THE LINK BETWEEN CHILDREN’S SOCIAL COGNITIVE SKILLS 1

Do I Know What They Know? Linking Metacognition, Theory of Mind, and Selective Social

Learning

Keywords: developmental cognition, metacognition, selective social learning, explicit

metacognition, implicit metacognition, theory of mind

This manuscript is in press at Journal of Experimental Child Psychology (JECP)

Authors and affiliation: Elizabeth Dutemplea, Hanifa Hakimia, Diane Poulin-Duboisa

a
Department of Psychology (PY 276), Concordia University 7141 Sherbrooke St. West,

Montreal, Qc, Canada, H4B 1R6 Phone: (514) 848-2424, ext. 2279

Corresponding author: Elizabeth Dutemple (elizabeth.dutemple@mail.concordia.ca)

Author contributions: E.D., H.H., and D.P.D. conceptualized the study, developed the

methodology, and wrote the original draft; E.D. and D.P.D. reviewed and edited; D.P.D.

provided funding and supervised.

Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank Mallorie Brisson, Jessy Burdman-Villa,

Cassandra Neumann, Alexa Ruel, Tiffany Resendes, Nathalie Germain, Guilherme Pereira, and

Alexandra Meltzer for volunteering and helping at various stages of the study. for help testing

and scoring for this project.

Funding: SSHRC Insight grant (# 435-2017-0564) awarded to Diane Poulin-Dubois

Declarations of interest: none.

Word count: 10,429 (without abstract)

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Abstract

Young children are often dependent upon learning from others and to this effect develop

heuristics to help distinguish reliable from unreliable sources. Where younger children rely

heavily on social cues such as familiarity with a source to make this distinction, older ones tend

to rely more on an informant’s competence (Tong et al., 2020). Little is known about the

cognitive mechanisms that help children select the best informant, however some evidence

points towards mechanisms such as metacognition (thinking about thinking) and theory of mind

(thinking about other’s thoughts) being involved. The goals of the present study were to 1)

explore how the monitoring and control components of metacognition may predict selective

social learning in preschoolers and 2) to attempt to replicate a reported link between selective

social learning and theory of mind. In Experiment 1, no relationship was observed across the

measures. In Experiment 2, only selective social learning and belief reasoning were found to be

related, as well as when both experiment’s samples were combined. No links between selective

social learning and metacognition were observed in the two experiments. These results suggest

that theory of mind is a stronger correlate of selective learning than metacognition in young

children.
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Do I Know What They Know? Linking Metacognition, Theory of Mind, and

Selective Social Learning

Findings from the past few decades suggest that children possess strategies which allow

them to distinguish unreliable sources of information from reliable ones, a process referred to as

selective social learning (e.g., Tong et al., 2019). Children frequently select learning sources

based on epistemic cues, or cues revealing informants’ knowledge. For example, preschoolers

preferentially learn from informants who have been accurate in the past, appear confident, or

have had visual access to relevant information (Brosseau-Liard, 2017; Harris et al., 2018; Koenig

& Sabbagh, 2013; Mills, 2013; Sobel & Finiasz, 2020).

Despite the convincing evidence for children’s selective learning abilities, there is little

consensus about the psychological mechanisms responsible for the development of this

selectivity (Brosseau-Liard, 2017; Heyes, 2016; Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016; Sobel

& Kushnir, 2013). According to some, selective social learning initially occurs through lower-

order cognitive strategies. In such cases, selective learning in younger children would be

governed by attention modulation and associative mechanisms – domain-general cognitive tools

that are applied in any learning context (social or asocial) across species (Heyes, 2016, 2018). In

contrast, according to others, selective social learning might be governed by higher-order

mechanisms such as metacognition (the ability to represent, monitor and control ongoing

cognitive processes), particularly in adults and children as of age 4 or 5 (Heyes et al., 2020).

Thus, although some selective learning strategies would be based on associative learning (e.g.,

“copy when uncertain”), others would be rooted in explicit metacognitive processes (e.g., “who

do I learn from”), otherwise described as the ability to reflect, identify, and disseminate our own

thoughts (Heyes, 2016; 2020). This ability would therefore be directly involved in at least a
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subset of socially motivated decision-making such as deliberating on the trustworthiness of a

source (Diaconescu et al., 2014; Tenney et al., 2007). Indeed, success on selective social learning

tasks partly rely on being able to reflect upon one’s knowledge and compare that knowledge to

that of potential sources of information to confirm whether a source is accurate. Similarly,

learning effectively from others presupposes being able to reflect on their knowledge state and

intentions, a key component of theory of mind (i.e., mind-reading), which broadly refers to

individuals’ ability to reflect upon other people’s mental states (Landrum et al.2015).

To reconcile these opposing views, Hermes and colleagues (2018) have suggested that

selective social learning consists of dual processes. The authors hypothesize that Type I

processes rely on implicit and automatic strategies (e.g., associative learning), and Type II

processes rely on flexible and conscious cognitive tools (e.g., metacognition; Hermes et al.,

2018; Heyes, 2018). The successful application of Type II mechanisms relies on numerous

factors – adequate inhibitory control and broader executive function, for instance (Davidson et

al., 2006; Sobel & Finiasz, 2020; Tong et al., 2020). Findings from a recent brain electro-

physiological (ERP) study have also revealed that the disruption of processes specifically

associated with semantic consolidation of word learning events is also involved in selective

learning (Mangardich & Sabbagh, 2018). Therefore, younger children might be less likely to

engage in Type II processes, lacking the necessary cognitive skills. However, Type I processes

likely also include implicit metacognitive skills, such as nonverbal expressions of uncertainty

reported in recent studies of metacognition in non-human animals and very young children

(Balcomb & Geurken, 2008; Beran, 2019; Goupil & Kouider, 2016; Hampton, 2009; Kornell,

2009; Paulus et al, 2013; Sodian et al., 2012). By this account, attentional biases and associative

learning do not fully explain how young children choose to trust a competent or expert model.
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Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying Epistemic Trust

Theory of mind and metacognition, though distinct, are thought to share

underlying mechanisms and have been linked to the development of selective learning (see Baer

et al., 2021; Flavell, 2000; Perner, 1991; Schneider & Lockl, 2006). Perner (1991) argues that the

prerequisite skill for both abilities is the representation of abstract concepts such as thoughts in

one’s mind. Once we can represent abstract concepts (e.g., other people’s thoughts or intentions)

in our mind, we may be able to then develop insight on our own thoughts and actions. Our

metacognitive skills become differentiated from the theory of mind abilities as we turn our

representational abilities inward and focus towards learning rather than others. Therefore, the

distinction between the two is important to explore as it will allow us to gain valuable

information about how they contribute to selective social learning.

Theory of mind. Initial support for the role of higher order cognitive processes in

selective social learning can be found in studies linking performance in selective learning and

theory of mind tasks. Studies with infants, preschoolers, and school-aged children have shown

that better developed theory of mind abilities are linked to better selective social learning skills

(Brosseau‐Liard et al., 2015; Crivello et al., 2018; DiYanni et al., 2012; DiYanni & Kelemen,

2008; Fusaro & Harris, 2008; Lucas et al., 2013; Palmquist & Fierro, 2018). Notably however, a

few studies have also reported conflicting results (Cossette et al., 2020; Pasquini et al., 2007).

Recently, Tahiroglu and colleagues (2014) created the 'Children's Social Understanding Scale'

(CSUS), to assess theory of mind through a parent-report questionnaire. The concurrent validity

of this scale with laboratory theory of mind tasks has been found to be excellent in both English

and French (Brosseau-Liard et al., 2019; Tahiroglu et al., 2014). To our knowledge, only two

studies have used this parental report on theory of mind as a predictor of selective learning
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abilities. One study found weak associations between the two, which upon further investigation,

was better explained by age (Brosseau-Liard et al., 2018). A recently published study found that

a single subscale of the CSUS (belief subscale) was related to performance on the selective

learning task (Resendes et al, 2021). One of the goals of the present study will be to replicate

and extend the findings on a link between selective learning and theory of mind, as measured

with the CSUS.

Metacognition. As mentioned above, it has been suggested that selective learning may

be linked to metacognition (Heyes, 2016; Resendes et al, 2021). Metacognition can be defined as

awareness of one’s own cognitive processes, i.e., thinking about thinking (Flavell, 1979; Geurten

& Willems, 2016). Regulating our thoughts when learning thus allows us to discriminate

between what is known and what is unknown. In the case of selective social learning, we might

expect metacognitive skills to allow children to recognize the discrepancy between their

knowledge state and that of various informants, allowing for more efficient learning.

Metacognitive monitoring is said to be the ability to assess and bring awareness to one’s thought

processes (Goupil & Kouider, 2019; Koriat & Helstrup, 2007). Metacognitive control is what

allows individuals to regulate their thoughts and interact with their environment in accordance

with their desired goals (Gliga & Southgate, 2016; Goupil & Kouider, 2019; O’Leary &

Sloutsky, 2019).

Researchers have recently shown that preschool-aged children can both monitor and

express their knowledge states nonverbally (Balcomb & Gerken, 2008; Beran et al., 2012;

Goupil & Kouider, 2016; Hembacher & Ghetti, 2014). This suggests that certainty can be

expressed without being able to display it with a deliberate action (endorsing levels of certainty)

or a verbal response (e.g., I am sure), drawing a distinction between ‘explicit’ metacognitive

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tasks and ‘implicit’ tasks. Implicit and explicit forms of metacognition are strongly related to

each other in some studies with neurotypical children but dissociated in children with autism

spectrum disorder (Kim et al, 2020; Nicholson et al, 2019; Roderer & Roebers, 2010). In her

review, Frith (2012) points out that the ability to self-correct during tasks is not dependent on the

ability to explicitly register a mistake (Yeung, Summerfield, 2012). Similarly, Goupil & Kouider

(2019) explain that we may possess a ‘core’ metacognitive ability, which allows us to interpret

abstract representations such as beliefs or thoughts, but that it alone is not enough to be able to

share these interpretations with others. Explicit metacognition would therefore emerge after

implicit metacognition and with language skills/other frontal lobe functions, as suggested by

neuroimaging data (Lak et al., 2014; Miyamoto et al., 2017). This has manifested itself in two

main ways in early life; preverbal infants tend to persist longer when they search for a ball at its

correct (but inaccessible) location, and toddlers do not attempt to answer questions they do not

know the answers to. In other words, the pay-off is more attractive when certainty about an

answer is high (Lucca & Sommerville, 2018).

Studies aiming to measure metacognition in young children often rely on non-verbal

responses such as looking time, looking patterns, post-decision persistence, and

electrophysiological signatures (Balcomb & Gerken, 2008; Beran et al., 2012; Geurten & Bastin,

2019; Goupil et al., 2016; Goupil & Kouider, 2019; Harris et al., 2018; Kuzyk et al., 2020;

Paulus et al., 2013). These measures can both reflect monitoring and control abilities; for

instance, uncertainty gestures are believed to reflect metacognitive monitoring (e.g., Kim et al.,

2016), whereas asking for a clue (e.g., Geurten & Bastin, 2019; Kloo et al., 2017) may reflect

implicit control, as children must make decisions regarding their level of certainty without

expressing it explicitly.
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To our knowledge, only one study has examined the link between explicit metacognition

and selective learning, with no success (Resendes et al, 2021). With regards to the link between

implicit metacognition and selective learning, the results are mixed. In one study, infants who

showed more persistence when searching at the correct location for a hidden object were less

likely to learn from an incompetent speaker (Kuzyk et al., 2020). Resendes and colleagues

(2021) reported that although explicit metacognition was not linked to selective learning, implicit

measures were. Finally, this relationship was not found in a recent study by Baer and colleagues

(2021). Clearly, more research is needed to confirm and expand these findings.

The Present study

The overarching objectives of the present experiments were 1) to examine the link

between implicit and explicit measures of metacognition and selective social learning and 2) to

further explore the relationship between selective learning and theory of mind. In the first

experiment, we measured both explicit and implicit metacognitive monitoring as possible

correlates of selective social learning. In the second experiment, we specifically focused on

implicit monitoring and implicit control measures with a selective learning task that involved a

conflict between the epistemic and social characteristics of the informants. Theory of mind was

measured via the CSUS questionnaire in both experiments, providing us with the possibility to

replicate previous findings regarding a link between theory of mind and selective social learning.

Experiment 1

Participants

Participants were recruited from a database of past participants, who were initially

recruited through birth lists provided by a governmental agency. Parents were contacted by email

and phone call, and informed consent was obtained via online consent form and verbal
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confirmation during the online procedure. Ethics approval was obtained from the University

Ethics board. Parents were compensated with a gift card to a local bookstore and a certificate of

merit for their children.

Following power analyses conducted on G*Power 3.1.9.7 (3 total predictors and 3 tested

predictors; implicit and explicit metacognition, and theory of mind), a target sample of 69

participants (assuming an alpha of 0.05, power of .8, and expected effect size of f 2 = .17 based

on similar research; Resendes et al., 2021). Out of 74 children tested, 11 had to be excluded due

to: undisclosed language development delays (N = 1), insufficient proficiency in either French or

English (N = 3), excessive parental interference (N = 1), or excessive distractibility (N = 6),

which was operationalized by calculating engagement ratings for each task (score lower than 3/5

on a Likert scale as rated by naïve coders).

The final sample included 63 participants (35 female) with a mean age of 47.1 ± 3.03

months. Fifty-six parents whose children were included in the final sample answered a

demographic questionnaire. According to its results, the families’ median yearly income was

between 100,000$ and 150,000$ (upper middle class) and most of our sample identified as

Canadian (60.3%). Other cultural identities reported were European (23.8%), East and Southern

Asian (15.9%), Caribbean (9.5%), African (7.9%), Latin/Central/South American (4.8%), and

Middle Eastern (4.8%).

Materials and procedure

The tasks were administered as part of a larger battery of tasks, the order of which was

counterbalanced across participants. The selective learning task was however always

administered first as it was particularly engaging and made children more comfortable. All tasks

were administered over an online video conference platform, where the children were typically
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10

seated beside or in front of their parent. In total, 29 participants were tested in French and 34

were tested in English. ANOVAs were run with and without language as a between-subjects

factor and results were not altered, so this variable was ignored in the analyses.

Selective Social Learning Task

We used a procedure adapted from Koenig and colleagues (2004) and Pasquini and

colleagues (2007). Two female puppets (“Sophie” and “Clara”) named familiar objects during

the three familiarization trials. One of the puppets named the objects accurately and the other did

not (e.g., named a ‘ball’ a ‘shoe’). The experimenter then asked the child if they knew which

puppet had said something wrong or right (“explicit judgement questions”). Whether we asked

about the correct or incorrect puppet was counterbalanced across participants. Children were

scored as correct if they correctly identified the puppet enquired after. During the three test trials,

unfamiliar objects were presented to the children. The latter were asked to identify the object and

if they wanted to ask one of the puppets for help labelling it (“Ask” question). Each puppet then

proceeded to label it with a nonsense word (e.g., “toma” or “mido”). Children were then asked

what they thought the object was called (“Endorse” question). Finally, the experimenter asked

the children a second time which puppet said something wrong or right (second explicit

judgement phase).

We counterbalanced the order in which the puppets spoke as well as their initial location

(left or right) and their reliability status. The position of the puppets was switched between trials

to ensure the children were relying on the identity of the puppet to endorse a label rather than the

position of the puppet (e.g., “the one on the left is always wrong”). Counterbalancing the latter in

addition to our explicit judgement questions resulted in 16 counterbalancing conditions.

Metacognition Task
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This knowledge monitoring task was adapted from Kim and colleagues (2016). The

experimenter showed an empty black shoebox to the child. Three scenarios (repeated twice, for a

total of six trials) would then have played out. In the “Full Knowledge” trials, the experimenter

showed a toy to the child, saying “I am going to put this toy inside the box.” The experimenter,

in full view of the child, then put the toy inside the box and closed the lid, saying “Now, I have

put the toy inside the box”. In the “Partial Knowledge” trials, the experimenter showed two toys

to the child and said: “I am going to put only one of these toys inside the box”. The experimenter

then occluded the screen with an opaque piece of cardboard. They then removed the cardboard

after the toy was hidden and said: “I have now put one of the toys inside the box”. In the

“Ignorance” trials, the experimenter told the child that: “I am now going to put a different toy

inside the box” without showing a specific toy. She would then occlude the screen, putting a

different toy inside the box, removed the cardboard and stated, “I have now put a different toy

inside the box.” Once one of these scenarios played out, the experimenter asked the child “Do

you know what’s inside the box or do you not know?” If the child answered that they knew, the

experimenter would ask them what the object was and if they really knew or if they were just

guessing. If they did not know, they were asked if they knew why they did not know. To ensure

the children knew what the toys were, and thus not answering that they did not know because

they could not identify the toy, the experimenter would ask them before each trial what each toy

was (other than for the ignorant trials, where the experimenter asked the child after the toy was

shown). We counterbalanced the order in which the participants saw the Ignorance, Partial

Knowledge, and Full Knowledge trials, resulting in six possible orders.

Theory of Mind Measure – the Children’s Social Understanding Scale

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This scale includes forty-two questions subdivided into 6 subscales of seven questions. It

offered us a comprehensive assessment of theory of mind, measuring the ability to reason about

emotions (e.g., “Talks about how people feel”), beliefs (e.g., “Talks about what people think or

believe”), knowledge (e.g., “Realizes that experts are more knowledgeable than others in their

specialty”), perception (e.g., “Talks about what people see or hear”), desire (e.g., “Recognizes

that if a person wants something, that person will probably try to get it”), and intentions (e.g.,

“Understands that hurting others on purpose is worse than hurting others accidentally”). Its

broader evaluation of theory of mind allows for better ecological validity, as it depicts a wider

range of behaviors and provides better score variability between participants. The creators have

reported excellent internal validity (α = .94; Tahiroglu et al., 2014) and a mean score of 3.14/4

for all combined scales, indicating their sample had overall very good theory of mind skills. The

French adaptation by Brosseau-Liard and Poulin-Dubois (2019) has shown similar excellent

validity and reliability to its English counterpart. The CSUS has generally shown reliability

across translations (e.g., Brosseau-Liard & Poulin-Dubois, 2019) and most recently inter-rater

reliability across parents (Gluck et al., 2021).

Parents responded on a four-point Likert-type scale (1 = definitely untrue, 2 = somewhat

untrue, 3 = somewhat true, and 4 = definitely true). Each participant received a mean score out of

4 for each subscale, as well as a total mean score. Higher scores on the CSUS indicate a better

developed understanding of others’ mental states.

Results and Discussion

First, results on each task were compared to chance performance and to previous studies

to provide evidence for or against replication. Afterwards, correlation coefficients were

computed to investigate the links between tasks.

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Data analyses were conducted on JAMOVI (v.1.1.9) and SPSS (v.27). A single univariate

outlier (N = 1) in our explicit metacognitive monitoring task was identified following visual

inspection of the data (± 3.29 standard deviations from the mean; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2019).

Analyses were run with and without this outlier with no change, so it was kept in the final

sample. No multivariate outliers were identified using Tabachnick and Fidell's (2019) criteria of

exclusion.

Selective Social Learning Task

Scoring. Children received 1 point every time they chose to ask the accurate puppet for

the novel label, endorsed the label used by the accurate puppet, and identified which puppet had

been accurate. There were 3 “Ask” and “Endorse” questions, meaning scores could vary between

0 and 3, and 2 “Explicit Judgement” questions, meaning scores could vary between 0 and 2. To

allow for increased variability amongst scores, we combined the scores on the Ask and Endorse

questions for a maximum score of 6. Proportion of correct responses were calculated from these

scores.

Chance Analyses. Sixty-three children were included in the one-sample t-tests

performed, however one child did not complete the explicit judgement trials. Chance was

operationalized at 50%, as children had to choose between two options (i.e., competent or

incompetent puppet) for all three question-types. Children performed above chance for ask (t(62)

= 2.32, p = .024, 95% CI [.01, .17], d = .29), endorse (t(62) = 2.89, p = .005, 95% CI [.04, .20], d

= .36), and explicit questions (t(61) = 3.62, p < .001, 95% CI [.07, .24], d = .46).

Table 1

Descriptive statistics for the Selective Social Learning task.

Ask Questions Endorse Questions Explicit Judgement

N 63 63 62
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Mean .59 .62 .65

SD .31 .33 .33
Range 0-1.00 0-1.00 0-1.00

Metacognition: knowledge monitoring task

Scoring. Children’s responses were scored as correct if they claimed to know which toy

was in the box in the Full Knowledge trials or if they correctly claimed not to know what was in

the box in the Partial Knowledge or the Ignorant trials. We initially wanted to follow the scoring

procedure used by Kim and colleagues, using the “guessing” measure, however, the children in

our sample indiscriminately claimed to guess during every trial type (RM ANOVA, F(2, 32) =

1.07, p = .355, η2 =.018), leading us to believe that they ignored what guessing meant.

Each type of trial was presented twice, for a total score between 0 and 6. Proportions of

correct responses were calculated for the explicit measure for the knowledge monitoring task.

Two independent coders scored this task and agreed on 96.35% of the trials (based on 25% of

total sample). Three types of uncertainty gestures were coded as an implicit measure of

metacognition: head tilting, shrugging shoulders, and shaking the head. Two independent raters

coded the gestures and agreed on 81.25% of the trials from this same sample subset (Cohen’s

kappa = .55). Though Kim and colleagues (2016) also coded for ‘looking away’, rating this

gesture from videos was found unreliable it was dropped. The presence of any type of gesture

per trial was coded, such as scores could vary between 0 and 2 for each type of trial. To construct

an overall individual measure of implicit metacognition for this task, we computed a difference

score by averaging the number of gestures in the ignorance and partial knowledge trials and

subtracting the number of uncertainty gestures recorded during the full knowledge trials. Our

initial rationale was that we would expect children with better implicit metacognitive skills to
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15

exhibit more uncertainty gestures in the partial and ignorance, as they aren’t aware of which toy

is put in the box in the latter trials. Such difference scores have previously been used in

developmental research with similar purposes (e.g., Vanderbilt et al., 2011). The difference

scores could vary between −2 and 2.

Table 2

Descriptive statistics in the metacognition task.

Full Trials Partial Trials Ignorance Trials

Uncertainty Uncertainty Uncertainty
Correct Correct Correct
Gesture Gesture Gesture
N 63 63 63 63 63 63
Mean 1.87 .33 .86 .70 1.51 .94
SD .38 .57 .84 .78 .74 .82
Range 0-2 0-2 0-2 0-2 0-2 0-2

Replication. We performed a repeated measures ANOVA with “trial type” (Full

Knowledge, Partial Knowledge, and Ignorance) as a within subject factor on the number of

correct judgments. We found a main effect of trial type (F(2, 124) = 37.0, p < .001, η2 = .28),

indicating that children performed worst on the Partial Knowledge trials than on the Full

Knowledge (t(62) = 7.88, p < .001) and Ignorance trials (t(62) = −5.52, p < .001; see Figure 1).

This pattern replicates the original findings. There were some concerns that presenting the

Ignorance trials last may have confused children into identifying the hidden toy as the one

previously presented, however, we found no difference in the scores according to an independent

samples t-test (t(61) = .221, p = .592, 95%CI [ -.10, .13], d = .063).

We ran a repeated measures ANOVA with “trial type” (Full Knowledge, Partial

Knowledge, and Ignorance) as a within-subjects factor on the proportion of trials with

uncertainty gestures. We found a main effect of trial type (F(2, 124) = 16.5, p <.001, η2 = .11),
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where notably, our sample engaged in more gestures in the Partial Knowledge (t(62) = − 3.34, p

= .001) and Ignorance trials (t(62) = −6.19, p < .001) as compared to the Full Knowledge trials

(see Figure 2).

Figure 1

Number of trials with correct judgments according to trial type. Being ‘correct’ meant saying “I

know” in the Full Knowledge trials and “I don’t know” in the Partial Knowledge and Ignorance

trials. The error bars represent the standard error. * = p< .05

Figure 2

Number of trials with uncertainty gestures. The error bars represent the standard error. * = p

< .05
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Children’s Social Understanding Scale (CSUS)

Parents filled out the CSUS online in either French or English. Sixty-two out of sixty-

three parents of children included in our final sample completed the questionnaire (see Table 3).

Our results are similar to those of Tahiroglu and colleagues’ (2014), suggesting that the present

sample has reached same level of theory of mind development. The questionnaire showed strong

internal consistency (N = 24, list-wise deletion according to all variables in procedure;

Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89).

Table 3

Mean scores on separate scales of the CSUS

Total Emotion Desire Knowledge Belief Intention Perception

N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
3.25 3.14 3.03
Mean (SD) 3.11 (0.35) 3.23 (0.44) 3.12 (0.52) 2.89 (0.36)
(0.40) (0.46) (0.60)

Intertask analyses
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Given that the main goal of this study was to examine the link between selective social

learning and cognitive skills, correlations were computed on measures of selective social

learning, metacognition, and global and Belief CSUS scores (see Table 4). We only observed a

significant relation between the implicit and explicit measures of metacognition (r = .272, p

= .031).

Table 4

Zero-order correlations between the different measures. An asterisk (*) reflects a significant

(p<.05) correlation.

1. Selective Social 3. Nonverbal

2. Verbal 4. CSUS -
Learning (Endorse metacognitive
metacognitive Belief 5. CSUS Mean total
and Ask monitoring
monitoring Subscale
questions) (Gestures)
1 —
2 -0.073 —
3 0.09 0.272* —
4 0.097 -0.073 0.042 —
5 -0.033 -0.021 -0.043 0.796* —

In sum, we failed to find a significant correlation between selective social learning skills

and implicit or explicit metacognition, nor did we did replicate with a parental questionnaire the

well-known link between theory of mind and either selective social learning or metacognition.

As Brosseau-Liard and colleagues (2018) pointed out, though previous studies have found a

relationship between epistemic trust and theory of mind (e.g., DiYanni et al., 2012; Vanderbilt et

al., 2011), this effect might be small and replicated with difficulty. Finally, we observed a link

among implicit and explicit variables within the metacognitive task, replicating previous findings

with neurotypical children (Kim et al, 2020; Roderer & Roebers, 2010). However, the link

between uncertainty gestures and explicit metacognition might only reflect the redundancy of
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gestures with expression of knowledge (i.e., performing more gestures when reporting ignorance;

see general discussion).

This first experiment has some limitations. Overall, methodological factors may have

contributed to these mostly unexpected results. Data were collected during the Covid 19

pandemic, which prevented in-person testing. Even though our final sample was rated as

engaged and performed as well as in previous live studies on all tasks, it is possible that the

depth of processing of the information was insufficient to result in robust understanding and

engagement. Given these methodological constraints, a replication and extension of these

findings was warranted. In the second experiment, we aimed to replicate and extend these

findings with the implicit measure (informing) reported by Kim and colleagues (2016) on the

same metacognition task. We also elected to test selective social learning with a task that pitted

epistemic against social cues, therefore increasing task difficulty.

Experiment 2

Researchers have identified two broad categories of cues which guide selective learning

(Tong et al., 2020). Cues can be epistemic, conveying information about knowledge states. Cues

can also be non-epistemic, conveying information about the social status, relationships, or

personality of an individual. When epistemic and social cues compete, age predicts the weight

children give to different types of cues, with a developmental shift toward epistemic cues over

social characteristics between 4 and 6 years of age (Tong et al., 2020). When epistemic cues are

pitted against benevolence, children between 3 and 5 years have been shown to prioritize a nice-

incompetent informant over a mean-competent one (Landrum et al., 2015). The objective of this

second experiment was to identify the unique contribution of implicit monitoring metacognitive

skills in addition to theory of mind to children’s selective social learning with a task that
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provides a conflict between social and epistemic cues. Given previous studies (Brosseau‐Liard et

al., 2015; Crivello et al., 2018; Kuzyk et al., 2020; Resendes et al, 2020), we expected that both

theory of mind and implicit metacognitive abilities would significantly predict selective social

learning. Specifically, we hypothesized that children who scored higher on the CSUS and the

implicit metacognition measures would endorse the testimony of a competent-mean informant

over an incompetent-nice informant.

Methods

Participants. Fifty-five four-year-old children were recruited as in Study 1. No

exclusions were made, so our final sample consisted of 55 preschoolers (Mage = 53.24

months, SD = 3.13, range = 48 to 59 months; 22 females). Children’s native language was either

French (N = 25) or English (N = 30) and the language of testing was determined by the language

spoken at home identified in the demographic form. Forty-eight parents agreed to answer the

‘yearly household income’ question on our demographic questionnaire, where the median yearly

income was between 100,000$/year and 150,000$/year (upper middle class). Ethical approval to

conduct this study was granted by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the University.

The Children’s Social Understanding Scale (CSUS)

We used the same measure as in Experiment 1.

Selective social learning task

The selective social learning task was adapted from Johnston, Mills, & Landrum (2015,

Experiment 3). Children were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. The first condition

informed children of the puppets’ benevolence first and of its competence second. The second

condition did the reverse.

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Procedure. Competence was presented via trait labels. The experimenter labeled one

informant “smart” and the other “not smart”. The experimenter provided three examples of

consistent knowledge, or lack thereof (i.e., “This person is smart. She gives right answers, she

knows all sorts of facts, and she knows what things are called!” and “This person is not smart.

She gives wrong answers, she doesn’t know any sort of facts, and she doesn’t know what things

are called!”). For benevolence, children were provided with niceness and meanness trait labels.

The experimenter told the participants that one informant was nice, and the other was mean.

Three examples of consistent nice and mean behaviors were provided (i.e., ‘This person is

always nice. She shares things, she gives presents to her friends and family, and she cares about

people’s feelings!’’ and ‘‘This person is always mean. She refuses to share things, she steals

presents from her friends and family, and she doesn’t care about other people’s feelings!’’). We

counterbalanced which trait was presented first (competence or benevolence). Two phases (with

one label then with both) each consisted of four endorsement trials for novel objects, presented

one at a time. Children were asked to endorse either of the nonsense labels provided by the

informants (e.g., “Nav” for a lemon juicer) for all eight trials [See Johnston and colleagues

(2015; Experiment 3) for methodological details]. The position of the puppet and its identity

were counterbalanced across children.

Scoring. We expected children with superior selective learning abilities to correctly

endorse the “smart” yet “mean” puppet regardless of the counterbalancing order. Points were

therefore awarded in the updated phases once both traits had been attributed to the puppet. One

point was awarded each time the participant endorsed the label given by the smart-mean puppet,

for a possible total of four points. Children also received one point for each explicit judgement

they answered correctly, for a possible total of two points.

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Implicit metacognition task

The metacognition task was adapted from Kim and colleagues (2016), as it was in

Experiment 1. However, we assessed an implicit form of metacognition as an opt-out task,

wherein children were given the choice to share or not to share the contents of a box with a

confederate (i.e., “Inform” questions). Children opted-out by declining to share information if

they felt uncertain. Participants sat across the experimenter and to the right of a confederate

(named “Max”). Removable screens blocked all three parties from each other’s view while the

experimenter hid objects. Across six trials, the experimenter asked the child if they could tell

“Max” what was in the box. Children were considered correct if they agreed to inform Max in

the Full Knowledge trials and if they declined to inform Max in the Partial Knowledge and

Ignorance trials. The children’s knowledge states in the trials were identical to those of

experiment 1 and each child completed each type of trial twice. See Kim and colleagues (2016)

for a detailed review of this methodology. Children were randomly assigned to six

counterbalancing groups.

Scoring. The scoring system was identical as above; children were correct if they wished

to share with Max in the Full Knowledge trials but incorrect if they did so in the Partial

Knowledge and Ignorance trials. In total, each participant received a score out of six (i.e., a

maximum of two points of the full knowledge, partial knowledge, and ignorance trials each).

Procedure

Parents filled out the required forms while children became familiar with the

experimenters and testing environment. The selective social learning task was always

administered first, and administration of the unexpected content task and metacognition task was

counterbalanced.
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Results and Discussion

Data Analysis

A single univariate outlier was identified among the CSUS scores (n = 1), and analyses

were run with and without it. Given that our interpretations would not have changed, we decided

to keep the outlier. No multivariate outliers were identified according to Tabachnick & Fidell’s

(2019) criteria described above.

Selective social learning

Performance is reported as a proportion of the maximum score (i.e., possibility of four

points representing the ‘updated phase’ when the children had been given both labels).

Children’s average performance was significantly above chance criterion (i.e., .50, given forced-

choice, two-alternative questions; M = .68, SD = .35; t(54) = 3.83, p < .001, d = 0.52). Children’s

performance was statistically significantly above chance (i.e., .50, given a forced-choice, two-

alternative question) in responding to both explicit judgement questions, (M = .76, SD = .29),

t(52) = 6.69, p < .001, d = 0.92). Further analyses revealed that children’s performance did not

vary across conditions. Children who learned about the puppets’ competence first did not display

a better performance (M = .74, SD = .33) than their counterparts who learned about the puppets’

benevolence first (M = .63, SD = .36; t(53) = 1.122, p = .267, d = 0.30).

Implicit metacognition

Informing measure. A repeated measures ANOVA compared the percentage of trials in

which children accepted (out of two trials) by condition (i.e., full knowledge, partial knowledge,

and ignorance). Children’s willingness to accept to share information with the confederate varied

significantly across conditions (F (2, 108) = 37.81, p < .001, η2 = .22; full knowledge M = .75,

SD = .37; partial knowledge M = .42 SD = .42; and ignorance M = .26 SD = .37). Children shared
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information with the confederate significantly more in the full knowledge trials than on the

partial (t(54) = 5.91, p < .001) and ignorance trials (t(54) = 8.11, p < .001).

Table 5

Descriptive statistics for the metacognitive task.

Full Trials Partial Trials Ignorance Trials

Uncertainty Uncertainty Uncertainty
Correct Correct Correct
Gesture Gesture Gesture
N 55 48 55 48 55 48
Mean 1.49 .98 1.16 1.65 1.47 1.63
SD .74 .86 .83 .57 .74 .61
Range 0-2 0-2 0-2 0-2 0-2 0-2

Figure 3

Proportion of trials in which children accepted to inform according to trial type. The error bars

represent the standard error. * = p < .05

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Uncertainty gestures. Four uncertainty gestures were coded (head tilting, head shaking,

shrugging, and looking away) and scores per trial were compiled where children were coded as

having performed (or not) any kind of uncertainty gesture. Two independent raters scored and

intercoder reliability was excellent (Cohen’s Kappa = 1). This resulted in a possible total of two

gesture performance trials per trial type (full, partial, ignorance). This was done to compare our

results to those of Kim and colleagues (2016). We performed a RM ANOVA where trial type

was the within-subject repeated measure. A main effect of trial type was found (F(2, 94) = 17.58,

p < .001, η2= .17) where children specifically performed fewer uncertainty gestures in the full

knowledge trials than in the partial (t(47) = −4.54, p < .001) or ignorance trials (t(47) = −4.79, p

< .001), replicating the results from Experiment 1.

Figure 4

Number of trials with uncertainty gestures as a function of condition. The error bars represent

the standard error. * p < .05

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Children’s Social Understanding Scale (CSUS)

As in Experiment 1, the average scores on the full scale as well as individual scales were

similar, though slightly higher, than what could be expected in this age range. Internal validity in

this sample was very good (Cronbach’s alpha = .84; see Table 6).

Table 6

Mean scores on the scales of the CSUS

Total Belief Knowledge Perception Desire Intention Emotion

N 52 52 52 52 51 52 52
Mean
3.21 (.36) 3.26 (.52) 3.37 (.42) 2.90 (.44) 3.19 (.51) 3.24 (.40) 3.21 (.36)
(SD)

Correlates of Selective Social Learning

Pearson first-order correlations were first run between mean total and Belief CSUS

scores, selective social learning scores, metacognition scores, and uncertainty gesture composites

(see Table 7). The uncertainty gesture composite was calculated as described above.

Performance on the selective social learning task was correlated with the Belief subscale of the

CSUS (r = .282, p = .043). There was also a trending correlation between performance on the

metacognition task and the CSUS total mean score (r = .259, p = .064). We also ran partial

correlations to partial out the effect of age (Brosseau-Liard et al., 2018). The results did not

change therefore they are not reported.

Table 7

Zero-order correlations among measures. * p <.05

1. Selective 3. Nonverbal
2. Verbal
social learning metacognitive 4. CSUS - Belief 5. CSUS Total
metacognitive
(Endorse monitoring Subscale Mean
control
questions) (Gestures)
1 --
2 0.096 --
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3 0.089 0.094 --
4 0.282* 0.167 −0.044 --
5 0.155 0.259 −0.069 0.791* --

In this second study, we assessed the performance of children on tasks measuring implicit

metacognitive and theory of mind skills in order to explore the relationship between these two

higher-order cognitive skills and selective social learning. Overall, as in Experiment 1, children

performed well on the selective learning task and on the opt-out component of the same implicit

metacognition task. The CSUS scores were once again comparable to that of previous studies

(e.g., Tahiroglu et al., 2014). Our main findings revealed that CSUS scores on the belief subscale

were correlates of performance in a selective learning task, while implicit monitoring and control

metacognitive skills were not.

Regarding a potential link between uncertainty gestures as a measure of implicit

metacognition and selective learning, the null results across experiments indicated that the nature

of this measure merited a closer examination. A detailed analyses of our data on gestures

revealed that 77% of trials with uncertainty gestures in the first experiment were performed when

the children were correct (Incorrect = 28 gestures total; Correct = 95 gestures total). According

to paired-sample t-tests, children indeed performed more gestures in correct than incorrect trials

(t(51) = −3.96, p < .001, 95%CI [−1.22, −.40], d = −.55) but also in trials where they said they

didn’t know (M = 1.30) than when they said they knew (M = .65), regardless of accuracy (t(62) =

3.34, p = .001, 95%CI [.26, 1.04], d = .42). In other words, this suggests congruency between

gesture and verbal response about the content in the box, rather than gesture and lack of

confidence about the answer. Supporting our interpretation is the fact that our sample did not

perform more uncertainty gestures in the partial knowledge condition than in the ignorance

condition. To be correct, children had to confirm that they did not know what was in the box in
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both conditions, however ‘not knowing’ in the ignorance trials was not ambiguous. There was no

reason to be uncertain about their answer, similarly to the full knowledge condition, where

children performed very few gestures. Despite this, they performed significantly more gestures

than in the latter, supporting our view that uncertainty gestures were linked to the content of the

box (known or not known) rather than the children’s confidence about the content. If gestures

were a good proxy to measure implicit metacognitive processes, the majority of uncertainty

gestures would be performed on incorrect trials, where children were unsure of their answer (i.e.,

uncertain representation of their thoughts about the world, rather than uncertain representations

about the world), rather than correct ones, as other implicit measures of metacognition do (e.g.,

Paulus et al., 2013). Thus, we conclude that uncertainty gestures may not be the most accurate

way to measure implicit metacognitive abilities but may be a better indicator of explicit

metacognition. To date, implicit measures of certainty linked to selective learning have been a

longer latency to produce an incorrect answer and information seeking in ambiguous contexts

(e.g., Resendes et al., 2021).

This study also adds to the literature evidence that the CSUS may be an appropriate tool

to measure theory of mind in children. Though very few studies have used the CSUS as a

measure of theory of mind in a comparison with other abilities in children, recently, studies have

demonstrated a positive correlation between children’s social understanding, as measured by the

CSUS, and social mimicry (van Schaik & Hunnius, 2018). Other studies have revealed that

parent-reported theory of mind shares no link with anthropomorphism in young children

(Tahiroglu & Taylor, 2019). The present findings may suggest that a specific theory of mind

ability (i.e., belief understanding), is related to selective social learning in addition to broader

mindreading abilities. They do not, however, support past results which had found a relationship
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between metacognition and theory of mind (e.g., Feurer et al., 2015; Kloo et al., 2021; Sodian, et

al., 2012).

Regressions and cross-experiment analyses

Although different selective social learning and metacognitive tasks were administered in

both experiments, we decided to merge the data from both experiments in order to increase the

statistical power necessary to run a repeated-measures logistic regression (as yet unmet in either

of our experiments) with all selective social learning trials included. We did not include the

gesture measure because, as discussed above, it appears to not be a reliable measure of implicit

metacognition. Our predictors were the total score on the metacognition task, the total CSUS

score, and the CSUS Belief subscale score. We found that the Belief scale emerged as the only

marginally significant predictor of selective social learning (OR = 1.98, 95% CI [0.95; 4.12]; z =

1.84, p = .067); by holding all other predictors constant, the odds of answering the selective

learning task trial correctly increased by 98% for each additional unit of parent-reported belief

understanding. This confirms that belief understanding may play an important role in selective

learning. These results however should be taken cautiously, given that metacognition and

selective learning were measured with different tasks across the two experiments.

General Discussion

The overarching goal of these two experiments was to shed light on the higher-order

mechanisms of metacognition (both implicit and explicit) and theory of mind in selective social

learning. Across the two experiments, no link was observed with any form of metacognition and

selective learning. In contrast, we replicated a limited relation between mindreading and

selective social learning. More specifically, the belief scale of the CSUS predicted selective

social learning, replicating this specific association reported in a recently published study
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(Resendes et al., 2021). This relationship was only observed in Experiment 2, likely because of

increased task difficulty; more socio-cognitive skills were required in the second task than in the

standard selective learning task of Experiment 1, as it required children to weigh knowledge

against benevolence. This deliberate distinction between the tasks allows us to conclude that

increasing socio-cognitive demands tap into Type II higher order mechanisms, whereas simpler

tasks may rely on Type I, associative learning mechanisms. This may also speak to the various

cognitive mechanisms needed to operate Type II processes, which may also include working

memory and inhibition in addition to metacognition and theory of mind. Nonetheless, this link

was found to be robust when we pooled the data from the CSUS and the selective learning task

from both experiments. It is important to point out however that the few studies that have

examined a relationship between theory of mind and selective word learning using a parental

questionnaire have yielded mixed results (Brosseau-Liard et al., 2018). Given this disparity

between the literature and results obtained with the CSUS, this questionnaire’s construct validity

warrants further investigation.

Contrary to our hypotheses, no relationship between selective word learning and implicit

or explicit metacognition was detected. Explicit metacognition was assessed in Experiment 1

through a monitoring measure, wherein children were asked whether they knew the content of a

box when they had seen or not the contents. Children were adept at monitoring their knowledge

in unambiguous situations (full or no knowledge) but had more difficulty when they only had

partial knowledge. This could be due to a lack of monitoring, or to a bias to guess if uncertain. If

the latter explanation is correct, perhaps other explicit metacognition measures may be better

suited to explore its relationship with selective social learning. A candidate might be confidence

judgments, but a recent study also failed to find a link with this measure (Resendes et al, 2021).
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Future research should use a range of measures of metacognition when exploring the link with

selective social learning before any conclusion can be reached about when and how explicit

metacognition facilitates selective social learning. This link might also only be observable in

older children, once explicit metacognition is better developed (Fritz et al., 2010). The difficulty

then would be to find a more complex selective social learning task, as children of that age reach

ceiling of the tasks we described here. As for implicit metacognition, which required a judgment

of sharing or not information with a second experimenter in Experiment 2, children performed

well, as revealed by the fact that they shared more in the full knowledge trials than in the partial

knowledge or ignorance trials and consistently performed more uncertainty gestures in partial

knowledge and ignorance trials. However, as discussed above, uncertainty gestures may be a

redundant admission of ignorance rather than an implicit form of knowledge monitoring.

Overall, the present data suggest that explicit metacognition is still developing at 4 years of age,

and that other tasks may be better suited to the measurement of implicit metacognition. The latter

may be especially important to explore; even in adults, studies have found that individuals seem

to justify or rationalize their actions after they have performed them rather than actively reflect

on their metacognitive processes while the decisions are being made (Frith, 2012). Therefore, it

is becoming increasingly clear that implicit metacognition is most likely to guide decision-

making in toddlers rather than explicit metacognition. Nevertheless, interindividual variability

on these variables did not predict success on the selective learning task.

There are several promising lines of research that warrant further investigation. First,

because the current design is cross-sectional, we cannot conclude that having a more advanced

theory of mind or better metacognitive skills lead children to have more sophisticated selective

trust. It is possible that other variables, such as general intelligence, might also account for this
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relation. However, a recent meta-analytic study failed to provide strong evidence of an

association between intelligence and metacognition (Ohtani & Hisasaka, 2018), while theory of

mind is shown to contribute to social cognition independently of verbal intelligence (Wellman,

2014). Second, to better understand the fine-grained development of selective learning itself,

longitudinal studies are necessary to identify key transitions in its developmental trajectory,

including the emergence of sophisticated mechanisms and their substitution to domain-general

cognitive strategies – i.e., the switch from Type I to Type II learning processes. Third, the next

crucial step would require a design in which each construct is measured in a multi-method

fashion. For example, many studies have measured metacognition in preschoolers with

behavioural responses, including expressing knowledge or uncertainty (Sodian et al., 2012).

These behavioral measures could be combined with measures such as looking time, pupil

dilation, and electrophysiological signatures to explore the relationship between the implicit and

explicit facets of metacognition (Call & Carpenter, 2001; Goupil & Kouider, 2016).

Overall, the present results only weakly support a rich view of selective social learning,

where this ability would stem from complex mechanisms such as the ability to reflect upon one’s

own thoughts or other’s mental states (Heyes et al, , 2020). They do not, however, discount this

hypothesis as it is possible that a link between these abilities emerges later. Indeed, it is possible

that we would find different patterns in children closer to 5-years-old, given that older children

have better explicit metacognitive skills (Sodian et al, 2012). The limitations surrounding the

implicit metacognition task used in Experiment 2 could also be addressed in future research. This

task required children to monitor their knowledge when deciding whether to inform a

confederate about the contents of a hidden box. Children had to weigh their uncertainty against

their desire for helping or sharing. Numerous studies have pointed to children’s prosocial
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tendencies, and how these increase throughout the first years of life (Flook et al., 2019). In early

childhood, the literature describes children’s spontaneous generous behavior, and the formation

of concepts such as fairness and equality. Thus, children’s natural prosocial disposition could

have easily interfered with their ability to monitor their knowledge. Future studies may seek to

measure prosocial skills and determine its role in socially motivated learning tasks.

To summarize, the main goal of this paper was to examine the link between different

types of metacognitive processes and selective social learning. Given exciting new research

surrounding metacognitive abilities in preschoolers, we were particularly interested in exploring

the relationship between both explicit and implicit metacognition and selectivity. Our results

show that, as measured by a knowledge monitoring task, neither explicit nor implicit

metacognitive abilities are predictive of selective social learning. This conflicts with previous

research that have documented a predictive relationship between implicit metacognition as

measured by persistence time and selective learning (Kuzyk et al., 2020). Further research with

older children could help elucidate the age at which metacognition plays a role in selective social

learning in an active, voluntary capacity (i.e., explicitly), as it does in adults.

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