VS. RCBC CAPITAL CORPORATION (G.R.
NO. 182248, DECEMBER 18, 2008)

FACTS:

Petitioners Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB) and the individual shareholders of Bankard, Inc.,
as sellers, and respondent RCBC Capital Corporation (RCBC), as buyer, executed a Share
Purchase Agreement (SPA) for the purchase of petitioners’ interests in Bankard, representing
226,460,000 shares, for the price of PhP 1,786,769,400. To expedite the purchase, RCBC
agreed to dispense with the conduct of a due diligence audit on the financial status of Bankard.
RCBC deposited the stipulated downpayment amount in an escrow account after which it was
given full management and operational control of Bankard. June 2, 2000 is also considered by
the parties as the Closing Date referred to in the SPA. Sometime in September 2000, RCBC
had Bankard’s accounts audited, creating for the purpose an audit team and the conclusion was
that the warranty, as contained in Section 5(h) of the SPA (simply Sec. 5[h] hereinafter), was
correct. RCBC paid the balance of the contract price. The corresponding deeds of sale for the
shares in question were executed in January 2001. Thereafter RCBC informed petitioners of its
having overpaid the purchase price of the subject shares, claiming that there was an
overstatement of valuation of accounts amounting to PhP 478 million, resulting in the
overpayment of over PhP 616 million. Thus, RCBC claimed that petitioners violated their
warranty, as sellers, embodied in Sec. 5(g) of the SPA (Sec. 5[g] hereinafter). RCBC, in
accordance with Sec. 10 of the SPA, filed a Request for Arbitration dated May 12, 2004 with the
ICC-ICA. In the request, RCBC charged Bankard with deviating from, contravening and not
following generally accepted accounting principles and practices in maintaining their books.
Arbitration in the ICC-ICA proceeded after the formation of the arbitration tribunal consisting of
retired Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, nominated by petitioners; Neil Kaplan, RCBC’s nominee;
and Sir Ian Barker, appointed by the ICC-ICA. After drawn out proceedings with each party
alleging deviation and non-compliance by the other with arbitration rules, the tribunal, with
Justice Kapunan dissenting, rendered a Partial Award. On the matter of prescription, the tribunal
held that RCBC’s claim is not time-barred, the claim properly falling under the contemplation of
Sec. 5(g) and not Sec. 5(h). As such, the tribunal concluded, RCBC’s claim was filed within the
three (3)-year period under Sec. 5(g) and that the six (6)-month period under Sec. 5(h) did not
apply.The tribunal also exonerated RCBC from laches, the latter having sought relief within the
three (3)-year period prescribed in the SPA. Notably, the tribunal considered the rescission of
the SPA and ASPA as impracticable and "totally out of the question." RCBC filed with the RTC
a Motion to Confirm Partial Award. The RTC issued the first assailed order confirming the Partial
Award and denying the adverted separate motions to vacate and to suspend and inhibit. From
this order, petitioners sought reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the RTC .

ISSUE:

WON there is manifest disregard of the law by the ICC-ICA

HELD:

The petition must be denied.

This is a procedural miscue for petitioners who erroneously bypassed the Court of Appeals (CA)
in pursuit of its appeal. While this procedural gaffe has not been raised by RCBC, still we would
be remiss in not pointing out the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC confirming,
vacating, setting aside, modifying, or correcting an arbitral award.

Rule 45 is not the remedy available to petitioners as the proper mode of appeal assailing the
decision of the RTC confirming as arbitral award is an appeal before the CA pursuant to Sec. 46
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, otherwise known as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
2004, or completely, An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution
System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for
other Purposes, promulgated on April 2, 2004 and became effective on April 28, 2004 after its
publication on April 13, 2004.

In Korea Technologies Co., Ltd v. Lerma, we explained, inter alia, that the RTC decision of an
assailed arbitral award is appealable to the CA and may further be appealed to this Court.

It is clear from the factual antecedents that RA 9285 applies to the instant case. This law was
already effective at the time the arbitral proceedings were commenced by RCBC through a
request for arbitration filed before the ICC-ICA on May 12, 2004.

The Court Will Not Overturn an Arbitral Award Unless It Was Made in Manifest Disregard of
the Law Following Asset Privatization Trust vs CA, , errors in law and fact would not generally
justify the reversal of an arbitral award. A party asking for the vacation of an arbitral award must
show that any of the grounds for vacating, rescinding, or modifying an award are present or that
the arbitral award was made in manifest disregard of the law. Otherwise, the Court is duty-
bound to uphold an arbitral award.

The instant petition dwells on the alleged manifest disregard of the law by the ICC-ICA.

The US case of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros expounded on the phrase
"manifest disregard of the law" in the following wise:
 This court has emphasized that manifest disregard of the law is a very narrow
standard of review. Anaconda Co. v. District Lodge No. 27, 693 F.2d 35 (6th Cir.1982). A
mere error in interpretation or application of the law is insufficient. Anaconda, 693 F.2d
at 37-38. Rather, the decision must fly in the face of clearly established legal precedent.
When faced with questions of law, an arbitration panel does not act in manifest disregard
of the law unless (1) the applicable legal principle is clearly defined and not subject to
reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrators refused to heed that legal principle.

Thus, to justify the vacation of an arbitral award on account of "manifest disregard of the law,"
the arbiter’s findings must clearly and unequivocally violate an established legal precedent.
Anything less would not suffice.

A review of petitioners’ arguments would, however, show that their arguments are bereft of
merit. Thus, the Partial Award cannot be vacated.

RCBC’s Claim Is Not Time-Barred

The Court upholds the conclusion of the tribunal and rules that the claim of RCBC under Sec.
5(g) is not time-barred.

Petitioners Were Not Denied Due Process

Petitioners assert that "the arbitrators’ partial award admitted and used the Summaries as
evidence, and held on the basis of the ‘information’ contained in them that petitioners were in
breach of their warranty in GAAP compliance." Petitioners’ position is bereft of merit. The
petitioners afforded the opportunity to refute the summaries and pieces of evidence submitted
by RCBC which became the bases of the experts’ opinion. Petitioners’ right to due process was
not breached.

Sec. 15 of RA 876 or the Arbitration Law provides that:

Section 15. Hearing by arbitrators. – Arbitrators may, at the commencement of

the hearing, ask both parties for brief statements of the issues in controversy and/or an
agreed statement of facts. Thereafter the parties may offer such evidence as they
desire, and shall produce such additional evidence as the arbitrators shall require or
deem necessary to an understanding and determination of the dispute. The arbitrators
shall be the sole judge of the relevancy and materiality of the evidence offered or
produced, and shall not be bound to conform to the Rules of Court pertaining to
evidence. Arbitrators shall receive as exhibits in evidence any document which the
parties may wish to submit and the exhibits shall be properly identified at the time of
submission. All exhibits shall remain in the custody of the Clerk of Court during the
course of the arbitration and shall be returned to the parties at the time the award is
made. The arbitrators may make an ocular inspection of any matter or premises which
are in dispute, but such inspection shall be made only in the presence of all parties to
the arbitration, unless any party who shall have received notice thereof fails to appear, in
which event such inspection shall be made in the absence of such party. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The well-settled rule is that administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers shall not be
fettered by the rigid technicalities of procedure, albeit they are, at all times required, to adhere to
the basic concepts of fair play.

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. x x x

(Emphasis supplied.)

RCBC Is Not Estopped from Questioning the Financial Condition of Bankard

On estoppel, petitioners contend that RCBC is now precluded from denying the fairness and
accuracy of said accounts since it did not seek price reduction under Sec. 5(h). Lastly, they
asseverate that RCBC continued with Bankard’s accounting policies and practices and found
them to conform to the generally accepted accounting principles, contrary to RCBC’s
allegations.

Petitioners’ contention is not meritorious.

The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith, and
justice; and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against one’s own acts, representations, or
commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied on
them.

The elements of estoppel pertaining to the party estopped are:

(1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material

facts, or, at least, which calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise
than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2)
intention, or at least expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by the other
party; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the actual facts.

In the case at bar, the first element of estoppel in relation to the party sought to be estopped is
not present. Petitioners’ position is that "RCBC was aware of the manner in which the Bankard
accounts were recorded, well before it consummated the SPA by taking delivery of the shares
and paying the outstanding 80% balance of the contract price."

The Arbitral Tribunal explained in detail why estoppel is not present in the case at bar. In
summary, the tribunal properly ruled that petitioners failed to prove that the formation of the
Transition Committee and the conduct of the audit by Rubio and Legaspi were admissions or
representations by RCBC that it would not pursue a claim under Sec. 5(g) and that petitioners
relied on such representation to their detriment. The SC agrees with the findings of the tribunal
that estoppel is not present in the situation at bar.

It becomes evident from all of the foregoing findings that the ICC-ICA is not guilty of any
manifest disregard of the law on estoppel. As shown above, the findings of the ICC-ICA in the
Partial Award are well-supported in law and grounded on facts. The Partial Award must be
upheld.
 The member of the three-person arbitration panel was selected by petitioners, while another
was respondent’s choice. The respective interests of the parties, therefore, are very much
safeguarded in the arbitration proceedings. Any suggestion, therefore, on the partiality of the
arbitration tribunal has to be dismissed.

53) REPUBLIC VS. EXTELCOM (G.R. 147096, JANUARY 15, 2002)

FACTS:

Bayantel filed an application with the NTC for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity
(CPCN) to install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service
(CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional Authority (PA). Shortly thereafter the NTC issued directing
all interested applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file their respective applications
before the Commission and prior to the issuance of any notice of hearing by the NTC with
respect to Bayantel’s original application, Bayantel filed an urgent ex-parte motion to admit an
amended application. the notice of hearing issued by the NTC with respect to this amended
application was published in the Manila Chronicle. Copies of the application as well as the
notice of hearing were mailed to all affected parties. Subsequently, hearings were conducted on
the amended application. But before Bayantel could complete the presentation of its evidence,
the NTC grant of two (2) separate Provisional which resulted in the closing out of all available
frequencies for the service being applied for by herein applicant, and in order that this case may
not remain pending for an indefinite period of time, ordered ARCHIVED without prejudice to its
reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes available. NTC issued
Memorandum re-allocating five (5) megahertz (MHz) of the radio frequency spectrum for the
expansion of CMTS networks. Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the
availability of new frequency bands for CMTS operators, the NTC granted BayanTel’s motion to
revive the latter’s application and set the case for hearings. Extelcom filed an Opposition
praying for the dismissal of Bayantel’s application which was denied for lack of merit. Extelcom
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition,which was granted.
Petitioner filed MR but subsequently denied by the CA. Hence, the NTC filed the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the 1993 Revised Rules of the NTC is operative and should be applied to the
Respondent even with the absence of Publication Requirement?

HELD:

No, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those
issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and
implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations
can take effect. The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC fall squarely within the scope
of these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the case Tañada v. Tuvera. which is clear and
categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative
regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can take
effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall take effect only after
their publication in a newspaper of general circulation. In the absence of such publication,
therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs.

54) LOBETE VS. SUNDIAM (123 SCRA 95)

DECISION

DE CASTRO, J.:

For failure of petitioner to perfect his appeal within the reglementary period, the present petition
for certiorari was filed seeking nullification of respondent court’s Order dated December 14,
1973 disapproving the record on appeal as well as the Order dated February 21, 1973
dismissing the complaint for recovery of a sum of money on ground of prescription.

Herein petitioner, Gregorio Lobete, a bona fide USAFFE Veteran of World War II filed a
complaint with the former Court of First Instance of Manila seeking the payment to him by the
Philippine Veterans Administration, of salary differential pursuant to Republic Act No. 65. On
June 30, 1972, the respondent court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Upon a motion
for reconsideration filed by private respondents, respondent court reconsidered and reversed its
decision and dismissed the case. It held that the cause of action over the claim of the petitioner
for his monthly pension of P100.00 from July, 1957 and the additional monthly pension at the
rate of P10.00 for each of his seven unmarried minor children had legally and factually accrued
as of the approval of the last amendment of RA 65 on July 22, 1957; and that it appearing that
this instant action was filed before this Court on December 24, 1971, the ten (10) year period
within which to file an action upon an obligation claimed under the law, pursuant to Article 144 of
the New Civil Code has long prescribed.

On March 29, 1973 petitioner filed a notice of appeal and a record on appeal. Private
respondents filed an opposition to the record on appeal on grounds that it was not afforded at
least five (5) days from receipt within which to oppose the same in accordance with Section 7,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, and that said record on appeal failed to include material parts of a
pleading and orders of the court.
On March 31, 1973 respondent court issued an order approving the record on appeal prompting
private respondents to file a motion for reconsideration. On May 5, 1973 respondent court
reconsidered and set aside its previous order of March 31, 1973 and set the case for hearing on
May 26, 1973. After hearing, the lower court issued an order dated May 26, 1973 requiring
petitioner to amend the record on appeal and to incorporate therein certain pleadings and
orders. Petitioner received the order on May 30, 1973.

On November 14, 1973 or five and a half (51/2) months later, petitioner filed a supplemental
record on appeal to which private respondents filed an opposition. On December 14, 1973,
respondent court, after hearing, disapproved the record on appeal as well as the supplemental
record on appeal for having been filed out of time and for non-compliance with the court’s order.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied, the present case was instituted
claiming that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion:

"1. . . . in giving due course to, instead of denying, respondents’ motion for reconsideration of
the decision in the case in favor of the petitioner, which motion was fatally defective but later
surreptitiously corrected under dubious circumstances;

"2. . . . in reversing its well-reasoned decision of June 20, 1972, and ordering the dismissal of
the case on a different and surprising ground of prescription which issue was never seriously
raised at the start, but as a matter of fact was deemed excluded or waived at the pre-trial;

"3. . . . in disapproving plaintiff-appellant’s record on appeal on ground of sheer form and

technicality at the expense of substantive justice;

"4. . . . in not upholding its decision of June 20, 1972, in the case which is in conformity with law
and the evidence, and in accord with the applicable rulings of the Supreme Court in the similar
veterans cases of Begosa v. PVA, 32 SCRA 466 and Teoxon v. PVA, 33 SCRA 685."

At the outset, it should be underscored that petitioner failed seasonably to perfect his appeal. In
an order dated May 26, 1973, the court a quo required petitioner to amend the record on appeal
which order was received by petitioner on May 30, 1973. No period was set by the lower court
for the submission of an amended record on appeal. However, Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court is explicit on the period within which a party should submit an amended record on
appeal. Thus, said section provides:

". . . If the trial judge orders the amendment of the record, the appellant, within the time limited
in the order, or such extension thereof as may be granted, or if no time is fixed by the order
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, shall redraft the record by including therein, in their
proper chronological sequence, such additional matters as the court may have directed him to
incorporate, and shall thereupon submits the redraft record for approval, upon notice to the
appellee, in like manner as the original draft."

Pursuant to the above provision, petitioner had only ten (10) days, or until June 9, 1973, to file
an amended record on appeal. However, he filed a supplemental record on appeal only on
November 4, 1973 or five and a half (5 1/2) months thereafter, Hence, the lower court properly
disapproved the same in its order dated December 14, 1973, because petitioner’s failure to take
the necessary steps for the amendment of the record on appeal within the time prescribed by
the rules is one of the grounds for the dismissal of an appeal.

In the present petition, petitioner has dwelt at length into the merits of the case which is not in
issue as this is a petition for certiorari and not an appeal, for which reason the same cannot be
entertained. Settled is the rule that the writ of certiorari may not be availed of to make up for the
loss, through omission or oversight, of the right to appeal. Petitioner was not denied or deprived
of the right to appeal as he was ordered by the court a quo to file an amended record on appeal.
However, he complied with said order after a lapse of five and one half (5 1/2) months, hence
he lost his right to appeal due to his own fault for which he alone is to blame. Time and again
We have dismissed petitions for certiorari to annul decisions or orders which could have, but
have not, been appealed.

In view of the foregoing, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

55) PEOPLE VS. BERIALES (70 SCRA 361)

56) SERRANO VS. NLRC (G.R. NO. 117040, JANUARY 27, 2000)

JURISDICTION, NOTICE AND HEARING

ART. 704, CIVIL CODE

57) JOSE ATIENZA ET. AL. VS. COMELEC (G.R. NO. 188920, FEBRUARY 16, 2010)

FACTS:

July 5, 2005, Drilon, the president of LP announced his party's withdrawal of support for the
administration of PGMA but Atienza, LP Chairman, and a number of party members denounced
Drilon's move claiming that he made the announcement without consulting the party.

March 2, 2006, Atienza hosted a party conference to discuss local autonomy and party matters,
when convened, the party proceeded to declare all positions in the party vacant and elected
new officers, making Atienza as the new president of LP. Drilon immediately filed a petition with
the COMELEC to nullify the elections. Drilon is claiming that the election was illegal because the
party was not properly convened. Drilon also claims that the officers of LP were elected to a
fixed 3 year term that was yet to end on November 2007.

Atienza claimed that the majority of LP attended the assembly and that the amendments of LP's
constitution were not properly ratified thus the term of Drilon and other officers already ended on
July 2006.

COMELEC ruled in favor of Drilon, Hence, this petition,

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.’s constitutional right
to due process by the latter’s expulsion from the party.

RULING:

Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of party
membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to due
process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first summoned
them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party. According to Atienza, et al.,
proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings and are,
therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations.

But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political
parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies created
by the state and through which certain governmental acts or functions are performed. An
administrative agency or instrumentality "contemplates an authority to which the state delegates
governmental power for the performance of a state function." The constitutional limitations that
generally apply to the exercise of the state’s powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies.

The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the state’s powers are found in Article III of the
Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of life,
property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the state’s
powers in relation to the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect
ordinary citizens against arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by private
individuals or entities. In the latter case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs from such
private acts apply. The right to due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by the
state into the fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies
involving private parties.
Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary
between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument. The
discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property
within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the
state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that
party members may have, in relation to other party members, correspond to those that may
have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract
among the party members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated
have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a due process
issue against the government or any of its agencies.

But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in
membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct
its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. In Sinaca v.
Mula, the Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public interest by
allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also consistent with
the state policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according to the free choice
of the people.

58) SUSIE CHAN-TAN VS. JESSE TAN (G.R. NO. 167139, FEBRUARY 25, 2010)

FACTS:

In its 30 March 2004 Decision, the trial court declared the marriage between petitioner Susie
Chan-Tan and respondent Jesse Tan void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner and respondent were married in June of 1989 at Manila Cathedral in Intramuros,
Manila. They were blessed with two sons: Justin, who was born in Canada in 1990 and Russel,
who was born in the Philippines in 1993.

In 2001, twelve years into the marriage, petitioner filed a case for the annulment of the marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties submitted to the court a compromise
agreement

On 31 July 2003, the trial court issued a partial judgment approving the compromise agreement.
On 30 March 2004, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage void under Article
36 of the Family Code on the ground of mutual psychological... incapacity of the parties. The
trial court incorporated in its decision the compromise agreement of the parties on the issues of
support, custody, visitation of the children, and property relations.
Meanwhile, petitioner cancelled the offer to purchase the Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot No.
12, Block 2. She authorized Megaworld Corp. to allocate the amount of P11,992,968.32 so far
paid on the said lot in the following manner

Petitioner authorized Megaworld Corp. to offer Lot 12, Block 2 of Corinthian Hills to other
interested buyers. It also appears from the records that petitioner left the country bringing the
children with her.

Respondent filed an omnibus motion seeking in the main custody of the children. The evidence
presented by respondent established that petitioner brought the children out of the country
without his knowledge and without prior authority of the trial court; petitioner failed to pay... the
P8,000,000 remaining balance for the Megaworld property which, if forfeited would prejudice the
interest of the children; and petitioner failed to turn over to respondent documents and titles in
the latter's name.

Trial Court decision...

the trial court, in its 17 May 2004 resolution, awarded to respondent custody of the children,
ordered petitioner to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latter's name, and
allowed respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City.

Petitioner filed on 28 June 2004 a motion for reconsideration alleging denial of due process on
account of accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. She alleged she was not able to present
evidence because of the negligence of her counsel and her own... fear for her life and the future
of the children. She claimed she was forced to leave the country, together with her children, due
to the alleged beating she received from respondent and the pernicious effects of the latter's
supposed gambling and womanizing ways. She prayed for... an increase in respondent's
monthly support obligation in the amount of P150,000.

The 30 March 2004 Decision declared the marriage between the parties void under Article 36 of
the Family Code on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. It incorporated the 31 July
2003 Partial Judgment approving the Compromise Agreement between the parties. The 17 May
2004 Resolution amended the earlier partial judgment in granting to respondent custody of the
children, ordering petitioner to turn over to respondent documents and titles in... the latter's
name, and allowing respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City. The 15
February 2005 Resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the 28 December
2004 Resolution denying... petitioner's motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the
12 October 2004 Resolution, which in turn denied for late filing petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution.

ISSUES:

Petitioner raises the question of whether the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004
resolution of the trial court have attained finality despite the alleged denial of due process.
Ruling:

The petition has no merit.

Petitioner contends she was denied due process... when her counsel failed to file pleadings and
appear at the hearings for respondent's omnibus motion to amend the partial judgment as
regards the custody of the children and the properties in her possession.

Petitioner claims the... trial court issued the 17 May 2004 resolution relying solely on the
testimony of respondent.

Petitioner further claims the trial court erred in applying to her motion to dismiss Section 7 of the
Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. Petitioner argues that if indeed the provision is applicable, the same is
unconstitutional for setting an obstacle to the preservation of the family.

We held that the decision annulling the marriage had already become final and executory when
the husband failed to appeal during the reglementary period. The husband claimed that the
decision of the trial court was null and void for violation of his right to due process. He... argued
he was denied due process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial
court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and rendered judgment based
solely on the evidence presented by private respondent. We upheld the judgment of nullity... of
the marriage even if it was based solely on evidence presented by therein private respondent.

We also ruled in Tuason that notice sent to the counsel of record is binding upon the client and
the neglect or failure of the counsel to inform the client of an adverse judgment resulting in the
loss of the latter's right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a... judgment valid and regular
on its face.

In the present case, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial
court had become final and executory upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal

The clear intent of the provision is to allow the respondent to ventilate all possible defenses in
an answer, instead of a mere motion to dismiss, so that judgment may be made on the merits.

59) SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD VS. TORCITA [330 SCRA 153 (2000)]

FACTS:

Major Lazaro Torcita was offduty , coming from a party was driving and was overtaken by
Mazda pick-up w/ afterwards pick up speed. Upon entering the compound of HDA Aimee ,
Torcita was denied entry. They complained that Torcita confronted them and that he was yelling
and hurling incentives. They filed 12 complaints against him and was consolidated for “conduct
unbecoming of a police officer.” The board dismissed the complaint but found him guilty of
simple irregularity, suspending him for 20 days for being having alcoholic drink during the
incident. Torcita appealed and RTC / CA reversed the dispositive portion.

Petitioner contend that “Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer” is broad enough to include
any act of an officer which tends to bring dishonor and disgrace to the PNP organization.

ISSUE:

Whether or not conviction is null on the ground of lack of procedural due process of law?

RULING:

CA decision affirmed, dispositive portion of SDB decision annulled.

It is glaringly apparent from a reading of the titles of the twelve administrative cases filed against
C/Insp. Torcita, earlier quoted, that none of the charges or offenses mentioned or made
reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the performance of official duty. The
omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the offense for which he was
not notified nor charged. It is a requirement of due process that the parties be informed of how
the litigation was decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the Court.

The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the offense for which he
was not notified nor charged. Summary dismissal proceedings are governed by specific
requirements of notification of the charges together with copies of affidavits and other
attachments supporting the complaints, and the filing of an answer, together with supporting
documents. It is true that consistent with its summary nature, the duration of the hearing is
limited, and the manner of conducting the hearing is summary, in that sworn statements may
take the place of oral testimonies of witnesses, cross-examination is confined only to material
and relevant matters, and prolonged arguments and dilatory proceedings shall not be
entertained. (Section 4, Memorandum Circular No. 92-006). However, notification of the charges
contemplates that respondent be informed of the specific charges against him. Torcita was
entitled to know that he was being charged with being drunk while in the performance of duty,
so that he could traverse the accusation squarely and adduce evidence in his defense. Although
he was given an opportunity to be heard on the multiple and broad charges initially filed against
him, the absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a
proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process (Alonte v.
Savellano Jr., 287 SCRA 245).

It is a requirement of due process that the parties be informed of how the litigation was decided
with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the Court
(ABD Overseas Manpower Corp. v. NLRC, 286 SCRA 454). Memorandum Circular No. 92-006
specifically prescribes that the decision shall contain "a brief statement of the material facts and
the findings of the summary dismissal authority as well as the disposition thereof" (Sec. 6). The
cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline
by taking drinks while in the performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual
findings referring to this particular offense. As it turned out, the dismissal Board believed his
allegation that he was not drunk and found that he was in full command of his senses where he
tried to apprehend the driver of the maroon Mazda pick-up. Although Torcita did not deny that
he had taken a shot of alcoholic drink at the party which he attended before the incident, the
records show that he was then off-duty and the party was at the Municipality of Victorias, which
was outside of his area of police jurisdiction. On the other hand, the hot pursuit incident
occurred while he was on in his way home to Cadiz City with the members of his family. As
observed by the Dismissal Board itself, the hot pursuit was motivated by the duty "inherent to
the position as Chief of Police of Cadiz City and as Deputy of the Land Transportation Office to
enforce traffic rules and regulations, to prevent chaos and accidents in roads and highways"
(Decision, p. 76). The Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that even if he was prosecuted for
irregular performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol
while in the performance of duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of
liquor; he was on a private trip fetching his wife.

Premises considered, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the decision of the
petitioners Board was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, as respondent Torcita was
found guilty of an offense for which he was not properly charged. A decision is void for lack of
due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard (Palu-ay v. CA,
293 SCRA 358). A void judgment never acquires finality (Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez v.
CA 255 SCRA 672; Fortich v. Corona, 298 SCRA 678).

Hence, aforementioned decision cannot be deemed to have become final and executory.

60) BANCO ESPANOL VS. PALANCA (G.R. NO. L-11390, MARCH 26, 1918)

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in

Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died
on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted
foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by
publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the
defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk
complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of
Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise
published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder.
On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the
confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate
of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of
default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of
this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void
because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the
action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING:

On Due Process

xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the
requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There
must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property
which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be
heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we
observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident
owner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized
as essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually
in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though
commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a
means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject
of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to
protect it.

It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that
the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication
may never in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may
often be very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though
much increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as
well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the
provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of
notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant’s residence
is known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of
this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.

The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification
which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the
possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain
conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its
condemnation and sale.

Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendant’s last known address constitute
denial of due process?

The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk
to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a
denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not
avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the
only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was
absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.

It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether
it be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. In
the matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. The court
either has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be
considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from
the conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the
application of the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be
so rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter
requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in
the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was
fatal. We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect
upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle
underlying the exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these
conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process of law has not been infringed.

Where the defendant in a mortgage foreclosure lives outside of the country and refuses to
appear or otherwise submit himself to the authority of the court, the jurisdiction of the latter is
limited to the mortgaged property, with respect to which jurisdiction of the court is based upon
the fact that the property is located within the district and that the court, under the provisions of
law applicable in such cases is vested with the power to subject property to the obligation
created by the mortgage. In such case personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant is
non-essential and in fact cannot be acquired.

61) SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. LANTION (G.R. NO. 139466, OCTOBER 17, 2000)

62) PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA (G.R. NO. 130487, JUNE 19, 2000)

63) SAMARTINO VS. RAON (G.R. NO. 131482, JULY 3, 2002)

64) LIM VS. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. 111397, AUGUST 12, 2002)

65) ASILO VS. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 159017-18, MARCH 9, 2011)

66) PARAYNO VS. JOVELLANOS (495 SCRA 85)

67) LAWTON VS. STEELE ( 152 US 133)

EXCEPTIONS TO NOTICE AND HEARING REQUIREMENTS

68) PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ [180 SCRA 218 (1989)]

FACTS:

By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish,
construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select,
station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite
communications." Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct and
operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the
communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals."

PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to companies like Globe and PLDT.

Pursuant to the said franchise, petitioner, since 1967, has established its earth stations and
antennas to provide direct satellite communication. Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing
its satellite circuits to different telephone, cable, and radio companies.

Executive Order No. 196 placed the petitioner under the jurisdiction, control, and regulation of
respondent NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates.

Petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application for authority to continue operating and
maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967,
to continue providing the international satellite communications services it has likewise been
providing since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services.
Pending the hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate
and maintain the above-mentioned facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the
aforesaid rates therein applied for.

PHILCOMSAT was granted one-year provisional authority to continue operating its existing
facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then
charging.
The NTC order had extended the provisional authority of the petitioner for another six (6)
months, but it directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of
fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized rates.

PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and commissioner Alcuaz assailING the said directive and holds
that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public service
communications, does not provide the necessary standards which were constitutionally
required, hence, there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory
powers of NTC.

PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of
NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the
jurisdiction of NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its
rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers.

PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a
reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to
NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.

ISSUE:

WON the questioned order violates procedural due process for having been issued motu proprio
without prior notice and hearing and the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and
confiscatory

HELD:

YES. The application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is
quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the function of the administrative agency
is legislative, notice and hearing are not required, but where an order applies to a named
person, as in the instant case, the function involved is adjudicatory.

The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the
attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains
exclusively to the petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although
patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an
initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an
explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a
corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending
contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen
percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better
position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it
charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies
attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore,
inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its
rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public considering
the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay
involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the
inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order.

69) SUNTAY VS. PEOPLE [101 PHIL. 833 (1957)]

FACTS:

On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified
complaint against Emilio Suntay who took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul’s Colleges in Quezon City
with lewd design and took her to somewhere near the U.P. compound in Diliman, Quezon City
and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her. Alicia Nubla is a minor of 16 years.

After an investigation, an Assistant City Attorney recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon
City that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney for the
complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took exception to
the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for
seduction be filed against the herein petitioner.

The petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs and
left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at present enrolled in
school. The offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with
seduction which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary
investigation had been conducted.

The private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order “directing such
government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation
and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to
the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law.

The respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order
the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to
compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. The counsel
for the petitioner wrote to the respondent Secretary requesting that the action taken by him be
reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent Court
reconsider its order which the respondent Secretary denied.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner should have been granted a quasi-judicial hearing by the respondent
Secretary before withdrawing or cancelling the passport issued to him.
HELD:

No, Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or
cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is
facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already
issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling
such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is
exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious
criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by such officer as a
prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due
process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him
cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious of because of the absence of such hearing. If
hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of clause of the
Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said
clause.

When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the
filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by
such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not
violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion
vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious of because of the absence of such
hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of clause of
the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the
said clause.

70) DE BISSCHOP VS. GALANG [8 SCRA 244 (1963)]

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal on questions of law from an order issued on 27 March 1961, in Civil Case No. 41477 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila (Judge Antonio Canizares, presiding) the dispositive portion
of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, and for the proper

determination of the case of herein petitioner, the Court hereby grants the petition for
prohibition and orders respondent Commissioner of Immigration to desist and refrain
from arresting and expelling the petitioner from the Philippines unless and until proper
and legal proceedings are conducted by the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of
Immigration in connection with the Application for extension of stay filed by petitioner
with said Board.
The facts are not disputed. Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was
allowed to stay in this country for three years, expiring 1 August 1959, as the prearranged
employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is president and general manager. He
applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July 1959. In
view, however, of confidential and damaging reports (Exhibits P, Q, and R) of Immigration
Officer Benjamin de Mesa to the effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of a gambling
front than the enterprise for promotion of local and imported shows that it purports to be, and
that de Bisschop is suspect of having evaded payment of his income tax, the Commissioner of
Immigration, in a communication of Customs of Iloilo demanded from petitioner the paytion of 10
September 1959, advised him that his application for extension of stay as a prearranged
employee has been denied by the Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5
days. Thereafter, counsel of de Bisschop requested for a copy of the adverse decision said
Board, but the legal officer of the Bureau of Immigration replied, on 11 September 1959, in this
tenor:

In reply to yours of even date requesting that you furnished copy of the
decision, order or resolution of the Board of Commissioners denying the
application for extension of stay of Mr. GEORGE DE BISSCHOP, please be
advised that, pursuant to immigration practice and procedure and as is usual in
such cases where the result is a vote for denial, for reason of practicability and
expediency, no formal decision, order resolution is promulgated by the Board.
The denial of the petition for extension was expressed by the majority members
of the Board as follows:

For denial, Talabis, 8-24-59;

O.K. for extension, De la Rosa, September 9;

Denial, Galang, 9-10.

Thereafter, Mr. Bisschop was simply advised of said denial as per letter of this Office dated
September 10, 1959.

In view thereof, you and your client are advised anew that Mr. Bisschop is hereby required to
depart within five (5) days of this notice.

No request for reinvestigation was made with the Bureau of Immigration. Instead, to forestall his
arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation proceedings, de Bisschop filed the present
case on 18 September 1959. Pending resolution of the main case for prohibition, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued ex-parte by the court a quo on the same day ordering herein
respondent-appellant to desist from arresting and detaining petitioner-appellee. During the
hearing, only documentary evidence were presented.
In his brief, appellant Commissioner raises two main issues: That the lower court erred (a) in
holding that the Commissioners of Immigration are required by law to conduct formal hearings
on all applications for extension of stay of aliens, and (b) in ruling that said Commissioners are
enjoined to promulgate written decisions in such cases.

After a careful study of the case, we fully agree with appellant's contention on several grounds.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.

The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of the
Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the
part of the immigration authorities. Since Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these cases,
we are inclined to uphold the argument that courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely
administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases
as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. This would not
violate the due process clause if we take into account that, in this particular case, the letter of
appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere formality, a
preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant's
answer to the complaint, the "requirement to leave before the start of the deportation
proceedings is only an advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be
compelled to take steps for his expulsion". It is already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a
day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings.

The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative
proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American
writer on Constitutional Law, has well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial
process; much of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the
order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due
process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial
proceedings, in administrative proceedings, it is otherwise since they rest upon different
principles. . . . In certain proceedings, therefore, of all administrative character, it may be
stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not
essential to due process of law. (Cornejo vs. Gabriel and Provincial Board of Rizal, 41
Phil. 188, 192-194)

With respect to the contention that the decision of the Board of Commissioners on matters of
petition for extension of stay of aliens should be promulgated in writing, appellee relies on
Section 8 of the Immigration Act, which provides that in "any case coming before the Board of
Commissioners, the decision of any two members shall prevail". However, we agree with the
Solicitor General that the word "decision", as employed in this section, obviously refers to the
number of "votes" necessary to constitute the decision of the said Board. The Sampaguita Shoe
case (G. R. No. L-10285, 14 Jan. 1958), which was taken into account by the lower court, is not
applicable to the case at bar; it applies to judicial decisions, as provided in Section 1, Rule 35, of
the Rules of Court. On the other hand, as pointed out in appellant's brief, where the intention of
the lawmaker is otherwise, the immigration laws specifically enumerate when the decisions of
the Board of Commissioners shall be in writing, to wit: (1) in cases of appeal from a decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry as to matters of admission or exclusion of aliens, as provided in
Section 27 (c) of the Immigration Act; and (2) the decision of the Board of Commissioners in
cases of deportation under Section 37, paragraphs (a) and (c). But there is nothing in the
immigration law which provides that the Board of Commissioners must render decisions on
petitioners for extension of stay.

Finally, though not brought out in appellant's brief there is another reason why prohibition will
not lie herein. Prohibition is not favored by the Courts. The writ should issue with caution, and
only in cases of extreme necessity — which condition does not obtain in this case. Moreover, it
will issue only if there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy (Section 2, Rule 67,
Rules of Court). This Court has already ruled that "the use of habeas corpus to test the legality
of aliens' confinement and proposed expulsion from the Philippines is now a settled practice"
(Lao Tang Bun v. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682, 683). This is because habeas corpus, aside from being
thorough and complete, affords prompt relief from unlawful imprisonment of any kind, and under
all circumstances. It reaches the facts affecting jurisdiction, or want of power, by the most direct
method, and at once releases the applicant from restraint when it is shown to be unauthorized
(cf. People ex rel. Livingston v. Wyatt, 186 N.Y. 383; 79 N.E. 330). And it has already been held
by a long line of American decisions that the existence of this adequate remedy by habeas
corpus will bar the issuance of a writ of prohibition.

It has been repeatedly decided by the Supreme Court that the writ of habeas corpus is a proper
remedy for reviewing proceedings for the deportation of aliens and to ascertain whether
jurisdiction has been, therein exceeded. United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621, 8 S. Ct.
663, 31 L. Ed. 591; Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 28 S. Ct. 201, 62 L. Ed. 369; Ng
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 42 S. Ct. 492, 66 L. Ed. 938; Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149,
44 S. Ct. 54, 68 L. Ed. 221. While in the state courts it is very generally held that the existence
of an adequate remedy habeas corpus will prevent the issuance of a writ of prohibition.
Livingston v. Wyatt, 186 N. Y. 383, 79 N.E. 330, 10 L.R.A. (N. S.) 159, 9 Ann. Cas. 972; Parks
v. Ryan, 4 N.M. 176, 173 P. 858; In re Heffner, 16 Okl. Cr. 691, 182 P. 88; State v. Second
Judicial District Court (Nev.) 18 P. (2d) 449; Wessels v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. 403, 253 P.
135, and in Bedford v. Wingfield, 27 Grat. 329, the Supreme Court of Virginia said that the writ
of prohibition "issues only in cases of extreme necessity. . . . It is a principle of universal
application, and one which lies at the very foundation of the law of prohibition, that the
jurisdiction is strictly confined to cases where no other remedy exists; and it is always a
sufficient reason for withholding the writ, and the party aggrieved has another and complete
remedy at law". (Kabadian v. Doak, 65 F. [2d] 202, 205).
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed. The petition for prohibition is dismissed,
and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the court a quo is hereby dissolved, with costs
against petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Labrador, J., took no part.

71) VAR ORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC. VS. ACHACOSO [161 SCRA 232 (1988)]

FACTS:

Var-Orient Shipping Co filed a complaint with POEA against crewmembers for having allegedly
violated their Contracts of Employment with the petitioners that supposedly resulted in
damages. the case was heard and the parties agreed to submit their respective position papers
and thereafter the case would be submitted for decision. On the basis of the pleadings and
memoranda, Tomas Achacoso, POEA Administrator rendered decision in favour of the crew. A
copy of the decision was sent by registered mail and delivered by the postman to the petitioners’
counsel. Petitioners allegedly learned about the decision only when the writ of execution was
served on them by the Sherriff. Petitioner filed filed an ‘urgent Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution’ on the ground that the decision had not been received by the petitioners, hence, it
was not yet final and executory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was denied due process of law because the respondent Administrator
resolved the case without any formal hearing?

DECISION:

Petition denied.

No, The petitioners’ allegation that the issuance of the writ of execution was premature because
the decision had not been received by their counsel is unconvincing. Petitioners failed to submit
an affidavit of the receptionist Marlyn Aquino explaining what she did with the decision which
she received for Atty. Figura. Under the circumstances, the respondent Administrator’s ruling
that the decision had been properly served on petitioners’ counsel and that it is now final and
unappealable, should be sustained.

Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners ‘allegation that they were denied due process because
the decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The
fact is that at the hearing of the case on March 4,1987, it was agreed by the parties that they
would file their respective memoranda and thereafter consider the case submitted for decision.
This procedure is authorized by law to expedite the settlement of labor disputes. However, only
the private respondents submitted memoranda. The petitioners did not. On June 10, 1987, the
respondents filed a motion to resolve. The petitioners’ counsel did not oppose either the “Motion
to Resolve” or the respondents “Motion for Execution of Decision” dated October 19, 1987, both
of which were furnished them through counsel. If it were true, as they now contend, that they
had been denied due process in the form of a formal hearing, they should have opposed both
motions.

OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD

72) BUDIONGAN VS. DE LA CRUZ (G.R. NO. 170288, SEPTEMBER 22, 2006)

FACTS:

By virtue of Municipal Ordinance, the Municipality of Carmen, Bohol appropriated an amount for
the purchase of a road roller for the municipality. However, the Municipal Development Council
recommended that the amount be realigned and used for the asphalt laying of a portion of a
Street. Thereafter, it was discovered that there was yet no ordinance approving the realignment
of the funds. Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance, approving the realignment of the
fund. Malmis was paid the contract price.

Private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas alleging illegality in the conduct of the bidding, award and notice to
commence work since there was no fund appropriated for the purpose.

The Office of the Deputy found probable cause and recommended the filing of an information for
violation of Article 2207 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioners. Upon review, the
Case Assessment, Review and Reinvestigation Bureau of the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
issued the assailed Memorandum modifying the charge against petitioners for allegedly giving
unwarranted benefit to Malmis and violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 against petitioner
Budiongan for allegedly “directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in a contract
or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity.”

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Office of the Special Prosecutor which
was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution dated October 19, 2005.
adrianantazo.wordpress.com
ISSUE:

Whether the refusal or failure to conduct a re-investigation has violated petitioners’ right to due
process?

HELD:

No, The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right
conferred by statute.

The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the Information or
otherwise render the same defective. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case
or constitute a ground for quashing the Information. If absence of a preliminary investigation
does not render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, then
the denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the Information or oust the
court of its jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioners were not deprived of due process because they were afforded the opportunity to
refute the charges by filing their counter-affidavits. The modification of the offense charged did
not come as a surprise to the petitioners because it was based on the same set of facts and the
same alleged illegal acts. Moreover, petitioners failed to aver newly discovered evidence nor
impute commission of grave errors or serious irregularities prejudicial to their interest to warrant
a reconsideration or reinvestigation of the case as required under Section 8, Rule III of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the modification of the offense
charged, even without affording the petitioners a new preliminary investigation, did not amount
to a violation of their rights.

73) ALMENDRAS, JR. VS. ALMENDRAS (G.R. NO. 179491, JANUARY 14, 2015)

FACTS:

As culled from the CA, petitioner sent letters with similar contents on 7 February 1996 to House
Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr., and on 26 February 1996 to Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of
Oil Carriers, Inc. The controversial portion of the first and second letters reads as follows:

This is to notify your good self and your staff that one ALEXIS "DODONG" C. ALMENDRAS, a
brother, is not vested with any authority to liaison or transact any business with any department,
office, or bureau, public or otherwise, that has bearing or relation with my office, mandates or
functions. x x x.

Noteworthy to mention, perhaps, is the fact that Mr. Alexis "Dodong" C. Almendras, a reknown
blackmailer, is a bitter rival in the just concluded election of 1995 who ran against the wishes of
my father, the late Congressman Alejandro D. Almendras, Sr. He has caused pain to the family
when he filed cases against us: his brothers and sisters, and worst against his own mother.

I deemed that his act of transacting business that affects my person and official functions is
malicious in purpose, done with ill motive and part of a larger plan of harassment activities to
perforce realise his egoistic and evil objectives.

May I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the above information to
concerned officials and secretariat employees of the House of Representatives.

xxxx

These letters were allegedly printed, distributed, circulated and published by petitioner, assisted
by Atty. Roberto Layug, in Digos, Davao del Sur and Quezon City, with evident bad faith and
manifest malice to destroy respondent Alexis C. Almendras' good name. Hence, the latter filed
an action for damages arising from libel and defamation against petitioner in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 19, Digos City.

THE RTC RULING

In the course of trial at the lower court, petitioner failed to present any evidence, except his
Answer, despite several rescheduling of hearings at his instance. The trial court thus submitted
the case for decision, and eventually ruled that respondent was libeled and defamed. For the
sufferings, social ridicule, defamation and dishonor caused by petitioner's letters, respondent
was awarded damages, as follows: "P5,000,000.00 as moral damages; P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P10,000.00 for litigation expenses; and attorney's fees in the amount of
25% of whatever amounts actually received by plaintiff for this judgment."

Petitioner moved for reconsideration and/or new trial,[6] but the same was denied by the trial
court.

THE CA RULING

On intermediate appellate review, the CA ruled that petitioner was not denied due process. It
noted that petitioner was given full opportunity to present his evidence, but he vehemently
disregarded the proceedings by merely absenting himself from trials without valid excuses.

The appellate court also ruled that the letters were not privileged communications, since
petitioner was not acting as a member of the Congress when he sent them. In fact, his letter
stated that he extends his "apology for bringing this personal matter in the open." He was, as
maintained by the respondent, sending open libelous and unsealed letters, duly published and
circulated in Digos, Davao del Sur, and Quezon City. Consequently, the CA upheld the
damages awarded by the trial court, the amounts being consistent with the social and financial
standing of the parties involved.
ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was deprived due process

RULING:

First, we rule that petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process.

Settled is the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. The only exception is
when the negligence of the counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is
deprived of his day in court. In such instance, the remedy is to reopen the case and allow the
party who was denied his day in court to adduce evidence. However, perusing the case at bar,
we find no reason to depart from the general rule.

Petitioner was given several opportunities to present his evidence or to clarify his medical
constraints in court, but he did not do so, despite knowing full well that he had a pending case in
court. For petitioner to feign and repeatedly insist upon a lack of awareness of the progress of
an important litigation is to unmask a penchant for the ludicrous. Although he rightfully expected
counsel to amply protect his interest, he cannot just sit back, relax and await the outcome of the
case. In keeping with the normal course of events, he should have taken the initiative "of
making the proper inquiries from his counsel and the trial court as to the status of his case." For
his failure to do so, he has only himself to blame. The Court cannot allow petitioner the
exception to the general rule just because his counsel admitted having no knowledge of his
medical condition. To do so will set a dangerous precedent of never-ending suits, so long as
lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the client's case and obtain
remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law.

74) UYBOCO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 211703, DECEMBER 10, 2014)

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner assailing the
Sandiganbayan's Decision1 dated January 9, 2014 and Resolution dated March 14, 2014,
finding petitioner and his co-accused Rodolfo G. Valencia guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended, in Criminal Case No. 24461, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Rodolfo G. Valencia, Carlo A. Maramot, & Edelbert C. Uyboco.

Petitioner asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the existence of a conspiracy and
in convicting him in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt of such conspiracy. More
importantly, petitioner finds fault in the Sandiganbayan's denial of his Motion to Reconsider the
Decision of this Honorable Court (Promulgated on January 9, 2014) with a Plea to Re-Open the
Proceedings dated January 22, 2014. In his motion, petitioner prayed for the reopening of the
proceedings on the ground that his constitutional rights to due process and to competent
counsel were violated when his former counsel, due to blatant error, abuse of discretion, and
gross incompetence, did not present any evidence in his defense, causing serious prejudice to
him.

According to petitioner, he was "accorded grossly insufficient legal assistance by his former
lawyer" who informed him that "there was no necessity for a preliminary investigation and to
present any evidence." His former counsel also "failed to cross examine the main prosecution
witness because said counsel was inexplicably absent on the trial date" and even "failed to
prepare and file a memorandum" and "merely relied on the defense presented by the lawyers of
co-accused Valencia and Maramot by adopting the defenses of the other accused and all their
pleadings and manifestations, even when these were clearly not applicable to petitioner’s
defense." Thus, petitioner avers that his constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due
process and of law and to competent counsel were violated.

In its Comment dated September 30,2014, the Office of the Special Prosecutor opposed
petitioner’s plea toreopen the case on the ground of denial of due process. In citing Lagua v.
CA, they claim there is no basis to set aside the assailed decision and resolution since "a client
is bound by the action of his counsel."

After a careful review of the records of the case, We find that the petition has no merit.

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari shall raise
only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth, as held by this Court in Microsoft Corp.
v. Maxicorp, Inc., to wit:

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only
questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the
doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when
the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

Findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate
tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the
results of the case, those findings should not be ignored. Absent any clear showing of abuse,
arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts, especially
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon this Court.

This rule admits of exceptions, as follows: (1) where the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) where the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) where the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.
Even if the foregoing rules were to be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice, this Court
nevertheless finds no reason to disagree with the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan. A
meticulous scrutiny of the records of the case persuades Us to conclude that the
Sandiganbayan did not err in its finding that petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. The
evidence on record amply supports the findings and conclusions of the Sandiganbayan and
petitioner has shown no cause for this Court to apply any of the foregoing exceptions.

Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of

public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross in excusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

For accused to be found liable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the following elements must
concur:

1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
2) He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and

3) That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.

Based on the records of the case, the elements of the crime charged exist in the present case.
On the first element, accused Valencia was a public officer at the time the acts in question were
committed. Thus, while petitioner was a private individual, he was found to have been
inconspiracy with accused Valencia. This is in accord with the rule that private persons may be
charged in conspiracy with public officers, as We held in People of the Philippines v. Henry T.
Go:

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when
acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable
for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed
policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons
alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto. This is the
controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a
case involving herein private respondent.
The Sandiganbayan found that petitioner and accused Valencia acted in conspiracy to commit
the crime charged, to wit:

The records show that conspiracy existed by and between accused Rodolfo
Valencia and Edelbert Uyboco, president of Gaikoku, considering that the procurement
of the subject dump trucks for an overpriced amount of Ph₱6,994,286.00 could not have
been possible without each other’s participation and cooperation, as evidenced by their
execution and approval of the purchase order No. 4979 dated March 1993, and
Gaikoku’s proforma invoice.

Petitioner failed to dispute any of the documentary evidence presented by the prosecution and
relied upon by the Sandiganbayan. Thus, there appears to be no reason for this Court to review
such finding.

As to the second element, accused Valencia entered into a negotiated contract with Gaikoku
without authority from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP). In fact, Valencia had already
approved the purchase request for the dump trucks as earlyas March 1993, prior to any SP
resolution approving such direct acquisition.

The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled, and respondents aptly pointed out, that accused Valencia
failed to comply with the requirements of Section 369 of the Local Government Code on
negotiated purchase, which required that there must have been at least two failed public
biddings before a contract for a negotiated purchase may be entered into. The defense failed to
present any substantial evidence of the two failed biddings. In fact, it was proved by presented
evidence that the alleged failed biddings were merely simulated.

The present case is similar to the case of Plameras v. People, wherein this Court upheld the
conviction of the accused, to wit:

As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, certain established rules, regulations and policies
of the Commission on Audit and those mandated under the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160) were knowingly sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which enabled CKL
Enterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full payment for the school desks and armchairs,
despite non-delivery – an act or omission evidencing bad faith and manifest partiality.

It must be borne to mind that any procurement or "acquisition of supplies or property by local
government units shall be through competitive public bidding". This was reiterated in the Local
Government Code of 1991 on procurement of supplies which provides:

Sec. 356. General Rule in Procurement or Disposal. – Except as otherwise provided herein,
acquisition of supplies by local government units shall be through competitive public bidding. x x
x
The petitioner admitted in his testimony that he is aware of such requirement, however, he
proceeded just the same due to the alleged advice of the unnamed DECS representative that
there was already a negotiated contract – a representation or misrepresentation he willfully
believed in, without any verification. As a Governor, he must know that negotiated contract can
only be resorted to in case of failure of a public bidding. As it is, there is no public bidding to
speak of that has been conducted. Intentionally or not, it is his duty to act in a circumspect
manner to protect government funds. To do otherwise is gross inexcusable negligence, at the
very least, especially so, that petitioner acted on his own initiative and without authorization from
the Provincial School Board. This can be proved by his failure to present even a single witness
from the members of the Board whom he consulted as he claimed.

Finally, the third element of the crime is also present since it had been proven that an
overpayment was made for the dump trucks, since these were directly imported by the
Provincial Government from the distributor in Japan. With this direct importation, the Provincial
Government should have only paid the tax-free amount of ₱4,594,119.85. Instead, accused
Valencia had already authorized and caused the disbursement of ₱6,994,286, or an excess of
₱2,400,166.15, in favor of petitioner’s company, Gaikoku. This has clearly caused undue injury
to the government.

As to petitioner’s claim that his right to due process was denied due to his former counsel’s
error, abuse of discretion or gross incompetence, We find no merit in this claim. Time and again,
this Court has ruled that a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence and mistake in
handling a case, and to allow a client to disownhis counsel’s conduct would render proceedings
indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel.While
this rule has recognized exceptions, We find that there is no reason for this Court to deviate
from the findings of the Sandiganbayan. We held in Gotesco Properties, Inc. v. Moral:

The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his
counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The basis is the tenet that an act
performed by counsel withinthe scope of a "general or implied authority" is regarded as
an act of the client. While the application of this general rule certainly depends upon the
surrounding circumstances of a given case, there are exceptions recognized by this
Court: "(1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s
liberty or property;or (3) where the interests of justice so require."

The present case does not fall under the said exceptions. In Amil v. Court of Appeals, the Court
held that "to fall within the exceptional circumstance relied upon x x x, it mustbe shown that the
negligence of counsel must be so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court. Thus,
where a party was given the opportunity to defend its interests in due course, it cannot be said
to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of
due process." To properly claim gross negligence on the part of the counsel, the petitioner must
show that the counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear abandonment of the client’s cause.

In the present case, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied petitioner’s motion to re-open the
proceedings on the ground of violation of his due process, to wit:
 In the same vein, accused-movant Uyboco’s clear admission that "he had been
given the opportunity to present his evidence" and despite said opportunity, he and his
counsel decided/opted not to present any evidence for his defense, as shown by their
written Manifestation dated November 20, 2012, that "after earnest assessment and
evaluation, the accused EDELBERT C. UYBOCO has deemed it unnecessary to present
further evidence in his defense, thus he is waiving his right to present further testimonial
and documentary evidence," militates against his claim of miscarriage of justice, and
hence, his motion to reopen proceedings must likewise fail. Accused-movant Uyboco
cannot attribute any serious misjudgment or fault or gross incompetence on his counsel
alone as the decision not to present further evidence in his defense bears his conformity
as shown by his signature in the said manifestation.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor correctly pointed out that petitioner was given an
opportunity to be heard during trial. This opportunity to be heard is the essence of due process.
While petitioner claims that he was incorrectly advised by his former counsel that the
presentation of evidence is no longer necessary, this unfortunate mistake cannot qualify as
gross negligence or incompetence that would necessitate a reopening of the proceedings. In
fact, not once did petitioner refute, or at the very least, address the Sandiganbayan’s finding that
he had expressly consented to the waiver of the presentation of evidence by affixing his
signature as conformity to the manifestation submitted by his former counsel.

Petitioner also erroneously claims that his former counsel "failed to prepare and file a
memorandum for him" since the records show that petitioner’s former counsel had belatedly
filed a memorandum on his behalf, which the Sandiganbayan had admitted in the interest of
justice. Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the Sandiganbayan committed no
reversible error in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 9, 2014 and Resolution
dated March 14, 2014 issued by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24461 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

75) ROXAS VS. VASQUEZ (G.R. 114944, JUNE 19, 2001)

FACTS:

Manuel C. Roxas was the Chairman, while Ahmed S. Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids and
Awards Committee of the PC-INP who invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks.
The COA subsequently discovered that while the disbursement voucher indicated the bid price
has discrepancy. DILG Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman for violation of Section
3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against the accused. On review, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. However, the
Special Prosecutor made a sudden turnabout as regards to the petitioner and ordered their
inclusion as accused in a Criminal Case. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The
Review Committee of the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended that the Motion for
Reconsideration be granted and that the charge against the movants be dismissed. However,
Deputy Special Prosecutor disapproved the recommendation. Thus, Petitioner filed with this
Court the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to annul the orders of the
Ombudsman directing their inclusion as accused in Criminal Case.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners were deprived of due process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated
the complaint against them without their knowledge?

HELD:

Yes,

the court find that the case at falls under one of the recognized exceptions to this rule, more
specifically, the constitutional rights of the accused are impaired and the charges are manifestly
false. In cases where the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor were unable to agree on
whether or not probable cause exists, we may interfere with the findings and conclusions.

The petitioners were deprived of due process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated the
complaint against them without their knowledge.

Due process of law requires that every litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard. He has
the right to be present and defend himself in person at every stage of the proceedings. For all
intents and purposes, therefore, petitioners were no longer parties in the criminal action.
Evidently, the Office of the Special Prosecutor thought so too. It did not give petitioners notice of
the reinvestigation, which would have enabled them to participate in the proceedings. But when
it later found probable cause against petitioners, it should have first given them notice and
afforded them an opportunity to be heard before ordering their inclusion in Criminal Case.

76) Marohombsar vs. Judge Adiong (A.M. RTJ-02-1674, January 22, 2004)

77) Alba vs. Nitorreda (G.R. No. 120223, March 13, 1996)

78) Bautista vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 157219, May 28, 2004)
IMPARTIAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL

79) TANADA VS. PAEC [141 SCRA 307 (1986)]

RESOLUTION

PLANA, J.:

I. In G.R. No. 70632, (1) petitioners question the competence of respondent PAEC
Commissioners to pass judgment on the safety of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1 PNPP-1
in PAEC Licensing Proceedings No. 1-77 without however seeking their ouster from office,
although "proven competence" is one of the qualifications prescribed by law for PAEC
Commissioners. (2) Petitioners also assail the validity of the motion (application) filed by the
National Power Corporation (NPC) for the conversion of its construction permit into an operating
license for PNPP-1 on the principal ground that it contained no information regarding the
financial qualifications of NPC, its source of nuclear fuel, and insurance coverage for nuclear
damage. (3) Petitioners finally charge respondent PAEC Commissioners with bias and
prejudgment.

1. The first issue must be resolved against the petitioners. Where the validity of an appointment
is not challenged in an appropriate proceeding, the question of competence is not within the
field of judicial inquiry. If not considered a qualification the absence of which would vitiate the
appointment, competence is a matter of judgment that is addressed solely to the appointing
power.

2. As regards the legal sufficiency of the NPC motion for conversion, petitioners contend that
the deficiencies they have indicated are jurisdictional infirmities which cannot be cured. The
Court believes however that said deficiencies may be remedied and supplied in the course of
the hearing before PAEC. For this purpose, respondent-applicant NPC may submit pertinent
testimonies and documents when the PAEC hearing is re-opened, subject to controversion and
counterproof of herein petitioners.

3. There is merit in the charge of bias and prejudgment. The PAEC pamphlets- particularly
Annexes "JJ", "KK" and "LL" of the petition (G.R. 70632)-clearly indicate the pre-judgment that
PNPP-1 is safe.
Exhibit "JJ" is an official PAEC 1985 pamphlet entitled "The Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-l." It
gives an overview specifically of PNPP-1, lauds the safety of nuclear power, and concludes with
a statement of the benefits to be derived when the PNPP-1 start operation.

. . .When the PNPP-1 starts operating, it will generate a power of 620 megawatts enough to
supply 15 percent of the electricity needs in Luzon. This is estimated to result in savings of US $
160 million a year, representing the amount of oil displaced.

Aside from being a reliable source of electricity, nuclear power has an excellect safety record
and has been found to result in lower occupational and public risks than fossil fired (coal or oil)
stations. (p. 6. Emphasis supplied.)

The second pamphlet (Exh. "KK") is entitled "NUCLEAR POWER-SAFE CLEAN ECONOMICAL
AND AVAILABLE." On the surface, it merely propagates the use of nuclear power in general.
But its numerous specific references to the PNPP-1 "which will be operational in 1985." and its
advantages give credence to the charge that Exhibit "KK" was in reality designed to project
PNPP-1 as safe, among other

When Exhibit "KK" was published, PNPP-1 was the only nuclear plant under construction in the
Philippines. It is the Philippine nuclear plant specifically mentioned therein that was to be
operational in 1985. Therefore, when the pamphlet states that nuclear power is working now in
other countries and "it should work for us too" because it is "safe" and economical", it is logical
to conclude that the reference is to no other than the nuclear power to be generated at the
PNPP-1

Also worth quoting is the following passage in Exhibit "KK" which sweepingly vouch safes all
nuclear power plants, including the PNPP-1:

No member of the public has ever been injured during the last 25 years that commercial nuclear
reactors have been generating electricity. As is to be expected in any complex system as
nuclear power plants, there have been failure of equipment and human errors. However in every
instance, the safety equipment designed into the nuclear reactor self terminated the accident
without injury to the operators or the public. The Three Mile Island Incident, serious as it was,
did not result in the loss of life nor did it result in the exposure of anyone beyond permissible
limits.

The designers of nuclear plants assume failure to occur, and provide multiple safeguards
protection against every conceivable malfunction (P. 7, Emphasis supplied.)

The third pamphlet (Exh. "LL") is entitled NUCLEAR POWER PLANT and ENVIRONMENTAL
SAFETY. Speaking specifically of the PNPP-1 it categorically states that the Bataan nuclear
plant will not adversely affect the public or the flora or fauna in the area. One of the stated
reasons in support of the conclusion is—

And environmentally, a nuclear power plant emits only insignificant amount of radioactivity to the
environment. It does not cause chemical pollution of air or water, it does not emit sulfur dioxide
or nitrogen oxides like plants fired by fossil fuels such as coal and oil, Besides, even coal fired
plants may emits radioactive particles of uranium and thorium because these may be found
naturally associated with coal deposits.

Comparatively therefore, a nucelar power plant is the cleanest and the safest environmently no
other technology in modern times has been developed with so dominant concern for public
safety as nuclear power. (p. 8)

Respondent PAEC Commissioners cannot escape responsibility for these official pamphlets.
Exhibit "JJ" was published in 1985, when respondent Commissioners had already been
appointed to their present positions. Exhibits "KK" and "LL" were issued earlier, but the majority
of respondent Commissioners even then were already occupying positions of responsibility in
the PAEC. Commissioner Manuel Eugenio was Acting Chief of the PAEC Department on
Nuclear Technology and Engineering from June, 1980 to July, 1984; Commissioner Quirino
Navarro was PAEC Chief Science Research Specialist from May, 1980 to September, 1984-,
and Commissioner Alejandro Ver Albano was PAEC Deputy Commissioner from March, 1980 to
September, 1984. Additionally, the stubborn fact remains unrebutted that Exhibits "J.J." "KK"
and "LL" continued to be distributed by PAEC as late as March, 1985. In other words their
official distribution continued after the filing of NPC's motion for conversion on June 27, 1984
and even after PAEC had issued its order dated February 26, 1985 formally admitting the said
motion for conversion.
At any rate, even if it be assumed that there are some doubts regarding the conclusion that
there has been a prejudgment of the safety of PNPP-1 the doubts should be resolved in favor of
a course of action that will assure an unquestionably objective inquiry, considering the
circumstances thereof and the number of people vitally interested therein.

Having thus prejudged the safety of the PNPP-1 respondent PAEC Commissioners would be
acting with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction were they to sit in
judgment upon the safety of the plant, absent the requisite objectivity that must characterize
such an important inquiry.

The Court therefore Resolved to RESTRAIN respondent PAEC Commissioners from further
acting in PAEC Licensing Proceedings No. 1-77.

II. In G.R. No. 68474, acting on the motion filed therein dated June 8, 1985 to order PAEC to
reconsider its orders of May 31 and June 5, 1985, the urgent motion for mandatory injunction
and/or restraining order dated August 3, 1985, the second urgent motion for mandatory
injunction dated August 12, 1985, and the various pleadings and other documents submitted by
the parties relative thereto, and considering the paramount need of a reasonable assurance that
the operation of PNPP-1 will not pose an undue risk to the health and safety of the people,
which dictates that the conduct of the inquiry into the safety aspects of PNPP-1 be
characterized by sufficient latitude, the better to achieve the end in view, unfettered by technical
rules of evidence (Republic Act 5207, section 34), and in keeping with the requirements of due
process in administrative proceedings, the Court Resolved to ORDER respondent PAEC (once
reconstituted) to re-open the hearing on PNPP-1 so as to give petitioners sufficient time to
complete their cross-examination of the expert witnesses on quality assurance, to cross-
examine the witnesses that petitioners have failed to cross-examine on and after August 9,
1985, and to complete the presentation of their evidence, for which purpose, respondent PAEC
shall issue the necessary subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to compel the attendance of
relevant witnesses and/or the production of relevant documents. For the said purposes, the
PAEC may prescribe a time schedule which shall reasonably assure the parties sufficient
latitude to adequately present their case consistently with the requirements of dispatch. lt is
understood that the PAEC may give NPC the opportunity to correct or supply deficiencies in this
application or evidence in support thereof.

Justices Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Melencio-Herrera, De la Fuente and Cuevas concur.

Justices Escolin and Alampay took no part.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

I associate myself with Justice Plana's position. Additionally, I would like to answer the question
posed by Justice Patajo who asks: "Can We compel the President to designate another body to
try the case pending before PAEC or appoint temporary commissioners while respondents are
still holding office?

No, this Court cannot compel the President to designate another body or appoint temporary
commissioners. It would be unthinkable for this Court to compel the President of the Philippines
to do anything at anytime. What this Court should do is to restrain the commissioners from
further acting in PAEC Licensing Proceedings No. 1-77. What the President does thereafter is
for him to decide. This Court does not tell him what to do. It cannot because of the separation of
powers and the obvious fact that he is not a party to the proceedings.

AQUINO, C.J., dissenting

I dissent. G.R. No. 68474 is an action filed on September 1, 1984 for mandamus and injunction
wherein the petitioners, as taxpayers and citizens, prayed that the Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission (PAEC) and the National Power Corporation be ordered to give public notice and
hold a public hearing and give the petitioners copies of the contracts with Westinghouse.

This prayer had been granted by the respondents. As noted by the Solicitor General, that case
had been terminated (pp. 370-371, Vol. 11, Rollo of G.R. No. 68474, p. 410 Vol. II, Rollo of G.R.
No. 70632). Therefore, G.R. No. 68474 had become MOOT and ACADEMIC.

G.R. No. 70632 is an action filed on April 27, 1985 by the petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers,
for prohibition and injunction praying that the PAEC be enjoined from hearing the NPC's motion
for a license to operate the Bataan Nuclear Plant.
In its resolution of August 29, 1985 this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
PAEC from further proceeding in the licensing proceedings. The petitioners had participated in
the hearings on said motion. They used about 153 hours out of the 205 hours consumed in the
course of the hearings (p. 413, Vol. I 1, Rollo of G. R. No. 70632).

The instant case of G.R. No. 70632 should be DISMISSED because the petitioners HAVE NO
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION (See dissent in G.R. No. 68474
dated May 14,1985,395-B, Vol. 11, Rollo).

As taxpayers and citizens, they have no legal standing to file the petition. Generally, a citizen
and taxpayer cannot invoke judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative
action (Subido vs. Sarmiento, 108 Phil. 150, 157).

Prohibition is not the same as injunction. Lawyers often make the mistake of confusing
prohibition with injunction. Basically, prohibition is a remedy to stop a tribunal from exercising a
power beyond its jurisdiction. The PAEC has been acting within its jurisdiction. Prohibition does
not lie against it.

Prohibition is an extraordinary prerogative writ of a preventive nature, its proper function being
to prevent courts or other tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction
with which they are not vested (73 C.J.S. 10).

This Court has no original jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction. Hence, that remedy cannot
be invoked here.

The matter of the operation of a nuclear plant is a political question. It is a question of policy as
to which the Executive Department has discretional authority (Tanada and Macapagal vs.
Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1067).

No justiciable controversy is involved in the instant case. The great public interest involved in
the dispute does not justify the petitioners in USING THIS COURT TO INTERFERE with the
hearings conducted by the PAEC and with its interlocutory orders.
Its decisions are reviewable by the Appellate Court in accordance with section 9 of the Judiciary
Revamp Law in relation to section 36 of Republic Act No. 5207. The petitioners should not be
allowed to use this Court as an instrument to stop the operation of the nuclear plant. This Court
is not competent, and it has no jurisdiction in this case, to determine its safety. This case cannot
be utilized for making a pronouncement as to its safety.

Secretary Vicente Abad Santos in his opinion dated February 27, 1976 held that the nuclear
plant contract is lawful (p. 1 1 1, Vol. 1, Rollo of G.R. No. 68474).

The matter of safety had been passed upon by a Commission composed of Justices Puno,
Vasquez and Bautista in a 140-page report dated November 13, 1979 and by the International
Atomic Energy Agency in 1984 and in 1985. (See Comment of NPC dated November 20, 1985,
Vol. IV, Rollo of G.R. No. 68474.)

Petitioners should resort to other forums for the articulation of their opposition to the nuclear
plant. It is not wrong to oppose the nuclear plant. What is wrong is to employ this Court without
justification as a weapon for opposing it.

G.R. No. 70632 should be DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT. The restraining order should be
lifted. As already shown, G.R. No. 68474 had become MOOT.

PATAJO, J., dissenting:

I vote for the dismissal of G.R. No. 68474 for being moot and academic joining in this score the
separate opinion of the Chief Justice.

I vote also for the dismissal of G.R. No. 70632, said action being premature. There is no
showing that the competence of PAEC Commissioners to seat on the case had been properly
brought against said Commissioners and the latter had denied said challenge. More importantly
prohibition or injunction is not the proper remedy to question the competence or qualification of
one properly appointed to an office or position. If respondent Commissioners have been validly
appointed as PAEC Commissioners prohibition will not lie to prevent them from performing their
functions on the ground that they do not possess necessary competence or know how to do
their job.
I believe, further, that the pamphlets and articles published by PAEC regarding the safety of
nuclear plants which have not been shown to have been prepared by the Commissioners
themselves can be taken as evidence of bias in favor of granting the license to operate the
nuclear plant in question. I am more inclined to believe that said articles refer to the safety of
nuclear plants per se and not particularly to the Bataan nuclear plant. I trust that respondent
Commissioners can still be objective in their disposition of the petition pending before them and
can decide the same on the basis of the evidence presented during the continuation of the
hearing. From their decision the aggrieved party can appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court.

Another important consideration that must not be overlooked is that if respondent PAEC
Commissioners are disqualified who will try the case? Can We compel the President to
designate another body to try the case pending before PAEC or appoint temporary
commissioners while respondents are still holding office? Would not such a dilemma result in a
stalemate and further delay? It is no answer to said dilemma as suggested by petitioners that
respondent Commissioners could resign and pave the way for the appointment of their
replacements. For them to resign would be a virtual admission of the claim of petitioners that
they are incompetent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the Court's resolution but am registering a dissent insofar as Commissioner

Reynaldo Suarez is concerned. The PAEC exercises both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
powers. During the hearings involving tens of billions of pesos of public funds, the immediate
resolution of difficult procedural questions is often necessary. Complex issues calling for the
application of an entirely new field of substantive law are raised before the Commission.
Resultant criminal prosecutions or civil suits are ever present possibilities. I believe that the
constitutional requirement of due process calls for the appointment of a qualified "law member"
in the Commission. Commissioner Suarez, a former Nueva Ecija Regional Trial Court Judge
and prominent practising lawyer of Angeles City is qualified for the position. Regarding the
official pamphlets issued by PAEC, all except one of the pamphlets were issued before
Commissioner Suarez' appointment to the Commission and as for the one exception, there is no
showing that he was involved or had anything to do with its preparation and issuance.

Considering the foregoing, the law member should not be included in the Court's action
regarding the respondent Philippine Atomic Energy Commission.
Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

I associate myself with Justice Plana's position. Additionally, I would like to answer the question
posed by Justice Patajo who asks: "Can We compel the President to designate another body to
try the case pending before PAEC or appoint temporary commissioners while respondents are
still holding office?

No, this Court cannot compel the President to designate another body or appoint temporary
commissioners. It would be unthinkable for this Court to compel the President of the Philippines
to do anything at anytime. What this Court should do is to restrain the commissioners from
further acting in PAEC Licensing Proceedings No. 1-77. What the President does thereafter is
for him to decide. This Court does not tell him what to do. It cannot because of the separation of
powers and the obvious fact that he is not a party to the proceedings.

AQUINO, C.J., dissenting

I dissent. G.R. No. 68474 is an action filed on September 1, 1984 for mandamus and injunction
wherein the petitioners, as taxpayers and citizens, prayed that the Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission (PAEC) and the National Power Corporation be ordered to give public notice and
hold a public hearing and give the petitioners copies of the contracts with Westinghouse.

This prayer had been granted by the respondents. As noted by the Solicitor General, that case
had been terminated (pp. 370-371, Vol. 11, Rollo of G.R. No. 68474, p. 410 Vol. II, Rollo of G.R.
No. 70632). Therefore, G.R. No. 68474 had become MOOT and ACADEMIC.

G.R. No. 70632 is an action filed on April 27, 1985 by the petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers,
for prohibition and injunction praying that the PAEC be enjoined from hearing the NPC's motion
for a license to operate the Bataan Nuclear Plant.

In its resolution of August 29, 1985 this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
PAEC from further proceeding in the licensing proceedings. The petitioners had participated in
the hearings on said motion. They used about 153 hours out of the 205 hours consumed in the
course of the hearings (p. 413, Vol. I 1, Rollo of G. R. No. 70632).

The instant case of G.R. No. 70632 should be DISMISSED because the petitioners HAVE NO
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION (See dissent in G.R. No. 68474
dated May 14,1985,395-B, Vol. 11, Rollo).

As taxpayers and citizens, they have no legal standing to file the petition. Generally, a citizen
and taxpayer cannot invoke judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative
action (Subido vs. Sarmiento, 108 Phil. 150, 157).

Prohibition is not the same as injunction. Lawyers often make the mistake of confusing
prohibition with injunction. Basically, prohibition is a remedy to stop a tribunal from exercising a
power beyond its jurisdiction. The PAEC has been acting within its jurisdiction. Prohibition does
not lie against it.

Prohibition is an extraordinary prerogative writ of a preventive nature, its proper function being
to prevent courts or other tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction
with which they are not vested (73 C.J.S. 10).

This Court has no original jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction. Hence, that remedy cannot
be invoked here.

The matter of the operation of a nuclear plant is a political question. It is a question of policy as
to which the Executive Department has discretional authority (Tanada and Macapagal vs.
Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1067).

No justiciable controversy is involved in the instant case. The great public interest involved in
the dispute does not justify the petitioners in USING THIS COURT TO INTERFERE with the
hearings conducted by the PAEC and with its interlocutory orders.

Its decisions are reviewable by the Appellate Court in accordance with section 9 of the Judiciary
Revamp Law in relation to section 36 of Republic Act No. 5207. The petitioners should not be
allowed to use this Court as an instrument to stop the operation of the nuclear plant. This Court
is not competent, and it has no jurisdiction in this case, to determine its safety. This case cannot
be utilized for making a pronouncement as to its safety.

Secretary Vicente Abad Santos in his opinion dated February 27, 1976 held that the nuclear
plant contract is lawful (p. 1 1 1, Vol. 1, Rollo of G.R. No. 68474).

The matter of safety had been passed upon by a Commission composed of Justices Puno,
Vasquez and Bautista in a 140-page report dated November 13, 1979 and by the International
Atomic Energy Agency in 1984 and in 1985. (See Comment of NPC dated November 20, 1985,
Vol. IV, Rollo of G.R. No. 68474.)

Petitioners should resort to other forums for the articulation of their opposition to the nuclear
plant. It is not wrong to oppose the nuclear plant. What is wrong is to employ this Court without
justification as a weapon for opposing it.

G.R. No. 70632 should be DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT. The restraining order should be
lifted. As already shown, G.R. No. 68474 had become MOOT.

PATAJO, J., dissenting:

I vote for the dismissal of G.R. No. 68474 for being moot and academic joining in this score the
separate opinion of the Chief Justice.

I vote also for the dismissal of G.R. No. 70632, said action being premature. There is no
showing that the competence of PAEC Commissioners to seat on the case had been properly
brought against said Commissioners and the latter had denied said challenge. More importantly
prohibition or injunction is not the proper remedy to question the competence or qualification of
one properly appointed to an office or position. If respondent Commissioners have been validly
appointed as PAEC Commissioners prohibition will not lie to prevent them from performing their
functions on the ground that they do not possess necessary competence or know how to do
their job.

I believe, further, that the pamphlets and articles published by PAEC regarding the safety of
nuclear plants which have not been shown to have been prepared by the Commissioners
themselves can be taken as evidence of bias in favor of granting the license to operate the
nuclear plant in question. I am more inclined to believe that said articles refer to the safety of
nuclear plants per se and not particularly to the Bataan nuclear plant. I trust that respondent
Commissioners can still be objective in their disposition of the petition pending before them and
can decide the same on the basis of the evidence presented during the continuation of the
hearing. From their decision the aggrieved party can appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court.

Another important consideration that must not be overlooked is that if respondent PAEC
Commissioners are disqualified who will try the case? Can We compel the President to
designate another body to try the case pending before PAEC or appoint temporary
commissioners while respondents are still holding office? Would not such a dilemma result in a
stalemate and further delay? It is no answer to said dilemma as suggested by petitioners that
respondent Commissioners could resign and pave the way for the appointment of their
replacements. For them to resign would be a virtual admission of the claim of petitioners that
they are incompetent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the Court's resolution but am registering a dissent insofar as Commissioner

Reynaldo Suarez is concerned. The PAEC exercises both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
powers. During the hearings involving tens of billions of pesos of public funds, the immediate
resolution of difficult procedural questions is often necessary. Complex issues calling for the
application of an entirely new field of substantive law are raised before the Commission.
Resultant criminal prosecutions or civil suits are ever present possibilities. I believe that the
constitutional requirement of due process calls for the appointment of a qualified "law member"
in the Commission. Commissioner Suarez, a former Nueva Ecija Regional Trial Court Judge
and prominent practising lawyer of Angeles City is qualified for the position. Regarding the
official pamphlets issued by PAEC, all except one of the pamphlets were issued before
Commissioner Suarez' appointment to the Commission and as for the one exception, there is no
showing that he was involved or had anything to do with its preparation and issuance.

Considering the foregoing, the law member should not be included in the Court's action
regarding the respondent Philippine Atomic Energy Commission.

80) ANZALDO VS. CLAVE [119 SCRA 353 (1982)]

FACTS:

Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National Institute of Science and Technology for 28
years. She was holding the position Scientist Research Associate IV when she was appointed
as Science Research Supervisor II. Her appointment was approved by the CSC in 1978. The
position was previously held by Dr Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to his position. Dr
Venzon contested the position. Dr Afable, the one who appointed Anzaldo, averred that
Anzaldo’s appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation Committee which gave 88 points
to Anzalado and 66 points to Venzon. The issue was elevated to the Office of the president by
Venzon. Clave was then the Presidential Executive Assistant. Pursuant to PD 807 or the Civil
Service Decree, Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Clave was also holding the chairmanship
of the CSC. Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the contested position. After the
denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Anzaldo
appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of
PEA he just affirmed his decision as the CSC chairman.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar.

HELD:

The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he was “”inclined to
concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission””, what he meant was that he
was concurring with Chairman Clave’s recommendation: he was concurring with himself. It is
evident that Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant
Clave concurred with the recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave of the Civil Service
Commission.

It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive
Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of the Civil Service
Commission. The case is analogous to Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of Appeals, L-
49711, November 7, 1979, 94 SCRA 261, where it was held that the decision of Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon, affirming his own decision in a mining
case as Director of Mines was void because it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion and
was a mockery of administrative justice

Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA Clave should
decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to who between Anzaldo
and Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the
President of the Philippines.
81) TEJANO V. OMBUDSMAN [G.R. NO. 159190, JUNE 30, 2005]

FACTS:

The instant petition stemmed from the report of Philippine National Bank (PNB) Resident
Auditor Alexander A. Tan, dated 15 October 1992, on his investigation regarding an alleged
unfunded withdrawal in the amount of P2.2 million by V&G Better Homes Subdivision (V&G)
under Savings Account No. 365-5355-6-4.

The report, as summarized by Special Prosecution Officer III Jesus A. Micael, is as follows:

. . . [I]n the morning of 17 July 1992, Emilio P. Montesa (Bank Executive Officer of PNB Cebu)
handed a note to Jane Rita Jecong (Cashier) instructing her to include her cash requisition for
the day from Central Bank - Cebu, the amount of P2.2 M at P1,000.00 denomination; that on 20
July 1992 at about past 10:00 A.M., Juanito Mata (Cashier III), upon the instruction of Cayetano
A. Tejano Jr. (Vice President and Branch Manager of PNB Cebu), took the P2.2 M from Ms.
Jecong and delivered the same to Mr. Tejano; that at about noontime of same day, Mr. Mara
handed to Ms. Jecong a pre-signed withdrawal slip against SA No. 365-535506-4 under the
name of V & G Better Homes for the same amount to replace the cash withdrawn and to serve
as cash-on-hand at the end of the day's transaction; that the withdrawal slip was approved by
Mr. Tejano and was postdated 21 July 1992; that as of 20 July 1992 V & G Better Homes SA
No. 365-535506-4 has only P33,436.78; that in the afternoon of 20 July 1992 the amount of
P2,336,563.32 (consisting of P2,200,000.00 in cash; P100,000.00 in check; and P36,563.22 in
withdrawal slip) was received by Teller Mary Ann Aznar as payment for the loan of V & G Better
Homes for which PNB Official Receipt No. 952981E was issued; that the transaction was
recognized as an increase in PNB Cebu Branch's cash-on-hand and a decrease in the loan
account of V & G Better Homes; that the PNB Cebu Credit Committee approved the loan at the
rate of 23% lower than the 26% interest rate on its first renewal and 27% on its second renewal;
that the loan proceeds was credited to the account of V & G Better Homes on 21 July 1992, the
same day that the withdrawal slip of P2.2 M was taken by Mr. Montesa from Ms. Jecong and
given to Irene Abellanosa to be taken as her transaction for the day; and that upon the
instruction of Montesa, Savings Account No. 365-535506-4 of V & G Better Homes was debited
and the withdrawal slip was validated by Teller Abellanosa although no actual cash withdrawal
was made.

The report of Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan implicated Vice President Cayetano A. Tejano,
Jr., the petitioner herein, Executive Officer Emilio Montesa, and Supervising Branch Teller Jane
Rita Jecong, all of the PNB, Cebu City Branch, including Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz
of V&G, as persons involved in the irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB funds.

In an order dated 22 December 1992, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
ordered Tejano, Montesa, Jecong, Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz to file their
respective counter-affidavits.
In a resolution dated 29 March 1993, Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton
recommended the filing of the proper information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, against petitioner Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., Juana dela Cruz and Vicente
dela Cruz of V&G. The case against Montesa and Jecong was dismissed for lack of evidence.
The resolution was approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and then
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez.

The resolution was thereafter referred for review to Special Prosecutor III Orlando I. Ines of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor.

In a Memorandum dated 25 October 1994, Ines affirmed the resolution of Graft Investigation
Officer Edgardo G. Canton.

On 28 October 1994, Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose De G. Ferrer recommended the approval
of the memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer Ines.

On 08 November 1994, Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor, concurred in the
approval of Ferrer. Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez concurred thereto on 11 November
1994.

Subsequently, on 24 November 1994, an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act
No. 3019, as amended, was filed before the Sandiganbayan, and docketed as Criminal Case
No. 21654.

On 08 December 1994, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a Period of
Time to File Motion for Reinvestigation.

In an order dated 12 December 1994, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion for
reinvestigation.

On 22 December 1994, petitioner filed his motion for reinvestigation in the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.

On 20 April 1995, the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct
the reinvestigation. The reinvestigation was assigned to Special Prosecution Officer III Jesus
Micael.

Convinced that no probable cause existed to indict petitioner Tejano, and spouses Juana and
Vicente dela Cruz, Special Prosecutor Micael, in a memorandum11 dated 03 November 1999,
recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation was approved by Deputy Special
Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos and concurred in by Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo.

On 10 December 1999, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier participated in the initial
preliminary investigation as Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation for the
dismissal of the case with the marginal note "assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute
the case aggressively."
On 02 February 2000, Special Prosecutor Micael filed a Manifestation, to which was attached a
copy of his memorandum, informing the Sandiganbayan of the disapproval by Ombudsman
Desierto of his recommendation to dismiss the case.

On 10 February 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the disapproval by

Ombudsman Desierto of the recommendation of Micael.

Apparently, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was not resolved on the merits because on
27 June 2000, Special Prosecution Officer III Joselito R. Ferrer filed a Motion to Set the Case
for Arraignment alleging therein that the prosecution did not give due course to the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that it was the second motion which is prohibited under the
Ombudsman Act of 1989. He added that the results of the reinvestigation were already
submitted to the respondent court before receiving the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner manifested before the Sandiganbayan the Office of the Special Prosecutor's failure to
resolve his motion for reconsideration. Thus, in a resolution dated 24 March 2003, the
respondent court directed the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve the said motion.

In a memorandum dated 09 June 2003, Special Prosecutor Joselito R. Ferrer recommended the
denial of the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E.
Kallos changed his previous position and recommended that the memorandum for the dismissal
of the motion for reconsideration be approved, with Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio
concurring in the denial.

On 14 July 2003, Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, who succeeded Ombudsman Desierto when
he retired, approved Joselito Ferrer's memorandum recommending the denial of the motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner thus filed the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from taking further action in Criminal Case No. 21654.

On 25 August 2003, the First Division of this Court issued the temporary restraining order
prayed for.

On 28 July 2004, the instant petition was transferred to the Second Division of this Court.

ISSUE:

Petitioner raises the following issues:

I
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISAPPROVED THE EARLIER RECOMMENDATION
FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AGAINST ALL THE ACCUSED WITHOUT ANY
COGENT OR VERIFIABLE REASON AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN
THEY:

1. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE DISAPPROVAL

OF THE RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1999 - AGAINST ALL ACCUSED FOR LACK
OF PROBABLE CAUSE AS MANDATED UNDER SECTION 13 R.A. 6770 IN RELATION TO
SECTION 3, RULE 112 OF THE RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

2. THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROCECUTOR DID NOT DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF

PROBABLE CAUSE IN A RESOLUTION DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION FOR APPROVAL BY THE NEW OMBUDSMAN.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE FILED AGAINST THE ACCUSED IS A CLEAR CASE OF
PERSECUTION AND NOT PROSECUTION CONTEMPLATED UNDER R.A. 3019, AS
AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1374 AND CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII, BOOK II OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE

CASE.

RULING

Quite apart from the above, we find a focal issue apparently glossed over by the parties -
whether or not Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion in disapproving the
03 November 1999 memorandum of Special Prosecutor Jesus Micael recommending the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 21654 against petitioner Tejano, and spouses Juana and
Vicente dela Cruz of V&G for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, where he had
earlier participated in the preliminary investigation of the said criminal case recommending the
filing of the information.

This Court has been consistent in holding that it will not interfere with the Ombudsman's
exercise of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers, and respect the
initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who "beholden to no one, acts as the
champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service." Such discretionary
power of the Ombudsman is beyond the domain of this Court to review, save in cases where
there is clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction of
the latter.

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of
the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

Ombudsman Desierto, in this case, committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner attributes
partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the
instant case despite the fact that he earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of
the same when he was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for the filing
of the information before the Sandiganbayan.

We agree with the petitioner. Steadfastly, we have ruled that the officer who reviews a case on
appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review. In Zambales Chromite
Mining Company v. Court of Appeals, the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned an
appeal of the Secretary's own previous decision, which he handed down while he was yet the
incumbent Director of Mines. We have equally declared void a decision rendered by the Second
Division of the National Labor Relations Commission, because one of its members,
Commissioner Raul Aquino, participated in the review of the case which he had earlier decided
on as a former labor arbiter. Likewise, this Court struck down a decision of Presidential
Executive Assistance Jacobo Clave over a resolution of the Civil Service Commission, in which
he, then concurrently its Chairman, had earlier concurred.

Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the instant case and having
recommended the filing of an appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman Desierto to
recuse himself from participating in the review of the same during the reinvestigation. He should
have delegated the review to his Deputies pursuant to Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 6770, which
provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. 'The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:

...

(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as
shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions and duties herein or
hereinafter provided; . . .

In earlier recommending the filing of information, then Special Prosecutor Desierto was already
convinced, from that moment, that probable cause exists to indict the accused. It becomes a
farfetched possibility that in a subsequent review of the same, Ombudsman Desierto would
make a turnabout and take a position contradictory to his earlier finding.

Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not review his decision on
appeal. We take our bearings from Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals which
succinctly explained that:

In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out
to be farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision
is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real
review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view;
inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was
mistaken in his first view of the case.

Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government concedes the applicability of

the prohibition on the reviewing officer to handle a case he earlier decided, thus:

Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in the objectivity and impartiality of the
judge, such judge should inhibit voluntarily or if he refuses, he should be prohibited from
handling the case. A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear impartial as an
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. His actuation must inspire that belief. This
is an instance when appearance is as important as reality.

The same rule of thumb should apply to an investigating officer conducting a preliminary
investigation. This is the reason why under Section 1679 of the former Revised Administrative
Code, the Secretary of Justice, who has supervision over the prosecution arm of the
government, is given ample power to designate another prosecutor to handle the investigation
and prosecution of a case when the prosecutor handling the same is otherwise disqualified by
personal interest, or is unable or fails to perform his duty. (Underlining supplied)
The fact that the motion for reconsideration of Ombudsman Desierto's disapproval of the 03
November 1999 memorandum of Special Prosecutor Jesus Micael recommending the dismissal
of Criminal Case No. 21654 was denied by another reviewing officer, Ombudsman Marcelo,
does not cure the infirmity of Ombudsman Desierto's actuation. As stressed in Singson v.
NLRC:

. . . The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for reconsideration of
the petitioner was denied by two commissioners and without the participation of Commissioner
Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed
his appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. The denial
of petitioner's right to an impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his
right to due process. (Underlining supplied)

With the foregoing conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the Ombudsman's disapproval of the memorandum dated 03 November 1999,

where Prosecutor Jesus A. Micael of the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 21654, as well as the memorandum dated 09 June 2003, which
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the
Office of the Ombudsman for further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

82) Tumey vs. Ohio [273 U.S. 510 (1997)]

83) People vs. Court of Appeals [262 SCRA 452 (1996)]

84) Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan [268 SCRA 332 (1997)]

PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY

85) SHEPPARD V. MAXWELL [384 U.S. 333 (1966)]

RULE:

Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside
influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing
prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to
ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused. And appellate tribunals have the
duty to make an independent evaluation of the circumstances. Of course, there is nothing that
proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom. But where there is a
reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should
continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with
publicity. In addition, sequestration of the jury is something the judge should raise sua sponte
with counsel. If publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial
should be ordered. Reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that
will prevent the prejudice at its inception.

FACTS:

Defendant Sheppard, accused of murdering his wife, was tried before a jury in the Court of
Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Both before and during the trial, which began two
weeks before an election in which the trial judge and the chief prosecutor were candidates for
judgeships, defendant was the subject of extensive newspaper, radio, and television publicity.
The publicity included many matters unfavorable to the defendant which were never presented
in court. The trial judge denied various requests by defense counsel for a continuance, change
of venue, mistrial, and interrogation of the jurors as to their exposure to the publicity. During the
trial, which lasted over two months, reporters were seated at a press table inside the bar, a few
feet from the jury box; the corridors, the rooms throughout the courthouse, and most of the
seats in the courtroom were filled with representatives of the news media; newsmen handled
and photographed trial exhibits lying on the counsel table; radio broadcasting was done from a
room next to the room where the jury recessed and deliberated; courtroom proceedings that
were supposed to be private were overheard and reported by the press; and the noise of
newsmen moving in and out of the courtroom made it difficult for counsel and witnesses to be
heard. Before trial, the names and addresses of the jurors were published, and they received
letters and phone calls concerning the case. During the jurors' deliberation at the end of the trial,
they were permitted to make phone calls. Prospective witnesses were interviewed by the news
media, which in many instances disclosed their testimony, and the full verbatim testimony of
witnesses who had testified was available in the press to witnesses who had not yet testified.
The trial judge made no effort to control the release of leads, information, and gossip to the
press by the prosecuting attorneys, the coroner, police officers, or witnesses. Defendant was
convicted of second degree murder, his conviction of which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals of Cuyahoga County and the Ohio Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari. Several years later, Sheppard filed a petition for habeas corpus proceedings in
the federal district court, which held that Sheppard had been denied a fair trial and was entitled
to be released. The State was granted 60 days within which to take further action against him,
but the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed by a divided vote. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.

ISSUE:
Did Sheppard receive a fair trial consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?

ANSWER:

No

CONCLUSION:

The Court concluded that Sheppard did not receive a fair trial consistent with the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court could not say that Sheppard was denied
due process by the trial judge's refusal to take precautions against the influence of pretrial
publicity alone, the trial judge's later rulings had to be considered against the setting in which
the trial was held. In light of this background, the Court believed that the arrangements made by
the trial court with the news media caused Sheppard to be deprived of that judicial serenity and
calm to which he was entitled. There was no doubt that the deluge of publicity reached at least
some of the jury. The trial court did not fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the inherently
prejudicial publicity that saturated the community and to control disruptive influences in the
courtroom.

86) WEBB V. DE LEON [247 SCRA 652 (1995)]

FACTS:

Hubert Webb was one of the accused in the high-profile case Vizconde massacre. Preliminary
investigation was provided by NBI and the case was raffled to Judge Zosimo Escano who
inhibited himself from the case for being employed with NBI before. His pair Judge Escano
issued warrant of arrest to defendants. The case was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by
Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest. Webb and the others voluntarily
surrendered. They files before the court petition of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. They
contend that (1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when
they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them:
(2) the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause
to charge them with the crime of rape with homicide; (3) the DOJ Panel denied them their
constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation; and (4) the DOJ Panel
unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the
Information as an accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the attendant publicity deprived Webb and the others of their right to fair trial?
DECISION:

Petition dismissed.

To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the
case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content, of the
publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality
of the DOJ Panel.

Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the
DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel
is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long
experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can
easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity.

Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear
that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the
parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the
generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of
their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of
the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity.

87) PEOPLE V. SANCHEZ (G.R. NO. 121039, OCTOBER 18, 2001)

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Antonio Sanchez and others were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape with homicide. In his motion for reconsideration, he avers that he is a victim of
trial and conviction by publicity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the attendant publicity deprived Webb and the others of their right to fair trial?

DECISION:

We cannot sustain appellant’s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to
prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive
publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the
right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the
records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a
consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed position as a
result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during
the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the
burden.

Issues:

Mayor Antonio Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and conviction by publicity... the
principal witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan presented by the prosecution are
lacking in credibility... the testimony of his 13-year old daughter vis-à-vis his whereabouts on the
night of the felony should have been given full faith and credit as against the testimony of
Centeno and Malabanan

Ruling:

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact
that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself
prove that publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and... impaired his impartiality... Our
judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts
does not per se fatally infect their... impartiality.

This failure to present proof of actual bias continues to hound accused-appellant Sanchez,
having failed, in his motion for reconsideration, to substantiate his claims of actual bias on the
part of the trial judge. Not only that, accused-appellant's case has been... exhaustively and
painstakingly reviewed by the Court itself. Accused-appellant Sanchez has not shown by an
iota of proof that the Court, in the examination of his appeal, was unduly swayed by publicity in
affirming the sentence of conviction imposed by the trial court. The... charge of conviction by
publicity leveled by accused-appellant has thus no ground to stand on.

As to the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of Centeno and Malabanan, suffice it to say
that the points raised have all been carefully and assiduously examined, not only by the trial
court but also by the Court itself, and that the inconsistencies were found to refer to... minor and
collateral matters. It is well-settled that so long as the witnesses' declarations agree on
substantial matters, the inconsequential inconsistencies and contradictions dilute neither the
witnesses' credibility nor the verity of their testimony

Accused-appellant Sanchez's argument that the testimony of his 13-year old daughter, Ave
Marie Sanchez, as to his whereabouts on the night of the crime should be given full faith and
credence is likewise unavailing. While it is true that statements of children are accorded... great
probative value, it is likewise true that alibi is the weakest defense an accused can concoct.
Where nothing supports the alibi except the testimony of a relative, it deserves but scant
consideration

ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

88) ANG TIBAY VS. CIR (G.R. NO. L-46496, FEBRUARY 27, 1940)

FACTS:
Teodoro Toribio owns and
operates Ang Tibay, a leather
company which supplies the
Philippine Army.
Due to an alleged shortage of
leather, Toribio caused the lay off
of a number of his employees.
However,
the National Labor Union, Inc.
(NLU) questioned the validity of
said lay off as it averred that the
said
employees laid off were members
of NLU while no members of the
rival labor union (National
Worker’s
Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU
claims that NWB is a company
dominated union and Toribio was
merely
busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of
Industrial Relations (CIR) where
Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU
went to the Supreme Court
invoking its right to a new trial on
the ground of newly discovered
evidence.
The Court granted a new trial.
Thus, the Solicitor General,
arguing for the CIR, filed a motion
for
reconsideration.
The petitioner has filed an
opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent
National
Labor Union, Inc.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Labor
Union (respondent) is entitled to a
new trial.
HELD:
YES. The records show that the
newly discovered evidence or
documents obtained by NLU,
which they
attached to their petition with the
Supreme Court, were evidence so
inaccessible to them at the time of
the trial that even with the exercise
of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the
Court of Industrial Relations.
Further, the attached documents
and exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that
their
admission would necessarily mean
the modification and reversal of
the judgment rendered (said newly
FACTS:
Teodoro Toribio owns and
operates Ang Tibay, a leather
company which supplies the
Philippine Army.
Due to an alleged shortage of
leather, Toribio caused the lay off
of a number of his employees.
However,
the National Labor Union, Inc.
(NLU) questioned the validity of
said lay off as it averred that the
said
employees laid off were members
of NLU while no members of the
rival labor union (National
Worker’s
Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU
claims that NWB is a company
dominated union and Toribio was
merely
busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of
Industrial Relations (CIR) where
Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU
went to the Supreme Court
invoking its right to a new trial on
the ground of newly discovered
evidence.
The Court granted a new trial.
Thus, the Solicitor General,
arguing for the CIR, filed a motion
for
reconsideration.
The petitioner has filed an
opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent
National
Labor Union, Inc.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Labor
Union (respondent) is entitled to a
new trial.
HELD:
YES. The records show that the
newly discovered evidence or
documents obtained by NLU,
which they
attached to their petition with the
Supreme Court, were evidence so
inaccessible to them at the time of
the trial that even with the exercise
of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the
Court of Industrial Relations.
Further, the attached documents
and exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that
their
admission would necessarily mean
the modification and reversal of
the judgment rendered (said newly
FACTS:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to an alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his
employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off
as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the
rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a
company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right to a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. The Court granted a new trial. Thus, the Solicitor General, arguing
for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

The petitioner has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
NationalLabor Union, Inc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Labor Union (respondent) is entitled to a new trial.

HELD:

YES. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU,
which they attached to their petition with the Supreme Court, were evidence so inaccessible to
them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.

Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect
that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang
Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).

The Supreme Court also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly
bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply with the requirements of due
process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the
following:

(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be“substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate inarriving at a decision.

(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it. Therefore, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is
hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant
and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove.

89) MERALCO VS. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION (G.R. NO. L-13638-40, JUNE 30, 1964)

FACTS:

Meralco filed two applications to PSC for revision and reduction of rates for commercial (85889)
and non-residential and residential (85890) customers w/c were approved. They also applied for
revision nd reduction of its general power rate (89293), the same was approved as well.
Meralco filed seven additional applications.

The commission sought General Auditing Office to examine Meralco’s book of accounts. The
commission reset the hearing for considering such further revision of applicant’s rates. During
the hearing, the Chief of Finance and Rate Division announced that it was an ‘informal hearing’
and the purpose was to hear any statement of the parties and to define the issues. The
Commission through Dr Pedro Gil then submitted the 3 cases and asked the commission to
allow Meralco a rate of *% return. Soc-gen submitted the same report to Deputy Auditor General
adnd aske Meralco was asked to answer w/in 30 days.

Meralco contend that cases should be reset because they were not given the opportunity to
cross-examine the GAO report and to present evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the informal hearing serves the purpose of “proper notice and hearing” in
administrative cases.

RULING:

No.

The record shows that no hearing was held. On 22 June 1956, parties appeared before
"Attorney Vivencio L. Peralta, Technical Assistant, and Chief, Finance and Rate Division, Public
Service Commission, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence of the parties", and the
record shows that the hearing held before the said Commissioner was merely an informal
hearing because, using his own words, "I said at the beginning that this is only preliminary
because I want that the parties could come to some kind of understanding."

Meralco has not been given its day in court. The decision of 27 December 1957 was not
promulgated "upon proper notice and hearing", as required by law, and that therefore it can not
serve as a legal basis for requiring the Meralco to put in effect the reductions ordered in the
decision. It is the cardinal right of a party in trials and administrative proceedings to be heard,
which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof and to have such evidence presented considered by the tribunal.
Even if the Commission is not bound by the rules of judicial proceedings, it must how its head to
the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of right without due process of law,
which binds not only the government of the Republic, but also each and everyone of its
branches, agencies, etc.

WHEREFORE, We set aside the decision of the respondent Public Service Commission of
December 27, 1957 and the order of March 3, 1958, and remand the records of the above
entitled cases to the Commission for further proceedings, and to render judgment accordingly.
No costs.

90) LUMIQUED VS. EXEVEA (G.R. NO. 117565, NOVEMBER 18, 1997)

FACTS:
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of The Department of Agrarian Reform –
Cordillera Autonomous Region.

On Nov. 16, 1989 Jeannette Ober Zamudio charged Lumiqued with Malversation through
falsification of public documents. He allegedly falsified gasoline receipts amounting to Php
44,172.46 and made unliquidated cash advances amounting to Php 116,000.00. Zamudio also
charged him with oppression and harassment after being relieved without just cause after filing
the 2 cases against Lumiqued.

May 20, 1992 Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo Montenegro issued Department Order No. 145,
creating a committee to investigate complaints against Lumiqued.

June 23, 1992 Lumiqued submitted his affidavit alleging that the reason the cases were filed
against him was to extort money from him. He also admitted that his average daily consumption
was 108.45Li which is an aggregate consumption of the 5 service vehicle issued to him and that
the receipts were turned over to him by drivers for reimbursement.

July 3 and 10 Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted and Lumiqued was not
assisted by a counsel since he was confident that he can defend himself.

July 17, 1992 he was unable to attend the third hearing since he suffered a stroke on July 10.

July 31, 1992 Investigating Committee issued a report finding Lumiqued liable for all charges
against him

December 17, 1992 Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration.

April 1, 1993 The Committee informed Lumiqued that the report was already forwarded to the
President.

May 12, 1993 President Ramos issued AO No 52 finding Lumiqued administratively liable for
dishonesty in the alteration of 15 gas receipts and he was dismissed from service.

August 31, 1993 Lumiqued filed a Petition for appeal which was denied. He then file a second
motion for reconsideration, alleging that he was denied constitutional right to counsel during the
hearing.

September 28, 1993 The second motion was denied.

May 19, 1994 Lumiqued passed away.

Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to
counsel during the hearing. They maintained that his right to counsel could not be waived
unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of a counsel.

ISSUE:
WON the right to have a counsel during an administrative hearing is necessary.

HELD:

NO.

Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the executive branch of the

government, graduated from the University of the Philippines (Los Baos) with the degree of
Bachelor of Science major in Agriculture, was a recipient of various scholarships and grants,
and underwent training seminars both here and abroad. Hence, he could have defended himself
if need be, without the help of counsel, if the truth were on his side. This, apparently, was the
thought he entertained during the hearings he was able to attend.

The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or
the law.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain
one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even
much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. An
actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. As long as a party was
given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been
denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process.
Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity
to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Lumiqued’s appeal and his
subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the
proceedings conducted by the committee.

ACADEMIC DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

91) NON VS. HON. DAMES (G.R. NO. 89317, MAY 30, 1990)

FACTS:

Petitioners (Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano, Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes
Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Emmanuel Barba, Sonny Moreno. Giovani Palma, Joselito Villalon,
Luis Santos and Daniel Torres), students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte,
were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or
participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. They thus
filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Daet (Branch 38) seeking their re-admission or re-
enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition in an order dated 8 August
1988.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on 24 February
1989; stating that they waived-their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent
college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school
year 1988-89.

In addition, for the same semester, they duly signed pledges "to abide and comply with all the
rules and regulations laid down by competent authorities in the College Department or School in
which I am enrolled."

Hence, the affected students filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

WON there was a violation of the students’ right to freedom of speech and assembly.

HELD:

YES. The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued
with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the
grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions.

The authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which
has a term of one semester, has already expired, cannot be justified. Still, institutions' discretion
on the admission and enrollment of students as a major component of the academic freedom
guaranteed to institutions of higher learning.

The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards, however, cannot be
utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and
assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection.

Thus, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair
opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue.

However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required
academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the court should not review the
discretion of university authorities. Excluding students because of failing grades when the cause
for the action taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only
is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play.
Further, the failures in one or two subjects by some cannot be considered marked academic
deficiency. Neither can the academic deficiency be gauged from the academic standards of the
school due to an insufficiency of information. Herein, the students could have been subjected to
disciplinary proceedings in connection with the mass actions, but the penalty that could have
been imposed must be commensurate to the offense committed and it must be imposed only
after the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with (Paragraph 145,
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools).

But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative sanctions have
become moot and academic. Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or re-enrollment
and who have been effectively excluded from respondent school for four (4) semesters, have
already been more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have
committed when they led and participated in the mass actions that, according to respondents,
resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary proceedings would
serve no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the strained relations between
petitioners and the officials of respondent school which necessarily resulted from the heated
legal battle here, in the Court of Appeals and before the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of respondent judge dated August 8, 1988
and February 24, 1989 are hereby ANNULLED. Respondent Mabini College is ORDERED to
readmit and to allow the re- enrollment of petitioners, if they are still so minded, without
prejudice to its taking the appropriate action as to petitioners Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon, George
(Jorge) Dayaon and Daniel Torres, if it is shown by their records (Form 137) that they have
failed to satisfy the school's prescribed academic standards.

92) MONTEMAYOR VS. ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION (G.R. NO. L-44251, MAY 31,
1977)

FACTS:

Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation. On 7/8/74, he was found guilty
of making homosexual advances on one Leonardo De Lara by a faculty investigating
committee.

On 11/8/74, another committee was appointed to investigate another charge of a similar nature
against petitioner. Petitioner, through counsel, asked for the postponement of the hearing set
for 11/18 and 19, 1974, but the motion was denied.

The committee then proceeded to hear the testimony of the complainants and on 12/5/74,
submitted its report recommending the separation of petitioner from the University. On
12/12/74, the University applied w/ the NLRC for clearance to terminate petitioner’s
employment. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a complaint w/ the NLRC for reinstatement and
backwages. Judgement was rendered in petitioner’s favor, but on appeal to the Sec. of Labor,
the latter found petitioner’s dismissal to be justified.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Does academic freedom include the right of schools to dismiss teachers?

RULING:

Yes. Institutional academic freedom was vindicated in this case, where, against the plea of
academic freedom and security of tenure of a professor, the school was allowed to separate a
professor who after due process had been found guilty of violating behavioral standards.

The stand taken by petitioner as to his being entitled to security of tenure is reinforced by the
provision on academic freedom which, as noted, is found in the Constitution. It was pointed out
in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission, Committee that academic freedom “is more often Identified
with the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter
to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be
visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the
powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments. For the
sociologist, Robert Maclver, it is ‘a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as
investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being
subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are
unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution.” Tenure, according
to him, is of the essence of such freedom. For him, without tenure that assures a faculty
member “against dismissal or professional penalization on grounds other than professional
incompetence or conduct that in the judgment of his colleagues renders him unfit” for
membership in the faculty, the academic right becomes non-existent, Security of tenure, for
another scholar, Love joy, is “the chief practical requisite for academic freedom” of a university
professor. As with Maclver, he did not rule out removal but only “for some grave cause,”
Identified by him as “proved incompetence or moral delinquency.”

Issue: Whether or not the proceeding relating to Montemayor’s dismissal was done in violation
of due process?
Decision: Petition dismissed. In Montemayor’s absence the matter was heard and was
sufficiently found by the committee to be guilty of his conduct unbecoming and recommended
his removal. Such deficiency was remedied when Montemayor was able to present his case
with the Labour Commission. Records will show that after all efforts on conciliation had failed
parties agreed to submit their dispute for compulsory arbitration. Several hearings were
conducted. he legal aspect as to the procedural due process having been satisfied was then
summarized by the Solicitor General thus: “All the foregoing clearly shows that petitioner was
afforded his day in court. Finally, and more significant, is the fact that petitioner claims denial of
due process in the proceeding had before the investigating committees and not in the
proceedings before the NLRC wherein, as shown heretofore, he was given the fullest
opportunity to present his case.

93) ATENEO VS. CA (G.R. NO. L-56180, OCTOBER 16, 1986)

FACTS:

In a letter-complaint dated December 13, 1967 addressed to Rev. William Welsh S.J., Dean of
Men, Dean of Resident Students, and Chairman of the Board of Discipline, College of Arts and
Sciences, Ateneo de Manila, Carmelita Mateo, a waitress in the cafeteria of Cervini Hall inside
the university campus charged Juan Ramon Guanzon, son of private respondents Romeo
Guanzon and Teresita Regalado, and a boarder and first year student of the university with
unbecoming conduct committed on December 12, 1967 at about 5:15 in the evening at the
Cervini Hall’s cafeteria.

That Mr. Guanzon struck the complainant in the left temple. The university conducted an
investigation of the slapping incident. On the basis of the investigation results, Juan Ramon was
dismissed from the university. The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the filing of a
complaint for damages by his parents against the university in the Court stating that Juan
Ramon was expelled from school without giving him a fair trial in violation of his right to due
process and that they are prominent and well known residents of Bacolod City, with the
unceremonious expulsion of their son causing them actual, moral, and exemplary damages as
well as attorney’s fees.

After due trial, the lower court found for the Guanzons and ordered the university to pay them
P92.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and to
pay the costs of the suit. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the trial court’s
decision was initially reversed and set aside. The complaint was dismissed.

However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Guanzons, the appellate court reversed
its decision and set it aside through a special division of five. In the resolution issued by the
appellate court, the lower court’s decision was reinstated. The motion for reconsideration had to
be referred to a special division of five in view of the failure to reach unanimity on the resolution
of the motion, the vote of the regular division having become 2 to 1. adrianantazo.
ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner deprived the respondent due process in the administrative proceeding?

HELD:

No, the respondent was accorded administrative due process in his dismissal cases according
to the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due
process are:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them;

(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel,
if desired:

(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;

(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and

(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

When the letter-complaint was read to respondent, he admitted the altercation with the waitress
and his slapping her on the face. petitioner did not stop with the admission. The Board of
Discipline was made up of distinguished members of the faculty and there is nothing in the
records to cast any doubt on their competence and impartiality insofar as this disciplinary
investigation is concerned. respondent himself appeared before the Board of Discipline. He
admitted incident, then begged to be excused so he could catch the boat for Bacolod City. Juan
Ramon, therefore, was given notice of the proceedings; he actually appeared to present his
side; the investigating board acted fairly and objectively; and all requisites of administrative due
process were met.

94) ALCUAZ VS. PSBA (G.R. NO. 76353 MAY 2, 1988)

FACTS:

Petitioner bonafide students of PSBA QC staged demonstrations in the premises of the school.

An agreement between the school and the students was entered into about the regulations for
the conduct of protest action. In spite of the agreement, it was alleged that the petitioners,
committed tumultuous and anarchic acts within the premises of the school, with the cooperation
of the intervening professors, causing disruption of classes to the prejudice of the majority
students.

The school took administrative sanctions upon them in view of their participation in the
demonstration which caused the admission denial of the students for the second semester and
the dismissal of the intervening professors.

ISSUE:

W/N there has been deprivation of due process for petitioners-students who have been barred
from re-enrollment and for intervenors-teachers whose services have been terminated as faculty
members, on account of their participation in the demonstration or protest charged by
respondents

RULING:

No. There is no denial of due process.

PSBA-Q.C. no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening
teachers. When a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for
the entire semester. After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any
existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. The contract having
been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to
enter into another contract with said students and teachers.

The Supreme Court held that due process in disciplinary cases such as the case at bar does not
entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in the
courts of justice. The Court has already recognized the right of the school to refuse re-
enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations. In the
school’s administrative process, both students and professors were given three (3) days from
receipt of letter to explain in writing why the school should not take administrative sanction
against them.

With respect to the academic activities of the students and the teaching loads of the teachers,
while the investigation is on-going, the respondent school has created new class for the
petitioners and the intervening professors.

The Court then upheld that there is no denial of due process where all requirements of
administrative due process were met by the school and the students were given the opportunity
to be heard and that the right of expression and assembly are not absolute especially when
parties are bound to certain rules under a contract.
Petition is dismissed but in the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of the
absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school year when this
petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time.

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

This will be discussed in the Module on the Rights

MODULE 2-A-3. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY DUE PROCESS

95) AGABON VS. NLRC (G.R. NO. 158693, NOVEMBER 17, 2004)

FACTS:

Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. (RHI Inc.) is engaged in the business of selling and installing
ornamental and construction materials. It employed Virgilio and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board
and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for
abandonment of work.
Virgilio and Jenny then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims. The
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on December 28, 1999 declaring the dismissals illegal and it
ordered RHI Inc. to pay the monetary claims.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that the petitioners had
abandoned their work, and were not entitled to backwages and separation pay. The other
money claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter were also denied for lack of evidence.

The NLRC denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Agabon’s thus they filed a petition
for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was
not illegal because they had abandoned their employment but it ordered the payment of money
claims.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or Not the Riviera Home Improvements Inc. should be held liable for non-compliance
with the procedural requirements of due process?

RULING:

YES, Rivera Home Improvements Inc. should be held liable for non-compliance with the
procedural requirements of due process.

Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due process, has two aspects:
substantive, i.e., the valid and authorized causes of employment termination under the Labor
Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal. Procedural due process requirements for
dismissal are found in the Implementing Rules of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as
the Labor Code of the Philippines in Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 2, as amended by Department Order
Nos. 9 and 10. Breaches of these due process requirements violate the Labor Code. Therefore
statutory due process should be differentiated from failure to comply with constitutional due
process.

Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his
rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process found in the
Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated without
just cause after notice and hearing. Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause
under Article 282, the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or
opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a
notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be
heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if
the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must
give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior
to the effectivity of his separation.

From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just
cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for
health reasons under Article 284, and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without
just or authorized cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or
authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized
cause but due process was not observed. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice
requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have
been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private
respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to
the employee's last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the
procedural requirements of due process.

As enunciated by this Court in Viernes v. National Labor Relations Commissions, an employer

is liable to pay indemnity in the form of nominal damages to an employee who has been
dismissed if, in effecting such dismissal, the employer fails to comply with the requirements of
due process

The violation of the petitioners' right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants
the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances.
Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at
P30,000.00. We believe this form of damages would serve to deter employers from future
violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a
vindication or recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code
and its Implementing Rules.

MODULE 2-A-4. JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW (TESTS)

 Strict Scrutiny Test

 Intermediate Scrutiny

 Rational Basis Test

96) WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION VS. CITY OF MANILA (G.R. NO. 122846, JANUARY 20,
2009)
FACTS:

Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed an Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels,
motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.

The City claims that it is a legitimate exercise of police power.

Herein petitioners, assails the validity and constitutionality of the ordinance arguing that it
violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police
power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

The RTC declared the ordinance null and void, thus, the City of Manila elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the RTC ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

RULING:

The court ruled in the negative.

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila
has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and (6) must not be unreasonable.

The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those
means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its
guarantees to the people.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the equal protection rights of the Petitioners are also being interfered
with the said city ordinance.

HELD:

RATIO:

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of
Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers
of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

Due process evades a precise definition. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent
arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The
due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even
corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is
concerned.

In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard
for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the
regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws
dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as
expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.

Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten

Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be done; but rather an
atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as
they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them
as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.

97) WILLIAMSON VS. LEE OPTICAL OF OKLAHOMA [348 US 483 (1955)]

FACTS:

An Oklahoma state law made it unlawful for any person not licensed as an optometrist or
ophthalmologist in the state to fit lenses to a face or fashion existing lenses into a frame unless
given a prescription by a state-licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist. Lee Optical (plaintiff) of
Oklahoma brought suit in district court against Williamson (defendant), the official charged with
enforcing the Oklahoma state law, on the grounds that it violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court upheld the aspects of the
law that prevented an unlicensed person to provide eye examinations as constitutional, but held
unconstitutional the requirement of a prescription for an optician to simply place old lenses into
new frames. The district court reasoned that an optician’s performance of this task did not pose
a significant health and safety risk to the public, and thus the Oklahoma’s regulation of this
activity was not reasonably and rationally related to a health and safety interest. Williamson
appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Did the Oklahoma law violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

RULING:

In a unanimous decision authored by William Orville Douglas, the Court held that while the law
may have been "needless" and "wasteful," it was the duty of the legislature, not the courts, "to
balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement." That is, Courts should not
be able to invalidate state economic regulations on the grounds that they disagree with the
theories supporting them. Even if the state law imposes burdens or waste, the legislature has
the sole authority over weighing its benefits against its costs. In sum, the opticians could not
prove that the law had no rational relationship to legitimate state objectives.

WILLIAMSON V. LEE OPTICAL OF OKLAHOMA, INC. - UNITED STATES SUPREME

COURT - 348 U.S. 483 (1955)

RULE OF LAW: A state may regulate a business if its legislature determines there is a
particular health and safety problem at hand and that the regulation in question is a rational way
to correct the problem.

1) FACTS AND RELEVANT BACKGROUND-[material facts]

An Oklahoma state law made it unlawful for any person not licensed as an
optometrist or ophthalmologist in the state to fit lenses to a face or fashion existing lenses into
a frame unless given a prescription by a state-licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist [plus no
leases to anyone who offered services of eye examination].

Lee Optical (plaintiff) of Oklahoma sued in district court against Williamson (defendant), the
official charged with enforcing the Oklahoma state law, on the grounds that it violated the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. [procedural history]. The
district court upheld the aspects of the law that prevented an unlicensed person to provide eye
examinations as constitutional, but held unconstitutional the requirement of a prescription for an
optician to simply place old lenses into new frames [no rationally related to the health issue].
The district court reasoned that an optician’s performance of this task did not pose a significant
health and safety risk to the public, and thus the Oklahoma’s regulation of this activity was not
reasonably and rationally related to a health and safety interest. Williamson appealed the
decision to the United States Supreme Court.

2) LEGAL ISSUE

May a state law prohibit the fitting of lenses by an optician without prescriptive authority from a
licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist without violating the Fourteenth Amendment?

3) HOLDING (DOUGLAS)

YES.

4) RATIONALE

(i) INTERPRETATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Section 1: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws

DUE PROCESS CLAUSE IS A BODY OF SUBSTANTIVE LIBERTIES AND RIGHTS.

WHAT’S INCLUDED? STATES’ POWERS:

States may (i) impose reasonable conditions on the right to contract that further
the health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens;(ii) prohibit contracts which violate
either a federal or state statute, or contracts to use one’s personal property for immoral
or illegal purposes; (iii) Regulate certain types of employment OR ACTIVITIES.

It is a decision for the state legislature, not the judiciary, to balance the advantages and
disadvantages of the prescription requirement. In conducting this balancing, the
legislature could have reasonably concluded that prescriptions are needed often enough
to justify requiring them in every case where lenses are brought to an optician.

(ii) APPLICATION TO THIS CASE – RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW Prescriptions might not be
required in every case, but this is not the test under the Constitution for upholding the law.

Rather, it is sufficient that there is a particular health and safety evil at hand for correction and
that the particular legislative measure is a rational way to correct it. The legislature made a
rational determination that the law is needed in the present case, and the judgment of the
district court is reversed.

5) CONCLUSION

A state may regulate a business if its legislature determines there is a particular health and
safety problem at hand and that the regulation in question is a rational way to correct the
problem.
 MODULE 2-A-5. DOCTRINES AND CHALLENGES

VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE

AS-APPLIED CHALLENGE

FACIAL CHALLENGE

98) SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC. VS. ANTI-TERRORISM

COUNCIL [G.R. NOS. 178552, 178581, 178890, 179157 & 179461 (OCTOBER 5, 2010)]
FACTS:

Six petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as the
Human Security Act of 2007 for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. They argue
that the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like “widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure
the prohibited acts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth finds application in

RA9372?

RULING:

No, it does not.

A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of
constitutional litigation are rightly accepted. RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

Criminal statutes have general in terrorism effect resulting from their very existence, and, if
facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting
laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances
as in the area of free speech.

The over breadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.

99) DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE (G.R. NO. 203335, FEBRUARY 11, 2014)

FACTS:

These are consolidated petitions seeking to declare several provisions of R.A. No. 10175 (The
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012), unconstitutional and void.

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Petitioners claim that
the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities
violate certain of their constitutional rights.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE CYBERCRIME PREVENTION ACT
ARE CONSTITUTIONAL INSOFAR AS THEY REGARD CERTAIN ACTS AS CRIMES AND
IMPOSE PENALTIES FOR THEIR COMMISSION AS WELL AS WOULD ENABLE
GOVERNMENT TO TRACK DOWN AND PENALIZE VIOLATORS

RULING:

Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access is NOT unconstitutional.

Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of
laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people and should thus be struck down.

The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct,
useful in determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons.
According to this standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class
is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest. Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws
dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights, as
expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.

Strict Scrutiny Standard not applicable in Illegal Access provision.

The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny
standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially
a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a universally
condemned conduct.

Engagement of ethical hackers requires an agreement, therefore, insulating him from the
coverage of Section 4(a)(1).

Petitioners fear that this section will jeopardize the work of ethical hackers, professionals who
employ tools and techniques used by criminal hackers but would neither damage the target
systems nor steal information. Ethical hackers evaluate the target system’s security and report
back to the owners the vulnerabilities they found in it and give instructions for how these can be
remedied. Ethical hackers are the equivalent of independent auditors who come into an
organization to verify its bookkeeping records.

Besides, the client’s engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as
to the extent of the search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested. This is
referred to as the “get out of jail free card.” Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior
permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from the coverage of Section
4(a)(1).

Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference is NOT unconstitutional.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to
discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression,
creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state
regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby
invading the area of protected freedoms. But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these
freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of willfully
destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data,
electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed
freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private
documents.

Petitioners fail to discharge the burden of proving that the provision is invalid under the
Overbreadth Doctrine.

All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem
effect or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to
step beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal
laws because they instill such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and
penalizing socially harmful conduct. Here, the chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion
since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency
to intimidate the free exercise of one’s constitutional rights.

Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that
under no set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid. Petitioner has failed to discharge this
burden.

No Equal Protection violation under Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause in
that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate
as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary
device. For example, supposing there exists a well-known billionaire-philanthropist named “Julio
Gandolfo,” the law would punish for cyber-squatting both the person who registers such name
because he claims it to be his pseudo-name and another who registers the name because it
happens to be his real name. Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial distinction
between the two, the law should recognize the difference.
But there is no real difference whether he uses “Julio Gandolfo” which happens to be his real
name or use it as a pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the name that the
law condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad
faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the
rightful opportunity of registering the same. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)
(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.

Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft is NOT unconstitutional

Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to
privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.

The right to privacy

The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as
a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. But
the Court acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc, it ruled that the right
to privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself deserving of
constitutional protection.

Zones of Privacy

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of
intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal
process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction
that the right to privacy is a “constitutional right” and “the right most valued by civilized men,” but
also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that,
“no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy” and “every has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”

Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy
of communication and correspondence. In assessing the challenge that the State has
impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person
has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion.

No showing how the provision violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the
right to due process of the law.

The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his
residence address, his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if
any, his occupation, and similar data. The law punishes those who acquire or use such
identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show
how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and
correspondence as well as the right to due process of the law.

Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold
water since the specific conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like
speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions, the acquisition, use, misuse or
deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire
another’s personal data.

Section does not violate freedom of the press

Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists
would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to
secure information about him that could be published. But this is not the essence of identity theft
that the law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of identity information must be
intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminating information made
public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of theft.

The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through the
overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property
pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the
perpetrator. As such, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation, has
nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required
by this Section.
Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex does NOT violate freedom of expression

Petitioners claim that the section violates freedom of expression. They express fear that private
communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are
not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done “for
favor” in cyberspace. In common usage, the term “favor” includes “gracious kindness,” “a
special privilege or right granted or conceded,” or “a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn
conspicuously.” This meaning given to the term “favor” embraces socially tolerated trysts. The
law as written would invite law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms of married couples or
consenting individuals.

The understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of “engaging in
a business” necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex. The Act actually seeks to punish cyber
prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and consideration. This includes
interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam.

Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography committed through a computer system is NOT

unconstitutional

The section merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 (ACPA) to
cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from
invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a computer
system.

The law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace.
But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative
and there is rational basis for such higher penalty. The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of
a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.

Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications or SPAM is

UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating freedom of expression

The section penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known
as “spam.” The term “spam” surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy
games. One who repeats the same sentence or comment was said to be making a “spam.” The
term referred to a Monty Python’s Flying Circus scene in which actors would keep saying
“Spam, Spam, Spam, and Spam” when reading options from a menu.

The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial
communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of
internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes
with the owner’s peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to
one’s privacy since the person sending out spams enters the recipient’s domain without prior
permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.

But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce
the “efficiency of computers.” Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of computers, have
already been receiving such unsolicited ads by mail. These have never been outlawed as
nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. What matters is that the recipient has
the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipient
always have the option to delete or not to read them.

Commercial speech still entitled to protection

To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails,
even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category
of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The
State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.

Section 4(c)(4) on Cyber-Libel insofar as it penalizes the author of the libelous statement
or article is NOT unconstitutional

Petitioner lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the
cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of “presumed malice” even when the latest
jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of “actual malice” as a basis for
conviction. Petitioners argue that inferring “presumed malice” from the accused’s defamatory
statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression.
Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down as
unconstitutional for otherwise good jurisprudence requiring “actual malice” could easily be
overturned as the Court has done in Fermin v. People even where the offended parties
happened to be public figures.

Elements of libel: (a) allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b)
publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.

There is “actual malice” or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory statement
with knowledge that is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The
reckless disregard standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of probable falsity.
There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence
is not sufficient to establish actual malice.

Prosecution bears the burden of proving actual malice in instances where such element is
required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement
turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure,
as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First
National Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the
cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws
imply a stricter standard of “malice” to convict the author of a defamatory statement where the
offended party is a public figure. Society’s interest and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion of public affairs.

Where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of
malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character
of the assailed statement. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable
reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.

Cybercrime Prevention Act does not violate the Philippines’ obligations under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
General Comment 34 of ICCPR does not say that the truth of the defamatory statement should
constitute an all-encompassing defense. As it happens, Article 361 recognizes truth as a
defense but under the condition that the accused has been prompted in making the statement
by good motives and for justifiable ends.

Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be
admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made against government employees with
respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties.

In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be
acquitted.

Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting the Commission of Cybercrime should be permitted to apply to

Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data
Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices,
Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-Squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)
(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section
4(c)(1) on Cybersex.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who
willfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerate as
cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected
expression.

Aiding and abetting certain cybercrimes must be distinguished between the actors

In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger who originates the assailed statement;
b) the blog service provider like Yahoo; c) the internet service provider like PLDT, Smart, Globe,
or Sun; d) the internet café that may have provided the computer used for posting the blog; e)
the person who makes a favorable comment on the blog; and f)the person who posts a link to
the blog site.

The question is: are online postings such as “Liking” an openly defamatory statement,
“Commenting” on it, or “Sharing” it with others, to be regarded as “aiding or abetting?” In libel in
the physical world, if Nestor places on the office bulletin board a small poster that says,
“Armand is a thief!,” he could certainly be charged with libel. If Roger, seeing the poster, writes
on it, “I like this!,” that could not be libel since he did not author the poster. If Arthur, passing by
and noticing the poster, writes on it, “Correct!,” would that be libel? No, for he merely expresses
agreement with the statement on the poster. He still is not its author. Besides, it is not clear if
aiding or abetting libel in the physical world is a crime.
But suppose Nestor posts the blog, “Armand is a thief!” on a social networking site. Would a
reader and his Friends or Followers, availing themselves of the “Like,” “Comment,” and “Share”
reactions, be guilty of aiding or abetting libel? And, in the complex world of cyberspace
expressions of thoughts, when will one be liable for aiding or abetting cybercrimes? Where is
the venue of the crime?

Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed Like,
Comment and Share) are essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think little or
haphazardly of their response to the original posting. Will they be liable for aiding or abetting?
And, considering the inherent impossibility of joining hundreds of thousands of responding
“Friends” or “Followers” in the criminal charge to be filed in court, who will make a choice as to
who should go to jail for the outbreak of the challenged posting?

Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting” cyber-libel, unsolicited
commercial communications and child pornography is a nullity for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives,
and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which
seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a person’s
reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep,
invading the area of protected freedoms.

If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await
internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be
threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for
law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those
who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence,
Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the cyberspace is a
nullity.

When void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable

When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on
the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. Generally, the overbreadth and vagueness
doctrine is inapplicable in ‘facial” challenges to penal statutes not involving free speech. In an
“as applied” challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right must
assert his own right, not that of third persons. This rule is also known as the prohibition against
third-party standing.
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a “facial” challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own right under the assailed
statute where it involves free speech on the grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.

The rationale for this exception is to counter the “chilling effect” on protected speech that comes
from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech
constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking
in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into
silence.

Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension
on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression,
especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in
a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not
punishable unless consummated. In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens
and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)
(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on
Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.

Section 6, which imposes a higher penalty on crimes penalized under the Revised Penal Code if
committed through information and communication technologies, is NOT unconstitutional.

Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying
circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction between
crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology and similar
crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often
evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The
distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.

Section 7, which allows prosecution both under the Cybercrime Law and the Revised Penal
Code, is UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as cyber-libel and cyber child pornography is
concerned.

There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again
posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels.
The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a
violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact
one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4)
is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely
establishes the computer system as another means of publication. Charging the offender under
both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.

The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the
ACPA’s scope so as to include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed,
ACPA’s definition of child pornography in fact already covers the use of “electronic, mechanical,
digital, optical, magnetic or any other means.” Thus, charging the offender under both Section
4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy.

Section 8 which imposes penalties for cybercrimes is NOT unconstitutional

The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative.
Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious
cybercrimes. They appear appropriate to the evil sought to be punished. The power to
determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some
prior time the act or omission was but an element of another offense or might just have been
connected with another crime. Judges and magistrates can only interpret and apply them and
have no authority to modify or revise their range as determined by the legislative department.

Section 12, authorizing law enforcement to collect real-time traffic data, is TOO SWEEPING
AND LACKS RESTRAINT

Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record traffic
data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse.
They claim that data showing where digital messages come from, what kind they are, and
where they are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or recipients before they are
to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be protected
from government snooping into messages or information that they send to one another.

The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper governmental purpose since a law
may require the disclosure of matters normally considered private but then only upon showing
that such requirement has a rational relation to the purpose of the law, that there is compelling
State interest behind the law, and that the provision itself is narrowly drawn. In assessing
regulations affecting privacy rights, courts should balance the legitimate concerns of the State
against constitutional guarantees.
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a
need to put order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good. To do this, it is
within the realm of reason that the government should be able to monitor traffic data to enhance
its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.

Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or recording of traffic data is part, aims
to provide the law enforcement authorities with the power they need for spotting, preventing,
and investigating crimes committed in cyberspace. Crime-fighting is a state business.

Those who commit the crimes of accessing a computer system without right, transmitting
viruses, lasciviously exhibiting sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration, and
producing child pornography could easily evade detection and prosecution by simply moving the
physical location of their computers or laptops from day to day. In this digital age, the wicked
can commit cybercrimes from virtually anywhere: from internet cafes, from kindred places that
provide free internet services, and from unregistered mobile internet connectors. Criminals
using cellphones under pre-paid arrangements and with unregistered SIM cards do not have
listed addresses and can neither be located nor identified. There are many ways the cyber
criminals can quickly erase their tracks. Those who peddle child pornography could use relays
of computers to mislead law enforcement authorities regarding their places of operations.
Evidently, it is only real-time traffic data collection or recording and a subsequent recourse to
court-issued search and seizure warrant that can succeed in ferreting them out.

Two categories of right to privacy

In Whalen v. Roe, the United States Supreme Court classified privacy in two categories:
decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to
independence in making certain important decisions, while informational privacy refers to the
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter right – the right to informational
privacy – that those who oppose government collection or recording of traffic data in real-time
seek to protect.

Informational privacy and its two aspects

Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and
the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion. In determining whether or not a matter
is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective
test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over
a certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must
be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.

Without reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact

Computer data – messages of all kinds – travel across the internet in packets and in a way that
may be likened to parcels of letters or things that are sent through the posts. When data is sent
from any one source, the content is broken up into packets and around each of these packets is
a wrapper or header. This header contains the traffic data: information that tells computers
where the packet originated, what kind of data is in the packet (SMS, voice call, video, internet
chat messages, email, online browsing data, etc.), where the packet is going, and how the
packet fits together with other packets. The difference is that traffic data sent through the
internet at times across the ocean do not disclose the actual names and addresses (residential
or office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded internet protocol (IP) addresses. The
packets travel from one computer system to another where their contents are pieced back
together.

Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the
messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient.

ICT users must know that they cannot communicate or exchange data with one another over
cyberspace except through some service providers to whom they must submit certain traffic
data that are needed for a successful cyberspace communication. The conveyance of this data
takes them out of the private sphere, making the expectation of privacy in regard to them an
expectation that society is not prepared to recognize as reasonable.

“Due Cause” under Section 12 has no precedent in law or jurisprudence

Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, “with due cause,” to collect or record by
technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time. But the cybercrime law, dealing with a
novel situation, fails to hint at the meaning it intends for the phrase “due cause.” Section 12
does not even bother to relate the collection of data to the probable commission of a particular
crime. It just says, “with due cause,” thus justifying a general gathering of data. It is akin to the
use of a general search warrant that the Constitution prohibits.
The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks
restraint. While it says that traffic data collection should not disclose identities or content data,
such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies
holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of their sender or receiver and
what the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or,
worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in these agencies.

Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those “associated with specified
communications.” But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law
enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is virtually
limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in “fishing expedition,” choosing
whatever specified communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to
privacy.

This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the government and kindred institutions
to monitor individuals and place them under surveillance in ways that have previously been
impractical or even impossible. “All the forces of technological age x x x operate to narrow the
area of privacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and
support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and totalitarian
society.” The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies be
written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the Constitution
guarantees.

Section 13 on preservation of computer data and Section 17 on destruction of computer data do

not constitute undue deprivation of right to property

The contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their authors or
recipients and are to be considered private communications. The data that service providers
preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by reason
of the issuance of such orders. The process of preserving data will not unduly hamper the
normal transmission or use of the same.

It is unclear that the user has demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy
of the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he
should have saved them in his computer when he generated the data or received it. He could
also request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted.
Section 14 on disclosure of computer data does not violate privacy of communications and
correspondence

The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of subpoena. Executive
agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.
Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a
function usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive
functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or
seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and correspondence. Disclosure can
be made only after judicial intervention.

Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer data does not supersede existing
search and seizure rules

On its face, Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would
ensure the proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been
seized by virtue of a court warrant. The exercise of these duties does not pose any threat on the
rights of the person from whom they were taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede
existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements them.

Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data is UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Computer data may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as well as files
that contain texts, images, audio, or video recordings. Without having to go into a lengthy
discussion of property rights in the digital space, it is indisputable that computer data, produced
or created by their writers or authors may constitute personal property. Consequently, they are
protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, whether while stored in their personal
computers or in the service provider’s systems.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in one’s papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in effect,
seizes and places the computer data under its control and disposition without a warrant. The
Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.

The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19
operates as a restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all forms
of speech are protected. Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare certain kinds of
expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to seize content alleged to be unprotected
without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for him to be of the opinion that such content
violates some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one.

Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential
guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free
speech are generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous
tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger rule. Section
19, however, merely requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any
provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made
to apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of the three
tests mentioned above.

Section 20, punishing non-compliance with any order issued by law enforcement agencies
under Chapter IV, is NOT unconstitutional

Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that mere
failure to comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations where non-
compliance would be reasonable or valid.

But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of P.D. 1829, Section 20
necessarily incorporates elements of the offense which are defined therein. Thus, there must
still be judicial determination of guilt, during which, defense and justifications for non-compliance
may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV
which are not struck by the Court.

Sections 24 and 26, which provides the creation and powers of the Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordination Center, are VALID
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national
cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow.

In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has
adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test,
the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test
mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and
implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law
gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.

Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to
“prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and
prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for
fast and reliable international cooperation.” This policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law
and order, which has been considered as sufficient standard.

100) ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. NO. 148560, NOVEMBER 19)

FACTS:

Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder,
wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His
contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code
saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses.
Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner
uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using
the facial challenge.

RULING:

On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The
petitioner’s contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law
seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly
misplaced under the petitioner’s reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that
is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be
invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from
ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute
to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.

On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be
made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon
protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists.
Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free
speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of
a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it
might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application
might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down
entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities
are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is
more imagined than real.

The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress’
decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.