CHAPTER 2

Natural Persons
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article. (29a)
Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an
intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)
Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. (32a)
Article 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one
prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one
to the other. (33)

a. ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents. G.R. No. L-16439

July 20, 1961

FACTS:

In 1950, before Nita Villanueva and Oscar Lazo were married, Villanueva became pregnant. To conceal her pregnancy from her parents and upon her aunt’s advice, she had an
abortion by Antonio Geluz, a physician. After Villanueva and Lazo got married, she became pregnant for the second time. As she was an employee of the Commission on
Elections and found it inconvenient, she had her second abortion by Geluz in October 1953. In less than two years, she again became pregnant. On 21 February 1955,
Villanueva went to the clinic of Geluz in Manila accompanied by her sister and her niece. Unknown to Lazo and without his consent, his wife had an abortion for the third time, an
abortion of a two-month old fetus. Villanueva paid Geluz fifty pesos. At that time, Lazo was in Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board.

On the basis of the last abortion, Lazo instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Geluz. The trial court ordered Geluz to pay Lazo damages, attorney’s
fees and costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court. Hence, Geluz filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Did the unborn child acquire civil personality?

HELD:

No, the unborn child did not acquire civil personality.

Article 40 of the Civil Code expressly limits the provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: “provided it be born later with
the condition specified in the following article.” In this case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother’s womb.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury of death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be
instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical
personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act).

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or
violation of the rights of the deceased child, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they
would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish
attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them.

In this case, however, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee’s indifference to the
previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. Even after
learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have
been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment.

Hence, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed.

b.CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-26795 July 31, 1970

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing’s family and Felix Icao were neighbors and had close and confidential relations. Despite being married, Icao succeeded in having carnal intercourse with
Carmen several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent. Despite efforts and drugs supplied by Isao, Carmen became pregnant and had to stop studying. Hence,
she filed for support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney’s fees.
Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born. The trial judge sustained Icao’s motion and dismissed the
complaint. Thereafter, Carmen moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, she had later given birth to a baby girl. However, the court ruled that no
amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.

ISSUE:

May an action for support be filed for an unborn child?

HELD:

YES. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of Ilao(whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the
motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only “en ventre de sa mere;;” just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of
the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child
should be born after the death of the testator (Article 854, Civil Code).

The lower court’s theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children “does not contemplate support to children as
yet unborn,” violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that “the conceived
child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it” adds further “provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article” (i.e., that the
foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child;; for if it were,
the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective.

A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this
case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child
she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint;; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly
in error.
c. ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant, vs. CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

Antonia Loanco was hired as cashier in the barbershop of Vicente Mendoza, Cesar Syquia’s brother-in-law. Cesar then courted Antonia, and the latter became pregnant with a
baby boy who was born on June 17, 1931. During Antonia’s pregnancy, Cesar was always visiting her. On February 1931, he wrote a letter to the priest who was to christen the
baby boy, saying

Rev. Father,

The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.

He wrote this on the eve of his departure on a trip to China and Japan. While he was abroad, Cesar wrote several letters to Antonia Loanco, showing paternal interest in the
situation and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order that junior might be strong. The baby boy, however, was not named Cesar Syquia, Jr., but Ismael Loanco. After
giving birth, Cesar took Antonia to a house in Manila, and they lived together for about a year in regular family style. Cesar paid for all the household expenses during their living
together. Then Antonia became pregnant for the second time. However, Cesar got married to another woman.

The purpose of the petition filed by Antonia and her mother is to recover from Cesar Php30,000 as damages for the breach of promise to marry, to compel Syquia to recognize
Ismael and Pacita (Antonia’s second child) as natural children, and to make him pay for the maintenance of the children worth Php500 per month.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Syquia is compelled to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child

HELD:

The letter written by Syquia addressed to the Rev. Fr. served as an admission and acknowledgment of paternity. Likewise, the other letters sent were sufficient to connect the
admission with the child carried by Antonia.
It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet
unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights.

The words of recognition contained in the note to the priest are not capable of two constructions. They refer to a baby then conceived which was expected to be born in June and
which would thereafter be presented for christening. The baby came, and though it was in the end given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as
the child whom the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear.

d. Continental Steel vs Montaño - Galuten

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF
UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.

FACTS:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and
Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to ART. X and ART XVIII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died
during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.

Petitioner immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits.

It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that the provisions of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must
have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits.

Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements
for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel contended that only one
with civil personality could die, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code which provides:
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article.
Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life
of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

According to the petitioner, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that
a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality.

Hence, Atty. Montaño, the appointment Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator issued a Resolution ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.

The Office declares that for entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees as provided under ART. X, SEC. 2 of CBA three (3) indispensable
elements must be present: (1) there is death ; (2) such death must be of employee’s dependent; (3) such dependent must be legitimate

On the other hand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under ART. XVIII, SEC. 4 of the CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be
present: (1) there is death ; (2) such death must be of employee’s dependent; (3) such dependent must be legitimate; and (4) proper legal documents must be presented.

Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employees legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus has the right to be supported by the parents from the
very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone
else, specifically his/ her mother.

The CA affirmed Atty. Montaños Resolution. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:
A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than "loss of human life", especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are
meant to assuage the employee and the latter’s immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn
child.
CA denied Motion for Reconsideration of Continental Steel.

ISSUE:
Whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4 of the CBA.

RULING :

YES.

The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced.
 Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born.
Article 41 defines when a child is considered born.
Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.

The issue of civil personality is not relevant in this case. The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code
expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. Death has
been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the
womb already has life.

No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then
the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is “one who relies on another to support; one not able
to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else. By these definitions, even an unborn child is s dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have
reached 38-39 weeks of of its gestational life without depending upon his mother. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be a parent,
spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent. Without such
qualification, then child is understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.

We emphasize that the bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and is family
who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who in this case had gestational life of
38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

Where conflicting interests of labor and capital to be weighed on the scales os social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and
compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED

The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño,... which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four
Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child
are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation

e. Limjoco vs Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante - Napicog

G.R. No. L-770
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,

vs.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.

FACTS:

On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience for an Ice Plant to Pedro Pio Fragante to operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, who
had passed away, through its special or legal administrator.

The Commission determined that the application satisfied the requirements for a certificate of public convenience, including promoting the public interest, Pedro O. Fragante
being a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death, and his estate's financial capability to maintain the proposed ice plant.

The Public Service Commission, in its decision, noted that Fragante had invested P35,000 in the ice plant. Fragante's other business activities, including a transportation
business, were also mentioned, indicating his financial capability to operate the ice plant effectively.

The commission found that Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino citizen at the time of his death. This citizenship status was a crucial factor in determining his eligibility to obtain the
certificate of public convenience.

The Public Service Commission granted the application after Fragante's death, allowing his estate to maintain and operate the ice plant.

The petitioner raised several objections, including the commission's decision not being in accordance with the law, the alleged departure from the commission's policy, and the
substitution of the legal representative for the deceased applicant.

In the case of Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante, the parties had the following contentions regarding the issues raised in the case:

Petitioner's Contentions:

The petitioner argued that the Public Service Commission's decision to grant a certificate of public convenience to Pedro Pio Fragante's estate was not in accordance with the
law. They contended that the commission should not have allowed the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant after Fragante's death.

The petitioner also raised concerns about the alleged departure from the commission's policy. They argued that the commission's decision in this case departed from its usual
practices and policies, which should have been followed.
The substitution of the legal representative for the deceased applicant was another contention raised by the petitioner. They questioned whether Fragante's estate, represented
by a legal administrator, should be allowed to step into Fragante's shoes and continue with the application.

Respondent's Contentions:

The respondent, representing the Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante, argued that Fragante's estate should be considered a legal entity. They contended that if Fragante had lived,
he would have been granted the certificate of public convenience, and the situation remained the same except for his death. Therefore, his estate had the same economic
capacity to properly operate and maintain the ice plant, as it inherited this capability from him.

They asserted that the term "person" encompasses artificial persons, including the estates of deceased individuals. Therefore, within the constitutional framework, Pedro O.
Fragante's estate should be recognized as an artificial or legal entity for the purpose of settling and distributing his estate, which includes pursuing the rights and fulfilling the
obligations that continue after his death, such as the pending application before the Public Service Commission.

The respondent argued that failing to consider Pedro O. Fragante's estate as a legal entity would result in an unjust outcome, potentially leading to the loss of the $35,000
investment made by Fragante in the ice plant, which would affect the estate, creditors, and heirs solely because of the individual's death.

The court ultimately ruled in favor of the respondent, recognizing Pedro Fragante's estate as a legal entity and allowing it to maintain and operate the ice plant. This decision was
based on the principle that the estate of a deceased individual can continue to have a legal personality even after their death, primarily for the purpose of settling debts and
fulfilling obligations.

ISSUE: Is Pedro Fragante's estate considered a legal entity?

RULING:

Yes, the court decided that Pedro Fragante's estate should be considered a legal entity.

If Fragante had lived, he would have obtained the certificate, and the situation remained the same except for his death. His estate had the same economic capacity to properly
operate and maintain the ice plant, as it inherited this capability from him.

The term "person" encompasses artificial persons, including the estates of deceased individuals. Therefore, within the constitutional framework, Pedro O. Fragante's estate
should be recognized as an artificial or legal entity for the purpose of settling and distributing his estate, which includes pursuing the rights and fulfilling the obligations that
continue after his death. This includes his pending application before the Public Service Commission in this case.

Failing to consider Pedro O. Fragante's estate as a legal entity would result in an unjust outcome.
 Notes: CA 146, Section 15, mandates that no public service can operate in the Philippines without a valid certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as a "certificate
of public convenience" or "certificate of public convenience and necessity." This certificate ensures that the operation of the service and the authorization to conduct business will
serve the public interest adequately.

Relevance: The case highlights that the estate of a deceased individual can continue to have a legal personality even after their death, primarily for the purpose of settling debts.
In this situation, recognizing the estate as a legal entity is crucial to prevent the unjust loss of a $35,000 investment made by the deceased in an ice plant, which would otherwise
affect the estate, creditors, and heirs solely because of the individual's death.

NCC 42 states that civil personality ceases upon death, and the impact of death on the rights and responsibilities of the deceased is determined by law, agreements, and wills.

Article 40 of a legal code appears to address the legal concept of when a person's personality is established in the context of birth and the rights of a conceived child.

Elements of this article:

1. Birth as the Determinant of Personality: The article begins by stating that a person's personality, or legal identity, is established or determined by their birth. This means
that, in the eyes of the law, a person's existence as a legal entity begins when they are born.

2. Conceived Child: The article recognizes the existence of a "conceived child." This term refers to a fetus or embryo that has been conceived but has not yet been born. In
legal terms, this child is not yet considered a person with legal rights.

3. Consideration for Conceived Child: The article introduces an important principle. It states that, even though a conceived child is not yet born and does not have legal
personality, there are situations where the law will treat it as if it were already born.

4. Conditions Specified in the Following Article: To understand the full scope of when a conceived child is considered as born for legal purposes, one needs to refer to the next
article in the legal code. Article 40 acts as a preamble or introduction to the conditions outlined in the subsequent article.

In summary, Article 40 establishes the fundamental principle that a person's legal personality is determined by their birth. However, it also recognizes that in certain situations, a
conceived child can be considered as born for legal purposes, but the specific conditions under which this occurs are provided in the following article. This legal concept
acknowledges that some legal rights and protections may be extended to a conceived child in situations that are favorable to the child, even before their actual birth, provided
they meet the conditions outlined in the subsequent article.

f. Dumlao vs Quality Plastics –

 DOCTRINE: Civil personality is extinguished by death.

FACTS:
On February 28, 1962, the CFl of Pangasinan ordered defendants Pedro Oria, Vicente Soliven, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to solidarily pay
Quality Plastics Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus interest. The CFl further ordered that in case the defendants failed to pay before the decision became final then Quality
Plastics would be authorized to foreclose the bond. Under the bond, the four sureties bound themselves to answer solidarily for the obligations of the principlal, Vicente Soliven.
Due to their failure to pay the amount of the judgement, the CFL ordered the foreclosure of the bond and the sale by public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which Orio had given
as security under the bond. The sale was thereafter conducted. It turned out that Oria had died on April 23, 1959. This was before the action was filed and judgment rendered.
Quality Plastics was unaware of his death and the pending settlement of Oria's estate in special proceedings. The heirs of Oria and the administrator of his estate, herein
petitioners, filed for annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land. They argued that the court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Oria.

The lower court held that it had it had acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the other defendants by their voluntary appearance since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel
for Oria. And that although Soliven acted in bad faith by not informing the court of Oria's passing, the court had still acquired jurisdiction over the person of Oria and therefore the
judgment was valid as to him.

ISSUE:
W/N the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Oria.

HELD:

No, the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Oria and the judgment against him is void for lack of jurisdiction.
At the time of the filing of the case on June 13, 1960, Pedro Oria was already dead. He was not and could not have been validly served summons. He had no more civil
personality. His juridical capacity was lost through death.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The
execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void. No costs

g. Marcos vs Manglapus - Martinez

G.R. NO. 88211

MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS G.R. NO. 88211 (OCTOBER 27, 1989)

Based on the separate opinion of Justice Padilla: The right of a Filipino to be buried in his country is part of a continuing right that starts from birth and ends only on the day he is
finally laid to rest in his country.
FACTS: In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C.
Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power". This did not,
however, stop bloody challenges to the government. Armed threats to the government were not only found among the followers of Mr. Marcos. There are also the communist
insurgency and the seccessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos.

The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years
after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has
remained elusive.

Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a
time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar
the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

The Petition

 This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and
social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.

 This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family
and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law."
Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any
authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.

Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reside
here at this time in the face of the determination by the President that such return will endanger national security and public safety. Thus, banning the return of Marcos in the
Philippines.

ISSUES: Whether the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and his family returning to the Philippines is correct.

RULING: YES. That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning has been recognized by members of the Legislature. The President
has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest.
The country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses, while the Government has barely
scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total
economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.

The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the
country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees petitioners invoke are neither absolute
nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and expression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the
requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1981.]

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the
President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it
is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at
153].

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining
that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:

 Justice Cruz opined that Marcos' return was not at all a threat to national security and would not plunge the nation into paroxysms of grief.

 Justice Paras argued that the former President, although already dead, was still entitled to certain rights. The issue as to whether or not former President Ferdinand
Marcos should be allowed to return to the Philippines may be resolved by answering two simple questions: Does he have the right to return to his own country and should
national safety and security deny him this right?
 There is no dispute that the former President is still a Filipino citizen and both under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines, he has the right to return to his own country except only if prevented by the demands of national safety and national security. Our Armed Forces have failed to
prove this danger.

 Justice Padilla contended that the former President was a Filipino and, as such, entitled to return to, die and be buried in this country. Philippine democracy is built on the
fundamental assumption that the Constitution and all its guarantees apply to all Filipinos, whatever he is as long as he is a Filipino. The right of a Filipino to be buried
in his country is part of a continuing right that starts from birth and ends only on the day he is finally laid to rest in his country. Mr. Marcos is a Filipino and, as
such, entitled to return to die and be buried in this country.

 Justice Sarmiento voted to grant reconsideration and pointed out that the President has no power to deny requests of Marcos relatives to bury the former President in his
homeland as the President’s supposed “residual” power to forbid citizens from entering the Philippines can not be found on the Constitution, neither by direct grant or by
implication. The threats to the government which may be caused by the return of the Marcoses is a mere conjecture and speculation.