UX at its best!

Initiating with a Buy

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 Equity Research
BTG Pactual Global Research

Latin America
Technology, Media & Telecommunication
Company Note
14 June 2021

Infracommerce
UX at its best! Initiating with a Buy Rating Buy

We are initiating coverage on Infracommerce with a Buy rating and TP of R$25 12m Price Target R$25.00/US$4.88

We are initiating coverage on Infracommerce, a Latin American provider of complete Price R$16.10/US$3.15
e-commerce solutions to mid/large clients, with a Buy rating and a DCF-derived, fully- RIC: IFCM3.SA, BBG: IFCM3 BZ
diluted target price of R$25, offering upside potential of 55%.
Trading Data and Return Forecasts
Huge market, set for fast growth 52-wk range R$16.39-14.67/US$3.26-2.76
Market cap. R$3,826m/US$748m
Infracommerce’s R$1.1bn B2C GMV in 2020 was only 1% of total e-commerce Shares o/s (m) 237.7
transactions in Brazil. Even if its market share grows to ‘only’ 1.3% in 2025, its GMV Free float 40%
would shoot up 359% to R$5bn by 2025. The growth opportunity in B2B is even bigger. Avg. daily volume('000 Shares) 558
Avg. daily value (R$ m) 8.7
Only 1.5% of Brazil’s R$2trn B2B transactions are done online. Infracommerce is a
Forecast price appreciation +55.3%
major player in this segment. If Brazil’s online B2B market grows to 10% of total B2B Forecast dividend yield 0.0%
transactions, in line with more developed markets, Infracommerce B2B-related Forecast stock return +55.3%
revenues could jump.
Stock Performance (R$)
Additional opportunities to grow via M&A 30,0 200

It can also grow via acquisitions, especially after it raised ~R$870mn at its IPO. Some 160

of the solutions the company manages for its clients belong to third-party providers. 20,0
120

There is an opportunity for Infracommerce to buy some of them, enhancing its 80

10,0
ecosystem and gaining access to new technologies. We also expect the company to 40

explore opportunities to enhance and expand the reach of its logistics operations.
0,0 0
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Infracommerce is trading at attractive valuations, when compared to peers
Price Target (R$) Stock Price (R$) Rel. Ibovespa
Infracommerce is trading at 10.1x 2021E EV/Sales and 7.1x 2022E, a massive discount
to Locaweb (15x 2021E EV/Sales) and a group of global SaaS providers (median of
Carlos Sequeira, CFA
26x 2021E). Its valuation is especially attractive when we consider the huge growth New York – BTG Pactual US Capital LLC
opportunities that lie ahead. When we look at EV/sales multiples adjusted for expected carlos.sequeira@btgpactual.com
growth, Infracommerce’s multiples become even more compelling. +1 646 924 2479

Osni Carfi
Brazil – Banco BTG Pactual S.A.
Valuation 12/2019 12/2020 12/2021E 12/2022E 12/2023E osni.carfi@btgpactual.com
RoIC (EBIT) % (15.2) (10.4) 4.0 32.2 42.9
EV/EBITDA - - 74.8 38.0 21.8 +55 11 3383 2634
P/E - - (2,526.3) 59.9 46.6
Net dividend yield % - - 0.0 0.0 0.4

Financials (R$mn) 12/2019 12/2020 12/2021E 12/2022E 12/2023E

Revenues 138 236 370 527 740
EBITDA 1 6 42 81 140
Net Income (16) (17) (2) 64 82
EPS (R$) # # (0.01) 0.27 0.35
Net DPS (R$) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07
Net (debt) / cash (10) (34) 715 744 782
Source: Company reports, Bovespa, BTG Pactual S.A. estimates. / Valuations: based on the last share price
of the year; (E) based on a share price of R$16.10, on 11 June 2021.

ANALYST CERTIFICATION AND REQUIRED DISCLOSURES BEGIN ON PAGE 28

Banco BTG Pactual S.A. does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the
objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. Any U.S. person receiving this report and wishing to effect any transaction in a security
discussed in this report should do so with BTG Pactual US Capital, LLC at 212-293-4600, 601 Lexington Avenue. 57th Floor, New York NY 10022.
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 2

Investment case: A white-label, full commerce solution

We are initiating coverage on Infracommerce, a Latin American provider of complete
e-commerce solutions to mid/large clients, with a Buy rating and a DCF-derived, fully-
diluted target price of R$25, offering upside potential of 55%.

Infracommerce manages retailers’ entire e-commerce operations, including e-

commerce platforms, integration with marketplaces, payment solutions, fulfillment and
even customer care. Some of its solutions are proprietary and some are third-party
ones managed by the company.

Its B2C client base includes household brands (with annual online sales of +R$2mn)
keen to sell directly to their clients, providing them with superior customer service
experiences. Its clientele (totaling 190 clients) includes Nike, Cartier, Rayban, Armani,
Volvo, Nespresso, and Ambev. For these brands, outsourcing e-commerce operations
makes sense economically (more scale = much lower costs) and strategically, as
Infracommerce provides a top-notch service. In 2020, its B2C GMV exceeded R$1bn.

Infracommerce also operates B2B marketplaces, using a proprietary B2B e-commerce

platform, for big industries like Unilever, Johnson&Johnson, and Mondelez. It is a
pioneer in offering B2B e-commerce solutions in Brazil and operates +10 marketplaces
(single-seller and multi-seller), with +150 sellers and total GMV of ~R$3.5bn in 2020.
Infracommerce basically provides the e-commerce platform to its B2B clients, but the
goal is to add services like fulfillment and digital payments.

Huge market set for fast growth

In 2020, e-commerce sales were R$107bn in Brazil, or 8% of total retail sales. Our
retail/e-commerce team models e-commerce transactions to grow to R$377bn in 2025.

Infracommerce’s R$1.1bn GMV in 2020 was only 1% of total e-commerce transactions

in Brazil. Even if its market share grows to ‘only’ 1.3% in 2025, its GMV would shoot
up 359% to R$5bn by 2025.

The growth opportunity in B2B is even bigger. Only 1.5% of Brazil’s R$2trn B2B
transactions are done online. Infracommerce is a major player in this segment, with
estimated GMV of ~R$3.5bn in 2020. If Brazil’s online B2B market grows to 10% of
total B2B transactions, in line with more developed markets like the US, Infracommerce
could see a surge in B2B-related revenues.

Naturally, as the market grows it attracts new players. We thus forecast that
Infracommerce’s market share (which we estimated at 12% in 2020) will decline to 7%
by 2025. But even under these assumptions, its B2B GMV could grow to R$15.2bn in
2025, 331% more than in 2020.
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 3

Figure 1: Huge and underpenetrated addressable market

Source: Company reports

We also expect take-rates, especially in B2B, to go up over time as the company offers
its B2B clients additional services such as logistics/fulfillment and electronic payment
options.

Chart 1: Infracommerce’s GMV and take-rate forecasts

25,000 6.2% 6.5%
6.1%
5.9%
20,257 6.0%
20,000 5.6%
5.3% 5.4%
16,006 5.5%
5.1%
15,000 5.0%
4.6% 12,548

9,413 4.5%
10,000
6,855
4.0%
4,630
5,000 2,978
1,890 3.5%

0 3.0%
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

GMV Take-rate

Source: BTG Pactual estimates

 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 4

Additional opportunities to grow via M&A

Infracommerce can also grow via acquisitions, especially after it raised ~R$870mn at
its IPO. As we mentioned before, some of the solutions the company manages for its
clients belong to third-party providers. There is an opportunity for Infracommerce to
buy some of them, enhancing its ecosystem and gaining access to new technologies.

We also expect the company to keep looking for opportunities to enhance and expand
the reach of its logistics operations, similar to what it did by acquiring Pier 8 at the end
of 2020, which brought in 120 clients and 3 distribution centers.

As the company expands its solutions to other Latin American countries, it would be
reasonable to expect part of the expansion to come via M&A.

Unique logistics grid

Its solutions include a proprietary logistics operation that guarantees its clients fast,
reliable deliveries at competitive costs. Setting up logistics operations is expensive. So
unless the retailer is big enough to cover the costs, relying on a third-party provider
makes a lot of sense.

Infracommerce operates 10 distribution centers in Brazil (most brands, even the

biggest ones, have 1 or 2) and is rapidly opening dark stores in the main cities to make
same day/overnight deliveries in the main regions.

Chart 2: Infracommerce has more DCs than most brands

Source: Company reports

 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 5

Attractive valuations

Infracommerce is trading at 10.1x 2021E EV/Sales and 7.1x 2022E, a massive

discount to Locaweb (15x 2021E EV/Sales) and a group of global SaaS providers
(median of 26x 2021E). Its valuation is especially attractive when we consider the huge
growth opportunities that lie ahead.

In the table below, we show a group of 26 technology companies in which the market
forecasts revenue growth of above 20% per year over the next three years for all of
them.

When we look at EV/sales multiples adjusted for expected growth, Infracommerce’s

multiples become even more compelling. We see Infracommerce trading at an
EV/sales/growth of 0.22x, vs. a market average of 0.85x and Locaweb’s 0.51x.

Table 1: Valuation comps

Mkt.cap EV EV/SALES EV/Sales/Growth Sales Growth
Company
US$ mn US$ mn 2021E 2022E 2023E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Average
Crowdstrike Holdings Inc 50,194 49,056 57.2x 37.1x 27.7x 1.00 x 0.65 x 0.48 x 110.4% 87.0% 83.7% 54.0% 34.0% 57.2%
Okta Inc 33,212 32,491 39.5x 26.7x 19.4x 0.92 x 0.62 x 0.45 x 55.6% 43.9% 43.2% 47.9% 37.4% 42.8%
Zscaler Inc 26,147 25,636 38.8x 28.6x 21.8x 0.97 x 0.72 x 0.55 x 59.2% 42.9% 52.8% 35.3% 31.6% 39.9%
Palantir Technologies Inc 43,297 41,410 28.0x 21.6x 17.1x 0.89 x 0.69 x 0.54 x 24.7% 44.3% 38.0% 29.5% 26.6% 31.4%
Bill.com Holdings Inc 12,496 11,697 52.9x 38.9x 28.5x 1.36 x 1.00 x 0.73 x 67.0% 41.4% 44.2% 36.3% 36.4% 39.0%
Unity Software Inc 26,276 24,765 24.6x 19.4x 15.2x 0.85 x 0.67 x 0.53 x 42.3% 40.0% 32.5% 27.0% 27.4% 29.0%
Cloudflare Inc 25,608 25,015 40.9x 30.9x 24.1x 1.17 x 0.88 x 0.69 x 49.0% 47.5% 44.3% 32.7% 27.9% 35.0%
Datadog Inc 28,254 27,502 31.0x 23.2x 18.4x 0.84 x 0.63 x 0.50 x 83.2% 62.5% 50.4% 33.9% 25.9% 36.7%
Veeva Systems Inc 43,672 41,581 28.7x 22.8x 19.2x 1.11 x 0.88 x 0.74 x 24.9% 26.5% 32.8% 25.9% 18.7% 25.8%
Blackline Inc 5,970 5,909 14.1x 11.7x 9.4x 0.65 x 0.54 x 0.43 x 26.9% 20.4% 20.1% 21.2% 24.1% 21.8%
Five9 Inc 11,701 11,891 21.6x 18.2x 15.3x 0.95 x 0.80 x 0.68 x 27.3% 28.7% 30.6% 18.3% 19.2% 22.7%
Atlassian Corp PLC 58,290 57,512 28.0x 24.3x 19.8x 1.26 x 1.10 x 0.89 x 37.4% 31.8% 28.8% 15.0% 22.9% 22.2%
Alteryx Inc 5,162 5,128 9.0x 7.4x 6.0x 0.44 x 0.36 x 0.29 x 64.8% 16.6% 17.2% 20.7% 23.8% 20.6%
Coupa Software Inc 17,315 18,258 34.8x 26.9x 21.4x 1.13 x 0.87 x 0.69 x 39.4% 46.3% 37.6% 29.3% 25.7% 30.9%
Avalara Inc 11,180 10,607 16.3x 13.2x 10.8x 0.62 x 0.51 x 0.42 x 40.5% 27.9% 33.1% 23.4% 21.8% 26.1%
Slack Technologies Inc 25,526 24,870 28.0x 21.1x 16.6x 0.82 x 0.62 x 0.48 x 81.6% 55.3% 43.0% 32.7% 27.0% 34.2%
DocuSign Inc 39,047 39,190 27.4x 19.9x 15.5x 0.72 x 0.52 x 0.40 x 35.2% 37.7% 47.9% 38.2% 28.5% 38.2%
Zendesk Inc 16,034 15,777 12.0x 9.6x 7.7x 0.46 x 0.37 x 0.30 x 36.4% 25.4% 28.3% 25.1% 24.0% 25.8%
Agora Inc 5,454 4,583 25.1x 17.2x 12.2x 0.60 x 0.41 x 0.29 x 47.6% 103.1% 39.7% 45.5% 40.7% 42.0%
JFrog Ltd 3,926 3,341 16.5x 12.7x 9.8x 0.53 x 0.40 x 0.31 x 64.8% 43.1% 34.9% 30.2% 29.1% 31.4%
HubSpot Inc 23,197 22,757 18.3x 14.4x 11.6x 0.58 x 0.46 x 0.37 x 31.6% 28.6% 43.0% 27.0% 24.9% 31.7%
salesforce.com Inc 218,947 210,060 9.9x 8.1x 6.8x 0.45 x 0.37 x 0.31 x 26.0% 28.0% 24.2% 22.9% 19.4% 22.2%
Xero Ltd 15,058 15,015 24.2x 19.3x 15.5x 1.08 x 0.86 x 0.70 x 35.9% 31.6% 17.4% 25.5% 24.1% 22.3%
Shopify Inc 158,121 151,327 34.2x 25.9x 19.4x 0.86 x 0.65 x 0.48 x 47.0% 81.6% 54.2% 32.1% 33.7% 40.0%
Wix.com Ltd 14,698 14,121 11.0x 8.8x 7.2x 0.42 x 0.34 x 0.27 x 26.1% 28.3% 32.0% 24.7% 22.0% 26.2%
BigCommerce Holdings Inc 3,878 3,685 18.6x 15.2x 12.6x 0.73 x 0.60 x 0.49 x 22.0% 32.0% 33.6% 22.4% 20.6% 25.6%
Median High Growth SaaS - - 26.3x 19.6x 15.5x 0.85x 0.63x 0.48x 40.0% 38.9% 36.3% 28.2% 25.8% 31.1%
Locaweb 3,319 2,885 14.5x 11.1x 8.9x 0.51 0.39 0.32 22.5% 25.8% 32.1% 28.5% 23.9% 28.2%
Totvs 3,809 3,729 6.4x 5.6x 5.0x 0.58 0.51 0.46 -1.6% 15.6% 11.1% 11.6% 10.3% 11.0%
Infracommerce fully diluted 865 728 10.1x 7.1x 5.1x 0.22x 0.15x 0.11x 37.5% 70.5% 56.9% 42.4% 40.4% 46.6%
Source: BTG Pactual estimates, Bloomberg

In the dispersion chart below, it is even easier to visualize how Infracommerce’s

multiples stack up nicely against high-growth tech companies.

Our fully diluted DCF-derived target price of R$25 (WACC of 9.5% and perpetuity
growth of 5% in nominal BRL), indicates an upside potential of 55%.
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 6

Figure 2: Dispersion chart showing EV/sales 2021E and average sales growth for 2021-23e

Source: BTG Pactual estimates, Bloomberg

Main financials

We model net revenue growth of 40% per year on average for the next 5 years (2021-
2025). The company grew 70.5% y/y in 2020 and 38% y/y in 2019.

We expect EBITDA margin to expand from 8.5% in 2020 (low level due to heavy
investments to foster growth) to 22.5% in 2025. Margin expansion is mainly driven by
operating leverage/scale gains.

Revenue growth combined with margin expansion translate into EBITDA growth of
89% per year on average for the 2021-2025 period.
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 7

Table 2: Infracommerce’s P&L statement

(R$ mn) 2018 2019 2020 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Net revenues 101 138 236 370 527 740 976 1,256
Net rev. change year-on-year 37.5% 70.5% 56.9% 42.4% 40.4% 31.9% 28.6%

COGS (66) (74) (119) (183) (262) (371) (494) (640)

y/y 12.2% 59.2% 54.1% 43.5% 41.6% 32.9% 29.7%
% of Revs. 66.0% 53.8% 50.2% 49.4% 49.8% 50.2% 50.6% 51.0%

Gross profit 34 64 117 187 265 369 483 616

Gross margin 34.0% 46.2% 49.8% 50.6% 50.2% 49.8% 49.4% 49.0%

EBIT 0 1 6 5 58 91 173 244

EBIT margin 0.4% 0.8% 2.4% 1.4% 11.0% 12.3% 17.7% 19.4%

Adj. EBITDA 2 9 20 42 81 140 207 283

EBITDA margin 2.1% 6.5% 8.5% 11.2% 15.4% 18.9% 21.2% 22.5%
EBITDA growth, y-on-y 335.1% 124.0% 106.9% 94.8% 72.3% 48.5% 36.6%

Net income (3) (8) (2) (2) 64 82 137 188

% of net revenues -2.7% -5.7% -1.0% -0.4% 12.1% 11.1% 14.0% 14.9%
Source: BTG Pactual estimates

Revenue expansion in our model comes from a combination of GMV growth (which we
model at an annual average of 35% for 2021-2025) and higher take rates (which we
model will increase from the current 5.1% to 6.2% as Infracommerce is able to cross-
sell logistics and fintech solutions to its B2B client base).

Infracommerce’s short-term (next 2 years) growth doesn’t depend on onboarding new

clients. We estimate two thirds of the growth will come from growth among its current
client base (figure 14 in churn section illustrates this perfectly). For B2B clients, this
effect should be even more relevant, as it takes around 2 years for a B2B operation to
ramp up to its full potential (the platforms start to operate with 3-5 distributors, with
more and more being added each month, so it’s a process that takes time).

Chart 3: Infracommerce’s GMV and take-rate forecasts

25,000 6.2% 6.5%
6.1%
5.9%
20,257 6.0%
20,000 5.6%
5.3% 5.4%
16,006 5.5%
5.1%
15,000 5.0%
4.6% 12,548

9,413 4.5%
10,000
6,855
4.0%
4,630
5,000 2,978
1,890 3.5%

0 3.0%
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

GMV Take-rate

Source: BTG Pactual estimates

 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 8

Main risk: Almost a third of sales comes from just two clients

Infracommerce’s top two clients were 28% of sales in 1Q21. This degree of what we
call ‘client concentration’ is undoubtedly high, but it is coming down. In 1Q20,
Infracommerce’s top two clients were 42% of sales and in the whole year of 2020 they
were 34%.

While we have no way of knowing who Infracommerce’s two largest clients are, we
have reason to believe Nike is one of them. In 2020, Nike’s operations in Brazil were
acquired by Centauro, which took the strategic decision to develop and manage its e-
commerce operations in-house. By the end of 2021, when the contract between Nike
and Infracommerce expires, Centauro may opt to manage Nike’s e-commerce
operations internally. Infracommerce is negotiating with Centauro the possibility of
becoming a solutions provider to the latter (Centauro could, for instance, hire
Infracommerce’s logistics solutions).

Clients opting to internalize e-commerce as it becomes more relevant to their business

is also a risk. We estimate that, on average, e-commerce represents ~10% of
Infracommerce’s clients’ revenues. If 4-5 years from now e-commerce becomes more
representative (40-50% of their revenues), it may pressure the company’s pricing (it is
one thing to pay a 15% take rate on a service that represents a bit of your revenues,
but it is a whole different story as the proportion of revenues increases, so clients could
opt to bring things in-house).

Fully diluted stock option plan

Infracommerce has a stock option plan that establishes the issuance of up to

37,576,261 options (this represents 16% of the company’s current share count). The
timeframe of its SoP is relatively short, with most of the options becoming vested in the
short term. 23% of the options are already vested, while another 35% of the options
will be vested within 9 months (March 2022), followed an additional 22% in March 2023.

The exercise price is much lower than the current share price (varying from R$0.43 to
R$1.44), so dilution is practically guaranteed, reason why we have decided to calculate
our target price for the company on a fully diluted basis.

Why Infracommerce adds value to brands

Infracommerce provides a full suite of digital solutions that enable brands to deliver
exceptional customer experience in their e-commerce operations. It operates in a
market that we call “full commerce”, offering integrated services that cover e-
commerce, logistics, payments, marketing, customer care, big data, etc. (everything a
company needs to run a cutting-edge e-commerce operation).

The company’s white-label full commerce ecosystem serves around 190 clients and
processed R$4.6bn in GMV in 2020. On the back of its massive scale, clients can: i)
reduce costs in their e-commerce operations; ii) improve service levels (in e-
commerce, scale is a must to provide a decent customer experience); and iii) benefit
from the resulting increase in sales.
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 9

To build an e-commerce operation from scratch, a big company (keep in mind that the
company’s clients have average GMV of R$5.5mn per month) has to hire more than
20 vendors. It will need an e-commerce platform like VTEX, Locaweb’s Tray or Shopify.
Then it will need one or more payment processors (Stone, Mercadopago, Cielo, etc.),
along with logistics providers (Sequoia, Correios, Loggi, etc.), a marketplace integrator,
an anti-fraud solution, a SEO tool, and the list goes on.

Figure 3: It is not so simple to build an e-commerce operation

Source: Company reports

So, the DIY approach is complex and requires dozens of vendors to manage all of the
tiny details involved in a big e-commerce operation.

By hiring Infracommerce, brands remove the complexity of having to deal with a slew
of service providers, while also benefiting from the scale gains Infracommerce provides
via its vast client list.

Scale allows companies to generate insights from the huge swaths of collected data,
deliver impressive customer support (24/7 support, chat bots, etc.), offer competitive
pricing and provide state-of-the-art delivery/shipment.

Infracommerce has built a logistics grid that is on par with even the best marketplaces.
The company has 10 distribution centers spread across Brazil, covering more than half
(55%) of the population in as little as 2 days.

In the chart below, we show that big companies that opt for in-house e-commerce
usually do not generate the scale to build comparably comprehensive logistics
infrastructure, and even some marketplaces are lagging. And naturally, a great
customer experience/delivery time reflects directly on customers’ perception of a
brand. Infracommerce’s clients have better Reclame Aqui (consumer complaint) scores
than those that have taken an “in-house” approach.
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 10

Figure 4: Infracommerce offers great customer experience to its clients’ clients

Source: Company reports

As we mentioned above, scale can also help reduce costs. In the figure below, we
show how an e-commerce operation can save money at different levels of GMV. The
credit card processing costs of a R$10bn/year e-commerce operation are 30% lower
than a R$10mn/year operation. Shipping costs can be 15% lower and BI costs 60%.

Figure 5: Largest B2B e-commerce operations

Cost reduction by category

(Indexed to 100)

Illustrative
100 100 100 100 Annual GMV
96
89 91
85 86 R$10 mn
80 Medium
79
Brands
71 71
60 R$100 mn
57 Large
Brands
40 R$1 bn

R$10 bn

Credit Card (% of GMV) Freight (R$/order) Technology (% of GMV) Business Intelligence

(% of GMV)

Source: Company reports

 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 11

Competition from marketplaces

When explaining Infracommerce’s value proposition, investors wonder if marketplaces

represent a threat. After all, they have much greater scale than Infracommerce itself.

While marketplaces have the scale to provide a great service, they do not offer the
customer experience that big brands need. Infracommerce’s clients are at the top of
the pyramid (their average monthly GMV is R$5mn), have strong brands and want a
direct sales channel to their customers.

When a brand sells in a marketplace, it does not have close contact with the buyer, it
does not own the consumer data, and maybe most importantly, its interests will usually
be secondary to those of the client.

Example: If someone searches for a specific product in a brand’s marketplace store

and doesn’t buy the product, the next day the marketplace will target them with a bunch
of ads for the product, potentially leading them to other sellers on the platform.

This doesn’t mean Infracommerce’s clients aren’t able to sell in marketplaces. It’s quite
the opposite. Marketplaces are an important channel for anyone wanting to sell online
and Infracommerce provides all the necessary integration tools for clients to do so.

Addressable market is huge and underpenetrated

Infracommerce serves clients that sell directly to the final consumer (B2C) as well as
those that sell to other businesses (B2B).

B2C: E-commerce’s secular growth to drive revenues up

The opportunity in the B2C market is more straightforward for investors to understand
because it is a niche that the market already knows (all listed e-commerce companies
in Brazil operate in B2C – Meli, Magalu, Locaweb, B2W, etc.).

We estimate that the Brazilian e-commerce market had total GMV of close to R$100bn
in 2020 (8% of overall retail sales). Infracommerce’s B2C clients had R$1.1bn in GMV
last year (i.e., Infracommerce has a market share of 1% in B2C).

E-commerce in Brazil is growing fast. Higher e-commerce penetration in the country is

a clear growth driver for Infracommerce in the B2C market. In the US, e-commerce
penetration is almost double that of Brazil, and in China it is more than triple
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 12

Figure 6: Infracommerce’s share of Brazilian B2C GMV

Source: Company reports

B2B: An untapped market

The B2B segment is probably 10 years behind B2C in terms of digitalization. E-

commerce penetration is super low, so the opportunity seems huge.

Infracommerce had B2B GMV of R$3.5bn in 2020, while we estimate the B2B e-
commerce market to be around R$30bn (e-commerce penetration of only 1.5%).
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 13

Figure 7: Infracommerce’s share of Brazilian B2B GMV

Source: Company reports

We believe that the B2B market will go through the same digitalization process that we
saw in the B2C segment, and the fact that Infracommerce is already positioned to surf
this wave from the onset really excites us.

Delving deeper into B2B

Competition in the B2B niche is much softer. It is not easy to adapt a B2C solution
(indeed there are many great platforms) to the B2B world.

In the B2C segment, prices of products are the same for every user that accesses the
website (with the exception of shipping, of course). In a B2B platform, the price needs
to be dynamic depending on a variety of factors: i) the buyer’s segment, ii) their location
(taxes vary depending on state), iii) their order size (merchants that buy R$50k/month
and R$500k/month from the platform will naturally pay different unit prices).
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 14

So, B2B demands customization that a standard B2C platform doesn’t offer.
Infracommerce has a cutting-edge solution for the B2B niche and runs 12 platforms.

To better illustrate the B2B market, below we show Infracommerce’s main B2B
platforms as well as the largest B2B e-commerce operations in Brazil that aren’t
handled by Infracommerce.

Figure 8: Brazil’s largest B2B e-commerce operations

Source: Company reports

Ambev has the largest B2B operation in the country. The beverage manufacturer
created “Parceiro Ambev” to digitalize its relationship with small merchants.
Restaurants, pubs, grocery stores, markets, etc. can now buy products directly from
Ambev. We estimate Ambev’s platform has annual GMV of R$12-15bn.

The company hired Webjump to develop the project using Magento’s e-commerce
platform. But when a client hires Infracommerce to build a B2B e-commerce platform,
Infracommerce is the agency (developing the design, necessary integrations with third-
party solutions, etc.) and the platform (Infracommerce developed its own B2B
ecommerce platform with proprietary tech).

Compra Agora, a B2B e-commerce platform that Infracommerce built for Unilever, is
Infracomerce’s largest B2B operation. An interesting aspect about B2B platforms is
that they can be multi-seller (like a marketplace, with more than one brand selling
products on the platform). With Compra Agora, buyers can see Unilever, Mondelez and
Danone products, for instance.

This is great for Infracommerce. The more sellers on the platform, the greater the
potential for GMV, and thus the higher Infracommerce’s revenues. In addition, this is a
“Winner Take Most” segment, so five years from now when B2B e-commerce gains
higher penetration, there will only be a handful of winners in each segment. Take a
grocery store. The assortment of any grocery store is really broad, so it wouldn’t be
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 15

viable for a merchant to access dozens of B2B platforms to make all the purchases
necessary to keep its shelves stocked.

We think there will only be a few platforms that will be winners in this game (similar to
what we see in the marketplace segment). And as Infracommerce is an early mover in
the B2B niche, it will certainly have some of the winning platforms (Compra Agora and
Vila Nova are two examples of winning e-commerce platforms in food retail).

Figure 9: Compra Agora website – merchants can buy everything from shampoo to milk…

Source: Compra Agora website

Business Model
Infracommerce divides its operations into three business units:

i) Omnichannel Platform: Covers the e-commerce platform, marketing,

CRM, business intelligence, OMS, etc.

ii) Fulfillment: Covers the logistics operation.

iii) Fintech: Currently a payment and payment reconciliation solution.

 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 16

Infracommerce had R$4.6bn in GMV in 2020. R$1.1bn was handled by its logistics
vertical and R$600mn was processed by its payments division.

Figure 10: Infracommerce GMV in 2020

R$4.6B OPPORTUNITY

OPPORTUNITY
CROSS SELL

CROSS SELL

R$1.1B
R$ 0.6 B

OMNICHANNEL FULFILLMENT FINTECH

PLATFORM

Source: Company reports

It is no coincidence that fulfillment GMV is the same as B2C GMV (R$1.1bn). All of
Infracommerce’s B2C clients use its logistics solution. This is a clear sign that its clients
like the service, and is probably a big reason why they choose Infracommerce (logistics
is one of the most complex and delicate aspects of an e-commerce operation).

But B2B relationships in Brazil are usually intermediated by distributors, which is why
B2B clients don’t use Infracommerce for delivery. They already have long-term
relationships with plenty of distributors.

That said, Infracommerce thinks that by 2025 it can operate logistics for up to 15% of
its B2B GMV. This year, the company started to operate logistics for Unilever in two
regions (Brasilia and São Paulo) via a model it calls “Broker as a Service”. It all started
because Unilever’s distributor in Brasília shut down. The companies created the new
model together to solve the problem.

It is quite simple: Unilever gives its products to Infracommerce’s distribution center on

consignment (so Infracommerce doesn’t run any risk on the inventory side) and
Infracommerce delivers the products to Unilever’s clients. For Unilever, this model
means an increase in working capital (since a distributor pays upfront for the products),
but the payoff is a higher selling price, as it is Unilever selling directly to its clients,
without any middleman.
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 17

Infracommerce’s commercial model is designed to align the company with the interests
of its clients. Almost all revenue comes from take rates charged on top of GMV. This
means that Infracommerce grows along with its clients.

In the figure below, we show pricing examples for each service. Logistics is the most
expensive product (6-8% take rate), followed by the omnichannel platform (3-5%) and
the fintech unit (1.5-3%).

Figure 11: Take-rates for each service

Omnichannel
Platform1

R$4.6B
GMV
(3 - 5% take rate)

Fulfillment1 Fintech1
Client

R$1.1B R$0.6B
GMV TPV
(6 - 8% take (1.5 - 3% take
rate) rate)

Source: Company reports

While the B2B segment accounts for 76% of Infracommerce’s total GMV, we estimate
it only represents 28% of net revenues. This is because take rates are much lower in
the B2B vertical, as volumes are significantly higher and Infracommerce’s scope is
much more limited (logistics penetration is almost zero and payments is low too).

We estimate that Infracommerce charges take rates of around 2% in the B2B segment
and around 15% in the B2C segment. In the figure below, we show how the company’s
GMV and revenue are divided up among the B2C and B2B segments.
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 18

Figure 12: Illustrative take rates for each service; Using 2020 figures
2020 GMV

R$4.6bn

24% B2C 76% B2B

R$1.1bn R$3.5bn

Take-rate of 15.4% Take-rate of 1.9%

R$169mn R$67mn

B2C Revenues Total Revenues B2B Revenues

R$236mn

Source: Company reports

Client portfolio

Infracommerce has 70 clients using its full commerce solution (it onboarded another
120 clients after the recent acquisition of Pier 8, but they are only logistics clients).

The company has clients spread across a wide variety of segments. In apparel, we
highlight Nike, Asics, Mizuno, Armani. In food & beverage, we highlight Ambev
(Infracommerce runs its “Emporio da Cerveja” operation), Nespresso, Kopenhagen
and Mondelez (B2B clients). And in the fast-moving consumer goods segment, we
highlight Unilever, Johnson & Johnson, Coty and Danone (B2B clients).
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 19

Figure 13: Infracommerce has a stellar portfolio of clients

Source: Company reports

Churn dynamics

Infracommerce has a historical churn rate of 7% in the B2C segment. It has not
registered any client churn in the B2B vertical (the lock-in of the clients is much higher,
as they have dozens of distributors integrated into the platform and thousands of clients
buying products, so it is not so simple to cut out Infracommerce in a B2B operation).

Getting back to B2C, the main reason for the 7% annual churn is clients that decide to
bring their e-commerce operations “in house”. Infracommerce has never lost a client to
a competitor. But knowing that its main threat is internalization, the company intends
to modularize its service offering (something that it didn’t do before because it needed
to gain enough scale as a full commerce provider).

By modularizing its services, when a client decides to internalize e-commerce for any
reason, it can reduce its scope of services to increase the chance of keeping them as
a client (the client can internalize the platform, marketing and call center operations,
but stay with Infracommerce for logistics). By doing this, Infracommerce maximizes
client LTV/CAC, as the costs to acquire the client were already incurred and LTV
doesn’t go all the way to zero.
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 20

Figure 14: Infracommerce churn rate has been relatively stable; Net retention rate is high

2018 2019 2020

Net Retention Rate
(%, 2017-2020)
100% 2020

R$5 mn R$7 mn R$ 12 mn
274% 2019 (7%) (7%) (7%)

SER Churn

100% 200% 2018

100%
109% 3 3 5
2017
218%
136% 150%
100% # of Clients
2017 2018 2019 2020

Source: Company reports

Delving deeper into fintech and logistics operations

Fintech

Infracommerce launched its strategic fintech vertical in 2019.

The company’s fintech solutions can be divided into three segments: payment solutions
(main acquiring partner is Stone, but it also uses Cielo and Adyen), credit as a service
and management & back office (basically a payment reconciliation tool).

Figure 15: Infracommerce’s fintech solutions

Infracommerce Fintech Solutions

› “Boletos”
Payment › PIX (Instant Payment)
Solutions › Credit Cards
B2B and B2C › B2C installment payments
› Insurances

› Credit Engine as a Service (Big Data)

› Credit Policy via AI
Credit as a Service
› Risk management
B2B › POS payment solution
› Wallet

Management & › Payment Conciliation

Back-office › Dashboards & KPI’s

Source: Company reports

 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 21

The company processed R$600mn in TPV in 2020. Its payment solutions target B2B
and B2C clients, but today most of the TPV comes from B2C clients.

The B2B segment is also 10 years behind B2C when it comes to means of payment.
In the B2C segment, around 70% of purchases are made via credit/debit cards (the
other 30% are basically bank slips, but PIX is gaining ground). In the B2B segment,
almost all transactions are via bank slips. So, there is a big opportunity to digitalize
payments and explore credit in the B2B segment.

Today, when a client makes a purchase from a distributor, the distributor finances this
client (usually the client can pay the bank slip in 20-30 days). This is inefficient, as a
distributor is not specialized in credit, meaning it could make poor credit limit decisions,
translating into a sales bottleneck.

Infracommerce is collecting the data of 300k registered businesses that buy products
on its B2B platforms every day. The company can leverage this data to make credit
limit decisions for each client. This is good for everyone involved. The distributor
receives payment upfront and boosts its sales, as its clients will have higher credit
limits, and Infracommerce receives a fee for originating the credit.

This is a new initiative called “Credit as a Service”. It is something similar to what Totvs
does with Supplier. Infracommerce could partner up with a financial institution or even
create a FIDC to explore this opportunity itself.

It currently has a beta running with one client. It was able to boost credit limits by 30%,
cut down credit analysis to just a few hours (while distributors take 1 month) and
simplify the entire process.
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 22

Figure 16: Infracommerce’s Credit as a Service solution

New
Previous
(Fintech
(B2B Client)
Infracommerce)

Credit Limit 1.0x 1.3x

Analysis SLA 30 days 10 hours

Nothing
Full corporate
Requirements (online-based
documents
research)

Source: Company reports

A top notch logistics operations

Infracommerce’s logistics operations shipped 51mn items in 2020. With 10 distribution

centers distributed across 85k m², the company won the ABCOMM (Brazilian E-
commerce Association) award for “Best Service in E-commerce” in 2020.

The fulfillment operation has outstanding metrics, with 99% of orders delivered on time
(vs. 95% market average). Infracommerce covers 55% of the population within 2 days.
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 23

Figure 17: Infracommerce’s logistics grid

Source: Company reports

IPO to foster growth

Infracommerce’s IPO was priced in April at R$16, valuing the company at ~R$3.8bn.
The implied valuation was 8x EV/sales 2021E (or 9.6x on a fully diluted basis).

The offer was 100% primary and consisted of 54mn shares, injecting R$870mn into
the company’s balance sheet. The proceeds will be deployed as follows:

i) Acquisitions: 64%.

ii) Investments in capex, R&D and commercial expenses to accelerate

organic growth: 30%.

iii) Payment of debt: 6%.

M&As could enhance Infracommerce’s ecosystem

We believe that Infracommerce will focus its M&A efforts on four verticals:

i) Strengthen tech and AI capabilities. The goal of these potential

acquisitions is to enhance its ecosystem by bringing in new technologies.
AI, big data and POS solutions are some examples of technologies that
the company would like to bring in-house.

ii) Expand logistics infrastructure. Infracommerce has M&A targets that will
strengthen its logistics grid even more, enabling it to continuously
improve customer experience. An example of an acquisition in this
vertical is Pier 8. Last December, Infracommerce acquired Pier 8, a
company founded in 2012 that offers fulfillment and logistics solutions to
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 24

medium-sized businesses in segments such as apparel, food and

personal care. Pier 8 brought 3 new distribution centers and 120 clients
to Infracommerce, which paid R$71mn for 100% of the company. Below
we provide an example of some of Pier 8’s clients.

Figure 18: Pier 8 brought 120 medium-sized clients to Infracommerce

Source: Compra Agora website

iii) Consolidate the full commerce segment. Infracommerce has some

competitors in full commerce. As we flagged several times in the report,
the more scale you have, the greater the customer experience you will
be able to provide and the stronger your cost efficiency. So, it makes
perfect sense to buy competitors to strengthen the operation.
Infracommerce is the largest full commerce player in Brazil, followed by
Synapcom (we estimate it is half Infracommerce’s size in revenue), Tatix
(we think it is about 1/4 of Infracommerce’s size) and Selia.

iv) Strengthen its LatAm footprint. Some of Infracommerce’s clients wish that
it could solve “their problem” across all of LatAm, not just Brazil. In 2017,
the company acquired 20% of New Retail, a full commerce player that
has operations in Argentina (under the brand Brandlive) and Colombia
(Win Brandlike E-commerce). In 2018, Infracommerce increased its
stake in New Retail to 21.44%, before upping it again five months ago to
61% and acquiring control of the operation. Infracommerce also started
to operate in Mexico in 2015, but organically.

Shareholder structure, management and Board of Directors

Infracommerce has a disperse shareholder base. There are five big groups with more
than 5% of the company.

Arrow + Archery, two different funds owned by the same family, have 8.8% of
Infracommerce. Ebricks + Igah (two funds that merged) have 14.1% of Infracommerce
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 25

and are the largest shareholder. Engadin, a fund owned by Iguatemi and the Jereissati
family, has 12.2% of the company. Iguatemi holds 65% of Engandin (i.e., Iguatemi has
8% of Infracommerce).

Transcosmos, a Japanese tech company with a venture capital arm, holds 9.9%.
Flybridge, a seed stage venture capital firm, also holds 11.6% of Infracommerce. And
finally, Kai Schoppen, the founder and CEO of Infracommerce, has 4.3%.

Table 3: Shareholder structure

Group # of shares % of company
Arrow + Archery 20,999,524 8.8%
eBricks + Igah 33,708,303 14.1%
Engadin 29,315,634 12.2%
Transcosmos 23,642,101 9.9%
Flybridge 27,567,127 11.5%
Kai Schoppen 10,275,452 4.3%
Others 94,176,835 39.3%
Source: Company reports

Management and Board of Directors

Senior management has vast experience in the business. Kai Schoppen (CEO and
founder) has more than a decade of experience in e-commerce. Before starting
Infracommerce, he was CEO of Brandsclub. Last year, Kai was elected digital
entrepreneur of the year by ABCOMM (Brazilian E-commerce Association).

Luiz Pavão (VP B2C) is also a co-founder of the company and is the former logistics
and e-commerce director of Daslu.

Below we show Infracommerce’s management team and their previous experience.

Figure 19: Infracommerce’s management team

Source: Company reports, BTG Pactual

 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 26

The Board has 7 members: 3 independent (Estela Vieira, Claudia Worms and João
Ferreira), Kai Shoppen, Pedro Jereissati (who is also Chairman), Pedro Melzer (from
Igah+Ebricks) and Guilherme Weege (from Archery+Arrow).

Figure 20: Board members

Source: Company reports

 Infracommerce
Infracommerce 14 June 2021 page 27

Infrac ommerc e

Income Statement (R$mn) 12/2016 12/2017 12/2018 12/2019 12/2020 12/2021E 12/2022E 12/2023E
Revenue - - 101 138 236 370 527 740
Operating expenses (ex depn) - - (100) (137) (230) (329) (446) (601)
EBITDA (BTG Pactual) - - 0 1 6 42 81 140
Depreciation - - (2) (8) (14) (16) (23) (29)
Operating income (EBIT, BTG Pactual) - - (1) (7) (9) 5 58 91
Other income & associates - - 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Interest - - (3) (9) (8) (7) 35 34
Abnormal items (pre-tax) - - 0 0 0 0 0 0
Profit before tax - - (4) (16) (17) (2) 94 124
Tax - - 0 0 0 1 (30) (42)
Profit after tax - - (4) (16) (17) (2) 64 82
Abnormal items (post-tax) - - 0 0 0 0 0 0
Minorities / pref dividends - - 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Income (local GAAP) - - (4) (16) (17) (2) 64 82
Adjusted Net Income - - (4) (16) (17) (2) 64 82
Tax rate (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 34
Per Share 12/2016 12/2017 12/2018 12/2019 12/2020 12/2021E 12/2022E 12/2023E
EPS (local GAAP) - - # # # (0.01) 0.27 0.35
EPS (BTG Pactual) - - # # # (0.01) 0.27 0.35
Net DPS - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07
BVPS - - # # # 3.73 4.00 4.28
Cash Flow (R$mn) 12/2016 12/2017 12/2018 12/2019 12/2020 12/2021E 12/2022E 12/2023E
Net Income - - (4) (16) (17) (2) 64 82
Depreciation - - 2 8 14 36 23 49
Net change in working capital - - 0 0 0 (12) 1 (3)
Other (operating) - - 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net cash from operations - - (3) (8) (2) 23 87 128
Cash from investing activities - - 0 0 0 (73) (58) (54)
Cash from financing activities - - 0 0 0 0 0 (16)
Bal sheet chge in cash & equivalents - - - 26 32 677 29 188
Balance Sheet (R$mn) 12/2016 12/2017 12/2018 12/2019 12/2020 12/2021E 12/2022E 12/2023E
Cash and equivalents - - 11 38 70 747 776 964
Other current assets - - 97 142 164 244 341 474
Total current assets - - 109 180 234 991 1,116 1,438
Net tangible fixed assets - - 7 12 22 63 85 102
Net intangible fixed assets - - 7 25 106 122 135 144
Investments / other assets - - 8 46 61 62 62 62
Total assets - - 130 263 423 1,238 1,399 1,745
Trade payables & other ST liabilities - - 85 140 195 263 360 490
Short term debt - - 0 20 38 8 8 158
Total current liabilities - - 86 160 233 271 368 648
Long term debt - - 0 28 66 24 24 24
Other long term liabilities - - 8 8 57 57 57 57
Total liabilities - - 93 195 356 352 449 729
Equity & minority interests - - 37 68 68 886 950 1,016
Total liabilities & equities - - 130 263 423 1,238 1,399 1,745

Company Profile: Financial ratios 12/2019 12/2020 12/2021E 12/2022E 12/2023E

EBITDA margin 0.8% 2.4% 11.2% 15.4% 18.9%
Operating margin -4.9% -3.6% 1.4% 11.0% 12.3%
Infracommerce is a Brazilian B2B company that provides a
complete set of digital solutions to enable brands to deliver an Net margin -11.4% -7.1% -0.4% 12.1% 11.1%
exceptional customer experience in their ecommerce operations. RoE -30.1% -24.5% -0.3% 7.0% 8.4%
Infracommerce acts in a market that we call “full commerce”, RoIC -15.2% -10.4% 4.0% 32.2% 42.9%
offering combined services of Ecommerce, Logistics, Payments, EBITDA / net interest 0.1x 0.7x 5.6x -2.3x -4.1x
Marketing, Customer Care, Big Data, etc (ie. everything that a Net debt / EBITDA 9.3x 5.9x -17.2x -9.2x -5.6x
company needs to run a cutting-edge ecommerce operation). Total debt / EBITDA 44.0x 18.0x 0.8x 0.4x 1.3x
Net debt / (net debt + equity) 13.0% 33.3% -417.7% -361.7% -334.5%
Source: Company reports and BTG Pactual estimates. Valuations: based on the last share price of that year(E)
based on share price as of 11 June 2021
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 28

Required Disclosures

This report has been prepared by Banco BTG Pactual S.A.

The figures contained in performance charts refer to the past; past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results.

BTG Pactual Definition Coverage *1 IB Services *2

Rating
Buy Expected total return 10% above the company’s sector 63% 51%
average.
Neutral Expected total return between +10% and -10% the 36% 33%
company’s sector average.
Sell Expected total return 10% below the company’s sector 1% 0%
average.

1: Percentage of companies under coverage globally within the 12-month rating category.
2: Percentage of companies within the 12-month rating category for which investment banking (IB) services were provided within the past 12 months.
Absolute return requirements
Besides the abovementioned relative return requirements, the listed absolute return requirements must be followed:
a) a Buy rated stock must have an expected total return above 15%
b) a Neutral rated stock can not have an expected total return below -5%
c) a stock with expected total return above 50% must be rated Buy

Analyst Certification

Each research analyst primarily responsible for the content of this investment research report, in whole or in part, certifies that:
(i) all of the views expressed accurately reflect his or her personal views about those securities or issuers, and such recommendations were elaborated independently, including in relation to Banco
BTG Pactual S.A. and/or its affiliates, as the case may be;
(ii) no part of his or her compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, related to any specific recommendations or views contained herein or linked to the price of any of the securities discussed
herein.
Research analysts contributing to this report who are employed by a non-US Broker dealer are not registered/qualified as research analysts with FINRA and therefore are not subject to the restrictions
contained in the FINRA rules on communications with a subject company, public appearances, and trading securities held by a research analyst account.
Part of the analyst compensation comes from the profits of Banco BTG Pactual S.A. as a whole and/or its affiliates and, consequently, revenues arisen from transactions held by Banco BTG Pactual
S.A. and/or its affiliates.
Where applicable, the analyst responsible for this report and certified pursuant to Brazilian regulations will be identified in bold on the first page of this report and will be the first name on the signature
list.

Statement of Risk

Infracommerce CXAAS S.A. [BRIFCM] (Primary) - Our target prices for Latin American telco and tech companies are DCF-derived, based on long-term enterprise free cash flow. Besides volatile
equity markets and notable macroeconomic risks in LatAm (affecting currencies, cost inflation, market potential, and ability to borrow), these companies in general face risks from regulation, competition,
and technology change.

Valuation Methodology

Infracommerce CXAAS S.A. [BRIFCM] (Primary) - Our target price is based on a two-stage discounted cash flow methodology. The forecasted cash flows are discounted at a WACC rate of 9.5% in
US dollar terms. We use a 2.5% growth rate in perpetuity.

Company Disclosures

Company Name Reuters 12-mo rating Price Price date

Infracommerce 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 IFCM3.SA Buy R$16.10 11-6-2021

18. As of the end of the month immediately preceding the date of publication of this report, neither Banco BTG Pactual S.A. nor its affiliates or subsidiaries beneficially own 1% or more of any class of
common equity securities
19. Neither Banco BTG Pactual S.A. nor its affiliates or subsidiaries have managed or co-managed a public offering of securities for the company within the past 12 months.
20. Neither Banco BTG Pactual S.A. nor its affiliates or subsidiaries engaged in market making activities in the subject company's securities at the time this research report was published.
21. Banco BTG Pactual S.A. or its affiliates or subsidiaries have not received compensation for investment banking services from the companies in the past 12 months
22. Banco BTG Pactual S.A. or its affiliates or subsidiaries do not expect to receive or intends to seek compensation for investment banking services from the companies within the next 3 months.
 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 29

Infracommerce
Stock Price (R$) Price Target (R$)
30,0

20,0

10,0

0,0
14-Jun-18

14-Jun-19

14-Jun-20

14-Jun-21
14-Sep-18

14-Dec-18

14-Sep-19

14-Dec-19

14-Sep-20

14-Dec-20
14-Mar-19

14-Mar-20

14-Mar-21
Buy
Neutral
Sell
No Rating

Source: BTG Pactual and Economatica. Prices as of 11 June 2021

 Infracommerce
14 June 2021 page 30

Global Disclaimer

This report has been prepared by Banco BTG Pactual S.A. (“BTG Pactual S.A.”), a Brazilian regulated bank. BTG Pactual S.A. is the responsible for the distribution of this report in Brazil. BTG Pactual
US Capital LLC (“BTG Pactual US”), a broker-dealer registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and a member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority and the Securities
Investor Protection Corporation is distributing this report in the United States. BTG Pactual US is an affiliate of BTG Pactual S.A. BTG Pactual US assumes responsibility for this research for purposes
of U.S. law. Any U.S. person receiving this report and wishing to effect any transaction in a security discussed in this report should do so with BTG Pactual US at 212-293-4600, 601 Lexington Ave.
57th Floor, New York, NY 10022.
This report is being distributed in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in the European Economic Area (“EEA”) by BTG Pactual (UK) Limited (“BTG Pactual UK”), which is authorized and regulated by
the Financial Conduct Authority of the United Kingdom. BTG Pactual UK has not: (i) produced this report, (ii) substantially altered its contents, (iii) changed the direction of the recommendation, or (iv)
disseminated this report prior to its issue by BTG Pactual US. BTG Pactual UK does not distribute summaries of research produced by BTG Pactual US.
BTG Pactual Chile S.A. Corredores de Bolsa (“BTG Pactual Chile”), formerly known as Celfin Capital S.A. Corredores de Bolsa, is a Chilean broker dealer registered with Comisión para el Mercado
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