Thinking About Contradictions: Venanzio Raspa

Synthese Library 386
Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology,

and Philosophy of Science
Venanzio Raspa
Thinking about
Contradictions
The Imaginary Logic of
Nikolai Aleksandrovich Vasil’ev
Synthese Library
Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology,

and Philosophy of Science
Volume 386
Editor-in-Chief
Otávio Bueno, University of Miami, Department of Philosophy, USA
Editors
Berit Brogaard, University of Miami, USA
Anjan Chakravartty, University of Notre Dame, USA
Steven French, University of Leeds, UK
Catarina Dutilh Novaes, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6607
Venanzio Raspa
Thinking about
Contradictions
The Imaginary Logic of
Nikolai Aleksandrovich Vasil’ev
Venanzio Raspa
Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici
Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo
Urbino, Italy
Translated by Peter N. Dale
Synthese Library
ISBN 978-3-319-66085-1 ISBN 978-3-319-66086-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66086-8
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To Italo Cubeddu, with whom I began to
study philosophy and the issue of
contradiction
To Silvio Bozzi, who taught me to love the

study of logic and its history
Preface
This book is the result of a long, though not continuous, process. I first began to
study Vasil’ev’s work for my PhD thesis (In-contraddizione. Il principio di contrad-
dizione alle origini della nuova logica [In-contradiction. The Principle of
Contradiction at the Origins of the New Logic]). I defended this dissertation in
October 1996 and it was published in 1999. There I discussed, among other matters
regarding the principle of contradiction, the works of a group of thinkers (Meinong,
Łukasiewicz, Vasil’ev and Peirce) who made important contributions to the analysis
of this principle and the problems related to it and played key roles in the birth of
non-Aristotelian logics at the turn of the twentieth century.
My initial interest in the topic of the principle of contradiction led me to a degree
thesis, undertaken under the guidance of Italo Cubeddu, on Opposizione e contrad-
dizione in Aristotele e in Kant [Opposition and Contradiction in Aristotle and Kant].
Professor Cubeddu also supervised my PhD dissertation. At the same time, I also
had the good fortune to get to know Silvio Bozzi, whose guidance and stimulating
input during many conversations and exchanges was fundamental for the direction
and development of my research.
Since then, I have continued to study Vasil’ev’s imaginary logic, and I have also
had the opportunity to discuss it on several occasions: at the Congress of the Italian
Society for Logic and the Philosophy of Science (SILFS), held in Cesena and
Urbino on 15–19 February 1999; during a seminar on ‘Aristotle and the Birth of
Non-Aristotelian Logics’, held at the then Institute of Philosophy of the University
of Urbino on 7 May 2002; at the Congress ‘Knowledge as Network of Models’,
which took place in Alghero on 20–23 September 2004; in a seminar on the imagi-
nary logic of N. A. Vasil’ev, which I held at the Department of Philosophy and
Human Sciences of the University of Macerata on 13 March 2009; during the lec-
tures at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Ljubljana on 23 March
2009; and finally in the international workshop ‘On Contradictions’ which took
place in Padova, on 12–13 December 2013. Some results of my researches on
Vasil’ev and non-Aristotelian logics have been published in Logique et Analyse
40(159), 1997, 225–248; in the Journal of Philosophical Research 24, 1999,
57–112; in my monograph In-contraddizione. Il principio di contraddizione alle
vii
viii Preface
origini della nuova logica (Trieste: Edizioni Parnaso, 1999); and in my contribu-
tions to Prospettive della logica e della filosofia della scienza (Soveria Mannelli:
Rubbettino, 2001, pp. 73–87) and L’impossibilità normativa (Milano: LED, 2015,
pp. 127–148). In 2012, I published, together with Gabriella Di Raimo, the Italian
translation of the logical texts by N. A. Vasil’ev (Logica immaginaria, Roma:
Carocci). The present book is an expanded reworking of my introductory essay
published in that work. I am very grateful to the publisher Carocci for the permis-
sion to use it here.
In completing the book, I have incurred many debts, not least to the Staatsbibliothek
Preussischer Kulturbesitz Berlin, for enabling me to consult its extensive library
holdings; to Giuseppe Ambrogi and Francesca Di Ludovico of the Biblioteca
Centrale Umanistica of the University of Urbino, who have procured for me every
book or article I have requested with promptness and diligence; to Peter Dale, who
took charge of the translation of the manuscript and has always been willing to deal
with my enquiries about language; and to Patricia Barzotti, Gabriella Di Raimo and
Domenico Mancuso, who helped me in the final stage of editing the text.
Urbino, Italy Venanzio Raspa

15 June 2017
Note to Readers
Works are quoted with the publication date of the edition consulted (e.g. Venn
18942: 11–13). In the case of critical editions, the original date of publication is
indicated (e.g. Peirce 1880: CP 3.192–193). For manuscripts, the completion date
of the work is put into square brackets near the date of publication (e.g. Peirce
[1898]/1992: 261); for new editions of works, the date of the first publication is also
put before the date of the edition consulted (e.g. Łukasiewicz 1910a/1987). All
translations, when the corresponding English one is not shown in square brackets
and unless otherwise indicated, are mine. Collective works appear under the name
of the editor. In some cases, abbreviations have been used:
A = First edition of Kant’s Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (1781)
Ak. = Kants Gesammelte Schriften (1910 ff.)
B = Second edition of Kant’s Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (1787)
CP = Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (1931–1935–1958)
GA = Alexius Meinong Gesamtausgabe (1968–1978)
W = Writings of Charles S. Peirce (1982 ff.)
For Aristotle’s texts, the following abbreviations have been used:
Cat. = Categoriae (Categories); transl. by J. L. Ackrill
Int. = De Interpretatione (On Interpretation); transl. by J. L. Ackrill
An. pr. = Analytica Priora (Prior Analytics); transl. by A. J. Jenkinson
An. post. = Analytica Posteriora (Posterior Analytics); transl. by J. Barnes
Top. = Topica (Topics); transl. by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge
Metaph. = Metaphysica (Metaphysics); transl. by W. D. Ross
ix
Notes on Transliteration
The transcription used for Cyrillic characters refers to English transliteration. Given
the possibility of transliterating some of the characters in a different way, I will go
on to specify what criteria are adopted in the following cases:
• e is transliterated as e.
• ë is transliterated as yo.
• ж is transliterated as zh.
• и is transliterated as i.
• й is transliterated as i.
• k is transliterated as k.
• x is transliterated as kh.
• ц is transliterated as ts.
• ч is transliterated as ch.
• ш is transliterated as sh.
• щ is transliterated as shch.
• ы is transliterated as y.
• э is transliterated as e.
• ю is transliterated as iu.
• я is transliterated as ia.
Such criteria have not however been observed in all cases as the transliteration of
certain names has been established by convention for some time, and in particular
in the case of well-known people, such transliterations also appear in the bibliogra-
phies. A list follows of exceptions to the above:
• The marked sign ъ is removed, whereas the weak sign ь is maintained in the
majority of cases, with the exception of the word Казань which is always trans-
literated as Kazan and several names of authors (e.g. Gogol, etc.; see Index of
Names).
• Certain names such as Дocmoeвcкuй, Πоccкuй, Πобачeвcкuй and similar,
although ending in uй, are not transliterated according to the above-mentioned
rules, but in accordance with English transliteration through which they have
xi
xii Notes on Transliteration
become established (e.g. Dostoevsky, Lossky, Lobachevsky, etc.; see Index of

Names).
• First names, patronymics and surnames of celebrated personalities are
equally transliterated in accordance with the more widespread English translit-
eration and not according to the above-listed rules (e.g. Balmont, Bryusov,
Tolstoy, Bely, Yekaterina ii Alekseyevna of Russia, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov Lenin,
Yemelyan Ivanovich Pugachev, Vladimir Sergeyevich Solovyov, etc.; see Index of
Names).
• Equally, the patronymic Васuльeвuч is transliterated as Vasilevich when refer-
ring to Pavel Kopnin, Vasilievich when referring to Nikolai Gogol and Vasilyevich
when referring to Ivan the Terrible, whereas in all other cases it is transliterated
in accordance with the rules listed above (see Index of Names).
• First names and patronymics such as Алексáндр and Алексáндрович are trans-
literated as Alexander and Alexandrovich in the case of names whose translitera-
tion has become established or if they are cited in texts, whereas in the remaining
cases the above rules are observed. Hence, with reference to the Vasil’evs, the
first name Алексáндр and the patronymic Алексáндрович are transliterated
according to the above-mentioned rules as Aleksandr and Aleksandrovich.
• In English Васuльeв is transliterated as Vasil’ev, Vasil’év, Vasiliev, Vasil’iev,
Vasilyev or Vassilyev. Here the first transliteration will be used, but the other five
are preserved in citations from texts of other scholars when they use them and in
the bibliography.
Finally, I would like to explain my choice of the expressions ‘principle of contra-
diction’ and ‘law of contradiction’ in contrast to several contemporary authors who
use the expression ‘principle of non-contradiction’ or even ‘principle of (non-)con-
tradiction.’ All three of these expressions define the same principle, but the last two
have been introduced only recently. In the Greek commentators of Aristotle, the
expression ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀντιφάσεως (principle of contradiction), subsequently
translated in Latin as principium contradictionis, is found. The syntagma ‘of contra-
diction’ is an argumentary complement which means the principle concerning con-
tradiction, like the law of universal gravitation is the law which concerns universal
gravitation. The expression ‘principle of non-contradiction,’ or ‘principle of (non-)
contradiction,’ emphasizes on the other hand the normative nature of the principle:
this forbids the contradiction. To my mind, the three expressions are equally correct
to the extent that they fulfil their role in defining the principle in question. I have
chosen the first expression, because, on reading and translating texts of noncontem-
porary authors, I have noted that none of them used the prefix ‘non.’ Vasil’ev does
not employ the phrase Закон непротиворечия (law of non-contradiction). He
writes of the Закон противоречия (law of contradiction). The same holds true for
Łukasiewicz, who writes Satz des Widerspruchs – or zasada sprzeczności (principle
of contradiction) – and even for Kant, Sigwart, Erdmann, Göring, Heymans and
Husserl. Likewise, it is absent in Mill and Husik, who write principle of contradic-
tion or law of contradiction. In conclusion, none of the classic authors I have
examined have used ‘non’ before ‘contradiction.’ For this reason, I have preferred,
Notes on Transliteration xiii
as a matter of consistency, to remain loyal to the traditional expression and have

chosen ‘principle of contradiction’ and ‘law of contradiction.’ Not to observe a
faithful regard for this standard classical term would have entailed my adding, intru-
sively, of ‘non’ to all the citations from the texts of the authors mentioned or, other-
wise, maintaining the original expression in the citations of the texts while adopting
one of the other two expressions. That strategy would have given rise to an ambigu-
ity easily avoided by sticking to the traditional terminology.
Contents
1 An Unquiet Life, a Multi-faceted Output�� 1

1.1 Kazan�� 1
1.2 The Family�� 2
1.3 Childhood and Education�� 5
1.4 University Years: Medicine, Poetry, History �� 5
1.5 Teaching and Research: Logic, Literature, Ethics�� 9
1.6 War, Illness, Death�� 12
2 The Historical and Cultural Context �� 15
2.1 In Russia�� 16
2.2 In Western Europe �� 20
2.3 Readings�� 22
3 The Logic of Concepts �� 27
3.1 The Forms of Judgment According to Christoph Sigwart�� 29
3.2 Particular Judgment as Accidental Judgment �� 32
3.3 The Triangle of Oppositions and the Law of Excluded Fourth�� 37
3.4 A Debate on Particular Propositions �� 49
4 Non-Aristotelian Logic�� 53
4.1 A Perennial Contemporary: Aristotle�� 54
4.2 Isaac Husik�� 57
4.3 Jan Łukasiewicz and Alexius Meinong�� 62
5 Imaginary Logic �� 75
5.1 Countering the Uniqueness of Logic and the Absoluteness
of Logical Principles �� 75
5.2 A Novel Concept of Negation �� 81
5.3 Two Laws Regarding Contradiction�� 85
5.4 Indifferent Judgment �� 89
5.5 Indifferent Syllogisms �� 93
5.6 Imaginary Logic and non-Euclidean Geometries �� 99
xv
xvi Contents
5.7 Alternative Interpretations of Imaginary Logic�� 101

5.8 Metalogic�� 103
6 Interpretations�� 105
6.1 The First Readers, the First Criticisms�� 106
6.2 The Rediscovery of Vasil’ev and the Many-Valued
Interpretation of Imaginary Logic�� 109
6.3 The Paraconsistent Interpretation�� 112
6.4 Syllogistic Reconstructions of Imaginary Logic�� 117
6.5 Systematic Historical Readings of Imaginary Logic�� 119
6.6 Meinong and Vasil’ev: A Not-Impossible Connubium �� 121
6.7 Conclusion�� 124
Bibliography �� 127
Index�� 157
Introduction: From an Individual to a World
In 1912, the Russian logician Nikolai Aleksandrovich Vasil’ev (1880–1940) pub-

lished an essay, “Voobrazhaemaia (Nearistoteleva) Logika [Imaginary (Non-
Aristotelian) Logic],” in which he set forth an argument in favour of the possibility
of a logic “different from ours,” “a logic without the law of contradiction,”1 and
thereby emerged as a supporter of logical pluralism. His starting point was the
hypothesis that, in an imaginary world, negative properties (such as non-red) and
contradictory objects (those that are simultaneously red and non-red) may be per-
ceived in the same way which, in our world, the book that you are reading at this
precise moment, or the redness of our blood, is perceptible. Vasil’ev’s contribution
to logic consists, in fact, in proposing some outlines of systems, still imprinted on
the template of traditional formal logic, that would be valid for such an imaginary
world in which, other than contradictory objects and negative properties, subjects
capable of perceiving them could also be found. By analogy, one might conceive of
a very detailed topographic map that would permit one to take bearings in a large
yet unknown region, with the difference that the region delineated by the map does
not exist, or is located not in our real world, but in a world conjured up by one’s
imagination. What would we do with a map like that? And again, what purpose
would an imaginary logic serve? In response to this query, Vasil’ev replied curtly: it
is “to separate in our logic the empirical elements (that can be eliminated) from the
1
Vasil’ev (1912: 212 = 1989: 58, 59 [2003: 131]). Vasil’ev’s texts, with the exception of two
(1911/1989 and 1925), are cited both in the original version and in the collection of his writings
published in 1989 by V. A. Smirnov. Although the latter is more easily accessible, the texts contain
several omissions and transcription errors; therefore, reference to the original version has become
the preferred choice. To give an example: on page 64, fn. 4, the original wording “Канто-
Πeйбнuцeвcкая [Kantian-Leibnizian]” has been transcribed as “антuлeйбнuцeвcкая [anti-
Leibnizian]”; on page 65, fn. 6, instead of ложно (it is false), there is the wording должно (it is
necessary), so that the proposition “it is false [ложно] that the law of contradiction is not applica-
ble to God” has become “it is necessary [должно] that the law of contradiction is not applicable to
God,” as Vergauwen and Zaytsev have translated (cf. Vasil’ev 2003: 137–138, fn. 6); on page 74,
the minor premise of the syllogism in Bocardo “Bce S cуть М [All S are M]” has become “Bce нe
S cуть М [All S are not M],” resulting in a syllogism with two negative premises, from which, as is
known, nothing can be inferred.
xvii
xviii Introduction: From an Individual to a World
non-empirical elements, which may not be eliminated,”2 in that the latter are valid
not only for all possible worlds but also in those erratic worlds containing contradic-
tory objects.
In our day and age, it is not unusual to hear about contradictory objects and
impossible worlds, although controversy surrounds their acceptance. It is at the
same time an established fact that a plurality of logics exists. Yet, what can appear
to be obvious nowadays was not so in Vasil’ev’s time. While Vasil’ev’s endeavours
to make a radical interpretation of traditional logic place him at the margins of that
great movement which, between the second half of the nineteenth and the first
decades of the twentieth century, led to the construction of mathematical logic, it is
precisely the study of Vasil’ev’s work which can contribute substantially to a finer
grasp on this period, by prompting us to recognize that traditional logic itself con-
tained a wealth of suggestions and novel problems that in part were already pointing
towards a nonclassical pathway.
The most important essays published by Vasil’ev are “O Chastnykh Suzhdeniiakh,
o Treugol’nike Protivopolozhnostei, o Zakone Iskliuchennogo Chetvertogo [On
Particular Judgments, the Triangle of Oppositions, and the Law of the Excluded
Fourth]” (1910), “Voobrazhaemaia (Nearistoteleva) Logika [Imaginary (Non-
Aristotelian) Logic]” (1912) and “Logika i Metalogika [Logic and Metalogic]”
(1912–1913). To these we should add two very brief writings, Voobrazhaemaia
Logika (Konspekt Lektsii) [Imaginary Logic (Conspectus of a Lecture)] (1911) and
“Imaginary (Non-Aristotelian) Logic” (1925), which are similar for their synthetic
and expositive, rather than argumentative, character. If one takes into consideration
that the last-named text adds nothing new to the others, but simply restricts its scope
to a synthetic list of the results Vasil’ev had obtained, it appears that he had exhausted
his logical-philosophical meditations within the span of a few years. Yet, he died at
the end of 1940! This fact has always stirred my curiosity from the moment I first
began to read his texts. If we focus on his publication dates, we will notice that
Vasil’ev’s logical-philosophical research developed during the undoubtedly difficult
years immediately preceding the outbreak of the First World War. He himself was
forced to interrupt his investigations and his teaching in order to take up duties on
the front line, since, in addition to being a philosopher, he was qualified in medicine,
a more serviceable qualification during those years. Yet the war and its horrors
unhinged him, and, after a number of twists and turns, a series of psychological
crises would lead finally to his committal to a psychiatric clinic.
Vasil’ev’s writings were read, reviewed and debated immediately after their pub-
lication and stirred considerable interest within Russia. How Vasil’ev’s logical-
philosophical reflections might have gone on developing had they not been inter-
rupted so dramatically is an open question. In the wake of the rediscovery of his
writings, the variety of interpretations that have been given of his imaginary logic,
which on occasion has been regarded as anticipating either many-valued logics or
paraconsistent ones, either intensional logics or theories of impossible worlds, takes
on the guise of an implicit reply to the question and shows that many of the themes
2
Vasil’ev (1911/1989: 130). Cf. also Vasil’ev (1912: 243 = 1989: 90 [2003: 160]; 1925: 109).
Introduction: From an Individual to a World xix
Vasil’ev covered have been confirmed in contemporary logic: they have also
inspired, in a number of cases, new research orientations (on quantifiers, modality,
negation, incomplete and contradictory objects). The emphasis Vasil’ev laid on the
ontological basis of formal logic is clearly modern, as are his hypothesis that formal
logic contains elements that reflect our understanding of the world and of the types
of objects we deal with and the idea that a logical system is valid for a certain
domain of objects.
There are many ways to read an author: one consists in adopting him as a guide for
studying a cluster of theories and for knowing a world, or better, a portion of the
world. Thus, starting with Vasil’ev, we can re-read a fragment of the history of logic,
specifically of traditional logic, tracing a path as far back indeed to Aristotle him-
self. We are also drawn obviously enough into an investigation of the period in
which Vasil’ev lived and wrote, but, at the same time, the nonclassical logics that
arose after him also attract our attention.
It is incumbent on us to examine the formative cultural and historical backdrop
of a writer, the milieu in which his own reflections took shape, both because his
theories, and those he grappled with, bear traces of the period in which they were
worked out and because (and this assumes all the more importance if we are to avoid
embarrassing misprisions) the language and terminology of any specific age will
always suffer inflections from the historical process itself. To give an instance,
Vasil’ev employs the term ‘metalogic,’ which however is not to be taken in the
meaning it has today, but rather by analogy to the traditional meaning of the word
‘metaphysics’:
Metaphysics is the knowledge of being regardless of the conditions of experience. Metalogic
is the knowledge of thought regardless of the conditions of experience.3
Again, he employs the term ‘cуждeнue’ (suzhdenie), which I have translated here
as ‘judgement’ and not as ‘proposition,’4 according to the meaning attributed to
judgement in the course of the nineteenth century. Judgement is linked to the mind
that formulates it and carries in itself a psychical characterization, which however is
lacking in proposition, that is the linguistic expression of a judgement. Even were
we to allow a Platonism that holds theories to exist in themselves, independently of
the subjects that formulate them, it still remains true that in our ‘sublunary’ world,
to adopt Aristotle’s wording, we encounter theories through the works and dis-
courses of their authors, finite beings endowed with minds and bodies. We must thus
temper idealism with a touch of materialism which gently tugs us down from the
hyperuranion back to the earth, so that we may take into consideration the historical
and material conditions that play a pertinent role in the elaboration of theories. Such
3
Vasil’ev (1911/1989: 130; 1912: 242 = 1989: 89 [2003: 159]; 1912–1913a: 73 = 1989: 115 [1993:
345]; 1925: 109).
4
As was instead done by some translators; cf. Vasil’ev (1993; 2003). Because of different lexical
choices, I will give references to available translations of Vasil’ev’s writings, but I will make a free
use of them.
xx Introduction: From an Individual to a World
historical and material factors must cover not only the general outlines but also the
particular circumstances that surround and inform the context in which the writer
happened to work.
This means, in the specific case of Vasil’ev, that we must consider, if only suc-
cinctly, the state of logic in both Russia and Western Europe between the end of the
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century and, above all, the ways in
which he absorbed and reworked the input and suggestions flowing from external
sources. Thus, alongside external history, internal history, consisting of those read-
ings and encounters which were to be decisive for the formation and development
of Vasil’ev’s philosophical meditations, is equally relevant. There are cases where
his affinities with a number of contemporary logicians and philosophers lack overt
textual confirmation in his writings, but they highlight all the more a generalized
interest in certain arguments of that period.
How are we to trace these coordinates? Starting from the general picture and then
simply projecting it onto the particular is out of question because it would not be
enlightening, in so far as the general conditions of the age were shared by all (or
nearly all) the logicians and philosophers of a certain time. Instead, we must begin
with the particular, starting from the individual Vasil’ev himself, and then moving
on from him towards the identification of the general context of that world, which
was, after all, Vasil’ev’s or, better still, that which we have access to via what we
know of Vasil’ev’s life and work. In order to accomplish this, I will begin with a
synthetic outline of his life, which, to say the least, contains dramatic features: suf-
fice it to recall that he lived through the First World War, the October Revolution and
Stalinism, and spent a third of his life in a psychiatric hospital.
Vasil’ev is remembered, above all, as a logician and, in particular, for his articles
on what he called ‘imaginary logic.’ In fact, he was also deeply interested in poetry,
psychology, history and literary criticism. It is true that he never achieved promi-
nence in any of these fields: his poetry, which was composed in a style reminiscent
of Russian symbolism, left no mark on Russian literature; as a psychologist, Vasil’ev
taught the subject, but failed to develop his own theory; his contributions to histori-
cal studies and literary criticism are too few in number to constitute a notable out-
put; his status as philosopher is tightly bound to his work as a logician, in the sense
that, at least in his published writings, the theories he espoused belong either to the
field of logic or to the philosophy of logic. However, if logic is the area where
Vasil’ev achieved his most noteworthy results, it is nonetheless true that one cannot
neglect the versatile nature of his production, if one wishes to obtain a comprehen-
sive impression of the man as a scholar and intellectual. This is also indispensable
if we are to fully grasp the way he came to work out the notion of an imaginary logic
and the meaning he placed on it. Therefore, although I will mainly focus my atten-
tion on Vasil’ev’s writings on logic and the philosophy of logic, I have thought it
opportune to broaden my examination, albeit briefly, over the other disciplines
Introduction: From an Individual to a World xxi
which engaged his interests. In the chapter dealing with Vasil’ev’s life (Chap. 1), I
will also look at his activities as a historian and man of letters and then pass on to an
examination of his logical output. The latter will be framed first and foremost within
its historical and cultural context (Chap. 2) and then expounded in a systematic form
(Chap. 3 and 5). An intermediate chapter (Chap. 4) will deal with attempts, contem-
porary to his own, to develop non-Aristotelian logics that present affinities with
imaginary logic. Lastly, I will conclude with a review of the interpretations of imag-
inary logic that have been given over the last hundred years (Chap. 6).
Chapter 1
An Unquiet Life, a Multi-faceted Output
Abstract This chapter offers an outline of Vasil’ev’s life and works, especially of
his activities as a historian and man of letters. Vasil’ev grew up in a stimulating,
highly cultured family environment. Already as a boy, he showed interest in litera-
ture and during his university years, while studying medicine, he also dedicated
himself to poetry by publishing a collection of lyrics, Longing for Eternity (1904).
Such poems constitute a first step towards imaginary logic. Later, Vasil’ev enrolled
in the Faculty of Philology and History at the University of Kazan and in 1906 he
discussed a thesis on history, although he continued to deal with poetry and litera-
ture (Verhaeren, Swinburne, Gogol). Between 1908 and 1913 he developed his logi-
cal ideas, spent two study stays in Germany and began teaching at the University of
Kazan. During these years, he published his major articles in logic. In 1912, in an
essay on Tolstoy and Solovyov, he set forth his ethical conceptions. But with the
outbreak of the First World War his life took a dramatic turn. In 1916, the first symp-
toms of that mental illness which was to afflict him for the rest of his life manifested
themselves. In 1917 he was in Moscow during the October Revolution. In later
years, mental breakdowns alternated with periods of teaching at the university, but
in 1922 he was definitively interned in a psychiatric hospital where he remained
until his death in 1940.
1.1 Kazan
The city of Kazan, the modern capital of the Republic of Tatarstan (an autonomous
republic of the Russian Federation), is an important river port of central European
Russia, situated at the point of confluence of the Kazanka river with the Volga. It
was founded by the Mongols of the Golden Horde towards the end of the fifteenth
century, and within a short period became the capital of a powerful Tatar Khaganate.
In 1552, the Russians under Ivan the Terrible conquered the city. Some two centu-
ries later, during a revolt by Pugachev’s troops, Kazan was in large part razed to the
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 1

V. Raspa, Thinking about Contradictions, Synthese Library 386,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66086-8_1
2 1 An Unquiet Life, a Multi-faceted Output
ground, only to be rebuilt immediately afterwards during the reign of Catherine the
Great. It boasts a distinguished university, founded in 1804, where figures like Lev
Nikolayevich Tolstoy and Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin) were to pursue their
studies, the latter however only for a few months.1 According to Valentin
A. Bazhanov, Kazan, whose university was small compared to those of Moscow or
Saint Petersburg and lay on the margins of the European and Russian academic
worlds, nonetheless provided its students with the requisite liberties for pursuing
their own ideas. This would explain why several ‘heretical’ concepts and ideas were
worked out there — one thinks of the non-Euclidean geometry of Nikolai Ivanovich
Lobachevsky, Vasil’ev’s non-Aristotelian logic, and the futuristic poetry of Viktor
Vladimirovich Khlebnikov, each of which bore the epithet ‘imaginary.’2 And maybe
the concept of a ‘transductive logic’ can be added which was elaborated by
Alexander Romanovich Luria, another great scholar born and grown in Kazan.
Nikolai Aleksandrovich Vasil’ev was born in Kazan, on the 29th of June 1880,
the first child of Aleksandr Vasil’evich Vasil’ev and Aleksandra Pavlovna
Maksimovich.3 Both parents hailed in turn from families in which cultural and intel-
lectual pursuits were prized, and a certain engagement in politics encouraged. The
importance of this for Vasil’ev’s education will emerge presently, but for the moment
let us try to get closer to his family.
1.2 The Family
Nikolai’s paternal grandfather, Vasilii Pavlovich Vasil’ev (1818–1900), was a distin-

guished sinologist, author of a book entitled Buddizm, ego dogmaty, istoriia i litera-
tura [Buddhism: its Doctrines, History and Literature] (1857), and lecturer in
Chinese language and literature at the University of Kazan until 1855, when, after
the Department of Oriental Studies was shut down, he was transferred with other
colleagues to St. Petersburg University, where he continued to teach and was elected
member of the Academy of Sciences. In 1852, Vasilii Pavlovich Vasil’ev married
Sofia Ivanovna Simonova (1832–1868), the daughter of the astronomer Ivan
1
In August 1887, Lenin began attending Kazan University, from which he was expelled in
December, because of his participation in a non-authorized demonstration against the government.
On that occasion, he was arrested and subsequently exiled. In spite of having written several letters
to the rector, asking to be readmitted to the university, Lenin was only allowed to return to Kazan.
The reputation of his brother may have weighed on this (see fn. 12). Lenin obtained his degree in
law by examinations from the University of Saint Petersburg.
2
Cf. Bazhanov (2001: 208–209).
3
The main source for Vasil’ev’s biography has been for many years the monograph by Bazhanov
(1988a), on which the short biographical notices by Bazhanov himself (1989; 1990a: 334–336), by
Cavaliere (1992–1993: 14–22) and by Vergauwen & Zaytsev (2003: 166–174) are based; cf. also
Duffy’s review (1990: 71–74). Subsequently, Bazhanov published a new monograph (2009a)
which revises and updates the former work. My survey of Vasil’ev’s life will draw predominantly
from this recent text.
1.2 The Family 3
Mikhailovich Simonov (1794–1855), who was also a member of the St. Petersburg
Academy of Sciences and a colleague of Lobachevsky, whom he replaced as rector
of Kazan University.4 His maternal grandfather, Pavel Pavlovich Maksimovich
(1817–1892), was an important supporter of popular culture, and actively promoted
it by organizing courses to spread literacy. He founded an institute for girls in Tver
dedicated to the training of schoolteachers.5
Vasil’ev’s father, Aleksandr Vasil’evich Vasil’ev (1853–1929), was an able math-
ematician. In his earlier schooldays at the lyceum, he had displayed a great love for
chemistry, until his interests swung to mathematics. In 1870, he entered the Faculty
of Mathematics at the University of St. Petersburg, where he studied under the guid-
ance of Pafnuty Lvovich Chebyshev and graduated with top honours (a gold medal)
that enabled him to qualify as a lecturer at the University of Kazan in 1874. He mar-
ried Aleksandra Pavlovna Maksimovich in 1879 and their son Nikolai was born the
following year. In the meantime, A. V. Vasil’ev had continued his studies under the
guidance of the mathematicians Leopold Kronecker and Karl Th. W. Weierstrass in
Berlin, and of Charles Hermite in Paris.6 He soon developed an interest in the works
of Lobachevsky, on whom he wrote some papers and a monograph.7 We shall see
that this will prove to be an important factor in the growth and development of his
son’s thinking. In 1899, Aleksandr Vasil’evich was appointed to a full professorship
in pure mathematics at the University of Kazan. He provided an important stimulus
to the city’s cultural life, extending the hospitality of his home to mathematicians
and intellectuals such as Aleksandr Petrovich Kotel’nikov, Dmitrii Matveevich
Sintsov, Vladimir Leonidovich Nekrasov and Evgenii Ivanovich Grigor’ev, who
gathered there regularly every Friday to discuss a wide range of scientific issues.
Another notable figure who frequented his coterie was the poet Khlebnikov, whom
I have already mentioned, the highly gifted, multitalented personality who was to
make his name as an exponent of Russian futurism, and as the inventor of the so-
called zaumnyi yazyk (transmental language). Khlebnikov absorbed seminal hints
and creative stimuli, linked to his strong interest in mathematics, from Vasil’ev
père.8
Aleksandr V. Vasil’ev was highly regarded by his pupils and was one of the
founders of the Physical-Mathematical Society of Kazan, over which he presided
4
Cf. Bazhanov (2009a: 10).
5
6
Cf. Bazhanov (2009a: 13), Korzybski (1929: 599), Rainoff (1930: 343–344).
7
Cf. A. V. Vasil’ev (1894a; 1894b; 1914; 1992).
8
Cf. Bazhanov (2009a: 14–15). On the zaumnyi yazyk cf. Ziarek (2004: 73): “Zaum is a compound
composed of the Russian preposition za (beyond, behind) and the noun um (mind, reason), and
indicates a space or a modality of thinking beyond reason or understanding. The adjective zaumnyi
derived from this compound noun is often paired with the word for language, yazyk, and has been
translated as “beyonsense” language: a field of language in which relations take place otherwise
than in the conventional sense, or beyond its scope. As practiced by Khlebnikov, zaum is a lan-
guage in a different key, neither representational nor determinative. It is a language that becomes
disposed, not with a view to the production of meaning and understanding in accordance with the
dominant rules of sense, but with a view to transformation.”
until 1905. He knew many of the mathematicians of his time, among them, and in
addition to those already mentioned, Jean Gaston Darboux, David Hilbert, Felix
Klein, Sofia Vasilyevna Kovalevskaya, Beppo Levi, Marius Sophus Lie, Gösta
Mittag Leffler, Hermann Weyl, Jules-Henri Poincaré, Alfred North Whitehead, and
Bertrand Russell.9 During Russell’s trip to Russia, Vasil’ev père availed himself of
the opportunity to give him a copy of his own book Prostranstvo, vremia, dvizhenie:
istoricheskoe vvedenie v obshchuiu teoriiu otnositel’nosti [Space, Time, Motion: A
Historical Introduction to the General Theory of Relativity] (1922),10 which was in
due course published in an English version prefaced with an introduction by
Russell.11
Far from being indifferent to social issues, Aleksandr V. Vasil’ev was a friend of
Lenin’s brother Aleksandr Ilyich Ulyanov, whom he met in 1885. Aleksandr
Ulyanov, a major figure in the revolutionary movement of the 1880s, was one of
those responsible for organizing the failed attempt on the life of Tsar Alexander iii
in 1887.12 Aleksandr Vasil’evich was politically active in that same year, and though
he did not join the revolutionaries, he participated in a number of meetings orga-
nized at Kazan University, in which Lenin also took part.13
Aleksandr V. Vasil’ev moved to St. Petersburg University in 1907, and in 1923 to
Moscow University, where he became a member of the editorial commission of the
Mathematical Institute which worked on the complete edition of Lobachevsky’s
works. During his life, A. V. Vasil’ev was also elected to the Russian Duma and to
the Academic Union of the State Council.14
Aleksandr Vasil’evich’s younger brother, Nikolai Vasil’evich Vasil’ev (1857–
1920), to the contrary, was thoroughly committed to the revolutionary struggle. A
frequent traveller, he went to Switzerland and London, where he got to know Karl
Marx. He soon became one of Georgi Plekhanov’s most loyal followers, and main-
tained close contact with him. He returned to Russia in 1905 and joined the Russian
revolution in 1917, only to die shortly afterwards, in 1920.15
Clearly, Nikolai A. Vasil’ev grew up in a stimulating highly cultured family envi-
ronment characterized by a large variety of interests, among them literature, to
which Vasil’ev was to dedicate himself.
9
10
Cf. A. V. Vasil’ev (1922), with reference to which see also Bazhanov (2009a: 20, 56).
11
Cf. A. V. Vasil’ev (1924).
12
Because of his participation to the organization of the attack, Aleksandr Ulyanov was arrested on 1st
of March 1887, sentenced to death in the lawsuit which followed and hung on the 8th of May 1887.
13
14
Cf. Korzybski (1929: 599–600).
15
Cf. Bazhanov (2009a: 11–12).
1.4 University Years: Medicine, Poetry, History 5
1.3 Childhood and Education
As James Mill took care of the instruction of his children, in particular of that of
John Stuart16 — of which I will speak later — also Aleksandr Vasil’evich Vasil’ev
personally supervised his young son’s education down to his seventh birthday, and
introduced him to the study of mathematics at an early age. At age four, Nikolai
Aleksandrovich learnt from his father how to construct an equilateral triangle. By
the age of eight, he knew German, and was to go on to learn French, English, and
subsequently, classical Greek, Latin and Italian. He read the tales of E. T.
A. Hoffmann and the plays of Molière in their original languages. At a very early
age, he began writing a diary,17 where he wrote down reflections and notes inspired
by the wide reading that absorbed him, included the works of Sophocles,
Dante Alighieri, Giovanni Boccaccio and Johann Wolfgang Goethe, to name but a
few. His first notes on philosophical issues date to 1893. A year later, Nikolai began
to take an interest in logic: he went on to study Mikhail I. Vladislavlev’s Logika
(1872, 18812) and, in 1897, Charles S. Peirce’s “The Logic of Relatives” (1897). In
the meantime, other than the Russian symbolist poets Konstantin Dmitriyevich
Balmont, Alexander Alexandrovich Blok and foreign authors such as Henrik Ibsen
and Maurice P. M. B. Maeterlinck, the young Vasil’ev read Anna Karenina (1877),
a novel which left such a mark on him that he was spurred, some 20 years later, to
write an article on Tolstoy (see Sect. 1.5).18
1.4 University Years: Medicine, Poetry, History
Nikolai entered the Faculty of Medicine at Kazan University in 1898 after perform-
ing brilliantly throughout his secondary school education. He retained nonetheless
his interests in philosophy and psychology, which had burgeoned during his high
school years. In 1901, he joined in a number of demonstrations organized by the
revolutionary movement active in Kazan University. Together with other students,
Vasil’ev was also arrested and remained under police surveillance. For a period
(spring/summer of 1901), he moved to the governorate of Perm. Subsequently, he
applied to the Faculty of Philology of the University of Saint Petersburg, fearing,
after considering the circumstances of the moment, he could no longer be accepted
at the University of Kazan. However, in autumn he could return there thanks to a
special letter from the governor of Perm, who declared him innocent. After these
episodes, Vasil’ev ceased to take part in the riots, but continued to maintain progres-
sive ideas and came closer to Emile Verhaeren’s “sociological poetry,” as we shall
subsequently see. In 1904, Vasil’ev obtained his degree, and in May of the same
16
Cf. J. S. Mill (1873: 4 ff.).
17
Cf. Vasil’ev, Dnevnik [Diary], in Archive of V. A. Bazhanov, Simbirsk.
18
For various aspects of the younger Vasil’ev’s cultural interests see Bazhanov (2009a: 27–33).
year, married Ekaterina Stepanovna Zav’ialova, whose passion for theatre and
design was later to extend to literature and philosophy.19 Their child, Iulian, was
born in 1907.20
In the year he graduated, 1904, Vasil’ev published a collection of verse, not
unrelated to his later concepts of an imaginary logic, entitled Toska po vechnosti
[Longing for Eternity], which included his versions of poems by Charles Baudelaire,
Paul Verlaine and Algernon Charles Swinburne. In terms of both style and content,
these poems display debts to Russian and French symbolism, and we can detect a
number of motifs that will recur in his logical works, such as the notion of the
imaginary world and the theme of the coincidentia oppositorum or union of oppo-
sites.21 Specifically, the simultaneous presence of antonymous terms is a constant
in many of the compositions of Longing for Eternity.22 Obviously, this work should
not be read solely from the perspective afforded by the author’s later reflections.
Following in Schopenhauer’s wake, Vasil’ev holds that the world is appearance,
representation and, as such, deceptive,23 and that suffering is an integral,
19
Cf. Bazhanov (2009a: 34–37).
20
21
For a fine analysis of Vasil’ev the poet see Di Raimo (2012), which I have relied on here.
22
Cf. “В океане любви острова моей тихой печали… / V okeane liubvi ostrova moei tikhoi
pechali…” [In the ocean of love the islands of my silent melancholy…], in Vasil’ev (1904: 73):
Joy and sadness are colours on the world’s endless canvas
Its eternal shadings arise from the soul.
“Я в каждой горести пью счастия отраду. / Ia v kazhdoi goresti p’iu schastiia otradu. [In every
affliction I imbibe the solace of joy], in Vasil’ev (1904: 84):
In every affliction I imbibe the solace of joy
While never, in joy, forgetting my ancient wounds.
“Уснувшие звезды / Usnuvshie zvezdy [Sleeping stars],” in Vasil’ev (1904: 104):

In melancholy we search for an onset of intoxication:
The onset of intoxication is what we find in love,
In love we find something that compares to the fall,
As though the fall was a heaven that leads down to earth.
Poetry swirls off like smoke;
Like smoke, love and dreams swirl away,
Impotent love and dreams frighten us,
Impotent the void of love is what frightens.
23
Cf. “Мир ест мое представление / Mir est. moe predstavlenie [The World is my Representation],”
in Vasil’ev (1904: 140):
No bright-sharp colours lie outside my perceptions,
nor strains of sound, nor melancholic woods,
nor the enticing scent of roses.
[...]
I’m terrified by the thought that all I see about me
1.4 University Years: Medicine, Poetry, History 7
u navoidable part in our lives; yet, at the same time, it functions also as an instru-
ment of knowledge.24 It is from the reality of suffering that an urgent need arises
for another world different to ours. The notion of an ideal, imaginary world is
linked, in fact, to the quest for harmony, which can be achieved through love.25 In
evoking another dimension, Vasil’ev conflates a number of cultural and religious
motifs rooted in Egyptian, Indian and Scandinavian lore. Vedic poetry perhaps
struck the deepest chord. It was there that he came across the union of opposites:
of immanence and transcendence, of selfhood and world, which he sought after.26
Vasil’ev’s meditations were not however focused exclusively on his inner nature.
After working as a physician for a short period, Vasil’ev, whose philosophical and
psychological interests were growing apace in the meanwhile, decided to enrol in
the Faculty of Philology and History at the University of Kazan. In 1906 he passed
the final exams and discussed a thesis entitled “Vopros o padenii Zapadnoi Rimskoi
Imperii i antichnoi kultury v istoriograficheskoi literature i v istorii filosofii, v sviazi
s teoriei istoshchenia narodov i chelovechestva [The Question of the Fall of the
Western Roman Empire and of the Ancient Culture in Historiographical Literature
and in the History of Philosophy, in Relation to the Theory of the Extinction of
May be nothing more than a wan, deceptive fantasy,

Only the reflection of ‘things’ that are hidden.
And this world, the world of poetry and beauty,
that stirs man’s dreams with such urgent power —
is nothing but a lie, deception and ‘phenomenon.’
24
Cf. “Елегия / Elegiia [Elegy],” in Vasil’ev (1904: 61):
Only he who thinks, weeps and suffers,
Can grasp the beauty of the universe;
Only the melancholic can read its mysterious cipher,
Sowing the darkness of nature with the light of grief.
Beauty, in truth, is grief broadcast over nature,
In the dialogues of the stars and the flight of clouds,
In the slow wave of tunes flowing by,
In the sad murmur of remissive woods.
25
Cf. “Метафисика любви / Metafisika liubvi [The Metaphysics of Love],” in Vasil’ev (1904:
138):
Another world exists, a world shorn of anguish,
where the whole unity is without end,
where every atom, close-by or far away,
is but part of the selfsame ring.
[...]
Love is just a bridge of air,
a link between stranded worlds,
the submissive, nimble messenger
dispatched from mysterious frontiers.
26
Cf. the section entitled “Чужим богам / Chuzhim bogam [To Other Gods],” in Vasil’ev (1904:
109 ff.), and, more specifically, the poem “Молитва Браме / Molitva Brame [Prayer to Brahma]”
(p. 114).
Peoples and Mankind],”27 in which he laid out his own vision of the historical devel-
opment of mankind. The work was only published at a much later date, in 1921,
with few adjustments of substance, except for the afterword in which, speaking
personally, Vasil’ev explained what had prompted him to work out a pessimistic
conception of history.
Studying to be a physician, I worked out, while I was attending lectures on medicine and
biology, a concept of degeneration, of dissolution, as the aim of evolutionary development.
By considering that the history of the individual, qua history of mankind, qua historical
evolution, is the reflex of biological evolution, I found myself compelled to conclude that
historical evolution (culture) is a pile of destructive biological variations that lead to
decadence.28
A little further on in his thesis, Vasil’ev adds:

Perhaps I am tempted these days to think of the decline of humanity less as an inexorable
destiny, and more in terms of a threat against which humanity will struggle, and perhaps,
overcome. Nonetheless, the reality of this danger, of this tendency to decline, presented
itself to me in all its evident clarity.29
Vasil’ev conceived of revolutions as natural events in the process of the social

body’s renewal. At the same time, every apotheosis, in his view, is followed by a
period of decline and decadence.30 The fall of the Western Roman Empire was
therefore nothing other than the mark of the descending parabola of human evolu-
tion. On this basis, Vasil’ev establishes several analogies between the ancient and
modern world. In particular, he teases out a feature, urbanization, common to the
Roman Empire in its decadent phase and to Russia on the eve of the October
Revolution. The subject was a topic of frequent discussion in Russia during the
early years of the twentieth century. Various authors (V. Y. Bryusov, K. D. Balmont,
A. A. Blok, A. Bely, and above all L. N. Tolstoy) had, as it were, vindicated peasant
culture by insisting on the popular roots of Russian society, arguing that the aban-
donment of the land by the nobility had contributed to the cultural and material
impoverishment of the countryside.
In conformity with this Zeitgeist, in 1907 Vasil’ev translated and published, with
an ample afterword, Les campagnes hallucinées [The Moonstruck Countrysides]
(1893), a work by the Belgian poet Émile Verhaeren (1855–1916),31 whom he
defined as the poet “of powerful contrasts,” a poet “with a twinned soul.”32 This
book displays strong continuities with the two earlier works. Through his versions
of Verhaeren, Vasil’ev manages to give voice, perhaps once again attempting to
reconcile opposites, both to his personal quest for that inner religious dimension
which is evinced in many compositions in his Longing for Eternity, and to his
27
28
Vasil’ev (1921c: 231).
29
Vasil’ev (1921c: 232).
30
Cf. ibid.
31
Cf. Vasil’ev (1907a).
32
Vasil’ev (1907b: 84).
1.5 Teaching and Research: Logic, Literature, Ethics 9
socialist political vision. With Verhaeren he maintains that the new trend of urban-
ization leads to an acceleration of the rhythms of social existence, but also produces
considerable injustice on a large scale, as masses of suffering and exploited men and
women are lodged in new cities.
1.5 Teaching and Research: Logic, Literature, Ethics
In the autumn of 1906 Vasil’ev taught Russian language and literature at Kazan’s
Scientific lyceum. He signed a three-year contract with the university the following
year, and received a research grant to pursue work there in philosophy, psychology
and logic. Aristotle’s syllogistic (in particular the Prior Analytics) and John S. Mill’s
inductive logic (as outlined in his A System of Logic) featured as recommended logi-
cal topics. Vasil’ev also taught psychology and philosophy at the College for Women
in Kazan in this period (1906–1908), and published the texts of the lectures he
delivered,33 in which the influence of William James is recognizable.34
Over the summer and autumn of 1908, Vasil’ev resided in Germany. At the time,
he abandoned psychology in order to dedicate himself mainly to philosophy, and in
particular to logic. It was in Heidelberg, where he attended the proceedings of the
Third International Congress of Philosophy from the 31st of August until the 5th of
September of that year,35 that Vasil’ev first came up with the notion of an alternative
logic to the traditional one. His encounter with Gregor Itelson (1852–1926), who
had already worked out his ideas on a theory of objects (see Sect. 4.3, p. 72), exer-
cised a decisive influence on him in this regard. We are told that Vasil’ev had a long
discussion with Itelson on the nature of the laws of thought during a chess match.
Even if the idea itself of an imaginary logic must be pinned down later, to a period
between 1911–1912, there is good reason to believe that the formative ideas from
out of which this concept was to be developed, especially regarding particular judg-
ments, the necessity for introducing a third class of judgments alongside affirmative
and negative ones, and therefore the denial of the principle of excluded middle, took
shape in this earlier period. It was again during his stay in Heidelberg that Vasil’ev
began to question the nature of pragmatism. Specifically, while endeavouring to
identify the socio-cultural roots of pragmatism, he arrived at the firm conviction that
this kind of philosophical orientation had found its most eloquent expression through
English and American peoples, because — he believed — they were endowed with
a practical cast of mind superior to that of other nations.36 In 1909 Vasil’ev held a
33
Cf. Vasil’ev (1908a; 1908b); a second edition was published in 1915 (cf. Vasil’ev 1915a; 1915b).
Cf. also Bazhanov (2009a: 39).
34
In his 1910 essay, Vasil’ev quotes the Russian edition (1896) of James’ Psychology (1892).
35
Cf. Vasil’ev (1909f).
36
On pragmatism see Vasil’ev (1909f: 70 ff., esp. 79).
conference on “Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Actions” at the Popular University

of Kazan.37
In the same year, other than his essay “Znachenie Darvina v filosofii [The
Meaning of Darwin in Philosophy],” which, as we shall note, was not unconnected
to the circumstances attending the conception of imaginary logic, Vasil’ev pub-
lished materials on Algernon Charles Swinburne (1837–1909), translating some of
his poems.38 He also did a translation of one of Horace’s poems, namely the twenti-
eth ode of the third book, which however remained unpublished, and wrote an arti-
cle on Nikolai Gogol (1809–1852) for the occasion of the centenary of his birth.39
As was the case with his analysis of Verhaeren, Vasil’ev pointed out the oppositions
that are unified in Gogol’s works:
What is this soul that looks on the world with such large eyes? It is a Renaissance and
Christian soul, romantic and mystical, and at the same time, one troubled by an illness, the
soul of the moralist, of the hypochondriac, of the manic. It is a soul wholly absorbed in
itself, introverted, delicate and yet proud; eternally in pain on earth, eternally turned towards
heaven.40
Overall, we can see the strength of Vasil’ev’s commitment to literature in this first
decade of the twentieth century, which lingered on in his next work.
On the 18th of May 1910, in a trial lecture he delivered to qualify for teaching at
university level, Vasil’ev set out his views on logic for the first time. He did not
speak of imaginary logic, but rather dwelt on what he would later call the ‘logic of
concepts’ (see Chap. 3). Once qualified as a lecturer (Privatdozent) on philosophy,
at the beginning of 1911 Vasil’ev taught his first university course on the theme of
“Basic problems of logic with a brief historical review.” A few months earlier, in
December 1910, Vasil’ev had submitted a request for a year’s sabbatical leave in
order to return to Germany and dedicate himself to research on negative judgments
and the principle of contradiction. His request was granted and, thanks to scholar-
ship funding, he was able to travel together with his wife and son to Germany in the
summer of 1911. He stayed first in Berlin, and then in Munich. The report drawn up
by Vasil’ev on his return to Russia in the summer of 1912 testifies to the studies car-
ried out in this period.41 In Kazan Vasil’ev resumed his teaching engagements. In
1913 he taught a course entitled “A reading of fragments from Aristotle’s Organon,”
and a year later, together with two colleagues, he taught on the subject of
“Borderlands between logic and the philosophy of mathematics.”42
In the meantime, he had published his major articles on logic. Reworking the
lecture which he had delivered at the University of Kazan to be allowed to teach, in
1910 he published “On Particular Judgments, the Triangle of Oppositions, and the
37
Cf. Bazhanov (2009a: 100–101).
38
Cf. Vasil’ev (1909b; 1909e).
39
Cf. Vasil’ev (1909d).
40
Vasil’ev (1909d: 5).
41
Cf. Vasil’ev ([1912]/1989). This manuscript is currently preserved in Vasil’ev’s estate at the
Library of Kazan University.
42
Cf. Bazhanov (2009a: 41–44).
1.5 Teaching and Research: Logic, Literature, Ethics 11
Law of Excluded Fourth.” On the 13th of January 1911, Vasil’ev gave a lecture
before the Physical-Mathematical Society of Kazan entitled “Non-Euclidean
Geometry and non-Aristotelian Logic.” Moreover, a brief text called Imaginary
Logic, a conspectus of a lecture he gave at Kazan University in 1911, came out that
same year. In it, for the first time, the term ‘imaginary logic’ appears. In 1912, he
published “Imaginary (non-Aristotelian) Logic,” and followed it up with his “Logic
and Metalogic” in 1912–1913.
These were the most productive years for Vasil’ev from a scientific and literature
perspective. Alongside several reviews that reflect his logical and philosophical
interests,43 he also continued publishing versions of Swinburne’s poems,44 and an
important essay on Lev N. Tolstoy (1828–1910) and Vladimir S. Solovyov (1853–
1900) bearing the title “Logicheskii i istoricheskii metod v etike (Ob eticheskikh
sistemakh L. N. Tolstogo i V. S. Solovyova) [The Logical and Historical Method in
Ethics (On the Ethical Systems of L. N. Tolstoy and V. S. Solovyov)]” (1913), from
which we can gain an idea of his views on ethics. Both of these authors considered
ethical principles to form the groundwork of social life, and precisely for this reason
they lend themselves to comparison. Yet, while sharing similar intentions, they
arrive at diametrically opposed ethical conceptions: Tolstoy’s notion is abstract, rig-
orous and antihistorical, whereas Solovyov’s viewpoint is historical, and principles
may be transgressed if they achieve a higher aim.
Vasil’ev synthesizes these respective points of view in the following way:
Tolstoy’s moral method is abstract and geometrical. Above all, he is searching for a logical
coherence in morality, he wishes to provide a severe, neatly organized moral system, and
would wish that all morality might spring from a unique principle of logical necessity. […]
It’s a matter of complete indifference for Tolstoy whether these schemas exist more or less
in reality or whether his moral principles can be actuated: it is sufficient that the logical
bond which links everything is not destroyed. For this reason, Tolstoy’s motto is “No
compromises.”45
Solovyov’s method is historical and evolutionary. Absolute good and moral ideals cannot at
this time be embodied in life. Their incarnation will only be feasible at the end of history,
in the Kingdom of God, and history is nothing other than the gradual incarnation of the
Good. […] And everything that assists this historical progress, even when it might appear
evil to us, is justified, it has a moral meaning, because it serves as a means for the victory
over evil. Solovyov’s ethics is a Christian ethic of progress.46
Vasil’ev does not take sides in favour of either of the two conceptions. The stakes
are, effectively, very high: is it legitimate to do evil in order to bring about some
43
Vasil’ev reviewed the Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (ed. by Arnold Ruge),
in which the first three contributions deal with logical principles (cf. Vasil’ev 1912–1913b); Joseph
Geyser’s Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Psychologie (cf. Vasil’ev 1912–1913c); Frédéric Paulhan’s La
logique de la contradiction (cf. Vasil’ev 1913a); and the Dernières Pensées by Jules-Henri Poincaré
(cf. Vasil’ev 1913b), an author Vasil’ev cites on several occasions in his texts.
44
Cf. Vasil’ev (1913c).
45
Vasil’ev (1913d: 451–452).
46
Vasil’ev (1913d: 452).
final good? Even the Gospels failed to address and answer the question, which was
formulated eloquently by Ivan Karamazov when he remarked to his brother:
“imagine that it is you yourself who are erecting the edifice of human destiny with the aim
of making men happy in the end, of giving them peace and contentment at last, but that to
do that it is absolutely necessary, and indeed quite inevitable, to torture to death only one
tiny creature, the little girl who beat her breast with her little fist, and to found the edifice on
her unavenged tears — would you consent to be the architect on those conditions? Tell me
and do not lie!”47
Now, Vasil’ev calls both options “magnificent,” be it Alyosha’s negative reply to his
brother or the positive response that would permit an innocent child to suffer if this
were to enable the achievement of absolute good.
In one sense, what we have here is a response of an aesthetic character, which
recognizes on the other side that, in certain instances, diametrically opposed answers
are equally acceptable for the same problem. One could argue that the question is
poorly formulated, that no good can be accomplished by making an innocent child
suffer, and that an absolute good is nothing but a sheer fiction, which simply does
not exist. Yet one could also say that, wherever opposed answers are acceptable for
the same ethical question, a margin opens up for making a responsible decision in a
contingent circumstance.
It is difficult to determine how Vasil’ev’s logical and philosophical reflections
could have turned out had they gone on developing, since they were abruptly termi-
nated by the outbreak of the First World War.
1.6 War, Illness, Death
In the autumn of 1914, Vasil’ev was enlisted as a military doctor. In 1915 he was deco-
rated with the cross of the Order of Saint Stanislaus. However, by the following year,
those mental problems, which were to afflict him for the rest of his life and lead to his
confinement in a mental asylum, started to manifest themselves. The first of what
would prove to be one of many hospitalizations for his illness took place in 1916.
The October Revolution of 1917 found Vasil’ev in Moscow. In a letter to his
wife, he boasted of the Bolsheviks’ military and organizational superiority and, like
his father, judged the revolution to be “a legitimate and indispensable stage in
Russia’s development.”48 In the autumn of that year he returned to teach at Kazan
University, where he became a full professor in 1918. The same year he found him-
self, together with his wife Ekaterina Stepanovna and their son Iulian, stuck right in
the middle of the bloody battles launched by the White Army in its attempt to
occupy the town of Sviyazhsk.
A combination of anxieties for his family and the experience at first hand of these
events contributed to a fresh recurrence of his mental breakdown. By 1920, Vasil’ev
47
Dostoevsky (1882–1883/1958: i, 287).
48
Bazhanov (1988a: 33).
1.6 War, Illness, Death 13
had recovered sufficiently to resume his research and return to lecturing on psychol-
ogy at Kazan University. Over the spring quarter in early 1921, he taught a number
of subjects, including Logic and methodology, Social psychology and the History of
Weltanschauung. In the autumn quarter, he held lessons on the History of Russian
philosophy, German idealism and Aristotle’s Poetics.49 He also published, as we
have noted, his essay on “The Question of the Fall of the Western Roman Empire…,”
written in 1906, and reviewed two manuals pertinent to the subjects he taught.50
Moreover, he stood out for the address he delivered to the First Regional Conference
on the Education of the Blind,51 and for a psychological study he undertook on an
‘inquiry on taste,’ which contained 40 questions formulated in order to supply mate-
rials for an analysis of desires. Alexander Romanovich Luria (1902–1977), the
future neuropsychologist, figured among his students, and recalled Vasil’ev with
professions of gratitude and esteem many years later. Vasil’ev indeed wrote the
preface to the manuscript of Luria’s first scientific work, Printsipy real’noi psik-
hologii [Principles of True Psychology], which however has never been
published.52
In 1922, in the wake of a number of changes introduced in the organization of
teachings at Kazan University, one of which entailed the abolition of the Faculty of
Social Sciences where Vasil’ev was professor of Logic and Pedagogy, he was
appointed head of a research group on the Psychology of infancy. The projected
reorganization, despite Vasil’ev’s energetic dedication, turned out to be a failure. In
June of the same year, another mental breakdown brought Vasil’ev’s career to an
end. He was hospitalized first at Kazan University’s clinic, where he was diagnosed
as suffering from manic depression, and was then transferred to a psychiatric clinic
not far from that city. In periods of lucidity, he managed to do some work, and in
1924, following his father’s recommendation, he sent a communication on imagi-
nary logic to the v International Congress of Philosophy, which took place in Naples
from the 5th to the 9th of May, 1924. Vasil’ev was unable to personally deliver his
paper, but his communication, written on the pattern of his 1911 text, and bearing
the title “Imaginary (non-Aristotelian) Logic,” was published the following year in
the transactions.53 It was to be his last publication.
Judging by his letters to his wife and son Iulian, in the following years Vasil’ev
studied logic, mathematics and philosophy, while maintaining his literary inter-
ests.54 He died in Kazan on the 31st of December 1940.
49
Cf. Bazhanov (2009a: 46–47).
50
Cf. Vasil’ev (1921a; 1922).
51
Cf. Vasil’ev (1921b).
52
Cf. Bazhanov (2009a: 52–53). The manuscript, preserved in Luria’s Nachlass, remains unpub-
lished. He dismissed this early effort as “absolutely childish, but challenging.” Cf. Homskaya
(2001: 12).
53
Cf. Vasil’ev (1925).
54
Chapter 2
The Historical and Cultural Context
Abstract This chapter contextualizes Vasil’ev’s work considering the state of logic
in both Russia and Western Europe between the end of the nineteenth and the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, and, above all, the ways in which Vasil’ev absorbed
and re-worked input and suggestions flowing from external sources. This survey
starts with the individual, Vasil’ev himself, and then moves outwards to isolate and
identify the broader contexts within which his ideas developed. Among the main
Russian logicians who were important for Vasil’ev there are Matvei Mikhailovich
Troitsky, Mikhail I. Vladislavlev, Mikhail Ivanovich Karinsky, as well as the neo-
Kantians Aleksandr Ivanovich Vvedensky and Ivan Ivanovich Lapshin. As to the
Western scholars, even though Vasil’ev wrote during the years of the foundational
crisis of mathematics, he placed great importance on Aristotelian logic and hence on
traditional logicians like William Hamilton, John S. Mill, Rudolf Hermann Lotze,
Christoph Sigwart, Benno Erdmann, and Wilhelm Wundt. At the same time, atten-
tion is focused on the work of some contemporaries like Isaac Husik, Jan
Łukasiewicz, Alexius Meinong and Charles S. Peirce, whose work was relevant for
the elaboration of non-classical logical ideas around the turn of the century. In par-
ticular, the reading of Peirce played an important role in Vasil’ev’s elaboration of
the idea of a non-Aristotelian logic. Just as important was his acquaintance with
Darwin’s evolutionary theories through the mediation of Sigwart.
Contextualization is indispensable if one is to understand Vasil’ev’s work on logic. In

part, I have already covered this in sketching the historical and literary outlines of his
biography, as well as his historical and literary work. At this point however, we need to
take into consideration, if briefly, the cardinal elements of both the situation of logic in
Russia, straddling the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century,
when Vasil’ev’s thought took shape, and the state of logic in Western Europe in the
period, since he studied Western philosophy and logic, for which purpose, as we have
seen, he twice travelled to Germany. As a general survey would not be explanatory for
the reasons outlined in the introduction (see above, p. xx), Vasil’ev must be our point

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66086-8_2
16 2 The Historical and Cultural Context
of departure for sketching both of these contexts. We have already come across the
names of some logicians and philosophers while tracing the main stages of Vasil’ev’s
life, and here I should like to focus in greater detail on the picture we have so far drawn.
As will be evident from familiarity with his logical writings, Vasil’ev laid great
importance on Aristotelian logic and, indeed, his whole intellectual formation, as
well as the ideas that he was to develop, emerges out of a prevalently traditional
context. While it is true that Vasil’ev drops a hint here and there concerning math-
ematical logic or the algebra of logic, he does not deal with these themes in his texts.
Nonetheless, the richness and novelty of his ideas take wing from his encounters
with an extensive range of philosophical trends and energetic debates that were tak-
ing place both in Russia and, more generally, in Europe at that time.
2.1 In Russia
As a classic philosophical discipline, logic developed in close connection with vari-

ous movements and trends of thought and bears the marks of their influence, not
least among which are those that can be traced back to logic’s relationship with
theology. It is rather difficult to conceive of medieval theology shorn of support
from logic; for real theological problems are intrinsically of a strictly logical nature.
These links are, at the same time, not simply of an ideal kind: they are also political.
That is, they concern the attitude held by religious authorities in regard to philoso-
phy in general and, what interests us here, to logic in particular. These links have, in
the West, entailed dramatic, indeed, tragic consequences.
The cultural politics of religious authorities has also exercised an influence in
Russia, where the study of logic was viewed with hostility down to modern times,
particularly by the more conservative wing of the orthodox clergy, which perceived
in it an influx of alien provenance, if not indeed directly heterodox or heretical, that
was to be avoided at all costs.1 This mental closure with regard to whatever the West
might offer characterized a good part of Russian culture, even if attempts to encour-
age an exchange, in the spirit of the political reforms undertaken by Peter the Great,
were not lacking. In the wake of 1848, conservatism even went to the lengths of
suppressing the Faculty of Philosophy in 1850. Only the teaching of logic and psy-
chology was permitted provided they were taught by theology professors.
Consequently, this lead to the preserving of the logical tradition in Russia, but of a
logic linked to theology. However, over the course of several decades, the climate
changed and there was no lack of intellectuals who began to see in an exchange with
the West an opportunity for growth, rather than degradation.2
1
For a historical reconstruction of the fortunes of logic in Russia from the late medieval period to
the nineteenth century see Anellis (1992).
2
On the history of philosophy in the universities see Bazhanov (1995). Stelzner & Kreiser (2004:
236–241) provide a highly synthetic picture. On the history of logic in Russia in the nineteenth
century until the beginning of the twentieth century see also Bazhanov (2012; 2013: 65–67),
Schumann (2014).
2.1 In Russia 17
With regard to logic, the situation had begun to change some time in the middle
of the seventeenth century, but the seeds of a substantial transformation started to be
sown around the second half of the nineteenth century, which witnessed an upsurge
in works on logic by Russian authors and the publication of translations of Western
works on the topic of logic predominantly by English and German thinkers. In 1878
John S. Mill’s A System of Logic was translated, followed in 1895 by William
Minto’s Logic, Inductive and Deductive, in 1908 by Christoph Sigwart’s Logik (3rd
edition), and, the following year, by Edmund Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen
[Logical Investigations]. In addition to these, the translation in 1881 of William
Stanley Jevons’ The Principles of Science provided a strong stimulus to the algebra
of logic; works by Ernst Schröder and Louis Couturat were also published in its
wake.3 There was also a widespread diffusion of the psychologistic standpoint in
logic according to which logical laws are connected with human thinking and pos-
sess a cognitive character. Such a trend made the development of mathematical
logic difficult in Russia, but it had a heuristic impulse — as we shall see — in the
elaboration of imaginary logic by Vasil’ev.
Among the major Russian logicians mention must be made of Matvei
Mikhailovich Troitsky (1835–1899), who had a traditional education, taught for
some time at the University of Kazan, and was the author of Uchebnik logiki s
podrobnymi ukazaniiami na istoriiu i sovremennoe sostoianie etoi nauki v Rossii i
drugikh stranakh [A Manual of Logic with Detailed Illustrations of the History and
Contemporary State of this Science in Russia and Abroad] (1886), a text which
Vasil’ev cites on several occasions.4 The first work of logic Vasil’ev studied was, as
noted above (see Sect. 1.3), Mikhail I. Vladislavlev’s (1840–1880) Logika: obozrie-
nie induktivnykh i deduktivnykh priemov myshleniia i istoricheskie ocherki logiki
Aristotelia, skholasticheskoi dialektiki, logiki formal’noi i induktivnoi [Logic. A
Review of Inductive and Deductive Methods of Thought, together with Historical
Studies on Aristotle’s Logic, Scholastic Dialectic, and Formal and Inductive Logic]
(1872, 18812). Like Troitsky, Vladislavlev assigned a major relevance to inductive
logic but, above all, covered at length the principle of contradiction, particularly in
relation to the theory of inference. He held that contradictions are not given in
nature, but that in the pragmatic/epistemic sphere matters are decidedly different; he
indeed maintained that it was quite possible to ascribe contradictory properties to
the same object.5 As Werner Stelzner has speculated, notwithstanding the fact that
direct references are lacking which would confirm, based on Vasil’ev’s reading of
the book, a role for Vladislavlev’s Logika on the development of the problematic of
contradiction in Vasil’ev, one cannot wholly exclude such an influence.6
3
Cf. Cavaliere (1992–1993: 7 ff.). The Russian translations of the mentioned works are listed in the
bibliography.
4
Cf. Vasil’ev (1910: 10 fn. 1, 34, 41 = 1989: 18–19 fn. 8, 42, 48).
5
Cf. Vladislavlev (1872: 54–55).
6
Cf. Stelzner (2001: 250–251), Stelzner & Kreiser (2004: 256–257). For more details on the prob-
lematic of contradiction in Vladislavlev see Stelzner (2001: 243–249), Stelzner & Kreiser (2004:
387–393) again.
Other important logicians, who are mentioned in Vasil’ev’s writings, include

Mikhail Ivanovich Karinsky (1840–1917) and Platon Sergeevich Poretsky (1846–
1907), as well as the neo-Kantians Aleksandr Ivanovich Vvedensky (1856–1925)
and Ivan Ivanovich Lapshin (1870–1952). Poretsky, like Vasil’ev a lecturer at the
University of Kazan, is the Russian logician who provided, for this period, the most
relevant contributions to modern logic, in particular to the algebra of logic, with his
theories on logical consequences and on diagrams. Karinsky, in his Klassifikatsiia
vyvodov [The Classification of Inferences] (1880), criticized the Aristotelian syllo-
gism, Mill’s inductive logic and Kant’s transcendental logic, while developing a
relational logic centred on the notion of identity as the basis of inferences. The rela-
tion of logical identity, as distinguished from real identity, is expanded to embrace
what is similar, so that transitivity is not always valid.7 Vasil’ev noted that both
Karinsky and Vvedensky made “interesting and original breaks with tradition.”8 The
latter in particular, and in this he was followed by Lapshin, proposed interesting
ideas concerning the principle of contradiction and, over the bridging period of the
late nineteenth–early twentieth centuries, provided a notable contribution to the
development of non-classical logical ideas.9
Vvedensky proposed a variation of Kantian criticism, which he called ‘logicism,’
but which was distant from Frege’s logicism. In his Logika, kak chast’ teorii pozna-
niia [Logic as a Part of the Theory of Knowledge] (1909, 19173), where he upholds
an anti-psychologistic point of view, Vvedensky undertakes among other aims to
provide a foundation for Christianity and to refute Tolstoy’s religious doctrine. In
his view, “true being” can contain contradictions, whereas our knowledge of real
things cannot contain them, since it consists of representations which are always
non-contradictory. The world of transcendental being, that is, the world of things in
themselves, must be rigorously distinguished from the empirical world; contradic-
tions belong to the former, not to the latter. To the degree that our thought proceeds
by means of representations and reasons in such a way as to avoid contradictions,
the knowledge of contradictions regarding things in themselves cannot be demon-
strated and is nothing more than the object of mere belief.
In his Zakony myshleniia i formy poznaniia [The Laws of Thought and the Forms
of Knowledge] (1906) Lapshin, with Vvedensky explicitly in mind, affirms, against
what authors like William Hamilton had maintained,10 that the validity of logical
7
Cf. Biryukov (2001: 220–223).
8
Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 80 = 1989: 122 [1993: 351]).
9
In Russia, in 1901–1902, Samuil Osipovich Shatunovsky had maintained that the principle of
excluded middle was not valid for infinite sets, and later, Pavel A. Florensky, in The Pillar and
Ground of the Truth (1914 [1997]), spoke of degrees of belief, or faith, that go from +∞ to –∞ (cf.
Bazhanov 2001: 207; 2011: 95). There is no lack of scholars who see already in Florensky a sup-
porter of paraconsistency; cf. Guseinov & Lektorsky (2008: 13), Rhodes (2013: 20, 24 ff.). On the
relationships between Vasil’ev’s imaginary logic and Florensky’s philosophy, see Biryukov &
Pryadko (2010).
10
According to Hamilton (1861–18662: iii, 100), “all that we can positively think, that is, all that is
within the jurisdiction of the law of Reason and Consequent, lies between two opposite poles of
2.1 In Russia 19
laws, including the principles of contradiction and of excluded middle, cannot be

extended to the noumenon, but must be restricted only to “knowable being.” In the
world of things in themselves, the laws of thought may also be valid, but we are not
able to verify it.11 Such conclusions clearly presuppose the distinction between the
phenomenal and the noumenal, which is far from being unanimously shared. If one
does not accept an assumption of this kind, if the distinction itself is denied, then
there is no reason for limiting the validity of the principles of logic.
In his articles, Vasil’ev cites Vvedensky on several occasions12 and points out that
on the basis of the latter’s theory, according to which the law of contradiction is a
law concerning representations of the things of the empirical world, “the idea of an
imaginary logic must follow as an unavoidable corollary.”13 To “think a contradic-
tion” — Vasil’ev will state — it is enough to conceive of an imaginary world with
representations different from our own. This does not mean, however, that thought
itself becomes self-contradictory. As to Lapshin, Vasil’ev associates him with
Vvedensky precisely with regard to the question, much debated in Russia at that
time, on the validity of logical laws, and in particular of the law of contradiction, for
the intelligible world. Vasil’ev identifies the world of things in themselves with the
intelligible world and asserts that, on the basis of both Vvedensky’s and Lapshin’s
opinion, “the application of the law of contradiction to the intelligible world
becomes highly problematic.”14 Furthermore, he also mentions Lapshin when he
notes that there is a link between logic and the forms of knowledge.15 According to
Boris V. Biryukov, the concepts of Vvedensky and Lapshin had “some influence” on
Vasil’ev and his endeavours to enact an anti-Aristotelian reform of logic, in so far as
they “strengthened” doubts about the unlimited validity of the laws of logic.16 It is
evident that the separation of a real world from an intelligible one that can be
thought of and imagined is rooted in neo-Kantianism.17 The strong affinity between
Vasil’ev and the two neo-Kantian philosophers lies, as we shall see, in the fact that
all three consider that both thought and the real world are unable to contain contra-
dictions, whereas another world may hold them. For Vasil’ev this other world is not
thought, which, as exclusive of each other, cannot, on the principles of Identity and Contradiction,
both be true, but of which, on the principle of Excluded Middle, the one or the other must.” All this
applies to anything, even to the inconceivable, hence both to the phenomenal and to the noumenal.
On Hamilton’s concept of the laws of thought see Raspa (1999b: 84–89).
11
Cf. Biryukov (2001: 225–227), Stelzner & Kreiser (2004: 241–248).
12
Cf. Vasil’ev (1910: 12, 14 fn. 1, 40 fn. 1 = 1989: 20, 22 fn. 10, 47–48 fn. 22; 1912: 218–219 fn.
2, 222 = 1989: 65 fn. 6, 68–69 [2003: 137 fn. 6, 140–141]; 1912–1913a: 80 = 1989: 122 [1993:
351]).
13
Vasil’ev (1912: 222 = 1989: 69 [2003: 141]).
14
Vasil’ev (1912: 218, fn. 2 = 1989: 65, fn. 6 [2003: 137, fn. 6]).
15
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 72, fn. 1 = 1989: 114, fn. 10 [1993: 344]). In the translation, the note
has been put in the text.
16
Cf. Biryukov (2001: 227–228).
17
On Kantianism in Russia see also Evtuhov (1995), who speaks about Vvedensky’s reading of
Kant and Kantianism at Kazan University. On Vvedensky’s logical ideas and biography see
Biryukov & Biryukova (2011; 2012).
necessarily that of the things in themselves. From this, he will go on to deduce that
the principles of logic do not have universal validity and that for different object
domains different logical laws apply.
2.2 In Western Europe
If we turn from Russia to cast a rapid glance at the state of logic in the West, we see
that Vasil’ev is philosophically active in the same period when traditional formal
logic was substituted by modern mathematical logic. The champions of this revolu-
tion were George Boole, Gottlob Frege, David Hilbert, Giuseppe Peano and
Bertrand Russell (to mention just the most important figures, whom Vasil’ev him-
self also cites).18 These are the years of the ‘foundational crisis of mathematics’ that
broke out with the antinomy noted by Russell in Frege’s system of logic. Furthermore,
Hilbert at this time was revolutionizing axiomatics, and opening the way to a whole
series of lines of research on proof theory, which would culminate in the noted theo-
rems of Gödel, whilst Brouwer was developing intuitionistic mathematics. 1910,
the same year in which Vasil’ev published his first article on logic, was also the year
in which the first volume of the Principia Mathematica was printed.
Notwithstanding this, the logic Vasil’ev adopted was of the traditional kind. One
of the authors he cites more often is Christoph Sigwart, though he also refers fre-
quently to William Hamilton, John S. Mill, Rudolf Hermann Lotze, Benno Erdmann,
and Wilhelm Wundt. Vasil’ev basically stands outside the mainstream of his time, a
time in which the old lived on cheek by jowl with the new, that is, traditional syl-
logistic with the new logic, and a number of warning signs were already in the air
that anticipated kinds of logic that would go beyond the classical logic (as it would
be improperly called19) then under construction. We witness here, basically, a mix-
ture of past, present, and future. Vasil’ev unites the past and the future, while he
appears indeed to be aware of, but not to measure himself against, the present (if by
‘present’ we mean the developments in mathematical logic contemporary with his
own work). For this reason, Graham Priest has written that Vasil’ev came on the
scene, in some sense, too late, when others were revolutionizing logic in a far more
radical manner than he did, and in another sense, too early, since the logical devel-
18
Cf. Vasil’ev (1911/1989: 126; 1912: 244 = 1989: 92 [2003: 161]; 1912–1913a: 80 = 1989: 122
[1993: 350]; 1925: 107).
19
By ‘classical logic’ we understand, in accordance with contemporary usage, not traditional logic,
which arose with Aristotle and the stoic-megarian reflection, to continue through the Medieval age
down to modern times, but logical systems (classical propositional calculus and the logic of predi-
cates of the first and second order) that are opposed to intuitionistic, many-valued, paraconsistent
logics etc., i.e. ‘non-classical logics.’ Nonetheless, as should emerge from the following pages, not
all non-classical logics arise in reaction to classical logic, since non-classical elements were
already present in traditional logic.
2.2 In Western Europe 21
opments that would have allowed his proposal to find an appreciative audience had
not yet come into being.20
The constant reference Vasil’ev makes to the model of non-Euclidean geometries
helps us to understand his position within a broader context. The heuristic stimulus
spurred by the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries in the first half of the nine-
teenth century was at work on Vasil’ev as it was on his contemporaries; it was by
analogy with such geometries that he developed his imaginary logic. This aspect
allows us to compare him to Jan Łukasiewicz (1878–1956) and Charles S. Peirce
(1839–1914), whose respective conceptualizations of non-Aristotelian logics were
also influenced by the analogy with non-Euclidean geometries. Through a profound
reflection on the laws of logic, in particular on the principles of contradiction and of
excluded middle, Vasil’ev came to limit the validity of such principles with respect
to the correlated domain of objects. In doing this, he cannot but direct his attention
to incomplete and contradictory objects. For this reason, his logical proposal may be
set alongside that of his contemporary Alexius Meinong (1853–1920).
The multiple investigations by these thinkers around the turn of the century form
a cluster of theories that provides us with important leads for analyzing the philo-
sophical motivations that gave rise to the elaboration of non-classical logical ideas
and allow us, in various ways, both to link back to the logical and philosophical
tradition, and offer a fresh reading of that tradition.
Of course, in the opening decades of the twentieth century classical logic had not
yet been defined in the modern sense of the term. Therefore, the most widely used
term among various thinkers is ‘non-Aristotelian logic.’ By this is meant a form of
logic wherein the principle of contradiction and/or that of excluded middle does not
hold, or has only a limited scope. It should be noted, as a further justification of the
term, that the various proposals of non-Aristotelian logic are openly at odds with the
point of view, defended by several exponents of traditional logic, which argued that
this was grounded on the so-called laws of thought (the principles of identity, of
contradiction and of excluded middle), laws that tradition traced back to Aristotle
himself,21 but which precisely in this period were losing the centrality which had
been attributed to them. It should be said at the same time, however, that we shall
not examine complete logical systems, but rather conceptual proposals or sketches
of systems, designed to demonstrate the possibility and fundamental cogency of
forms of logic that work independently of the principles of contradiction and of
excluded middle, or that limit their scope by including contradictory objects in their
more extensive conceptual universe.
In addition to the idea of (L) a different logic, non-Aristotelian elements that
Vasil’ev shares with the writers we have just touched upon (and we should add to
the list the less known figure of Isaac Husik (1876–1939), whose place in our
account can hardly be dismissed as negligible) are: (A) the thesis that the syllogism
20
Cf. Priest (2000: 144).
21
Cf. for example Hamilton (1861–18662: iii, 79, 100) and Heymans (19052: 62 ff.); see also Sect.
2.1 fn. 10, and Sect. 5.1. With regard to twentieth century exponents of traditional formal logic, cf.
Freytag-Löringhoff (1955: 13–14, 20) and Luce (1958: 124).
is independent of the principle of contradiction; (B) the identification of a third form

of proposition side by side with affirmation and negation, namely a proposition that
asserts contradictory predicates of the same subject; (C) the assumption of
non-existent objects, and even contradictory ones, as possible authentic subjects of
propositions that bear truth-claims; and (D) the hypothesis of imaginary worlds,
wherein negative facts and contradictory objects are given, something which
involves a broadening of the universe of discourse. It emerges from an examination
of (B), (C) and (D) that, in order to define the role and scope of the principle of
contradiction, the notion of object, that is, of what occurs as a subject in a proposi-
tion, assumes a pivotal position. This is the main reason that led Vasil’ev, and not
only him, to hypothesize logical systems different from traditional logic:
We may thus think about other worlds than ours in which some logical laws differ from
those in our logic.22
Another psychological rather than ontological reason for this might reside in the
thesis that would conjoin logical laws to the mental nature of thinking entities, and
that leads, on the other hand, to hypothesizing living beings endowed with cognitive
structures that differ from our own. It is difficult nowadays to accept the thesis that
the laws of logic might be laws of thought. Concurring with the German psycholo-
gistic logicians (Erdmann, Wundt and, above all, Sigwart), Vasil’ev adopts this the-
sis and, like his contemporary Łukasiewicz (see Sect 4.3), does not regard it as
absurd to theorize living beings endowed with a psychic organization distinct from
our own.23 Nonetheless, in developing an imaginary logic he postulates, in contra-
distinction to Łukasiewicz, “the invariability of the cognizing subject.”24 This move
allows him to maintain that the plurality of logics, and therefore also the givenness
of an imaginary logic, depends on the world, namely on the types of objects.
2.3 Readings
At this juncture, we must subject to our scrutiny in what terms the general context,
both Western and Russian, finds a corresponding echo in the scholar Vasil’ev, and
above all in the works he read, in so far as these play a fundamental role in the
development of a philosopher’s thought.
Bazhanov who had access to Vasil’ev’s personal library and Nachlaß (his diary,
correspondence, documents and photos)25 has identified a variety of sources that
might have functioned as “vague, uncertain and barely formulated analogies” in the
development of imaginary logic: (i) Peirce’s logic of relatives, (ii) symbolist poetry,
for the idea of another world, (iii) the psychologistic point of view used in certain
22
Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 59 = 1989: 101 [1993: 334]).
23
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912: 208, 223 = 1989: 55, 69 [2003: 128, 141]; 1925: 108).
24
Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 59 = 1989: 101–102 [1993: 334]).
25
Cf. Bazhanov (1990a: 334; 1998: 17).
2.3 Readings 23
analyses of Aristotelian logic, (iv) Darwin’s evolutionary theories, (v) the analogy
with the construction and method of non-Euclidean geometries.26 We have already
touched on the importance of symbolist poetry for the elaboration of imaginary
logic (see Sect. 1.4); presently, we will have occasion to return to both the analogy
between imaginary logic and non-Euclidean geometries (see Sect. 5.6), and to the
role that certain psychologistic logicians, in particular Sigwart, played in the elabo-
ration of Vasil’ev’s logical concepts (see Sect. 3.1). Regarding the significance of
evolutionary theories, Vasil’ev, and here he is in agreement with Sigwart, places
Darwin at the head of a revolution which affected the realm of logic. According to
Vasil’ev, Sigwart would have demonstrated “that the same foundations of
Aristotelian logic — the universality of genus and the species — were shaken by
Darwin’s theory concerning the origin of the species, the random variation of indi-
viduals and their constant changeability.”27 Vasil’ev’s words recall very closely the
initial passage of the treatment of the Darwinian doctrine by Sigwart in a chapter
of his Logik entitled “Die Induction als Methode der Bildung real gültiger Begriffe
[Induction as the Method of forming Valid Concepts about Reality]”:
The first result of the Darwinian theory seems to be merely destructive. It does away entirely
with the Aristotelian basis, upon which, more or less, our logical theory has stood until now,
more especially in obtaining its classificatory concepts, and denies the objective validity of
the specific and generic concepts by which the classification of the organic world proceeded
under the assumption that the whole organic world was constructed according to forms
which could be fixed in definitions, and in such a way that each individual could be attrib-
uted to this or that species according to unmistakable characteristics. On the other hand,
attention has been drawn to the gradual transitions between those differences which are
peculiar to the individual and which have always been neglected in the formation of con-
cepts, the differences of varieties to which a doubtful recognition has been accorded, with
a tendency to refer them to external causes of climate, situation, etc., and the differences
which are usually accepted as specific, and employed for the determination of species; and
in so doing the Darwinian theory has assailed the distinction between the διαφορὰ εἰδοποιός
and the συμβεβηκός, and represented it as an arbitrary one. By pointing out the innumera-
ble transitional cases which confuse the boundaries of the species, and the impossibility of
carrying out any classification in such a way that every individual can be confidently
assigned to a species, it has substituted for the “discretion” demanded in forming concepts
the continuum of imperceptibly small differences as being alone objectively valid; and by
disputing the invariability of organic forms, and asserting that different forms have gradu-
ally come into being through small deviations from common forms, it has destroyed the
chief assumption upon which the Aristotelian doctrine of the concept was based — the
assumption that a significance independent of time attached to concepts, as timeless forms
always realizing themselves in the same way. It is only for the present moment that, the
intermediate members having disappeared, a part of the organic world falls into separate
spheres in such a way that individuals of one sphere seem more similar to each other than
those of different spheres; in another part we find continuous transitions.28
The application of the evolutionary method leads Vasil’ev to maintain that logic “is
produced in the process of life and struggle, of the interaction between man and his
26
Cf. Bazhanov (1992a: 46; 1998: 18–19; 2001: 209 ff.).
27
Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 79 = 1989: 122 [1993: 350]).
28
Sigwart (19043: ii, § 94, pp. 462–463 [1895: ii, 328–329]).
environment, and is the organ of life, the instrument of struggle, the reflection of
man and his environment.”29 Logic, that is, would be the outcome of an adaptive
process, being useful for the knowledge which, in turn, results from the interaction
between man and his environment, the knowing subject and the known object.
Vasil’ev’s youthful reading of Peirce has been noted earlier (see Sect. 1.3).
According to Bazhanov, it would appear that it was precisely Vasil’ev’s reading of
“The Logic of Relatives” (1897), of which traces remain in his diary, which may
have left him with a clear impression of the imperfection of traditional logic and the
limitations of the theory of judgment which characterize it. Peirce not only wrote in
a complete novel style, but also proposed a new conception of judgment.30 It is
nonetheless a fact that, in 1897, imaginary logic lay further down the road. Vasil’ev,
notwithstanding his philosophical and psychological interests, would have been
studying medicine at this stage and dedicating himself initially to literature. The
really decisive encounter with Peirce’s ideas took place some 13 years later, and it
is this which would prove decisive for his intuition of a concept of non-Aristotelian
logic. In volume xx of The Monist, Paul Carus, its general editor at the time, had
published an essay entitled “The Nature of Logical and Mathematical Thought”
(1910), where, among other things, he discussed the notion of precisely a non-
Aristotelian logic. He cited a passage in a letter Peirce had written to Francis
C. Russell, in which the former affirmed that, before dedicating himself to the study
of relatives, he had investigated a “sort of non-Aristotelian logic, in the sense in
which we speak of non-Euclidean geometry,” and examined the consequences that
would follow from supposing “the laws of logic to be different from what they
are.”31 Despite some interesting developments, Peirce added that, while he obtained
some noteworthy results, they were not sufficient to warrant publication. In this
same volume, Carus also printed a brief follow-up note from Peirce to The Monist
intended to clarify the remarks on non-Aristotelian logic he had made in his letter to
Russell. Far from being a “lunatic” undertaking, he wrote that, had he pursued this
line of thought, it might have led him to perceive features of logic that had hitherto
been ignored; however, he decided not to pursue that course any further.32
29
Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 74 = 1989: 116 [1993: 346]). Cf. also Vasil’ev (1909c), with reference to
which see Bazhanov (1990c).
30
Cf. Bazhanov (1992a: 46–47).
31
Peirce quoted in Carus (1910a: 45).
32
Cf. Peirce quoted in Carus (1910b: 158): “It does not seem to me to have been a lunatic study.
On the contrary, perhaps if I had pursued it further, it might have drawn my attention to features of
logic that had been overlooked. However, I came to the conclusion that it was not worth my while
to pursue that line of thought further. In order to show what sort of false hypotheses they were that
I traced out to their consequences, I will mention that one of them was that instead of the form of
necessary inference being, as it is, that from A being in a certain relation to B, and B in the same
relation to C, it necessarily follows that A is in the same relation to C, I supposed, in one case, that
the nature of Reason were such that the fundamental form of inference was, A is in a certain rela-
tion to B and B in the same relation to C, whence it necessarily follows that C is in the same rela-
tion to A; and I followed out various other similar modifications of logic.”
2.3 Readings 25
Unfortunately, apart from the vague reference to non-Euclidean logic, Peirce did not
explain what he understood by a non-Aristotelian logic. Yet, taking into consider-
ation the example he gave of a type of “false hypotheses” which he had analyzed for
their consequences, it is fair to speculate that he had tried to modify the principle of
transitivity.
The copy of this issue of The Monist survives among Vasil’ev’s papers and
reveals numerous annotations in his hand.33 In his article, Carus affirmed that the
coherence or uniformity of the world is an unavoidable condition if science is to
recover regularities in reality and thereby establish general laws.34 On the other
hand, this condition would appear to correspond more to a need for human reason
than to the effective state of things. Kant maintained that
For the law of reason to seek unity is necessary, since without it we would have no reason,
and without that, no coherent use of the understanding, and, lacking that, no sufficient mark
of empirical truth; thus in regard to the latter we simply have to presuppose the systematic
unity of nature as objectively valid and necessary.35
Indeed, science often has to take into account the apparent absence of regularity and
of a systematic unity of nature, and, therefore, must deal with the impossibility of
establishing general rules that do not admit exceptions or that do not have a proba-
bilistic value. But also in another sense, Kant’s perspective leaves us dissatisfied: in
his view, if we desire to avoid leaving the intellect trapped in a coherent solipsism,
if we desire our knowledge to have a grip on objects, then we must postulate, beside
the logical laws, corresponding transcendental laws that guarantee an accord with
nature or with the objects of experience. Peirce would object that to postulate a cor-
respondence between the uniformity of thought and the uniformity of reality does
not make the postulate true.36 Carus also judges Kant’s point of view insufficient.
Yet, assuming that consistency is the general rule that guides our operations, Carus
resolves the problem that afflicted the Königsberger philosopher in this way: “If
consistency dominates both objective existence and our thought, both will be
analogous.”37
As to logic, Carus recognized that the Aristotelian one is insufficient and incom-
plete, since it only deals with the most simple relations. He recognized, moreover,
that recent attempts, starting from Boole, to transfer the results obtained by mathe-
33
Cf. Bazhanov (1992a: 48; 2001: 207); on Vasil’ev’s reading of Carus’s essay see also Bazhanov
(1988a: 68–70; 2009a: 108–111).
34
Cf. Carus (1910a: 37): “Every contradiction is a problem and every solution of a problem
becomes a renewed justification of our belief in the consistency of existence. [...] If there were no
consistency there would be no science, reason would be a mere coincidence of haphazard regulari-
ties, and a trust in the efficiency of reason should be branded as a vagary of deluded dreamers. The
very existence of reason is an evidence that the universe is consistent throughout, and human rea-
son is an instinctive comprehension of this most remarkable feature of existence, while science is
simply the methodical application of reason.”
35
Kant (17811–17872: A 651 = B 679 [1998: 595]).
36
Cf. Peirce (1892: CP 6.39; W 8, 113).
37
Carus (1910a: 39).
matics to logic went far beyond Aristotle’s logic. Yet he concluded that, while allow-
ing for a world in which miracles might occur or pure chance reign, a handful of
laws of Aristotelian logic like Barbara and Celarent would remain valid. “Neither
Bolyai nor Lobatchevsky,” he remarked pithily, “upsets Euclid and none of the mod-
ern logicians will ever set aside Aristotle.”38 Carus ventured to make a prophecy
concerning an eventual non-Aristotelian logic:
the non-Aristotelian logic will abolish Aristotle as little as the non-Euclideans have anti-
quated Euclid. If it comes it will, if it be sound, give us new viewpoints, but it will not
abolish one iota of the well-established truths of the old logic.39
Vasil’ev undoubtedly read Carus’s article sometime in 1910. Uncertainty reigns

over whether he may have read it before the 18th of May, as Bazhanov has
suggested,40 but he must have read it before the 13th of January 1911, the date on
which he gave a lecture before the Physical-Mathematical Society of Kazan entitled
“Non-Euclidean Geometry and non-Aristotelian Logic.” He must have taken to
heart Peirce’s lesson by probing in the direction of a non-Aristotelian logic while
seeking an analogon of Euclid’s fifth postulate that would not be the principle of
transitivity. Like Carus, Vasil’ev admits that correct thinking cannot contradict itself
and that contradictions are not given in (our) reality. Nonetheless, on this last point,
he will propose a notable modification by endeavouring to unite coherence of think-
ing with the contradictory nature of the (imaginary) world. The question he poses to
himself is: how is one to express contradiction in a coherent manner?
We have already seen that (vi) Vasil’ev’s reading of the Russian neo-Kantians —
as Biryukov has shown — retained a certain weight on both his thinking and reform
of Aristotelian logic; the same (vii) is true — going by Stelzner’s reconstruction —
of his reading of Vladislavlev. The list could be extended, but at this point, it first
behooves us to go directly to Vasil’ev’s logical works.
The texts we will take into consideration are structured in paragraphs, each of
which is dedicated to one argument that marks a stage in the whole reasoning; at the
same time, however, Vasil’ev often lapses into repetitions of the same thought.
Moreover, he puts a certain emphasis on throwing into conspicuous relief the novel
character of his imaginary logic compared to “our logic,” which consists, for him,
of traditional syllogistic. It is easy to be tempted here into considering the irony of
fate, if one thinks of the recent developments in mathematical logic, but the fact
remains that Vasil’ev synthesizes in a very original manner elements and sugges-
tions he had picked up from his readings as well as various intellectual and personal
encounters. The ideas he proposes — as I hope will become clear in the course of
reading the following pages — retain a more than mere historical interest for both
logicians and philosophers of logic.
38
Carus (1910a: 44).
39
Carus (1910a: 46).
40
Chapter 3
The Logic of Concepts
Abstract This chapter systematically expounds Vasil’ev’s logic of concepts, that

is, a logic in which the law of excluded middle does not hold. Sigwart, especially
with his concept of the forms of judgment and his critique of particular judgement,
exercised a considerable influence on Vasiliev’s development of such a logic. Taking
up Sigwart’s analysis, Vasil’ev gives a strong interpretation of the particular judg-
ment as ‘Only some (not all) S are P,’ while the form ‘Some, and maybe all, S are
P’ would correspond to the Aristotelian indefinite proposition. According to Vasil’ev,
the strong particular affirmative judgment presupposes the particular negative judg-
ment ‘Some (the remaining) S are not P,’ and vice versa. These constitute one sole
judgment, the accidental one. By means of an analysis of the square of opposition,
Vasil’ev shows that for the judgments about concepts, which he distinguishes from
the judgments about facts, there are three kinds of universal judgments (affirmative,
negative, and universal) among which only the relation of contrariety holds, and
therefore the law of the excluded fourth holds, not that of excluded middle, as is
shown in the triangle of oppositions. The chapter closes with a historical excursus
on the principle of excluded middle followed by a debate on particular propositions
between Louis Couturat and Salomon Ginzberg, who discuss ideas which show
very strong affinities to Vasil’ev’s on strong particular judgment.
Vasil’ev’s attempt to show the possibility and legitimacy of a logic that can do with-
out the laws of contradiction and of excluded middle, and therefore, his undertaking
to ‘de-universalize’ these principles starts with the introduction, alongside affirma-
tion and negation, of a third form of judgment, which will lead to the substitution of
the law of excluded middle by the law of excluded fourth. This is set forth in his first
article of a logical kind, namely “O chastnykh suzhdeniiakh, o treugol’nike protivo-
polozhnostei, o zakone iskliuchennogo chetvertogo [On Particular Judgments, the
Triangle of Oppositions, and the Law of Excluded Fourth]” (1910), which turns on
the analysis of the structure of judgment, especially of particular judgment. Vasil’ev
here limits the sphere where the law of excluded middle is valid to one type of judg-
ment, that which hinges on facts, and gives particular attention to the notion of pos-
sibility. It is by interpreting particular judgment in terms of its modality that he
manages to isolate a third form of judgment, besides affirmation and negation. In

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66086-8_3
28 3 The Logic of Concepts
this essay, more so than in the later articles, Vasil’ev tackles the logical tradition and
proposes a historical rereading of traditional logic, in particular, of the theory of
judgment and the law of excluded middle. Sigwart’s influence is notably present
from the very first page, but references are not lacking to Aristotle, Kant, J. S. Mill
and a number of other English and German logicians, not to speak of those we have
mentioned above, Troitsky and Vvedensky.
Vasil’ev begins by noting various criticisms from several quarters over the nine-
teenth century of the traditional classification of judgments according to quantity
(which Kant also adopted) into universal, particular and singular.1 Referring again
to Kant, he considers the interpretation of singular judgments as universal judg-
ments2 — an idea put forth by John Wallis in 16383 — as valid. In his opinion,
problems arise particularly with regard to the subdivision of judgments, according
to quantity and quality, in universal affirmatives (A), universal negatives (E), par-
ticular affirmatives (I), and particular negatives (O). It is certainly true that more
than one logician, in the nineteenth century, had proposed classifications that differ
from the traditional one. Vasil’ev cites in particular English logicians like William
Hamilton, Augustus De Morgan, Stanley Jevons and John Venn, who introduced the
quantification of the predicate.4 The fact of the matter is, however, that these
approaches were more refinements of the traditional conception than substantive
critiques. Vasil’ev instead took the double operation enacted by Sigwart to be far
more radical, in that there (i) universal and particular judgments are included in a
unique class of plural judgments, that Sigwart opposed to singular judgments, and
(ii) affirmative and negative judgments were not considered on a par, in so far as the
second type was to be considered a judgment on a judgment.5 This thesis — Vasil’ev
writes — is shared by philosophers like Henri Bergson and Wilhelm Jerusalem, but
is already present in Mill, and, even earlier, in Kant.6
Since Vasil’ev often refers to the analysis of judgment, and to the critique of the
traditional classification of judgments set forth by Sigwart in his Logik, let us exam-
ine them briefly.7
1
Cf. Kant (17811–17872: A 70 = B 95 [1998: 206]; 1800: Ak. ix, 102 ff. [1992: 598 ff.]).
2
Cf. Kant (17811–17872: A 71 = B 96 [1998: 207]; 1800: Ak. ix, 102 [1992: 599]).
3
Cf. Wallis (1643/1687), with reference to which see Raspa (1999b: 294).
4
Cf. Vasil’ev (1910: 3–4 and fn. 1 = 1989: 12–13 and fn. 2). Cf. also Hamilton (1861–18662: iv,
257 ff., esp. 279–280), De Morgan (1847: 4 ff., 56 ff.; 1860/1966: 156 ff.), Jevons (1864/1971: §§
145–146, p. 52; 1870: 183 ff.), Venn (18942: 8).
5
Cf. Sigwart (19043: i, § 20, p. 155 [1895: i, 119]): “The object of a negation must be either a
completed or an attempted judgment.”
6
Cf. Vasil’ev (1910: 4–5 and fn. 3 = 1989: 13 and fn. 4). Cf. also Kant (17811–17872: A 709 = B
737 [1998: 628]), Mill (18728/1973–1974: ii, vii, § 5, p. 277), Jerusalem (1895: 183), Bergson
(1907: 310–312).
7
Sigwart’s Logik went through four editions (Tübingen 1873–18781, 1889–18932, 19043, 19114).
Since the Russian version Vasil’ev consulted was based on the third edition (cf. Sigwart 1908–
1909), we take this as our reference out of concern for uniformity. For further details on Sigwart’s
Logik see Raspa (1999b: 99 ff., 271 ff.), Stelzner & Kreiser (2004: 71 ff., 99 ff., 147 ff. and
passim).
3.1 The Forms of Judgment According to Christoph Sigwart 29
3.1 The Forms of Judgment According to Christoph Sigwart
Judgment is the fundamental notion in Sigwart’s logic, in relation to which all other
concepts are constructed. Logic is “a technical science of Thought” (eine Kunstlehre
des Denkens), whose aim is to arrive at “certain and universally valid” (gewiss und
allgemeingültig) propositions.8 A proposition (Satz) is the linguistic expression
(oral or written) of a judgment, which can be the object of scientific investigation
only if it is expressed in a proposition. Were this not the case, it would have no
claims to any objective existence (objectives Dasein). It can be the object of logical
treatment only if it possesses the traits of necessity and of universal validity.9 It is
these traits which allow one to distinguish logical from psychological analyses.
Judgment is an act of thought which consists in asserting something about some-
thing. It presupposes that there are two distinct ideas (Vorstellungen)10 present in
consciousness, that of the subject and that of the predicate. A judgment must be
accompanied by an awareness of objective validity. The fundamental form it
assumes is that of categorical judgment with a singular subject, or simple judgment
(einfaches Urteil), consisting in the synthesis of subject and predicate. Simple judg-
ments are split into two classes. If the subject of judgment is an idea of something
that exists, the judgment is a narrative one (erzählendes Urteil). If, on the other
hand, a judgment is made up of the general meaning of a term, it is explicative
(erklärendes Urteil).11 This distinction constitutes one of the two theses Sigwart
assumes as a starting point for criticizing the traditional classification of judgments
into universal, particular and singular.
According to this classification, a judgment is universal, if it asserts the predicate
of the entire extension of the subject; while a judgment is particular, if it asserts the
predicate only of a part of the subject extension. Finally, a judgment is singular, if
the subject is a proper name or an analogous expression, in such a way that its exten-
sion is exhausted by a unique individual. This doctrine, though traditionally consid-
ered to be lucidly evident, would in fact contain a number of obscure points.
Sigwart includes under a unique denomination of plural judgments (plurale
Urteile) judgments in which a unique predicate is asserted of a multiplicity of sub-
jects, whether they be copulative judgments of the type ‘A and B and C are P,’ or
plural judgments, stricto sensu, in which several subjects fall under a unique
denomination as in the judgment ‘Several N’s are P.’12 In his view, these are basi-
cally simple judgments, and this constitutes his second thesis, which allows Sigwart
to both criticize and refute the traditional classification of judgments.
8
Sigwart (19043: i, § 1, p. 1 [1895: i, 1]).
9
Cf. Sigwart (19043: i, § 1, pp. 9–10; § 5, pp. 27–28 [1895: i, 9–10, 25–26]).
10
According to the English translation of Sigwart’s Logik (1895), the German word ‘Vorstellung’
is here translated as ‘idea.’ However, when Vasil’ev uses the term ‘представление’ (predstavle-
nie), I have adopted the word ‘representation,’ which is closer to the sense of ‘Vorstellung.’
11
Cf. Sigwart (19043: i, 66 ff.; § 16, pp. 116 ff. [1895: i, 53 ff., 90 ff.]).
12
Cf. Sigwart (19043: i, § 26, p. 211 [1895: i, 157]).
Universal judgments (‘All A’s are B’) are to be divided, according to the distinc-
tion between narrative and explicative judgments, into empirically universal judg-
ments (empirisch allgemeine Urteile) and unconditionally universal judgments
(unbedingt allgemeine Urteile). An empirically universal judgment refers to deter-
minate individuals, that is, it presupposes a limited quantity of numerable single
objects and expresses the equality between the quantity constituted by the A’s and
that constituted by the A’s that are B. ‘All’ occurs as a predicate: ‘Those A’s which
are B are all A’s,’ that is to say that there are many A’s, there are exclusively A’s that
are B, and there are no cases of A’s that may not be B. ‘All’ thus expresses the lack
of exceptions. In the second instance, the judgments can be either explicative (ana-
lytic in the Kantian sense) or synthetic. If they are explicative, ‘all’ has a secondary
value, in so far as it is a simple consequence of the analysis of the meaning of the
representation of the subject. ‘All animals feel,’ for example, emerges from the anal-
ysis of the meaning of the word ‘animal,’ in which the predicate to feel is implicit,
for in fact it is precisely because animal feels, that all animals feel. If, instead, we
are dealing with a synthetic judgment, as in the example ‘All men are mortal,’ this
is the result of an inference, and precisely either from all observed cases to all oth-
ers, or from determinations included in the term, here ‘man,’ to others that must
from necessity belong to it. In the unconditionally universal judgment the real exis-
tence of the subject is not in doubt. ‘All A’s are B’ means ‘What is A is B,’ or ‘If
anything is A it is B,’ and may be rendered more adequately by eliding the plural and
writing simply ‘A is B,’ ‘Man is mortal.’ ‘All’ then expresses the necessary connec-
tion between the predicate B and the subject A.13
Even in particular judgment we find the distinction between judgments with an
empirical subject and judgments where the subject consists of a general term. The
formula ‘Some A’s are B’ is meaningful not concerning a judgment with an abstract
subject, but rather with respect to an empirically universal judgment. It is meaning-
ful, that is, only in so far as it indicates something individual, determinate and
numerable. The formula presupposes therefore a narrative judgment that deals with
a real existent and, moreover, presupposes that every part of the extension of the
subject contains a plurality of individuals. However, Sigwart notes, it is by no means
clear how a unique individual may not already constitute a part of the extension of
the subject. If particular judgments are narrative judgments, in other words, empiri-
cally grounded judgments, then they mean that a certain predicate is asserted of one
or more subjects, that are not denominated individually, but rather indicated in an
indeterminate fashion by means of a universal term. In this way, we have plural
judgments, which, for Sigwart, do not seem to differ “from a number of judgments
concerning single subjects, since the numerical determination is not emphasized.”14
Particular judgments, nonetheless, differ from copulative judgments. When one
substitutes the particular judgment ‘Some men mistake red for green’ for the copu-
lative one ‘John and Peter and Paul mistake red for green,’ the individual precision
of the assertion is lost, while an exception to the corresponding universal judgment
13
Cf. Sigwart (19043: i, § 27, pp. 216–220; § 33, p. 270 [1895: i, 160–163, 202–203]).
14
Sigwart (19043: i, § 28, p. 225 [1895: i, 168]).
3.1 The Forms of Judgment According to Christoph Sigwart 31
is made manifest. For Sigwart, it is precisely in so far as they assert an exception

with regard to universal judgments that plural judgments become particular.
Traditional logic teaches us that particular judgments do not involve the exclusion
of universal judgments. To say ‘Some A’s are B’ does not mean that ‘All A’s are B’
is excluded, but that is a further confirmation of the ambiguity of the particular
formula. In reality, the formula should mean that some A’s are distinguished from
the other A’s. Understood in this sense, a plural judgment prepares the way for a
universal judgment on the remaining A’s.15
If necessity was the appropriate expression for unconditionally universal expli-
cative judgments, for particular judgments with an abstract or general subject whose
extension does not consist in a multiplicity of things, the appropriate formulation
would be one of possibility. For example, the judgment ‘Some parallelograms have
equal diagonals’ is expressed more properly as follows: ‘The parallelogram can
have equal diagonals.’ A judgment of this kind derives from the analysis, not of the
concept of a parallelogram — which does not contain anything regarding right
angles —, but rather of the possible determinations, each compatible with the other,
contained in the representation of the parallelogram. Obviously, logic may preserve
the formula ‘Some A’s are B,’ on the condition however of taking ‘some A’s’ as a
part of the possible A’s, and by not substituting them for real A’s.16 Therefore,
“[w]hen we are dealing with subjects thought of as general, then the judgment ‘A
can be B,’ etc., is the adequate expression of the so-called particular judgment.”17
The traditional doctrine presupposes that the extension of a concept is consti-
tuted by single existent things, and, in Sigwart’s view, does not distinguish between
judgments based upon the concept alone (that is, the meaning of the subject-word)
and judgments on empirical things, just as it does not distinguish between empiri-
cally universal judgments and unconditionally universal judgments. Yet the same
universal and particular judgments, he argues, do not constitute two particular types
of judgment. The true, distinctive criterion does not lie in the extension of a concept,
but rather in the necessary or possible connection of a predicate with its subject.18
Before taking up once more the analysis of Vasil’ev’s text, there is one final dis-
tinction to be made, one which Sigwart emphasized and which also recurs in
Vasil’ev. Sigwart distinguishes the statement that a judgment is possible or neces-
sary from the statement that it is possible or necessary for a predicate to belong to a
subject.
The former refers to the subjective possibility or necessity of judgment; the latter to the
objective possibility or necessity of what is stated in the judgment. The Kantian distinction
of the differing modality of judgments, according to which they are problematical, asserto-
rial or apodeictic, applies to the former; the Aristotelian proposition: πᾶσα πρότασίς ἐστιν
ἢ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν (An. pr. i 2, 24b31
[= 25a1–2]) to the latter.19
15
Cf. Sigwart (19043: i, § 28, p. 226 [1895: i, 168]).
16
Cf. Sigwart (19043: i, § 28, p. 227 [1895: i, 169]).
17
Sigwart (19043: i, § 34, p. 276 [1895: i, 207]).
18
Cf. Sigwart (19043: i, § 27, pp. 220–222; § 30, p. 234 [1895: i, 163–165, 175]).
19
Sigwart (19043: i, 235 [1895: i, 176]).
Therefore, particular judgment is different from problematical judgment. In the

latter, we do have a judgment of the type ‘A may be B,’ yet — Sigwart clarifies —
this is to be understood not in the Kantian meaning, i.e., as a free assumption equal
to the antecedent of a hypothetical proposition expressing simple logical possibility,20
but rather in the sense of ‘A is perhaps B.’21 A judgment of this kind lacks what
Sigwart calls “the consciousness of objective validity” and expresses rather the
uncertainty of what is affirmed in the judgment. Therefore, “the so-called problem-
atical judgment is not a judgment at all; it is only the thought of one, the unfinished
attempt at a judgment.”22
In short, if judgments, whether universal or particular, have an empirical subject,
then they are nothing other than a numerable series of singular categorical judg-
ments, the difference being that, in universal judgments, ‘all’ indicates the lack of
an exception, whilst particular judgments assert an exception in regard to a universal
judgment. If judgments, whether universal or particular, have an abstract or general
subject, then the former express the necessity, the others the possibility of the con-
junction of the predicate with the subject. In this last instance, the appropriate for-
mula is not ‘Some A’s are B,’ but rather ‘A may be B.’ This interpretation of particular
judgments in terms of modality takes on a fundamental importance for the birth and
development of imaginary logic.
3.2 Particular Judgment as Accidental Judgment
Vasil’ev takes up Sigwart’s analysis, and develops a number of theses from it. He
too distinguishes between judgments about facts (Sigwart’s narrative judgments)
and judgments about concepts (Sigwart’s explicative judgments). Before doing so,
however, he makes explicit the semantic ambiguity residing in the term ‘some,’
which — he writes — “can bear two meanings: 1) some, and maybe all; at least
some, 2) some, but not all; only some.”23 Among the logicians, generally speaking,
the first meaning prevails, while it is the second sense (‘not all’) which — Vasil’ev
maintains — corresponds to the use of the term ‘some’ in both ordinary language
and in science, as when we say that ‘Some men are blond,’ or that ‘Some triangles
are rectangles.’ Logicians of the time were aware of the fact that the term ‘some’
could bear more than one meaning, and indeed Vasil’ev cites, in this regard,
20
Cf. Kant (17811–17872: A 74–75 = B 100–101 [1998: 209]).
21
Sigwart (19043: i, § 31, p. 237 [1895: i, 177]) writes: “The formula so often used ‘A may be B’ is
ambiguous and misleading, for it expresses both the objective ‘can’ (δύνασθαι) and subjective
hesitation.”
22
Sigwart (19043: i, § 31, p. 239 [1895: i, 179]).
23
Vasil’ev (1910: 5 = 1989: 14).
3.2 Particular Judgment as Accidental Judgment 33
Hamilton,24 Minto,25 Venn26 and Bain.27 Yet, Vasil’ev does not restrict himself to a
mere exposition of the argument, but rather derives from it radical conclusions, by
excluding that ‘some’ may also include all the elements that fall under a subject. In
his opinion, ‘Some, and maybe all, S are P’ is, for science, not a judgment but a
question, a problem demanding a solution, which, in turn, could be either ‘Not all S
are P’ or ‘All S are P.’ Corresponding to the double meaning of ‘some,’ also the
particular judgment ‘Some S are P’ can be of two types: “1) Some, and maybe all,
S are P; 2) Only some (not all) S are P.”28 Usually, the former is indicated as the
‘weak’ form, the latter as the ‘strong’ form of particular judgment.
Appealing to the passage in An. pr. i 1, where Aristotle “by cleaving to the guid-
ance of grammar” distinguishes between universal propositions, particular proposi-
tions and propositions devoid of any mark of being universal or particular,29 Vasil’ev
maintains that ‘Some (not all) S are P’ corresponds in effect to a particular judg-
ment, whilst the form ‘Some, and maybe all, S are P’ corresponds to Aristotle’s
indefinite proposition. Here, S “is taken into consideration without a designation of
universality or particularity,” and therefore a proposition of this kind is right “both
in the case where all S are P, and in the case where not all S are P.”30 The Aristotelian
(not-quantified) form ‘S’s are P’ (for example, ‘Men are egoists’) is nothing other
than an abbreviation of an awkward expression of the type ‘Some, and maybe all, S
are P.’ Since the Aristotelian classification clearly distinguishes the two senses of a
particular judgment, it is preferable to the traditional doctrine.
Vasil’ev’s interpretation — while clearly not intending to provide a philological
reading of the text of An.pr. i 1 let alone of Int. 7, with which it is often compared —
is not wholly without support within the Aristotelian literature. In the Prior
Analytics, it appears that Aristotle assimilates indefinite propositions to particular
propositions.31 Yet, as Heinrich Maier, whose work on Aristotle’s syllogistic Vasil’ev
24
Cf. Hamilton (1861–18662: iv, 283–284): “The designation of indefinitude or particularity, some
(ˏ or ˎ) may mean one or other of two very different things. 1°, It may mean some and some only,
being neither all nor none, and, in this sense, it will be both affirmative and negative, (ˎ ˏ). 2°, It
may mean, negatively, not all, perhaps none, — some at most; affirmatively, not none, perhaps
all, — some at least, (ˏ ˎ). Aristotle and the logicians contemplate only the second meaning. The
reason of this perhaps is, that this distinction only emerges in the consideration of Opposition and
Immediate Inference, which were less elaborated in the former theories of Logic; and does not
obtrude itself in the consideration of Mediate Inference, which is there principally developed.”
25
Cf. Minto (1893: 63): “Some stands for any number short of all: it may be one, few, most, or all
but one.”
26
Cf. Venn (18942: 11–13, 180–185, 277, 485–487).
27
Cf. Bain (1870: i, 81–82).
28
Vasil’ev (1910: 7 = 1989: 16).
29
Cf. Aristotle, An. pr. i 1, 24a16–22: “A proposition, then, is a statement affirming or denying
something of something; and this is either universal or particular or indefinite. By universal I mean
a statement that something belongs to all or none of something; by particular that it belongs to some
or not to some or not to all; by indefinite that it does or does not belong, without any mark of being
universal or particular, e.g. ‘contraries are subjects of the same science,’ or ‘pleasure is not good’.”
30
Vasil’ev (1910: 9 = 1989: 18).
31
Cf. Aristotle, An. pr. i 4, 26a30; 6, 28b27–29; 7, 29a27–29; 20, 39b2–3.
was familiar with,32 noted, such an assimilation does not mean that the two types of
proposition are identical, but rather that indefinite propositions imply particular
ones, but are not reducible to them.33
Summing up, we may state that, in agreement with Sigwart, who had criticized
the traditional interpretation of particular judgment by taking it as ‘Some S are dif-
ferent from the remaining S’s,’ Vasil’ev breaks down ‘Some S are P’ into the (strong)
particular judgment ‘Only some (not all) S are P’ (i.e., ‘Some S are P and some S
are not P’), and the indefinite judgment ‘Some, and maybe all, S are P.’ The latter is
ambiguous, because it embodies two affirmations, being right both when all the S’s
are P and when not all the S’s are P. However, such affirmations — as Aristotle
already knew — are contradictory to each other, and, Vasil’ev continues in this writ-
ing, “[a] logical judgment cannot express two affirmations that contradict each other
and are mutually exclusive.”34
In this context, Vasil’ev, who elsewhere uses the terms promiscuously, distin-
guishes between judgment and proposition. He affirms: “We cannot help noting
that, in reality, one cannot speak of indefinite judgments, but only of indefinite
propositions.”35 This distinction was quite common in the nineteenth century.
According to Sigwart, whom Vasil’ev will cite immediately after this remark, a
proposition — we have seen — is the linguistic expression (whether spoken or writ-
ten) of a judgment.36 In Vasil’ev’s view, while judgment corresponds to a choice, a
decision, an indefinite proposition evinces a state of indecision. Therefore, in so far
as it expresses uncertainty between two options, the indefinite kind is fundamentally
a problematical proposition, for which the critical observations raised earlier by
Sigwart remain valid.
If this is the way things stand, the indefinite proposition is basically different from
both particular judgment and universal judgment. ‘Some, and maybe all, S are P’ is a
complex, rather than a third, form of judgment. To put this more specifically, “it
expresses our subjective indecisiveness between universal and particular judgments,”37
and thus an indecisiveness between two hypotheses: ‘Either all S are P, or only some
S are P.’ Such a form of judgment — characterized in clear-cut psychological terms —
should be banished from science; a disjunction of the kind we have just mentioned
can be used for epistemic purposes by a scientist, in the sense that it may constitute a
point of departure to enable progress in knowledge. But, at the conclusion of such a
procedure, one will end up with only one of the two forms of judgment under discus-
sion — both of which are to be understood, as we shall see, as universal.
In point of fact, the (strong) particular judgment — which Vasil’ev, invariably
following Sigwart, reads as ‘Only some S are P,’ or ‘Some S are P and some S are
not P,’ in so far as it means that a certain part of the class S possesses the predicate
32
Cf. Vasil’ev (1910: 8 = 1989: 17).
33
Cf. Maier (1896–1900: i, 160); cf. also Mignucci (1969: 186, fn. 11).
34
Vasil’ev (1910: 10 = 1989: 19).
35
Ibid.
36
See also Lotze (18802: § 37, pp. 58–59) and Ueberweg (18825: § 77, p. 244).
37
Vasil’ev (1910: 11 = 1989: 20).
3.2 Particular Judgment as Accidental Judgment 35
P, while the remaining part lacks it, — also ranges over the entire class S, and is
therefore a universal judgment. An interpretation of this kind requires that the par-
ticular affirmative judgment ‘Some S are P’ presupposes the particular negative
judgment ‘Some (the remaining) S are not P,’ and vice versa. From a psychological
perspective, one could say that, when we think of a particular affirmative judgment,
we are also thinking of a particular negative one, and vice versa. Vasil’ev argues,
appealing to Vvedensky,38 that such judgments, in so far as one is an immediate
inference (eduction) from the other, are not two judgments, but one sole judgment.
Therefore, if we indicate the copula with u and the strong particular judgment, by
analogy with the symbolism usually adopted for Aristotelian logic,39 with
SuP (Vasil’ev calls it M from the Greek expression ἐν μέρει40), then we can write:
SuP =df SiP ∧ SoP.

In fact, Vasil’ev remarks, the diagram that represents SiP and SoP is the same,
indicating the intersection of the two concepts.
(1) S P
Obviously, this holds if we understand ‘some’ to mean ‘only some’ (i.e., ‘not all’).
However, the two particular judgments could be also represented by including the
predicate P into the subject S.41 This can be illustrated by the diagram (2):
(2) S P
Vasil’ev does not take into consideration diagram (2), because, depending on how
the extension of P varies, it can express — if P grows to the coextension with S like
in diagram (3) — the first meaning of a particular judgment: ‘Some, and maybe all,
S are P.’ Thus, for SuP we have, according to Vasil’ev, a unique diagram (1) that
represents the formula; for SiP on the other hand we have four, since the diagrams
that represent SaP (3 and 4) also work for SiP.42
38
Cf. Vasil’ev (1910: 14, fn. 1 = 1989: 22, fn. 10), who quotes Vvedensky (1909: 81).
39
The general form of an Aristotelian sentence is SxP, where S denotes the subject, P the predicate
and x the copula; this can be replaced by a, e, i, o — taken from the Latin words affirmo and
nego — expressing quality and quantity of judgments. Therefore, SaP stands for ‘All S are P,’ SeP
for ‘No S is P,’ SiP for ‘Some S are P’ and SoP for ‘Some S are not P.’
40
Cf. Vasil’ev (1910: 18 = 1989: 26).
41
As Lossky (1927: 172) had already noted.
42
We shall see that the need to eliminate the vagueness of the weak form of the particular judgment
in favour of the univocity of the strong form lies at the heart of the controversy between Salomon
Ginzberg and Louis Couturat (see Sect. 3.4).
(3) S P (4) P S
The particular judgment M can take two forms. The first is that of a disjunctive
judgment: given some S (men), some will be P (blond), others will be Q (dark-
haired), still others will be R (red-haired). If ‘all S are either P, or Q, or R,’ then
some S are P while others are not. Therefore, a particular judgment means ‘Every S
is or is not P.’ The second way in which M may be expressed corresponds to what
Vasil’ev calls ‘accidental judgment’: ‘S may be P,’ and here one can clearly see the
influence of his reading of Sigwart. Such a judgment asserts that the predicate P
(blond) can belong to the subject S (man), but not that it necessarily belongs to it, in
the sense that it does not belong to every S. In both cases, M is equal to I and O, i.e.,
it is a universal judgment in which the concept S is taken in all of its extension. That
logicians had missed this is, in Vasil’ev’s view, “one more example of how grammar
has won over logic,”43 and here he raises an issue that had already drawn the atten-
tion of Frege and Russell, involving the matter of separating logical and grammati-
cal form, and marking the deep structure of propositions. This is what Russell does
in “On Denoting,” and Vasil’ev, albeit with far more limited logical instruments, but
within that traditional logic which is closer to natural language, endeavours to do
with regard to particular judgment.
For Vasil’ev, this does not coincide with the problematical judgment, as Friedrich
Adolf Trendelenburg44 and Rudolf Hermann Lotze45 had maintained, but grounds its
possibilities. In its new meaning, particular judgment does not express indecision,
but rather an achieved knowledge concerning the accidental nature of a type of
predication. ‘Men can be blond’ affirms that some men are blond and others (those
remaining) are not. From this example it emerges, furthermore, that a particular (in
the sense of accidental) judgment has as its subject a concept, while a problematical
judgment (as ‘Ivan Ivanovich may be blond’) refers to a fact. The former is atempo-
ral — Vasil’ev will say that it expresses a rule — while the second is, instead, tem-
porally determined.46 The former grounds the possibility of the second.
43
Vasil’ev (1910: 20 = 1989: 28). V. A. Smirnov (1989a: 629–631) interprets the disjunctive form
of M according to the calculus of predicates and the accidental form in modal terms. In his view,
M does not equal the conjunction of I and O, but is deduced from I and O.
44
Cf. Trendelenburg (18703: ii, 291).
45
Cf. Lotze (18802: i, 67).
46
Later, Vasil’ev (1912: 236, fn. 1 = 1989: 83, fn. 13 [2003: 154, fn. 13]; 1912–1913a: 58, fn. 1 = 1989:
100, fn. 6 [1993: 333, fn. 7]) will also attribute the spatial determination to judgments about facts.
3.3 The Triangle of Oppositions and the Law of Excluded Fourth 37
Where there is not an accidental judgment in relation to the predicate P and the concept S,
there cannot even be a problematical judgment in relation to the presence of P for any effec-
tive S.47
In relation to what has been previously argued, Vasil’ev has introduced the
Sigwartian distinction between judgments about facts, that presuppose a temporal
determination, and judgments about concepts, which, to the contrary, do not make
any such assumption. The former have as their subject something factual, percep-
tions or representations, the latter classes or concepts. To the former one applies the
law of excluded middle, which does not apply however to the others.
3.3 he Triangle of Oppositions and the Law of Excluded

T
Fourth
Up until this point, Vasil’ev has distinguished two types of particular judgment, the
indefinite and the strong particular. He then brings the former back to problematical
judgment, and the latter to a universal judgment with a compatible predicate or
accidental copula (‘may be’). Yet, there are also other judgments that are normally
counted among particular judgments, for example, collective judgments (Sigwart’s
copulative judgments) as in ‘John, Anthony and Mark are blond,’ which correspond
to a group of singular judgments. These are judgments, not about concepts, but
about facts. Through a process of gradual abstraction, one obtains from a collective
judgment first of all a numerical judgment (‘Three of my friends are blond’), or a
judgment on a number of effective S’s, which however leave individuality, and the
qualitative exactitude of the subjects, out of consideration; and then the even more
generic indefinite-numerical judgment (‘Some [Neskol’ko] of my friends are
blond’), in which quantitative exactitude is also ignored and the term ‘some’
appears.
All collective, numerical and indefinite-numerical judgments are sets of singular
judgments, being all judgments about effective S’s, whereas accidental judgment —
as we have seen — is a judgment about a concept S. This is, according to Vasil’ev,
the result of an inductive process. Starting from the examination of a group of sin-
gular judgments, a corresponding collective judgment is formulated, and then the
numerical and indefinite-numerical judgment, until one obtains the result that
‘Some S are P’ and ‘Some S are not P.’ The disjunctive form of problematical judg-
ment, or indefinite judgment, is “an intermediate phase (psychological rather than
logical) between an indefinite-numerical judgment and an accidental one, a bridge
that leads from a fact to a rule.”48 The final step consists in generalization: ‘Everything
that is of relevance to the concept S either is P, or is not P.’ The result of the induc-
47
Vasil’ev (1910: 19 = 1989: 27).
48
Vasil’ev (1910: 22 = 1989: 31).
tion is a hypothetical judgment, which expresses a universal judgment49: either affir-

mative, or negative, or (as often occurs) accidental. The fundamental classification
of judgments is therefore between (singular and collective) judgments about facts
and (affirmative, negative, and accidental) judgments about concepts. For each of
these judgments its own proper logic is valid. Vasil’ev shows, limited to the theory
of judgment, that what obtains for the former is the square of opposition, whereas
for the others, the triangle of oppositions obtains.
In order to make Vasil’ev’s discourse cogent, it would be opportune to briefly
explain the relations of contrariety, contradiction, subcontrariety and subalternation
between universal and particular propositions synthesized in the traditional square
of opposition. These are the result of a combination of the quantitative determina-
tion of propositions with a qualitative distinction between affirmation and negation,
from which four kinds of proposition, which we already know, arise:
(i) SaP universal affirmative ‘All S are P’;

(ii) SeP universal negative ‘No S is P’;
(iii) SiP particular affirmative ‘Some S are P’;
(iv) SoP particular negative ‘Some S are not P’.
According to traditional theory, a universal affirmative proposition and the cor-

responding particular negative (or else a particular affirmative and its corresponding
universal negative), both having the same subject and predicate, are contradictory.
Such are SaP (‘All men are white’) and SoP (‘Some men are not white’), SeP (‘No
man is white’) and SiP (‘Some men are white’). These propositions, in accordance
with the principle of contradiction, cannot be simultaneously true; and, according to
49
As Bradley (1883: 46–47, 82) has already pointed out, every universal judgment of the type ‘All
A are B’ is really a hypothetical judgment, which asserts: ‘If anything is A, then it is B.’ The same
holds for the negative universal judgment and for the accidental one: ‘If anything is A, then either
it is B or is not B.’
the principle of excluded middle, one of them is necessarily true and the other
false.50 Therefore, we will obtain:
SaP ↔ ¬SoP and SeP ↔ ¬SiP,
and furthermore:
SiP ↔ ¬SeP and SoP ↔ ¬SaP.
Moreover, two universal propositions, one affirmative and the other negative,
having the same subject and predicate, like SaP (‘All men are white’) and SeP (‘No
man is white), are contrary. The principle of excluded middle does not apply to
them. Thus, whilst the contradictory propositions are necessarily incompatible with
and alternative to each other, the contrary ones are only incompatible, in the sense
that they cannot be simultaneously true, but may be simultaneously false.51
Consequently, the following implications are applicable:
SaP → ¬SeP and SeP → ¬SaP,
but the inverse implications are not always valid (that is, ¬SeP → SaP and ¬SaP →
SeP).52 This means that if a universal proposition is true, its contrary is false; but
from the falsity of a universal proposition, the truth-value of its contrary cannot be
inferred.
Relations of incompatibility do not exist on the other hand between the two par-
ticular opposed propositions: SoP (‘Some men are not white’) and SiP (‘Some men
are white). These propositions, so-called subcontraries, are not in reality opposed,
as besides being not alternative, they are also compatible, since they can be simul-
taneously true. Nevertheless, they cannot both be false, as they correspond to the
respective contradictories of contrary universal propositions.53 Therefore, on the
basis of relations between contradictory propositions, the following is obtained:
¬SiP → SoP and ¬SoP → SiP,
but the inverse does not apply, that is, from the truth of one, neither the truth nor the
falsity of the other can be determined.
Finally, SiP and SoP are so-called subalterns, respectively of SaP and of SeP, in
the sense that from the truth of a universal proposition SaP (or SeP) derives the truth
of the particular proposition SiP (or SoP)54:
50
Cf. Aristotle, Int. 7. 17b16–20, 26–27.
51
Cf. Aristotle, Int. 7. 17b3–6, 20–23.
52
Cf. Aristotle, An. pr. ii 11. 61b6, 62a17–19.
53
Cf. Aristotle, Int. 7. 17b23–26.
54
Cf. Aristotle, Top. ii 1. 109a3–6.
SaP → SiP and SeP → SoP,
and moreover, from the falsity of the subaltern particular proposition derives the
falsity of the superaltern universal proposition:
¬Sip → ¬SaP and ¬Sop → ¬SeP.
As can be inferred from the previous footnotes, the relations synthesized in the
square of opposition, with the exception of the subalternation, are expounded by
Aristotle in De interpretatione 7, in which however neither the square figure, nor the
use of the term ‘subcontrary’ and ‘subaltern’ can be found. These are introduced in
the subsequent tradition, which Vasil’ev55 traces back to Apuleius56 and to the Latin
translation of De interpretatione by Boethius.57 According to mathematical logic, at
least according to most contemporary logicians, the square of opposition is valid on
condition that the subject of the propositions is not empty, otherwise only the rela-
tion of contradiction holds. As concerns contrariety, if the subject were empty, both
universal propositions would be trivially true. In the case of subalternation, we
would have the paradoxical consequence that the truth of the universal negative
proposition implies the truth of the particular negative: ‘No Martian is living on the
moon’ implies the truth of ‘Some Martians are not living on the moon,’ that is, that
there are some Martians who do not live on the moon. But this is wrong, since there
are no Martians.
Modern interpretation concerning the square of opposition is not however totally
applicable to Aristotle’s thesis on the relations among propositions with a universal
subject expounded in De interpretatione 7. Many maintain that, according to
Aristotle, the terms of the propositions are never empty, but always presume refer-
ence to what is real, in the sense that if we are talking about ‘men’ and it is said they
are ‘white,’ it is presumed that at least one man exists and that white as a colour also
exists. However, Aristotle’s position regarding the existential import of negative
propositions is considerably different and substantially more complex.
The thesis according to which all propositions in Aristotle have an existential
scope, whether particular or universal, affirmative or negative, is symbolically rep-
resented in The Development of Logic by William C. and Martha Kneale.58 The
consequence of such a thesis is that negation becomes affirmation, which is
reached through obversion: ‘Some men are not white’ means the same as ‘Some
55
A synthetic exposition of the square of opposition is provided by Vasil’ev (1910: 26–27 = 1989:
34).
56
Cf. Apuleius, Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας, V, 269 (1991: iii, 195 [1987: 89]). The attribution of this text to
Apuleius, which is however included in the corpus apuleianum, is now questioned by scholars (cf.
Apuleius 1991: iii, ix–x).
57
Cf. Boethius, In librum Aristotelis de interpretatione. Libri duo, editio prima, seu minora com-
mentaria, i, 321 b; In librum Aristotelis de interpretatione. Libri sex, editio secunda, seu majora
commentaria, ii, 471 a–b.
58
Cf. Kneale & Kneale (1962: 56 ff.). The chapter on Aristotle is by Martha Kneale.
men are not-white’ and ‘No man is white’ as ‘All men are not-white.’ In this way,
the scope of opposed propositions, both contradictory and contrary, always presup-
poses the existence of the subject.
However, there are supporters of the opposed thesis, according to which negative
propositions unlike affirmative ones need not have existential scope in order to be
true. I will briefly explain the viewpoint of Vittorio Sainati,59 who regards negation
as working “not just on the single terms (φάσις), but on the whole discursive com-
plex of the assertion.” The contestational scope of negation is therefore absolute: “in
whatever way the reality of things denies the assertive content of the affirmation, the
corresponding negative apophansis will always be verified.”60 This means that the
non-existence of the subject implies the truth of the negative proposition; in other
words, if the subject is empty, the negation is always true.61 In such a way the exis-
tential scope of affirmative propositions alone is recognized and particular signifi-
cance is given to the qualitative aspect of propositions, in virtue of which the
affirmation is prior to negation.62
In Int. 5. 17a8–9 Aristotle restricts himself to stating that “[t]he first single
statement-making sentence is the affirmation, next is the negation;” whilst in An.
post. i 25. 86b34–36 he provides a brief clarification:
affirmative propositions are prior to and more familiar than negative propositions (for nega-
tions are familiar because of affirmations, and affirmations are prior—just as being the case
is prior to not being the case).
Alongside this gnoseo-ontological explanation, Sainati makes explicit a logical

explanation. According to his interpretation, which I agree with, the role of negation
in Aristotle is purely logical: it does not define something determined, but simply
denies the existence of something enounced by the affirmation, and nothing more.
‘No man is white” is the contradictory negative proposition of ‘Some man is white’:
whilst the latter proposition affirms that ‘At least one white man exists,’ the former
asserts that ‘No white man exists.’ Even the particular negative is formulated by
Aristotle as a sentence negation: he does not write ‘Some man is not white,’ but ‘Not
every man is white (οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός)’63; this is — as remarked by Michael
V. Wedin — “a form that allows room for failure of existential import.”64 The nega-
tion is not therefore such as to affirm the existence of the terms which constitute it
and to solely negate the belonging of the predicate to the subject. This would lead
us back to the initial interpretation, and therefore to understand the negation (‘No
59
Cf. Sainati (1968: 226–240). In more recent times, the same thesis has been sustained by Wedin
(1990) and Parsons (1997; 2008; 2014). Menne & Öffenberger (1980/1981) offer an interpretation
of the square of opposition from a four-valued perspective. In their opinion, whilst a two-valued
interpretation is not exhaustive, but leaves some inconclusive links in the theory of oppositions, the
four-valued perspective involves and extends the two-valued one, without setting off conflict.
60
Sainati (1968: 229).
61
Cf. Prior (19622: 165), who refers also to the Schoolmen.
62
Cf. Aristotle, Int. 5. 17a8–9; An post. I 25. 86b34–36.
63
Cf. Aristotle, Int. 7. 17b26, 18a5.
64
Wedin (1990: 134).
man is white’) as an affirmation (‘Every man is not-white’). There follows a cau-

tious stance even in relation to the transcribing of the Aristotelian propositions in
modern symbolism: this bends Aristotle’s logic to predicate logic, not expressing in
this way all the complexity and specificity of the Stagirite’s theory.
Terence Parsons has observed that the Aristotelian conception described above is
produced precisely by late medieval logic, whilst particularly in the nineteenth cen-
tury and soon after, the conviction is expressed that the square of opposition presup-
poses the assumption that the terms are not empty65; therefore, he invites us to be
circumspect regarding the actual dissemination of such a concept. In summary, he
writes:
In modern logic: particulars are false when their subject terms are empty, and universals are
vacuously true. In late medieval logic: affirmatives are false when their subject terms are
empty, and negatives are vacuously true.66
The problem concerning the much discussed existential import of negative prop-
ositions in Aristotle is not addressed by Vasil’ev, who does not commit to a philo-
logical reading of the Aristotelian theory. When he affirms that the square of
opposition is valid only for judgments about facts, which are obtained through
induction, Vasil’ev implicitly assumes that the terms that occur in such judgments
are not empty. It would seem therefore that he would be putting forward the thesis
which attributes an existential import to all propositions. Nevertheless, from the
conception of a particular proposition in a strong sense, combined with the funda-
mental distinction of judgments as those about facts and those about concepts, the
Russian logician is lead to relativize the validity of the traditional square of opposi-
tion.67 He argues as follows.
If we consider the judgments about concepts, taking a particular judgment like
‘Only some S are P’ or ‘Some S are P and some (the remaining) S are not P,’ we get
three forms of judgment, A, E and M, that is, SaP, SeP and SuP, corresponding to
the plural judgments with an abstract subject studied by Sigwart: (i) the affirmative
judgment about a concept, or universal affirmative, which expresses the necessity
that a given predicate belongs to a given concept, as in ‘The triangle must be closed’
or ‘All triangles are closed’ (SaP); (ii) the negative judgment about a concept or
universal negative, which expresses the impossibility that a given predicate may
belong to a given concept, as in ‘The triangle cannot be square’ or ‘No triangle is
square’ (SeP); and lastly, (iii) the accidental judgment about a concept, which
expresses the possibility that a given predicate may belong to a given concept, as in
‘The triangle can be equilateral’ or ‘Some triangles are equilateral’ (SuP). For these
judgments about concepts, only one of the four relations synthesized in the square
of opposition, namely that of contrariety, is valid.
65
Cf. Parsons (1997: 39; 2008: 10; 2014: § 5.2).
66
Parsons (2008: 8–9).
67
Today, the square of opposition has become object of renewal studies, as a series of recent pub-
lications and conferences has demonstrated. For more information, see the website: http://www.
square-of-opposition.org/
The demonstration is conducted by assuming (like in the traditional square of

opposition) that the contrary propositions can both be false, but not both true. So,
even two contradictory propositions like ‘All men are not animals’ (E) and ‘Some
[Nekotorye] men are animals’ (I) are both false: the first is manifestly false, the
second is so because, interpreted in the strong form, its truth presupposes that some
men are not animals, something which is again evidently false. Therefore, Vasil’ev
concludes:
there is the same relation between contradictory propositions as there is between the con-
traries: they cannot both be true, but they can both be false.68
The relation of subalternation does not hold for reasons different from those for
which mathematical logic does not accept it: if it is true that ‘All planar triangles
have interior angles adding up to two right angles’ (A), it follows that ‘Some planar
triangles have interior angles adding up to two right angles’ (I) is false, because that
implies, following Vasil’ev, that ‘Some planar triangles do not have interior angles
adding up to two right angles’ (O). With regard to the relation of subcontrariety, we
know that I and O form a unique judgment (M), and therefore cannot be opposites.
Consequently, the sole relation of contrariety remains valid for judgments about
concepts.
According to the square of opposition, if A and E are false, then I and O are true;
but since Vasil’ev unites I and O in the accidental judgment M, the traditional square
of oppositions yields place to a triangle, from which it emerges that of the three
forms of judgments about concepts (A, E and M) one, and only one, is always true,
and there is not a fourth one. For this reason, Vasil’ev writes:
the three types of judgments of this kind are all to be found in a reciprocal relation of abso-
lute and exhaustive tricotomic disjunction.69
Thus, we obtain the following propositions:
68
Vasil’ev (1910: 28 = 1989: 35).
69
Vasil’ev (1910: 32 = 1989: 39).
(1) SaP ∨ SeP ∨ SuP

(2) ¬SuP → (SaP ∨ SeP)
(3) ¬SeP → (SaP ∨ SuP)
(4) ¬SaP → (SeP ∨ SuP)
(5) ¬(SaP ∧ SeP)
(6) ¬(SaP ∧ SuP)
(7) ¬(SeP ∧ SuP).
These express the law of excluded fourth, which Vasil’ev formulates in the follow-
ing manner:
If two of these propositions are both false, it means that the third judgment is true. If A and
E are false, then M is true; if A and M are false, then E is true. Thus, the relation among A,
E and M is an absolute relation, which excludes the disjunction:
either S constantly has the predicate P — (A) universal affirmative;
or S does not constantly have the predicate P — (E) universal negative;
or S has the predicate P as accidens — (M), the so-called particular judgment.
Each possibility excludes the remaining two; if they are false, if any two possibilities
fail, then the third shall be necessarily true. There cannot be a fourth possibility.70
The core of such a conception revolves around the interpretation of the term ‘some
(nekotorye),’71 which occurs in the particular judgment as ‘only some’; if one were
to interpret it in the sense of ‘some, and maybe all,’ then the square of opposition
would be valid but, at the same time, particular judgments would be confused with
indefinite ones. In the logic of concepts, the truth of an accidental proposition
excludes the truth of the corresponding general proposition, something that does not
happen if the particular proposition, as traditionally understood, is true; and since
the strong particular affirmative is equivalent to the strong negative particular, from
a formal perspective a unique copula is necessary, which Vasil’ev calls
“accidental.”
If the truth of a proposition implies the falsity of the remaining two, it is also true
that the falsity of a proposition leaves as an open question which of the other two
may be true. With regard to this, Fania Cavaliere notes that:
What is lacking in Vasil’ev’s system is rather the possibility of inferring, from the fact that
a judgment can be true or false, something definitive as to its necessary, accidental or
70
Vasil’ev (1910: 30 = 1989: 37–38). See also § 5.4.
71
In Russian, the word ‘some’ can be translated both as несколько (neskol’ko) and некоторые
(nekotorye), whereas neskol’ko is equivalent to an indefinite numeral adjective (some, several, a
few) and is used to express the idea of a moderate generic quantity, the use of nekotorye, in turn an
indefinite but not numeral adjective, implies a comparison, a relation between one part (some,
several) and the whole. Therefore, Vasil’ev uses neskol’ko (some, several, a few) as a sign of
indefinite-numerical judgment, nekotorye (some, several) as a sign of accidental judgment (see
above the examples on pp. 37 and 43). This peculiarity of the Russian language can be translated
into English only with figurative phrases, thus both neskol’ko and nekotorye have been translated
by ‘some.’
impossible being (from the falsity of a judgment, for instance, we can only deduce that it is
not necessary, but we cannot infer if it is impossible or accidental).72
In effect, and this applies also to imaginary logic in which the propositions expressed
by the triangle of oppositions recur in the so-called “preparatory forms,” Vasil’ev
does not provide, and cannot provide, once the immediate inferences between the
propositions have been dropped, a procedure for deciding, after it has been ascer-
tained that a given proposition is false, which of the other two corresponding propo-
sitions is true. The reason is that this is not the task of logic, but of each single
science. Once it has ascertained that a certain proposition is false, the task of sci-
ence, Vasil’ev argues, is not completed because two possibilities still remain open,
“one of which should be chosen in order to bring the cognitive process to an end.”73
In relation to the triangle of oppositions, Vasil’ev then returns to Aristotle, for
whom knowledge is given only of the universal. In that case, the Russian logician
appears to be saying, the Stagirite should have laid emphasis on the relations
expressed by the triangle, and not on those expressed by the square of opposition. In
reality, Vasil’ev notes, and his remark is very similar to those made by Jan
Łukasiewicz regarding the value of the Aristotelian principle of contradiction,74
Aristotle’s theory of oppositions was conceived by him within a dialectical context,
“with the aim of contesting and refuting the adversary, not for logical reasons.”75
The square is to be understood in terms of the dialectical discussion engaged in by
two contending parties. If it is said that all S are (not) P, it would suffice to adduce
a single exception and the thesis would be refuted.
In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the law of excluded
fourth, Vasil’ev undertakes a short historical excursus on its nobler kin, the princi-
ple of excluded middle.76 He argues that in Aristotle this principle — “there cannot
be an intermediate between contradictories, but of one subject we must either affirm
or deny any one predicate”77 — is a direct consequence of his conception of judg-
ment. If Aristotle’s declarative sentence can only be affirmative or negative, true or
false, then it already entails the principle of excluded middle, since the middle term
72
Cavaliere (1992–1993: 118).
73
Vasil’ev (1912: 225 = 1989: 71 [2003: 143]).
74
Cf. Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 139–141) and (1910b: 37 [1971: 508–509]): “At a time of the
political decline of Greece, Aristotle became the founder and investigator of systematic, scientific,
cultural work. […] Denial of the principle of contradiction would have opened door and gate to
every falsity and nipped the young, blossoming science in the bud. Hence, the Stagirite turns
against the opponents of the principle with forceful language in which one can trace an internal
fervor, against the eristic thinkers of Megara, the cynics of the school of Antisthenes, the disciples
of Heraclitus, the partisans of Protagoras; and he battles with all of them for a theoretical principle
as if for personal goods. He might well have himself felt the weaknesses of his argument, and so
he announced his principle a final axiom, an unassailable dogma.”
75
Vasil’ev (1910: 31 = 1989: 38).
76
Cf. Vasil’ev (1910: 32–40 = 1989: 40–47).
77
Aristotle, Metaph. γ 7. 1011b23–24.
would be neither an affirmation nor a negation, and would be neither true nor false.
Bivalence implies the tertium non datur.
In the history of philosophy, various formulations and interpretations have been
given of this principle. Vasil’ev cites the Logique of Port-Royal,78 Wolff,79 Kant,80
Schopenhauer,81 Lotze,82 Troitsky,83 but the conception that has established itself as
alternative to the Aristotelian thesis (which is shared by Mill, Sigwart, and Troitsky)
is the scholastic notion retrieved by many traditional logicians (like Hamilton,84
78
The formulation of the principle of excluded middle in the Logique of Port-Royal is different to
Vasil’ev’s: “Contradictories are never both true or both false, but if one is true the other is false, and
if one is false the other is true” (Arnauld & Nicole 1662/1965: ii partie, ch. iv, p. 117 [1996: 85]).
79
Cf. Wolff (1740/1962: ii, § 532, p. 401): “Propositionum contradictoriarum altera necessario
vera; altera necessario falsa [Of two contradictory propositions one is necessarily true; the other
necessarily false].”
80
Vasil’ev refers to Kant (1800: Ak. ix, 53 [1992: 560]): “[…] the principle of the excluded middle
(principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria), on which the (logical) necessity of a cognition
is grounded — that we must necessarily judge thus and not otherwise, i.e., that the opposite is
false — for apodeictic judgments.”
81
Cf. Schopenhauer (18593/1988: ii, Chap. 9, p. 122 [1966: ii, 103]): “It seems to me that the doc-
trine of the laws of thought could be simplified by our setting up only two of them, namely the law
of the excluded middle, and that of sufficient reason or ground. The first law thus: ‘Any predicate
can be either attributed to or denied of every subject.’ Here already in the ‘either, or’ is the fact that
both cannot occur simultaneously, and consequently the very thing expressed by the law of identity
and of contradiction. Therefore these laws would be added as corollaries of that principle, which
really states that any two concept-spheres are to be thought as either united or separated, but never
as both simultaneously; consequently, that where words are joined together which express the lat-
ter, such words state a process of thought that is not feasible. The awareness of this want of feasi-
bility is the feeling of contradiction.”
82
According to Lotze, the law of excluded middle is a particular case of the disjunctive law of
thought (disjunktives Denkgesetz). Moreover he states: “Der Gedanke, den die Form des disjunc-
tiven Urtheils ausdrückt, wird gewöhnlich in zwei gesonderten Denkgesetzen, dem Dictum de
omni et nullo und dem Principium exclusi tertii inter duo contradictoria ausgesprochen; ihre
Verschmelzung in ein einziges drittes Grundgesetz ist indessen nicht nur leicht, sondern nothwen-
dig” (Lotze 18802: i, 94–95).
83
Cf. Troitsky (1886: 101): “What is called the principle of excluded middle is the axiom which
establishes direct evidence of the incompatibility of contradictory propositions (contradictoriae).
The principle is expressed as follows: ‘The contradictory propositions A and O, E and I, by exclud-
ing each other, do not allow for even a middle term between them’.”
84
Cf. Hamilton (1861–18662: iii, 83): “The principle of Excluded Third or Middle — viz. between
two contradictories, (principium Exclusi Medii vel Tertii), enounces that condition of thought,
which compels us, of two repugnant notions, which cannot both coexist, to think either the one or
the other as existing. Hence arises the general axiom, — Of contradictory attributions, we can only
affirm one of a thing; and if one be explicitly affirmed, the other is implicitly denied. A either is or
is not. A either is or is not B.”
Wundt,85 Minto86 and Ueberweg87), according to which the principle of excluded

middle regards not judgments but rather predicates: A is either B or non-B.
There is also a third position entertained by those who deny, albeit only partially,
the validity of the law of excluded middle. Vasil’ev discovered a precursor for his
position in the Kantian Wilhelm Traugott Krug (1770–1842),88 who held that this
law is valid only for concrete objects, not for universal concepts, that is, for objects
of logic and thought like the triangle in general.
A triangle in general is a logical or conceivable object. But the concept of the triangle in
general does not contain either the mark of its rectangularity or that of its non-rectangularity.
Under this aspect, the object in fact remains indeterminate. [… ] Thence, only on condition
that a thing must be thought about as completely determinate, is it necessary that of each
pair of contradictory marks one belongs to it.89
85
Cf. Wundt (18932: i, 565–567): “Schon Aristoteles hat dem Satz des ausgeschlossenen Dritten
eine selbständige Bedeutung zuerkannt. Später hat man ihn meist für entbehrlich angesehen,
indem man meinte, er ergebe sich von selbst, wenn man das Identitätsgesetz mit dem Satz des
Widerspruchs verbinde. Wäre aber dies richtig, so müsste in der Formel „A = B und A = non-B
widersprechen sich “unmittelbar der Satz des ausgeschlossenen Dritten enthalten sein: „A ist ent-
weder B oder non-B“. Dies ist aber nicht der Fall; die Erklärung, dass B und non-B sich widerspre-
chen, schliesst nicht aus, dass es neben beiden noch ein Drittes gebe. Ebenso wenig folgt dies aus
der Aufhebung der doppelten Verneinung. Denn diese zeigt nur an, dass man durch die Häufung
der Verneinungen keine neue logische Function neben Bejahung und Verneinung erzeugen kann;
es bleibt aber dahingestellt, ob nicht neben der Verneinung noch eine andere Form der Aufhebung
eines positiven Begriffs existirt. Dass dies nicht der Fall ist, sagt eben erst der Satz des ausgeschlos
senen Dritten. Dagegen setzt dieser die Gesetze der Identität und des Widerspruchs voraus, und
wenn es daher durchaus darauf ankäme die drei logischen Axiome auf eines zurückzuführen, so
wäre dazu, wie Schopenhauer richtig erkannt hat, kein anderes als der Satz des ausgeschlossenen
Dritten geeignet. Gleichwohl würde sich diese Reduction kaum empfehlen. […] Der Satz des
ausgeschlossenen Dritten kann als das Grundgesetz der disjunctive Urtheile betrachtet werden […]
Gerade der Satz des ausgeschlossenen Dritten ist mehr als die beiden vorigen Axiome in seiner
abstracten logischen Form als Regel der wirklichen Eintheilung, selbst der Erfahrungsobjecte,
verwendet worden, indem man die Eintheilung nach dem contradictorischen Gegensatze wegen
ihrer nie mangelnden logischen Richtigkeit bevorzugte.”
86
Cf. Minto (1893: 29): “Every thing is A or not-A; or A is either b or not-b.”
87
Cf. Ueberweg (18825: § 78, p. 265): “A ist entweder B oder ist nicht B; jedem Subjecte kommt
jedes fragliche Prädicat entweder zu oder nicht.” Ueberweg gives also an Aristotelian formulation:
“contradictorisch einander entgegengesetzte Urtheile (wie: A ist B, und: A ist nicht B) können
nicht beide falsch sein und lassen nicht die Wahrheit eines dritten oder mittleren Urtheils zu,
sondern das eine oder andere derselben muss wahr sein, und aus der Falschheit des einen folgt
daher die Wahrheit des anderen. Oder: die Doppelantwort: weder ja noch nein, auf eine und die-
selbe in dem nämlichen Sinne verstandene Frage ist unzulässig” (p. 254).
88
Cf. Krug (18192: § 19, p. 51 ff.).
89
Krug (18192: § 19, Anm. 3, p. 54): “Denn ein Triangel überhaupt ist doch wohl ein logischer oder
denkbarer Gegenstand. In dem Begriffe des Triangels überhaupt aber ist weder das Merkmal recht
winkelig noch das Merkmal nicht rechtwinkelig enthalten. Der Gegenstand bleibt nämlich in die-
ser Hinsicht unbestimmt. […] Also nur unter der Voraussetzung, dass ein Ding als durchgängig
bestimmt gedacht werden soll, muss ihm von jedem Paar widersprechender Merkmale Eins
zukommen.”
Regarding Hegel’s criticism of the principle of excluded middle, according to whom

this is an empty law of the abstract intellect, one that seeks at any cost to avoid
contradiction,90 Vasil’ev remarks:
Between opposite predicates the true predicate is just the middle. Between the guilty and
the innocent, there are some who are a bit one and a bit the other.91
In another sense, Mill restricts the scope of the validity of the principle of excluded
middle, which he intends — as we will see later (see Sects. 4.2, 4.3) — as a gener-
alization from experience:
A proposition must be either true or false, provided that the predicate be one which can in
any intelligible sense be attributed to the subject; […]. ‘Abracadabra is a second intention’
is neither true nor false. Between the true and the false there is a third possibility, the
Unmeaning.92
Finally, Sigwart does not understand the tertium non datur as an independent law,
but as a theorem that can be deduced from the principle of contradiction and the law
of double negation.93 Nevertheless, according to Vasil’ev this third position, in so far
as it just limits the validity of the law of excluded middle, is not sufficiently radical:
“The law of excluded middle must be totally excluded from the inventory of the laws
of thought.”94
It emerges, from what has been stated above, that the principle of excluded mid-
dle does not hold for concepts. If one takes it as valid for contradictory propositions,
then the principle fails for the simple fact that judgments about concepts that are
contradictory do not exist. If, on the other hand, the principle is applied to predi-
cates, then again there is a third possibility, since, as we have seen, every predicate
refers to a subject (concept) in such a way that it is either necessary for it, or impos-
sible, or possible. No further alternative exists, and thus one of these three must
be fulfilled.95 Here we have another formulation of the law of excluded fourth.
Vasil’ev argues that this law is not only valid for concepts, but also for subjects
of singular judgments, on condition that they are considered for the entire duration
of their existence and not in a precise spatio-temporal moment. In such a case, indi-
viduals are very similar to concepts. A predicate can apply to an individual like
Julius Caesar as a proprium (man), as an accidens (sick), or not apply to him at all
(triangular). The law of excluded middle applies exclusively to temporalized
90
Cf. Hegel (1840: § 119, pp. 238–239 = W 8, 243–244 [2010: 183–184]).
91
Vasil’ev (1910: 38 = 1989: 45–46).
92
Mill (18728/1973: ii, vii, § 5, p. 278).
93
Cf. Sigwart (19043: i, § 25, p. 202 [1895: i, 150]): “It follows of itself from the principles of
contradiction and of twofold negation that of two contradictorily opposed judgments one is neces-
sarily true; hence that there is no third statement besides affirmation and negation which would
imply the falsity of both. This is the principle of the excluded middle, which, like the two
previous principles, aims only at interpreting more fully the nature and meaning of the negation.”
94
Vasil’ev (1910: 41 = 1989: 48).
95
Cf. Vasil’ev (1910: 42 = 1989: 49).
3.4 A Debate on Particular Propositions 49
r eality96: the sky now is either blue or not blue, but the sky in general, as a concept,
as an incomplete object, can be blue; blue pertains to the sky as an accidens, it is
neither necessarily predicated of it, nor impossible.
The logic of concepts, admitting only relations of contrariety between judg-
ments, would fit well with the Meinongian theory of incomplete objects. According
to Meinong, the nature of an object can be unravelled (aufgelöst) in a collectivity of
determinations whose number varies between 1 and ∞. Meinong here shares the
Kantian principle of complete determination.97 When we say that an object is com-
pletely determined, we mean that of two opposed predicates, given or possible, one
must necessarily belong to it. The principle of excluded middle is valid for every-
thing that is concrete; in other words, for everything that effectively exists, and also
for whatever subsists, but not for objects in abstracto: the object ‘something blue’
is not determined with respect to extension, just as a general triangle is not deter-
mined with respect to equilaterality, but only with respect to the properties with
which any triangle is endowed.98 Objects of this kind, that are not determined in all
of their aspects, are called “incomplete.” Thus, beside (i) completely determined
objects, namely individuals, there are (ii) underdetermined, that is to say incom-
plete objects, and, Meinong adds, (iii) overdetermined objects, those which are
impossible or contradictory. Vasil’ev makes the same point, as we will have occa-
sion to observe.
In 1910, Vasil’ev rejects the law of excluded middle but not the law of contradic-
tion, which, together with the laws of identity and of sufficient reason, he considers
valid.99 He will get round to refuting also the principle of contradiction, and in doing
so he takes a route opposite to the path followed by Łukasiewicz, who in that same
year first criticized the principle of contradiction, and only after this followed up
with a critique of the law of excluded middle (see Sect. 4.3).
3.4 A Debate on Particular Propositions
Vasil’ev’s thesis fitted into a lively debate on particular propositions which, at that
time, attracted the attention of logicians of diverse background. Vasil’ev, as we have
seen, mentions several of them. An echo of this debate may be found in Nikolai
Onufrievich Lossky’s Logika (1922), which was reprinted the following year, and
96
Vasil’ev (1910: 41, 44 = 1989: 48, 50; 1912–1913a: 64 = 1989: 106 [1993: 337]) appears to adopt
as his own the idealistic thesis according to which reality consists of perceptions and representa-
tions. Since he does not follow through with any arguments on this matter, we are unable to exam-
ine his point of view.
97
Cf. Kant (17811–17872: A 571–572 = B 599–600 [1998: 553]): “among all possible predicates of
things, insofar as are compared with their opposites, one must apply to it.”
98
Cf. Meinong (1915: GA vi, 168 ff., 178). On these arguments cf. Dyche (1982), Findlay (19632:
152–217), Grossmann (1974: 156–181, 199–223), Haller (1989), Lambert (1983: 67–93), Lenoci
(1995), Parsons (1980: 17–29), Raspa (2005: 209 ff.; 2008a: 233 ff.), Reicher (1995).
99
Cf. Vasil’ev (1910: 46 = 1989: 53).
translated into German as Handbuch der Logik in 1927. At the outset, Lossky draws
on Theodor Lipps’s treatise Grundzüge der Logik (1893). Lipps held that in particu-
lar judgment, the predicate is attributed to the entire extension of the subject, and,
moreover, that such a judgment expresses an incomplete knowledge on which fur-
ther research can throw light, eventually replacing it with a universal judgment.100
This indeterminateness would emerge in the weak, but not in the strong, interpreta-
tion of ‘some.’ There is a natural transition here to Vasil’ev’s treatment of his theses.
Even though Lossky rejects Vasil’ev’s proposal, the critical exposition of it that he
provides is at the same time a mark of the significance it was accorded. Above all,
Lossky challenges the idea that the subject is to be taken in all of its extension, a
thesis that Vasil’ev shares with Lipps. He challenges, therefore, the notion that the
weak form of particular judgment is a problematic judgment endowed with an ele-
ment of vagueness. In this regard, he refers to Lapshin’s criticisms (1917) of
Vasil’ev. Finally, Lossky affirms that the strong particular judgment is a composite
form and that, if it is interpreted in its disjunctive form, it has not been neglected by
logic.101
The polemic between Louis Couturat (1868–1914) and Salomon Ginzberg
(1889–1969) conducted in the pages of the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale
between 1913 and 1914 is even more salient. It is quite probable that Ginzberg was
unfamiliar with Vasil’ev’s essay on particular judgments, and yet, in his “Note sur
le sens équivoque des propositions particulières [A Note on the Equivocal Meaning
of Particular Propositions]” (1913), he proposes to interpret ‘some (quelques)’ in
the sense of ‘only some (rien que quelques)’ in a way that is strikingly reminiscent
of Vasil’ev. Ginzberg holds that the traditional interpretation is vague in meaning
and that, if the new interpretation is adopted, “there are no contradictories”102 and I
and O constitute “a unique particular judgment” — ‘some S are P’ is by now equiva-
lent to ‘some S are not P’ — which he terms Pr. For Ginzberg, therefore, “the only
possible relation of opposition is that of contrary judgments”103 and from this he
derives the law of excluded fourth, even though he does not employ this wording:
none of the paired judgments (A-E-Pr) can be true at the same time (thanks to the exact
meaning of each of them), and each couple can be equally false, if the third is true.104
Ginzberg also examines — unlike Vasil’ev who omits to do so in his article — the
consequences that the interpretation of ‘some’ as ‘only some’ would have on imme-
diate and mediate inferences, that is, on conversion, contraposition, and the syllo-
gism. He manages to establish that the only valid modes are Barbara and Celarent
100
Cf. Lipps (1893: 35 ff.), Lossky (1927: 167–169).
101
Cf. Lossky (1927: 169–173). Stelzner (2001: 280–283; cf. also Stelzner & Kreiser 2004: 253–
256) points out a parallelism between Lossky and Vasil’ev regarding the denial of the laws of
contradiction and of excluded middle, although textual evidence that would indicate Vasil’ev was
familiar with Die Grundlegung des Intuitivismus (1908) is lacking.
102
Ginzberg (1913: 102).
103
Ginzberg (1913: 103).
104
Ginzberg (1913: 103–104).
3.4 A Debate on Particular Propositions 51
in the first figure, Cesare and Camestres in the second, Camenes in the fourth,
Disamis + Bocardo in the third. Ginzberg’s analyses anticipated by several decades
the development by some recent researchers of a syllogistic of concepts.105
Couturat replies vigorously to Ginzberg in his “Des propositions particulières et
de leur portée existentielle [On Particular Propositions and their Existential Import]”
(1913), by lending prominence to what have emerged as the two fundamental issues
at stake in the question: the vagueness of the weak form, and the simplicity of the
strong form of the particular judgment. Couturat affirms that Pr is a complex propo-
sition, which therefore cannot be assumed as the basis for a syllogistic system. He
challenges the idea that the particular weak proposition is vague in meaning: in so
far as the particular propositions negate their respective universal propositions, they
affirm exactly that the class S is not contained in the class P (‘Some S are not P’) and
that S and P are not disjointed (‘Some S are P’).106 In addition, from the thesis
according to which particular propositions have an existential import, Couturat
derives the non-validity of both the subalternation and of the conversio per acci-
dens, on the hypothesis that the subject is empty (see Sect. 3).
In the following year, Ginzberg insists, against Couturat, that Pr is a simple prop-
osition, in that (and here the parallel with Vasil’ev is dazzlingly obvious) it only
corresponds to the intersection between the two classes. He therefore reaffirms the
exactitude of Pr as opposed to the vagueness of the weak form and maintains that
the attribution of an existential import to particular propositions is not the classic
interpretation, but one of the new possible interpretations.107 In his response,
Couturat refers Ginzberg’s particular proposition to the system of Joseph-Diez
Gergonne,108 affirming — with some good reason — that “the moment one tries to
‘quantitatively’ specify the statements, one steps outside the framework of classical
logic.”109
Couturat missed a point which lies at the heart of both Ginzberg’s and Vasil’ev’s
arguments, namely, the idea that a plurality of logics may exist. In his later articles,
Vasil’ev will make more explicit the idea that different logics are valid for different
object domains.
105
On this matter see Sect. 6.4. Suchoń (1999: 133) speculates that Vasil’ev must have been disap-
pointed by the exiguous number of valid modes one might construct (only six, if four figures are
considered). Stelzner & Kreiser (2004: 170) also draw attention to the fact that, in the logic of
concepts, only five valid modes can be constructed (if the first three figures are considered), and
maintain this to be an argument that a traditional logician might raise as an objection to the reform
Vasil’ev proposed. If this were so, the argument would rebound back against whoever used it,
because fourteen modes are not too many more than five. Ginzberg (1913: 106) on the other hand
maintains that researchers ought to be left free to choose either interpretation of ‘some,’ corre-
sponding to the states of knowledge, since the restricted interpretation is adapted to the exposition
of the truths that have been acquired. Yet one more affinity with Vasil’ev.
106
Cf. Couturat (1913: 257–258).
107
Cf. Ginzberg (1914).
108
Cf. Gergonne (1816/1817).
109
Couturat (1914: 260).
Chapter 4
Non-Aristotelian Logic
Abstract This chapter deals with attempts, contemporary with Vasil’ev’s own, to
develop non-Aristotelian logics that present affinities with imaginary logic. Already
in Aristotle’s work there are passages that press in the direction of a non-Aristotelian
logic, in so far as they show that the syllogism is independent of the principle of
contradiction. Some Aristotelian scholars like Heinrich Maier and Isaac Husik had
drawn attention to such passages. Husik in particular proposes, on the basis of them
and of Herbert Spencer’s philosophy, a hypothetical logic in which the syllogism is
independent of the principle of contradiction; judgments are allowed that assert
contradictory predicates of the same subject; contradictory objects are subjects of
true propositions; and a hypothetical world is assumed, for which such a different
logic would be valid. Jan Łukasiewicz was familiar with Maier and Husik’s works.
He subjects to rigorous critique the Aristotelian principle of contradiction, claiming
that it is uncertain, that it is not a simple, ultimate and necessary principle, and that
in relation to contradictory objects it is actually false. Łukasiewicz took the notion
of contradictory objects from Meinong, according to whom such objects — which
are overdetermined objects of higher order in which a surplus of determinations
inheres, amongst which there is a relation of incompatibility — can occur as genu-
ine subjects in true propositions. The chapter concludes with an outline of the con-
troversy between Meinong and Russell, with which Łukasiewicz was thoroughly
acquainted, and his proposal of a non-Aristotelian logic in which the principle of
contradiction is insignificant.
Vasil’ev’s brief 1911 text Voobrazhaemaia logika (Konspekt lektsii) [Imaginary

Logic (Conspectus of a Lecture)] constitutes a transitional moment from the logic of
concepts to imaginary logic. Other than introducing his own work into a broad pro-
cess of “emancipation from Aristotle’s logic,”1 to which, from different perspectives
Hegel, Mill, Sigwart and the algebraists Boole, Schröder and Poretsky contributed,
Vasil’ev takes up the distinction already advanced in his earlier essay between the
laws of thought (or of concepts) and the laws of reality (or of facts). In this text he
1
Vasil’ev (1911/1989: 126).

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66086-8_4
54 4 Non-Aristotelian Logic
endeavours to apply this distinction to the construction of his imaginary logic,

which he names here for the first time. The laws of thought are unchangeable and
cannot be eliminated, whilst, to the contrary, those of reality can be eliminated and
substituted. We cannot arbitrarily change our nature as thinking beings, but we can
construct imaginary objects and worlds out of material drawn from the empirical
world. This idea is very similar to Meinong’s notion of objects of higher order. In
this same article, hints are given of the essential points that characterize imaginary
logic, “a logic without the law of contradiction,”2 which Vasil’ev will go on to elab-
orate in a more comprehensive fashion in his two successive essays, “Voobrazhaemaia
(nearistoteleva) logika [Imaginary (non-Aristotelian Logic)]” (1912) and “Logika i
metalogika [Logic and Metalogic]” (1912–1913). Such points consist of an analogy
with Lobachevsky’s non-Euclidean geometry; the double formulation of the law of
contradiction (logical and ontological); the conception of negation that is not based
on incompatibility; the notion of an imaginary world in which negations are percep-
tible; the individuation of a third form of qualitative judgment (indifferent judg-
ment); the independence of the syllogism from the law of contradiction and
metalogic. Before we examine these theories in detail, we would do well to cast a
broad glance over the work of those contemporaries of Vasil’ev who in turn had
worked ideas on non-classical logics.
4.1 A Perennial Contemporary: Aristotle
The fact of the matter is that there are already present in Aristotle’s works passages
that press in the direction of a non-Aristotelian logic, as Łukasiewicz recognized in
his O zasadzie sprzeczności u Arystotelesa [On the Principle of Contradiction in
Aristotle].3 A passage in the Posterior Analytics states that the syllogism is indepen-
dent of the principle of contradiction:
[i] No demonstration assumes that it is not possible to assert and deny at the same time —
unless (3) the conclusion too is to be proved in this form.4
This means that the syllogism never assumes the principle of contradiction among
its premisses, except in the case where it must appear in the conclusion. How then
are we to take here the principle of contradiction, and, therefore, the conclusion?
There is nothing trite in posing this question, in that one of the major difficulties in
understanding this passage, as one can readily observe in examining the different
ways in which interpreters have construed it, lies in how to translate into formal
terms the ordinary language Aristotle uses here. From the overall argument it
emerges that he is speaking not only of negations of propositions, but also of
2
Vasil’ev (1912: 212 = 1989: 59 [2003: 131]).
3
Cf. Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 8).
4
Aristotle, An. post. i 11, 77a10–12. Both the interpolation of Arabic and Roman numerals in
Aristotle’s text and the italics, here and in later quotations, are mine.
4.1 A Perennial Contemporary: Aristotle 55
n egations of terms. It would therefore appear to be the case that the conclusion has
a form of the type ‘(Every) C is A and is not not-A,’ which, according to the standard
syllogistic symbolism, may be expressed thus5:
(3) AaC ∧ ¬(~AaC).
The first ‘not’ (¬) negates the proposition, the second ‘not’ (~) negates the term. A
number of experts agree on such an interpretation,6 but its justification is to be
sought rather in Aristotle himself than in the consensus of scholarship. In all
likelihood, in the passage under examination Aristotle understands in the aforemen-
tioned form the principle of contradiction, not taking it as
(3*) ¬(AaC ∧ ¬(AaC)),
out of respect for one of the fundamental conditions of demonstration, that is, that it
takes place within a determined genus.7 Were this not the case, it would not be clear
how a principle as general as that of contradiction could act as a premiss in a dem-
onstration that is always conducted within a genus. Thus, Aristotle is affirming in
this chapter, as also elsewhere, that the axioms are not to be assumed universally,
but rather to a sufficient extent. That is, it is enough to apply them “by analogy
[κατ’ἀναλογίαν]” to the subordinate genus of the science within which the demon-
stration is conducted.8 This requires a particular interpretation of negation, an inter-
pretation that is given by keeping in mind the illustration of the thesis which Aristotle
supplies immediately afterwards:
[ii] Then it is proved by assuming (1) that it is true to say the first term of the middle and
not true to deny it. It makes no difference if you assume (2′) that the middle term is and is
not; and (2″) the same holds for the third term. [iii] For if you are given (2) something of
which it is true to say that it is a man, (2′) even if not being a man is also true of it, then
provided only that it is true to say (1) that a man is an animal and not not an animal, it will
be true to say (3) that Callias, (2″) even if not Callias, is nevertheless an animal and not not
an animal.9 [iv] The explanation is that the first term is said not only of the middle term but
5
As opposed to traditional logic, in which the subject precedes the predicate, in Aristotle AaC
means ‘A belongs to all the C’s,ʼ that is ‘All C are A.’
6
Cf. Ross (1949: 542, ad i 11. 77a10), Bocheński (19703: 72), McKirahan (1992: 77), Barnes
(19942: 145, ad i 11. 77a10); but cf. also Husik (1906: 219) and Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 93;
1910b: 32 [1971: 504]).
7
Cf. Aristotle, An. post. i 7, 75b7–14.
8
Cf. Aristotle, An. post. i 10, 76a37–b2; 11, 77a23–24; Metaph. γ 3, 1005a25–27. Cf. also
McKirahan (1992: 71–73).
9
A translation of lines 77a15–18 conforming more closely to the interpretation I propose is as fol-
lows: “For if you are given (2) something of which it is true to say that it is a man, (2′) even if
not-a-man is also true of it, then provided only that it is true to say (1) that man is an animal and
not not-an-animal, it will be true to say (3) that Callias, (2″) even if he is not-Callias, is neverthe-
less an animal, and not not-an-animal.”
also of something else, because it holds of several cases; so that even if the middle both is
it and is not it, this makes no difference with regard to the conclusion.10
Let us take sections [ii] and [iii] together; section [iii] is nothing more than an
illustration of what has been affirmed in section [ii]. What Aristotle cites as an
example is a syllogism in Barbara — here, as in some other passages, he treats
singular propositions as universal propositions —, whose essential condition, in
order to be valid, is that the major premiss be true, namely that the middle term be
included in the extension of the major term. In other words, in order that the conclu-
sion may take the form of (3), it is necessary that the major premiss affirms that ‘B
is A and is not not-A.’ Now, (1) states “that it is true to say the first term of the
middle and not true to deny it,” i.e.:
⊤(AaB) ∧ ⊥(~AaB),
which we may render, if we take, as is the case in a bivalent context, the falsity of a
proposition as equivalent to its negation, in these terms:
(1) AaB ∧ ¬(~AaB).
Also here interpreters (see footnotes 6 and 10) agree, but from this point onwards,
they begin to differ.
Aristotle now goes on to say that, given a major premiss of this kind, it is not
important (2′) “that the middle term is and is not.” It is sufficient to predicate it of
the minor term (“if you are given something of which it is true to say that it is a
man”). He then adds that it is irrelevant (2″) that “the same holds for the third term.”
The greatest difficulties arise over the interpretation of these two expressions. If we
read them in terms of the example adopted in the following lines, by indicating with
A the major term (animal), with B the middle term (man) and with C the minor term
(Callias), we might translate (2′) as follows:
(2′) BaC ∧ (~BaC),
or ‘C is both B and not-B,’ ‘Callias is both man and not-man’; and (2″) thus:
(2″) BaC ∧ (~CaC),
which means ‘C, which is not-C, is B,’ ‘Callias, who is not-Callias, is man.’
Therefore, Aristotle appears to be saying that the syllogism is valid even when the
principle of contradiction is violated by the minor premiss (2′), or in the minor term
(“the third term”) (2″). Indeed, in order to deduce (3), (1) and the first part of (2′),
10
Aristotle, An. post. i 11, 77a12–21. For a commentary on the passage cf. Ross (1949: 542–543,
ad I 11. 77a10–21), Mignucci (1975: 221–237; 2007: 185–187 ad 77a10–21), McKirahan (1992:
76–79), Barnes (19942: 145–147, ad i 11. 77a10).
4.2 Isaac Husik 57
or of (2″), are sufficient, the rest being irrelevant. Thus, we may write the two result-
ing syllogisms in the following way:
(α) (1) AaB ∧ ¬(~AaB)

(2′) BaC ∧ (~BaC)
∴ (3) AaC ∧ ¬(~AaC)
(β) (1) AaB ∧ ¬(~AaB)

(2″) BaC ∧ (~CaC)
∴ (3) AaC ∧ ¬(~AaC)
Of course, it seems absurd to speak of a Callias who is man and not-man, or who
is even not-Callias. Precisely for this reason the difficulties over how to read the text
regard, above all, the interpretation of the minor premiss. But it is clear that here
Aristotle is reasoning hypothetically, in order to better grasp certain logical laws
and procedures. Thus, he hypothesizes an object C which is also not-C, and observes
how even in this case, under certain conditions, i.e., if the major premiss is true, that
is, if the middle term is included in the extension of the major term, and if it is true
to predicate the middle of the minor term, the conclusion necessarily follows from
the premisses.11
Some authors have derived from this passage the thesis of the independence of
the syllogism from the principle of contradiction. Historically, Isaak Husik has been
the first to draw such a conclusion, even if, from a theoretical point of view, Peirce
anticipated him.12
4.2 Isaac Husik
Husik himself recognized that, some years before his own intervention, Heinrich
Maier (1867–1933) in his Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles [Aristotle’s Syllogistic]
(1896–1900) had laid emphasis on the above passage in the Posterior Analytics.13
Yet, Maier’s argumentation is highly synthetic and only aims to specify “how and
under what conditions” the principle of contradiction is needed as a premiss in a
syllogism, namely, [i] “when the conclusion that is to be demonstrated explicitly
11
Recently, some scholars have hypothesized a paraconsistent approach to the Aristotelian syllo-
gistic. da Costa, Beziau & Bueno (1998: 142–50; cf. also da Costa, Krause & Bueno 2007: 828–
829) proposed a paraconsistent interpretation of traditional syllogistic built on the monadic
paraconsistent first-order C1* logic. Priest (2005: 132) claimed, with reference to An. pr. ii 15, that
syllogistic is paraconsistent. Finally, in a more detailed way through the analysis of both An. pr. ii
15 and An. post. i 11, Gomes & D’Ottaviano (2010) showed that Aristotle’s theory of syllogism is
a paraconsistent theory in a broad sense.
12
Cf. Peirce (1880: CP 3.192–193; W 3, 176–178).
13
Cf. Husik (1906: 217, fn. 1).
requires it. But also in such a case” — Maier continues — [ii] “it is sufficient to
assume it in the major premiss.”14 [iii] For example, the proposition ‘Callias is an
animal and not also, simultaneously, not an animal’ follows from the premisses
‘Man is an animal and not also, simultaneously, not an animal; but Callias is a man.’
In order for this conclusion to be inferred correctly, “it is not necessary to attach the
same addendum to the middle term and minor term.” Indeed, even in the case where
“Callias was simultaneously not Callias and man simultaneously not man, the con-
clusion that ‘Callias is an animal’ would be valid.” [iv] This is clarified by consider-
ing that the concept of animal has a greater extension than the concept of man, and
therefore not-man can also be animal, and further, that Callias is man, and man is in
any case comprised in the concept of animal.15
In analyzing this passage, however, Maier does not draw the consequences which
Husik will elicit. Husik’s argument, moreover, is constructed in far more detail, and
the conceptual context in which he places his analysis of the Aristotelian passage is
totally different. In his article in Mind, entitled “Aristotle on the Law of Contradiction
and the Basis of the Syllogism” (1906), Husik starts his analysis of this Aristotelian
text by discussing the way Theodor Waitz had interpreted it.16 For Waitz, “it means
apparently that the law of contradiction is not explicitly stated as a premiss unless it
is to appear explicitly also in the conclusion.”17 But, Husik objects, if this is true, the
significance of such a statement cannot be comprehended. Indeed, if all that Aristotle
means to say is that, given the universal certainty of the principle of contradiction,
it is not necessary that it be explicitly asserted in the premisses, in so far as it is
always already implied there, its appearance in the conclusion would be meaning-
less. One cannot see why it must be necessary to express in the conclusion that
which is in any case true as a fundamental condition for any proposition and infer-
ence whatsoever. Therefore, Husik turns the reading of the text upside down:
In the first sentence [I] Aristotle makes the significant statement that the syllogism as such
is independent of the principle of contradiction; that therefore the conclusion does not
exclude its opposite unless the major premiss does so.18
Thus, a proposition with the same structure as the principle of contradiction (3)
can appear in the conclusion, not if the conclusion requires it, but if the major prem-
iss has the same form, namely if one wants the conclusion to exclude its opposite. In
such an instance, it is sufficient to assume the principle of contradiction in the major
premiss, while it is not necessary to do so in the minor premiss. This emerges from
14
Maier (1896–1900: ii.2, 238).
15
Cf. Maier (1896–1900: ii.2, 239 fn. 3).
16
Cf. Waitz (1844–1846: ii, 328–329, ad 77 a 10).
17
Husik (1906: 219). The original text by Waitz (1844–1846: ii, 328) runs: “Principium contradic-
tionis quod dicitur in ipsam demonstrationem non assumitur, nisi etiam in conclusione expressum
esse debeat.”
18
Husik (1906: 219). The interpolation of Arabic and Roman numerals in Husik’s text, here and in
later quotations, is mine.
4.2 Isaac Husik 59
the analysis of the sequel following on from Aristotle’s passage, where the thesis he
has just mentioned is demonstrated by examining the following syllogism:
(1) B is A All men are animals

(2) C is B Callias is a man
∴ (3) C is A Callias is an animal
and by hypothesizing that a contradiction may occur in the minor premiss (in α), or
concern the minor term (in β):
(α) (1) B is A (and is not not-A)

(2′) C is B and is not-B
∴ (3) C is A (and is not not-A)
(β) (1) B is A (and is not not-A)

(2″) C, that is not-C, is B
∴ (3) C is A (and is not not-A)
Husik then comments:

[II–III] the exclusion of not-animal in the major premiss (1) is responsible for its exclusion
in the conclusion, even if the principle of contradiction should not hold in the minor prem-
iss, and in the minor term; i.e., even if it were true that (2') Callias is man and not-man (εἰ
καὶ μὴ ἄνθρωπον ἀληθές), and that (2”) he is Callias and not-Callias (Καλλίαν εἰ καὶ μὴ
Καλλίαν), still as long as (1) man is animal and not not-animal, it would follow that (3)
Callias is animal and not not-animal. [IV] The reason for this is, he [Aristotle] goes on to
say, that the major term is more extensive than the middle, and applies to not-man as well
as to man, and the middle term is more extensive than the minor and applies to not-Callias
as well as to Callias; and therefore even if Callias is both man and not-man (εἰ τὸ μέσον καὶ
αὐτό ἐστι καὶ μὴ αὐτό), this does not prevent the major term animal (and not not-animal)
from applying to it. Similarly even if the minor term is both Callias and not-Callias, the
major term still applies to it through the middle.19
The argument is not dissimilar to the one we examined earlier. One should note, more-
over, that in [iv] it is made explicit that, for the syllogism to be necessarily valid, one
must take not-man (not-B) not as the absolute complement of man, which extends to all
of the entities of the universe with the exception of man, but rather as its relative com-
plement, limited to all animals (A) with the exception of man (B). The same holds for
not-Callias (not-C). In other words, the syllogism is valid if the extension of negative
terms is restricted to their region: that of not-Callias is man, that of not-man is animal.
Besides showing that a syllogism in Barbara is valid independently of the law of
contradiction, Husik also adduces other theses of some importance to our account.
These theses represent the context in which the analysis of the Aristotelian passage
is inserted and can assist us in replying to the question: why should we desire that a
conclusion take the form of the principle of contradiction?
19
Husik (1906: 219–220).
First and foremost, let us subject to a closer examination the conception of nega-
tion which Husik proposes. In his view, the negative term of a pair of opposed terms
(B–not-B) is not extended to the entire universe, excluding B, but is restricted to its
region. A region is constituted by incompatible elements. For example, white and
not-white constitute the region of colours, triangular and not-triangular the region of
figures. A region, therefore, is denoted by a general term, and yet, notwithstanding
a number of affinities, the concept of region is distinguished from that of class for
two reasons. Above all, a class is composed of an aggregate of similar individuals,
but their similarity does not give an account of the incompatibility which makes
them members of the same region. In addition, there are also notions of class (like
that of quality) whose elements (the qualities) are not all incompatible. The defini-
tion of a region summons back the question: on what basis are two attributes incom-
patible? To this Husik replies that only experience can tell us which attributes are,
and which are not, incompatible. Consequently, ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ are names
for modes of consciousness which are found to be incompatible. Now, if we indicate
the number of these incompatibles by n and posit any one of them, A, all the other
n − 1 modes constitute not-A and the totality of the incompatible n’s constitute a
region. A region therefore is defined as “an aggregate of incompatible modes of
consciousness.” Clearly, and here Husik cites the authority of Herbert Spencer, only
experience can supply us with these fields.20
Spencer, in agreement with J. S. Mill, had maintained that logical principles are
generalizations from experience. More specifically, he held that the principle of
excluded middle is “a generalization of the universal experience that some mental
states are directly destructive of other states,”21 for which reason the presence of a
given positive state in consciousness excludes the correlative negative state, and
vice-versa. This means that positive states of consciousness are necessary, in rela-
tion to which the negative ones are excluded. Such states of consciousness have their
origin in experience. The more or less coherent relations subsisting between states
of consciousness are generated by more or less constant relations in something that
lies beyond consciousness.22 Propositions are states of consciousness and reason-
ings are a coherent series of states of consciousness.23 However, states of experience
exist independently of whether we are aware of them or not. Returning to Husik’s
article, this implies that the existence of states of experience is independent of
whether or not regions of incompatibles, as modes of consciousness, exist for us.24
Husik asks us therefore to imagine a state of experience in which there are no
regions of incompatibles, so that various modes of consciousness result; a state of
20
Cf. Husik (1906: 215–216).
21
Spencer (1865/1966: 192; 18732: 423–424); cited also in Mill (18728/1973–1974: ii, vii, § 5,
pp. 278–279; 18724/1979: 381 n.).
22
Cf. Spencer (1865/1966: 213).
23
Cf. Spencer (1865/1966: 205, 208).
24
For more details on Mill and Spencer’s conceptions regarding the principles of contradiction and
of excluded middle see Raspa (1999b: 89–97).
4.2 Isaac Husik 61
experience in which absolute chaos does not dominate, but which would require, if
we were to construct a logic on this hypothesis, the exclusion, or at least the reduc-
tion to a minimum of a priori inferences (i.e., the immediate inferences between
opposed propositions). Let us suppose that, in a hypothetical logic, the judgment ‘A
is B’ means only what it directly states and that no inference is allowed from it
regarding not-B. Let us even suppose that the same holds for ‘A is not-B,’ from
which, therefore, it is not legitimate to infer anything with respect to B. “B and not-B,
in other words, are to be treated, in accordance with this hypothesis, as B and C are
in our actual logic.”25 For Husik, as for Vasil’ev, “our actual logic” is traditional logic.
Yet, the real point of affinity between the two, as we shall see, consists in the hypoth-
esis of considering B and not-B as independent of each other. The affinity here is such
that, when reading Vasil’ev, one is strongly tempted to think that he had read Husik.
Husik next goes on to examine what consequences such a conception of the judg-
ment might have about the syllogism.
The inference of the conclusion from the premisses is based simply on the right to repeat
separately a judgment regarding an object or group of objects, which was made before
regarding the same plus others.26
In this inferential process, the law of contradiction is not involved at all. The syllo-
gism (analogous to the Aristotelian example we have noted earlier)
All B is A
All C is B
∴ All C is A
would be valid even in the case in which “the law of contradiction were banished
from logic.”27 In ordinary logic, the conclusion ‘All C is A’ excludes ‘All C is not-A’
not on the strength of syllogistic procedure, but only because the major premiss
excludes it — the conclusion in fact adds nothing to the major premiss, but rather
constitutes a particular case of it —, while the major premiss ‘All B is A’ excludes
‘All C is not-A’ a priori, on the grounds of the law of contradiction. One obtains the
same result by doing without such a law and by explicitly denying not-A in the major
premiss. In fact, since the conclusion “does nothing more than repeat part of the
major premiss,” ‘All C is A’ excludes in the same way its opposite ‘All C is not-A,’
if the major premiss excludes it, that is, if the major premiss asserts ‘All B is A and
not not-A.’ This holds also in the case in which — as in the syllogisms (α) and (β) —
either the minor premiss or the minor term would contain a contradiction. This is
what takes place in hypothetical logic. The difference between the two logics lies
here: what ordinary logic holds to be superfluous to assert, in so far as it regards it to
be true a priori, hypothetical logic asserts explicitly on the grounds of experience.28
25
Husik (1906: 216).
26
Ibid.
27
Husik (1906: 217).
28
Cf. ibid.
Thus, the sense of a syllogism whose conclusion is a proposition of the type ‘C

is A and is not not-A’ is also explained. Precisely because the syllogism is indepen-
dent of the principle of contradiction, to the extent that the conclusion excludes its
opposite only if the major premiss excludes it, it may be necessary to make such
assertions in certain cases (when the exclusion of the opposite is not immediate or a
priori). Together with the main thesis, (A) the independence of the syllogism from
the principle of contradiction, Husik’s article presents other ideas which are equally
important for explaining the birth, at the beginning of the twentieth century, of non-
Aristotelian logics. Namely (D) the hypothesis of a state of experience (or of a
hypothetical world differing from our own), for which (L) a different logic would be
valid, in which (B) judgments would be allowed that, though they assert a certain
predicate B of a subject A, do not exclude not-B, or judgments that, on the basis of
experience (of the hypothetical world), can attribute opposed properties to a given
subject, in so far as the negations are understood by the standards of positive facts.
As was observed above, B and not-B are considered as though they were B and C.
In this sense, Husik implicitly admits also the thesis (C), concerning the assumption
of contradictory objects (see Sect. 2.2).
4.3 Jan Łukasiewicz and Alexius Meinong
Both in his book O zasadzie sprzeczności u Arystotelesa [On the Principle of

Contradiction in Aristotle] and in his article Über den Satz des Widerspruchs bei
Aristoteles (1910), Łukasiewicz subjects to rigorous critique those pages of the cor-
pus aristotelicum devoted to the principle of contradiction. In Aristotle’s
Metaphysics, Łukasiewicz distinguishes three formulations of the principle of con-
tradiction which he rewrites in the following way:
(i) ontological formulation (corresponding to Metaph. γ 3, 1005b19–20):
“No object can possess and not possess the same property at the same time”29
(ii) logical formulation (corresponding to Metaph. γ 6, 1011b13–14):

“Two sentences, of which the one ascribes to an object exactly that property which the other
denies to it, cannot be true at the same time”30
(iii) psychological formulation (corresponding to Metaph. γ 3, 1005b23–24):

“Two beliefs, to which correspond contradictory sentences, cannot exist at the same time in
the same mind.”31
These three formulations are not synonymous, because each contains expres-
sions designating different objects: the first formulation refers to objects, the second
29
Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 10, 149; 1910b: 16 [1971: 488]).
30
Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 11, 149; 1910b: 16–17 [1971: 488]).
31
Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 12, 149; 1910b: 18 [1971: 488]).
4.3 Jan Łukasiewicz and Alexius Meinong 63
to sentences, and the third to beliefs. Hence, they express different thoughts, in the
sense that each of them has a different informative value. However, the logical and
ontological formulations are equivalent since the first follows from the second and
vice versa. According to Łukasiewicz, they are equivalent also for Aristotle.32 Such
equivalence is a logical consequence of the assumption of the realistic point of view,
shared by both Aristotle and Łukasiewicz, according to which “being and true sen-
tences correspond reciprocally.”33
The issue concerning the different formulations of the principle of contradiction
does not just relate to Aristotle, but also involves traditional logic. In Aristotelian
texts, Łukasiewicz detected positions separately expressed by authors such as
Trendelenburg, Ueberweg and Sigwart.34 Furthermore, Heinrich Maier, known to
Łukasiewicz, had already identified different formulations in Aristotle.35 To these, a
third source can be added, recognizable in some theories elaborated in the realm of
Austrian philosophy of that time. First of all I would like to refer to the distinction
among act, content and object both for representations and for judgments, to which
attention had been directed by Kazimierz Twardowski in Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und
Gegenstand der Vorstellungen [On the Content and Object of Presentations]
(1894).36 In “Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren
Wahrnehmung [On Objects of Higher Order and Their Relationship to Internal
Perception]” (1899), Meinong also makes such a distinction in relation to represen-
tations, a distinction which he uses to justify the givenness of non-existent objects,
among which he includes (like Twardowski) contradictory ones.37 Furthermore, in
relation to judgments, he elaborates the notion of objective (or state of affairs) as
their object (see Sect. 6.6). Łukasiewicz, who was initially Twardowski’s student at
Lvov, and then Meinong’s auditor and interlocutor at Graz, uses such concepts to
identify and to explain the three Aristotelian formulations of the principle of contra-
diction, as well as to argue in which cases such a principle is actually false.38
Now according to Łukasiewicz in the psychological formulation, the principle of
contradiction is uncertain, because it is expressed, recalling Husserl’s criticism of Mill’s
and Spencer’s concept of the logical principles, in an inaccurate way and it is empiri-
cally unproven. As we know, Mill and Spencer consider the principle of contradiction
32
Cf. Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 16–18; 1910b: 17 [1971: 489]). On the distinction between equiv-
alence and synonymity see Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 15–16).
33
Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 18); cf. also Aristotle, Metaph. γ 7, 1011b26–27.
34
Cf. Trendelenburg (18703: i, 23, 31–32; ii, 174), Ueberweg (18825: § 77, 234–237), Sigwart
(19043: i, § 23, pp. 188–191 [1895: i, 139–141]).
35
Maier (1896–1900: i, 41–45, esp. p. 42 fn. 1) had indicated, for each of the formulations distin-
guished by Łukasiewicz, the self-same passages subsequently examined by the latter.
36
Cf. Twardowski (1894 [1977]).
37
Cf. Meinong (1899: GA ii, 381 ff. [1978: 141 ff.]). On the relationship between Meinong’s and
Twardowski’s conceptions regarding the distinction between act, content and object see Raspa
(2016: 39 ff.).
38
Here I give only a sketch of Łukasiewicz’s concept and criticism of the principle of contradic-
tion; for more details on this topic see Raspa (1999a; 1999b: 53 ff., 110 ff., 139 ff., 257 ff.; 2000).
together with other logical principles to be generalizations from experience. According

to Mill, the original foundation of the principle of contradiction is “that Belief and
Disbelief are two different mental states, excluding one another,” as it would result from
the ascertainment that “any positive phenomenon whatever and its negative, are distinct
phenomena, pointedly contrasted, and the one always absent where the other is pres-
ent.”39 This thesis is shared by Spencer who is quoted by Mill for his own support both
in A System of Logic and in An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy.40 In
his Logische Untersuchungen Husserl in turn, in referring to Mill’s position, which he
assimilated to Spencer’s, noted that Mill took the impossibility for two contradictory
propositions to be both true as equivalent to the real incompatibility of the correspond-
ing acts of judgement. Since Mill asserts that what can properly be true or false are acts
of belief — Spencer talks about states of consciousness — Husserl states that their prin-
ciple of contradiction could be formulated in this way:
Two contradictorily opposed acts of belief [or states of consciousness] cannot coexist.41
If this is true, the principle, then, proves to be inexact and scientifically not verified
since it requires specifications on the mental state of the subject, on the circum-
stances in which he thinks, etc., that are not easy to determine.42
Already some years before, Łukasiewicz rejected psychologism in logic stating —
in the wake of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen but also of Meinong — that psy-
chology cannot be a foundation for logic, because their objects and laws are different.43
Logic does not take as its object of study the psychical processes but the relations of
truth and falsity among judgments. In O zasadzie sprzeczności u Arystotelesa
Łukasiewicz, continuing Husserl’s objection to Mill’s and Spencer’s psychologistic
interpretation of the principle of contradiction, maintains that the weakness of the
psychological formulation of this principle consists in having to do not with purely
logical objects, like sentences, but with objects connected to experience, as beliefs
have to be. Therefore, a law of this type is revealed to be inaccurate, it has only a proba-
bilistic value and, since specific psychological researches have not proved its validity,
it remains empirically unproven. It is however doubtful that such a proof could be pos-
sible since historically there have been authors like Hegel who have asserted with full
awareness that something can be and not be at the same time. On this matter, either we
agree with Aristotle that “what a man says he does not necessarily believe,”44 which
means that Hegel wrote something that he did not believe, or we conclude that Hegel
39
Mill (18728/1973–1974: ii, vii, § 5, pp. 277–278).
40
Cf. Mill (18728/1973–1974: ii, vii, § 5, pp. 278–279; 18724/1979: 381 fn. *).
41
Husserl (1900–1901: i, 81 [2001: i, 58]).
42
Cf. Husserl (1900–1901: i, 81–82 [2001: i, 58]).
43
A lecture on “Teza Husserla na stosunku logiki do psychologii [Husserl’s Thesis on the
Relationship between Logic and Psychology]” held by Łukasiewicz at the Polish Philosophical
Society testifies to this (for a short report of the lecture, cf. Łukasiewicz 1904). He speaks more at
length about this subject in “Logika a psychologia [Logic and Psychology]” (cf. Łukasiewicz
1907). Cf. also Borkowski and Słupecki (1958: 46–47), Kuderowicz (1988: 142–143), Sobociński
(1956: 8–9), and Woleński (1989: 194).
44
Aristotle, Metaph. γ 3, 1005b25–26.
had not fully thought out what he was writing. In both cases, we have to resort — as
Husserl noticed — to supporting hypotheses (Hilfshypothesen), or to specifications on
the thinking subject which complicate the principle and diminish its degree of proba-
bility (Wahrscheinlichkeitswert).45 The conclusion of this argument is that the psycho-
logical principle of contradiction is not a certain principle, because it does not have to
do with sentences but with beliefs.46 I have dwelt on the analysis of the psychological
formulation of the principle of contradiction by Łukasiewicz because — as we shall
see — a fundamental difference in relation to Vasil’ev emerges from it.
Moreover, Łukasiewicz maintains that the principle of contradiction is not a sim-
ple principle, as it presupposes specific logical notions (i.e. negation and logical mul-
tiplication) that are not present in simpler and more evident laws (like the principle of
identity).47 Yet, it is not an ultimate principle, since it is not true ‘through itself,’ a
characteristic that belongs only to the definition of a true sentence.48 Again, for
Łukasiewicz, the principle of contradiction is not a necessary principle, because other
laws are independent of it; in certain contexts, i.e. in relation to contradictory objects,
it is actually false. All this, however, does not signify that the principle of contradic-
tion is invalid. On the contrary, it retains its own validity, but, if one aims to ground it,
one must have recourse to the notion of objects and provide it with an ontological
foundation, presupposing that the objects are non-contradictory by definition.49
45
Cf. Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 30–34; 1910b: 21 and fn. 1–2 [1971: 492–493 and fn. 6–7]).
46
Łukasiewicz’s criticism of Aristotle’s psychological formulation of the principle of contradiction
follows another path but reaches the same conclusion. Łukasiewicz takes into account the passages
of Metaph. γ 3, 1005b26–32 — read in connection with Int. 14, 23a27–39 — and γ 6, 1011b15–22,
which he interprets as two complementary parts of a single attempt conducted by Aristotle to prove
the validity of the principle of contradiction even for beliefs. The result achieved by Łukasiewicz
(1910a/1987: 19 ff.; 1910b: 18 ff. [1971: 489 ff.]) is that the impossibility for a subject to have
contradictory beliefs at the same time is demonstrable only provided that we treat these as if they
were sentences for which the alternative true or false is valid. Therefore, the psychological formu-
lation of the principle of contradiction is nothing but a consequence of the logical one. In such a
way, Aristotle would fall into that error which is the exact converse of “psychologism in logic,” that
is, “logicism in psychology.” However, sentences are not beliefs. The latter are “psychical phenom-
ena” and, as such, are always positive. Consequently, it can never happen that two beliefs are in
contradiction like an affirmation and its negation. Such a thing would involve that the same belief
should be present and at the same time should not be present in the same mind, but a belief that
does not exist cannot be in contradiction with another. In reality, while sentences mean that some-
thing is or is not and while they are in a relation of correspondence or of non-correspondence with
their own objects or facts, so that they can be true or false, beliefs have a different structure. As
psychical phenomena, they do not assert simply that something is or is not but they rather represent
an intentional relation with something: without something that is intended, Łukasiewicz says, there
is no belief. This intentional relation consists of two parts: the act of belief and the Meinongian
objective (see Sect. 6.6). The expression in words or in signs of the second part of the intentional
relation is the sentence, which can be true or false, but the first part does not refer to any fact, so
we can say that it is neither true nor false. Then, beliefs are not purely logical objects. Cf.
Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 25, 29–30).
47
Cf. Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 49 ff.; 1910b: 22 [1971: 493–494]).
48
Cf. Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 57 ff.; 1910b: 23 [1971: 494]).
49
Cf. Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 102, 109 ff.; 1910b: 35 [1971: 506–507]).
In this way, Łukasiewicz can claim his place in a long debate which can be traced
back to tensions over the presumed absolute, self-evident character, priority and
unavoidability of the principle of contradiction within the traditional formal logic of
the nineteenth century and its offshoots at the beginning of the twentieth century.50
Nonetheless, Łukasiewicz did not only aim to subject the principle of contradiction
to a critique, but also to investigate under what conditions it is valid and the logical
consequences that would result were (on hypothetical grounds) such conditions
lacking. In his view, the principle of contradiction does not constitute the necessary
presupposition for every demonstration, since many principles and theorems are
independent on it, in the sense that they would be true even where it is no longer
valid. Such is the case in Aristotle for the dictum de omni et nullo, and, in symbolic
logic, other than the principle of the syllogism,51 for the principle of identity, the
principles of simplification and composition, the principle of distribution, and,
among others, the laws of commutation, tautology and absorption.52 All this is of
special importance for the consequences that Łukasiewicz draws from it: on exam-
ining the relation between the principle of contradiction and syllogism, he arrives at
prospecting the idea of a non-Aristotelian logic. To strengthen his hand, he is there-
fore obliged to show that one can effectively make correct inferences independently
of the principle of contradiction, something he undertakes by referring back to and
in part modifying Husik’s thesis.
In effect, Łukasiewicz acknowledges the merits of both Husik and Maier for hav-
ing drawn our attention to the significance of An. post. i 11, but he maintains that
their analyses lend themselves to further refinement.53 The reading he offers of the
Aristotelian passage repeats Husik’s on many points: he examines the same syllo-
gisms, which he considers valid, and asserts that the conclusion ‘C is A’ is true,
notwithstanding the contradictory nature of the minor premiss in (α), or of the minor
term in (β). But he parts company from them on a fundamental point. For
Łukasiewicz, a negative term not-B (not-man) is the absolute complement of B
(man), which extends to all the entities of the universe with the exception of B, and
is not, therefore, restricted to A (animal), but can also include not-A. It follows that
the contradiction in the minor premiss (or in the minor term) need not but may affect
the conclusion. Whereas for Husik the conclusions of the syllogisms (α) and (β) are
necessary, for Łukasiewicz they are only possible.54
50
Cf. Raspa (1999b: 80 ff. and passim).
51
By principle of the syllogism Łukasiewicz means, following Couturat (1905: 8), the law of tran-
sitivity: ((a → b) ∧ (b → c)) → (a → c); cf. Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 155).
52
Cf. Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 95, 191–192; 1910b: 32–33 [1971: 504]).
53
According to Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 91 and fn. *), Maier did not recognize the fundamental
significance this passage has for Aristotle’s entire system of logic, while Husik, notwithstanding
“the correctness of his central idea,” expressed his views in a very imprecise manner. The truth of
the matter is that Łukasiewicz is indebted both to Maier and, above all, to Husik.
54
Cf. Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 93–95). See also Bocheński (19703: 71–72), who shares
Łukasiewicz’s interpretation, and in contrast Zwergel (1972: 21–28) and Seddon (1981: 203–206),
who disagree with it.
Another difference lies in the way a proposition like ‘C is B and is not B’ is to be

understood. What sense does a proposition of this kind have? We have noted that
Aristotle reasons by hypotheses, with the aim of obtaining a better understanding of
certain logical laws and procedures. We have observed that Husik also introduced
this type of proposition in a hypothetical context, in order to have a better grasp of
the syllogistic process. Łukasiewicz, too, is in agreement on a similar manner of
proceeding,55 a position characterized, in this particular period, by his acceptance of
various theories advanced by Meinong, including that regarding impossible objects.
The latter, for Meinong, are objects of higher order, or complex objects, which
have objects of lower order as their constituent parts, granting which is a necessary
condition for the former to exist. The inferiora can be, in turn, objects of higher
order, themselves constituted by elements connected by relations. But, at the end of
the descending process one arrives at final elements that are no longer divisible
(according to the principle of obligatory infima). Precisely because they are the
result of specific relations subsisting among the inferiora, objects of higher order
are non-independent, and intrinsically so, in the sense that they cannot be thought of
without reference to their inferiora.56 Examples of objects of higher order are a
melody, a football team, but also a red square and a relation of similarity or differ-
ence. A centaur is also an object of higher order, being based on the inferiora of man
and horse, which we have knowledge of through experience. A round square is
another example, in that it results from the union of a square and a circle, between
which there subsists a relation of incompatibility. Impossible objects are overdeter-
mined objects, in which a surplus of determinations inheres, amongst which again,
there is a relation of incompatibility. Now, Meinong holds that true propositions can
be constructed, in which non-existent, even impossible, objects occur as genuine
subjects. He firmly upholds, therefore, theses (B) and (C).
It should be clarified here that the peculiarity of Meinong’s position does not lie
so much in the fact that he drew attention to non-existent objects. One can track
down a leitmotiv regarding the treatment of the non-existent in the history of phi-
losophy, in which not only philosophers close to him (such as Bernard Bolzano and
Kazimierz Twardowski), but also others from the distant past, like Thomas Reid,
Christian Wolff, Francisco Suárez, Roger Bacon and Avicenna would figure.
Meinong’s peculiarity lies rather in the way he held that non-existent, even impos-
sible, objects can be the subject matter of our thinking on the same level as existing
objects. That is to say, non-existent objects may occur (to adopt Meinong’s terms)
as objecta in objectives and may give rise to judgments, some of which are true.
Non-existent objects, like geometrical figures, even though they do not exist, are
known, and knowing them entails knowing their properties and the relations they
have with other objects. The same holds for non-existent objects like literary fic-
tions and, Meinong says, even for impossible objects. This all implies, according to
55
Cf. Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 96); but cf. also Peirce (1878: CP 5.403; W 3, 266–267), whom
we have already alluded to (see Sect. 2.3) and to whom we shall return presently (see Sect. 5.4 fn.
61 and Sect. 5.6).
56
Cf. Meinong (1899: GA ii, 386 [1978: 144]).
the principle of independence of so-being from being (Prinzip der Unabhängigkeit

des Soseins vom Sein), the possibility of speaking of the so-being of an object, or of
its determinations, independently of its being, of the fact that such an object may
exist or, at least, subsist. Thus, “the so-being of an object is not affected by its non-
being.”57 That one may predicate certain qualities of a given subject without requir-
ing that it exist presupposes that the object (but not, however, its representation) be
somehow “given prior [vorgegeben]” to ascertaining its eventual being or non-
being. What this means is that one must grant a pure object, which lies “beyond
being and non-being.”58 In its totality, the world is constituted, in Meinong’s view,
not only of what is real, but also of what does not exist, and therefore understanding
the connections between the existent and non-existent (a paradigmatic instance of
such connections is provided by objects of higher order) is an indispensable condi-
tion, if we are to give ourselves an explanation of the world in its totality.
As is well known, Russell’s reaction on reading Meinong’s concept was one of
critical asperity. Here, I will not go into the details of the Meinong-Russell contro-
versy,59 I would rather prefer to highlight in particular just one aspect of the contro-
versy concerning the accuracy and appropriateness of Russell’s critique.
According to the theory of descriptions, a denoting phrase does not have a mean-
ing in itself, taken in isolation, but rather the proposition in which it occur does have
a meaning.60 A denoting phrase containing the article ‘the’ has a denotation only if
both the condition of existence and the condition of uniqueness are satisfied.
Consider the proposition
(1) ‘the father of Charles ii was executed,’
in which the denoting phrase F ‘the father of Charles ii’ occurs. Whilst Meinong
expresses it in traditional terms as
(2) B(F),
in which B is about to ‘be executed,’ Russell analyses it in the following way: ‘there
was one and only one entity x which was the father of Charles ii, and that entity was
executed.’ In formal terms:
(3) ∃x(Fx ∧ ∀y(Fy → x = y) ∧ Bx).
The original proposition (1) has been reduced to a form without denoting phrases
(3), in which the grammatical subject is intended as a predicate. There is a clear
57
Meinong (1904: GA ii, 489 [1960: 82]).
58
Meinong (1904: GA ii, 494 [1960: 86]).
59
On this controversy, only touched on in passing here, cf. Griffin & Jacquette (eds., 2009). A care-
ful reconstruction of the dispute is provided by Farrell Smith (1985). I have dealt with it in Raspa
(1995/1996: 181 ff.; 1999b: 247 ff.), where the relevant literature on the topic is listed.
60
Cf. Russell (1905b/1973: 105).
detachment from the grammatical subject-predicate form, to which Meinong is still

attached. The difficulties which are avoided in this way are those which arise con-
cerning denoting phrases without denotations such as ‘the present King of France,’
‘the golden mountain’ or ‘the round square,’ insofar as they are accepted as genuine
constituents of propositions.
Now let us consider the following proposition:
(4) ‘the golden mountain is golden.’
Russell analyses it in the following manner:
(5) ∃x((Mx ∧ Gx) ∧ ∀y((My ∧ Gy) → x = y) ∧ Gx),
that is, ‘there is one and only one entity x such that x is a golden mountain and x is
golden,’ where G means ‘being golden’ and M ‘being a mountain.’ According to
Russell, in (5) the condition of uniqueness is satisfied, but not the condition of exis-
tence, since no golden mountain exists; thence, (5) is false.61
The criticism Russell makes against Meinong’s object theory in “On Denoting”
is in the introduction of paraphrases which facilitate the transition from superficial
grammatical form to profound logical form, which in fact includes existential quan-
tification. According to Russell, in ordinary language proposition (4) reflects an
existential assumption which can be expressed by stating that there is an individual
that does not exist (if it is admitted that each singular term denotes something). The
logical paraphrase given by him (in 5) does not feature individuals (the golden
mountain) that do not exist, but predicates which are satisfied or not. Nevertheless,
certain theoretical presumptions play an important role in paraphrases.
The statement (4) is not, according to Meinong, an existential proposition with a
singular subject — as seems to be the result of the paraphrase given by Russell in
(5) —, but rather an analytical judgment, in which the subject is a general term,62
and which can be represented in the following way:
(6) ∀x((Mx ∧ Gx) → Gx),
which is equivalent to:
(7) ¬∃x((Mx ∧ Gx) ∧ ¬Gx).
The meaning of (4) could be translated, without betraying the Meinongian posi-
tion, by stating that ‘for every x, if x is a mountain and it is golden, then x is golden’
(6); that is, ‘there does not exist an x which is a mountain and golden, and which is
61
Cf. Russell (1905b/1973: 115–116). On the notion of existence here presupposed see Russell
(1905a/1973: 98–99).
62
Cf. Meinong (1900: GA i, 470; 1906: GA v, 389).
not golden’ (7). This is none other than an analytical judgment in a Kantian sense,
whose negation is a contradiction.63 The utterance in (4) does not assert the exis-
tence of a golden mountain which is a non-existent object — which, as Russell has
noted, turns out to be contradictory —, as the expression ‘the golden mountain,’
from Meinong’s point of view, is not a singular term which claims to denote an
individual, but rather, as has been said, a general term which refers to an incomplete
object, that is not determined in all of its aspects (see Sect. 3.3, p. 49).64 Clearly,
Russell agrees that (6) is true, but warns that it cannot be expressed without presup-
posing the existence of non-entities in terms of singular predications.
What has been said is also relevant to an expression such as ‘the round square’
and a proposition such as
(8) ‘the round square is round,’
which, as opposed to what Russell has maintained, does not claim the existence of
an entity which possesses certain properties. Russell writes:
(9) ‘the round square is round’ means ‘there is one and only one entity x which is
round and square, and that entity is round.’65
According to Meinong, on the other hand, (8) is a true analytical proposition with-
out any existential commitment.
In interpreting (4) and (8), Russell considers the golden mountain and the round
square as individuals denoted by singular terms; these are not so however for
Meinong, according to whom individuals are complete objects which exist or sub-
sist.66 As far as Meinong is concerned, the paraphrase given by Russell in (5) is not
applicable to (4), nor that given in (9) to (8). Clearly, one can disagree with the
opinion that the golden mountain or the round square are incomplete objects and
therefore are not individuals, and thence regard the Russellian paraphrase as valid,
but such a choice concerns the wider theoretical context of reference, and hence the
consistency among propositions of the assumed theoretical system.
Łukasiewicz was familiar with this controversy and, with Meinong, maintained
that the principle of contradiction was not a universal law, since, not being valid for
impossible objects, it is not valid for all objects.67 For Łukasiewicz as well, it is true
to say that certain objects are and are not a certain thing, and, for this reason, he has
no difficulty in dealing with propositions of the form ‘C is B and is not B’ and to
consider them to be actually true, if they revolve around contradictory objects.
63
Cf. Kant (17811–17872: A 151 = B 190–191 [1998: 280]). Cf. also Raspa (2015: 137).
64
Ernst Mally (GA i, 494, Zusatz 17) also observed that an object which possesses the only deter-
minations to be a mountain and to be golden, and for the rest it is ontologically incomplete in every
other respect, cannot exist or be real.
65
Russell (1905b/1973: 117).
66
Cf. Meinong (1915: GA vi, 180).
67
Cf. Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 110 and fn.; 1910b: 35 and fn. 1 [1971: 506 and fn. 14]).
Łukasiewicz was later to change his opinion on the syllogism and its indepen-
dence from the principle of contradiction, by resolutely denying both the idea that
something like ‘the principle of the syllogism’ exists,68 and that inferences can be
made by totally dispensing with the principle of contradiction. Instead he main-
tained that the axioms of syllogistic are four in number (AaA — ‘A belongs to every
A’ —, AiA — ‘A belongs to some A’ —, Barbara and Datisi)69 and that the ‘meta
logical’ principle of contradiction, or “the principle of consistency,” must be assumed
absolutely, if one wants to have a logic.70 However, these results will emerge from
his later research. In 1910, in the meantime, in order to both add a further argument
against the absolute indispensability of the principle of contradiction and to buttress
the thesis of the independence from it of some types of argumentation, Łukasiewicz
theorizes a logic, that he calls “non-Aristotelian,” in which the principle of
contradiction is insignificant. He does not build a system, but simply limits himself
to providing an example to indicate what a non-Aristotelian logic might look like.
Since the principle of contradiction contains a negation, in order to obtain a logic
in which such a principle is not valid, it is sufficient to eliminate that negation and
work only with affirmative propositions. To illustrate this idea, Łukasiewicz makes
use of a fiction by hypothesizing other living beings who live in a world like ours
yet possess a similar, though not identical, mental organization to our own, in so far
as for them all the negations are true, and therefore indifferent. By this, he shows
that, using only affirmations, these beings are capable of making elementary induc-
tions and deductions independently of the principle of contradiction.71 A logic con-
sisting only of positive propositions is very close to Vasil’ev’s conception of
metalogic (see Sect. 5.8). Of course, giving an example does not yet mean that one
has built a system of logic, but it will be the pursuit of the idea of constructing a
non-Aristotelian logic, even if this takes a different course from the one expounded
here by directing one’s research to the principle of excluded middle72 and the prin-
ciple of bivalence,73 which will lead Łukasiewicz to work out a many-valued logic.
The idea of a logic in which the principle of contradiction is not valid would be
taken up by a student of Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Jaśkowski, who, taking clues from
O zasadzie sprzeczności u Arystotelesa, would go on to build the first propositional
calculus for contradictory but non-trivial deductive systems in 1948.74 But now we
would do well to turn our gaze back to Vasil’ev.
68
Cf. Łukasiewicz (19572: 12, 46–47, 73–74).
69
Cf. Łukasiewicz (19572: 46, 88).
70
Cf. Łukasiewicz (19582 [1963: 67–68]; 1937 [1970: 243, 248]). Cf. also Sobociński (1956: 11
ff.) and Jordan (1963: 13). In 1910, Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 8, 9) used the term ‘metalogical,’
but not in the sense that it later acquired and still retains in mathematical logic today.
71
Cf. Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 95–101); a glance at the same argument can be detected also in
Łukasiewicz (1910b: 33). For further details cf. Raspa (1999a: 76 ff.; 1999b: 262 ff.).
72
Cf. Łukasiewicz (1910c [1987]; 1913: 32–33).
73
Cf. Łukasiewicz (1920 [1970: 87–81]; 1930/1988: 107–109 [1970: 164–166]; 1961: 125 [1970:
126]).
74
Cf. Jaśkowski (1948 [1969]). In his brief historical survey of the problem followed by the exposi-
tion of the known solutions, Jaśkowski (1948: 57 ff. [1969: 143 ff.]) ignores Vasil’ev’s point of
view. Independently of Jaśkowski, Newton C. A. da Costa (1963; 1964a; 1964b; 1964c; 1974)
also began to study inconsistent and non-trivial systems. Cf. also D’Ottaviano (1990b: 20 ff.).
In all probability, it is unlikely that Vasil’ev was familiar with Łukasiewicz’s

essay on the principle of contradiction in Aristotle. What we do know is that he
knew Maier75 and that he makes mention of Meinong in one of his essays.76 In 1908,
Vasil’ev participated in the Third International Congress of Philosophy at Heidelberg
(see Sect. 1.5), where he had an opportunity to hear one of Meinong’s students,
namely Ernst Mally, who gave two addresses there, one of which was entitled
“Gegenstandstheorie und Mathematik [Object Theory and Mathematics].”77 It is
probable that, if he had not known of Meinong earlier, he did hear him discussed on
this occasion in Heidelberg. One may recall, moreover, his encounter with Itelson
who proposed a theory of objects with similar features to Meinong’s.
In his lecture at the ii International Congress of Philosophy held at Geneva from
the 4th to the 8th of September 1904, Itelson cast his glance back over the history of
logic from Aristotle down through the Renaissance to modern times, and raised
questions about the traditional definition of logic as a science of the laws of thought.
Itelson maintained, against the psychologistic point of view, that logic ought to be
defined independently of thought and must concern itself with objects — not spe-
cific objects, since that would make logic a material science —, but rather with
“objects in general.” In response to the objection that this would only confuse logic
with ontology, Itelson replied (and agreement with Meinong here is surprising) —
that “this [i.e. ontology] is the science of beings, of existing objects, whereas Logic
is the science of all objects, real or not real, possible or impossible, abstraction
drawn from their existence (De rebus omnibus et de quibusdam aliis).”78 In such a
manner, logic is freed from every kind of metaphysical difficulty, and need no longer
concern itself with extra-logical questions like judgments of existence, but rather
simply with the formal relations of objects.
As we have seen, Vasil’ev shares with Meinong the concepts of incomplete
objects, contradictory objects and objects of higher order (although he himself does
not use this term). He maintains that it is possible, on an empirical basis, to go
beyond experience and to construct imaginary, even contradictory, objects, which
are not given in our world. By uniting the predicates ‘horse’ and ‘man,’ the human
imagination created the centaur and, with an analogous procedure, a mythology, a
75
Cf. Vasil’ev (1910: 8 = 1989: 17).
76
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 80 = 1989: 122 [1993: 350]).
77
Cf. Mally (1909).
78
Itelson’s point of view is referred to in Couturat (1904: 1038–1039): “celle-ci est la science des
êtres, des objets existants, tandis que la Logique est la science de tous les objets réels ou non, pos-
sibles ou impossibles, abstraction faite de leur existence (De rebus omnibus et de quibusdam aliis).
Ainsi la Logique est délivrée de toutes les difficultés d’ordre métaphysique; elle n’a pas à s’occuper
des jugements d’existence, ils sont extra-logiques (Cogito; argument ontologique). Et pourtant la
Logique a une valeur objective universelle, puisqu’elle s’applique, en particulier, aux objets réels;
ainsi s’explique que la nature obéisse aux lois de la Logique. La Logique ne s’occupe même pas
du vrai et du faux, car le vrai et le faux sont des qualités de la pensée, et non des objets: la Logique
porte sur les relations formelles des objets, non sur la relation de la pensée à ses objets.”
sociology, and a history — as did Charles Renouvier79 — that were imaginary.80 If

the conception of imaginary objects as objects of higher order has its origins in
Meinong, Husik’s article offers a cross-reference that is chronologically closer to
Vasil’ev in regard to the idea of imaginary worlds. Husik’s name does not come up
in Vasil’ev’s printed work, but it is not unlikely that a copy of the review Mind, in
which the article by Husik we have already touched on, passed through his hands.
As we shall see, Vasil’ev shares a number of Husik’s theses.
79
Cf. Renouvier (1876).
80
Cf. Vasil’ev (1911/1989: 127; 1912: 222 = 1989: 68 [2003: 140]; 1912–1913a: 61 = 1989: 102
[1993: 335]).
Chapter 5
Imaginary Logic
Abstract This chapter discusses in depth Vasil’ev’s imaginary logic. Vasil’ev criti-
cizes the uniqueness of logic and the absoluteness of logical principles, taking into
consideration the conceptions of Gerardus Heymans, Carl Göring, Benno Erdmann,
Edmund Husserl and John S. Mill. The key point of his criticism is the assumption
of another world, different from ours, and of beings with a different intellectual
structure from our own. He then proposes a novel concept of negation, which is not
based on the incompatibility between predicates and is not a deduction as it is in our
world. In an imaginary world, in which negations are immediate and perceptible,
the law of contradiction does not hold. In this imaginary world another logic is
valid, imaginary logic, which accepts a third form of judgment near affirmation and
negation, namely the indifferent judgment, which asserts that both P and non-P
apply to the same object simultaneously. In this new logic, the law of excluded
middle does not hold, but the law of excluded fourth does. After an exposition of the
different kinds of judgments (individual, universal, and particular), Vasil’ev shows
how it is possible to conduct inferences containing indifferent judgments. The chap-
ter closes with three arguments: the analogy between imaginary logic and non-
Euclidean geometry, some alternative interpretations of imaginary logic (e.g., a
logic that, distinguishing between absolute and relative negation, accepts degrees of
falsehood), and the notion of metalogic, that is, a minimal logic which is shared by
both Aristotelian logic and imaginary logic.
5.1 ountering the Uniqueness of Logic

C
and the Absoluteness of Logical Principles
The first task Vasil’ev sets himself in “Imaginary (non-Aristotelian) Logic” (1912)
is to refute the idea of the unity of logic, something that today we would consider
superfluous now that we accept a plurality of logics. Yet, Vasil’ev’s point of view is
far from banal: it still finds a place among those who maintain that there is a plural-
ity of logics according to which every logical system is valid for a given domain of
objects. The operation he conducts is flanked by the corresponding critique of the
immutability and absolute character of logical principles in his “Logic and
Metalogic” (1912–1913). The two operations imply and complement each other.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66086-8_5
76 5 Imaginary Logic
The idea that there is no such thing as a unique logic is already implicit in the
distinction Vasil’ev drew, in 1910, between a logic of concepts and a logic of facts.
Compared to preceding investigations imaginary logic constitutes both a general-
ization and a broadening of horizons. His point of departure is the hypothesis of
another world, where, precisely, a different logic is valid.
However unusual the idea of a different logic may be, there is nothing implausible in it.
That which is obvious for us, [i.e.] in our world with our structure of mind and our faculty
of perception, may be not only not evident, but also completely wrong in a different world,
for beings with a different kind of mental structure.1
In “Logic and Metalogic” Vasil’ev speaks of “a world of realized contradiction” and

indeed, given the infinite nature of the universe, of more worlds “where contradic-
tory things would really exist.”2
The distinction between imaginary logic and Aristotelian logic is given by the
different corresponding dominions. For Aristotle, the principle of contradiction is
“the most certain of all principles,”3 valid in both the logical and ontological spheres,
and contradictory objects are μὴ ὄντα. Instead, in the world hypothesized by
Vasil’ev precisely these contradictory objects which Aristotle excluded exist. In this
sense, Vasil’ev’s logic is non-Aristotelian, and it is imaginary in so far as, in distinc-
tion from Aristotelian logic, it is shorn of any relation with reality, that is, “it is a
purely ideal construction” which applies, according to its formulator’s words, “only
in a world different from our own,”4 that is, in an imaginary world.
Vasil’ev provides three arguments against the unity of logic, and, consequently,
against the presumed immutability and absolute character of logical principles. The
first is simply counterfactual: if the hypothesis of another world where beings live
who have a psychical organization different from our own is not absurd, then by the
same token we cannot dismiss as absurd the idea of a logic different from ours.
Vasil’ev wonders why on earth should the Divinity think according to the laws of
the syllogism and Mill’s rules of induction.5
The second argument adopted by Vasil’ev is that the possibility of conceiving
reasonings and logical operations that differ from our own is not excluded by any
of the contemporary conceptions about the nature of logic and the fundamental
logical laws of identity, contradiction, excluded middle and sufficient reason.
Following Gerardus Heymans’s Die Gesetze und Elemente des wissenschaftlichen
Denkens [The Laws and Elements of Scientific Thought] (1890–1894, 19052),
Vasil’ev isolates three main viewpoints: logical laws are either (i) real laws of
thought, or (ii) norms of correct thinking, or (iii) ideal truths.6 To these he adds a
1
Vasil’ev (1912: 208 = 1989: 55 [2003: 128]).
2
Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 57, 58 = 1989: 99 [1993: 332, 333]).
3
Aristotle, Metaph. γ 4, 1005b11–12, 17–18.
4
Vasil’ev (1912: 208 = 1989: 54 [2003: 127]).
5
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912: 208–209 = 1989: 55 [2003: 128]).
6
Cf. Heymans (19052: 64): “[…] man glaubte, die logischen Gesetze entweder als Idealgesetze,
welche unabhängig von allem faktischen Denken für sich gelten, oder als Normalgesetze, welche
nur aussagen wie das faktische Denken verlaufen soll, auf keinen Fall aber als Realgesetze, welche
5.1 Countering the Uniqueness of Logic and the Absoluteness of Logical Principles 77
fourth conception, which interprets logical laws as (iv) generalizations from

experience.
(i) The first point of view, which was upheld by Heymans himself, is psy-
chologistic. According to this, psychical processes and the laws of the syllogism
are ultimately analyzed as “two fundamental psychical laws, which cannot be
further reduced and do not allow for exceptions”: the principles of contradiction
and of excluded middle.7 These are recognized as norms of thought to the degree
that they are natural laws of thought, whose point of departure is, precisely, that
one cannot consider a contradiction to be true.8 Vasil’ev however objects that if
both beings with a different intellectual structure (as we have seen with
Łukasiewicz) and worlds with different natural laws of thought can be hypothe-
sized, then we must consider that other logical laws are also possible, and we
cannot defend the idea of the uniqueness of logic. Like Heymans, Vasil’ev also
discusses Edmund Husserl’s and Carl Göring’s theses as representative of the
other two points of view.
(ii) If logical laws are understood as norms of correct thinking, i.e. not as natural
laws, but rather as positive ones, on the level with moral and legal laws, by adhering
to which thought might avoid making errors, then, given that in different ages and
different countries men have allowed for different varieties of law, we can certainly
imagine beings who allow for different norms of correct thought. As representative
of this second thesis, Vasil’ev mentions Göring, who, in his System der kritischen
Philosophie [A System of Critical Philosophy] (1874–1875), had maintained that
the point of the logical laws of identity, contradiction and the excluded middle was
above all to exclude error, and thus contribute to our knowledge.9 In this sense, they
are norms (Normalgesetze) that find an application only in the context of thought
intended as an operation with representations (Denken als eine Operation mit
den Verlauf des faktischen Denkens beschreiben, ansehen zu müssen. Zur Begründung dieser
Ansichten pflegt man sich teils auf den allgemeinen Charakter, teils auf den besonderen Inhalt der
logischen im Vergleiche mit den psychologischen Gesetzen zu berufen.”
7
Cf. Heymans (19052: 62): “[Die psychischen Prozesse lassen] sich sämtlich auf zwei fundamen-
tale, nicht weiter reduzierbare und keine Ausnahme erleidende psychologische Gesetze zurückfüh-
ren [...]. Diese Gesetze sind: erstens das Gesetz des Widerspruchs (principium contradictionis),
[…] zweitens das Gesetz des ausgeschlossenen Dritten (principium exclusi tertii).” “Die Gesetze
des Widerspruchs und des ausgeschlossenen Dritten haben wir als die Grundgesetze des Denkens
kennen gelernt, in genau demselben Sinne, in welchem etwa die Gesetze der Trägheit und des
Kräfteparallelogramms die Grundgesetze der Mechanik sind. Die tatsächlich gegebene Orga
nisation des menschlichen Denkens findet in denselben ihren allgemeinsten und erschöpfenden
Ausdruck: wir können eben das menschliche Denken definieren als ein Denken nach den Gesetzen
des Widerspruchs und des ausgeschlossenen Drittens; so wie wir die mechanische Bewegung
definieren können als eine Bewegung nach den Gesetzen der Trägheit und des Kräfteparallelogramms”
(ibid., p. 64).
8
Cf. Heymans (19052: 6–7, 70). On the argument see also Picardi (1994: 37–39).
9
Cf. Göring (1874–1875: i, 309–310): “die Logik [hat] Gesetze aufgestellt, welche indirekt die
Erkenntniss fördern, indem sie den Irrthum ausschliessen: den Satz der Identität, des Widerspruchs
und des ausgeschlossenen Dritten.” See also ibid., p. 314.
Vorstellungen).10 Göring does not mention analogies between logical laws and
moral or juridical laws, which suggests that Vasil’ev’s reference is indirect, that is,
taken from Heymans.
(iii) Even were we to accept the point of view Husserl defended,11 according to
which logical laws are ideal truths, independent of psychical processes, i.e., similar
to the axioms of mathematics, then the uniqueness of logic is indefensible.
Mathematics itself, Vasil’ev continues, provides us with an example of generaliza-
tions of its operations that allow it to do what is impossible in other fields. For
example, moving from real to imaginary numbers, mathematicians extract the
square root even of negative numbers, and, moreover, non-Euclidean geometries are
also examples of constructing imaginary disciplines.
Exactly in the same way as mathematical operations can be generalized, logical operations
can be generalized too, and in both cases this generalization may lead to the creation of
imaginary objects.12
(iv) Lastly, even if we cleave to J. S. Mill’s conception in which the laws of logic
are generalizations from experience, then — as Husik had already done (see Sect.
4.2) — it is possible to imagine a world in which generalizations from experience,
and therefore the logic derived from them, differ from our own.13
Let us now look at Vasil’ev’s third argument. If all logic were reducible to a
single statement or to a definition of logic, that is, if its whole content were to arise
from that unique statement, then another logic would not be feasible, since the laws
one might deduce from it could only differ by altering its fundamental principle. If,
on the other hand, not all of the content of logic derived from a unique logical state-
ment, but from more than one axiom, each independent of the other, then it should
be possible to preserve some of them and eliminate those that turn out to be a syn-
thetic addition to the first. By virtue of such reciprocal independence, the corollaries
of the preserved axioms would continue to be valid, and one could develop on this
basis another kind of logic. Vasil’ev holds that something analogous to this occurred
with non-Euclidean geometry with regard to Euclid’s fifth postulate. A geometry of
this kind was feasible because the postulate of parallels is not reducible to other
axioms, but is independent of them. The same happens in imaginary logic where the
principle of contradiction is the correlative of the parallel postulate.
10
Cf. Göring (1874–1875: i, 311). About the logical laws, Göring writes: “Man wird jedoch durch
Beobachtung des natürlichen Denkens sich bald überzeugen, dass es den Satz der Identität weder
kennt noch befolgt, vielmehr sich in Widersprüchen herumtummelt, ohne dadurch zu Zweifeln an
der Wahrheit seiner Gedanken veranlasst zu werden. [...] Wir werden demnach den Satz der
Identität für ein Normalgesetz der Logik halten müssen” (ibid., p. 310). This holds also for the laws
of contradiction and of excluded middle, since “die Befolgung des Satzes der Identität macht
natürlich den Satz des Widerspruchs überflüssig, denn beide haben denselben Inhalt, der einmal
positiv, das andere Mal negativ ausgedrückt wird,” and “verwandt mit dem Satze des Widerspruchs
ist der des ausgeschlossenen Dritten” (ibid., p. 311).
11
Cf. Husserl (1900–1901: i, 62 ff., 149 [2001: i, 47 ff., 97]).
12
Vasil’ev (1912: 210 = 1989: 57 [2003: 130]).
13
Stelzner (2001: 259 fn. 52, 260) notes that Vasil’ev failed to consider other equally important
conceptions of the logical laws, such as the formalist and the transcendental conceptions, just as he
leaves out normative but non-conventionalist views, which can be traced back, for example, to both
Sigwart and Frege.
5.1 Countering the Uniqueness of Logic and the Absoluteness of Logical Principles 79
The arguments we have examined are therefore of three kinds: theological, onto-
logical and logical. In the first case, Vasil’ev maintains that the logic of the Divinity
is not necessarily that of man (a typically biblical concept). In the second, he
hypothesizes an imaginary world, different from our real world, in which, as we
shall see, negations are objects of sensations precisely as are positive facts, contra-
dictory objects are granted and, consequently, other systems and operations that
differ from those of traditional logic are valid. In the third instance, Vasil’ev pro-
poses a concept of logic as a “synthesis of several independent axioms,” and thus
“the rejection of some axioms and the construction of a logic without them is quite
conceivable.”14 By this, one is to understand that propositional and inferential struc-
tures are substantively independent of the principle of contradiction. These argu-
ments aim to achieve an essential goal, that of questioning the presumed uniqueness
of logic and, with it, the immutability and absolute character of logical principles.
This does not mean, however, that everything is destabilized. In a new logical sys-
tem some laws are preserved, others lapse or are modified, and yet others are added.
Vasil’ev deduces from this that “Some logical truths are absolute, others” (in the
spirit of his 1910 essay, Vasil’ev means here ‘the remainders’) “are not.”15 Shortly,
we shall have occasion to observe that his operation consists in separating the spe-
cifically logical character from the empirical element of the laws of logic: what is
purely logical is immutable and absolute, while what is empirical is relative, and
may be eliminated and substituted.
In this way, in the controversy involving Benno Erdmann and Edmund Husserl
on the nature of logical laws,16 Vasil’ev adopts an intermediate position. From the
discussion undertaken earlier, he had concluded that such a question is not relevant
for constructing a non-Aristotelian logic. For this reason, in his “Imaginary (non-
Aristotelian) logic,” where the focus is on properly logical-formal aspects of imagi-
nary logic, he hints at the controversy merely in a note.17 In “Logic and Metalogic,”
on the other hand, a text which revolves predominantly around the logical-
philosophical aspects of imaginary logic, Vasil’ev takes an explicit position on the
nature of logical laws.
Erdmann states that logical laws are relative, in so far as their necessity is valid
only for our thought and is based, like every form of necessity, on the impossibility
of thinking that judgments can contradict them. Given that this impossibility
depends on the conditions of our thought, the very necessity of logical laws is
hypothetical. In order for these to have an absolute validity, we would have to be
certain that the conditions of our thought are those of every possible thought.
However, we are debarred from entertaining any such certainty, because we only
know our own thinking and are not in a position to imagine another mode of thought
that differs from it. Moreover, we cannot even be certain that our thought, which
14
Vasil’ev (1912: 211 = 1989: 58 [2003: 130, 131]).
15
Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 57 = 1989: 98 [1993: 332]).
16
Cf. Erdmann (1892: 375: ff.; 19072: i, 527 ff.), Husserl (1900–1901: i, 136 ff. [2001: i, 90 ff.]).
17
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912: 212, fn. 1 = 1989: 58, fn. 2 [2003: 131, fn. 2]).
developed from less complex forms of imagination, will always remain connected
to the conditions and norms we are familiar with.
For Husserl, Erdmann is guilty of psychologism: the logical laws are not of a
psychological kind, but, he argues, are ideal truths independent of the structures of
real thought, and those who dispense with them in making judgments will be caught
up in error, whatever the psychical mode of thought they may adopt.
Vasil’ev maintains that Husserl and Erdmann are speaking of different things, the
former of the immutability of ideal truths, the other of the mutability of thought, and
he acts as a spokesman for an intermediate position.
[B]oth are wrong, for they both fail to define the limits of their assertions. Erdmann does
not define the limits on the possible change of thinking, nor does Husserl define the limits
of logic’s unchangeability, whereas this should and could be done. Thinking can change,
but not everything in it is changeable; there are absolute logical truths, but not all logical
truths are absolute.18
Vasil’ev notes that if Erdmann calls ‘thinking’ both our own and any possible
thinking, then he would be implicitly recognizing that the two have something in
common, something immutable. Were this not the case, he would not have referred
to them as ‘thinking.’ With regard to Husserl, Vasil’ev allows that there are eternal,
unchangeable logical truths — such as the analytic truths and the definitions —, but
he takes issue with the idea that all logical laws are immutable. What would, to the
contrary, testify in favour of a different logic, in which some laws are not valid, are,
precisely, the multiplicity of fundamental logical laws and the fact that logic is not
reducible to a unique principle. That this is what happened in geometry should con-
vince us of the fact that something analogous is also feasible in logic. By making a
distinction between formal and empirical laws, as well as illuminating the issues
that regard the fundamental principles of logic, that is, by defining precisely the
axioms, demonstrating their independence and classifying them in an exhaustive
fashion, Vasil’ev isolates one of the main applications of imaginary logic.19
In his “Logic and Metalogic,” Vasil’ev develops at length (D) the theme of imagi-
nary worlds and relative objects. In his “Imaginary (non-Aristotelian) Logic,” on the
other hand, he focuses predominantly on the formal-logical aspects regarding the
structure of the proposition and the modes of realizing inferences with propositions
that contain as their subject (C) contradictory objects. This sits nicely with the other
two conditions we have noted earlier for the elaboration of the (L) imaginary logic:
(A) the substantive independence of the inferential structures from the principle of
contradiction and (B) the individuation of a third propositional form next to affirma-
tion and negation, which Vasil’ev arrives at via the interpretation of particular prop-
ositions in terms of modality.
Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 54–55 = 1989: 96 [1993: 330]).

18
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912: 245 = 1989: 92 [2003: 161–162]; 1912–1913a: 77 = 1989: 119 [1993: 349]).
19
For a very critical assessment of the thesis claimed here by Vasil’ev see Mikirtumov (2013).
5.2 A Novel Concept of Negation 81
5.2 A Novel Concept of Negation
In order to achieve his program, Vasil’ev dedicates himself to a close analysis of

negation, which starts with the following meaning of the law of contradiction:
(1) The law of contradiction expresses the incompatibility between an affirmation and [its]
negation. (2) A cannot be non-A.20 (3) No object contains a contradiction, [i.e.] allows us to
at once make an affirmative and a negative judgment.21
This passage remains unclear because (1) is not explained in terms of what follows.
Above all, what A and non-A stand for is not stated: if in (2) Vasil’ev means judg-
ments of the type ‘S is P’ and ‘S is not P,’ and ‘not’ therefore expresses a proposi-
tional negation, then the distinction between this law and the law that will be
enunciated shortly concerning the absolute difference between truth and falsehood,
would vanish. Unless one supposes that Vasil’ev is muddled precisely over what
constitutes the pivot on which his reflection hangs, only two other readings of the
passage are left, the first being that A and non-A stand for facts, or objects, on the
basis of which the two corresponding judgments, ‘S is P’ and ‘S is not P,’ are for-
mulated. Alternatively, according to a hint he supplies a little further down the text,22
we are to understand them as predicates, and properly as incompatible predicates.
In this sense, ‘non’ would express a predicative negation. The second interpretation
would appear to be closer to Vasil’ev’s thinking, in that, as we shall see, he does
deduce the possibility of facts or objects expressed via contradictory judgments
from the existence of incompatible predicates.
In (3) the emphasis is laid on the term ‘object’ which, taking it stricto sensu, is
to be understood as an ‘object (of our world).’ The entire period should be read as
an implication: “since no object (of our world) contains a contradiction, then we
cannot at once make an affirmative and a negative judgment.” Objectuality forms
the basis for the logical-linguistic expression. This also agrees, moreover, with the
Aristotelian conception of the relationship between discourse and reality.23 Saying
that the law of contradiction expresses the incompatibility of affirmation and nega-
tion therefore means:
(3′) For every object (of our world) it holds that it cannot simultaneously possess
the property P and the property non-P.
In this formulation, which substantially corresponds to the formulation of the prin-
ciple of contradiction in An. post. i 11 (see Sect. 4.1), contradictory objects are not
20
Here as later, Vasil’ev employs two different ways for marking the ‘not’: the first is written in
Cyrillic characters, the second, in italics, is written with Latin letters.
21
Vasil’ev (1912: 212 = 1989: 59 [2003: 132]). I am responsible for the interpolation of Roman
numbers into the text. On the nature of negation in Vasil’ev see Bueno (2017: § 6).
22
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912: 221 = 1989: 67 [2003: 139]): “‘A is not non-A’ is true only because in our
world there are predicates that are incompatible with A, and we call these predicates non-A.” Cf.
also Vasil’ev (1911/1989: 128; 1912–1913a: 62–63, 68 = 1989: 104, 110 [1993: 336, 341]).
23
Cf. Aristotle, Cat. 12, 14b11–22; Int. 9, 18b37–38; Metaph. Θ 10, 1051b6–9.
given in our world, and from this arises the necessity to postulate an imaginary
world for a logic devoid of the law of contradiction.
As to negation, Vasil’ev defines it in a manner that mirrors (1):
(4) “negation is that which is incompatible with affirmation.”24
Vasil’ev aims in fact to show that the law of contradiction is already included in
such a definition and therefore his strategy consists in working out a different con-
cept of negation, one in which elements of both a logical and ontological order are
fused.
In this case too, Vasil’ev develops his idea by taking Sigwart’s Logik as his point
of departure. Sigwart — as is evidenced in the essay “On Particular Judgments, the
Triangle of Oppositions, and the Law of Excluded Fourth” — had taken negation to
be “a judgment concerning a positive judgment that has been essayed or passed [ein
Urteil über ein versuchtes oder vollzogenes positives Urteil],”25 that is, as an act
which the subject makes against an affirmation, or at least against the idea of an
affirmation, where one asserts its falsity. It follows that the negative judgment is
incompatible with the affirmative judgment, but does not have the same value: to the
contrary, it is subordinate to it, in so far as it is understood only in relation to the
affirmation, without which it could not even exist.26 All this has an ontological foun-
dation, namely that neither sensations nor representations are given of negative
‘things.’ Consequently, Vasil’ev takes affirmation to be a judgment on objects or
facts, one grounded in sensations, perceptions or representations of such objects or
facts, which are as positive as their respective sensations and perceptions.
If, however, only positive facts and objects exist, for which there are correspond-
ing equally positive sensations, perceptions or representations, and if therefore, only
the affirmative judgment is directly grounded on the sensation and perception of
facts and objects, the negation, to which nothing real corresponds, cannot be, from
a logical point of view, anything other than the ‘refusal’ by the subject of something
positive. Thus, negation is invariably deduced, or simply asserts the incompatibility
between predicates (in a sense that will be immediately clarified).
With regard to definition (4), Vasil’ev specifies that negation is given if there is,
in effect, an incompatibility between predicates: it is not given if there is a simple
difference between them, or where a predicate is lacking. In the first case, he
explains that the negation of blue cannot be something like dry, which is not incom-
patible with blue, but rather something that falls under the non-blue, in other words,
red, white, orange and so on. This clearly recalls to mind the conception in Husik,
who restricted the meaning of negation to its region (see Sect. 4.2).
If dry is a negation of blue — Vasil’ev argues —, then any statement ‘dry can be blue’ will
be a breach of the law of contradiction, a coincidence of affirmation and negation.27
24
Vasil’ev (1912: 212 = 1989: 59 [2003: 132]); cf. also Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 69 = 1989: 111
[1993: 341]).
25
Sigwart (19043: i, § 20, p. 159 [1895: i, 122]); cf. also Vasil’ev (1910: 4 = 1989: 13).
26
Cf. Sigwart (19043: i, § 20, pp. 155 ff. [1895: i, 119 ff.]).
27
Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 71 = 1989: 113 [1993: 343]).
5.2 A Novel Concept of Negation 83
As to the second issue, Vasil’ev points out that it is not possible to verify imme-
diately that A lacks the predicate B because our perception is never directed at what
is absent, which can only be ascertained in a mediate manner by comparing our
perception or representation of object A with the predicate B. In any case, “the
simple absence of the predicate B in my perception or representation of the object
A cannot serve as a logical ground for a negative judgment”28: the fact that I may
not perceive the object A or the predicate B as inherent in A does not mean that A
does not exist nor that A does not possess B, but only that I do not perceive it. In
short, “[n]egation is not the absence of a property, but the presence of an excluding
property, which signifies the presence of an excluding positive fact.”29 Further, as
noted earlier, Vasil’ev excludes the possibility that negative functions are given in
consciousness: not to see something signifies to see something else, make a com-
parison, note a difference between what one sees and the predicate that has been
thought. To recapitulate:
the simple difference between the real and the expected images of the object, as every
simple difference, cannot constitute a reason for negation. Only if in the real image of the
object there are properties which exclude the expected image, I can say that the expected
image is, in fact, absent. […] Thus, absence can serve as a reason for a negative judgment
only when it can be reduced to incompatibility. In general, it can, then, be said that the only
logical basis for negation is incompatibility.30
By excluding otherness and absence as possible sources of negation — as they

appear in the literature — Vasil’ev tries to forestall a possible objection, namely,
that incompatibility is not the sole source of negation. On the other hand, it seems
that negation does not assert only an incompatibility between predicates; suffice it
to consider negative judgments on objects and perceptions of our world. Therefore,
in conformity with what has been stated above, Vasil’ev explains that such judg-
ments are not primitive but rather the conclusion of inferences. In point of fact,
since negative perceptions are not granted, a negative judgment can only be a deduc-
tion from positive perceptions: I cannot see non-white, but I do see blue or red, and
I know that blue or red cannot be white. Only if I know that a property N that
excludes the property P belongs to an object S can I deny that P belongs to S. The
negative judgment ‘S is not P’ is, hence, the conclusion of a syllogism, or, to put it
more precisely, it is the conclusion of a syllogism of the first figure (Celarent):
N excludes P, is incompatible with P (statement of incompatibility)

S is N (minor premiss)
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
S is not P (inferred negative judgment).
For Vasil’ev, normally we do not take such a deduction into account since it is so
quick and automatic that it does not even reach our consciousness. However, what
is not necessary psychologically for the fulfilment of our effective psychical pro-
28
Vasil’ev (1912: 213 = 1989: 59 [2003: 132]).
29
Stelzner (2000: 136; 2001: 268).
30
Vasil’ev (1912: 213–214 = 1989: 60 [2003: 133]).
cesses is so in logic. Negative judgments in traditional formal logic are therefore of

two kinds: (i) that of the major premiss (‘N excludes P’), that is, the statement of
incompatibility between predicates, and (ii) that of the conclusion of a syllogism (‘S
is not P’), that is, the inferred negative judgment.31
If we now take into consideration definitions (1) and (4), it is evident that the first
is contained in the second, or that the law of contradiction is a consequence of nega-
tion and of its fundamental property concerning the incompatibility of predicates. It
is clear then, Vasil’ev notes, why the law of contradiction can never be violated in
traditional logic. Since only two judgments of quality are granted by it, the affirma-
tive and the negative, whenever affirmation and negation might coincide, we would
not conclude that the law of contradiction is invalid, but rather that the relation of
incompatibility between the two judgments in question does not subsist. The essen-
tial condition for the law of contradiction is thus the presupposition (of an empirical
character) that there be incompatible predicates (the negation being taken as the
major premiss). Were this not the case, there would be no negation (as conclusion of
a syllogism) and, therefore, not even the law of contradiction.32 Hence “constructing
a logic without the law of contradiction properly amounts to constructing a logic
without our negation which is reducible to incompatibility.”33 Imaginary logic there-
fore needs a new concept of negation. The criterion to be used is invariably that in
which the empirical (or material) side is separated from the logical (or formal) one.
For Vasil’ev, in traditional logic the negative judgment ‘S is not P’ comprises
within it precisely these two moments. The formal one defines the properties of
negation, that is, “that the truth of a negative judgment implies the recognition of the
falsehood of the affirmative one, but it leaves open the question on what grounds we
can ascertain the truth of negative judgments.” The foundation of negation, on the
other hand, is defined from the material moment, according to which “a negative
judgment is based upon the incompatibility of predicates; it is either (i) a statement
of incompatibility, or (ii) a deduction from this statement.”34 To obtain a novel kind
of negation, we must try to preserve the formal moment and alter the material one.
We can achieve this by supposing that negative judgments are as immediate as affir-
mative ones. This is conceivable if one postulates “a different world,” wherein both
affirmative and negative judgments can be derived immediately from experience
itself, a world in which negative states of affairs are granted. Such judgments would
be negative in so far as they would continue to assert the falsehood of affirmative
judgments but, in distinction to those of traditional logic, they would be based on a
different material moment, on immediate perception, and not on statements of
incompatibility and on inferences from such statements. A negation of this type is
31
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912: 214–215 = 1989: 61 [2003: 133–134]; 1912–1913a: 125–126 = 1989: 112–
113 [1993: 343]). Cf. also Kline (1965: 319–320).
32
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912: 215 = 1989: 61–62, 67 [2003: 134, 139]; 1912–1913a: 69–70 = 1989: 111–
112 [1993: 342–343]).
33
Vasil’ev (1912: 215 = 1989: 62 [2003: 135]).
34
Vasil’ev (1912: 216 = 1989: 62 [2003: 135]). The parenthetical additions are my own.
5.3 Two Laws Regarding Contradiction 85
“a judgment which declares the affirmative one to be false but not, however, on the
grounds of incompatibility.”35 Uncoupling negation from the incompatibility of
predicates entails the elimination of the (ontological) law of contradiction.
5.3 Two Laws Regarding Contradiction
The law of contradiction, which Vasil’ev cancels, states the impossibility of incom-
patible predicates belonging to the same subject, and therefore the impossibility of
there being contradictory objects that might function as a basis for the coexistence
of an affirmative judgment and its negation. Vasil’ev sharply distinguishes this law,
corresponding to (1) and reformulated in terms of (3′), from another one, which he
calls the law of absolute difference between truth and falsehood. According to this
other law,
(5) “one and the same judgment cannot be true and false simultaneously.”
(3′) can be cancelled from imaginary logic, but not (5), “since anyone who would
reject it, and therefore confuse truth and falsehood, would stop reasoning logically
at all.”36 In developing this thesis, Vasil’ev adds some arguments that lack clarity, to
say the least, and which, indeed, are not required for the purposes he set himself in
this essay.
It is the failure to distinguish between these two laws, which have been wrongly
held to be two different formulations of the same law, that would lie at the origin of
discussions concerning the exact formulation of the principle of contradiction. To
the contrary, according to Vasil’ev, those that, following Sigwart, appear to be its
two main formulations express two distinct laws. The law of contradiction would
correspond to the Kantian formulation:
(6) “no predicate pertains to a thing that contradicts it [Keinem Dinge kommt ein
Prädikat zu, welches ihm widerspricht]”37;
while the law of absolute difference between truth and falsehood would correspond
to Sigwart’s formulation:
(7) “The judgments, ‘A is B’ and ‘A is not B’ cannot both be true together.”38
Vasil’ev clarifies that, since for Sigwart negation is an assertion of the falsehood
of an affirmation, (7) “does not allow the simultaneous acceptance of the judgment
‘A is B’ in the affirmative statement ‘A is B,’ and the denial of the judgment ‘A is B’
in the negative statement ‘A is not B’.”39 Moreover, in so far as (7) prevents us from
35
Vasil’ev (1912: 217 = 1989: 63 [2003: 136]).
36
Vasil’ev (1912: 217 = 1989: 64 [2003: 136]).
37
Kant (17811–17872: A 151 = B 190 [1998: 279).
38
Sigwart (19043: i, § 23, p. 188 [1895: i, 139]).
39
Vasil’ev (1912: 218 = 1989: 64 [2003: 136]); cf. also Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 64–65 = 1989: 106–
107 [1993: 339]).
simultaneously accepting and refuting the same judgment, it would not be express-
ing anything other than the law of absolute difference between truth and falsehood.
Vasil’ev, again concurring with Sigwart (and thus speaking in psychologistic terms),
states that the fundamental distinction between these two laws, would lie in the fact
that whilst the law of absolute difference between truth and falsehood concerns the
knowing subject, who is prohibited from contradicting himself (and in that sense
could also be termed the law of non-self-contradiction), the law of contradiction,
instead, concerns objects, denying that they can harbour contradictions, i.e., that
contradictory predicates can pertain to them simultaneously.
The [latter] law banishes contradictions from the world, as the former one banishes them
from the subject. The law of contradiction has an objective value, whereas the law of abso-
lute difference between truth and falsehood [has] a subjective one. Therefore, it is clear,
that one can — without violating the law of absolute difference between truth and falsehood
or the law of non-self-contradiction — violate or reject the law of contradiction. If I affirm
that this NN is at the same time both a human being and not-a-human-being, I do, of course,
violate the law of contradiction, but if I always affirm it and firmly hold it, without contra-
dicting myself, I am not at all violating the law of absolute difference between truth and
falsehood.40
Synthesizing the argument, for Vasil’ev one can violate the ontological law of con-
tradiction (which is also defined as empirical), but one may not violate the subjec-
tive (or formal) law that presides over the coherence of discourse. The latter is
nothing more than the requirement to express contradiction in a coherent manner.
The identification of (3′) with the Kantian formulation (6) and of (5) with the
so-called Sigwartian formulation (7) raises nonetheless some problems of interpre-
tation. Vasil’ev does not give a full account of Kant’s thought, in that he restricts
himself to giving a literal interpretation of (6). In emphasizing ‘Ding,’ Vasil’ev
holds that the Kantian formulation of the principle of contradiction is exclusively
concerned with objects, whereas a comprehensive study of Kant’s thought shows
that he considered this principle to be the negative condition of the truth of all judg-
ments, be they analytic or synthetic. Moreover, in the passage in question Vasil’ev
refers imprecisely to the page in Sigwart’s Logik where the latter in fact distin-
guishes two fundamental formulations of the principle of contradiction:
The principle of contradiction refers to the relation between a positive judgment and its
negation; it expresses the nature and meaning of the negation by saying that the judgments
‘A is B’ and ‘A is not B’ cannot both be true together. This statement differs essentially from
the proposition usually known as the principium contradictionis (A is not not-A), which
refers to the relation between a predicate and its subject, and forbids that the predicate
should be opposed to the subject.41
For Sigwart, the two formulations are essentially different from each other, in the
sense that they hinge on different objects and are directed to different aims. The first
(the relation between an affirmative and a negative judgment, understood as
40
Vasil’ev (1912: 218–219 = 1989: 65–66 [2003: 137–138]).
41
Sigwart (19043: i, § 23, p. 188 [1895: i, 139]).
5.3 Two Laws Regarding Contradiction 87
constituted of a subject and a predicate) corresponds to the Aristotelian one; the

second (the relation between subject and predicate) to Kant’s formulation. From the
first only the impossibility of holding simultaneously as true both an affirmation and
its negation follows, but not, in any way, the truth or the falsity of either. From the
second, on the other hand, which states that a judgment whose predicate contradicts
its subject is absolutely false, it is required that the truth of certain propositions
should be recognized. Kant had formulated the principle of contradiction as a nega-
tive criterion for every truth, in the sense that “it holds of cognitions merely as
cognitions in general, without regard to their content, and says that contradiction
entirely annihilates and cancels them.”42 With regard to analytic judgments, how-
ever, this principle could be used in order to know the truth. Since in an analytic
judgment knowledge of the object is already contained in the concept of the subject,
its truth must be sufficiently recognizable on the basis of its agreement with the
principle of contradiction, understood as the condition of analyticity.43 Sigwart
maintains, however, that the Kantian formulation can be interpreted as a principle of
contradiction in that, when a contradiction is generated, what is at work is the
Aristotelian principle. In fact, in order for a contradiction to obtain, it is necessary
that the judgment, in attributing a predicate B to a subject A, presupposes that
another judgment be implicitly included in A, one that negates the same predicate B
to the subject A. Only in so far as this last judgment is assumed as obvious, or at
least is known by other means, is the contradiction obtained that eliminates the pre-
ceding judgment. Yet that occurs, precisely, on the basis of the Aristotelian princi-
ple, which prohibits the simultaneous truth of two contradictory judgments. The
judgment ‘An unlearned person is learned’ is a contradiction, in that it attributes a
predicate (‘learned’) to a subject (‘an unlearned person’), which already implies a
judgment (‘A person is not learned’) that negates in fact the same predicate
(‘learned’) of the subject (‘a person’). The original judgment thus might be reduced
back to the two judgments ‘X is learned’ and ‘X is not learned.’ It is because these
two are asserted together in a unique judgment, that the latter contains a contradic-
tion and is, therefore, false:
A contradiction, then, can only take place in so far as a judgment is already implied in the
subject.44
But, in that case, (6) is valid because (7) is valid. The result here is not new, since
Kant himself had affirmed the same thesis45 and was aware of both of the meanings
of contradiction we have laid out here. Furthermore, Sigwart understands (7) as the
Aristotelian formulation of the principle of contradiction in Metaph. γ 3, 1005b19–
20. For this reason, it is difficult to identify it, as does Vasil’ev, with (5). The latter
corresponds instead to the formulation which Mill had given of the principle of
42
Kant (17811–17872: A 151 = B 190 [1998: 279–280]). Cf. also Kant (1800: Ak. ix, 51 [1992:
559]).
43
Cf. Sigwart (19043: i, § 23, pp. 192–194 [1895: i, 142–144]).
44
Sigwart (19043: i, § 23, p. 196 [1895: i, 145]).
45
Cf. Raspa (1999b: 70–71).
contradiction,46 one that Vasil’ev already proves to be familiar with in 191047 and
which he uses in 1911 to express what he calls “the first form of the law of
contradiction,”48 corresponding to the law of absolute difference between truth and
falsehood. Why then does Vasil’ev fail to mention Mill? The reason for the omis-
sion probably is that, for Vasil’ev, the English philosopher represented the tradi-
tion, as opposed to Sigwart whom he will later describe as a “revolutionary in
logic.”49 In effect, the Russian logician has written the whole section regarding
negation and the law of contradiction in dialogue with Sigwart, in an attempt to
adapt his thesis to imaginary logic. Vasil’ev has obviously run into an error of per-
spective. He is convinced that the road opened up by Sigwart is the most innovative
in logic, one that leads to a decisive overtaking of tradition. He does not see, and
indeed he limits himself to mentioning just a handful of mathematical logicians,
that logic had already taken a completely different course.
Aside from questions of textual interpretation, there is also another reason, which
lies more at the heart of imaginary logic itself, why the identifications Vasil’ev pro-
posed do not stand up to scrutiny. For Kant non-contradictoriness is a condition for
the analyticity of judgments. Vasil’ev, to the contrary, understands the Kantian for-
mulation in empirical terms, and, following Sigwart, concurs in regarding the first
formulation (which for Sigwart is Aristotelian, and, for Vasil’ev, expressive of the
law of absolute difference between truth and falsehood) as fundamental compared
to the second.50 It is however evident, as will become even more so presently, that
Sigwart’s formulation (7) is less general than (5), in that it concerns only categorical
judgments as they are understood by traditional logic, and not also other forms of
judgment. Furthermore, (7) could be read without difficulty as the logical-linguistic
equivalent of (3′), which expresses the incompatibility of affirmation and nega-
tion.51 In so far as he tries to adapt Sigwart’s concepts to imaginary logic, or, better
still, to employ Sigwart’s concepts to work out imaginary logic, Vasil’ev is drawn
into reading (7) in terms of (5). However, (5) is the most authentic expression of the
law of absolute difference between truth and falsehood, as Vasil’ev himself for that
matter confirms elsewhere:
46
Cf. Mill (18728/1973–1974: ii, vii, § 5, p. 278: “the Principle of Contradiction (that one of the
two contradictories must be false) means that an assertion cannot be both true and false.”
47
Cf. Vasil’ev (1910: 39 = 1989: 46).
48
Cf. Vasil’ev (1911/1989: § 6, pp. 127–128; § 9, p. 129).
49
Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 121 = 1989: 79 [1993: 350]).
50
That Vasil’ev borrows from Sigwart the interpretation of the Kantian formulation like ‘A is not
non-A’ is also confirmed by a passage in “Logic and Metalogic,” where, precisely as Sigwart does
(19043: i, § 23, p. 192 [1895: i, 142]), Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 62 = 1989: 104 [1993: 336]) calls (6)
the “Kantian-Leibnizian” formulation. Cf. also Vasil’ev (1912: 217, fn. 1 = 1989: 64, fn. 4 [2003:
136, fn. 4]). In the 1989 edition of Vasil’ev’s writings an error occurs: instead of ‘Канто-
Лейбницевской’ the editor wrote ‘антилейбницевской,’ which also caused the translators to
make an error in their translation (cf. Vasil’ev 2003: 136, fn. 4).
51
Cavaliere (1991: 60) observes that the formulation of the principle of contradiction borrowed
from Sigwart “is not adequate for effectively characterizing his [Vasil’ev’s] proposal,” in that “this
formula reintroduces exactly the law of non-contradiction of classical logic: not(A and non-A).”
5.4 Indifferent Judgment 89
The law of absolute difference between truth and falsehood applies to the cognizing subject
and forbids him/her to contradict him/herself; [it] indicates that a true judgment is always
true, and a false one always false, and that therefore he/she cannot declare that the same
judgment is now true, now false.52
The identification of (5) with (7) and of (3′) with (6) turns out to be superfluous for
the economy of Vasil’ev’s argument. What counts is that imaginary logic may refute
the law of contradiction (3′) and that it cleaves firmly to the law of absolute differ-
ence between truth and falsehood (5). It is for this reason that he states:
It [imaginary logic] nowhere contradicts itself and is (thus) a system which is devoid of
self-contradictions.53
It emerges from this that Vasil’ev does not consider at all a logic in which the law of
Pseudo-Scotus is not valid54; and if, as we shall see, one adds that the most appropri-
ate of the formulations of indifferent judgment given by Vasil’ev is that wherein the
negation is predicative (‘S is P and non-P’), then the paraconsistent interpretations
of imaginary logic become problematical: one could argue, on the one hand, that
imaginary logic is not paraconsistent in a modern sense, on the other hand, that the
paraconsistent interpretations seek to bend it to a paraconsistent theory. We will see,
however, that exactly the aim to capture some of Vasil’ev’s insights and to develop
them further is a mark of the richness of the theoretical ideas and suggestions imagi-
nary logic offers (see Sect. 6.3).
To take one step back. What has been said so far has to do not only with Kant,
but, once more, with Aristotle, and consists in asserting that we can violate the prin-
ciple of contradiction in the formulation (3) — one should recall the way, in agree-
ment with Husik, Vasil’ev understood negation —, but not (3*) (see Sect. 4.1). In
what way?
5.4 Indifferent Judgment
In imaginary logic, every judgment is owed a unique truth-value, true or false. But
in the imaginary world, as distinct from our own, there also exist negative facts and
objects to which both P and non-P apply simultaneously. Consequently, it is possi-
ble for presuppositions for both an affirmative and a negative judgment to coexist in
a certain object. A judgment can never be simultaneously true and false, but the
same object may have opposed properties. From this, there arises the need for a
52
Vasil’ev (1912: 218 = 1989: 64 [2003: 137]).
53
Vasil’ev (1912: 219 = 1989: 66 [2003: 138]). Cf. also Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 65 = 1989: 107
[1993: 338]): “Imaginary logic never contradicts itself, since it is a system devoid of internal
contradictions.”
54
But an interesting point of view on this subject is proposed by D’Ottaviano & Gomes
(2017: § 3).
third type of judgment side by side to affirmative and negative judgments. Vasil’ev
writes:
Assume that fact a is the basis for the affirmative judgment ‘S is A’ and fact b the basis for
the negative judgment ‘S is not A.’ The relation between the facts a and b is not, as normally,
the relation of incompatibility. Consequently, it is quite possible that the facts a and b co-
exist simultaneously. What will happen in this case? By virtue of the fact a, the affirmative
judgment ‘S is A’ is true; by virtue of the fact b, it is false. On the other hand, by virtue of
the fact a, the negative judgment ‘S is not A’ is false, while by virtue of the fact b, it is true.
Thus, in this case, both judgments — the affirmative and negative one — turn out to be at
the same time true and false. But that is not allowed by the law of absolute difference
between truth and falsehood. Therefore, there should exist in the case of the simultaneous
existence of the facts a and b a third (kind of) judgment, which will be true here. We will
call this third kind of judgment — which reveals the presence of a contradiction in the
object S, [that is,] the coincidence within it [i.e. within this object] of the grounds for both
an affirmative and a negative judgment — a judgment of contradiction, or, better, an indif-
ferent judgment, and we will define it as follows: ‘S is A and is not A simultaneously.’55
The indifferent judgment expresses therefore “a union of contradictory predicates.”56

Hence we have three kinds of judgments of quality:
(a) affirmative (‘S is A’),
(b) negative (‘S is not A’),
(c) indifferent (‘S is A and is not A simultaneously’),
for which the law of excluded fourth is valid (which we already know):
(8) “each of these forms — affirmative, negative, or indifferent — is false, when any
of the two remaining is true.”57
This law, with an evident appeal to what Vasil’ev had already maintained in 1910
(see Sect. 3.3), can also be expressed in other, equivalent forms:
the truth of any form entails the recognition of the falsity of the other two and, vice versa, the
truth of any form can be inferred from the recognition of the falsity of the other two. The recog-
nition of the falsity of any form is equivalent to the indecision between the remaining two.58
In imaginary logic, if the affirmative judgment is false, the corresponding negative

judgment is not necessarily true (as is the case in traditional logic), but the indifferent
judgment can be true. It is then possible to say that ‘S is A and is not A simultane-
ously,’ it being understood that such a proposition is either true or false. At this point,
the reason why (5) has a more general significance than (3′) becomes clear. This is
because in the instance we have just mentioned, (5) continues to be valid, but not (3′).
55
Vasil’ev (1912: 219–220 = 1989: 66 [2003: 138]).
56
Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 63 = 1989: 105 [1993: 337]). Vasil’ev writes ‘S is A and is not A simulta-
neously’; yet since, as I have endeavoured to show above (see Sect. 5.2), negation in imaginary
logic is understood to be predicative, the indifferent judgment is to be read as ‘S is A and non-A
simultaneously.’ Priest & Routley (1989: 33), Cavaliere (1992–1993: 136), Suchoń (1999: 134)
also agree on this.
57
Vasil’ev (1912: 220 = 1989: 67 [2003: 139]).
58
Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 64 = 1989: 106 [1993: 337]).
5.4 Indifferent Judgment 91
Vasil’ev underscores the analogy existing between accidental and indifferent

judgments:
To an indifferent judgment in imaginary logic, there corresponds an accidental judgment
about a concept: ‘S may be P.’ The latter judgment can be considered as a specific synthesis
of an affirmation and a negation. Indeed, an accidental judgment such as ‘S may be P’ or
‘triangles may be equilateral,’ is equivalent to the form: ‘Some S are P, [and] some S are not
P.’ ‘Some triangles are equilateral, [and] some are not.’
Therefore, it can be said that the logic of concepts is analogous to imaginary logic.59
Once more, the reference to his 1910 article is evident. Indeed, it was in the light of
these earlier results that Vasil’ev was able to distinguish between empirical laws and
real laws, and found himself in the position now of being able to introduce a third
type of judgment of quality. All the same, indifferent judgment is analogous, not
identical, to accidental judgment, just as the terrestrial logic of concepts is analo-
gous to imaginary logic, in the sense that for both it is not the law of excluded
middle that holds, but the law of excluded fourth. (We shall return to dwell on these
analogies, which are in one respect problematical, in another harbinger of interest-
ing developments). Next to the law of absolute difference between truth and false-
hood, the law of excluded fourth, and the laws of identity and sufficient reason,
imaginary logic possesses another law, denominated “principle of judgments of
contradiction, or of indifferent judgments,” which asserts that: “Contradiction is
possible: things can be both A and non-A.”60
Here also we find in Vasil’ev a thesis already present in Husik, that is, that a nega-
tion non-A is independent of A, and therefore is to be regarded as a fact in itself, as if
it were a B. But Vasil’ev, in contradistinction to Husik (and also to Łukasiewicz),
who commented on Aristotle taking into account even a judgment of the type ‘S is A
and is not-A,’ or ‘Callias is man and not-man,’ does not regard it as a simple hypoth-
esis to explain the independence of the syllogism from the principle of contradiction,
but rather as an authentic form of judgment. This is fundamental for imaginary logic:
such a logic holds fast to bivalence, and does not introduce, as Peirce had61
59
Vasil’ev (1912: 235 = 1989: 82 [2003: 153]).
60
Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 64–65 = 1989: 106 [1993: 338]); cf. also Vasil’ev (1912: 223, 235,
243 = 1989: 70, 82, 90–91 [2003: 142, 153, 160]).
61
Through a close analysis of the continuous, which leads him to call his own metaphysical con-
cept “synechism” (cf. Peirce [1898]/1992: 261), and of the related phenomenon of vagueness,
Peirce arrives at the hypothesis that there is something intermediate, like “a border line between
affirmation and negation” (1905: CP 5.450), that is neither the one nor the other. He proposes two
perspectives in order to handle such a state of indeterminacy: the first regards the introduction of a
third truth-value, or even more, alongside the true and the false (1976: iii/1, 742–750); the second
consists in measuring the truth-grade of a proposition (1976: iii/1, 751–754). On a metric concep-
tion of truth-values, Peirce speaks already in 1885. Cf. Peirce (1885: CP 3.365; W 5, 166):
“According to ordinary logic, a proposition is either true or false, and no further distinction is
recognized. This is the descriptive conception, as the geometers say; the metric conception would
be that every proposition is more or less false, and that the question is one of amount.” With refer-
ence to this cf. Dipert (1981: 571–572 and fn. 4). I have dealt with these arguments in Raspa
(1999b: 292–322; 2008b: 198–210).
(and Łukasiewicz would62), a third value side by side with the true and the false, but
a new form of judgment side by side with affirmation and negation. It is this third
form of judgment that renders the laws of contradiction and of excluded middle
invalid in imaginary logic.
As has been anticipated above (see Sect. 5.1.), it emerges from our discussion of
the distinction between the law of contradiction and the law of absolute difference
between truth and falsehood that “Some logical truths are absolute, others are not.”
Always on the basis of the criterion of separation of the empirical from the logical,
this affirmation matches the distinction between empirical and real laws valid for
our world, and purely logical ones. The law of contradiction is an empirical law, in
that it derives from the existence, in our world, of incompatible predicates, so that,
if this condition is removed, it is no longer valid. It is also real, “because it applies
not to thoughts, but to reality, not to judgments, but to objects.”63 It states that (3′)
contradictions or contradictory objects (like, for example, square circles) are not
granted in reality. The law of absolute difference between truth and falsehood is a
formal law of thought and, like all formal laws, applies “to thought only and not to
reality, to judgments only and not to objects.”64 Formal laws (like the laws of abso-
lute difference between truth and falsehood, of identity and of sufficient reason) are
presupposed by every kind of logic, whilst empirical laws (like the laws of contra-
diction and of excluded middle) may vary according to the logic and the world to
which they refer. Imaginary logic is one which preserves all formal laws, while
abandoning those that are empirical; it is a logic that denies the law of contradiction
(and the law of excluded middle), but not the law of absolute difference between
truth and falsehood (and the law of excluded fourth). It holds for imaginary objects,
that is, objects of higher order (see Sect. 4.3, p. 67) that can be constructed arbitrarily
from experience, which are not granted in our world however, but rather in an imag-
inary world.
That the law of contradiction has an empirical character is likewise shown by the
fact (and Vasil’ev appeals here to the authority of Vvedensky) that we are capable of
thinking, but not representing contradictions like a square circle. It is not thought,
but only the activity of representation which is subject to the law of contradiction.
Imaginary logic becomes feasible in the moment we leave off trying to harmonize
thought and representation. In that case, in fact, we can “think a contradiction,” that
is, an indifferent judgment, since every thought that we formulate is always
expressed in a judgment,65 and therefore we can think independently of the law of
62
Cf. Łukasiewicz (1920).
63
Vasil’ev (1912: 221 = 1989: 67 [2003: 139]).
64
Vasil’ev (1912: 221 = 1989: 68 [2003: 140]). As a further confirmation of the fact that Vasil’ev is
constantly referring to Sigwart’s Logik, one may consider that, immediately after this, he states that
“the law of identity establishes the logical constancy of concepts” (ibid.). Now, according to
Sigwart (19043: i, § 23, p. 191 [1895: i, 141]), the so-called “constancy of ideas [Constanz der
Vorstellungen],” or “the unambiguity of the act of judgment,” “would form the content of a prin-
ciple of identity” taken as the “positive rendering [positive Kehrseite]” of the principle of
contradiction.
65
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912: 222 = 1989: 69 [2003: 141]): “Every real thought is always manifested in a
judgment. Therefore, to think a contradiction actually means to conceive a special kind of judg-
5.5 Indifferent Syllogisms 93
contradiction but in conformity with the law of absolute difference between truth
and falsehood. Contrary to Sigwart, who identified thought and representation,
Vasil’ev, by separating them, shows that his theory, albeit expressed in terms of
psychologistic logic, harbours in nuce the elements for shaking off psychologism.
Up to this point, Vasil’ev has demonstrated that a logic which can do without the
law of contradiction is conceivable. He is now obliged to show in what way one can
work with a logic of this kind: that means constructing valid syllogisms with indif-
ferent judgments.
5.5 Indifferent Syllogisms
Vasil’ev aimed, not to reinvent the whole of logic, but rather to show that, by intro-
ducing certain modifications (which many consider self-destructive) into the gener-
ally accepted logic — that is, from his point of view, traditional logic — argumentation
is still feasible. The essential condition for inferential reasonings and procedures to
be possible is that, even when one eliminates the laws of contradiction and of
excluded middle, the other logical rules and laws will remain valid. It is necessary
therefore to show (and in this we return to the problems raised by Husik and
Łukasiewicz) that inferential procedures are independent of the principle of contra-
diction. To accomplish this, it is above all necessary for the knowing subject, with
his psychical organization, his manner of perceiving and knowing the facts of expe-
rience, his language, symbolism and capacity to judge and infer, to remain identical.
Here once more we see clearly the psychologistic cast of Vasil’ev’s logic, and we
also see a difference between his point of view and Łukasiewicz’s in proposing a
non-Aristotelian logic. The latter, by refusing all psychologistic interpolations in
logic and claiming that in reality there are no effective contradictions, sets out from
the hypothesis of another mental organization, typical of other human beings for
whom all negations are true and for whom the principle of contradiction is not a part
of reasoning (see Sect. 4.3). Vasil’ev, on the other hand, claiming a subjective con-
sistency, supposes the invariability of the knowing subject. He employs the depen-
dence of logic on the knowing subject in order to motivate a pivotal point in his
argument: if, assuming the invariability of the subject, other laws obtain in other
worlds, this can only mean that the changed (or cancelled) laws are dependent, not
on the subject, but on reality. They are, that is, not logical, but empirical laws.
Consequently, and this is the second condition for constructing imaginary logic, he
supposes another world, which is equal to ours in every respect, with the sole excep-
tion that there, things that simultaneously possess both the property P and the
ment of contradiction, viz. an indifferent one, alongside with the affirmative and negative ones.”
On the conceivability of the contradiction with a special attention to representation see Raspa
(2015). On the relation between conceivability and imagination related to Vasil’ev see Bueno
(2017: § 4).
property non-P are granted. For example, there are things that are white, others that
are not white, others that are both white and non-white simultaneously. “In this third
group of things,” Vasil’ev writes, “contradiction is realized.”66 In this way, the exis-
tence of an objective contradiction is admitted, and the (ontological) law of contra-
diction is rejected. In conclusion, in assuming that the knowing subject and purely
logical laws are absolutely immutable, and, on the other hand, that the objects of the
sensible world and empirical laws are changeable (or can be cancelled) because
they can be thought of and hypothesized differently by the subject, it becomes nec-
essary to express objective contradiction in a coherent manner, i.e. by avoiding sub-
jective contradiction. In this way, Vasil’ev states, we do not infringe the (logical)
laws of thought, but only the (empirical) laws of reality.67
We already know that there are three types of judgments of quality (affirmative,
negative and indifferent) in imaginary logic. Let us now examine those regarding
quantity which, for Vasil’ev, can either be singular or hinge on a class (or on a con-
cept). The latter are divided in turn into universal and accidental. Judgment that is
grounded in sensation or (i) judgment about an individual S can be so according to
each of the three forms mentioned above:
(i.a) ‘S is P,
(i.b) ‘S is not P,’
(i.c) ‘S is and is not P simultaneously.’
(ii) The universal judgment about a concept or about a class S can also be affirma-
tive, negative or indifferent:
(ii.a) ‘All individuals S possess the predicate P,’
(ii.b) ‘All S are not P,’
(ii.c) ‘All individuals S are and are not P simultaneously.’
Where not all S of a given class possess the predicate P, one has (iii) accidental
judgments, that can consist of four kinds:
(iii.a) ‘Some S are P, and all the others are not P,’
(iii.b) ‘Some S are P, and all the others are and are not P simultaneously,’
66
Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 63 = 1989: 104 [1993: 336]). Another point distinguishing the approaches
of Vasil’ev and Łukasiewicz regards the different meanings each assigns to negation, which itself
plays a fundamental part in the way the principle of contradiction is intended. In imaginary logic,
the relationship between incompatible predicates and negative facts is the inverse of what obtains
in traditional logic. In the latter, there are incompatible predicates but not negative facts; in imagi-
nary logic, there are negative facts but not incompatible predicates. In the former, negation has its
foundation in the logical relation of incompatibility; in the latter, in perception, because in the
imaginary world, negations, like positive facts, are the objects of sensation and perception, and
there are negative facts. Łukasiewicz embraces the traditional conception, according to which a
negation is true, in so far as the opposite positive state of affairs does not exist; for Vasil’ev, instead,
a negation is true, in so far as the corresponding negative fact subsists. For both the truth of nega-
tion entails the falsity of affirmation, but for different reasons.
67
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912: 222–223 = 1989: 69–70 [2003: 141]; 1912–1913a: 59–63 = 1989: 101–104
[1993: 334–336]).
(iii.c) ‘Some S are not P, and all the others are and are not P simultaneously,’
(iii.d) ‘Some S are P, some are not P, and all the other S are P and are not P
simultaneously.’
While Vasil’ev picks up themes he had already dealt with in his 1910 article, here it is
evident that his thought has evolved. In the earlier article, Vasil’ev isolates a unique
form of accidental judgment; in the current article, besides adding the indifferent
judgment, as a third form of judgment of quality, so that we have three types of uni-
versal judgment, he provides a fourfold partition of accidental judgment, which ranges
over the whole extension of the class S. These seven types of judgment, of which three
are universal and four accidental, exhaust all possible cases regarding relations
between a class S and a predicate P.68 It is evident from this page that it is inaccurate,
as some have done,69 to identify accidental with indifferent judgments. An indifferent
judgment is one of quality, whilst an accidental judgment concerns the quantity.
Furthermore, we know that between judgments there exist (iv) forms of exclusion
such that the falsehood of one of them implies the truth of either of the other two, an
argument Vasil’ev had already made in 1910 [see in Sect. 3.3 propositions (2), (3)
and (4)]. Even if he is highly concise, we can try to set forth, and provide additional
material for, his conception of relations of exclusion between judgments. As distinct
from traditional logic, in imaginary logic the falsity of the affirmation does not nec-
essarily imply the truth of the corresponding negation, but leaves open the possibil-
ity that either the negative or indifferent judgment may be true. The same holds for
the other two forms of judgment. This is valid, obviously, for judgments on an
individual S or about a class S. The position here is the one adopted in 1910, when,
appealing to Kant, Vasil’ev had asserted that singular judgments can be considered
to be universal. There is no reason for us to maintain that he had changed his opinion
by 1912, and therefore we can limit ourselves to considering only judgments about
a class, as for that matter Vasil’ev himself seems to do in this new context.
Vasil’ev posits indifferent judgment in the place of accidental judgment and
states that between the three types of judgment (affirmative, negative and indiffer-
ent) there subsist forms of exclusion such that, if one is false, one of the other two
is true. Yet, since it is undecided as to which of the two may be true, Vasil’ev terms
these forms of exclusion “preliminary.” They represent the beginning of the cogni-
tive process, that is, the indecision over two possibilities between which a choice
must be made if the process is to have a conclusion. These forms of exclusion
exhibit therefore “some analogy” with the indefinite judgments of traditional logic
of the type ‘Some, and maybe all, S are P.’ Just as the indecision between an affir-
mative judgment and an indifferent judgment derives in imaginary logic from the
falsity of the negative judgment, so too, in traditional logic ‘Some, and maybe all, S
are P’ excludes that ‘All S are not P,’ but leaves undecided whether ‘All S are P’ or
whether ‘Only some S are P.’70 Obviously, however, the situation is more
68
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912: 223–224 = 1989: 70–71 [2003: 142–143]).
69
Cf. Suchoń (1999: 132), Schumann (2006: 29, fn. 9).
70
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912: 224–225 = 1989: 71–72 [2003: 143–144]). In a footnote, Vasil’ev (1912: 225,
fn. 1 = 1989: 72, fn. 8 [2003:144, fn. 8]) refers us back explicitly to the 1910 article.
complicated than the one Vasil’ev illustrates. In imaginary logic, ‘Only some S are
P’ can assume three forms of accidental judgment: (iii.a), (iii.b) or (iii.d), and
unfortunately Vasil’ev gives no indication of how the forms of exclusion function
when it comes to taking also into consideration the quantity of judgments. V. A.
Smirnov will seek to fill the void. For him, every pair of the seven types of judgment
(universal and accidental) cannot be simultaneously true and the disjunction of all
seven judgments is true.71 However, what he effectively does is limited to translating
the judgments of imaginary logic into the language of the logic of predicates. He
does not analyze in detail the forms of exclusion.
Vasil’ev presents his theory of judgment as a modification of the traditional the-
ory and as a richer amplification of the view espoused in his article “On Particular
Judgments, the Triangle of Oppositions, and the Law of Excluded Fourth.” Imaginary
logic preserves, as does the traditional conception, the division of judgments accord-
ing to the quantity in singular judgments and judgments about a class, that can be
either universal or accidental. The latter corresponds to particular judgments.
Moreover, the forms of exclusion are analogous to indefinite judgments. A classifi-
cation of this kind is very similar to the one given by Aristotle in Int. 7:
judgments with an individual subject judgments with a universal subject (or about a class)

(i) singular (ii) universal not universal

(iii) particular (iv) indefinite.
(or accidental)
The novelty lies in the classification of judgments according to quality. The indiffer-
ent judgment is added to affirmative and negative judgments, and this also entails a
revision of the accidental (or strong particular) judgment.
At this juncture, it is a matter of showing that one can construct valid syllogisms
with the forms of judgment that have been listed. With regard to the independence
of the syllogism from the principle of contradiction, Vasil’ev maintains what Husik
and Łukasiewicz affirmed in their comments on Aristotle, i.e., that “[t]he principle
of the syllogism of the first figure does not depend upon the law of contradiction.”72
In fact, since there are no negative judgments in Barbara, the principle of contradic-
tion has no impact on it. We have also seen that, in the imaginary world, objects (M)
are given to which both P and non-P belong. Let us therefore consider a class of
objects of this type, such as ‘All M are and are not P simultaneously.’ If we construct
a syllogism whose major premiss is a universal indifferent judgment of this sort and
whose minor premiss is an affirmative judgment, we get an indifferent judgment as
in the conclusion:
71
Cf. V. A. Smirnov (1986: 209–210; 1989a: 633 ff.); but cf. also Markin & Zaitsev (2002) (see
Sect. 6.4).
72
Vasil’ev (1912: 225 = 1989: 72 [2003: 144]); cf. also Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 66 = 1989: 107–108
[1993: 339]).
All M are and are not P simultaneously

S is M

S is and is not P simultaneously.
The sense of the minor premiss consists in saying that what is true of M is also true
of S. Therefore,
If there is a contradiction in the concept M, and S is subsumed under this concept, then S is
to possess this contradiction as well. If a contradiction is intrinsic to the whole class M, then
it goes without saying that it will be also intrinsic to any S which belongs to this class.73
To repeat, by contradiction Vasil’ev means the simultaneous possession of the prop-

erties P and non-P. As in Husik, the minor premiss means the simple belonging of S
to the class M, and the conclusion is a particular instance of the major premiss.
Vasil’ev demonstrates the legitimacy of the (universal) indifferent mode of the
first figure and of the indifferent conclusion also via a reductio ad absurdum. Let us
take the syllogism:
All M are and are not P simultaneously

All S are M

All S are and are not P simultaneously.
If we refuse the conclusion ‘All S are and are not P simultaneously,’ if, therefore, we
refuse the indifferent judgment, we are left with making two assumptions, one
regarding an affirmative judgment, the other regarding a negative judgment: either
‘Some, and maybe all, S are P,’ or ‘Some, and maybe all, S are not P.’ Substituting
these in the major premiss of the syllogism to be demonstrated, two syllogisms of
the third figure are obtained with the middle term S: (a) Disamis and (b) Bocardo.
(a) Some, and maybe all, S are P

All S are M

Some M are P
(b) Some, and maybe all, S are not P

All S are M

Some M are not P.
Yet, both these conclusions negate the major premiss of the syllogism in question,
since they assign an affirmative predicate to some M and a negative predicate to
some other M, while the major premiss assigns to every M an indifferent predicate. For
this reason, to avoid falling into contradicting ourselves, and infringing the law of
absolute difference between truth and falsehood, in the syllogism to be demonstrated
we are constrained to accept an indifferent judgment as the conclusion.74 From this one
deduces, and the point is crucial for our purposes here, that the expression ‘is and is
73
Vasil’ev (1912: 226 = 1989: 73 [2003: 145]).
74
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912: 226–227 = 1989: 73–74 [2003: 145–146]; 1912–1913a: 66 = 1989: 108
[1993: 339]).
not P simultaneously’ is an indifferent predicate and not the conjunction of two

judgments.
On the other hand, the inferences are valid neither if the minor premiss is an
indifferent or negative judgment, nor if the major premiss is a judgment that is sin-
gular, accidental or of an exclusive form. In imaginary logic the selfsame laws of
traditional syllogistic are valid for the first figure: the major premiss must be univer-
sal, and the minor premiss affirmative. Were this not the case, we would be stuck in
indecision and we should not be in a position to draw any deduction. At this point,
by changing the quality of the major premiss in Barbara and Darii, Vasil’ev can add
two new modes to the traditional four of the first figure: (a) Mindalin and (b)
Kindirinp.75
(a) All M are and are not P simultaneously

All S are M

All S are and are not P.
(b) All M are and are not P simultaneously

Some S are M

Some S are and are not P.
Vasil’ev himself observes the symmetry subsisting between traditional syllogistic

and imaginary logic: by transforming the major premiss of the affirmative modes
Barbara and Darii from affirmative into negative, one obtains two negative modes
Celarent and Ferio; by transforming it into indifferent, one obtains the indifferent
modes Mindalin and Kindirinp.
Regarding the other syllogistic figures, the second poses problems — the conclu-
sion is invariably in the form of an exclusion and never affirmative —, whilst the
third is valid and three other modes are added to it.76 Thus Vasil’ev has achieved the
aim that he had set himself: “not […] in constructing a system of imaginary logic —
that is quite a different task —, but in showing the very principle, upon which it is
built,” and, moreover, of demonstrating that “imaginary logic preserves the neces-
sary character of inferences and the rigour of the logical rules.”77
75
Where “in” marks the universal indifferent judgment and “inp” the particular indifferent
judgment.
76
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912: 228–229 = 1989: 75–76 [2003: 147–148]). In “Logic and Metalogic” Vasil’ev
(1912–1913a: 67 = 1989: 109 [1993: 340]) states that “[t]he second figure of syllogism in imagi-
nary logic is impossible.”
77
Vasil’ev (1912: 231 = 1989: 78 [2003: 150]).
5.6 Imaginary Logic and non-Euclidean Geometries 99
5.6 Imaginary Logic and non-Euclidean Geometries
Before bringing our exposition to its conclusion, there remain three arguments that
must be dealt with in order to complete the picture: the analogy between imaginary
logic and non-Euclidean geometry, which Vasil’ev never fails to underscore at every
step, some alternative interpretations of imaginary logic, and the notion of metalogic.
The first point sends us back to the origins of imaginary logic and, more generally,
to the heuristic value of the analogy, which has always played, and still does, a
notable role in the elaboration of theories, and could indeed well form the basis of a
new theoretical proposal.
Vasil’ev generalizes the concept of imaginary logic, an operation Peirce also had
achieved for a many-valued logic, precisely by reflecting on geometry. Plane geom-
etry is a two-dimensional geometry, the geometry of space a three-dimensional one.
Why then may we not also imagine a space of four or more dimensions, for which
a geometry of four or n dimensions would obtain? Analogously, traditional logic,
which possesses two judgments of quality, is a second order logic; imaginary logic,
with its three judgments of quality, a third-order logic. But we can also imagine a
logic with more than three types of judgments of quality, with n types of judgments
of quality, and in that case we shall have a logic of the n-th order, even if we are not
in a position to represent it. And just as in Aristotelian logic the law of excluded
middle holds, and in imaginary logic the law of excluded fourth, so too in a logic of
the n-th order the law of excluded (n + 1)-th shall hold.78
As to the specific relation between imaginary logic and non-Euclidean geometry,
undoubtedly this is just an analogy. And yet, the discovery in the first half of the
nineteenth century of non-Euclidean geometries made a notable heuristic impact on
several thinkers, as we have noted above, spurring them to think also of logic as a
hypothetical-deductive system.79 Taking the principle of contradiction as the anal-
ogon of Euclid’s fifth postulate, one sought to realize in logic the selfsame operation
that had already materialized in the field of geometry. And since a geometry without
the axiom of parallels is “non-Euclidean,” in similar wise a logic devoid of the prin-
ciple of contradiction would be “non-Aristotelian.” Both Łukasiewicz and Peirce,
by independently hypothesizing the non-validity of certain logical laws, or by trans-
forming them, had in fact undertaken investigations into the possibility of a non-
Aristotelian logic.80 Vasil’ev himself declares that Lobachevsky’s non-Euclidean
78
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912: 229–230 = 1989: 76–77 [2003: 148–149]).
79
Cf. Mangione & Bozzi (1993: 17).
80
Cf. Łukasiewicz (1910a/1987: 8): “only then shall we know if such a principle [of contradiction]
is really supreme, the true corner stone of all of our logic, or if it is possible to transform it or even
to reject it, in order to create a non-Aristotelian system of logic, just as the system of non-Euclid-
ean geometry was founded by means of the transformation of the axiom of the parallels”; Peirce
(quoted in Carus 1910a: 45): “Before I took up the general study of relatives, I made some inves-
tigation into the consequences of supposing the laws of logic to be different from what they are. It
was a sort of non-Aristotelian logic, in the sense in which we speak of non-Euclidean geometry.”
See also Sect. 2.3, 4.3.
geometry “served as a model for the construction of a non-Aristotelian logic,”81 so

much so that, taking in the fact that Lobachevsky had called his own geometry
“imaginary,”82 Vasil’ev adopted the same adjective to describe his own logical
project. This too is of a hypothetical-deductive character and fits perfectly into the
panorama of research we have briefly sketched above. Imaginary logic starts from
the hypothesis of an imaginary world, in which negative sensations are possible,
negative judgments are primitive, and contrary objects are granted. It aspires to
describe, or better still, translate into logical terms a world of this kind, where nei-
ther the (ontological) law of contradiction nor the law of excluded middle holds.
The analogies between imaginary logic and non-Euclidean geometry concern
both the two disciplines directly and their respective relations with Aristotelian
logic and Euclidean geometry. With respect to this second type of analogy, Vasil’ev
notes that (a) “[b]oth non-Euclidean geometry and non-Aristotelian logic arise as a
consequence of the rejection of an axiom”; that, even if they contradict common
sense, (b) both are closed and internally consistent systems; that (c) they share
something in common, respectively, with Aristotelian logic and Euclidean geome-
try; and that (d) they are both more complex than Aristotelian logic and Euclidean
geometry.83
The direct analogies between non-Euclidean geometries and non-Aristotelian
logic concern instead their content and their potential application to the real world.
Euclidean geometry recognizes a double relationship between two straight lines on
a plain: either they intersect or are parallel. Lobachevsky’s geometry, on the other
hand, recognizes a triple relation: the lines may converge, diverge or run parallel.84
Analogously, traditional logic recognizes a double relation between subject and
predicate: affirmative or negative; while imaginary logic recognizes a threefold rela-
tion: affirmative, negative or indifferent. Therefore, Vasil’ev concludes:
the dichotomy of our logic and our geometry turns into a trichotomy in the imaginary
disciplines.85
There would be one last analogy between non-Euclidean geometry and imagi-
nary logic. Just as one can give a “real interpretation” of non-Euclidean geometry —
of Lobachevsky’s if the surface is considered as a pseudosphere, as was shown by
Beltrami (1868), and of Riemann’s if it is considered as a sphere86 —, “[i]n the same
way, in our world structures can be found whose logic is analogous to imaginary
[logic].”87 According to Vasil’ev, such a logic would be constituted by the logic of
concepts, which is substantially different from the logic of objects, in so far as (as
we have seen) it is not the law of excluded middle that is applied to concepts, but
81
Vasil’ev (1912: 208 = 1989: 54 [2003: 128]).
82
Cf. Lobachevsky (1835).
83
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912: 232–233 = 1989: 79–80 [2003: 151]).
84
Lobachevsky (1835–1838/1883–1886: i, 301).
85
Vasil’ev (1912: 233 = 1989: 81 [2003: 152]).
86
Cf. Riemann (1867).
87
Vasil’ev (1912: 234 = 1989: 81 [2003: 152]).
5.7 Alternative Interpretations of Imaginary Logic 101
rather that of excluded fourth, which happens also to be a law of imaginary logic. A
categorical judgment can in fact express either the necessity or the impossibility, or
the possibility that a certain predicate belongs to a given subject. Likewise, the indif-
ferent judgment would find its counterpart in the accidental judgment about a con-
cept. Therefore, Vasil’ev concludes, “the logic of concepts is analogous to imaginary
logic.”88 Analogous, not identical. Yet Vasil’ev is stretching the analogy unduly. On
closer inspection, the accidental judgment ‘S may be P,’ or ‘Some S are P, some S
are not P,’ is distinct from the indifferent judgment ‘(Every) S is P and non-P simul-
taneously,’ in that it does not violate the principle of contradiction, a principle which,
in the logic of concepts, retains all of its validity. Perhaps the problem is one of
imagining another kind of logic of concepts.
5.7 Alternative Interpretations of Imaginary Logic
Vasil’ev proceeds to examine the analogy in great depth: just as geometry strives to
define the conditions under which non-Euclidean geometry would be the real geom-
etry of space, “[e]xactly in the same way it can be shown that, assuming a certain
structure of our world or of our faculty of sense-perception, logic should necessar-
ily be non-Aristotelian.”89 Our world and our faculty of sense-perception are struc-
tured in such a manner that all our sensations are positive. This is also the case with
sensations that have a negative cause, like silence, darkness, stasis. Negation is
extrinsic to sensations; it is only when we note a relationship of incompatibility
between two of them that one becomes the negation of the other. Down to this point,
Vasil’ev has repeated an argument he had already made, but he now adds something
that opens up an interesting interpretation of imaginary logic. If, he says, we hypoth-
esize a world with pure non-A’s, which would have as the unique content of its
being the negations of A’s, then the negation would not be a relation joined by com-
parative thinking, but rather an integral part of the nature of the sensation non-A. For
instance, we might think of the sensation of the non-white and nothing else, while
at the moment we are incapable of thinking of it, because for us non-white is equiva-
lent to red, blue etc. The first is an absolute negation, whilst our own is a relative
negation, in that it is based on the relation of incompatibility. In such a world, the
same object S could stir in us both the sensation A and the sensation non-A; we
would then be drawn to formulating the indifferent judgment ‘S is A and non-A
simultaneously.’ Therefore, in a world in which negative sensations are given a non-
Aristotelian logic holds, which is, precisely, what imaginary logic is.
Vasil’ev mentions having found the distinction between absolute negation and
relative negation in Bernard Bolzano. In § 89 of his Wissenschaftslehre [Theory of
Science] (1837) entitled “Bejahende und verneinende Vorstellungen [Affirmative
and negative ideas],” Bolzano defines “negative in the widest sense [verneinende in
88
Vasil’ev (1912: 235 = 1989: 82 [2003: 153]).
89
Vasil’ev (1912: 238 = 1989: 85 [2003: 156]).
der weitesten Bedeutung]” those ideas in which the ‘not’ is required as a component
part and “negative in the narrow sense [verneinende in der engeren Bedeutung]”
those ideas from which, eliminating a part, one does not obtain an idea that is equiv-
alent and devoid of the concept of negation. Bolzano further breaks down the latter
into “purely or absolutely negative [rein oder durchaus verneinende]” and “partly
negative [teilweise verneinende].”90 The first have the form ‘not A,’ the others the
form ‘A, which is not B.’ He furthermore states that “ideas are not affirmative or
negative merely relatively [bloß beziehungsweise], but in and of themselves [an sich
selbst].”91
Vasil’ev re-elaborates the notions of absolute and relative negation in a highly
personal manner. In stating ‘S is P,’ he says, we state the entire content of P, and in
negating that ‘S is P,’ we negate the totality of P’s properties, but not each of them
separately. In denying that Napoleon is the French emperor who died in battle at
Waterloo, we do not deny that Napoleon was French and an emperor. We can how-
ever imagine a negation that does not have any of P’s properties, an absolute nega-
tion, so that we obtain, alongside the affirmation ‘S is P,’ that affirms all of the
properties of P, both the absolute negation (or the absolutely false judgment) which
denies all of the properties of P, and the relative negation (or simply false judg-
ment), which denies some properties of P, but affirms others. With this interpreta-
tion, Vasil’ev argues, “we get an imaginary logic, which is however somewhat
different from the one whose main features we have sketched in this paper.”92 We
shall see shortly that, although Vasil’ev explicitly recognizes only two truth-values,
precisely this interpretation of imaginary logic will be read in a many-valued key.
Alongside the (i) logic of concepts and the (ii) logic that, distinguishing between
absolute and relative negation, accepts degrees of falsehood, Vasil’ev suggests a
third interpretation of imaginary logic: (iii) a logic in which the affirmative judg-
ment expresses the similarity of two phenomena, the negative judgment their abso-
lute difference or absolute dissimilarity, and the indifferent judgment their
simultaneous similarity and dissimilarity. He states that our world is full of such
examples. These three variations of imaginary logic, which Vasil’ev calls “interpre-
tations,” do not coincide, but are formulated in the same language and derive from
the selfsame exigency.93
90
Cf. Bolzano (1837: i, 415–417 [2014: i, 298–299]).
91
Bolzano (1837: i, 419 [2014: i, 301]).
92
Vasil’ev (1912: 241 = 1989: 88 [2003: 158]).
93
Stelzner (2014) proposes another type of application of imaginary logic to our real world. It is to
consider such logic from an epistemic point of view. He proposes, then, to interpret imaginary
worlds as epistemic worlds. According to Stelzner (2014: 57), “[i]n our real world, epistemic situ-
ations (or epistemic worlds) are given, whereas epistemic subjects have contradictory epistemic
attitudes or perform contradictory epistemic or linguistic acts. […] The existence of epistemic
contradictions is entirely compatible with the soundness of the law of contradiction in our world.”
Therefore, Stelzner assumes as his starting point one of the results of Łukasiewicz’s investigations
concerning the principle of contradiction (see Sect. 4.3). Cf. also Stelzner (2017).
5.8 Metalogic 103
5.8 Metalogic
One of Vasil’ev’s article bears the title “Logic and Metalogic” (1912–1913), but the
concept of metalogic had already been introduced in a short 1911 essay where the
Russian logician synthesizes his ideas about it in the following way:
We shall call metalogic all the non-empirical elements and the statements of logic. It is
analogous to metaphysics. Metaphysics is the knowledge of being independently of the
conditions of experience. Metalogic is the knowledge of thought independently of the con-
ditions of experience.
Statements analogous to the impossibility of declaring the same judgment simulta-
neously true and false are part of the statute of metalogic. Statements that are included
in the second form of the law of contradiction are part of the statute of empirical logic,
since that is based on the existence of incompatible predicates in our world.
Therefore, the concept of logic has three meanings:
(1) non-empirical logic (metalogic) — the formal premiss of every logic;
(2) empirical logic — the logic of reality;
(3) imaginary logic.94
Metalogic is that minimum, that part which is shared by both Aristotelian logic
and imaginary logic, and — Vasil’ev adds — every logic; it is the analogue of the
absolute geometry which Janos Bolyai wrote about.95 It is constituted of merely
formal elements, depending on the nature of thought, in that it abstracts from all of
its content; such elements contain nothing empirical. Aristotelian logic, on the
other hand, contains empirical, material elements and for this reason is adapted to
our world. Formed from processes of the struggle for existence and of the interac-
tions between man and his environment, it reflects the properties of our world. In
another world, with different properties than those obtaining in our own, other
empirical laws hold, but the formal laws remain the same. Thus, both Aristotelian
logic and imaginary logic contain at the same time formal, meta-empirical ele-
ments. What are these elements that construct metalogic? The method for obtaining
them, and in this Vasil’ev discerns an application of imaginary logic, lies in verify-
ing if they can be eliminated or substituted by other elements. What is empirical,
like the laws of contradiction and of the excluded middle, is not valid in imaginary
logic and therefore does not belong to that logical minimum which metalogic is.
What remains is meta-empirical, and hence is part of metalogic, which conse-
quently contains the form of judgment and of deduction, the law of absolute differ-
ence between truth and falsehood, the law of the excluded second, the laws of
identity and of sufficient reason.96 Vasil’ev does not explicitly refer to the last two,97
94
Vasil’ev (1911/1989: 130 [184]).
95
Cf. Bolyai (1832 [1987]). D’Ottaviano & Gomes (2015: 274) suggest that Vasil’ev anticipates
“aspects of what is today known as universal logic.” Cf. also D’Ottaviano & Gomes (2017: § 4).
96
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912: 242–243 = 1989: 89–90 [2003: 159–160]; 1912–1913a: 72–74, 77 = 1989:
115–116, 119 [1993: 344–345, 348]).
97
Except in a context where the notion of metalogic has not yet been introduced (cf. Vasil’ev 1912:
221 = 1989: 68 [2003: 140]).
but if they belong to both traditional logic and imaginary logic in that they are for-
mal laws, it follows that they also belong to metalogic.
Vasil’ev also points out the ‘theological’ aspect of metalogic. Aristotelian logic,
he says, contains negation because, for the finite being that is man, the possibility of
error is always lying in ambush, and it is, precisely, negation that expresses error,
the falsity of an affirmation. A perfect spirit who never errs, however, has no use for
negations, for producing false judgments, and such a spirit would express itself only
through affirmations. Divine logic, the logic of perfect knowledge, for this reason
possesses only affirmative judgments. Metalogic is the logic of only affirmative
judgments, a first-order logic (in the sense mentioned above, see Sect. 5.6), for
which the law of the excluded second (“the law of the perfection of knowledge, of
the impossibility of error”) holds, just as the law of excluded middle holds for
Aristotelian logic, and that of excluded fourth for imaginary logic.98
Once more, in endeavouring to underline the relevance of his work, Vasil’ev
lapses into imprecision. If metalogic is common to all logics, then it cannot contain
the law of the excluded second, because this is neither a law of Aristotelian nor of
imaginary logic, but rather the law of excluded (n + 1)-th, and, in so far as it is
implied by the latter, the law of excluded second. Were this not so, the method of
imaginary logic would no longer be useful for individuating the merely formal laws
belonging to metalogic.
Vasil’ev’s writings are not lacking in elements of incoherence and imprecision.
He undoubtedly exaggerates the novelty of imaginary logic as he states his intention
to reform traditional logic. Yet, a point that marks him off with respect to traditional
logicians deserves to be stressed, a point that he shares in common with those logi-
cians of his period who worked on the construction of mathematical logic. In the
texts of traditional logic we find a general idea of logic that is then projected onto
theories of the concept, of judgment, of truth, of negation and so on. The most
cogent contributions of traditional logic regard the doctrine of concepts (or of rep-
resentations) and the theory of judgment, but not the study of inferences. Vasil’ev,
on the other hand, starts from the analysis of logical structures, and, after demon-
strating how the notions he had developed were functional, he arrived at a proposal
for a general idea of logic. Logical objects are not bent to a general conception, but
such a conception itself derives from the use that we can, or manage to, make of
them. It is from a reflection of this kind that he advances the proposal for a logic
which makes his work interesting even in modern times.
98
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 74–77 = 1989: 116–119 [1993: 346–349]).
Chapter 6
Interpretations
Abstract This chapter offers a review of the interpretations of imaginary logic that
have appeared over the last hundred years. The early readers of Vasil’ev’s work can
be grouped as displaying one or another of two tendencies, either sharp criticism
(e.g. K. A. Smirnov) or notable appreciation (e.g. N. N. Luzin). After two decades
of silence, Russian and Polish scholars began to write about Vasil’ev. But in order to
appreciate his logical ideas, the development of non-classical logics, like many-
valued and paraconsistent logics, as well as a revalorization and formalization of
syllogistic, have been necessary. Some scholars interpret imaginary logic in a many-
valued key, either as a forerunner of many-valued logic or in terms of a reconstruc-
tion of imaginary logic as a many-valued one (L. Chwistek. H. Greniewski, A. I.
Mal’tsev, T. Kwiatkowski, G. L. Kline, N. Rescher, M. Jammer). In the 1970s, the
paraconsistent interpretation was proposed by A. I. Arruda and was further devel-
oped by several scholars (L. Z. Puga, Newton C. A. da Costa, A. S. Karpenko, V. L.
Vasyukov, O. Bueno, I. M. L. D’Ottaviano). Others interpreted Vasil’ev as a founder
of intensional logics (G. Priest and R. Routley), as a theoretician of logical plural-
ism and of impossible worlds. Another line of interpretation reconstructs Vasil’ev’s
logic in terms of a syllogistic adapted to modern standards (V. A. Smirnov, T. P.
Kostiuk, V. I. Markin, D. Zaitsev, A. Kouznetsov, W. Suchoń). Finally, systematic
historical investigations about Vasil’ev have also emerged (V. A. Bazhanov,
F. Cavaliere, R. Vergauwen, E. A. Zaytsev, W. Stelzner). The chapter closes with the
proposal to use some formalized reconstructions of imaginary logic as an adequate
logical basis for Meinong’s object theory.
It is appropriate to conclude our investigations here with an analysis of the main

readings that have emerged on imaginary logic in over a hundred years since its
birth. Their very variety is a mark of the richness of the theoretical ideas and cues it
offers.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66086-8_6
106 6 Interpretations
6.1 The First Readers, the First Criticisms
Vasil’ev’s logical writings aroused a certain interest in Russia as soon as they were
published.1 His article “On Particular Judgments, the Triangle of Oppositions, and
the Law of Excluded Fourth” was discussed by Sergei Iosifovich Hessen in Rech’
(1910a) and Logos (1910b), and by Konstantin Aleksandrovich Smirnov both in
Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia [The Journal of the Ministry of
Education] (1911a) and in the opuscule Vasil’ev i ego zakon chetvertogo [N. A.
Vasil’ev and the Law of Excluded Fourth] (1911b). Hessen wrote a very positive
evaluation of Vasil’ev’s essay, placing it among those that had sought to overcome
traditional logic and reproaching him only for failing to throw light on the links
between logical-formal and gnoseological-metaphysical problems. On the contrary,
Smirnov adopted a wholly different tack accusing Vasil’ev of having confused acci-
dental judgments about facts with judgments about concepts, and the latter with
rules. Some trace of these criticisms can be found in Vasil’ev’s 1912 essay
“Imaginary (non-Aristotelian) Logic,” where he expresses amazement at the objec-
tions Smirnov had raised.2 In this first engagement with his critics, one detects what
will prove to be the keynote that will characterize future evaluations of Vasil’ev’s
ideas. On one hand, we discern a positive evaluation and further development of the
ideas he proposed; on the other, severe critique and a dismissal of his theoretical
proposal.
The address entitled “Non-Euclidean Geometry and non-Aristotelian Logic,”
which Vasil’ev gave on the 13th of January 1911 before the Physical-Mathematical
Society of Kazan, had a broad impact at the time. Some twenty members of the
Society participated, together with an audience of about a hundred listeners.3 A long
account was published of the proceeding by Vladimir Nikolaevich Ivanovskii in
several numbers of Kamsko-Volzhskaia Rech’ (1911), which pointed out the link
Vasil’ev had made between his own imaginary logic and Lobachevsky’s non-
Euclidean geometry. We are also given an account of the debate which ensued, with
the comments made by, among others, D. N. Zejliger, A. V. Vasil’ev, A. P.
Kotel’nikov, M. E. Ioinsky, A. O. Makovel’sky and S. M. Jur’ev, who, though not
skimping on criticisms of imaginary logic (Zejliger, for example, disapproved of the
use of the term ‘imaginary’ as applied to non-Aristotelian logic),4 did not fail to
recognize its theoretical significance and novelty. Stepan Aleksandrovich
Bogomolov in his Voprosy obosnovaniia geometrii [Questions on the Foundations
of Geometry] (1913) also alludes to this address, maintaining that the independence
of the axioms is not a sufficient reason for allowing that some of them may be can-
celled. Logical principles are not only sufficient, but also necessary for obtaining
1
On the discussions stirred by Vasil’ev’s theses in Russia cf. Bazhanov (1988a: 78–87; 2009a:
121–133).
2
Cf. Vasil’ev (1912: 236–237, fn. 1 = 1989: 83–84, fn. 13 [2003: 154–155, fn. 13]).
3
Cf. Mal’tsev (1971: 70).
4
Cf. Ivanovskii (1911/1989: 178).
6.1 The First Readers, the First Criticisms 107
other logical laws, and what therefore is necessary cannot be eliminated. Bogomolov
questions the analogy itself, so dear to Vasil’ev, between imaginary logic and non-
Euclidean geometry. While it is true that many logicians conduct research on the
basis of the model of non-Euclidean geometry, Bogomolov maintains nonetheless
that success in building such a geometry does not constitute a proof of the existence
of a non-Aristotelian logic.5
Subsequently, Ivan Ivanovich Lapshin (1917), Nikolai Onufrievich Lossky
(1922) and Nikolai Nikolaevich Luzin (1927) wrote critical reviews of Vasil’ev’s
theses. His historical essay on “The Question of the Fall of the Western Roman
Empire…” also attracted some interest among his contemporaries.6 We have already
touched on Lossky7 and Lapshin’s critical observations. Luzin expresses a notable
appreciation for Vasil’ev’s work on logic, detecting correspondences between it and
recent works of intuitionistic and finitistic mathematics undertaken by Luitzen
Egbertus Jan Brouwer, David Hilbert, Klaus Hugo Hermann Weyl and Émile Borel.
According to Luzin, by 1910 Vasil’ev had already set in motion the construction of
a new logic which had, by the time (namely the years 1924–1926), become a reality.
This particular line of interpretation was not followed up for the simple reason that
the review article in which Luzin set down his views in such glowing terms was to
remain unpublished for many years.8 The same fate attended, in the short term, the
interpretation of imaginary logic as a many-valued logic inaugurated by Leon
Chwistek in his Granice nauki [The Limits of Science] (1935 [1948]). Except for his
brief treatment of imaginary logic, a veil of silence falls on Vasil’ev during the thir-
ties and forties.
At the outset of the fifties, the Russian Pavel Vasilevich Kopnin returned to
Vasil’ev’s work. In his lengthy essay “O logicheskikh vozzreniiakh N. A. Vasil’eva.
Iz istorii russkoi logiki [On the Logical Views of N. A. Vasil’ev. From the History
of Russian Logic]” (1950),9 Kopnin places imaginary logic both within the
5
Cf. Bogomolov (1913: 88–89), with reference to which see Stelzner (2001: 263–266).
6
Cf. the reviews by Ivanov (1921) and Kareev (1923). On Vasil’ev’s essay, see Sect. 1.4.
7
We have seen that in his Handbuch der Logik (1927), Lossky criticized Vasil’ev’s concept of the
particular judgment (see Sect. 3.4). Later on, in his History of Russian Philosophy (1952), after a
short presentation of imaginary logic, Lossky (1952: 317) addressed his criticism against the latter,
remarking that “N. A. Vassilyev develops his theory of the possibility of a non-Aristotelian logic
cleverly and consistently, but it is founded upon an error. Lossky explains in his Logic that the law
of contradiction is certainly not the expression of the incompatibility of any two qualities, such as
red and blue. It expresses something far more fundamental, namely, that ‘red is not not-red,’ or that
‘redness in so far as it is redness is not the absence of redness.’ Thus understood, the law of con-
tradiction is an ontological law discovered through intellectual intuition and absolutely inviolable.
Accepting this interpretation, Lossky shows that all attempts to prove the possibility of violating
the law of contradiction, made, e.g., by Hegel, S. L. Frank, Vvedensky, Lapshin, dialectical mate-
rialists, are invalid.”
8
The manuscript is dated 4th January 1927 and was not brought out until 1987, when Bazhanov
had it published (1987a: 84; 1988a: 137); cf. also Bazhanov (1990a: 340; 2001: 314) and Suchoń
(1999: 138–139).
9
The essay was once more published in a shortened form, with the title “O logicheskikh vozzreni-
iakh N. A. Vasil’eva [On the Logical Views of N. A. Vasil’ev],” in Kopnin (1973: 405–448). The
following notes refer to this edition.
c ontroversy that opposed Aristotelian logic and non-Aristotelian logic, and within the
classical tradition going back to Kant and Hegel. Kopnin says that Vasil’ev is in com-
plete agreement with Kantian metaphysical logic in denying that, in our world, con-
tradictions are granted to things, and yet he then introduces the concept of another
world, in which contradiction can take place.10 For Kopnin, the idealistic and meta-
physical character of imaginary logic would also appear from the distinction made
between a logic of concepts and a logic of facts.11 Noteworthy in the critical analysis
which Kopnin supplies of Vasil’ev’s classification of judgments is his comment apro-
pos indefinite judgments. While accepting the distinction between particular and
indefinite judgments, Kopnin challenges the idea that the formula ‘Some, and maybe
all, S are (are not) P’ is only “an attempted judgment,” a pure psychological stage in
the process of knowledge, and states to the contrary that it has “an objective basis, that
is, the fact of establishing that some S are (are not) P.”12 In the way Kopnin copes with
the questions raised by imaginary logic one can discern the need, typically dialectical,
to avoid a caesura between the world of facts and the intelligible world of concepts. In
succeeding years the Polish scholars Antoni Korcik (1954) and Henryk Greniewski
(1958) also paid attention to Vasil’ev’s work in a general theoretical context.
According to Bazhanov, the lack of fortune surrounding Vasil’ev’s works can be
explained by the fact that he had been far too in advance of his time, and thus failed
to be understood by his contemporaries.13 Yet, if we recall that just shortly after-
wards both modal and many-valued logics began to be developed, and that Brouwer
was already working on an intuitionistic logic, one can hardly accuse his contempo-
raries of having closed minds over new logical ideas, all the more so if one consid-
ers that mathematical logic represented a decidedly radical break with tradition.
Vasil’ev’s misfortune is to be attributed rather to the fact that he was offering new
wine in old bottles. His contemporaries could well have found his ideas interesting,
but not so his attempt to reform traditional logic as that what he termed ‘our logic’
was no longer ‘their logic.’ Suffice it to consider that, although a student of Luzin’s,
Andrei Nikolaevich Kolmogorov, in his article “О printsipe tertium non datur [On
the Principle tertium non datur]” (1925), does not name Vasil’ev.
In order to appreciate his logical ideas, not only the development of non-classical
logics, like many-valued and paraconsistent logics has been necessary, but also a reval-
orization and formalization of syllogistic, as well as an appraisal of the way philosophi-
cal logic provided theoretical (not technical-formal) contributions that assisted the birth
of non-classical ideas of logic. It is difficult to pigeon-hole imaginary logic. Every
interpretation takes its moves from certain theses in Vasil’ev’s logical articles, but one
can trace many other theses and statements in these same articles which give lie to
interpretations that have been given. It is time for us to resume our historical account.14
10
Cf. Kopnin (1973: 423).
11
Cf. Kopnin (1973: 439).
12
Kopnin (1973: 433).
13
14
On the state of Vasil’ev studies down to the end of the 1980s cf. Bazhanov (1988a: 112–126),
Cavaliere (1991: 66–71) and D’Ottaviano (1990a: xiii–xv). Bazhanov (1990a: 339–341) also con-
tains some notes on the reception of Vasil’ev’s logical ideas.
6.2 The Rediscovery of Vasil’ev and the Many-Valued Interpretation of Imaginary Logic 109
6.2 he Rediscovery of Vasil’ev and the Many-Valued

T
Interpretation of Imaginary Logic
Vasil’ev’s writings attracted renewed interest in both Russia and the West at the
outset of the 1960s. Among the texts that mark this resumption of interest are
Vladimir Aleksandrovich Smirnov’s article, “Logicheskie vzgliady N. A. Vasil’eva
[The Logical Views of N. A. Vasil’ev]” (1962), the review of this provided by
David Dinsmore Comey in 1965,15 a review that would assume a notable impor-
tance for western logicians interested in Vasil’ev, and the contemporary essay by
George L. Kline, which I will touch on presently. Several readings of Vasil’ev’s
work have been given since then, readings prompted by the fact that he did not
leave behind a complete system of imaginary logic, and that, as often is the case
with a new theory, his proposal is not shorn of problematic elements and incoher-
encies. Most researchers tend to show how Vasil’ev anticipated modern non-clas-
sical logics. Bazhanov considers him to be not only the founder of many-valued
and paraconsistent logics but also, and here he appeals to Luzin’s authority, a
precursor of intuitionistic logic.16 It should be clear at this point, that elements
which we now regard as non-classical, such as the elimination and limitation of
the principles of contradiction and of excluded middle, were already present in
Vasil’ev’s theory of judgment and in his syllogistic. Yet, as we have had occasion
to observe, these elements were also present in the theories of other thinkers at the
time. Scholarly disagreement revolves around the various threads developed from
such ideas.
For some decades the thesis interpreting imaginary logic in a many-valued key
has taken root. According to Chwistek, Vasil’ev’s proposal would constitute the old-
est system of many-valued logic, a consistent one built on the hypothesis that,
alongside affirmation and negation, propositions are also given of the type ‘S is P
and non-P.’ Chwistek does not elaborate to any extent, other than remarking that
this vein of research is intriguing, in so far as expressions similar in kind to such
formulae are current in everyday speech.17 Greniewski (1958), while regarding
Chwistek’s arguments as both generic and vague, and after clarifying that the first
three-valued propositional calculus had been developed by Jan Łukasiewicz in 1920
on the basis of decisive work undertaken earlier by Tadeusz Kotarbiński, likewise
adopted the many-valued interpretation of imaginary logic. He argues that Vasil’ev
had clearly set forth, albeit in everyday language, some of the rules of three-valued
logic.18 The same thesis was independently advanced by Anatoly Ivanovich Mal’tsev
(1971). According to the latter, Vasil’ev, by showing the possibility of constructing,
15
Cf. Smirnov (1962) and Comey (1965).
16
Cf. Bazhanov (1990a: 333; 1992a: 46).
17
Cf. Chwistek (1935: 107 [1948: 129–130]).
18
Cf. Greniewski (1958: 176–177). Also Ładosz (1961: 98, 378, 379) associates Łukasiewicz and
Vasil’ev as proponents of a many-valued logic.
with the example of Lobachevsky in mind, a closed logical system without the law
of contradiction and by introducing the indifferent judgment, had worked out a kind
of three-valued logic, without however providing it with an adequate algebra.
Notwithstanding this lacuna, his achievement, in Mal’tsev’s view, qualifies him as a
founder of many-valued logics. It is noteworthy that Mal’tsev included imaginary
logic among studies of algebra predating the October Revolution of 1917.19 Whereas
Chwistek based his comment on the brief communication which Vasil’ev forwarded
to the conference of Naples in 1925, Mal’tsev used the account of the address on
“Non-Euclidean Geometry and non-Aristotelian Logic” which Vasil’ev delivered in
1911. Greniewski’s remarks are limited to citations from Chwistek.
Tadeusz Kwiatkowski’s article “Wasiliewa koncepcja logiki niearystotele-
sowskiej [Vasil’ev’s Concept of non-Aristotelian Logic]” (1964), on the other hand,
was far more articulated, and attentive to the original sources. After expounding
both the distinction between real and ideal worlds and the characteristics of the
imaginary world, and clarifying the differences between Vasil’ev and Aristotle with
regard to the principle of contradiction, Kwiatkowski underlined the importance of
the new concept of negation Vasil’ev had proposed, and of his metalogic, that is, a
logic containing only affirmative judgments wherein, unlike the principles of iden-
tity and of sufficient reason, the principles of contradiction and of excluded middle
are not valid. Nevertheless, he points out critical problems with imaginary logic:
Vasil’ev’s system lacks uniformity; his analogy between Aristotle’s fundamental
laws of thought and Euclid’s axioms does not stand up to scrutiny; in imaginary
logic, it is not possible to define the notion of an impossible object; Vasil’ev was not
aware that Aristotle’s syllogistic is only a part of the formal logic of “our world.”
Finally, Kwiatkowski concluded that, despite imaginary logic being substantially
bivalent, all the same, some of Vasil’ev’s conceptions (such as the new concept of
negation and the idea of a logic with only one judgment of quality) “seem to speak
in favour of the fact that he was quite close to the discovery of many-valued logics.”20
Let us now examine George L. Kline’s important essay “N. A. Vasil’ev and the
Development of Many-Valued Logic” (1965), which likewise aspires to draw atten-
tion to the fact that Vasil’ev had anticipated in general terms the idea of a three-
valued logic a decade earlier than Łukasiewicz and Post.21 Kline first expounds,
and criticizes on single points, the main theses of imaginary logic regarding the
denial of the law of contradiction, indifferent judgment and negation. He then
states that these theses, despite the fact that Vasil’ev had not developed a calculus
for indifferent judgments, lead directly to dealing with many-valued logics. In a
three-valued logic, the term he uses in place of ‘imaginary logic,’ if a proposition
(affirmative, negative or indifferent) is false, then one of the other two is true (but
19
Cf. Mal’tsev (1971: 70).
20
Kwiatkowski (1964: 215).
21
Cf. Kline (1965: 315).
6.2 The Rediscovery of Vasil’ev and the Many-Valued Interpretation of Imaginary Logic 111
not both).22 Another ‘interpretation’ of Vasil’ev’s three-valued logic concerns the

denial of the law of excluded middle and the conception of logical systems in
which the law of excluded (n + 1)-th holds. But the most interesting ‘interpretation’
is that which starts from the distinction between absolute negation and relative
negation. If it is granted that the concept A includes a series of properties p1, p2, …
pn, the absolute negation of A (Ā) would consist of the conjunction of the negations
of all the properties (Ā = ¬p1 ∧ ¬p2 ∧ … ∧ ¬pn), and the relative negation (¬A) by
the disjunction of those properties (¬A = ¬p1 ∨ ¬p2 ∨ … ∨ ¬pn). A proposition of
the form ‘S is A’ is absolutely true if S has all the properties of A, absolutely false
if S has none of these properties, and relatively false if S lacks at least one of these
properties. Kline specifies that, according to what Vasil’ev states, “a three-valued
logic based on the truth-values ‘true,’ ‘absolutely false,’ and ‘relatively false’ would
differ slightly from one based upon affirmative, negative and ‘indifferent’
propositions.”23 Unfortunately, Vasil’ev did not illustrate such differences in detail.
The idea we have just set forth would show strong affinities with Emil Leon Post’s
grades of negation (or of falsity)24 and would readily lend itself to a many-valued
construction, more than imaginary logic does with its distinction between affirma-
tive, negative and indifferent propositions. As we will have occasion to observe,
this ‘interpretation’ of imaginary logic will continue to engage the interest and
attention of Vasil’ev’s readers.
Nicholas Rescher (1969) also places Vasil’ev (together with Peirce and MacColl)
among the “founding fathers” of many-valued logics. His sources consisted of
Kline’s article, and Comey’s review of Smirnov’s paper. Both of these are com-
mendable works given the fact that, until 1965, only Russian and Polish scholars
had expressed an interest in Vasil’ev’s work. After a brief account of the main theses
of imaginary logic, Rescher states that the logic of the imaginary world posited by
Vasil’ev “is essentially three-valued,”25 as is shown by the fact that Vasil’ev formu-
lated a law of excluded fourth generalized in the law of excluded (n + 1)-th. However,
for Rescher “one cannot regard his systems as many-valued logics properly speak-
ing. This is so because Vasil’ev himself never made the transition from his key idea
of propositions about states of affairs corresponding to predications more complex
than the classical on-off picture, to the concept that the truth status of a given propo-
sition might be other than true or false.”26 In the wake of Kline and Rescher’s con-
tributions Max Jammer (1974), in his glancing comments on Vasil’ev, likewise
maintains that “[t]he first explicit formulation of a non-Chrysippean logic which
was published was the system proposed by Nikolaj Aleksandrovic Vasil’ev.”27
22
Cf. Kline (1965: 320–321).
23
Kline (1965: 323); cf. also Vasil’ev (1912: 241 = 1989: 88 [2003: 158]).
24
Cf. Post (1921: 184–185).
25
Rescher (1969: 6).
26
Rescher (1969: 7).
27
Jammer (1974: 342). On the use of the term ‘non-Chrysippean’ in place of ‘non-Aristotelian,’
Jammer (1974: 341), as did Kline earlier (1965: 316–317, fn. 4), refers us to Łukasiewicz
(1930/1988: 114–115 [1970: 262]), who had noted that, whilst Aristotle had been the first to rec-
Some more recent books on many-valued logics just mention Vasil’ev only curso-
rily together with Peirce28 and MacColl29 as a pioneer of such logics.
Obviously, the many-valued interpretation of imaginary logic has not been with-
out its critics. Boris V. Biryukov (2001) dismissed it, perhaps a touch hastily, refer-
ring to a confusion which rests on the identification of truth-values with the
fundamental propositional forms.30 That might be valid for Chwistek and Mal’tsev
(whom Biryukov mentions), but it does not hold for Kline’s more sophisticated
reading. Like Biryukov, Wojciech Suchoń (1999) also notes, against Chwistek, that
“Vasiľiev did not have in mind any conception of the third logical value,”31 but, to
the contrary, has clearly stated that there were only two logical values (truth and
falsity). Suchoń then raises an objection against Kline: namely, that the alternative
model of an imaginary logic based on the assumption of an absolute and a relative
negation was far from ever having been worked out. Against Mal’tsev, Suchoń
argues that Vasil’ev did not build a logical system on new axioms, but restricted
himself to noting that trichotomies appear in his syllogistic.32 Here then we find the
repeated claim that Łukasiewicz was the founder of many-valued logics. Still, with-
out denying Łukasiewicz’s merits, it should be observed that Peirce had already
sketched out in his unpublished writings ideas regarding three-valued and many-
valued logical systems (the logic of vagueness and the triadic logic).33
However, despite these criticisms, relations between Vasil’ev’s logics and many-
valued logics have continued to attract interest in recent research (cf. Maximov
2016a). A translation of Vasil’ev’s imaginary logic into the language of quantified
three-valued logic has been provided by Markin (1999a; 1999b; 2000). More
recently, Maximov (2016b) has shown that many-valued mathematical structures
are suitable for modelling some ideas of Vasil’ev’s logics.
6.3 The Paraconsistent Interpretation
In the meantime, as paraconsistent logics were being developed, an interpretation

began to make headway in which Vasil’ev was also seen as a forerunner of these.
Ayda I. Arruda, in her article “On the Imaginary Logic of N. A. Vasil’év” (1977)
ognize that the principle of bivalence does not hold for certain propositions (those on contingent
futures), Chrysippus, on the other hand, strongly argued that every proposition is either true or
false. The same observation, without any reference to Łukasiewicz, may be found in Rescher
(1969: 5, fn. 8) as well.
28
Cf. Bolc & Borowik (1992: 23).
29
Cf. Malinowski (1993: 2).
30
Cf. Biryukov (2001: 228–229); cf. also Biryukov & Shuranov (1998).
31
Suchoń (1999: 136).
32
Cf. Suchoń (1999: 137–138).
33
In addition to the classic article by Fisch & Turquette (1966), see also Engel-Tiercelin (1989) and
Lane (1999). See also Sect. 5.4 fn. 61.
6.3 The Paraconsistent Interpretation 113
inaugurating the paraconsistent interpretation of imaginary logic, displays a consid-

erable degree of prudence in stating that “Vasil’ev can (perhaps with much stronger
reasons than for the case of many-valued logic) be considered as a forerunner of
nonclassical logics constructed for the study of inconsistent nontrivial theories.”34
At the same time, she correctly recognizes that Vasil’ev’s logical conceptions can be
interpreted in different ways, so much so that it is difficult if not indeed impossible
to maintain that a formal system is the effective formalization of imaginary logic. A
certain system is, instead, only a formalization of a given interpretation of imagi-
nary logic.35 Arruda specifies furthermore, as do other authors, that she does not
wish to provide an exegesis of Vasil’ev’s works, and that her views on the Russian
logician’s ideas are based on the expositions set forth in the works of Smirnov
(1962), Comey (1965) and Kline (1965). Others in turn, in constructing formal sys-
tems that derive their inspiration from Vasil’ev, will work out their ideas from
Arruda’s articles, without having directly consulted the original sources.36
“According to some of Vasil’év’s insights,”37 Arruda works out three proposi-
tional calculi (V1, V2, and V3), in which she interprets metalogic as corresponding
to classical propositional calculus and imaginary logic as one extension of it.
Common to all three calculi is the acceptance of two types of negation, one that is
classical (or logical) and one that is non-classical (or ontological), for which the law
of contradiction is not valid. This is obtained in various ways. V1 uses two sorts of
propositional letters, classical and Vasil’ev’s. The negation has classical properties
when applied to the first, non-classical properties when applied to Vasil’ev’s propo-
sitional letters, in respect of which a contradiction can be produced. V3 on the other
hand, has both two symbols for classical and non-classical negation and two sym-
bols for classical and non-classical conjunction. The negation Arruda attributes to
Vasil’ev is of the propositional kind and, consequently, the law of contradiction
corresponds to the formula ¬(P ∧ ¬P), which, as Priest and Routley will note,38 does
not properly mirror the meaning of the ontological principle of contradiction which
Vasil’ev refuted.
Leila Z. Puga and Newton C. A. da Costa (1988) rely on Arruda’s formalizations
in presenting a first-order paraconsistent and paracomplete logical system, V*,
34
Arruda (1977: 4).
35
Later Arruda (1990: 13) would reassert that a paraconsistent interpretation of imaginary logic is
not the only possible one, since a variety of readings are conceivable, and that some formulations
of imaginary logic do lead to a paraconsistent logic.
36
Other than on Arruda (1977), on Arruda (1980: 7, 8–9; 1989: 102–103; 1984). The Brazilian
scholar examines Vasil’ev’s logical writings especially in Arruda (1984) and had begun to do so in
a more extensive work, having provided translations into Portuguese of Vasil’ev’s papers of 1910,
1912 and 1912–1913; these translations, however, were not complete and were left in a fragmen-
tary state. In 1990, Arruda’s work was organized and published posthumously as a volume (cf.
Arruda 1990) by I. M. L. D’Ottaviano, who also prepared the Preface of the book (cf. D’Ottaviano
1990a).
37
Arruda (1977: 4).
38
Cf. Priest & Routley (1989: 33).
which, developed “according to the spirit of Vasiliev’s approach,” “captures some of

Vasiliev’s more important intuitions,”39 without any pretence at faithfully expound-
ing his thought, so much so that their brief exposition of Vasil’ev’s ideas is based
again on Comey and two of Arruda’s articles. Following in Arruda, da Costa and
Puga’s footsteps, Alexander S. Karpenko (2002) also presents a classification of
paraconsistent logics that attempt to capture some of Vasil’ev’s key ideas. We may
add here Vladimir L. Vasyukov (1999), who, while working on da Costa’s paracon-
sistent algebra, elaborated (in conformity with Vasil’ev’s idea) a logical system
which is inconsistent on the ontological level, but consistent on the logical level.
Just as Arruda considers Vasil’ev “the first forerunner of paraconsistent logic,”
despite his not having played any role in the development of such a logic,40 so Itala
M. Loffredo D’Ottaviano (1990b) as well as da Costa, Jean-Yves Béziau and Otávio
Bueno (1995) also frame the Russian logician within the period of paraconsistent
logic’s gestation, considering him as a forerunner, not a founder, of such logics.41
Currently, the paraconsistent interpretation of imaginary logic is generally preferred
to the many-valued interpretation.42
Graham Priest and Richard Routley (1989), on the other hand, challenge both
of these interpretations and regard Vasil’ev rather as a founder, together with Hugh
MacColl and Charles Irving Lewis, of intensional logics.43 They recognize that the
negation that is required in the ontological principle of contradiction negated by
Vasil’ev is a predicate negation, not a sentential negation, and state that “this would
make his position quite compatible with classical sentential logic.”44 In addition in
their view, the reading Vasil’ev himself suggested, in one of his alternative ‘inter-
pretations’ of imaginary logic, of ‘S is P and not P’ as ‘S may be P’ (the accidental
judgment of the logic of concepts) “can be accommodated, more or less, in tradi-
tional logical theory.”45 Lastly, and this is what counts most, they maintain that
Vasil’ev had no idea of what lies at the heart of a paraconsistent theory: accepting
A ∧ ¬A, but at the same time demonstrating that in it A, ¬A ⊦ B is not valid.
39
Puga & da Costa (1988: 210, 205).
40
Cf. Arruda (1989: 102–103).
41
Cf. D’Ottaviano (1990b: 14, 17 ff.), da Costa, Béziau & Bueno (1995: 112 and fn. 3). Cf. also da
Costa & Krause (2003: 2, 4), D’Ottaviano & Gomes (2017).
42
In addition to the authors cited above, cf. Anosova (1982a; 1982b; 1984; 1985), who devoted a
number of writings to an examination of the links between Vasil’ev’s logical work and non-classi-
cal logics (intuitionistic, many-valued, of relevance and, above all, paraconsistent logics). In
Anosova’s opinion, imaginary logic lies at the basis of paraconsistent logics, whose discovery can
be traced back to the work of the Russian logician, and would yield fine results were it employed
to handle certain gnoseological problems that arise in the areas of both dialectical logic and of
dialectical materialism. Cf. also Drago (2001; 2003), whose paraconsistent formalization of
Vasil’ev’s logic agrees with da Costa and Puga’s V*; and Sautter (2009), who presents two para-
classical syllogistics which incorporate Vasil’ev’s ideas of accidental judgment and of the triangle
of oppositions.
43
Cf. Priest & Routley (1989: 29–30).
44
Priest & Routley (1989: 33).
45
Ibid.
6.3 The Paraconsistent Interpretation 115
Indeed, it is not enough to accept contradictions in a logical system, in order for

it to be paraconsistent, but it is necessary to show that such contradictions do not
make it trivial, and this is possible only if from a contradiction any formula cannot
be inferred, that is, if ⊦ is not explosive. In this reading, Vasil’ev would be revisit-
ing, instead, the theory of the syllogism, by showing it is legitimate to operate with
indifferent judgments.
It is true that Vasil’ev does not speak of a third truth-value, side by side with the
true and the false, but rather of a third type of judgment. It is also true that he does
not even speak of the non-validity of Pseudo-Scotus’s law, a fundamental condition
if a logical system is to be called paraconsistent. He maintains that a statement and
its corresponding negation cannot be simultaneously true: what can be true is a sole
judgment which maintains that a certain S possesses simultaneously the properties
P and non-P. However, both the many-valued and the paraconsistent interpretation
consider Vasil’ev only as a forerunner and argue that his logic can be formalized and
developed in a many-valued or a paraconsistent way, since it is evident that Vasil’ev
did not propose a complete logical system and that he worked with the traditional
logic.
In a follow-up paper, “Vasil’év and Imaginary Logic” (2000), Priest puts us on
guard against the danger of anachronism which is inherent in attempts to interpret
imaginary logic in terms of modern logic.46 After providing a brief reconstruction
of imaginary logic based on a reading of “Logic and Metalogic,” he goes on to set
forth his criticisms of Vasil’ev’s notions of negation, perception and metalogic.
Vasil’ev maintains that imaginary logic holds in a world that differs from our own,
and that in this other world the principle of contradiction lapses. Priest challenges
both Vasil’ev’s acceptance of the principle of contradiction in our world, and the
thesis of the variability of logical laws in other worlds. He argues that it is in fact
possible that in other worlds ‘not P’ has an extension different to the one it has in
our world. But, one might reply, given the plurality of worlds, it is also possible
that one may exist with the characteristics hypothesized by Vasil’ev. Furthermore,
Priest denies that we perceive only positive properties and states of affairs, which
is the reason why negation would be an inference. In his view, to the contrary, we
perceive also negative states of affairs, as for example, that a certain physical object
is transparent or opaque, either of which is the negation of the other. He deduces
consequently that imaginary logic might have an application in our world as well,
something that, as we have noted, would not have displeased Vasil’ev. However,
we could take a more cogent example not, as is usually done, from the realm of
physical reality, but from man’s world: can we perceive the absence of a person?
We certainly can, as a lack of possibility, of experience, of life.47 Essentially, Priest
wishes to get to the point of maintaining that the differences between our world
and the imaginary world can be eliminated, and that therefore imaginary
Cf. Priest (2000: 135).

46
The question of whether or not our senses can come into contact with the absence of something
47
was investigated in Indian thought. Cf. Raju (1985: 241 f.).

logic might hold, were it valid, in our own world.48 This thesis is also one that
Vasil’ev might share, since, in hypothesizing another world, he simply wished to
say that we need another logic in the event that the corresponding realm of objects
changes, and sought likewise to show the applicability of imaginary logic to our
world. Lastly, Priest is critical of the notion of metalogic, the fact that what Vasil’ev
held to be the logical laws belonging to metalogic underlie all forms of logic. Priest
argues that, in point of actual fact, all of the laws which Vasil’ev ascribes to meta-
logic (see Sect. 5.8) “may fail in some modern logics.”49 His concluding judgment
on Vasil’ev’s logic is that its value does not lie in its content, so much so that imagi-
nary logic remains in our time “little more than a curiosity”50: Vasil’ev was at the
same time a very radical and a very conservative logician. His conservatism lies in
psychologism and in his use of traditional logic, in a period when Frege, Husserl
and Russell were active. In this sense, Vasil’ev arrived too late. His radicalism is
discerned in being a forerunner of non-classical logics, or at least in being regarded
as such. In reality, Priest thinks that he cannot be inscribed among the predecessors
of many-valued logics, nor — even if it would be more appropriate — of paracon-
sistent logics. Perhaps he is so with regard to dialetheic logic, but it would be more
correct to insert him among the ranks of those who defend logical pluralism in the
manner of da Costa, and also among the theoreticians of impossible worlds. In that
case, he turns out to be too early.
Anticipating Priest by a few years, Gert-Jan C. Lokhorst (1988; 1998) had
already placed Vasil’ev’s logic within a theory of impossible worlds.51 By conceiv-
ing imaginary logic not only within an effective logical pluralism, but as a proposal
of a plurality of imaginary logics — something which in his view Arruda (1977),
who had not even clarified the idea of an ‘imaginary world,’ had overlooked52 —,
Lokhorst works out a modal extension of the series of da Costa’s paraconsistent
logics 𝒞n, 0 ≤ n ≤ ω, which would support the plurality of imaginary logics in rela-
tion to the plurality of worlds.53 It is superfluous to remark that the theory of
impossible worlds, just as is the case with the various forms of non-classical logic,
had also been developed independently of Vasil’ev.
48
Cf. Priest (2000: 140–141).
49
Priest (2000: 142).
50
Priest (2000: 143).
51
Cf. Lokhorst (1988; 1992: 81 ff.; 1998: 62).
52
Cf. Lokhorst (1988: 15). But concerning this second critique see Arruda (1984: 476, 478), with
reference to which Lokhorst (1988: 14, fn. 6; 1992: 85, fn. 6) declares he based his own
exposition.
53
According to Lokhorst (1988; 1992: Chap. 5), Vasil’ev’s logics, which accept a plurality of
worlds, effectively explain logical relativism, that is, the view stating that different peoples have
“different logics” and “different standards of rationality.”
6.4 Syllogistic Reconstructions of Imaginary Logic 117
6.4 Syllogistic Reconstructions of Imaginary Logic
Another line of interpretation tries to reconstruct Vasil’ev’s logic in terms of a syl-

logistic adapted to modern standards, combining it both with propositional calculus
and the calculus of predicates. Vladimir A. Smirnov initiated this type of interpreta-
tion. In the 1980s, he dismissed the characterization of Vasil’ev as a forerunner of
many-valued, intuitionistic and paraconsistent logics,54 taking his logical system as
a non-standard syllogistic based on classical propositional calculus. Smirnov pro-
vides an axiomatization of the logic of concepts in terms of classical syllogistic,
acknowledging Vasil’ev’s two different interpretations of accidental judgment (see
Sect. 3.2, fn. 43). He gives a syllogistic reconstruction of imaginary logic with its
seven types of judgment (three universal and four accidental), which he translates
into the language of the predicate calculus, and also a syllogistic system that
accounts for the multidimensional logic which Vasil’ev understood as a generaliza-
tion of imaginary logic.55
A group of Russian logicians proceeded along the path opened up by Smirnov’s
studies. T. P. Kostiuk and V. I. Markin (1997a) offer a formal reconstruction of
Vasil’ev’s assertoric syllogistic, taking the fundamental syllogistic of Brentano-
Leibniz, the syllogistic fragment in Bolzano’s logic, and the traditional syllogistic
formalized by Łukasiewicz as the object of their studies.56 Moreover, they con-
structed a calculus (named IL) which provides an adequate formalization of
Vasil’ev’s imaginary logic.57 Andrei Kouznetsov (2000), drawing inspiration from
Vasil’ev’s notion of a multidimensional logic, and Smirnov’s account of it, con-
structs a pseudo-Boolean multidimensional algebra on a generalized sequences of
classes. Of considerable interest here is a proposal set forth by Vladimir I. Markin
and Dmitry Zaitsev (1999b; 2002) to formalize a variation of imaginary logic,
which they call “imaginary logic-2” (IL2), to which Kline had already drawn our
attention. In this kind of imaginary logic, terms do not denote individuals but con-
cepts composed of sets of properties, so that alongside affirmation there is both
absolute and relative negation. Semantics and the axiomatization they have worked
out take into account all types of proposition in imaginary logic, and, for this reason,
figure among those that remain most faithful to Vasil’ev’s text.58
54
Cf. V. A. Smirnov (1989a: 625–626).
55
Cf. V. A. Smirnov (1986; 1989a; 1989c). A formal reconstruction of Vasil’ev’s idea of an
n-dimensional logic is given by Kostiuk (2000).
56
Cf. also Kostiuk & Markin (1997b), Karpinskaia & Markin (1999), Kostiuk (1999a; 1999b).
57
Cf. Kostiuk & Markin (1998).
58
Cf. Markin & Zaitsev (2002); Engl. transl. of Zaitsev & Markin (1999b). An appreciation as well
as a critical evaluation of “imaginary logic-2” is provided by Moretti (2007: 391 ff.), who gives a
paraconsistent interpretation of it expressing some paraconsistent syllogisms and linking therefore
the recent Russian research on Vasil’ev’s logic with the paraconsistent interpretation of it. Markin
(2013) offers a syntactical survey of such attempts to reconstruct Vasil’ev’s assertoric syllogistic,
to formalize imaginary logic (IL), to generalize it as an n-dimensional logic, to provide a formal
reconstruction of a variation of imaginary logic (IL2), as well as to give temporal and modal inter-
Already in 1954, after giving a synthetic account of the fundamental theses of the
logic of concepts and of imaginary logic, Antoni Korcik had outlined how syllogis-
tic would change if the new forms of judgment Vasil’ev had introduced were to be
assumed. In particular, he listed which modes would lapse (Bamalip and Darapti)
and which would retain their validity (Darii, Ferio, Festino, Baroco, Datisi, Ferison,
Dimatis, Fresison), if one adopted among the premisses the particular affermative
judgment in Vasil’ev’s sense or the indifferent judgment.59 The results of Korcik’s
work, despite the fact that he is cited from time to time, have not been harvested
however. Later, Wojciech Suchoń provided a syllogistic reconstruction both of the
logic of concepts and of imaginary logic according to modern standards.60 In addi-
tion, Andrew Schumann has provided a vectorial lattice for the language of both
Aristotle and Vasil’ev’s syllogistic,61 and has showed that both Aristotle’s syllogistic
and Vasil’ev’s syllogistic are contained in non-empty Leśniewski’s ontology.62
Summing up, Vasil’ev has hitherto been considered to be a forerunner of many-
valued and paraconsistent logics, of intensional logics and of theories of impossible
worlds. We may draw both positive and negative conclusions from this variety of
readings of his work. It is not possible to stick a label onto imaginary logic both
because, as Priest warned, one risks falling into anachronism, and also because
Vasil’ev’s work had no direct impact of any of these forms of logic. To the contrary,
it was only after these disciplines reached a certain level of development that steps
were taken to cast about for predecessors, one of whom was identified in Vasil’ev.63
On the other hand, it remains a fact that Vasil’ev’s insights and ideas have been
elaborated, and still lend themselves to development in a variety of directions. The
variety of interpretations examined here is an obvious mark of the richness of sug-
gestions contained in his writings.64
pretations of imaginary logic (cf. Markin 1998). A volume edited by Zaitsev & Markin (eds., 2017)
contains papers by Markin, Mikirtumov, Popov & Shangin, Smirnova, Vasyukov, and Zaitsev,
which offer reconstructions and new applications of Vasil’ev’s logics.
59
Cf. Korcik (1954: 40–42).
60
Cf. Suchoń (1998a; 1998b).
61
Cf. Schumann (2006).
62
Schumann (2013: 81–84).
63
Bazhanov (2009b: 130–132) gives a theoretical explanation of the different interpretations that
have been given of Vasil’ev’s work. The reason why the latter was not soon recognized as a fore-
runner of non-classical logics lies in the syllogistic form, that is, in the language adopted by
Vasil’ev. That imaginary logic has been regarded as anticipating now intuitionistic, now many-
valued or paraconsistent logic depends on the fact that new generations interpret informal ideas
according to their goals and interests.
64
As often occurs in philosophy, there is no lack of clearly opposing assessments of such liveliness
of studies; cf. Mikirtumov (2013: 137). However, confirming that not only the contemporary schol-
ars received ingenious and enthusiastic incentives by Vasil’ev, but also his ideas themselves are
fertile, one can read Guglielminetti (2014), who not only connects Priest with Vasil’ev but gives a
metaphysical interpretation of imaginary logic on the basis of the hypothesis that “different forms
of imaginary logic may find their ontological anchorage in a metaphysics of the addition,” (p. 373)
that is, a metaphysics in which being is meant as being-more-than-itself.
6.5 Systematic Historical Readings of Imaginary Logic 119
6.5 Systematic Historical Readings of Imaginary Logic
Systematic historical investigations based on a direct examination of Vasil’ev’s

writings constitute a further area for research. We have already had occasion to draw
attention to the worthy and wide-ranging works of Bazhanov, who roams over the
entire field of the Russian logician’s oeuvre, covering also areas that are not strictly
of a philosophical orientation. In this field of research, Fania Cavaliere’s doctoral
thesis (1992–1993) is also worthy of particular notice. Cavaliere situates Vasil’ev
within the respective fields of Russian and Western logic in the period between the
end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. In her view, Vasil’ev’s
work is to be read in relation to the problems and themes analyzed by the algebraists
of logic.65 Moreover, the logic of concepts is taken as showing affinities with Hugh
MacColl’s intensional logic, to which Cavaliere devotes part of her work. In particu-
lar, the logic of concepts is seen as constituting “the pivotal nucleus and most com-
prehensive and coherent aspect of Vasil’ev’s investigations,”66 whilst imaginary
logic, within which Vasil’ev attempts to integrate the logic of concepts, is taken to
be a system of a different order, in which Vasil’ev would be advancing new insights,
while refraining from working his ideas out in depth and giving them a systematic
form.
The work of Roger Vergauwen and Evgeny A. Zaytsev (2003) fits into the same
vein of research. They read Vasil’ev’s work together with certain aspects of
Aristotle’s logic (the theory of oppositions, in particular that regarding possession
and privation, the traditional square of opposition, the relation between syllogistic
and the ontological distinction of genus and species) and Kant’s distinction between
a pure general logic and a transcendental logic. They go on to deny the psychologis-
tic character of imaginary logic, something which is widely recognized by scholars,
even if evaluations of it differ.
Now, while the thesis defended by the authors, that Vasil’ev’s psychologism is to
be considered in relation to the Russian tradition of neo-Kantianism of that time,67
is very plausible (and I have earlier glanced at the role played by Vvedensky and
Lapshin in the development of our author’s logical theories, see Sect. 2.1), the idea
that such a psychologism is only “alleged” or “presumed”68 leads to the conclusion
that Vasil’ev had no clear idea of what he meant when he wrote, for example, that
“[t]he law of absolute difference between truth and falsehood applies to the cogniz-
ing subject,”69 and that “the invariability of the cognizing subject and its rational
functions” is a sine qua non condition, if logic is to exist (“When these are lacking
then logic is absent”70), or that metalogic “contains only laws of pure thought, of
65
Cf. Cavaliere (1992–1993: 45–46).
66
Cavaliere (1992–1993: 121).
67
Cf. Vergauwen & Zaytsev (2003: 213 ff.).
68
Vergauwen & Zaytsev (2003: 209, 220).
69
Vasil’ev (1912: 218 = 1989: 64 [2003: 137]).
70
Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 59 = 1989: 101–102 [1993: 334]).
judgment and inference in general, it reflects only the nature of the cognizing
subject.”71 What would psychologism be, if not the conception that postulates the
existence of a subject as a precondition for logic, and which therefore regards the
logical laws as laws of thought? Imaginary logic is grounded on the distinction
between the ‘rational’ element, which concerns the subject or thought, and the
‘empirical’ element, which regards the object or reality. What is rational, or formal,
is immutable; what is empirical, or material, may vary, and the plurality of logics
follows on from such variations. Psychologism is maintaining that the formal ele-
ments of logic regard the knowing subject and thought. Werner Stelzner (2001) has
defended vigorously the view that ‘psychologism’ is not an ugly term, and that it
does not necessarily imply or mean subjectivism. He recognizes Vasil’ev’s psy-
chologism precisely in the thesis that binds the logic to the psychical organization
of the knowing subject.72
Stelzner makes a far-reaching argument on psychologism. In the period of transi-
tion from traditional formal logic to modern logic, the much deprecated psycholo-
gistic logic had provided, in his view, relevant contributions of a logical-philosophical
nature, above all for what concerns the theory of judgment, and promoted progress
towards non-classical notions of logic. Vasil’ev’s work would turn out to be one of
the clearest confirmations of such a thesis.73 Already in 1908 Vasil’ev had declared
that psychology is the stable foundation of logic.74 In the following years, the role of
psychologism in Vasil’ev’s work would be clarified in the sense that it does not lead
to a model of psychological grounding, but shows its prolific character in the elabo-
ration of non-classical logical proposals. Even though he may not have developed a
complete system of non-classical logic and some of his criticisms of logic are based
on a misunderstanding of classical positions, Vasil’ev would have nonetheless under-
stood his own work as a proposal that was both alternative and opposed to traditional
syllogistic.75 Certainly, the operation he set in motion was non-Aristotelian, but in a
limited manner, being restricted to traditional logic, whose fundamental logical prin-
ciples he questions, although he leaves untouched both the subject-predicate struc-
ture of propositions and the predominance of the syllogistic form in argumentation.
The results obtained are more destructive of classical principles than they are coher-
ent constructions of new perspectives. All this makes Vasil’ev a precursor, rather
than a protagonist in the history of non-classical logics.76
Stelzner argues that in the 1910 essay one can discern an anti-Aristotelian ten-
dency, but that this cannot yet be taken in a non-classical sense, in so far as Vasil’ev
does not cast doubts on any of the fundamental classical positions. His first attempt
to revise Aristotelian logic remains within the classical framework and is essentially
71
Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 73 = 1989: 115 [1993: 345]).
72
Cf. Stelzner (2001: 266), Stelzner & Kreiser (2004: 264). Sorina (2017) interprets Vasil’ev’s
position as an anti-antipsychologism.
73
Other than the texts mentioned in the preceding note, cf. also Stelzner (2003).
74
Cf. Vasil’ev ([1908]/1989: 141).
75
Cf. Stelzner (2001: 250), Stelzner & Kreiser (2004: 256).
76
Cf. Stelzner (2001: 253–254), Stelzner & Kreiser (2004: 258–259).
6.6 Meinong and Vasil’ev: A Not-Impossible Connubium 121
determined in a pragmatic and linguistic sense. From 1912 onwards (though his
1911 address goes in the same direction), Vasil’ev radicalizes his position and sets
himself the task of developing a logic that would be fundamentally alternative to the
traditional logic, by linking the construction of the new logic with the idea that
Aristotelian logic, or better, some of its fundamental laws, have an empirical char-
acter and depend on the structure of our world and even on our perceptive and sen-
sorial capacities.77
Stelzner considers that Vasil’ev himself had developed some elements of a
relevant-paraconsistent syllogistic,78 and endeavours to grasp the fundamental
structure of imaginary logic in terms of the logic of relevance worked out by
Anderson, Belnap and Dunn.79 By introducing the truth-values Truth, False and
Both, to which he adds None, Stelzner constructs matrices for negation, conjunction
and disjunction in the sense of a semantics for a system of tautological entailment,
arguing that a semantics of this kind could constitute an adequate base for a logical
development of Vasil’ev’s ideas.80
6.6 Meinong and Vasil’ev: A Not-Impossible Connubium
One could argue that the interpretations that have been given are biased in so far as
they proceed from the assumption of a precise point of view. Yet what interpretation
is exempt from bias? The interpretation I myself will now propose, which exploits
some of the riches produced by readings that have engaged more attentively with
Vasil’ev’s writings, has also no pretensions to impartiality. Let’s start from Markin
and Zaitsev’s “imaginary logic-2.” They formalize that ‘interpretation’ of imagi-
nary logic which had attracted Kline, wherein the terms denote not individuals, but
rather concepts constituted of sets of properties. In this interpretation, we have three
types of proposition (affirmation, absolute negation and relative negation), to which
correspond truth, absolute falsehood and relative falsehood. Priest drew attention to
the fact that we require a logic that can operate with contradictions, contradictions
that are given in our, not in an imaginary, world. It is a fact that our world, particu-
larly the social-historical world, is not exempt from contradictions; therefore, let us
adopt Priest’s requirement. If we do so, the interpretation under consideration,
according to Vasil’ev, applies, not to the imaginary world, but to our own. We should
recall at this point that, according to Vasil’ev, individuals also, if not taken in a pre-
cise spatial-temporal moment but rather over the whole duration of their existence,
are very similar to concepts. Arruda, without however going into great detail, hints
77
Cf. Stelzner (2001: 256, 258–259), Stelzner & Kreiser (2004: 176, 259).
78
Cf. Stelzner (2001: 253), Stelzner & Kreiser (2004: 258).
79
Cf. Anderson & Belnap (1975), Anderson et al. (1992).
80
Cf. Stelzner (2000: 139–141; 2001: 274–280), Stelzner & Kreiser (2004: 269–274).
at a use of imaginary logic for the study of Meinong’s object theory.81 In effect, we
have seen that there are several points in common shared by Meinong and Vasil’ev:
the notions of incomplete objects, of impossible objects, of objects of higher order,
and, if we accept some recent interpretations of Meinong, also the notion of impos-
sible worlds. Another point they share in common, furthermore, is their acceptance
of the indifferent judgment, since, according to Meinong, an impossible object such
as the round square is simultaneously round and non-round. To this I would add a
theory of grades of falsehood applied to judgments. We are already familiar with
Vasil’ev’s position. Here, I will restrict myself to a brief exposition of Meinong’s
view, in order to give an idea of how we might lay out the groundwork for a com-
bined study of the object theory and imaginary logic.
Not unlike many exponents of traditional formal logic (we have earlier encoun-
tered the names of Sigwart, Ueberweg and Lotze), Meinong distinguishes between
judgment as a mental fact and proposition as its linguistic expression. In his Über
Annahmen [On Assumptions] (19021, 19102), this distinction takes on a particular
significance, in that there one reads that a proposition expresses a judgment only if
it asserts a conviction regarding a certain object.82 The moment of conviction,
whereby something is asserted with a claim to being true,83 is a specific and pecu-
liar characteristic of the judgment; another is the position, which can either be
affirmation or negation. It can happen that one is not always convinced of some-
thing one says, that affirmations are made in bad faith, or that one argues on the
basis of hypotheses. In these instances, propositions do not express judgments, but
rather assumptions. “An assumption is a judgment without conviction,”84 one that
does possess the modal moment but is asserted without any claim to being true.
Typical cases where we employ assumptions are provided by lying, playing, theat-
rical performances, and narrative works, in brief, by fictional contexts. Meinong
recognizes a quantitative moment in judgments as psychical acts, which is expressed
as “the more and less of judgmental certainty [das Mehr und Weniger an Gewißheit
des Urteilens],”85 and points out a close relationship subsisting between degrees of
certainty and degrees of probability. Thus, the assumption is the lower limit of a
continuous series of grades, “a sort of limit-case of the judgment, characterized by
the zero-value of the strength of conviction.”86 Inversely, “judgments may be con-
sidered as assumptions to which the moment of belief (in one of its degrees) has
been added,”87 a degree that may vary in increasing and decreasing measure. The
assumption also shows, according to Meinong, a moment that is not properly one
81
Cf. Arruda (1977: 21; 1984: 489).
82
Cf. Meinong (1902: 2, 25; 1910: GA iv, 2, 32 [1983: 10, 29]).
83
Cf. Meinong (1910: GA iv, 357 [1983: 255]; 1917: GA iii, 305 [1972: 19]).
84
Meinong (1902: 257; 1910: GA iv, 340, 368 [1983: 242, 262–263]); cf. also Meinong (1921: GA
vii, 33). The terms ‘conviction’ or ‘belief’ (Überzeugung, Glauben) and ‘assumption’ (Annahme)
are used in a technical sense, and not according to the meanings they have in everyday language.
85
Meinong (1910: GA iv, 342 [1983: 244]).
86
Meinong (1910: GA iv, 344 [1983: 245]).
87
Meinong (1917: GA iii, 333 [1972: 44]).
6.6 Meinong and Vasil’ev: A Not-Impossible Connubium 123
of conviction, but is so similar to one to make the assumption seem akin to a judg-
ment, although it does not cease to be an assumption.
We know that, for Meinong, the objects of judgments and assumptions are the
‘objectives,’88 for which he does not provide a definition, but rather a description,
bringing out the properties characterizing them that distinguish them from other
types of objects. Objectives are ideal objects of higher order, that at most subsist,
and are truth bearers. They are objects of higher order because they require objecta
(that is, the objects of representations) as their presuppositions just as judgments
require representations as their constituent parts. Objectives are therefore complex
objects. An objective expressed by the judgment ‘A is B’ is a superius, which is built
on the objecta A and B; the objective ‘that A is B’ is the immediate object of the
judgment, while the objecta A and B are the mediated objects about which one judg-
es.89 With the notion of objective Meinong intends at first to answer the question:
what do we know in the case of a true negative judgment like ‘there was no attack
in Baghdad’? We do not know the attack in Baghdad, that simply was not there, but
a sentence with ‘that’: ‘that there was no attack in Baghdad.’ This is not “a piece of
reality” because the judgment denies the existence of it,90 but something that — in
the case the judgment is true — subsists like every ideal object. However, not only
negations, but also affirmations and false judgments have objectives as their objects.
In the latter case, the objective does not even subsist; on the contrary, a true objec-
tive subsists and designates a fact.91
What interests us here is exactly that objectives are truth bearers as well as
Husserl’s states of affairs or Russell’s propositions. Now, a true objective, in that it
designates a fact, is factual (tatsächlich). Conversely, a false objective is unfactual
(untatsächlich). In Über Annahmen (1910), Meinong does not give a definition of
factuality (Tatsächlichkeit), but just a description of it. Factuality is a modal prop-
erty of the objective,92 the end of a scale of magnitude, a scale whose points corre-
spond to different degrees of possibility,93 and is an indication of the truth of the
objective: “what one asserts is true when it agrees with what is — or with what is
factual.”94 Still in Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit [On Possibility and
Probability] (1915) Meinong does not define factuality, but illustrates it with exam-
ples: that there are the antipodes, that the magnetic needle is deflected by the gal-
vanic current, are factual objectives; while that there are spirits, that the round
square exists, that radioactivity and magnetism are the same thing, are unfactual
objectives. The spectrum of possibilities extends between factuality and unfactual-
ity. Possibility also is a modal property of an objective.
88
Cf. Meinong (1904: GA ii, 387 [1960: 80]; 1910: GA iv, 44 [1983: 38]; 1915: GA vi, 26–27).
89
Cf. Meinong (1910: GA iv, 49 ff., 62–63, 135 [1983: 42 ff., 50–51, 101]; 1917: GA iii, 389–390
[1972: 93–95]).
90
Cf. Meinong (1910: GA iv, 42–43 [1983: 37–38]).
91
Cf. Meinong (1910: GA iv, 69 [1983: 55]).
92
Cf. Meinong (1910: GA iv, 83 [1983: 65]).
93
Cf. Meinong (1910: GA iv, 89 [1983: 68]).
94
Meinong (1910: GA iv, 94 [1983: 71]).
Factuality is the maximum of possibility, and possibility is ‘factuality of a lower degree,’

diminished, or, so to speak, incomplete factuality.95
Meinong calls subfactuality (Untertatsächlichkeit) this “gradually diminished fac-

tuality,” that varies between the two limits of factuality and unfactuality.96 Between
the factual and unfactual objectives there are, therefore, ‘subfactual’ objectives,
whose factuality is open and which are known by means of assumptions.97
An objective can be factual or true, unfactual or false, subfactual according to
degrees that have, as their upper limit, the absolutely true and as their lower limit the
absolutely false. The formalization of imaginary logic in the interpretations which
we spoke of above, one suggested by Vasil’ev himself, could constitute an adequate
logical basis for Meinong’s ontology. Imaginary logic not only gives an account of
objects that are incomplete, impossible and of a higher order, it not only holds that
judgments that attribute contradictory properties to the selfsame subject can be true,
but shares the Meinongian exigency of explaining the complexity of the world by
introducing the more and the less with respect to the truth of judgments or of their
respective objects. It is true that, as Suchoń has noted, this alternative model of an
imaginary logic was not worked out by Vasil’ev. Yet, developing a philosophy does
not mean constructing it ex novo, but rather adding something to what has already
been done. Meinong also had no idea of Meinongian semantics, and these also work
upon variations of the object theory, whose fundamental insights they seek to cap-
ture.98 We have seen that the same has been done by many scholars who have devel-
oped logics inspired by imaginary logic and have captured some insights from it.
For this reason, starting from the close study of the texts, one may uncover common
ground between Meinong and Vasil’ev, fertile terrain to work over, where one may
cultivate the growth of fresh ideas.
6.7 Conclusion
Though he did not develop complete formal systems, Vasil’ev showed in a clear-cut
manner how rich in suggestiveness and new problematics traditional logic is. From
the interpretation he provided of it, non-classical perspectives and themes (quanti-
fiers, modality, incomplete and contradictory objects, imaginary worlds) have
emerged that have had an echo in later logic, and, in more recent times, have inspired
new directions for research.
His endeavour, if not properly to build, but to show the possibility and soundness
of a logic that dispenses with the principles of contradiction and of excluded middle,
95
Meinong (1915: GA vi, 92).
96
Cf. Meinong (1915: GA vi, 147).
97
I have provided in Raspa (2005: 199ff.) a more thorough discussion of the Meinongian concepts
mentioned here.
98
As Parsons (1980: xii), Lambert (1983: xiii), and Jacquette (1996: 3, 11) explicitly declare.
6.7 Conclusion 125
starts from an analysis of the structure of judgment. In his essay “On Particular
Judgments, the Triangle of Oppositions, and the Law of Excluded Fourth,” Vasil’ev
provided a close analysis of particular judgment, drawing out consequences that
burgeoned into an original interpretation of the relations expressed by the traditional
square of opposition, and a questioning of the principle of excluded middle. He thus
suggested a way for dealing logically with incomplete objects. With the distinction
between judgments about facts and judgments about concepts, he laid emphasis on
the ontological basis of formal logic, an aspect that will emerge more saliently in his
later articles. In his Imaginary Logic (Conspectus of a Lecture), Vasil’ev states that
“logic depends on the properties of our reality or of our sensations.”99 For example,
negation, as it is understood in his “Imaginary (non-Aristotelian) Logic” and in his
“Logic and Metalogic,” is bound to the structure of our world and to our sensorial
faculties. Such a thesis, which in his time seemed to be little more than a provoca-
tion, today finds interesting points of confirmation and invites us to at least examine
whether, or to what degree, formal logics contain elements that reflect our under-
standing of the world and of the types of objects we deal with. Through a study of
judgments on contradictory objects and of the modes of realization of inferences in
which such judgments occur, Vasil’ev manages “to show the possibility of a logic
and of logical operations different from those which we use.”100 With the hypothesis
of imaginary worlds, in which contradictory objects are granted, he proposes a fruit-
ful application of hypothetical reasoning to logic and becomes an exponent of logi-
cal pluralism, even suggesting the idea of an “infinity of possible logical systems.”101
It is from this perspective that Vasil’ev stakes his position within an age-old debate
on the logical form of judgments and on the nature of the laws of logic, foreseeing
the possibility of developing a multidimensional logic that is valid not only for indi-
viduals, or for complete and non-contradictory objects, but also for incomplete
objects like the circle in general, or the centaur, and even for contradictory objects.
Though the survey I have undertaken of the range of interpretations of Vasil’ev’s
imaginary logic aspires to be comprehensive, ongoing research will no doubt yield
up further perspectives which have escaped my scrutiny.102 However, besides offer-
99
Vasil’ev (1911/1989: 130); cf. also Vasil’ev (1925: 109).
100
Vasil’ev (1912: 207 = 1989: 53 [2003: 127]).
101
Vasil’ev (1912–1913a: 81 = 1989: 123 [1993: 351]).
102
Two International Conferences have demonstrated the renewed interest in Vasil’ev. The first,
N. A. Vasiliev’s “Imaginary logic” and the modern nonclassical logics, was held in Kazan from the
11th to the 15th of October 2010, and was attended by V. A. Bazhanov, W. Stelzner, N. N.
Nepejvoda, F. F. Serebryakov, G. V. Greenenko, L. G. Tonojan, G. N. Zverev, S. M. Kuskova, D. H.
Mushtari, A. Costa-Leite, L. L. Maksimova, K. Ambos-Spies, V. L. Vasyukov, I. V. Khomenko,
A. V. Chagrov, N. G. Baranetz, A. B. Verevkin, S. B. Cooper, I. D’Ottaviano, V. A. Kinosyan, V. D.
Solovyev, V. V. Gorbatov, K. A. Pavlov, S. M. Antakov, V. I. Kurashov, and S. N. Tronin. The sec-
ond, NikolaiVasiliev’s Logical Legacy and Modern Logic, took place in Moscow on 24th–25th
October 2012. The proceedings (Zaitsev & Markin, eds., 2017) contain papers by V. A. Bazhanov,
J.-Y. Beziau, O. Bueno, J. Bueno-Soler & W. Carnielli, J. V. T. da Mata, I. M. L. D’Ottaviano &
E. L. Gomes, V. I. Markin, I. B. Mikirtumov, V. M. Popov & V. O. Shangin, G. Priest, E. D.
Smirnova, G. V. Sorina, W. Stelzner, V. L. Vasyukov, and D. V. Zaitsev.
ing an overall view on the studies conducted to date on imaginary logic, it aims to
provide readers with a synopsis of important issues that warrant deeper reflection.
Those who are tempted to amuse themselves by giving an interpretation of imagi-
nary logic, may appropriate one of the many already formulated, or, otherwise,
come up with a new proposal. On the basis of the law of the cornucopia of argu-
ments, which has never ceased to hold for philosophy, there is a place for
everyone.
Bibliography1
1. Works of Nikolai Aleksandrovich Vasil’ev
1.1. Published works
— 1904. Toska po vechnosti [Longing for Eternity]. Kazan: Tipolitografia of V. M. Kliuchnikov,

155 pp. [= Tocкa пo вeчнocти. Кaзaнь: Типолитография B. M. Ключникoвa, 1904. 155 c.].
— 1906. Perevod s angliiskogo gl.iii–viknigi Bena A. Psikhologiia. Tom 2 [Translation from
the English of Chs. III–VI of the book Bain A. Psychology. Vol. 2]. Ed. by V. N. Ivanov.
Moskva: M. N. Prokopovich – xiv, 301, 104 pp. [Пepeвoд c aнглийcкoгo гл.iii–viкниги БЭнa
A. Пcиxoлoгия. Toм 2. Пoд peдaкциeй B. H. Ивaнoвcкoгo. Mocквa: M. H. Пpoкoпoвич,
1906 – xiv, 301, 104 c.].
— 1907a. Verhaeren, Émile, Obezumevshie derevni [The Moonstruck Countrysides]. Translated
by N. A. Vasil’ev. Kazan: Izd. Kazan. kom. obshch.-va pomoshchi golodaiushchim, 95 pp. [=
Bepxapн, Эмиль, Oбeзyмeвшиe дepeвни. Пepeвoд H. A. Bacильeвa. Кaзaнь: Изд. Кaзaн.
кoм. oбщ-вa пoмoщи гoлoдaющим, 1907. 95 c.].
— 1907b. Émile Verhaeren. In Verhaeren, Émile, Obezumevshie derevni [The Moonstruck
Countrysides]. Translated by N. A. Vasil’ev, 74–95. Kazan: Izd. Kazan. kom. obshch.-va
pomoshchi golodaiushchim [= Эмиль Bepxapн // Bepxapн, Эмиль, Oбeзyмeвшиe дepeвни.
Пepeвoд H. A. Bacильeвa. Кaзaнь: Изд. Кaзaн. кoм. oбщ-вa пoмoщи гoлoдaющим, 1907,
c. 74–95].
— 1908a. Programma po psikhologii [A Program for Psychology]. Kazan, 5 pp. [= Пpoгpaммa пo
пcиxoлoгии. Кaзaнь 1908. 5 c.]. Repr. in Bazhanov, V. A., N. A. Vasil’ev i ego voobrazhae-
maia logika. Voskreshenie odnoi zabytoi idei [N. A. Vasil’ev and his Imaginary Logic. The
Rebirth of a Forgotten Idea], 223–227. Moskva: Kanon+, 2009 [= Бaжaнoв, B. A., H. A.
Bacильeв и eгo вooбpaжaeмaя лoгикa. Bocкpeшeниe oднoй зaбытoй идeи. Mocквa:
Кaнoн+, 2009, c. 223–227].
1
The bibliography is divided into three sections: 1. Works of N. A. Vasil’ev, 2. Works on N. A.
Vasil’ev, 3. Other works. English translations have been placed immediately after the originals.
With regard to ancient sources, I have used the texts as printed in critical editions.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66086-8
128 Bibliography
— 1908b. Lektsii po psikhologii, chitannye na Kazanskikh vysshikh zhenskikh kursakh [Lectures

on Psychology, Read in the Women’s College in Kazan]. 1st ed., Kazan, 228 pp. [= Лeкции
пo пcиxoлoгии, читaнныe нa Кaзaнcкиx выcшиx жeнcкиx кypcax. 1-oe изд., Кaзaнь 1908,
228 c.].
— 1909a. Grezy starogo doma [Dreams of an Old House]. In Tvorchestvo [Creation], 99–107.
Kazan: Tipolitografia of I. S. Perov [= Гpeзы cтapoгo дoмa // Tвopчecтвo. Кaзaнь:
Типолитография И. C. Пepoвa, 1909, c. 99–107].
— 1909b. Svinbern. Perevody iz O. Ch. Svinberna [Swinburne. Translations of Algernon Charles
Swinburne]. In Tvorchestvo [Creation], 121–148. Kazan: Tipolitografia of I. S. Perov [=
Cвинбepн. Пepeвoды из O. Ч. Cвинбepнa // Tвopчecтвo. Кaзaнь: Типолитография И. C.
Пepoвa, 1909, c. 121–148].
— 1909c. Znachenie Darvina v filosofii [The Meaning of Darwin in Philosophy]. Kamsko-
Volzhskaia Rech’. Kazan (30 January 1909), Feuilleton [= Знaчeниe Дapвинa в филocoфии //
Кaмcкo-Boлжcкaя Peчь. Кaзaнь 1909, 30 янвapия (Фeльeтoнь)]. Repr. in Bazhanov, V. A.,
N. A. Vasil’ev i ego voobrazhaemaia logika. Voskreshenie odnoi zabytoi idei [N. A. Vasil’ev and
his Imaginary Logic. The Rebirth of a Forgotten Idea], 216–223. Moskva: Kanon+, 2009 [=
Бaжaнoв, B. A., H. A. Bacильeв и eгo вooбpaжaeмaя лoгикa. Bocкpeшeниe oднoй зaбытoй
идeи. Mocквa: Кaнoн+, 2009, c. 216–223].
— 1909d. O Gogole [On Gogol]. Kamsko-Volzhskaia Rech’. Kazan, No. 134 (20 March 1909):
3–4; (25 March): 5 [= O Гoгoлe // Кaмcкo-Boлжcкaя Peчь. Кaзaнь, № 134, 1909, 20 мapтa,
c. 3–4; 25 мapтa, c. 5].
— 1909e. Poeziia Svinberna [Swinburne’s Poetry]. Vestnik Evropy [The European Herald]. Sankt-
Peterburg, xliv (August 1909), 8: 507–523 [= ПoЭзия Cвинбepнa // Becтник Евpoпы.
Caнкт-Пeтepбypг, xliv, 1909, aвгycт. Кн. 8, c. 507–523].
— 1909f. Tretii Mezhdunarodnyi filosofskii Kongress v Heidelberge (31-go avgusta–5-go sen-
tiabria 1908 goda novogo stilia) [Third International Congress of Philosophy in Heidelberg
(31 August–5 September 1908 of the Gregorian calendar)]. Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo
Prosveshcheniia [The Journal of the Ministry of Education]. New series, xix (February 1909).
Sankt-Peterburg: Senatokaia tipografiia, pp. 53–85 [= Tpeтий Meждyнapoдный филocoфcкий
Кoнгpecc в Гeйдeльбepгe (31-гo aвгycтa–5-гo ceнтябpя 1908 гoдa нoвoгo cтиля) // Жypнaл
Mиниcтepcтвa Hapoднoгo Пpocвeщeния. Hoвaя cepия, Ч. xix. 1909, фeвpaль. Caнкт-
Пeтepбypг: Ceнaтoкaя типoгpaфия, c. 53–85].
— 1910. O chastnykh suzhdeniiakh, o treugol’nike protivopolozhnostei, o zakone iskliuchen-
nogo chetvertogo [On Particular Judgments, the Triangle of Oppositions, and the Law of
Excluded Fourth]. Uchenye zapiski Imperatorskogo Kazanskogo Universiteta [Scientific
Memoirs of the Imperial University of Kazan], year lxxvii, book 10 (October 1910).
Kazan: Tipolitografia of the Imperial University, pp. 1–47 [= O чacтныx cyждeнияx, o
тpeyгoльникe пpoтивoпoлoжнocтeй, o зaкoнe иcключeннoгo чeтвepтoгo // yчeныe зaпиcки
Импepaтopcкoгo Кaзaнcкoгo yнивepcитeтa, Гoд lxxvii, дecятaя книгa, 1910, oктябpь.
Кaзaнь: Типолитография Импepaтopcoгo yнивepcитeтa, c. 1–47]. Repr. in Vasil’ev,
N. A., Voobrazhaemaia logika. Izbrannye trudy [Imaginary Logic. Selected Works]. Ed. by
V. A. Smirnov, 12–53. Moskva: Nauka, 1989 [= Bacильeв, H. A., Booбpaжaeмaя лoгикa.
Избpaнныe тpyды. Пoд peдaкциeй B. A. Cмиpнoвa. Mocквa: Hayкa, 1989, c. 12–53].
— 1911/1989. Voobrazhaemaia logika (Konspekt lektsii) [Imaginary Logic (Conspectus of a
Lecture)]. Kazan: Obshchestvo Narodnykh Universitetov, 6 pp. [= Booбpaжaeмaя лoгикa
(Кoнcпeкт лeкции). Кaзaнь: Oбщecтвo Hapoдныx yнивepcитeтoв, 1911, c. 6]. Repr. in
Vasil’ev, N. A., Voobrazhaemaia logika. Izbrannye trudy [Imaginary Logic. Selected Works].
Ed. by V. A. Smirnov, 126–130. Moskva: Nauka, 1989 [= Bacильeв, H. A., Booбpaжaeмaя
лoгикa. Избpaнныe тpyды. Пoд peдaкциeй B. A. Cмиpнoвa. Mocквa: Hayкa, 1989, c.
126–130].
— 1912. Voobrazhaemaia (nearistoteleva) logika [Imaginary (non-Aristotelian) Logic]. Zhurnal
Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia [The Journal of the Ministry of Education]. New series,
xl (August 1912). Sankt-Peterburg: Senatokaia tipografiia, pp. 207–246 [= Booбpaжaeмaя
(нeapиcтoтeлeвa) лoгикa // Жypнaл Mиниcтepcтвa Hapoднoгo Пpocвeщeния. Hoвaя
Bibliography 129
cepия, Ч. xl. 1912, aвгycт. Caнкт-Пeтepбypг: Ceнaтoкaя типoгpaфия, c. 207–246]. Repr. in

Ed. by V. A. Smirnov, 53–94. Moskva: Nauka, 1989 [= Bacильeв, H. A., Booбpaжaeмaя
53–94].
— 1912–1913a. Logika i metalogika [Logic and Metalogic]. Logos. Mezhdunarodnyi ezhegodnik
po filosofii kul’tury. Russkoe izdanie [Logos. Internatonal Yearbook of Philosophy of Culture.
Russian edition] 1–2: 53–81 [= Лoгикa и мeтaлoгикa // Лoгoc. Meждyнapoдный eжeгoдник
пo филocoфии кyльтypы. Pyccкoe издaниe. 1912–1913. Кн. 1–2, c. 53–81]. Repr. in Vasil’ev,
V. A. Smirnov, 94–123. Moskva: Nauka, 1989 [= Bacильeв, H. A., Booбpaжaeмaя лoгикa.
— 1912–1913b. Review of the book: Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, in
Verbindung mit Wilhelm Windelband herausgegeben von Arnold Ruge, i. Band: Logik, Verlag
von J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1912. Logos 1–2: 387–389 [= Peцeнзия нa книгy: Encyclopädie
der philosophischen Wissenschaften, in Verbindung mit Wilhelm Windelband herausgege-
ben von Arnold Ruge. i. Band: Logik, Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1912 // Лoгoc.
1912–1913. Кн. 1–2, c. 387–389]. Repr. in Vasil’ev, N. A., Voobrazhaemaia logika. Izbrannye
trudy [Imaginary Logic. Selected Works]. Ed. by V. A. Smirnov, 131–134. Moskva: Nauka,
1989 [= Bacильeв, H. A., Booбpaжaeмaя лoгикa. Избpaнныe тpyды. Пoд peдaкциeй B. A.
Cмиpнoвa. Mocквa: Hayкa, 1989, c. 131–134].
— 1912–1913c. Review of the book: Prof. J. Geyser, Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Psychologie,
Münster 1912, xix+736. 2. Auflage. Logos 1–2: 392 [= Peцeнзия нa книгy: Prof. J. Geyser,
Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Psychologie, Münster 1912. xix+736. 2-te Auflage // Лoгoc. 1912–
1913. Кн. 1–2, c. 392].
— 1913a. Review of the book: Paulhan, Fr., La logique de la contradiction, Paris 1911, Felix
Alcan édit., 182 pp. Logos 3–4: 363–365 [= Peцeнзия нa книгy: Paulhan Fr., La logique
de la contradiction, Paris, 1911, Felix Alcan édit., 182 pp. // Лoгoc. 1913. Кн. 3–4, c. 363–
365]. Repr. in Vasil’ev, N. A., Voobrazhaemaia logika. Izbrannye trudy [Imaginary Logic.
Selected Works]. Ed. by V. A. Smirnov, 135–137. Moskva: Nauka, 1989 [= Bacильeв, H. A.,
Booбpaжaeмaя лoгикa. Избpaнныe тpyды. Пoд peдaкциeй B. A. Cмиpнoвa. Mocквa:
Hayкa, 1989, c. 135–137].
— 1913b. Review of the book: Jules-Henri Poincaré, Dernières Pensées, Paris, 1913, Ernest
Flammarion édit. Logos 3–4: 365–367 [= Peцeнзия нa книгy: Jules-Henri Poincaré,
Dernières Pensées (Paris, 1913. Ernest Flammarion édit.) // Лoгoc. 1913. Кн. 3–4, c. 365–
367]. Repr. in Vasil’ev, N. A., Voobrazhaemaia logika. Izbrannye trudy [Imaginary Logic.
Selected Works]. Ed. by V. A. Smirnov, 137–140. Moskva: Nauka, 1989 [= Bacильeв, H. A.,
Hayкa, 1989, c. 137–140].
— 1913c. Iz O. CH. Svinberna [From the Work of A. Ch. Swinburne]. In Chtets-deklamator [The
Reciter], 377–380, 393–394. Kiev, vol. 2 [= “Из O. Ч. Cвинбepнa” // Чтeц-дeклaмaтop.
Киeв 1913, т. 2, c. 377–380, 393–394].
— 1913d. “Logicheskii i istoricheskii metod v etike (Ob eticheskikh sistemakh L. N. Tolstogo i
V. S. Solovyova) [The Logical and Historical Method in Ethics (On the Ethical Systems of L. N.
Tolstoy and V. S. Solovyov)]. In Sbornik statei v chest’ Dmitriia Aleksandrovicha Korsakova
[Festschrift in Honour of Dimitri Aleksandrovich Korsakov], 449–457. Kazan: Izd-vo M. A.
Golubeva [= Лoгичecкий и иcтopичecкий мeтoд в Этикe (Oб Этичecкиx cиcтeмax Л.
H. Toлcтoгo и B. C. Coлoвьeвa) // Cбopник cтaтeй в чecть Дмитpия Aлeкcaндpoвичa
Кopcaкoвa. Кaзaнь: Изд-вo M. A. Гoлyбeвa, 1913, c. 449–457]. Repr. in Bazhanov, V. A.,
N. A. Vasil’ev i ego voobrazhaemaia logika. Voskreshenie odnoi zabytoi idei [N. A. Vasil’ev and
his Imaginary Logic. The Rebirth of a Forgotten Idea], 204–215. Moskva: Kanon+, 2009 [=
идeи. Mocквa: Кaнoн+, 2009, c. 204–215].
130 Bibliography
— 1915a. Programma po psikhologii [A Program for Psychology]. Kazan: Tipolitografiia

Imperatorskogo Universiteta, 6 pp. [= Пpoгpaммa пo пcиxoлoгии, Кaзaнь: Типолитография
Импepaтopcкoгo yнивepcитeтa, 1915. 6 c.].
— 1915b. Lektsii po psikhologii, chitannye na Kazanskikh vysshikh zhenskikh kursakh [Lectures
on Psychology, Read in the Women’s College in Kazan]. 2nd ed., Kazan, 226 pp. [= Лeкции пo
пcиxoлoгии, читaнниe нa Кaзaнcкиx выcшиx жeнcкиx кypcax. 2-oe изд., Кaзaнь, 1915.
226 c.].
— 1921a. Review of the book: È. Radlov, Ocherk istorii russkoi filosofii. Vtoroe dopolnen-
noe izdanie [An Essay on the History of Russian Philosophy. Second revised edition].
Petrograd 1921. Knigoizd. “Nauka i shkola”. Str. 98. Kazanskii Bibliofil: Zhurnal kritiko-
bibliograficheskii [The Kazantine Bibliophile: Journal of Critical Bibliography] 2: 98–100 [=
Peцeнзия нa книгy: Э. Paдлoв, Oчepк иcтopии pyccкoй филocoфии. Bтopoe дoпoлнeннoe
издaниe. Пeтpoгpaд. 1921. Книгoизд. “Hayкa и шкoлa”. Cтp. 98 // Кaзaнcкий библиoфил:
Жypнaл кpитикo-библиoгpaфичecкий. 1921. № 2, c. 98–100].
— 1921b. O nekotorykh zadachakh vospitaniia slepykh [On Some Problems of the Education
of the Blind]. Vestnik prosveshcheniia [The Bulletin of Education] 4–5 (September-October
1921): 53–56 [= O нeкoтopыx зaдaчax вocпитaния cлeпыx // Becтник пpocвeщeния. 1921,
ceнтябpь-oктябpь. № 4/5, c. 53–56].
— 1921c. Vopros o padenii Zapadnoi Rimskoi Imperii i antichnoi kul’tury v istoriografiches-
koi literature i v istorii filosofii, v sviazi s teoriei istoshcheniia narodov i chelovechestva
[The Question of the Fall of the Western Roman Empire and of the Ancient Culture in
Historiographical Literature and in the History of Philosophy, in Relation to the Theory of the
Extinction of Peoples and Mankind]. In Izvestiia Obshchestva Arkheologii, Istorii i Etnografii
pri Kazanskom Universitete [Communications of the Society for Archaeology, History and
Ethnography at the University of Kazan] 31(2–3): 115–247 [= Boпpoc o пaдeнии Зaпaднoй
Pимcкoй Импepии и aнтичнoй кyльтypы в иcтopиoгpaфичecкoй литepaтype и в иcтopии
филocoфии, в cвязи c тeopиeй иcтoщeния нapoдoв и чeлoвeчecтвa // Извecтия Oбщecтвa
Apxeoлoгии, Иcтopии и Этнoгpaфии пpи Кaзaнcкoм yнивepcитeтe. 1921. Toм xxxi,
выпycк 2–3, c. 115–247].
— 1922. Review of the book: Sborniki Assotsiatsii obshchestvennykh nauk [Anthologies of the
Association of Social Sciences]. Vol. 1. Kazan: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1921. Kazanskii
Bibliofil: Zhurnal kritiko-bibliograficheskii [The Kazantine Bibliophile: Journal of Critical
Bibliography] 3: 56–57 [= Peцeнзия нa книгy: Cбopники Accoциaции oбщecтвeнныx нayк.
Toм 1. Кaзaнь: Гocyдapcтвeннoe издaтeльcтвo, 1921 // Кaзaнcкий библиoфил: Жypнaл
кpитикo-библиoгpaфичecкий, 1922. № 3, c. 56–57].
— 1925. Imaginary (non-Aristotelian) Logic. In Atti del v Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia
(Napoli, 5–9 maggio 1924). A cura di Guido Della Valle, 107–109. Napoli – Genova – Città di
Castello: Società anonima editrice Francesco Perella.
— 1989. Voobrazhaemaia logika. Izbrannye trudy [Imaginary Logic. Selected Works]. Ed. by V. A.
Smirnov. Moskva: Nauka [= Booбpaжaeмaя лoгикa. Избpaнныe тpyды. Пoд peдaкциeй
B. A. Cмиpнoвa. Mocквa: Hayкa, 1989].
1.2. Literary Estate2
— [1908a]/1989. Otchet o pervom gode zaniatii professorskogo stipendiata po kafedre filosofii

N. A. Vasil’eva (s 1 ianvaria 1907 goda po 1 ianvaria 1908 goda) [Report on the First Year of
Lessons by Fellow Professor of the Chair of Philosophy N. A. Vasil’ev (from January 1, 1907 to
2
Among the papers left behind in Vasil’ev’s literary estate, a number of manuscripts have come to
light, some of which remain as yet unpublished, while others have recently been edited.
Bibliography 131
January 1, 1908)]. Library of the University of Kazan, Manuscript No. 5669, 9 pp. [= Oтчeт
o пepвoм гoдe зaнятий пpoфeccopcкoгo cтипeндиaтa пo кaфeдpe филocoфии H. A.
Bacильeвa (c 1 янвapя 1907 г. пo 1 янвapя 1908 г.) // Hayч. б-кa Kaзaнcкoгo yнивepcитeтa.
OPPК. Pyкoп. № 5669. Кaзaнь. 9 c.]. In Vasil’ev, N. A., Voobrazhaemaia logika. Izbrannye
trudy [Imaginary Logic. Selected Works]. Ed. by V. A. Smirnov, 141–149. Moskva: Nauka,
1989 [= Bacильeв, H. A., Booбpaжaeмaя лoгикa. Избpaнныe тpyды. Пoд peдaкциeй B. A.
— [1912e]/1989. Otchet privat-dotsenta po kafedre filosofii Imperatorskogo Kazanskogo univer-
siteta N. A Vasil’eva o khode ego nauchnykh zaniatii za vremia s 1 iiulia 1911 goda po 1 iiulia
1912 goda [Report of Privatdozent of the Chair of Philosophy at the Imperial University of
Kazan, N. A. Vasil’ev, on the Course of his Studies from July 1, 1911 to July 1, 1912]. Library
of the University of Kazan, Manuscript No. 6217, 34 pp. [= Oтчeт пpивaт-дoцeнтa пo
кaфeдpe филocoфии Импepaтopcкoгo Кaзaнcкoгo yнивepcитeтa H. A. Bacильeвa o xoдe
eгo нayчныx зaнятий зa вpeмя c 1 июля 1911 г. пo 1 июля 1912 г. // Hayч. б-кa Kaзaнcкoгo
yнивepcитeтa. OPPК. Pyкoп. № 6217. Кaзaнь. 34 c.]. In Vasil’ev, N. A., Voobrazhaemaia
logika. Izbrannye trudy [Imaginary Logic. Selected Works]. Ed. by V. A. Smirnov, 149–169.
Moskva: Nauka, 1989 [= Bacильeв, H. A., Booбpaжaeмaя лoгикa. Избpaнныe тpyды. Пoд
peдaкциeй B. A. Cмиpнoвa. Mocквa: Hayкa, 1989, c. 149–169].
— Kratkaia avtobiografiia (g. 1916) [Short Autobiography (Year 1916)]. Arkhiv avtora [Author’s
archive] [= Кpaткaя aвтoбиoгpaфия (1916 г.) // Apxив aвтopa].
—. Kurs obshchei psikhologii [Course of General Psychology]. Library of the University of Kazan,
Manuscript No. 4857, pp. 113–115 [= Кypc oбщeй пcиxoлoгии // Hayч. б-кa КГy. OPPК. Pyк.
№ 4857. C. 113–115].
—. Dnevnik [Diary]. Archive of V. A. Bazhanov, Simbirsk [= Днeвник // Apxив B. A. Бaжaнoвa,
Cимбиpcк].
1.3. Translations
— 1988. Voobrazhaemaia (nearistoteleva) logika. Translated by V. A. Bazhanov. In Bazhanov,

V. A., Nikolai Aleksandrovich Vasil’ev. 1880–1940, 135–136. Moskva: Nauka, 1988;
Bazhanov, V. A., N. A. Vasil’ev i ego voobrazhaemaia logika. Voskreshenie odnoi zabytoi idei
[N. A. Vasil’ev and his Imaginary Logic. The Rebirth of a Forgotten Idea], 201–203. Moskva:
Kanon+, 2009 [= Booбpaжaeмaя (нeapиcтoтeлeвa) лoгикa. Пep. B. A. Бaжaнoв // Бaжaнoв,
B. A., Hикoлaй Aлeкcaндpoвич Bacильeв. 1880–1940. Mocквa: Hayкa, 1988, c. 135–136;
идeи. Mocквa: Кaнoн+, 2009, c. 201–203]. Russian transl. of “Imaginary (non-Aristotelian)
Logic”.
— 1989. Voobrazhaemaia (nearistoteleva) logika. Translated by V. N. Karpovich. In Vasil’ev,
N. A., Voobrazhaemaia logika. Izbrannye trudy [Imaginary Logic. Selected Works]. Ed. by V. A.
Smirnov, 124–126. Moskva: Nauka [= Booбpaжaeмaя (нeapиcтoтeлeвa) лoгикa. Пep. B. H.
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— 1990a. Sobre os Juízos Particulares, o Triângulo das Oposições e a Lei do Quarto Excluído.
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CLE, v. 7). Partial Portuguese translation of “O chastnykh suzhdeniiakh, o treugol’nike pro-
tivopolozhnostei, o zakone iskliuchennogo chetvertogo”.
— 1990b. Lógica Imaginária (Não-Aristotélica). In Arruda, A. I., N. A. Vasil’ev e a lógica para-
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2. Works on N. A. Vasil’ev
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Anosova, Viktoriia Valentinovna. 1982b. Paraneprotivorechivye logiki i logicheskie idei N. A.
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modal’noi i intensional’noi logiki [Philosophical Problems of Modal and Intensional Logic].
Moskva: Izd.-vo MGU [= Aнocoвa, Bиктopия Baлeнтинoвнa, Пapaнeпpoтивopeчивыe
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Anosova, Viktoriia Valentinovna. 1984. Logicheskie idei N. A. Vasil’eva i paraneprotivorechivye
sistemy logiki. Diss. kand. filos. nauk. [The Logical Ideas of N. A. Vasil’ev and Paraconsistent
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Anosova, Viktoriia Valentinovna. 1985. Neklassicheskoe otritsanie v ‘voobrazhaemoi’ logike
N. A. Vasil’eva [Non-classical Negation in the ‘Imaginary’ Logic of N. A. Vasil’ev]. In
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пpoизнeceннaя в тopжecтвeннoм coбpaнии Имп. Кaзaнcк. yн-тa 22 oктябpя 1893 г. пpoф.
A. Bacильeвым, Кaзaнь: типo-лит. Имп. yн-тa, 1894]. Engl. transl.: A. V. Vasil’ev 1894b.
Vasil’ev, Aleksandr Vasil’evich. 1894b. Nicolái Ivánovich Lobachévsky; Address Pronounced
at the Commemorative Meeting of the Imperial University of Kasán, October 22, 1893, by
Professor A. Vasil’ev. Translated from the Russian, with a preface, by Dr. George Bruce
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Meisenheim am Glan: Hain.
Index
A Biryukov, B.V., 18, 19, 26, 112

Ackrill, J.L., ix Biryukova, L.G., 19
Alexander III (Romanov, A.A.), 4 Blok, A.A., 5, 8
Alighieri, D., 5 Boccaccio, G., 5
Ambos-Spies, K., 126 Bocheński, J.M., 55, 66
Ambrogi, G., viii Boethius, A.M.S., 40
Anderson, A.R., 121 Bogomolov, S.A., 106, 107
Anellis, I.H., 16 Bolc, L., 112
Anosova, V.V., 114 Bolyai, J., 26, 103
Antakov, S.M., 126 Bolzano, B., 67, 101, 102, 117
Antisthenes, 45 Bonaparte, N., 102
Apuleius Madaurensis, L., 40 Boole, G., 20, 25, 53
Aristotle, vii, ix, xii, xix, 9, 10, 13, 17, 20, 21, Borel, F.É.É., 107
26, 28, 33, 34, 39–42, 45, 53–59, Borkowski, L., 64
62–67, 72, 76, 81, 89, 91, 96, 110, 111, Borowik, P., 112
118, 119 Bozzi, S., 99
Arnauld, A., 46 Bradley, F.H., 38
Arruda, A.I., 112–114, 116, 121, 122 Brentano, F., 117
Avicenna (Ibn-Sīnā), 67 Brouwer, L.E.J., 20, 107, 108
Bryusov, V.Y., 8
Bueno, O., 57, 81, 93, 114, 126
B Bueno-Soler, J., 126
Bacon, R., 67
Bain, A., 33
Balmont, K.D., 5, 8 C
Baranetz, N.G., 126 Caesar, G.J., 48
Barnes, J., 55, 56 Carnielli, W., 126
Barzotti, P., viii Carus, P., 24–26, 99
Baudelaire, C.P., 6 Catherine the Great (Yekaterina II
Bazhanov, V.A., 2–6, 8–10, 12, 13, 16, 18, Alekseyevna of Russia), xii, 2
22–26,106–109, 118, 119, 126 Cavaliere, F., 2, 17, 44, 45, 88, 90, 109, 119
Belnap, N.D., Jr., 121 Chagrov, A.V., 126
Beltrami, E., 100 Charles II of England, 68
Bely, A., 8 Chebyshev, P.L., 3
Bergson, H., 28 Chrysippus of Soli, 112
Béziau, J.-Y., 57, 114, 126 Chwistek, L., 107, 109, 110, 112

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66086-8
158 Index
Comey, D.D., 109, 111, 113, 114 Grigor’ev, E.I., 3

Cooper, S.B., 126 Grossmann, R., 49
Costa-Leite, A.F.B., 126 Guglielminetti, E., 118
Couturat, L., 17, 35, 50, 51, 66, 72 Guseinov, A.A., 18
D H
da Costa, N.C.A., 57, 71, 113, 114, 116 Haller, R., 49
Dale, P.D., viii Hamilton, W., 18–21, 28, 33, 46, 64
Darboux, J.G., 4 Hegel, G.W.F., 48, 53, 64, 65, 107, 108
Darwin, C.R., 10, 23 Heraclitus of Ephesus, 45
De Morgan, A., 28 Hermite, C., 3
Di Ludovico, F., viii Hessen, S.I., 106
Dipert, R.R., 91 Heymans, G., xii, 21, 76, 77
Di Raimo, G., viii, 6 Hilbert, D., 4, 20, 107
Dostoevsky, F.M., xi, xii, 12 Hoffmann, E.T.A., 5
D’Ottaviano, I.M.L., 57, 71, 89, 103, Homskaya, E.D., 13
109, 113, 114, 126 Horace (Flaccus, Q.H.), 10
Drago, A., 114 Husik, I., xii, 21, 55, 57–62, 66, 67, 73, 78, 82,
Duffy, C., 2 89, 91, 93, 96, 97
Dunn, J.M., 121 Husserl, E., xii, 17, 63–65, 77–80, 116, 123
Dyche, R.E., 49
I
E Ibsen, H., 5
Engel-Tiercelin, C., 112 Ioinsky, M.E., 106
Erdmann, B., xii, 20, 22, 79, 80 Itelson, G., 9, 72
Euclid, 26, 78, 99, 110 Ivan IV the Terrible (Ivan IV Vasilyevich), 1
Evtuhov, C., 19 Ivanov, I., 107
Ivanovskii, V.N., 106
F
Farrell Smith, J., 68 J
Findlay, J.N., 49 Jacquette, D.L., 68, 124
Fisch, M., 112 James, W., 9
Florensky, P.A., 18 Jammer, M., 111
Frank, S.L., 107 Jaśkowski, S., 71
Frege, G., 18, 20, 36, 78, 116 Jenkinson, A.J., ix
Freytag-Löringhoff, B. von, 21 Jerusalem, W., 28
Jevons, W.S., 17, 28
Jordan, Z.A., 71
G Jur’ev, S.M., 106
Gergonne, J.-D., 51
Geyser, J., 11
Ginzberg, S. (Shlomo Ginossar), 35, 50, 51 K
Gödel, K., 20 Kant, I., vii, ix, xii, 18, 19, 25, 28, 32, 46, 49,
Goethe, J.W., 5 70, 85–89, 95, 108, 119
Gogol, N.V., 10 Kareev, N.I., 107
Gomes, E.L., 57, 89, 103, 114, 126 Karinsky, M.I., 18
Gorbatov, V.V., 126 Karpenko, A.S., 114
Göring, C., xii, 78 Karpinskaia, O.I., 117
Greenenko, G.V., 126 Khlebnikov, V.V. (Christian name Viktor), 2, 3
Greniewski, H., 108–110 Khomenko, I.V., 126
Griffin, N., 68 Kinosyan, V.A., 126
Index 159
Klein, F., 4 Maier, H., 33, 34, 57, 58, 63, 66, 72
Kline, G.L., 84, 109–113, 117, 121 Makovel’sky, A.O., 106
Kneale, M., 40 Maksimova, L.L., 126
Kneale, W.C., 40 Maksimovich, A.P., 2, 3
Kolmogorov, A.N., 108 Maksimovich, P.P., 3
Kopnin, P.V., xii, 107, 108 Malinowski, G., 112
Korcik, A., 108, 118 Mally, E., 70, 72
Korzybski, A., 3, 4 Mal’tsev, A.I., 106, 109, 110, 112
Kostiuk, T.P., 117 Mancuso, D., viii
Kotarbiński, T., 109 Mangione, C., 99
Kotel’nikov, A.P., 3, 106 Markin, V.I., 96, 112, 117, 118, 121, 126
Kouznetsov, A., 117 Marx, K.H., 4
Kovalevskaya, S.V., 4 Mata, J.V.T. da, 126
Krause, D., 57, 114 Maximov, D.Y., 112
Kreiser, L., 16, 17, 19, 28, 50, 51, 120, 121 McKirahan, R.D., Jr., 55, 56
Kronecker, L., 3 Meinong, A., vii, ix, 21, 49, 54, 62–73,
Krug, W.T., 47 121–124
Kuderowicz, Z., 64 Menne, A., 41
Kurashov, V.I., 126 Mignucci, M., 34, 56
Kuskova, S.M., 126 Mikirtumov, I.B., 80, 118, 126
Kwiatkowski, T., 110 Mill, J., 5
Mill, J.S., xii, 5, 9, 17, 18, 20, 28, 46, 48, 53,
60, 63, 64, 76, 78, 87, 88
L Minto, W., 17, 33, 47
Ładosz, J., 109 Molière (Poquelin, J.-B.), 5
Lambert, K., 49, 124 Moretti, A., 117
Lane, R., 112 Mushtari, D.H., 126
Lapshin, I.I., 18, 19, 50, 107, 119
Leffler, G.M., 4
Leibniz, G.W., 117 N
Lektorsky, V.A., 18 Nekrasov, V.L., 3
Lenin (Ulyanov, V.I.), xii, 2, 4 Nepejvoda, N.N., 126
Lenoci, M., 49 Nicole, P., 46
Leśniewski, S., 118
Levi, B., 4
Lewis, C.I., 114 O
Lie, M.S., 4 Öffenberger, N., 41
Lipps, T., 50
Lobachevsky, N.I., xi, xii, 2–4, 26, 54, 99,
100, 106, 110 P
Lokhorst, G.-J.C., 116 Parsons, T., 41, 42, 49, 124
Lossky, N.O., xii, 35, 49, 50, 107 Paulhan, F., 11
Lotze, R.H., 20, 34, 36, 46, 122 Pavlov, K.A., 126
Luce, A.A., 21 Peano, G., 20
Łukasiewicz, J., vii, ix, xii, 21, 22, 45, 49, 54, Peirce, C.S., vii, ix, 5, 21, 22, 24–26, 57, 67,
55, 62–67, 70–73, 77, 91–94, 96, 99, 91, 99, 111, 112
102, 109–112, 117 Peter the Great (Romanov, P.A.), 16
Luria, A.R., 2, 13 Picard-Cambridge, W.A., ix
Luzin, N.N., 107–109 Picardi, E., 77
Plekhanov, G.V., 4
Poincaré, J.-H., 4, 11
M Popov, V.M., 118, 126
MacColl, H., 111, 112, 114, 119 Poretsky, P.S., 18, 53
Maeterlinck, M.P.M.B., 5 Post, E.L., 110, 111
160 Index
Priest, G., 20, 21, 57, 90, 113–116, Suárez, F., 67

118, 121, 126 Suchoń, W., 51, 90, 95, 107, 112, 118, 124
Prior, A.N., 41 Swinburne, A.C., 6, 10, 11
Protagoras, 45
Pryadko, I.P., 18
Puga, L.Z., 113, 114 T
Pugachev, Y.I., xii, 1 Tolstoy, L.N., xii, 2, 5, 8, 11, 18
Tonojan, L.G., 126
Trendelenburg, F.A., 36, 63
R Troitsky, M.M., 17, 28, 46
Rainoff, T., 3 Tronin, S.N., 126
Raju, P.T., 115 Turquette, A., 112
Raspa, V., 19, 28, 49, 60, 63, 66, 68, 70, Twardowski, K., 63, 67
71, 87, 91, 93, 124
Reicher, M.E., 49
Reid, T., 67 U
Renouvier, C., 73 Ueberweg, F., 34, 47, 63, 122
Rescher, N., 111, 112 Ulyanov, A.I., 4
Rhodes, M.C., 18
Riemann, G.F.B., 100
Ross, W.D., ix, 55, 56 V
Routley, R., 90, 113, 114 Vasil’ev, A.V., 2–5, 106
Ruge, A., 11 Vasil’ev, I., 6, 12, 13
Russell, B., 4, 20, 36, 68–70, 116, 123 Vasil’ev, N.V., 4
Russell, F.C., 24 Vasil’ev, V.P., 2
Vasyukov, V.L., 114, 118, 126
Venn, J., ix, 28, 33
S Verevkin, A.B., 126
Sainati, V., 41 Vergauwen, R., xvii, 2, 119
Sautter, F.T., 114 Verhaeren, E., 5, 8–10
Schopenhauer, A., 6, 46, 47 Verlaine, P.M., 6
Schröder, E., 17, 53 Vladislavlev, M.I., 5, 17, 26
Schumann, A., 16, 95, 118 Vvedensky, A.I., 18, 19, 28, 35, 92,
Seddon, F.A. Jr., 66 107, 119
Serebryakov, F.F., 126
Shangin, V.O., 118, 126
Shatunovsky, S.O., 18 W
Shuranov, B.M., 112 Waitz, T., 58
Sigwart, C., xii, 17, 20, 22, 23, 28–32, 34, 36, Wallis, J., 28
37, 42, 46, 48, 53, 63, 78, 82, 85–88, Wedin, M.V., 41
92, 93, 122 Weierstrass, K.T.W., 3
Simonov, I.M., 3 Weyl, K.H.H., 4, 107
Simonova, S.I., 2 Whitehead, A.N., 4
Sintsov, D.M., 3 Woleński, J., 64
Słupecki,J., 64 Wolff, C., 46, 67
Smirnov, K.A., 106 Wundt, W., 20, 22, 47
Smirnov, V.A., xvii, 36, 96, 109, 111, 113, 117
Smirnova, E.D., 118, 126
Sobociński, B., 64, 71 Z
Solovyev, V.D., 126 Zaitsev, D.V., 117, 118, 121, 126
Solovyov, V.S., xii, 11 Zav’ialova, E.S., 6, 12
Sophocles, 5 Zaytsev, A.E., xvii, 2, 119
Sorina, G.V., 120, 126 Zejliger, D.N., 106
Spencer, H., 60, 63, 64 Ziarek, K., 3
Stelzner, W., 16, 17, 19, 26, 28, 50, 51, 78, 83, Zverev, G.N., 126
102, 107, 120, 121, 126 Zwergel, H.A., 66

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Synthese Library 386

Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology,

Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology,

Translated by Peter N. Dale

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017949873

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature

To Silvio Bozzi, who taught me to love the

Urbino, Italy Venanzio Raspa

become established (e.g. Dostoevsky, Lossky, Lobachevsky, etc.; see Index of

as a matter of consistency, to remain loyal to the traditional expression and have

1 An Unquiet Life, a Multi-faceted Output������������������������������������������������ 1

5.7 Alternative Interpretations of Imaginary Logic���������������������������������� 101

In 1912, the Russian logician Nikolai Aleksandrovich Vasil’ev (1880–1940) pub-

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 1

1.2 The Family

Nikolai’s paternal grandfather, Vasilii Pavlovich Vasil’ev (1818–1900), was a distin-

1.3 Childhood and Education

1.4 University Years: Medicine, Poetry, History

“Уснувшие звезды / Usnuvshie zvezdy [Sleeping stars],” in Vasil’ev (1904: 104):

May be nothing more than a wan, deceptive fantasy,

A little further on in his thesis, Vasil’ev adds:

Vasil’ev conceived of revolutions as natural events in the process of the social

1.5 Teaching and Research: Logic, Literature, Ethics

conference on “Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Actions” at the Popular University

1.6 War, Illness, Death

Contextualization is indispensable if one is to understand Vasil’ev’s work on logic. In

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 15

2.1 In Russia

As a classic philosophical discipline, logic developed in close connection with vari-

Other important logicians, who are mentioned in Vasil’ev’s writings, include

laws, including the principles of contradiction and of excluded middle, cannot be

2.2 In Western Europe

is independent of the principle of contradiction; (B) the identification of a third form

Vasil’ev undoubtedly read Carus’s article sometime in 1910. Uncertainty reigns

Abstract This chapter systematically expounds Vasil’ev’s logic of concepts, that

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 27

3.1 The Forms of Judgment According to Christoph Sigwart

is made manifest. For Sigwart, it is precisely in so far as they assert an exception

Therefore, particular judgment is different from problematical judgment. In the

3.2 Particular Judgment as Accidental Judgment

SuP =df SiP ∧ SoP.

3.3  he Triangle of Oppositions and the Law of Excluded

tion is a hypothetical judgment, which expresses a universal judgment49: either affir-

(i) SaP universal affirmative ‘All S are P’;

According to traditional theory, a universal affirmative proposition and the cor-

SaP ↔ ¬SoP and SeP ↔ ¬SiP,

SiP ↔ ¬SeP and SoP ↔ ¬SaP.

SaP → ¬SeP and SeP → ¬SaP,

¬SiP → SoP and ¬SoP → SiP,

SaP → SiP and SeP → SoP,

¬Sip → ¬SaP and ¬Sop → ¬SeP.

Alongside this gnoseo-ontological explanation, Sainati makes explicit a logical

man is white’) as an affirmation (‘Every man is not-white’). There follows a cau-

The demonstration is conducted by assuming (like in the traditional square of

Thus, we obtain the following propositions:

(1) SaP ∨ SeP ∨ SuP

Wundt,85 Minto86 and Ueberweg87), according to which the principle of excluded

Regarding Hegel’s criticism of the principle of excluded middle, according to whom

3.4 A Debate on Particular Propositions

Vasil’ev’s brief 1911 text Voobrazhaemaia logika (Konspekt lektsii) [Imaginary

Urbino, Italy Venanzio Raspa

1 An Unquiet Life, a Multi-faceted Output�� 1

5.7 Alternative Interpretations of Imaginary Logic�� 101

1.2 The Family

1.3 Childhood and Education

1.4 University Years: Medicine, Poetry, History

1.5 Teaching and Research: Logic, Literature, Ethics

1.6 War, Illness, Death

2.1 In Russia

2.2 In Western Europe

3.1 The Forms of Judgment According to Christoph Sigwart

3.2 Particular Judgment as Accidental Judgment

3.3 he Triangle of Oppositions and the Law of Excluded

3.4 A Debate on Particular Propositions

4.1 A Perennial Contemporary: Aristotle

4.2 Isaac Husik

4.3 Jan Łukasiewicz and Alexius Meinong

5.1 ountering the Uniqueness of Logic

5.2 A Novel Concept of Negation

5.3 Two Laws Regarding Contradiction

5.4 Indifferent Judgment

5.5 Indifferent Syllogisms

5.6 Imaginary Logic and non-Euclidean Geometries

5.7 Alternative Interpretations of Imaginary Logic

6.1 The First Readers, the First Criticisms

6.2 he Rediscovery of Vasil’ev and the Many-Valued