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International Trade Law Final
International Trade Law Final
COMPILED BY
EMMANUEL MITENGO
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 7
1.1 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947 8
1.2 Economic systems of trade 9
1.2.1 MERCANTILISM 9
1.2.2 LAISSEZ-FAIRE 14
1.2.3 NATIONAL CONTROL MODEL 18
2 THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 24
2.1 Understanding the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 25
2.2 Multination’s Negotiations (MTN) 25
2.3 Complete General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade rounds 26
2.4 The significance of the Tokyo round 29
2.4.1 Major agreements reached in the Tokyo round 29
2.4.2 Six major codes for the conduct of international trade 33
2.4.3 Combined effects of agreements on tariffs and non-tariff measures 39
2.4.4 What the Tokyo round did not accomplish 41
2.5 Core principles of the general agreement on tariffs and trade 44
2.5.1 Most Favoured Treatment 44
2.5.2 National treatment 45
2.5.3 General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions 45
2.5.4 Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions
46
2.6 General agreement on tariffs and trade procedures 46
2.6.1 Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations 46
2.6.2 Tariff Negotiations 47
2.6.3 Transparency 47
2.6.4 Tariffs preferred 48
2.6.5 Tariff reductions and bindings 48
3 THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 50
3.1.1 Creating the world trade organization 50
3.1.2 World Trade Organization 1994 51
3.2 Multi-lateral world trade agreements 52
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3.2.1 Goods 53
3.2.2 Services 58
3.2.3 Intellectual property rights (TRIPS) 59
3.2.4 Dispute settlement (DSU) 60
3.3 World trade organization admission 61
3.4 Principles of the trading system 65
3.5 World Trade Organization Structure 67
3.6 World Trade Organization dispute settlement 70
3.7 Development and trade 78
4 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 80
4.1 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) 80
4.1.1 Combating poverty in low-income countries 93
4.1.2 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative 95
4.1.3 Financial Reporting and Audit Requirements 97
4.2 THE WORLD BANK 103
4.2.1 The World Bank: IBRD and IDA 103
4.2.2 Membership in the world Bank Group 111
4.2.3 Ways of Classifying Countries 112
4.2.4 Regional Groupings 113
4.2.5 How the World Bank operates 119
4.2.6 World Bank Group’s Relationship to the IMF and the United Nations
123
4.3 THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (AFDB) 125
4.3.1 Overview of African Development Bank Group 125
4.3.2 Objectives of African Development Bank 126
4.3.3 Membership of the Group 127
4.3.4 Resources of the African Development Bank 128
4.3.5 The Institutional and management structure 129
4.3.6 Operations, policies, initiatives and achievements 130
4.4 THE WORLD BANK ASSOCIATES 137
4.4.1 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES (IDA) 137
4.4.2 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL COOPERATION (IFC) 139
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4.4.3 THE MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY
(MIGA) 132
5 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
(UNCTAD) 135
5.1 Unctad: a brief historical overview 135
5.1.1 Origin of UNCTAD 136
5.1.2 Principal analytical ideas 138
5.1.3 Development strategies 139
5.2 Structure of the unctad 140
5.3 The changing international context surrounding UNCTAD 149
5.4 UNCTAD achievements 164
6 THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA 166
6.1 THE AFRICAN TRADE LIBERALISATION FRAMEWORK 166
6.2 The African Union (AU) 167
6.3 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 174
6.4 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 181
6.5 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 188
6.6 The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) 196
6.7 The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 197
6.8 The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 201
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
EU European Union
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ICSID International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
MFN Most-favoured-nation
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TRIPS Trade-related aspects of intellectual
UN United Nations
UR Uruguay Round
US United States
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1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Trade between nations and the link between trade and economic growth are
neither recent nor novel developments. The existence of trade routes such as
the Silk Route1 and the Amber Route2 crossing boundaries and continents, is
ample evidence that international trade is not a recent phenomenon. The link
between economic growth and trade was widely realised and exploited.
Between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, the Venetians and Genoese
traders with commercial acumen accumulated huge wealth by buying goods
at low prices in one port and selling them at high prices at another. This period
also saw the emergence of a new form of mercantile venture through
corporations. The East India Company established under the Royal Charter in
1600 by Queen Elizabeth I,3 the Dutch East Indies Company4 and the Swedish
East Indies Company are some such examples.
Trade, mainly in spices, silk, opium and saltpetre, between the East and the
West thrived and helped in the economic growth of the European states.
However, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, mercantilism,
which argued for strict regulation that encouraged exports and domestic
manufacture of goods to cheaper imports, had gained ground.
1 Refers to the combination of ancient land and sea routes connecting east, southern and western Asia with
the Mediterranean and north Africa.
2 Refers to the route that connected Europe to Africa and used for the amber trade.
3 This company was also imparted with powers to make laws and tax the locals
4 This was established in 1602 and is often said to be the first multinational company.
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1.1 THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) 1947
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947, borne out of the
cornucopia of horrors that the world witnessed in the 1930s and 1940s,
enshrined the philosophy of free trade using the principles of non-
discrimination 5 (also known as Most Favoured Nation obligation) and the
elimination of quantitative restrictions. This philosophy of free trade continues
to this day in the form of GATT 1994. The gradual growth in international trade
since the 1950s is largely due to the influence of GATT on the world stage, and
it seems that this growth is set to continue. Developing countries like Brazil,
China and India have emerged as key players in the provision of manufactured
goods and services on the international scene and are setting a trend for other
developing nations to follow. The philosophy of free trade, however, has not
gone unchallenged.
Over time, the world has become more aware of the global effects of
environmental degradation and the exploitation of the economically
disadvantaged and the young by commercial enterprises. Social and ethical
issues in the context of trade have taken on new meaning, and non-
governmental organisations have successfully harnessed citizens to question
the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the philosophy of free
trade as enshrined in GATT 1994, so much so that there is widespread
agreement that trade needs to acquire a human face.
Given the plurality of legal systems and the variations in liability schemes,
harmonisation through international conventions is widely seen as the best
option of imparting certainty to the legal questions that arise in the context of
international commercial transactions. International organisations, such as the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the
5 The principle of non-discrimination requires that a contracting party should treat all contracting states
alike so that where a trade advantage has been contracted by one contracting party to another, that
advantage should be granted equally to all other contracting parties
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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), took on
the task of addressing various legal aspects affecting an international
commercial contract, such as carriage of goods, sales of goods, agency,
factoring and standby letters of credit using international conventions as the
preferred method for achieving the desired harmonisation
1.2.1 MERCANTILISM
What is mercantilism?
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4. It was believed that trade balance must be favourable, for example
exports should exceed imports. Since commerce helps a nation to
export surplus goods and bring back bullion, it must be aided.
Merchants must be protected abroad; favourable treaties should be
negotiated and new markets opened up. For distant trade, the nations
must aid and protect chartered companies with monopolies. High
tariffs should be imposed on exports and imports from foreign
countries.
Similarly, the Navigation Act of 1651 forbade foreign vessels from trading
along the British coast and required colonial exports to first pass through
British control before being redistributed throughout Europe. Programs like
these resulted in a favourable balance of trade that increased Great Britain's
national wealth.
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Under mercantilism, nations frequently engaged their military might to
ensure local markets and supply sources were protected, to support the idea
that a nation's economic health heavily relied on its supply of capital.
Mercantilists also believed that a nation's economic health could be assessed
by its levels of ownership of precious metals, like gold or silver, which tended
to rise with increased new home construction, increased agricultural output,
and a strong merchant fleet to provide additional markets with goods and
raw materials.
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needed to prop up its army and navy. The combination of taxes
and inflation caused great colonial discontent.
Consequently, many believed the state should franchise out its leading
merchants to create exclusive government-controlled monopolies and cartels,
where governments used regulations, subsidies, and (if needed) military force
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to protect these monopolistic corporations from domestic and foreign
competition. Citizens could invest money in mercantilist corporations, in
exchange for ownership and limited liability in their royal charters. These
citizens were granted "shares" of the company profit, which were, in essence,
the first traded corporate stocks.
The most famous and powerful mercantilist corporations were the British and
Dutch East India companies. For more than 250 years, the British East India
Company maintained the exclusive, royally granted the right to conduct trade
between Britain, India, and China with its trade routes protected by the Royal
Navy.
Effects of Mercantilism
1. Mercantilism gave great impetus to imperialism of this era. Since
colonies were viewed as sources of gold and valuable essential
commodities and market, the nation states were keen to acquire as
many colonies as possible. The European powers, often under the
aegis of monopolistic companies, such as the Dutch East India
Company or the British Hudson Bay Company (Canada), carried out
colonial activities around the globe.
2. Since colonies were regarded as existing for the benefit of their mother
countries, the colonized parts of North America, South America and
Africa were involuntarily involved with mercantilism and were
required to sell raw materials only to their colonizers and purchase
finished goods only from them.
3. Its rigid notions of favourable trade balance often caused commercial
rivalry and even wars between nations. The Anglo-Dutch wars and
Franco-Dutch wars are a case in point.
4. Restrictions on where finished goods could be purchased led in many
cases to burdensome high prices for those goods.
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5. The constraints of mercantilism caused friction between Britain and
her American colonies and were greatly responsible for out-break of
the American Revolution.
6. Adam Smith, a strong critic of the mercantilist policies, opined that
this type of economy has low rate of growth, the wealth is
concentrated in the hands of few, majority of people have no
development and the economic growth is hampered.
1.2.2 LAISSEZ-FAIRE
What is Laissez-faire?
Laissez-faire is an economic theory from the 18th century that opposed any
government intervention in business affairs. The driving principle behind
laissez-faire, a French term that translates to "leave alone" (literally, "let you
do"), is that the less the government is involved in the economy, the better off
business will be, and by extension, society as a whole.
It has served as both a regulative ideal and the foundation for an economic
worldview; as an expansive moral doctrine founded on an ethos of
productivity and as a narrowly economic doctrine focused on the
accumulation of wealth; as a pessimistic restriction on the exercise of popular
democracy and as an optimistic attempt to expand freedom of choice.
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Advocates have represented it as the absence of intervention, while critics
have seen it as reliant upon the constant exercise of state power. Regardless
of its meaning, justification, and conceptual viability, laissez-faire continues
to carry great weight as a point of reference in debates about political
economy
Understanding laissez-faire
HISTORY OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE
Criticisms of laissez-faire
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society. While laissez-faire advocates argue that if individuals serve their own
interests first, societal benefits will follow.
Advantages
c. No tax is paid
Disadvantages
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In Laissez-Faire capitalism, companies could operate with a pure profit
motive and not have to worry about government regulation or taxation. This,
of course, could create negative externalities and information asymmetries
that can allow producers to behave as bad actors and get away with it.
Proponents of Laissez-Faire say that costly and exhaustive regulation is not
needed since the market would weed out such bad actors.
In reality, however, bad actors may continue operating for a long while. For
instance, if a vitamin company is filling their capsules with sawdust instead
of herb powder, it may remain unknown without government testing and
regulatory oversight to protect consumers.
Standards have many roles and functions. Not only do they establish a
common trading language between buyers and sellers, but they also ensure
public safety and the protection of the environment within and outside
national borders. Moreover, in today’s globalized production systems,
standards ensure that parts produced across borders fit and that networks are
compatible. Regulations and standards and the verification of their application
through conformity assessment procedures have, therefore, many benefits.
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However, inappropriate regulations can result in high costs and inefficiencies
in trading partner countries as well as in the domestic economy and have
international repercussions.
b) Quantitative Restrictions.
Under this system, except a country with whom the bilateral agreement
entered into as a part of specific treaty, a uniform rate is applied on imports
from all other countries. Generally, specific treaties have been entered into
with specific countries due to political, racial or regional ties. Hence the tariffs
rates applicable for import and export with such country are called preferential
tariffs.
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c) Specific Duty
Whenever the imported product is available at quite a lower price than the
domestic running price of product, then to protect the interest of domestic
producers, a specific duty is imposed on imported goods. As an action of this,
the imported goods will not be in a position to stand in the domestic market.
Such duty is known as compensatory tariff duty.
e) Countervailing Duty
Importing country will impose additional duty on imported goods if
imported from a particular country, in the case, when an exporting
country supports its goods to be exported through the monetary
support provided in the form of subsidy. Such additional duty is
imposed on the import of such goods by importing country to ensure
the protection to domestic manufactures.
f) Quantitative Restrictions
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Protectionism in the less-developed countries
Much of the industrialization that took place in the late 20th century in some
less-developed countries was characterized by the expansion of import-
competing industries protected by high tariff walls. In many of those countries,
tariffs and various quantitative restrictions on manufactured goods were high,
but the effective rates of protection were often even higher, because the goods
tended to be highly fabricated and the proportion of value added in
production after importation was low. While countries such as Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and South Korea oriented their manufacturing industries mainly
toward export trade, they tended to be exceptional cases.
a. Revenue
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higher duty rates, this may choke off the flow of imports and so reduce tariff
revenue instead of increasing it.
Probably the most common argument for tariff imposition is that particular
domestic industries need tariff protection for survival. Comparative-
advantage theorists will naturally argue that the industry in need of such
protection ought not to survive and that the resources so employed ought to
be transferred to occupations having greater comparative efficiency. The
welfare gain of citizens taken as a whole would more than offset the welfare
loss of those groups affected by import competition; that is, total real national
income would increase.
An opposing argument would be, however, that this welfare gain would be
widely diffused, so that the individual beneficiaries might not be conscious of
any great improvement. The welfare loss, in contrast, would be narrowly and
acutely felt. Although resources can be transferred to other occupations, just
as comparative-advantage theory says, the transfer process is sometimes slow
and painful for those being transferred. For such reasons, comparative-
advantage theorists rarely advocate the immediate removal of all existing
tariffs. They argue instead against further tariff increases—since increases, if
effective, attract still more resources into the wrong occupation—and they
press for gradual reduction of import barriers.
c. Unemployment
Finally, the tariff remedy for unemployment is a poor one because it is usually
ineffective and because more suitable remedies are available. It has come to be
generally recognized that unemployment is far more efficiently dealt with by
the implementation of proper fiscal and monetary policies.
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2 THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
One notable feature was that the United States of America joined the 21 other
countries is signing a protocol of the provision application popularly known
as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Another notable feature was
the exemptions of existing trade restraints of contracting states. General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade evolved from its ‘provisional’ status into the
premier international trade body General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
based in Geneva. It was this organisation that tariffs were steadily reduced
over decade by mean of increased membership.
Today General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 has been superseded by
substantially similar General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 agreement
which is part of the World Trade Agreement that took effect in 1995. The World
Trade Organization has taken over from the General Agreement as the basis
for institutional cooperation and dispute settlement on trade matters among
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its members. But the core principles of the GATT are still in place, and the
Uruguay Round package cannot be understood except in relation to them.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade regularly held the multi-nations
meetings seeking to open up international trade. These periodic General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade rounds cumulatively reduced average tariff
barriers to 80% below those existing in the post-World War II era. The Uruguay
rounds finalised in 1994, average tariff of developed countries on dutiable
manufactured imports were cut from 6.3% to 3.9%.
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The Uruguay Round also changed General Agreement on Trade status. Before
the round, it was the only multilateral trade agreement; and it only covered
trade in goods. The Uruguay Round expanded the coverage of the multilateral
rules to include services and intellectual property. General Agreement on
Trade in Services now stands alongside the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement) as one of the agreements of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) which was established on 1 January 1995.
c. The third round was in 1950 in Torquay, this time 38 countries were
involved, and almost 9,000 tariff concessions passed, reducing tax
levels by as much as 25%.
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The Uruguay Round also updated the technical barrier to trade
agreement. The older 1979 version took effect on 1 January 1980. At the
end of 1994, before it was superseded by the new version, its
signatories were the European Union (12 countries at the time, plus 8
countries which subsequently became members) and 26 others. The
Uruguay Round made two broad changes: the WTO technical barrier
to trade agreement revised the original version, and has been signed by
all WTO members as part of the “single undertaking”, which also
includes the SPS Agreement and the majority of WTO treaties.
The Uruguay Round agreements on goods fall essentially into four
groups. First is the “GATT, a modified version of the original General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now referred to as the “GATT 1947”),
together with certain comparatively minor agreements which interpret
or bring up to date particular GATT provisions, and a legal text (the
Marrakesh Protocol) that brings under the multilateral GATT umbrella
the individual tariff and non-tariff commitments made by WTO
members in the Uruguay Round.
A second group consists of two major agreements that aim to bring
trade in agricultural products, and in textiles and clothing, within the
normal trading rules from which they have in recent years largely
escaped. A third group is made up of five agreements which go well
beyond the original GATT rules in prescribing how particular aspects
of policies affecting trade should be applied. And finally, a further
group of six agreements deals with different aspects of the traditional
GATT concern to regulate and ease the necessary formalities of
customs and trade administration. These are handled in other books in
this series.
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h. Doha round was in 2001, committing all countries to negotiations
opening agricultural and manufacturing markets, as well as trade in
services (GATS) negotiations and expanded intellectual property
regulation (TRIPS). In November 2011, the Doha round failed after ten
years of negotiations. Doha is formally not completed but some issues
related to Doha Development Agenda were taken up in the Nairobi
Ministerial Conference (10th World Trade Organisation Ministerial
Conference) that took place in December 2015.
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those of the other major participants, even though other countries made larger
absolute reductions in tariff rates than did the United States. In general,
reductions in agricultural tariffs were less than reductions in other tariffs.
The most often cited measures of the size of the agreed-upon tariff reductions
are so-called "depth of cut" figures, measuring the percentage decrease in
tariffs that will result from the Tokyo Round agreements. These figures can be
useful in conveying a general impression of the quantitative significance of the
Tokyo Round tariff reductions, but they do not reflect accurately the relative
size of the concessions made by various countries. In some cases, demand for
imported goods is very sensitive to changes in prices, and even small
reductions in tariff rates can bring about large increases in imports.
Conversely, the demand for many internationally traded commodities is
nearly insensitive to variations in price; even large tariff reductions for these
commodities will have little effect on trade flows. Thus, one should not place
too much emphasis on the relative depths of tariff cuts made by various
countries; these do not serve as accurate measures of the relative concessions
made by each.
The tariff cuts negotiated in Geneva, although large in percentage terms, will
have only a small effect on the overall price level of dutiable imports. This is
because tariff rates are, on average, fairly low already. Throughout the Tokyo
Round negotiations on tariff cuts, primary emphasis was placed on reductions
in industrial tariffs. In most cases the European Country is an exception tariffs
on agricultural products were reduced less than were tariffs on industrial
products.
At the outset of the Tokyo Round, the United States proposed that all tariffs be
reduced uniformly by 60 percent. (This was the maximum reduction allowed
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for U.S. tariffs by the Trade Act of 1974.) The European Community rejected
this proposal, urging instead that tariffs should be both reduced and
"harmonized" that is, that higher tariffs should be reduced by a higher
percentage than lower ones. Eventually, it was agreed that the so-called "Swiss
formula" should serve as the basis for tariff cutting.
Ideally, all tariffs would be cut by the amounts specified by the formula, with
exceptions being made for particularly sensitive commodities or for
commodities for which the application of the formula would result in a larger
reduction than the negotiators were empowered to agree to. Strict adherence
to the Swiss formula would have led to average tariff reductions of 42 percent
for the United States, 43 percent for the European Countries, 68 percent (in
applied rates) for Japan, and 39 percent (in applied rates) for Canada much
larger cuts than were in fact made.
Some indications of which industries were considered particularly sensitive to
increased import competition and therefore deserving of special consideration
by each of the participants can be obtained by comparing the tariff reductions
that actually resulted from the Tokyo Round negotiations with the reductions
that would have resulted from a strict application of the Swiss formula.
Agreement on trade in civil aircraft
Further, the signatories note that governments are often necessarily deeply
involved in national aircraft industries, and they therefore agree to use care in
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avoiding export subsidies or other practices that could hamper competitive
trade.
Agreements on non-tariff
Among the several elements of the Tokyo Round agreements, most attention
has focused on the provisions affecting nontariff barriers to trade. These
nontariff barriers can take a wide variety of forms, ranging from direct
quantitative restrictions to various procedural and administrative practices
that have the result of hindering the international flow of trade. Generally, the
term "nontariff barriers to trade" is used to denote any government policy
except tariffs that limits international trade.
Measures Agreements on nontariff measures were a new feature of the Tokyo
Round negotiations; previous rounds of trade talks had concentrated on tariff
reductions. For this reason, and because nontariff practices are regarded as the
major barriers to trade today, these nontariff agreements are generally seen as
the most important elements of the Tokyo Round package. The agreements are
of three types: codes of conduct for international trade, reform of the GATT
framework, and reductions in nontariff barriers affecting particular
commodities.
In addition to the six codes that were settled on in Geneva, negotiators
considered, but could not agree upon, two other codes. One of these, the so-
called "safeguards" code, was to have detailed what actions are available to
countries faced with sudden increases in imports of a particular product. The
GATT currently allows countries to take action against such import surges in
order to safeguard threatened domestic producers. In recent years, however,
the major industrial nations have increasingly ignored the GATT mechanisms
in such circumstances, preferring instead bilaterally negotiated arrangements
by which other countries have agreed "voluntarily" to limit their exports of the
product in question. The code was to have brought safeguard actions back into
the GATT framework.
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The main obstacle to agreement on this code has been the issue of selective
safeguard actions. The European nations have insisted on the right to apply
safeguard actions against imports from specific countries. Although they have
not taken clear stands on this issue, the United States and Japan are reported
to be willing to accept the European Country position. Less developed
countries, however, fearing that they would become the chief targets of such
selective safeguards, have insisted on the maintenance of the current GATT
requirement that safeguard actions be applied equally against imports from all
sources. To date, no way around this impasse has been found.
Agreements affecting nontariff measures
2. Anti-Dumping Code
The Anti-Dumping Code clarifies GATT policy toward dumping, the selling
of goods in foreign markets below the prices at which similar goods are sold
in domestic markets. Current U.S. practice generally conforms with the new
code, and few changes are expected.
The Standards Code outlines procedures for setting and enforcing national
health, safety, performance, quality, and labelling standards for imports. Its
intent is to simplify compliance with such standards and to prevent their use
as barriers to trade. Because standards are of particular importance for high.
The Import Licensing Code provides some guides for import licensing
practices. It is intended to ensure that these practices are not used to restrict
trade in a discriminating way. Among other provisions, it prohibits the
rejection of applications for import licenses because of minor clerical errors.
The import licensing code requires that procedures be as simple, open, and
"transparent" as possible, and applied in a non-discriminatory manner to
products from all signatory countries. It also prohibits the rejection of
applications for import licenses because of minor errors in documentation, and
the refusal of imports because of minor variations in quantity or weight from
amounts designated in the license. This code, too, establishes a committee of
signatories to facilitate consultation and dispute settlement.
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4. The subsidies/countervailing duties code
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are called upon to enter into "commitments" to eliminate these subsidies as
their economic development allows. The code also establishes a committee of
signatories to consider complaints about compliance with the terms of the
code.
Tariff rate reductions alone do not always lead to reductions in duties charged
on imported goods. By adjusting the method for determining the value of
imported goods, customs officials can increase duties independently of tariff
rates. Many exporters have often complained that foreign customs officials
arbitrarily inflate the value of other countries products, thus requiring higher
duties, and that uncertainties over foreign customs valuation procedures
complicate the transaction of international business.
The customs valuation code is intended to reduce the arbitrariness of various
national methods of customs valuation. To this end, it establishes the
"transaction value" of a product "the price actually paid or payable for the
goods when sold for export" plus certain other costs and expenses associated
with the transaction as the primary method for valuing imports. The code also
identifies four alternative methods for valuation that are to be used in a
specified order of preference when for some reason the primary method is not
applicable. In agreeing to this code, the United States has agreed to abandon
its use of the method of customs valuation. This code, like the other codes, also
establishes a committee of signatories to facilitate the settlement of disputes
concerning the code's provisions.
Among the national trade policies that are most vexatious to foreign producers
are those setting standards for the quality, performance, safety, or labelling of
imported products. More than half of the complaints of unfair treatment filed
with the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations by
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exporters have concerned matters of standards. While few would deny the
right of governments to apply reasonable standards to protect their domestic
consumers from foreign products of inadequate quality, there has been an
increasing sense that standards are often applied in ways that seriously disrupt
trade. In some cases, exporters see the standards as frivolous, restricting
imports with no clear benefit to consumers. In other cases, goods thought by
exporters to be in compliance with the relevant standards have been denied
entry because they infringed details of standards that had not been completely
understood. In still other cases, goods are required to undergo expensive
certification procedures, sometimes duplicative of procedures already
satisfied in other countries. The possibilities for restricting trade through the
use of technical barriers are obviously quite various.
The most important aspect of the standards code is the recognition that
national standards should not be allowed to disrupt trade unnecessarily. The
code calls on all its adherents to ensure that standards are not adopted or
applied with a view to creating obstacles to trade. It states, further, that
whatever standards are adopted must be applied without discrimination:
imported goods are to be subject to the same standards as domestic goods, and
imports from all sources are to be treated similarly. Parties to the agreement
are required to adopt international standards whenever possible, to publish
details of their own standards whenever these standards are different from
international norms, and to provide a point of enquiry where questions
regarding standards can be handled expeditiously. Whenever possible,
signatories will accept certification of products issued by other parties to the
agreement. The code also establishes a committee of signatories to monitor
compliance with its provisions and to aid in settlement of disputes.
This code is not expected to bring about any direct near-term changes in trade
flows. In the longer run, however, it should allow trade to expand as technical
obstacles are gradually reduced. Obstacles of this sort are particularly
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important for trade in technologically sophisticated items. Because the United
States is a major producer and exporter of such items, it may be expected to
reap particular advantages from the implementation of the code. Much of the
code's effectiveness will depend on just how the provisions are implemented
and enforced. At present, there is no way of estimating its specific effects.
Because the effects of changes in tariffs and nontariff measures interact with
each other, the overall employment effects of these changes in the United
States will be somewhat different than the sum of the individual changes
considered separately. The principal finding of studies of the effects of
individual elements of the Tokyo Round package, however, remains
unchanged: The employment effects of the entire Tokyo Round package of
agreements are very small.
Only Deardorff and Stern have calculated the combined employment effects
of the various parts of the Tokyo Round agreements. Their estimates include
the effects of tariff reductions and changes in two types of nontariff measures
those affecting agriculture and government procurement. The industries
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enjoying increased employment opportunities will be those employing
sophisticated, modern technologies and highly skilled workers, while those
experiencing reduced employment opportunities will be labour-intensive
industries and those with less sophisticated technologies.
b. Price and welfare effects
Among the benefits claimed for the Tokyo Round agreements is that the prices
paid for imported commodities will fall and with them the overall price level.
Further, lower prices for imported goods will increase competitive pressure on
domestic producers of similar goods, limiting their ability to raise prices.
Also complicating the estimation of the price effects of trade liberalization are
the effects that liberalization may have on exchange rates. If trade liberalization
increases a country's imports more than its exports, one would expect the value
of its currency to fall. This devaluation of the currency will increase the price
of imports and erode somewhat the price reductions brought about by lowered
tariffs. If liberalization increases exports more than imports, the process will
yield the opposite result.
As is the case with any major multilateral undertaking, the Tokyo Round
negotiations have had an important political dimension, and it may be that the
most important results of the Tokyo Round agreements will lie in their effect
on the political climate that produces national trade policies.
For a variety of reasons--disappointing economic growth in the industrialized
world, structural changes in the world economy, and increased government
involvement in heretofore private commercial activities sentiment for
protectionism has been rising throughout the developed world. There seems
little reason to expect that its underlying causes will weaken significantly in
the near future. Many observers fear that, without some formal steps toward
liberalized trade, these sentiments will continue to grow stronger, leading to a
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proliferation of new trade barriers and a subsequent decline in world trade. In
a sense, the Tokyo Round agreements may be important not so much for what
they will accomplish as for what they will prevent.
Similarly, the trade talks have served as an important link between the
industrialized and the less developed countries and particularly between the
industrialized countries and the more advanced Least Developed Countries,
which have the most to gain from increased access to markets in the
industrialized world. For these countries, the new role of international trader
brings with it new opportunities for economic growth, new domestic political
and economic problems, and new responsibilities.
The United States and its industrialized allies have a strong interest in how the
rapidly developing countries meet these opportunities, problems, and
responsibilities. They also have, therefore, a strong interest in maintaining
close contact with these countries through such channels as the trade
negotiations. That full agreement could not be reached in the Tokyo Round
between developed and less developed countries must: stand as a
disappointment, though there is hope that at least some of the Least Developed
Countries will eventually subscribe to the entire package of Tokyo Round
agreements.
But the Tokyo Round did not accomplish all that some observers had hoped
for. This is not surprising, of course, in negotiations of such size and
complexity. Nonetheless, an appropriate way to conclude a discussion of the
accomplishments of the Tokyo Round may be to consider briefly what the
negotiators did not accomplish.
a. Failure to achieve a systematic progress on the general issue of
quantitative restrictions
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Much more disappointing has been the failure to reach agreement on a
safeguards code. In the absence of effective safeguard procedures, most
industrial countries have turned in recent years to bilaterally negotiated
"orderly marketing arrangements" and "voluntary" export restraints.
Many have criticized such arrangements because they violate the general
GATT principle of non-discrimination; these arrangements restrict the exports
of some countries but not of others. Nor are these arrangements subject to even
the current highly imperfect procedures for international review provided by
the GATT; an often-heard complaint is that large, powerful nations can too
easily dictate the terms of such agreements to smaller, weaker nations.
c. Failure to strengthen the GATT dispute settlement mechanism
The talks also failed to strengthen significantly the GATT dispute settlement
mechanism. Some creditable first steps have been taken, and perhaps it is
unrealistic to expect sovereign states to subject themselves to a supranational
entity even in very narrowly defined areas. Nonetheless, few observers expect
the Tokyo Round to bring about any major improvement in what are generally
regarded as inadequate GATT procedures for enforcement of the provisions of
trade agreements and for the settling of disputes arising over these provisions.
d. Failure in the area of quantitative restrictions
Two major exceptions to these central rules that have also been carried over
into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 the provisions on
regional trading arrangements and on restrictions to protect the balance-of-
payments will be considered separately, in conjunction with the Uruguay
Round understandings that have slightly modified them.
The Most Favoured Treatment rule is basic to the whole edifice of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Stated in Article I of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, it requires that if one General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade signatory grants to another country “more favourable treatment” (such as
a reduction in the customs duty payable on imports of a particular product), it
must immediately and unconditionally give the same treatment to imports
from all signatories.
In other words, all General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade members are
entitled to receive the most favourable treatment given by any member or to
put it the other way round, they are entitled not to be discriminated against.
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exporting, as well as to internal taxes and charges, and to all the rules by which
such duties, taxes and charges are applied.
It says that, once imports have passed the national frontier (and in so doing
have paid whatever import duty is imposed) they must be treated no worse
than domestic products. Internal taxes or other charges on the imports must
be no higher than on domestic products, and laws and regulations affecting
their sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use must be no less
favourable than for goods of national origin.6
6 Bhala, R., 2019. international Trade Law: a Comprehensive Textbook. 5th ed. Durham
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the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of
any other contracting party.
Article XI broadly but not completely prohibits the other use of prohibition of
imports from contracting parties. It prevents the use of quotas, imports license
or other measures to restrict imports from a contracting party. When such a
measure is authorised, Article XIII comes in to take an action.7
First the general agreement on tariffs and trade requires that a notice must be
given of any international trade on any national regulation change. Each
contracting party shall maintain, or institute as soon as practicable, judicial,
arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of
the prompt review and correction of administrative action relating to customs
matters. Each contracting party shall administer in a uniform, impartial and
reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings.
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2.6.2 Tariff Negotiations
Article XXVIII
The contracting parties recognize that customs duties often constitute serious
obstacles to trade; thus negotiations on a reciprocal and mutually
advantageous basis, directed to the substantial reduction of the general level
of tariffs and other charges on imports and exports and in particular to the
reduction of such high tariffs as discourage the importation even of minimum
quantities, and conducted with due regard to the objectives of this Agreement
and the varying needs of individual contracting parties, are of great
importance to the expansion of international trade. The contracting parties
may therefore sponsor such negotiations from time to time.
Article XXVIII of the general agreement on tariffs and trade governs the
negotiations that are required when a member wishes to withdraw or modify
a past concession. Under the rules, the right to compensation for loss of the
benefits of a tariff binding for a particular product is largely reserved to
countries that have a recognized status as the initial negotiators or principal
suppliers.
2.6.3 Transparency
A further principle carried over to GATT 1994 is that of transparency.
Multilateral review and transparency are a major element in the WTO itself (in
the Agreement Establishing the WTO). It is retained also in general
requirements imposed by GATT Article X for trade policies and regulations
affecting trade in goods, and in more specific requirements built into many
other Uruguay Round agreements.8
These key elements which shaped the functioning of the old GATT system,
and which are still present under the GATT 1994, will not be discussed further
8
INTRODUCTION TO GATT 1994 & 1947
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here. Numerous studies of these principles, pitched at every level of detail and
sophistication, have been published over the years since the GATT came into
force, and have passed judgement on their economic and political effect. The
purpose of recalling them here is only to underline that they will continue to
operate, and presumably to have similar effects, under the WTO. The
discussion which follows will turn instead to changes introduced into the
GATT rules by the Uruguay Round agreements.
Developing countries to a great extent stood aside from this process, and many
had no schedule of bindings at all. Under the WTO all members are required
to have schedules, and the proportion of products subject to bindings is
generally much higher than before. The Article II and XXVIII rules will continue
to guide negotiations under the WTO for the reduction of barriers to trade in
goods.9
9 Honnold, 1999. Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention. 1st
ed. Kluwer: Routledge.
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3 THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
The World Trade Organization has taken over from the General Agreement as
the basis for institutional cooperation and dispute settlement on trade matters
among its members. But the core principles of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade are still in place, and the Uruguay Round package cannot be
understood except in relation to them.
The major issue was trade in agricultural goods with the European Union
maintaining a protective position and the United States of America seeking to
reduce agricultural barriers and subsidies. In 2000, new talks started on
agriculture and services. These have now been incorporated into a broader
work programme, the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), launched at the
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fourth World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in
November 2001. The agenda adds negotiations and other work on non-
agricultural tariffs, trade and environment, World Trade Organization rules
such as anti-dumping and subsidies, investment, competition policy, trade
facilitation, transparency in government procurement, intellectual property,
and a range of issues raised by developing countries as difficulties they face in
implementing the present World Trade Organization agreements. In the end,
a modern compromise has achieved in the World Trade Organization.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 and General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 are two distinct agreements. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 incorporates provisions of 1947, except for the protocol
of provision application which is expressly excluded. Therefore, the problems
created by exempting existing national laws at the time of adoption of protocol
are avoid by this exclusion in the covered agreement. Otherwise, in cases
involving general Agreement on Tariff and Trade 1947 and 1994, the General
Agreement on Tariff and Trade 1947 prevails or controls.
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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 is no longer in effect.
However, it is still necessary to read it. Its successor, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, is defined only by a brief agreement1 that, although
entitled “General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994”, is little more than a
series of references to other texts.
The “General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994” is the basic set of trade rules,
largely taken over from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, that
in conjunction with the other agreements in Annex 1A to the World Trade
Organization agreement now represents the goods-related obligations of
World Trade Organization members. The world Trade Organization will be
guided by the decisions, procedures developed under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade.
3.2.1 Goods
It all began with trade in goods. From 1947 to 1994, General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade was the forum for negotiating lower customs duty rates and
other trade barriers; the text of the General Agreement spelt out important
rules, particularly non-discrimination Annexed to the World Trade
Organization agreements are several multi-lateral trade agreements as to trade
in goods they include agreements.
Since 1995, the updated GATT has become the WTO’s umbrella agreement for
trade in goods. It has annexes dealing with specific sectors such as agriculture
and textiles, and with specific issues such as state trading, product standards,
subsidies and actions taken against dumping.
a. Agriculture
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▪ domestic support - subsidies and other programmes, including
those that raise or guarantee farmgate prices and farmers’
incomes
b. Textile
Since 1995, the WTO’s Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) took
over from the Multifibre Arrangement. By 1 January 2005, the sector
was fully integrated into normal GATT rules. In particular, the quotas
came to an end, and importing countries are no longer able to
discriminate between exporters. The Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing no longer exists: it’s the only WTO agreement that had self-
destruction built in.
c. Anti-dumping
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▪ emergency measures to limit imports temporarily, designed to
“safeguard” domestic industries.
GATT (Article VI) allows countries to take action against dumping. The
Anti-Dumping Agreement clarifies and expands Article 6, and the two
operate together. They allow countries to act in a way that would
normally break the GATT principles of binding a tariff and not
discriminating between trading partners typically anti-dumping action
means charging extra import duty on the particular product from the
particular exporting country in order to bring its price closer to the
“normal value” or to remove the injury to domestic industry in the
importing country.
d. Safeguards
Both try to identify how to meet the need to apply standards and at the
same time avoid protectionism in disguise. These issues are becoming
more important as tariff barriers fall some compare this to seabed rocks
appearing when the tide goes down. In both cases, if a country applies
international standards, it is less likely to be challenged legally in the
WTO than if it sets its own standards.
f. Pre-shipment inspection
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commercial fraud, and customs duty evasion, for instance) and to
compensate for inadequacies in administrative infrastructures.
This agreement does two things: it disciplines the use of subsidies, and
it regulates the actions countries can take to counter the effects of
subsidies. It says a country can use the WTO’s dispute settlement
procedure to seek the withdrawal of the subsidy or the removal of its
adverse effects. Or the country can launch its own investigation and
ultimately charge extra duty (known as “countervailing duty”) on
subsidized imports that are found to be hurting domestic producers.
h. Rules of origin
“Rules of origin” are the criteria used to define where a product was
made. They are an essential part of trade rules because a number of
policies discriminate between exporting countries: quotas, preferential
tariffs, anti-dumping actions, countervailing duty (charged to counter
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export subsidies), and more. Rules of origin are also used to compile
trade statistics, and for “made in ...” labels that are attached to
products. This is complicated by globalization and the way a product
can be processed in several countries before it is ready for the market.
Although less widely used now than in the past, import licensing
systems are subject to disciplines in the WTO. The Agreement on
Import Licensing Procedures says import licensing should be simple,
transparent and predictable. For example, the agreement requires
governments to publish sufficient information for traders to know how
and why the licences are granted. It also describes how countries
should notify the WTO when they introduce new import licensing
procedures or change existing procedures. The agreement offers
guidance on how governments should assess applications for licences.
Some licences are issued automatically if certain conditions are met.
The agreement sets criteria for automatic licensing so that the
procedures used do not restrict trade.
3.2.2 Services
Banks, insurance firms, telecommunications companies, tour operators, hotel
chains and transport companies looking to do business abroad can now enjoy
the same principles of freer and fairer trade that originally only applied to
trade in goods. These principles appear in the new General Agreement on
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Trade in Services (GATS). World Trade Organization members have also made
individual commitments under General Agreement on Trade in Services
stating which of their services sectors they are willing to open to foreign
competition, and how open those markets are.
In the past, most services were not considered to be tradable across borders.
Much has occurred to alter the tradability of services, including health services.
Advances in communications technology, including the development of e-
commerce, as well as regulatory changes in many parts of the world have
made it easier to deliver services across borders. In many countries, changes in
government policy have left greater room for the private sector - domestic as
well as foreign - to provide services. Partly as a result, services have become
the fastest-growing segment of the world economy, providing more than 60
per cent of global output and employment.
Certain obligations apply across all service sectors, regardless of whether they
have been included in a Member's Schedule of Commitments. These
unconditional obligations, include most-favoured nation treatment (MFN),
certain transparency and notification obligations, and certain competition
principles.
The areas of intellectual property covered by the TRIPS Agreement that are
relevant to health include: patents; trademarks including service marks, which
are relevant, for example, to combating counterfeit drugs; and undisclosed
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information, including trade secrets and test data. In respect of each of these
areas, the Agreement sets out the minimum standards of protection that must
be adopted by each Member. Each of the main elements of protection is
defined, namely the subject matter to be protected, the rights to be conferred
and permissible exceptions to those rights, and the minimum duration of
protection.
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And it is also entirely up to the complainant to argue its case. The dispute is
only between governments, and only about alleged failures to comply with
World Trade Organization agreements or commitments. So, for example, a
government cannot complain about another government's health policy as
such. It can only complain if it believes a particular measure breaks an
agreement or commitment that the other government has made in the World
Trade Organization. Companies, organizations or private individuals cannot
complain directly to the World Trade Organization, but can do so through
their governments.
Most importantly all these agreements are binding to the contracting member
states. Each contracting member is obliged to incorporate these World Trade
Organization legal into their national legal regimes.
The entire process, which in some cases began before 1995 under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, took between 3 and 10 years, except in the
case of China, which recently became a member after 15 years of accession
negotiations, this was because Mexico had extracted stiff promises against the
dumping of Chinese goods.
The following countries are some of the examples who completed their accession process
RUSSIA….
In 1993, Russia formally applied for accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT). Its application was taken up by the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 1995, the successor organization of the GATT. Russia’s application has
entered into its most significant phase as Russia negotiates with World Trade
Organization members on the conditions for accession.
The process had been moving forward, but, the last few years, differences over some
critical issues have made the timing of Russian accession to the World Trade
Organization uncertain. Russia completed the negotiation on 22nd August, 2012.
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VIETNAM….
Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization on 11th January, 2007. The accession
to the World Trade Organization has been initiated to secure Vietnam access to the
leading markets and to anchor the domestic reforms on strong external commitments.
IRAN….
The Islamic Republic of Iran joined on 26th May, 2005. Iran’s application had not been
considered, mainly as a result of United States of America objection and the USA veto
power in the World Trade Organization council. At the 22nd time, its application was
approved unanimously by the organization members and thus by the USA and Israel
as a goodwill gesture so as to ease the nuclear deal between Iran and the international
community.
Ecuador and Bulgaria acceded in 1996; Mongolia and Panama acceded in 1997; the
Kyrgyz Republic acceded in 1998; and Latvia and Estonia acceded in 1999.
The accessions of five new Members in 2000 which are Albania, Croatia, Georgia,
Jordan and Oman in 2000 brought to 12 the number of Members that have acceded to
the WTO since 1995. Lithuania and Moldova were poised to join the WTO in 2001.
Each accession has the same “win-win” quality for the WTO. The acceding
party operates a more transparent and predictable trade regime, by assuming
WTO obligations on goods, services, and intellectual property protection
(possibly with transitional periods to full implementation). It opens its markets
for goods and services to its trading partners, and thus locks-in reforms and
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gains the benefit of more competitively-priced imports. In turn, the new WTO
Member gains the right to similar rights and terms of access on the markets of
other WTO Members. These commitments are enforced on both sides by
dispute settlement. Domestic reform and integration into the world economy
thus go hand-in-hand to strengthen growth and investment prospects of the
acceding country, and of WTO Members.
Accession process
All accessions begin with a letter from the requesting government addressed
to the Director-General. The item is then placed on the agenda of the WTO
General Council for action, which generally establishes a “working party”,
composed of representatives of Members, to examine the application. The
applicant generally obtains observer status in the WTO to become familiar
with its activities.
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basis with individual WTO Members at their request, apply to all other WTO
Members through the application of the most-favoured-nation clause.
The working party concludes its activity by submitting a report to the WTO
General Council, a draft Protocol of Accession and a draft Decision. Such a
decision on accession is, in practice, approved by consensus. The accession
takes effect 30 days after domestic ratification by the applicant.
Powers to veto
The World Trade Organization rule confers a veto power on every member of
the organization and there is a widespread belief that members would likely
oppose any efforts to replace consensus with voting.
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Both the GATT and the GATS are complemented by detailed and lengthy
schedules (or lists) of commitments made by individual countries. In the goods
area, these relate to tariff levels and, for agricultural products, also to subsidies.
In services, the commitments specify the degree of foreign access which is
guaranteed to foreign services and service providers in specific sectors,
together with any limitations on market access and national treatment. It
should be stressed that these are minimum conditions; nothing prevents a
government from according better treatment than that guaranteed in its
schedule. While treated differently in the GATT and the GATS, as well as in
the specific agreements and Annexes, the key principles of most-favoured-
nation (MFN) and national treatment are a common feature.
Most-favoured-nation (MFN)
Together, those three Agreements cover the main areas of trade covered by the
WTO. In general, MFN means that every time a country lowers (or introduces)
a trade barrier or opens up a market, it has to do so for the same goods or
services or service suppliers from all its fellow WTO Members whether rich or
poor, weak or strong.
National treatment
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the importing country's market. The same applies to foreign and domestic
services and service suppliers, and to foreign and local nationals in regard to
the protection of intellectual property. This principle is found in all the three
main WTO Agreements (Article III of GATT, Article XVII of GATS and Article 3
of TRIPS), although the principle is handled differently in each of these
Agreements. National treatment under GATT only applies once a product has
entered the market. Therefore, charging customs duty on an import is not a
violation of national treatment even if locally-produced products are not
charged an equivalent duty.
Under the GATS, national treatment is not a general obligation. It applies only
to sectors listed in the individual Members' schedule of commitments.
Moreover, Members may specify in their schedules any differential treatment
they wish to apply to foreign services and service suppliers as compared to
nationals. An unqualified commitment means that they will be treated in the
same way as nationals. Under TRIPS, the principle requires foreign nationals
to be given no less favourable treatment than that given to a country's own
nationals in regard to the protection of intellectual property.
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First tier: the Ministerial Conference
So, the WTO belongs to its members. The countries make their decisions
through various councils and committees, whose membership consists of all
WTO members. Topmost is the ministerial conference which has to meet at
least once every two years. The Ministerial Conference can take decisions on
all matters under any of the multilateral trade agreements.
All three are in fact the same the Agreement Establishing the WTO states they
are all the General Council, although they meet under different terms of
reference. Again, all three consist of all WTO members. They report to the
Ministerial Conference. The General Council acts on behalf of the Ministerial
Conference on all WTO affairs. It meets as the Dispute Settlement Body and
the Trade Policy Review Body to oversee procedures for settling disputes
between members and to analyse members’ trade policies.
Three more councils, each handling a different broad area of trade, report to
the General Council:
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▪ The Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS Council)
As their names indicate, the three are responsible for the workings of the WTO
agreements dealing with their respective areas of trade. Again, they consist of
all WTO members. The three also have subsidiary bodies.
Six other bodies report to the General Council. The scope of their coverage is
smaller, so they are “committees”. But they still consist of all WTO members.
They cover issues such as trade and development, the environment, regional
trading arrangements, and administrative issues. The Singapore Ministerial
Conference in December 1996 decided to create new working groups to look
at investment and competition policy, transparency in government
procurement, and trade facilitation. Two more subsidiary bodies dealing with
the plurilateral agreements (which are not signed by all WTO members) keep
the General Council informed of their activities regularly.
These reviews are part of the Uruguay Round agreement, but they began
several years before the round ended, they were an early result of the
negotiations. Participants agreed to set up the reviews at the December 1988
ministerial meeting that was intended to be the midway assessment of the
Uruguay Round. The first review took place the following year. Initially they
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operated under GATT and, like GATT, they focused on goods trade. With the
creation of the WTO in 1995, their scope was extended, like the WTO, to
include services and intellectual property.
For each review, two documents are prepared: a policy statement by the
government under review, and a detailed report written independently by the
WTO Secretariat. These two reports, together with the proceedings of the
Trade Policy Review Body’s meetings are published shortly afterwards.
Individual members of the WTO each prepare a “country report” on their trade
policies.
WTO secretariate also prepare a report on each member but on the perspective
of the secretariate. Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) reviews trade policies of
each member based on their two reports. At the end of the review, the TPRB
issued its own report concerning the adherence of members trade policy to the
WTO covered agreements. The TPRB has no enforcement capability but the
report is sent to the next meeting of the WTO ministerial Council. It is then up
to the Ministerial Council to evaluate the policies of each member states.
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guise), which consists of all WTO members. The Dispute Settlement Body has
the sole authority to establish “panels” of experts to consider the case, and to
accept or reject the panels’ findings or the results of an appeal. It monitors the
implementation of the rulings and recommendations, and has the power to
authorize retaliation when a country does not comply with a ruling.
There is also a binding parallel process for binding arbitration if both parties
agree to submit the dispute arbitration rather than to DSB panel. There are
three points wealth of emphasizing:
ii. Dispute settlement option is not open to private litigants, only member
state, governments may file an action before the DSB
iii. Although formally binding, the WTO has no direct powers to compel
compliance with its decisions.
None the less, it may order compensation for the aggrieved state or authorise
retaliatory trade sanctions and these may provide a significant incentive for
and offending state to bring its domestic law into compliance. Although the
dispute settling understanding (DSU) offers a unified resolution system that is
applicable across all sectors and boarders all covered WTO agreements, there
are specialised rules which arise under them. These are
i. Textile agreements
However, the point is not to pass judgement. The priority is to settle disputes,
through consultations if possible. By January 2008, only about 136 of the 369
cases had reached the full panel process. Most of the rest have either been
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notified as settled “out of court” or remain in a prolonged consultation phase
some since 1995. There are seven stages in the resolution of disputes under the
WTO.
Phase I
Any WTO member who believes that the measure of another member is not in
conformity with what is in the covered agreement may call for consultation
over those measures. The respondent has 10 days to reply and must agree to
enter into consultation within 30 days. If the respondent does not enter into
consultation within 30 days, party seeking consultation can immediately
request establishment of a panel under dispute settlement understanding
(DSU).
Once consultation begin the parties have 60 days to achieve settlement. This is
done to seek a positive solution to the dispute. If such a settlement cannot be
obtained after 60 days of consultation, the party may request the establishment
of the DSU. Third parties with an interest in the matter of consultation may
seek to be included. If such is rejected, they may seek their own consultation
with the other member.
Phase II
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but when the Dispute Settlement Body meets for a second time, the
appointment can no longer be blocked (unless there is a consensus against
appointing the panel). The parties seeking the consultation may request the
DSB to investigate, report and resolve the dispute.
The DSB must establish such a panel upon the request unless the DSB
expressly by consensus decides not to establish a panel. The WTO maintains a
list of well qualified persons who are available to serve as panelist. Panels are
like tribunals. But unlike in a normal tribunal, the panellists are usually chosen
in consultation with the countries in dispute. Only if the two sides cannot agree
does the WTO director-general appoint them.
Panels consist of three (possibly five) experts from different countries who
examine the evidence and decide who is right and who is wrong. The panel’s
report is passed to the Dispute Settlement Body, which can only reject the
report by consensus. Panellists for each case can be chosen from a permanent
list of well-qualified candidates, or from elsewhere. They serve in their
individual capacities. They cannot receive instructions from any government.
Phase III
Either side can appeal a panel’s ruling. Sometimes both sides do so. Appeals
have to be based on points of law such as legal interpretation they cannot re-
examine existing evidence or examine new issues. This means that the review
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of the panel is available at the request of any available party unless the DSB
rejects.
The appellant body is the new institution. GATT 1947 had nothing comparable
to it. Each appeal is heard by three members of a permanent seven-member
Appellate Body set up by the Dispute Settlement Body and broadly
representing the range of WTO membership. It is composed of seven member
or judges. Members of the Appellate Body have four-year terms. They have to
be individuals with recognized standing in the field of law and international
trade, not affiliated with any government.
The review is performed by three judges out of the seven. The parties do not
have any influence on which judges are selected to review a particular panel
report. There is a schedule created by the appellant body itself for the rotation
for the sitting of each judge. The appeal can uphold, modify or reverse the
panel’s legal findings and conclusions. Normally appeals should not last more
than 60 days, with an absolute maximum of 90 days. Appellant Body decisions
are anonymous. Appellant body decisions do not present binding decision.
Phase IV
The DSB must adopt and the parties must unconditionally accept, the
Appellate body report unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the
Appellate body within 30 days following its circulation to members.
Whether there was a consensus against the adoption of the report in question.
Nowadays, he or she simply gives the floor to the parties to the dispute and
then to other Members to express their opinions. It sometimes happens that a
member urges the other Members to oppose the report, but this typically has
no consequence because a rejection of the report would require consensus of
all the Members present at the meeting. The DSB chairperson, therefore,
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merely states that the DSB takes note of all the statements and adopts the
report.
In disputes regarding both prohibited and actionable subsidies, the DSB must
adopt the report within 30 days of its circulation to all Members, unless it
decides by consensus not to adopt it or unless one of the parties notifies the
DSB of its decision to appeal.
Phase V
With WTO law is not part of the mandate of the arbitrator under the DSU. If
there are several possible ways to bring about conformity, the implementing
Member has the discretion to choose among these options. Whether the chosen
option truly achieves full conformity is to be decided according to the
procedure of Article 21.5 of the DSU. For those reasons, arbitrators determine
the reasonable period of time on the basis of the proposal of the implementing
Member.
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satisfactory adjustment; such suggestions shall not be binding upon the parties
to the dispute.”
Non implementation
If the losing Member fails to bring its measure into conformity with its (WTO)
obligations within the reasonable period of time, the prevailing complainant is
entitled to resort to temporary measures, which can be either compensation or
the suspension of WTO obligations, as discussed below. Neither of these
temporary measures is preferred to full implementation of DSB
recommendations.
Phase VI
If the implementing Member does not achieve full compliance by the end of
the reasonable period of time, it has to enter into negotiations with the
complaining party with a view to agreeing a mutually acceptable
compensation. This compensation does not mean monetary payment; rather,
the respondent is supposed to offer a benefit, for example a tariff reduction,
which is equivalent to the benefit which the respondent has nullified or
impaired by applying its measure.
The parties to the dispute must agree upon the compensation, which must also
be consistent with the covered agreements. This latter requirement is probably
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one of the reasons why WTO members have hardly ever been able to work out
compensation in cases reaching this stage. Conformity with the covered
agreements implies, notably, consistency with the most-favoured-nation
obligations (Article I of GATT 1994, among others).
Therefore, WTO Members other than the complainant would also benefit, if
compensation is offered for instance in the form of a tariff reduction. This
makes compensation less attractive to both the respondent, for whom this
raises the price, and the complainant, who does not get an exclusive benefit.
These obstacles could to some extent be overcome, however, if the parties were
to select a trade benefit (an example tariff reduction) in a sector of particular
export interest to the complainant and other Members had little export interest
in that sector or product.
Phase VII
First, smaller and developing countries do not always import goods and
services or intellectual property rights (in sufficient quantities) in the same
sectors as those in which the violation or other nullification or impairment took
place. This may make it impossible to suspend obligations at a level equivalent
to that of the nullification or impairment committed by the respondent, unless
the complainant can suspend obligations in a different sector or under a
different agreement.
Second, the suspension in the same sector or under the same agreement could
be ineffective or impracticable because the bilateral trade relationship is
asymmetrical in that it is relatively important for the complainant and
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relatively unimportant for the respondent, particularly if the latter is a big
trading nation. In that case, the effects of the suspension of obligations and the
imposition of trade barriers might not even be visible in the respondent’s trade
statistics.
The 2001 Ministerial Conference in Doha set out tasks, including negotiations,
for a wide range of issues concerning developing countries. Some people call
the new negotiations the Doha Development Round.
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increase their ability to trade, and some additional preferential market access
agreements. A World Trade Organization Committee on Trade and
Development, assisted by a Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries,
looks at developing countries’ special needs. Its responsibility includes
implementation of the agreements, technical cooperation, and the increased
participation of developing countries in the global trading system.
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4 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The origin of the IMF lies in the experience of countries during the inter-war
period, including the Great Depression. In the 1920s and 1930s, many countries
attempted to maintain domestic income in the face of shrinking markets
through competitive devaluation of their currencies and resort to exchange
and trade restrictions. Such measures could achieve their objectives only by
aggravating the difficulties of trading partners who, in self-defence, were led
to adopt similar policies, leading to a destructive vicious cycle. There was
growing recognition of the largely self-defeating nature of these policies at the
country level and the increasing global welfare losses, resulting in a widening
acceptance of the need for a globally agreed code of conduct in international
trade and financial matters.
This mandate gives the IMF its unique character as an international monetary
institution, with broad oversight responsibilities for the orderly functioning
and development of the international monetary and financial system.
The IMF is also actively engaged in promoting economic growth and poverty
reduction in its poorer members by providing financing on concessional terms
in support of efforts to stabilize economies, implement structural reforms, and
achieve sustainable external debt positions. Often missing from the public
perception of the IMF, however, is the broader context in which this financing
takes place.
1. Regulatory functions
IMF include formal jurisdiction over measures that have the effect of
restricting payments and transfers for current international transactions.
Member countries are required to provide the IMF with such information and
statistical data as it deems necessary for its activities, including the minimum
necessary for the effective discharge of its duties, as outlined in the Articles of
Agreement (Article VIII).
2. Consultative functions
This stem primarily from the IMF’s responsibility for overseeing the
international monetary system and exercising firm surveillance over the
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policies of its members, a task entrusted to the IMF following the collapse of
the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s. These
activities include regular monitoring and peer review by other members of
economic and financial developments and policies in each of its members
under Article IV of the Articles of Agreement, ongoing reviews of world
economic and financial market developments, and semi-annual consideration
of the world economic outlook (Article IV).
3. Financial functions
Financial functions of the IMF are the subject of this pamphlet. They range
from the provision of temporary balance of payments financing and
administration of the SDR system to the extension of longer-term concessional
lending and debt relief to the poorest members (Articles V and VI).
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The IMF is therefore concerned not only with the problems of individual
countries but also with the working of the international monetary system as a
whole. Its activities are aimed at promoting policies and strategies through
which its members can work together to ensure a stable world financial system
and sustainable economic growth.
The IMF provides a forum for international monetary cooperation, and thus
for an orderly evolution of the system, and it subjects a wide area of
international monetary affairs to the covenants of law, moral suasion, and
understandings. The IMF must also stand ready to deal with crisis situations,
not only those affecting individual members but also those representing
threats to the international monetary system.
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IMF policy assessments and recommendations also provide important signals
to investors and financial markets regarding a country’s economic future, and
impact on investor and market confidence in the economy.
The IMF is a premier source for economic analysis of its member countries’
economic policies and statistical information. Information is disseminated
through its numerous economic reports and research studies on member
countries, as well as specialized statistical publications. The IMF also conducts
research in areas relevant to its mandate and operations, mainly to improve its
economic analysis and its advice to member countries. The results of this
research are disseminated through books, IMF and academic journals and
working papers, occasional papers, and the internet.
The Articles of Agreement enable the IMF to lend to member countries that
have a balance of payments need to provide temporary respite and enable
countries to put in place orderly corrective measures and avoid a disorderly
adjustment of the external imbalance. Such lending is usually undertaken in
the context of an economic adjustment program implemented by the
borrowing country to correct the balance of payments difficulties, which also
safeguards IMF resources. In addition to providing direct financing to its
member countries, the IMF plays an important catalytic role in helping
member countries to mobilize external financing for their balance of payments
needs.
a. Quota Subscriptions
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(SDRs or currencies of other members deemed by the IMF to be readily
available and accepted for international payments), and the balance is paid in
the member’s own currency. Members’ currencies are deemed usable or
unusable. Usable currencies are those of member countries whose external
position is strong enough for them to be called upon to finance IMF credit to
other members. The IMF uses its pool of usable currencies and SDR holdings
to extend credit to member countries. Since some currencies are unusable, this
pool of loanable funds is less than the sum total of quota subscriptions.
Quota-based funds are held in the IMF’s General Resources Account (GRA).
Any member can request a loan from the pool of quota resources at any time
and such a request will be granted if certain criteria are satisfied.
b. Borrowing
The Articles of Agreement (Article VII, Section 1) allow the IMF to replenish
its holdings of any member’s currency through borrowing, when needed in
connection with its transactions. Such borrowing is undertaken on a temporary
basis and is subject to continuous monitoring and a regular review of the IMF’s
liquidity by the Executive Board.
The IMF borrows from official bilateral sources to finance concessional lending
to low-income countries under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
(PRGF) and the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF), which are administered by
the IMF through the PRGF-ESF Trust. Borrowing for PRGF-ESF lending
usually takes place at market interest rates. However, since these funds are on-
lent to low-income borrowers at a concessional rate of 0.5 percent (or interest-
free in the case of debt relief), the difference between the market borrowing
rate and the concessional lending rate has to be subsidized.
This subsidy is covered through bilateral grants (see below) or through IMF
borrowing from official bilateral sources at below-market interest rates. In the
latter case, the difference between the market interest rate and the below-
market rate paid to the creditor is the creditor’s contribution to the interest
subsidy.
Bilateral grants help finance the interest subsidy on concessional loans to low-
income countries, including PRGF/ESF loans and loans to low-income
countries that access the IMF's emergency assistance. While the loans are made
from the IMF’s quota based GRA resources and therefore carry no concessional
interest rates, a concessionally element is incorporated through an interest rate
subsidy. The interest subsidy is the difference between the IMF’s basic GRA
rate of charge and the effective concessional lending rate of 0.5 percent.
Bilateral grants also partly finance the IMF’s contribution to debt relief under
the HIPC Initiative, the remainder of which was financed through gold sales.
d. Gold Sales
The IMF acquired virtually all of its holdings of gold prior to the Second
Amendment of the Articles of Agreement in 1978. Prior to this Amendment,
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gold played a central role in the functioning of the international monetary
system: the first 25 percent of members’ quota subscriptions and quota
increases was normally paid in gold, interest on outstanding IMF credit was
normally paid in gold, and members could also use gold to purchase reserve
currencies or repay debt to the IMF. The Second Amendment severely limited
the use of gold in IMF transactions: the IMF may only sell gold at prevailing
market prices and accept gold in the discharge of a member’s obligations to
the IMF; no other transactions in gold. Also, to help finance its contribution to
debt relief under the HIPC Initiative, the IMF conducted a series of off-market
transactions in gold in 1999-2000 that left its gold holdings unchanged.
The IMF has sold gold on various occasions in the past to support its
operations, mostly prior to 1980. Since gold is valued at historical cost in the
IMF’s accounts and the market value is usually substantially higher than the
book value, the sale of gold results in a profit for the IMF. These profits were
placed in a Special Disbursement Account, from where they were transferred
to other special-purpose accounts, in particular for financial assistance to low-
income countries, including debt relief.
1. Board of Governors
The Board of Governors also elects or appoints executive directors and is the
ultimate arbiter on issues related to the interpretation of the IMF's Articles of
Agreement. Voting by the Board of Governors usually takes place by mail-in
ballot.
The Boards of Governors of the IMF and the World Bank Group normally meet
once a year, during the IMF-World Bank Spring and Annual Meetings, to
discuss the work of their respective institutions. The Meetings, which take
place in September or October, have customarily been held in Washington for
two consecutive years and in another member country in the third year.
The Annual Meetings usually include two days of plenary sessions, during
which Governors consult with one another and present their countries' views
on current issues in international economics and finance. During the Meetings,
the Boards of Governors also make decisions on how current international
monetary issues should be addressed and approve corresponding resolutions.
The Annual Meetings are chaired by a Governor of the World Bank and the
IMF, with the chairmanship rotating among the membership each year. Every
two years, at the time of the Annual Meetings, the Governors of the Bank and
the Fund elect Executive Directors to their respective Executive Boards.
2. Ministerial Committees
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The IMFC has 24 members, drawn from the pool of 190 governors. Its structure
mirrors that of the Executive Board and its 24 constituencies. As such, the
IMFC represents all the member countries of the Fund.
The IMFC meets twice a year, during the Spring and Annual Meetings. The
Committee discusses matters of common concern affecting the global economy
and also advises the IMF on the direction its work. At the end of the Meetings,
the Committee issues a joint communiqué summarizing its views. These
communiqués provide guidance for the IMF's work program during the six
months leading up to the next Spring or Annual Meetings. There is no formal
voting at the IMFC, which operates by consensus.
The IMF’s 24-member Executive Board conducts the daily business of the IMF
and exercises the powers delegated to it by the Board of Governors, as well as
those powers conferred on it by the Articles of Agreement. With the entry into
force of the Board Reform Amendment on January 26, 2016, the all-elected
Executive Board has been in place since the subsequent election took effect on
November 1, 2016. Previously, the member countries holding the five largest
quotas were each entitled to appoint an Executive Director, while 19 were
elected by the remaining member countries.
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The Board discusses all aspects of the Fund’s work, from the IMF staff's annual
health checks of member countries' economies to policy issues relevant to the
global economy. The Board normally makes decisions based on consensus, but
sometimes formal votes are taken. The votes of each member equal the sum of
its basic votes (equally distributed among all members) and quota-based votes.
Therefore, a member’s quota determines its voting power. Following most
formal meetings, the Board summarizes its views in a document known as a
Summing Up. Informal meetings may also be held to discuss complex policy
issues at a preliminary stage.
To view Executive Board documents, which are available in the public domain,
visit the Executive Board Documents Collection via the IMF Archives
Catalogue. The Collection includes: agendas and minutes of Board meetings;
policy papers; staff reports; reports on missions to member countries; and
discussions of fiscal, monetary and economic policy issues.
Governance Reform
To be effective, the IMF must be seen as representing the interests of all its 190
member countries. For this reason, it is crucial that its governance structure
reflect today’s world economy. In 2010, the IMF agreed wide-ranging
governance reforms to reflect the increasing importance of emerging market
countries. The reforms also ensure that smaller developing countries will
retain their influence in the IMF.
The Articles of Agreement require the IMF to adopt policies that will establish
adequate safeguards for the temporary use of the organization’s resources.
These safeguards can be divided into those aimed at protecting currently
available or outstanding credit and those focused on limiting the duration of,
and clearing, overdue obligations. Safeguards to protect committed and
outstanding credit include:
▪ Post-program monitoring;
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▪ Voluntary services and supplementary information provided by the
IMF, including technical assistance; the transparency initiative,
comprising the establishment and monitoring of codes and standards,
including statistical standards and codes for monetary and fiscal
transparency and the assessment of financial sector soundness; and the
improved governance initiative.
Given the monetary character of the IMF and the need for its resources to
revolve, members with financial obligations to the institution must repay them
as they fall due so that these resources can be made available to other members.
Since the early 1980s, the overdue obligations that have emerged have been a
matter of concern because they weaken the IMF’s liquidity position and
impose a cost on other members.
Safeguards put in place to deal with overdue obligations to the IMF include
the following two broad areas:
The IMF focuses on its core areas of responsibility and expertise, where it has
a clear comparative advantage, namely: the pursuit of stable macroeconomic
conditions and macro-relevant structural reforms, with supporting financial
and technical assistance. In its work in low-income countries, the IMF works
in close collaboration with other development partners, particularly the World
Bank, which is the lead institution for poverty reduction.
The IMF, in conjunction with other development partners, has endorsed a two-
pillar strategy for tackling poverty in low-income countries.
▪ Second, for those countries that implement sound policies and reforms,
the international community must provide strong support through
greater trade opportunities and increased and better-delivered aid
flows.
However, the IMF and the World Bank have suggested the following as
possible core elements of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP):
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macroeconomic, structural, and social policies that together comprise a
comprehensive strategy for achieving these outcomes;
The IMF’s launching of the HIPC Initiative is consistent with its mandate to
provide balance of payments assistance as well as promote economic growth
in member countries. In September 1999, the IMF and the World Bank agreed
to strengthen the HIPC Initiative to provide broader, deeper, and faster debt
relief by lowering the threshold and the performance period requirement,
thereby increasing also the number of eligible countries. At the same time, the
links between debt relief and poverty-reduction efforts were strengthened
through the PSRP framework.
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A topping-up decision can also be taken, as is discussed later, but, briefly,
involves the disbursement of assistance over and above that which was
committed at the decision point. The debt relief provided to a member at the
completion point is irrevocable and is provided with no further policy
conditionality.
iii. have received, or are eligible to receive, assistance to the full extent
available under traditional debt relief mechanisms. Even after the full
application of these traditional debt relief mechanisms, the member’s
external debt situation, based on end-2004 data, is unsustainable, as
defined under the HIPC Initiative.
To qualify for assistance (for example to reach the decision point) under the
Initiative, an eligible member must have:
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iii. established a track record of strong policy performance under IMF-
supported programs, covering macroeconomic policies and structural
and social policy reforms; and
iv. a commitment from all other creditors (holding debt claims above a
certain minimum amount) to participate in the Initiative.
The IMF’s finances are analogous to those of other financial institutions, and
comparison between the IMF and such institutions has been made easier by
recent changes in the presentation of the IMF’s financial statements. A typical
financial institution holds liquid assets and loan claims and securities among
its assets, financed by its deposit (monetary) liabilities and capital resources.
Similarly, in the GRA the IMF holds assets (currencies, SDRs, and gold) and
credit outstanding to its members, and issues monetary liabilities (referred to
as reserve tranche positions), while its capital includes members’ quota
subscriptions. Similar practices are followed in the financial statements of the
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SDR Department and of the PRGF and PRGF-HIPC Trusts in order to make
their financial operations transparent.
The audit procedures in place call for an external audit of the IMF’s accounts
and activities. The external audit of the financial statements of the IMF’s
General Department, SDR Department, Administered Accounts, and Staff
Retirement Plans is conducted annually by an external audit firm selected by
the Executive Board. The external audit is conducted in accordance with
International Standards on Auditing (ISA) under the general oversight of an
External Audit Committee (EAC).
The nominees must possess the qualifications required to carry out the
oversight of the IMF’s annual audit and the nominees are therefore typically
experienced independent auditors or auditors in public service. The EAC
elects one of its members as chairman, determines its own procedures, and is
otherwise independent of the management of the IMF in overseeing the
annual audit.
The audit committee is responsible for transmitting the audit reports issued
by the external audit firm to the Board of Governors through the IMF’s
Managing Director and the Executive Board. The chairman of the EAC is also
required to brief the Executive Board on the work of the EAC at the
conclusion of the annual audit.
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Collaboration with the world bank and the world Trade organization
The original Bretton Woods conference called for the creation of three
international organizations. While the IMF and the World Bank were created
shortly after the conference, an international organization devoted to the
facilitation of international trade was only created in 1996, when the World
Trade Organization (WTO) was established incorporating the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). While the IMF cooperates with a
large number of international organizations, including all the regional
development banks, the common origin and complementary mandates of the
IMF, World Bank, and WTO led to intense and well-defined forms of
cooperation.
If the issue cannot be resolved at the management level before a World Bank
lending operation or IMF-supported program is to be presented to the
respective Executive Board, then management would highlight the
disagreement to the Board prior to the Board discussion, and at the time of
meeting, indicate the nature of the disagreement and ensure that staff from the
other institution are present at the Executive Board to present their views.
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▪ Integration and coordination of the views of either institution requires
timely input from the other institution. In situations where either
institution does not have the capacity or is unable to provide policy
advice and expertise, whichever institution can provide input should
do so in order to ensure that the country’s program does not suffer. At
the same time, the institution that is unable to provide input would
review its work priorities with a view to better aligning them to the
requirements of the country’s program.
The IMF and the WTO work together on many levels, with the aim of ensuring
greater coherence in global economic policymaking and reflecting the
underlying common policy goal of limiting the use of restrictions on the
international flow of goods and services, which can be affected through
exchange or trade restrictions. On an operational level, the IMF established the
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Trade Integration Mechanism (TIM) in April 2004 to support progress under
the WTO’s Doha round of trade talks
The IMF has observer status at the WTO, and participates actively in many
meetings of WTO committees, working groups, and bodies. For this purpose,
the IMF maintains an office in Geneva to facilitate the regular interaction with
the WTO. Trade policy issues feature prominently in IMF program and
surveillance work wherever macro-relevant. Equally, IMF surveillance
reports, including assessments of exchange rate policies, are important inputs
to the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) and the periodic
reports on member countries’ trade policies (Trade Policy Reviews).
Consultations
The WTO is required to consult the IMF when it deals with issues concerning
monetary reserves, balance of payments, and foreign exchange arrangements.
For example, WTO agreements allow countries to apply trade restrictions in
the event of balance of payments difficulties. The WTO’s Balance of Payments
Committee bases its assessments of restrictions on the IMF’s determination of
a member’s balance of payments situation.
The IMF and the WTO work together in the Integrated Framework for Trade-
Related Technical Assistance to Least-Developed Countries that was put in
place in 1997. The Integrated Framework aims at strengthening the capacity of
these countries to formulate trade policy, negotiate trade agreements, and
tackle production challenges in their domestic economies. In addition, the
Integrated Framework seeks to ensure that poorer member countries
incorporate appropriate trade reforms into their Poverty Reduction Strategy
documents, which form the basis for concessional support by the IMF.
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4.2 THE WORLD BANK
Conceived in 1944 to reconstruct war-torn Europe, the World Bank Group has
evolved into one of the world’s largest sources of development assistance, with
a mission of fighting poverty with passion by helping people help themselves.
The term World Bank was first used in reference to IBRD in an article in the
Economist on July 22, 1944, in a report on the Bretton Woods Conference. The
first meeting of the Boards of Governors of IBRD and the IMF, which was held
in Savannah, Georgia, in March 1946, was officially called the “World Fund
and Bank Inaugural Meeting,” and several news accounts of this conference,
including one in the Washington Post, used the term World Bank. What began
as a nickname became official shorthand for IBRD and IDA in 1975.
IBRD and IDA share staff and headquarters, report to the same senior
management, and use the same standards when evaluating projects. Some
countries borrow from both institutions. For all its clients, the Bank
emphasizes:
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▪ strengthening governments’ ability to deliver quality services
efficiently and transparently;
Bank programs which give high priority to sustainable social and human
development and to strengthened economic management place an emphasis
on inclusion, governance, and institution building. In addition, within the
international community, the Bank has helped build consensus around the
idea that developing countries must take the lead in creating their own
strategies for poverty reduction. It also plays a key role in collaborating with
countries to implement the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which
the United Nations (UN) and the broader international community seek to
achieve by 2015.
IBRD is the original institution of the World Bank Group. When it was
established in 1944, its first task was to help Europe recover from World War
II.
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Today, IBRD plays an important role in improving living standards by
providing its borrowing member countries—middle-income and creditworthy
poorer countries with loans, guarantees, risk management, and other financial
services, as well as analytical and advisory services. It provides these client
countries with risk management tools and access to capital on favourable
terms in larger volumes, with longer maturities, and in a more sustainable
manner than the market in several important ways:
IBRD is structured like a cooperative that is owned and operated for the benefit
of its 187 member countries. Shareholders of IBRD are sovereign governments,
and its borrowing members, through their representatives on the Board of
Executive Directors, have a voice in setting its policies and approving each
project and loan. IBRD finances its activities primarily by issuing AAA-rated
bonds to institutional and retail investors in global capital markets. IBRD’s
financial objective is not to maximize profit, but to earn adequate income to
ensure its financial strength and to sustain its development activities.
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Although IBRD earns a small margin on this lending, the greater proportion of
its income comes from investing its own capital. This capital consists of
reserves built up over the years and money paid in from the Bank’s 187-
member country shareholders. IBRD’s income also pays for World Bank
operating expenses and has contributed to IDA, debt relief, and other
development causes.
IBRD borrowers are typically middle-income countries that have some access
to private capital markets. Some countries eligible for IDA lending because of
low per capita incomes are also eligible for some IBRD borrowing because of
their creditworthiness. These countries are known as “blend” borrowers.
Hundreds of millions of the developing world’s poor, defined as those who
live on less than $2 a day, live not in the world’s very poorest countries, but in
middle-income countries, which are defi ned as those with an annual gross
national income per capita between $996 and $12,195 (as of April 2011).
Countries are considered to have graduated from IBRD borrowing when their
per capita income exceeds the level that the Bank classifies as middle income.
For more information, including a list of IBRD graduates. Even though IBRD
does not maximize profits, it has earned a positive operating income each year
since 1948. This income funds development activities and ensures financial
strength, enabling low-cost borrowing in capital markets and good terms for
borrowing clients.
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Organizing Principles within the World Bank Group
The vice-presidential unit (VPU) is the main organizational unit of the World
Bank (IBRD and IDA). Such units are commonly referred to as vice
presidencies. With a few exceptions that report directly to the president, each
of these units reports to a managing director or to the Bank Group’s chief
financial officer (CFO). In general, each vice presidency corresponds to a world
region, a thematic network, or a central function. The network vice
presidencies cut across the regional vice presidencies in the form of a matrix.
This arrangement helps ensure an appropriate mix of experience and
expertise. Consequently, a staff member may work for a network vice
presidency but could be deployed to support work in a specific region or
country.
The organizational structures of the other World Bank Group institutions have
varying degrees of similarity to the organization of IBRD and IDA, reflecting
the unique aspects of each institution’s mission.
Bank Group institutions have long organized much of their work around
major world regions and have carried it out through offices in member
countries. In recent years, decentralization has been a top priority, with the
goal being to bring a higher proportion of Bank Group staff members closer to
their clients. IBRD and IDA, for example, have relocated two thirds of their
country directors from Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C., to the fi eld
since the mid-1990s. The percentage of staff members who work in the fi eld
has also increased significantly. Similarly, more than 50 percent of IFC staff
members are located in country offices worldwide.
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The World Bank has six regional vice presidencies: Africa, East Asia and the
Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle
East and North Africa, and South Asia. The Bank operates offices in more than
100 member countries. As part of their work, country offices coordinate and
partner with member governments, representatives of civil society, and other
international donor agencies operating in the country. In addition, many
country offices serve as Public Information Centres (PICs) for the World Bank
Group.
IBRD and IDA have created thematic networks to develop connections among
communities of staff members who work in the same fi elds of development
and to link these staff members more effectively with partners outside the
Bank. The networks help draw out lessons learned across countries and
regions, and they help bring global best practices to bear in meeting country-
specific needs.
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▪ Financial and Private Sector Development Network. Key areas
include financial systems; capital markets; financial inclusion;
investment climate; competitive industries; and innovation,
technology, and entrepreneurship.
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finance, global trade liquidity, housing finance, insurance, Islamic
finance, leasing, microfinance, small and medium-size enterprise
banking, and trade finance.
4. Corporate Secretariat
5. Development Economics
7. External Affairs
8. Financial Management
9. General Services
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10. Human Resources
In each of these cases, member countries buy shares in the institution, helping
build its capital and borrowing power; this arrangement is called “capital
subscriptions.” Member countries also sign the founding document of each
institution: the Articles of Agreement for IBRD, IDA, and IFC and the MIGA
Convention. Membership in the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) entails signing and ratifying the ICSID
Convention and also involves capital subscriptions
Member countries can withdraw from Bank Group institutions at any time by
giving notice. A member may also be suspended, and after a year may be
expelled if it fails to fulfil any of its obligations to a Bank Group institution. A
country that ceases to be a member of the IMF automatically ceases to be a
member of the Bank Group unless, within three months, the Bank Group
decides by a special majority to allow the country to remain a member. When
a country ceases to be a member, it continues to be liable for its contractual
obligations, such as servicing its loans. It also continues to be liable for calls on
its unpaid subscription resulting from losses sustained by a Bank Group
institution on guarantees or loans outstanding on the date of withdrawal
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4.2.3 Ways of Classifying Countries
Several important distinctions among member countries are commonly used
at the Bank Group. Although the meanings of the terms overlap and all of them
make distinctions in terms of wealth it is important to note that they are not
interchangeable.
In its analytical and operational work, the Bank Group characterizes country
economies as low-income, middle-income (subdivided into lower-middle and
upper-middle), and high-income. It makes these classifications for most non-
sovereign territories as well as for independent countries. Low-income and
middle-income economies are sometimes referred to as developing economies.
On the basis of 2001 gross national income, low-income countries are those
with average annual per capita incomes of US$745 or less. For lower-middle-
income countries, the figures are US$746 to US$2,975; for upper-middle-
income countries, US$2,976 to US$9,205; and for high-income countries,
US$9,206 or more. Classification by income does not necessarily reflect
development status
In general usage at the Bank Group, the term “developing” refers to countries
whose economies are classified as low-income or middle-income. The terms
“industrial” or “developed” refer to countries whose economies are high-
income. The use of these terms is not intended to imply that all economies in
the group are experiencing similar development or that other economies have
reached a preferred or final stage of development.
Countries choose whether they are Part I or Part II primarily on the basis of
their economic standing. Part I countries are almost all industrial countries and
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donors to IDA, and they pay their contributions in freely convertible currency.
Part II countries are almost all developing countries, some of which are donors
to IDA. Part II countries are entitled to pay most of their contributions to IDA
in local currency. MIGA makes a similar distinction between Category I and
Category II member countries. The breakdown of countries into these
categories differs slightly from the breakdown within IDA.
The distinctions between IBRD and IDA borrowers and the circumstances in
which a country may be eligible to receive a blend of IBRD and IDA credits are
based on per capita income and the country’s creditworthiness. Note that as a
country’s per capita income increases, it can graduate out of eligibility for IDA
credits and, in turn, out of eligibility for IBRD loans. However, wealthier
countries remain members of Bank Group organizations, even if they or the
enterprises operating within their borders do not draw upon Bank Group
services
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facts, and some information on the Bank Group’s activities and priorities. They
also offer information on major regional initiatives, which in most cases are
partnership initiatives between the Bank Group and other organizations or
governments.
1. AFRICA (SUB-SAHARAN)
Regional Initiatives
Regional Initiatives
The following initiatives are in place in East Asia and the Pacific:
3. SOUTH ASIA
Regional Initiatives
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assisting governments, civil society, and the media as they work to
improve urban air quality.
Regional Initiatives
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projects to address inter-ethnic tensions and social cohesion issues in
southeast Europe.
Regional Initiatives
The following initiatives are in place in Latin America and the Caribbean:
Regional Initiatives
Regional initiatives in the Middle East and North Africa include the following:
a. The Governance in the Middle East and North Africa initiative seeks to
improve governance institutions and processes, the weaknesses of
which may lead to disappointing economic performance. It is a
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partnership of individual researchers from the region, local think tanks,
and donor agencies.
This section covers the main strategies guiding the work of the Bank Group:
Poverty Reduction
The resulting Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) then become the
basis for International Development Association (IDA) lending from the
World Bank, for comparable lending from the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility, and for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) Initiative.
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Country Assistance Strategies
Country Assistance Strategies (CASs) identify the key areas in which the Bank
Group can best assist a country in achieving sustainable development and
poverty reduction. CASs are the central vehicle used by the Bank Group’s
executive directors to review and guide the Bank Group’s support for
borrowers from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) and IDA. Each CAS includes a comprehensive diagnosis drawing on
analytic work by the Bank Group, the government, and other partners of the
development challenges facing the country, including the incidence, trends,
and causes of poverty.
From this assessment, the level and composition of Bank Group financial,
advisory, and technical support to the country are determined. So that
implementation of the CAS program can be tracked, CASs are increasingly
resulting focused. Thus, each CAS includes a framework of clear targets and
indicators that are used to monitor Bank Group and country performance in
achieving stated outcomes.
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2. Policies and Procedures
The World Bank Group has established policies and procedures to help ensure
that its operations are economically, financially, socially, and environmentally
sound. Each operation must follow these policies and procedures to ensure
quality, integrity, and adherence to the Bank Group’s mission, corporate
priorities, and strategic goals.
Operational policies are short, focused statements that follow from the Bank’s
Articles of Agreement and the general conditions and policies approved by the
Board of Executive Directors. They establish the parameters for conducting
operations, describe the circumstances in which exceptions to policy are
admissible, and spell out who authorizes exceptions.
Bank procedures explain how staff members carry out the operational policies
by describing the procedures and documentation required to ensure
consistency and quality across the Bank. Good practices are statements that
contain advice and guidance on policy implementation, such as the history of
an issue, the sectoral context, and the analytical framework, along with
examples of good practice.
The Bank has 10 safeguard policies that cover the following issues:
environmental assessment, natural habitats, pest management, involuntary
resettlement, indigenous peoples, forests, cultural resources, dam safety,
international waterways, and projects in disputed areas. The Bank also has a
policy to govern the use of borrower systems for environmental and social
safeguards. Bank safeguards require screening of each proposed project to
determine the potential environmental and social risks and opportunities and
how to address those issues.
The Bank’s Quality Assurance and Compliance Unit within the Bank’s
Operations Policy and Country Services (OPCS) Vice Presidency, jointly with
the Environmental and International Law Practice Group of the Legal Vice
Presidency, provides support to Bank teams that are dealing with
environmental and social risks in Bank-supported operations.
Fiduciary policies
The Bank’s fiduciary policies, set forth in the Operational Manual, govern the
use and flow of Bank funds, including financial management, procurement,
and disbursement. The OPCS Vice Presidency provides guide the procurement
of goods and services in Bank projects. The guidelines help ensure that funds
are used for their intended purposes and with economy, efficiency, and
transparency. They also ensure competitive bidding and help protect Bank-
funded projects from fraud and corruption.
Access to information
In 2010, the Bank launched its Policy on Access to Information. The new policy
represents a fundamental shift in the Bank’s approach to disclosure of
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information moving from an approach that spells out what information it can
disclose to one under which the Bank will disclose any information in its
possession that is not on a list of exceptions.
For some years, the Bank has viewed the disclosure of information as a means
of being more open about its activities, explaining its work to the widest
possible audience, and promoting overall accountability and transparency in
the development process. Now the public can get more information than ever
before—information about projects under preparation, projects that are being
implemented, analytic and advisory activities, and Board proceedings
4.2.6 World Bank Group’s Relationship to the IMF and the United
Nations
The Bretton Woods Institutions the World Bank and the IMF were both created
in 1944 at a conference of world leaders in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire,
with the aim of placing the international economy on a sound footing after
World War II. As a result, of their shared origin, the two entities the IMF and
the expanded World Bank Group are sometimes referred to collectively as the
Bretton Woods institutions. The Bank Group and the IMF which came into
formal existence in 1945 work closely together, have similar governance
structures, have a similar relationship with the United Nations, and have
headquarters in close proximity in Washington, D.C. Although membership in
the Bank Group’s institutions is open only to countries that are already
members of the IMF, the Bank Group and the IMF remain separate institutions.
Their work is complementary, but their individual roles are quite different.
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A few Banks Group and IMF units have joint functions, including the Library
Network, Health Services, and the Bank/Fund Conferences Office, which
plans and coordinates the joint Annual Meetings and Spring Meetings. The
staff members of the two institutions have formed the joint Bank-Fund Staff
Federal Credit Union, but this entity is independent of the institutions
themselves.
The Development Committee is a forum of the Bank Group and the IMF that
facilitates intergovernmental consensus building on development issues.
Known formally as the Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of the Bank
and Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries, the
committee was established in 1974.
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4.3 THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (AFDB)
The African Development Bank (AfDB) Group is a multilateral development
finance institution, comprising three distinct entities: the African Development
Bank (AfDB), the parent institution, and two affiliates, the African
Development Fund (ADF) and the Nigerian Trust Fund, (NTF). The AfDB
Group is Africa’s premier development finance institution. It is one of the five
major global multilateral development banks (MDBs). It is difficult to cover all
the activities and operations of the AfDB Group in a single document. AfDB in
Brief presents the salient features of the organisation and activities of the Bank
Group.
The headquarters of the AfDB was opened in Abidjan, Côte D’Ivoire, in March
1965. The AfDB commenced operations in July 1966 with ten staff members.
When the Bank was established, only independent African countries were
eligible to be shareholders. Thus, for 19 years, the AfDB depended on African
countries for its capital resources. In 1982, the Bank’s capital was opened to
non-African Countries.
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after the Bank commenced operations: the nature as well as terms of lending
to the poorest of the countries, especially for projects with long-term maturities
or non-financial returns such as roads, education and health.
The Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF): The Nigeria Trust Fund was set up in 1976 by
agreement signed between the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
and the Bank Group. The NTF became operational in April 1976 following
approval of the agreement establishing it by the Board of Governors.
The Bank Group therefore strives to mobilize internal and external resources
to promote investment and provide technical assistance to the Regional
Member Countries (RMCs). Additional resources are usually mobilized
through co-financing with bilateral and other multilateral development
agencies as well as from the financial markets. The AfDB Group also promotes
international dialogue on development issues concerning Africa. It supports
policy reforms, capacity building, knowledge sharing, studies and preparation
of development projects.
As from 2006, the Institution has placed greater emphasis on the following
strategic areas: Investing in infrastructure; the private sector, supporting
economic and governance reforms; promoting higher education, technology
and vocational training; promoting regional integration. Through these core
investment areas, the AfDB Group provides support to fragile states, low-
income countries, middle-income countries, agriculture and rural
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development, social and human development, the environment and climate
change, and gender issues.
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To become an AfDB member, non-regional States must first and fore most
accede to ADF membership. Only one ADF member state, the United Arab
Emirates, is yet to accede to AfDB membership. South Africa is currently
completing the requirements of accession to ADF. Turkey whose membership
was approved by the Board of Governors in Maputo, Mozambique, in May
2008 is in the process of completing the requirements of state participation in
the ADF.
iv. Other income received by the Bank for example through bilateral and
multilateral donors or income from investment.
The Board of Governors is the supreme organ of the Bank. Each member
country is represented on the Board by a Governor and an Alternate. The
position of Governor is usually held by Ministers of Finance and/or Economy
of member states. The Board of Governors issues general directives concerning
the operational policies of the Bank. For the ADF Board of Governors, each
State Participant is represented by one Governor while Governors of the
African Development Bank are ex-officio Governors of the ADF
2. Board of Directors
a. Departments--Operations Evaluations,
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c. Administrative Tribunal--come under the 13 direct controls of the
Board of Directors while the President exercises oversight functions
over them.
3. The President
Elected by the Board of Governors, the President is the Chief Executive and
conducts the business of the Bank. The President is also the legal representative
of the Bank. He is elected for a term of five years, renewable once.
The AfDB President is also the President of the ADF as well as the Chairman
of the Board of Directors. He determines the organizational structure,
functions and responsibilities as well as the regional and country
representation offices. He proposes to the Board of Directors the appointment
of the Vice-Presidents who assist him in the day-to-day management of the
Bank Group. The AfDB comprises 43 departments.
In the past, Bank Group operations were oriented almost exclusively to project
lending. Since 1980, and in response to changing economic circumstances of
regional member countries, the AfDB has greatly diversified its lending,
making use of several lending instruments. The instruments are as follows:
The first three lending instruments are referred to, collectively, as “project or
programme lending”. The designation “policy-based lending” (PBL) applies
to the fourth and fifth categories of sectoral and structural adjustment lending
technical assistance operations are financed only by the ADF through the
Technical Assistance Fund.
vii. Budget support and country system instruments. Over the past years
the Bank has increased its use of a new lending framework for projects.
Budget support, generally provides funds to the country covering
expenditure relating to the project and for general public finance
budget spending. In so doing the Bank implements the project through
the “country systems” approach which would rely solely on a
borrower government’s systems (for example a country’s relevant
national, sub-national, or sectoral implementing institutions and
applicable laws, regulations, rules, procedures, and track records).
B. Project cycle
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AfDB Group works with each borrowing regional member country to define a
medium-term to long-term development strategy and operational program in
a document called Country Strategy Paper (CSP). The CSP emphasizes
performance and results, aligned to the country's own development plan and
poverty reduction goals, and its preparation or planning cycle. This is a major
instrument of AfDB Group policy dialogue with the countries.
This phase starts with the AfDB Group’s interest to finance a given project or
programme, and includes both in-bank and external collection of information
and data which will help the Bank’s experts to appraise the project. A
preparation mission to a country is multi-disciplinary and usually led by an
expert. During the preparation mission, the experts review the project in line
with the Country Strategy Paper (CSP), obtain existing documentation such as
feasibility studies on the project, and cross-check information with the
authorities of the country.
▪ Loan amount in foreign and local costs of the project and the financing
plan;
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▪ The procurement methods and dates of bidding announcements;
• proposed realistic date for loan signature and deadlines for first
and last disbursements;
After negotiations with the government, the loan proposal is submitted to the
AfDB Board of Directors for approval.
v. Implementation
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▪ An interplay of priorities outlined in the country’s development plan,
Bank’s Country Strategy Paper and the country’s absorptive capacity.
▪ The country’s special geographic and political situation for example for
land-locked countries, fragile states, post-conflict states, emergency
situations
▪ Country category based on GNP per capita income and debt servicing
capacity.
E. Establishment of institutions
At the continental level the African Development Bank has also been
instrumental in the establishment and promotion of the following African
institutions:
▪ Shelter Afrique;
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▪ Federation of African Consultants (FECA);
▪ PTA Bank;
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▪ Infrastructure Consortium for Africa
Stakeholders and beneficiaries often cite the water and debt relief initiatives as
concrete examples of well-tailored support enhancing the Bank Group’s
development effectiveness on the continent.
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4.4 THE WORLD BANK ASSOCIATES
IDA complements the World Bank’s original lending arm the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). IBRD was established to
function as a self-sustaining business, and provides loans and advice to
middle-income and credit-worthy countries. IBRD and IDA share the same
staff and headquarters and evaluate projects with the same rigorous standards.
IDA is one of the largest sources of assistance for the world’s 75 poorest
countries, 39 of which are in Africa, and is the single largest source of donor
funds for basic social services in these countries.
IDA lends money on concessional terms. This means that IDA credits have a
zero or very low interest charge. Repayments are stretched over 25 to 38 years,
including a 5- to 10-year grace period. IDA also provides grants to countries at
risk of debt distress. In addition to concessional loans and grants, IDA provides
significant levels of debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI).
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IDA within the World Bank Group
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other major donors think conducive to development of an
appropriate sort.
▪ investment services,
▪ advisory services,
▪ asset management
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local communities. The goal is to improve lives, especially for the people who
most need the benefits of growth.
Direct lending to businesses is the fundamental contrast between IFC and the
World Bank: under their Articles of Agreement, IBRD and IDA can lend only
to the governments of member countries. IFC was founded specifically to
address this limitation of World Bank lending.
In conjunction with IFC, the Bank is also helping countries strengthen and
sustain the fundamental conditions they need to attract and retain private
investment. With Bank Group support—both lending and advice—
governments are reforming their overall economies and strengthening
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banking systems. Investments in human resources, infrastructure, and
environmental protection help enhance the attractiveness and productivity of
private investment.
It can also combine its financial products and services with advice tailored to
the needs of each client. The bulk of the funding, as well as leadership and
management responsibility, however, lies with the private sector owners. IFC
charges market rates for its products and does not accept government
guarantees. Therefore, it carefully reviews the likelihood of success for each
enterprise. To be eligible for IFC financing, projects must be profitable for
investors, must benefit the economy of the host country, and must comply with
IFC’s environmental and social standards.
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banks, leasing companies, stock markets, credit-rating agencies, and venture
capital funds. IFC does not lend directly to microenterprises, to small and
medium-size enterprises, or to individual entrepreneurs; however, many of its
investment clients are financial intermediaries that on-lend to smaller
business.
Resource mobilization
Through its syndicated loan (or B-loan) program, IFC offers commercial banks
and other financial institutions the chance to lend to IFC-financed projects that
they might not otherwise consider. These loans are a key part of IFC’s efforts
to mobilize additional private sector financing in developing countries and to
broaden its development effects. Through this mechanism, financial
institutions share fully in the commercial credit risk of projects, whereas IFC
remains the lender of record.
Advisory services
Asset management
Projects financed by MIGA create jobs; provide water, electricity, and other
basic infrastructure; strengthen financial systems; generate tax revenues;
transfer skills and technological know-how; and allow countries to tap natural
resources in an environmentally sustainable way. MIGA helps investors and
lenders by insuring projects against losses related to currency inconvertibility
and transfer restriction, expropriation, war and civil disturbance (including
terrorism), breach of contract, and failure to honour sovereign financial
obligations.
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MIGA insures cross-border investments made by investors from a MIGA
member country into a developing country that is also a member of MIGA. Its
operational strategy, which is designed to attract investors and private
insurers into difficult operating environments, focuses on four priorities where
it can make the greatest difference:
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Bank Group Country Assistance Strategies and integrate the best
environmental, social, and governance practices.
MIGA complements the activities of other investment insurers and works with
partners through its coinsurance and reinsurance programs. By doing so, it
expands the capacity of the PRI industry and encourages private sector
insurers to enter into transactions they would not otherwise have undertaken.
MIGA’s guarantees can be used on a stand-alone basis or in conjunction with
other World Bank instruments, which offer an additional set of benefits.
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5 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD)
Aid questions were handled by two establishments: most multilateral aid was
handled by the World Bank (later together with the regional development
banks); bilateral aid was overseen by the Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). Issues touching upon international monetary cooperation were
normally discussed within the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Developing countries recognized that they should uphold the common
diplomatic stance that all of these institutionally fragmented but functionally
integrated issues should be considered comprehensively within one central
organization.
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development. Feeling marginalized in the decision-making process of the
Bretton Woods institutions, as well as in the GATT negotiations, developing
countries sought an alternative international forum in which they could
articulate and aggregate their interests. Therefore, a key component in the
platform within and outside the UN among the developing countries was, first
of all, a call for an international conference on trade and development, which
was incidentally strongly supported by socialist countries.
The first joint action of developing countries from Asia, Africa and Latin
America was the Conference on Problems of Developing Countries, held in
Cairo in July 1962, which was a non-UN meeting, and was attended by 36
delegations. The Cairo Declaration called for an international conference
within the framework of the UN on “all vital questions related to international
trade, primary commodity trade and economic relations between developing
and developed countries (UNCTAD, 1985: 10)”. Later in the same year, the UN
General Assembly decided to convene a conference on trade and development,
and established a preparatory committee for it. Indeed, this decision was a
triumph of the developing countries resulting from their persistent pressure
over the general opposition of western developed countries.
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Havana Charter which formed the basis of the ITO, would, together with the
World Bank and the IMF, constitute an institutional "troika" of international
institutions to prevent serious problems in the international economic and
financial systems. However, the ITO could not be institutionalized, having
failed to achieve ratification by the required number of signatories to the
Havana Charter.
UNCTAD I was held when the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations (1964-
1967) was about to embark, or at a time of expansion in the world economy
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where the need for major cooperative efforts for the developing countries was
broadly recognized. It was the belief that such efforts should be made specially
to assist the developing countries to participate in world trade by improving
market access abroad, strengthening and stabilizing commodity markets and
enlarging financial flows to them. These issues have continued to be of
paramount concern to UNCTAD.
From the outset, UNCTAD has been a major institutional actor promoting the
development of a global trading system that promotes the preferential
treatment for developing countries on a non-reciprocal basis as opposed to the
MFN treatment for all.
The UNCTAD I report, known as the Prebisch report, set out to show that
given the structural obstacles to growth for the developing countries, the free
play of international economic forces would not by itself lead to the most
desirable utilization of the world's productive resources. As for the policy
implications for trade and related finance to achieve the target of 5 per cent
annual growth rate (for the first UN Development Decade of the 1960s) for
developing countries, the report rejected both the import substitution model
handed down from the inter-war period and the MFN openness model
embodied in GATT.
1. The Conference
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for the period before the next session. Currently, the Conference membership
consists of 192 member States.
The TDB also serves as a preparatory committee for future sessions of the
Conference, and is therefore responsible for preparing a provisional agenda
and the necessary documentation. The TDB – which used to meet twice a year,
but now only once in the autumn – reports annually to the UN General
Assembly through Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). In addition to the
regular session, the TDB may meet in executive sessions, each normally lasting
only one day, on three occasions throughout the year with six weeks' prior
notice. The TDB executive sessions deal with policy, management and
institutional matters that cannot be deferred to the regular session.
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2. the Commission on Investment, Technology, and Related Financial
Issues; and
These Commissions usually meet once a year for five days. The UNCTAD
secretariat also services the Commission on Science and Technology for
Development, which is a subsidiary body of ECOSOC.
The offices of the UNCTAD secretariat are located within the United Nations
Office in Geneva’s complex, Le Palais des Nations. UNCTAD has a staff of
approximately 400, mostly economists, whose principal activities revolve
around servicing the Conference, the TDB and the deliberations of their
subsidiary bodies; they are also engaged in research (including policy analysis
and advice) and technical cooperation activities. At present, the substantive
part of the UNCTAD secretariat consists of four divisions and one office, this
structure reflects the reforms agreed at UNCTAD IX (1996).
The Office of the Special Coordinator for Least Developed, Landlocked and
Island Developing Countries (OSC-LDC) coordinates UNCTAD's work on
these categories of countries. It also provides analyses of the broad
development challenges facing these countries and deliverers technical
assistance. The Office also publishes The Least Developed Countries Report
and houses a special unit covering issues related to Africa, which produces an
annual report on Economic Development in Africa. The Division of
Management includes the Administrative Services, the Technical Cooperation
Services and the Intergovernmental Affairs and Outreach Services (IAOS).
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Through its publications, the UNCTAD secretariat has also played a role in
raising issues, generating ideas and influencing thoughts, policies and actions
in national capitals, as well as in other institutions of the international system.
As mentioned earlier, the secretariat has directly interacted with many
developing countries (and more recently with countries in transition) through
various technical cooperation activities.
▪ Group C: the Latin American and Caribbean countries with 9 seats; and
The G-77 members have forged a common position and mutually agreed
proposals and apply concerted leverage with bargaining power in its
negotiations with Group B members. On the other hand, Group B members,
which largely coincide with the OECD membership, have also responded to
the demands made on them in a collective fashion.
Socialist countries formed their own group — Group D — which, until the end
of the 1980s, consistently denounced Group B and gave token support to the
G-77. This was because the main diplomatic thrust of the G-77 was directed to
Group B, their main trading partners, rather than to Group D. Therefore, the
Group D members had little difficulty in supporting the demand of developing
countries.
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The evaluation of the group system varies. Supporters defend it on two main
grounds. First, the diplomatic value of the group system lies in its catalytic role
in facilitating the decision-making process by providing for regular
consultation and consideration of positions. Second, the group system is
praised for its contribution to the formulation of principles and general policies
aimed at structural change. The unity of the G-77 is imperative in order to
legitimize its demand for change and to increase pressure on the international
community.
In the field of trade, many concerned observers came to realize that the
principle of reciprocity in trade concessions would constitute a formidable
problem for the majority of developing countries.
After all, the principle of reciprocity, not to mention the principle of the most
favoured nation (MFN) treatment, was based on non-discriminatory
multilateralism, for example treating all countries on an equal footing
regardless of their stage of development. Consequently, considerable interest
was expressed in the possibility of introducing exceptional cases whereby
preferential tariffs by developed countries for exports from developing trade
partners should be implemented on a non-reciprocal basis.
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and the addition of Part IV, a chapter on trade and development.17 It calls on
all GATT Contracting Parties to refrain from increasing trade barriers against
products of specific concern to the developing countries, gives priority to the
reduction and elimination of such barriers, and implements a standstill on
internal taxation on tropical products. It also calls for joint actions to promote
trade and development, which was the basis for establishing a Trade and
Development Committee in GATT to work on the elimination and reduction
of trade barriers.
Despite the fact that the Kennedy Round negotiations constituted the first
negotiating setting that followed the implementation of Part IV, the (limited)
participation of developing countries failed to create any decisive challenge to
the principles of reciprocity and the MFN treatment.
In fact, the general expectation was that as long as the principles of reciprocity
and of MFN treatment were upheld; it was unlikely that the Kennedy Round
would have brought about any substantive gains for developing countries.
This historic Conference was held in Geneva from 26 March to 6 June 1964, and
attended by the representatives of 120 countries, together with those of
numerous international organizations. The substantive discussions were
grouped into six agenda items:
The Final Act adopted by UNCTAD I contained, among others, the following
principal aims:
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In October 1967, the G-77 developing countries held a ministerial meeting –
now standard practice before each Conference – as their own final preparatory
process for UNCTAD II. Group B and Group D also held their own
consultative meeting to clarify their respective group positions. Meanwhile,
the TDB, the four principal committees and other intergovernmental bodies
considered various substantive issues.
ii. financing;
vii. others.
Another noteworthy event that evolved towards the end of the 1960s was the
institutional decision whereby UNCTAD became a participating agency for
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the original idea had
been advanced at UNCTAD II. In 1969, a Technical Coordination Unit was
established within the UNCTAD secretariat. In subsequent years, the
UNCTAD secretariat became increasingly active in providing technical
assistance to developing countries.
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III. UNCTAD III (Santiago 1972)
The third Conference was held in Santiago, Chile from 13 April to 21 May 1972,
with the participation of representatives of 131 member countries, including,
for the first-time representatives of China, together with those of numerous
international organizations. The Conference was held after the first movement
in the breakdown process of the Bretton Woods monetary system. All
participants understood that the basic mission of UNCTAD III was to promote
the implementation of the most essential objectives and commitments of the
International Development Strategy for the Second UN Development Decade.
The initial shock took place in August 1971 when the United States announced
that its monetary authorities would no longer maintain the US Dollar-gold
exchange rate, and would allow the foreign exchange rate to float. In December
of the same year, the Group of Ten developed countries reached the
Smithsonian agreement, by which the US Dollar was devalued in terms of gold
and the major currencies were appreciated in terms of this key currency.
The 1970s witnessed the rise and fall of so-called "commodity power", the
continued disintegration of the international monetary system, an erosion of
the multilateral trading system, and a slowdown in world economic growth
rates. All induced adverse consequences for trade and economic development
of many developing countries.
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Commodity prices – not just the price of oil, but the prices of a number of other
industrial raw materials, food and tropical beverages – had risen sharply in the
first half of the 1970s. The example of the oil cartel in particular suggested to
developing countries that other commodities could be also cartelized. In the
1970s, the operations of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) were without doubt the most important factor affecting the
international political and economic scene.
By the time UNCTAD IV took place, the prices of many commodities had
fallen well below their 1974-1975 peak. The Conference was dominated by
discussions on the Integrated Programme for Commodities (IPC). In contrast
to previous approaches, the essential characteristic of the IPC was the objective
of dealing with commodity problems in a "comprehensive and systematic"
fashion. It stipulated those agreements for 18 specific commodities would be
negotiated or renegotiated within the UNCTAD framework with the principal
objective of stabilizing them "at a level remunerative to the producers and
equitable to the consumers".
The IMF had been closely monitoring the fixed exchange rate system in the
post-war period and had failed to prevent its eventual collapse. The unilateral
decision of the United States on 15 August 1971 to suspend dollar-gold
convertibility, without prior consultation with other major industrial countries
or the IMF, triggered the initial debacle of the Bretton Woods system. The
attempt to create a new system of fixed parities through the Smithsonian
Agreement of December 1971 ended in failure, which led to the floating of all
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the major currencies in April 1973. The initiative of the principal industrialized
countries to coordinate policy among themselves (through the Group of 10)
rather than in IMF forums had the effect of marginalizing the function of the
IMF. To some observers, therefore, it appeared in the 1970s that the IMF was
heading for extinction.
V. UNCTAD V (1979)
By the time of UNCTAD VI, the drive for international economic restructuring
had appeared to be unrealistic, particularly in the light of the newly-formed
conservative administrations in some of the principal industrial countries.25
At the Conference, another attempt was made to revive the North-South
dialogue which was based on a revised rationale: "the need to reactivate
development in the South as an essential means of stimulating the global
economy and reinforcing recovery in the industrialized countries themselves".
This was again turned down by the industrialized countries, which argued
that recovery in their economies was already under way and would in due
course spill over to developing countries.
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VII. UNCTAD VII (1987)
As there had been no offer forthcoming from a developing country to host the
Conference, UNCTAD VII was held in Geneva. On the eve of unexpected,
international political turbulence with global ramifications, UNCTAD VII
reiterated virtually the same elements of international action as it had in the
previous Conference.
Another new and noteworthy event was the launch of the Global System of
Trade Preferences (GSTP), a system of trade preference among developing
countries. The initial proposal had been discussed among G-77 members in the
early 1970s and presented at UNCTAD IV (1976).
For some years at least, GATT appeared be successful in lowering high tariff
walls and expanding world trade considerably. Nevertheless, non-tariff
barriers (NTBs) had also risen to such an extent that much of the progress that
had been made was undone. In the 1980s, many observers viewed the initiative
to form regional free trade frameworks in the western hemisphere, and greater
momentum among the European Community (EC) member countries for
deeper integration, as a threat to universal multilateralism.
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national economies (in the case of the EU). These were in contrast with a "rule-
based, multilateral reciprocity" in accordance with the MFN treatment and
"generalized" reciprocity.
Towards the end of the 1980s, we witnessed the beginning of the most
dramatic political changes of the post-war period: the socialist regimes in
Eastern and Central Europe collapsed in a rapid succession and the Soviet
Union disintegrated in 1991. It was in response to economic and security
concerns arising from frustrations and tensions in the former socialist
transition countries that the new impetus for global cooperation was
generated. With political changes taking place in many parts of these
economies, the concept of development as taken up in UN forums rapidly
evolved, and was now widely understood to be linked to a multidimensional
undertaking and a people-centred process. Furthermore, various social and
environmental issues associated with development activities began to be
discussed more seriously within UN forums. Meanwhile, the role of the
Bretton Woods institutions in the management of international economic
relations was further enhanced as they were assigned a central role in assisting
the economies in transition.
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As for international trade, the Conference reaffirmed the need to curtail
protectionism and maintain an open and non-discriminatory trading system.
But the scope of multilateral trade negotiations for example the ongoing
Uruguay Round negotiations since 1986 – was vastly expanded to include
trade in services, intellectual property, environment-related issues, trade
policy reforms, improvement in competition, facilitation of structural
adjustment and the optimization of the relationship between investment and
technology.
One of the most significant decisions made at UNCTAD VIII that would
critically affect negotiations in UNCTAD was the extensive reorganization of
the intergovernmental machinery. Particularly critical was the abolition of the
Commission on Invisibles and Financing-related to Trade (CIFT), one of its
oldest bodies. It curtailed the contribution of UNCTAD to the debate on the
international financial architecture. Since then, issues related to financial
architecture have only been discussed in a lukewarm fashion, under the
agenda item of "interdependence" at the TDB.
The post-Cold War period heralded a period in which the "cost of peace"
resulting from increasing armed conflicts was taken into consideration. The
arms race, civil wars (in the form of ethnic cleansing and separatist activities)
and various kinds of conflict in developing countries, further drew advanced
countries and the UN into costly peace-making and peacekeeping operations
in various parts of the world. At the same time, there was increasing
call/pressure for reforming the UN system with a view to improving its
efficiency, streamlining its organizational structure and making its field
operations more effective.
At the end of 1993, meanwhile, the long and difficult negotiations of the GATT
Uruguay Round were successfully completed, and the decision was taken to
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create the World Trade Organization (WTO) as of January 1995. The new
organization was assigned a broad mandate which extended far beyond tariff
reduction, bringing into the ambit of the multilateral trading system a number
of what had traditionally been seen as domestic or non-trade issues, such as
intellectual property, investment measures and services.
It highlighted that globalization involves both opportunities and risks and that
the international community should provide assistance to developing
countries in their efforts to integrate into the global economic system and
maximize the benefits they derive from that system. UNCTAD's role in
assisting developing countries in their integration into the international
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trading system by building their supply capacities and their ability to
participate effectively in the multilateral trade negotiations was also stressed.
X. UNCTAD X (2000)
UNCTAD XI was held in São Paulo, Brazil and coincided with the 40th
anniversary of the organization. In the same manner at UNCTAD X, the São
Paulo Conference was also held after the failure of the WTO Ministerial
Meeting in Cancun (2003). The main theme of the Conference was "Enhancing
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coherence between national development and global economic process
towards economic growth and development, particularly of developing
countries".
This Conference theme was based on the belief that resorting exclusively either
to national responses or to international processes would not resolve the
poverty problems of developing countries. These countries should address the
challenge of integrating into the international economy under conditions
conducive to their development, where central to this challenge should be the
need to identify development strategies and policies that would strengthen
their productive capacity and enhance their competitiveness. In this regard,
the interface and greater coherence between internationally agreed disciplines
and commitments on the one hand, and the development strategies that
developing countries need to pursue to achieve their development objectives
on the other, are critical.
One noteworthy and positive event during UNCTAD XI was the launch of the
third round of "the Global System of Trade Preference among Developing
Countries" (GSTP), a major instrument for the promotion of "South-South"
trade.
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b. Trade and competition policy (adoption/updating of national
competition laws and related disciplines in trade agreements). So far,
UNCTAD has assisted in the formulation and implementation of
competition legislation in 25 developing countries and eight regional
groups. o Trade facilitation platforms (integrated trade and transport
facilitation country projects, technology-based automated customs
system (ASYCUDA). UNCTAD's customs software has been installed
in more than 80 developing countries, and has achieved a significant
reduction in the time needed for Customs clearance. In Zimbabwe, the
average amount spent clearing Customs was shortened from a little
over two weeks to one day.
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5.4 UNCTAD ACHIEVEMENTS
Intergovernmental negotiations held under UNCTAD’s auspices have
resulted in international agreements in areas covering trade, commodities,
debt management, transport and special categories of developing countries.
i. Trade
General System of Preference (GSP) (1971): Every year over $60 billion of
developing country exports receive preferential treatment in developed
country markets due to the GSP.
Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of
Restrictive Business Practices (1980).
ii. Commodities
More than 50 poor developing countries have benefited from debt relief of over
$6.5 billion since a resolution of the retroactive adjustment of the ODA debt of
low-income developing countries was approved by the TDB (1978).
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iv. Least Developed, Land-locked and Transition Countries
UNCTAD has played a leading role in mobilizing international support for the
least developed countries (LDCs), including through:
Agreements on ODA target, including the 0.7 per cent of GNP target in donor
countries, for developing countries in general, and the 0.15 per cent target for
LDCs.
Reduction of commercial bank debt for the heavily indebted poor countries
(HIPCs).
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6 THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA
These gains would come, in part, from decreased tariffs, which remain
stubbornly high in many countries in the region. Even greater gains would
come from lowering trade costs by reducing nontariff barriers and improving
hard and soft infrastructure at the borders—so-called trade facilitation
measures. These measures would reduce red tape, lower compliance costs for
traders, and ultimately make it easier for African businesses to integrate into
global supply chains.
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scheme in doing so, it is observed that some similarities in the provisions
emerge, which can form the basis of the Common market preferential area.
The integration strategy adopted by the Abuja Treaty is based on the use of
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as ‘building blocks’ for the eventual
continental trade bloc. Though the Treaty provided for the creation of five
RECs corresponding to the five regions recognised by the OAU, there are
currently eight RECs that have been recognised as AEC building blocks.
Member States of the AU thus have the twin obligations of complying with the
Abuja Treaty’s provisions as well as those of the RECs to which they belong.
Underpinning principles
The principles underpinning the AEC as set out in Article 3 include ‘inter-State
cooperation, harmonisation of policies and integration of programmes; and the
promotion of harmonious development of economic activities among Member
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States10.’ The objectives of the AEC as stated in Article 4 include, inter alia, the
integration of African economies and the co-ordination and harmonization of
policies among existing and future economic communities in order to foster
the gradual establishment of the Community. Article 4 further states that
among the steps to be taken to attain the objectives of the Community are the
harmonisation of national policies in the field of agriculture and the
establishment of appropriate organs for trade in agricultural products.
Member States also agree to grant ‘special treatment to those Member States
classified as least developed countries’ and to adopt ‘special measures in
favour of land-locked, semi-land-locked and island countries.’ An additional
provision that can be regarded as setting out an underlying principle of the
AU is found in Article 88 which provides that ‘The Community shall be
established mainly through the coordination, harmonisation and progressive
integration of the activities of the regional economic communities.’
Harmonisation of laws
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Member States undertake to create favourable conditions for the
development of the Community and the attainment of its objectives,
particularly by harmonising their strategies and policies. They shall
refrain from any unilateral action that may hinder the attainment of
the said objectives.11
Moreover, under Article 88, ‘Member States undertake to promote the co-
ordination and harmonisation of the integration activities of regional economic
communities of which they are members with the activities of the
Community…’ By virtue of these provisions, Members would therefore be
under an obligation to implement any measures agreed on to establish a
common market for agricultural products. However, in view of the language
used, it is quite possible to interpret these provisions as being ‘best
endeavours’ obligations that are subject to the capacity of the Members to
implement them.
The Abuja Treaty’s integration strategy sets out a programme that reflects
what is commonly described as the market integration model41. This
programme is to be affected over a lengthy transitional phase which, however,
is not to exceed a cumulative period of 40 years. The Abuja Treaty relies on the
RECs to provide the foundation for the establishment of the Economic
Community with the AEC playing a coordinating role.
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customs union, followed by a common market and eventually a monetary
union. Article 30 elaborates on the obligation of Members to reduce and
ultimately eliminate customs duties at the level of the RECs in accordance with
programmes to be set out by each individual REC. During this process, the
Assembly is supposed to take the necessary measures to co-ordinate and
harmonise the steps being taken by the RECs.
The Abuja Treaty obliges Members to ‘accord one another, in relation to intra-
community trade, the most-favoured-nation treatment’13. Unlike, for instance,
the COMESA Treaty, the Abuja Treaty does not define most-favoured-nation
treatment. Whether intra-community here refers to trade within the individual
RECs or the Community as a whole is unclear. An interpretation of
‘community’ based on Article 1 would support the wider application of the
MFN obligation.
However, this would render the whole trade liberalisation programme based
on the RECs superfluous as any preferences extended within the RECs would
have to be extended to all other AU countries. Given that this is not the case
13
AEC Treaty, Article 37
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and that the programme set out in Article 6 is an integral part of the Treaty, it
can be concluded that under the Abuja Treaty, MFN is to be interpreted
restrictively.
Trade in agriculture
Chapter VIII of the Abuja Treaty sets out provisions regarding Food and
Agriculture. Article 46 sets out various areas in which the Members agree to
cooperate with regard to agricultural development and food production. Most
of the provisions are concerned with increasing the productivity of the
agricultural sector and the protection of prices of export commodities.
However, Article 46(2)(e) provides that Members are to cooperate in the
‘harmonisation of agricultural development strategies and policies at regional
and Community levels, in particular, in so far as they relate to production,
trade and marketing of major agricultural products and inputs.
Article 47 then states that for the purposes of the Chapter, ‘Member States shall
cooperate in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Food and
Agriculture.’ In drafting a Protocol for a Common Market in Agricultural
Products, one crucial issue that will need to be determined is the relationship
between the Common market Protocol and the Article 47 Protocol. Given that
there is presently no Protocol on Food and Agriculture, there will be a need to
ensure complementarity between it and the Common market Protocol when
the former is eventually negotiated and concluded. It should be noted that no
mention is made of establishing a common agricultural policy in the Abuja
Treaty. It may be that this is one of the purposes that the Article 47 Treaty is
meant to serve.
Trade remedies
Article 36 of the Abuja Treaty defines and prohibits dumping but does not
specify what measures are to be taken against a Member State that engages in
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dumping. Dumping is defined as meaning ‘the transfer of goods originating
from a Member State to another Member State for them to be sold:
a. at a price lower than the usual price offered for similar goods in the
Member State from which those goods originate, due account being
taken of the differences in conditions of sale, taxation, transport
expenses and any other factor affecting the comparison of prices;
Safeguard measures
The Abuja Treaty permits the imposition of safeguard measures in the form of
quantitative or similar restrictions or prohibitions in three situations:
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industries, the measures are only to be applied for a period specified by the
competent organ.
The Abuja Treaty provides for exceptions to the free movement of goods in
Article 35 which provides, inter alia, that Member States ‘may impose or
continue to impose restrictions or prohibitions affecting … the protection of
human, animal or plant health or life’. Before imposing such restrictions,
Members are to make their intention known to the Secretariat of the
Community. The Treaty also provides that in no case are the restrictions to ‘be
used as a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade
between Member States.’
Further provisions relating to the issue of standards can be found in Article 67,
where Member States agree to:
Rules of origin
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Given that no such Protocol has yet been concluded, each REC currently relies
on its own Rules of origins to determine which products are eligible for
preferential treatment. This is one aspect where early harmonization of
regulations is required in order for the Common market to operate. For the
purpose of implementing the Common market it will be necessary to
incorporate Rules of origin into the Protocol either by means of an Annex or as
a substantive Article in the Protocol. If the rules can be kept brief and straight-
forward the latter option would be preferable, whereas if the rules are fairly
detailed, then it might be best to include them in an Annex.
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and programmes and cooperation ‘in the creation of an enabling environment
for foreign, cross border and domestic investment
Underpinning principles
The underlying principles guiding the operation of the organisation are set out
in Chapter Three of the COMESA Treaty. The relevant principles for the
purposes of this study include contributing towards the establishment and
realisation of the objectives of the African Economic Community, enhancing
food sufficiency and cooperating in the export of agricultural commodities and
adhering to the principle of inter-State cooperation, harmonisation of policies
and integration of programmes among the Member States.
Harmonisation of laws
In Article 414, one of the specific undertakings made by Member States in the
field of economic and social development is to ‘harmonise or approximate
their laws to the extent required for the proper functioning of the Common
Market’. More generally, Member States are to ‘take steps to secure the
enactment of and the continuation of such legislation to give effect to this
Treaty and in particular…to confer upon the regulations of the Council the
force of law and the necessary legal effect within its territory.’
14
COMESA Treaty, Article 4
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systematic tariff classification. Pursuant to this provision, COMESA Member
States have adopted the Harmonized System (HS), 2002 version.
The COMESA Treaty obliges Member States to eliminate customs duties and
other charges of an equivalent effect on imports, in the course of progressively
establishing a customs union. In Article 46, a deadline of the year 2000 was set
for the elimination of customs duties and other charges of an equivalent effect.
Pursuant to this provision, a COMESA ‘free trade area’ was established in 2000
and as of 31 May, 2007, 13 Members had joined the free trade area and were
trading on a tariff free basis.
The other Members continue to impose tariffs on imports from other Members
which, in the case of Swaziland, are those determined by its status as a SACU
Member. The expansion of the FTA is a major undertaking in the region as it
prepares for the customs union (a delay of eight years) by 2008 and a Common
Market by 2014.
Non-tariff barriers
Article 45 of the COMESA Treaty provides, inter alia, that in the process of
establishing a COMESA customs union, ‘non-tariff barriers including
quantitative or like restrictions or prohibitions and administrative obstacles to
trade among the Member States shall’ be removed. Accordingly, quantitative
restrictions as a non-tariff barrier to trade should, theoretically, no longer be
an issue with regard to trade within the COMESA bloc.
The requirement in the Treaty that Member States ‘remove immediately upon
the entry into force of the Treaty, all the then existing non-tariff barriers to the
import’ of goods originating in other Member States, can be interpreted to
include a ban on licensing requirements for such imports, which were to have
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been eliminated unless justified by some other provision such as the security
and other restrictions found in Article 50.
Trade in agriculture
The COMESA trade bloc, as a REC, has made good progress in identifying
issues that have constrained trade in agriculture and proposing measures that
can be taken to enhance trade in agriculture. These are set out in a ‘Report on
the Harmonisation of Agricultural Policy for COMESA countries. The Report
states that in ‘the medium to long term, the emphasis in agriculture will be on
the adoption and implementation of the COMESA common agricultural policy
and strategy’. It states that the objectives of the CAP should be:
e. to eradicate and control major diseases and pests of livestock and crops;
and
One important point made by the Report is the need to ensure ‘that there
continue to be marked differences in national agricultural policies between
member states and that harmonisation be restricted to areas where it is
necessary to exploit the potential of the free trade area. This is because a
complete harmonisation ‘would result in national policies that were unsuited
to national conditions.’ The COMESA Treaty itself provides that in the field of
agriculture, Members are to:
Rules of origin
Under the COMESA Treaty, goods are accepted as eligible for Common
Market tariff treatment if they originate in the Member States. The definition
of products originating in the Common Market is set out in a Protocol on the
Rules of Origin for Products to be traded between COMESA States. Under
these Rules, there are five criteria under which products can qualify to be
considered as originating within the region.
The first of these is where goods have been wholly produced in a Member
State. The second is goods produced wholly or partially from imported
materials that have undergone a production process that results in a
transformation such that the CIF value of those materials does not exceed 60
percent of the total cost of materials used, or thirdly, the value-added during
production accounts for at least 35 percent of the ex-factory cost, or fourthly,
there is a change of tariff heading.15 The fifth criterion is for products included
on a list approved by the Council as being of particular importance and
containing not less than 25 percent value added.
15
Towards an African Common Market for Agricultural Products
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Safeguard provisions
Amongst the core RECs in Africa, COMESA is one that has taken significant
strides in enhancing its regional integration efforts in response to the many
challenges ranging from acute poverty and food insecurity levels to poor rural
infrastructure, droughts, disease and conflicts. The impetus for regional
integration in COMESA began in December 1994 when it was created to
replace the former Preferential Trade Area (PTA). Though COMESA replaced
the PTA in 1994, the PTA framework for tariff liberalization operated until
December 2000.
In 1994, when COMESA replaced the PTA, many of its ongoing trade
facilitation programmes and activities were continued. However, given the
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slow pace in achieving a customs union, COMESA launched an FTA in 2000
with just 9 Members. To date, 13 of its Member States are part of the FTA and
this has expanded trade in the region and created significant opportunities in
all sectors. Examples include cotton yarn exports from Zambia to Mauritius,
replacing imports from Asia and the Far East; tea exports from Kenya to Egypt,
replacing imports from India and Sri Lanka; edible oil exports from Kenya to
Zambia; and sugar imports into Kenya from Malawi, Zambia, Sudan, Egypt,
Madagascar and Swaziland, displacing Brazilian and Argentinean sugar.
The agricultural sector has been the hardest hit from the disease resulting in
labour and the diversion of resources away from agriculture to meet the
regions health needs. The high mobility in agricultural trade particularly along
the region’s transport corridors has accelerated the spread of the disease and
this has negatively affected cross border trading activities resulting in major
trade losses. In response to this epidemic COMESA and its development
partners plan to initiate a programme dubbed Building Corridors of Hope
aimed at behavioural change communication activities.
Summary
COMESA has made fairly good progress towards liberalising trade within its
borders but difficulties remain. Detailed rules have been drawn up covering
most of the areas relevant to establishing a common market in agricultural
products and the plans for a common agricultural policy indicate an awareness
of the importance of the sector to the region’s economies. One issue that the
COMESA process highlights is that of the differing capacities possessed by
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States to undertake liberalisation and reform. The asymmetrical approach
adopted in COMESA provides flexibility to those countries with limited
capacity but undermines the normative nature of treaty obligations.
SADC’s origins date back to April 1980 when the Southern African
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was established following
the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration. The primary aim of the organisation
was not to create an integration arrangement but rather to reduce dependence
on South Africa. Cooperation, rather than the taking on of binding
commitments, was the strategy adopted by the new organization.
In 1992, one year after the adoption of the Abuja Treaty, SADCC was
transformed into the Southern African Development Community following
the adoption of the Declaration and Treaty of SADC at Windhoek,
Namibia140. This Treaty was later amended in August 2001. The SADC trade
agenda is set out in the Protocol on Trade, which was concluded in August
1996 and entered into force on 25 January 2000. Pursuant to the Protocol,
SADC’s aim is to establish a free trade area within eight years of the Protocol’s
entry into force, that is to say, by 2008.
The SADC Trade Protocol was notified to the WTO under Article XXIV in
2004142, and is currently being examined pursuant to the newly established
transparency mechanism. SADC Member States are also currently engaged in
EPA negotiations with the European Union under two configurations: the ESA
– EU EPA configuration and the Southern Africa – EU EPA configuration.
South Africa recently joined the Southern Africa negotiations after having been
an observer in the early stages.
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Underpinning principles
The legal principles underlying SADC that are of relevance to this study are to
be found in both the Treaty itself and the Protocol on Trade. The SADC Treaty
provides, inter alia, that in order to achieve its objectives, SADC will
‘harmonise political and socio-economic policies and plans of Member States’
and ‘develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the
free movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the people of
the Region generally, among Member States’.
Among the objectives of SADC under the Protocol on Trade are the
liberalisation of intra-regional trade in goods and services on the basis of fair,
mutual, equitable and beneficial trade arrangements and the establishment of
a free trade area in the SADC region.
Harmonisation of laws
One of the objectives set out in the SADC Treaty is the harmonisation of
political and socio-economic policies and plans of Member States. ‘Member
States undertake to take all necessary steps to ensure the uniform application
of the Treaty’. The Protocol on Trade provides for the harmonisation of
customs tariff nomenclatures and statistical nomenclatures in conformity with
the Harmonised System, the harmonisation of valuation laws and practice, as
well as the simplification and harmonisation of customs procedures. In
simplifying their customs procedures, Members are to act in accordance with
internationally accepted standards, recommendations and guidelines.
The SADC tariff reduction programme is set out in the SADC Trade Protocol
which, though signed in 1996, only entered into force in 2000. This provides
that the reduction of tariffs and elimination of other barriers to trade is to be
accomplished on a principle of asymmetry within a period of eight years from
the Protocol’s entry into force. The programme provides for the five SACU
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countries to liberalise trade at a faster rate than the other SADC Members. The
programme also provides for the categorisation of the goods to be traded on a
tariff free basis, with category A goods to be liberalised immediately, category
B goods to be subject to gradual liberalisation and category C consisting of
sensitive goods to be liberalised last. Thus by 2008, SADC is due to have
established a free trade area.
Non-tariff barriers
The SADC Protocol on Trade contains an MFN clause that obliges Member
States to accord MFN Treatment to one another. However, Members are
permitted to grant or maintain preferential trade arrangements with third
countries, provided such arrangements do not impede the objectives of the
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Protocol and any advantages granted to third countries are extended to other
Member States.16
Rules of origin
Under Article 9 of the SADC Trade Protocol, Member States are permitted to
adopt or enforce any measures ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health’ provided that such measures are not applied in a manner
constituting a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
Members or a disguised restriction on trade.
Member States are to enter, upon request, into consultation with the
aim of achieving agreements on the recognition of the equivalence of
16
Annex on Rules of Origin, rule 2(1)
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specific sanitary and phytosanitary measures, in accordance with the
WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures.
Safeguard provisions
Trade remedies
Article 24 of the Protocol on Trade provides that ‘Member States are to adopt
their policies and implement measures within the Community for the
protection of Intellectual Property Rights, in accordance with the WTO
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.’
There are therefore no special intra-bloc rules regarding IP and Member
States have undertaken to comply with, and harmonise to, multilateral
standards.
Unlike other RECs, whose RIAs are based on the classic Vinerian
approach, with primary focus being the benefits of regional integration to
derive almost exclusively from a trade angle, SADC, in contrast,
stemming from the economic independence desires and political security
needs of the Front-Line States, has had a development approach to
regional integration. For it, the strongest argument for regionalization has
been hinging on wider issues, with structural weaknesses being regarded
as the critical constraint to intra-regional trade.
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The SADC region produces all the strategic products and like the COMESA
with which it overlaps, maize is the most important food crop as it is the key
staple for the bulk of the SADC population. Agricultural and food production
are mainly driven by South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Madagascar, Congo,
DR (sugar, cassava, maize, vegetables, sweet potatoes, sorghum, rice, cattle);
Mozambique (cassava, sorghum, rice); and Angola (cassava, sweet potatoes).
Mauritius which is outside the mainland is entirely dominated by sugar
production.
Average levels of food dependency for maize, rice and wheat for this region is
over 60 percent. Commercial imports of cereals were around 7 million metric
tonnes during 2003-05, with food aid accounting for about 12 percent of its
total cereal imports. In this region, food aid in maize, rice and wheat all show
a slight decline. Non-cereal food aid is has also declined and this is due largely
by the decline in food aid of milk and vegetable oils. During 2003-05, food aid
in pulses/ legumes account for 10 percent of total pulses imports.
Summary
The SADC trade regime is designed to conform to WTO requirements and its
notification to the WTO under Article XXIV is an indication that its members
are ready to undergo close scrutiny as to their trade liberalisation plans. One
of the main outstanding issues to be resolved regarding SADC is that of
overlapping membership with COMESA and the EAC. Though COMESA and
SADC established a joint Task Force in 2001 to coordinate the programmes and
activities of the two organisations, there is a very real danger that if the two
blocs do not rationalise their membership, then states belong to both blocs
could be faced with conflicting obligations.
Underpinning principles
Among the aims and objectives of the Member States of ECOWAS are
promoting co-operation and integration, and maintaining and enhancing
economic stability. In pursuing these objectives, Members affirm their
adherence to a number of principles including inter-state co-operation,
harmonisation of policies, integration of programmes and recognition and
observance of the rules and principles of the Community. Regarding the wider
continental integration scheme, Members undertake to facilitate the co-
ordination and harmonisation of the policies and programmes of the
Community with those of the AEC. The ECOWAS Treaty also permits the
Community to enter into co-operation agreements with other regional
Communities in the context of achieving its regional objectives.
Harmonisation of laws
Provisions regarding the harmonisation of laws and policies are spread over a
number of sections in the ECOWAS Treaty. These include Articles 3 and 4
which set out the Aims and Objectives and Fundamental Principles of the
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Member States, respectively. Article 5 wherein Member States undertake to
create favourable conditions for the attainment of the objectives of the
Community and to take all necessary measures to ensure the required
enactment of legislation for the implementation of Treaty provisions is also
relevant. With regard to agriculture, Article 25 specifically provides that
Members States shall co-operate in the harmonisation of food security policies
paying particular attention to the conclusion of agreements on food security at
the regional level.
In order to achieve the aim of establishing a Common Market, Article 3(2) of the
ECOWAS Treaty provides that Members are to abolish, by stages, customs
duties levied on imports and exports among Members. This obligation is
further elaborated in Article 35 of the Treaty, which contains an obligation on
the part of the Members to progressively establish in the course of 10 years
from 1 January, 1990, a customs union among the Members. Article 36 then
provides for the reduction and ultimate elimination of customs duties and
other charges of equivalent effect on goods eligible for Community tariff
treatment. With regard to external trade, Article 37 provides for the gradual
establishment of a common external tariff on all goods imported into the
Community from third countries.
Most-favoured-nation principle
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Trade in agriculture
Rules of origin
With regard to the goods that are eligible for preferential treatment, Article 38
provides, inter alia, that ‘goods shall be accepted as eligible for Community
tariff treatment if they have been consigned to the territory of the importing
Member States from the territory of another Member State and originate from
the Community.’ The Article goes on to provide that the rules governing
products originating from the Community shall be contained in the relevant
Protocols and Decisions of the Community.
Trade remedies
Article 42 of the ECOWAS Treaty defines and prohibits the practice of dumping
within the Community. It defines dumping as meaning ‘the transfer of goods
originating in a Member State to another Member State for sale:
a. at a price lower than the comparable price charged for similar goods in
the Member States where such goods originate (due allowance being
made for the differences in the conditions of sale or in taxation or for
any other factors affecting the comparability of prices); and
Transport
17 Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo
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of economic integration: free trade area, customs union and common market.
The WAEMU adopted a CET in 1998 and revised it 2000.
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involving the complete elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers by the
end of the 1999. Under the scheme goods eligible for duty free status
consist of raw materials, traditional handcrafts and industrial goods
identified in the TLS agreement.
Within the TLS framework, the establishment an ECOWAS free trade area
was supposed to be followed by the formation of an ECOWAS customs
union within two years, by 2002. However, the introduction of the CET did
not proceed as anticipated and was deferred to 2005 so that the common
external tariffs of ECOWAS and WAEMU could be harmonized.
A key feature of the WAEMU and ECOWAS customs union regime are
every clear and specific safeguards and trade remedy measures, some of
which are based on those used earlier by WAEMU. These measures which
are still not finalised will be made WTO compatible and will form part of
the ECOWAS customs union notification to the WTO. These measures are:
Summary
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6.6 THE COMMUNITY OF SAHEL-SAHARAN STATES (CEN-SAD)
CEN-SAD is the youngest of the RECs, having been established in February
1998 with the adoption of the Treaty establishing the Community of Sahel-
Saharan States. It was subsequently recognised as a REC at the 36th summit of
the OAU held in Lomé in July 2000. Unlike the other RECs, its geographical
spread does not correspond with any of the five geographical regions specified
in the Abuja Treaty. As a result, CEN-SAD’s membership consists of countries
that are already members of other RECs.
The founding Members of CEN-SAD were Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali,
Niger and Sudan. One year later, the Central African Republic and Eritrea
joined the organisation and in 2000, Djibouti, Gambia and Senegal also acceded
to the Treaty. Since then, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea Bissau,
Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo and Tunisia have
joined the bloc, bringing the total membership to 23 States. Though this rapid
expansion has the effect of enlarging the market covered by CEN-SAD, it also
raises serious issues regarding coherence of its policies with those of the RECs
with which it overlaps.
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6.7 THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES (ECCAS)
Background
For a number of years following its formation, ECCAS was dormant due to
financial difficulties and conflict in the Great Lakes region. With regard to EPA
negotiations, the six CEMAC countries together with Sao Tomé and Principe
and (since 2005), the DRC have joined to negotiate together under the CEMAC
– EU EPA configuration.
Underpinning principles
The preamble to the ECCAS Treaty indicates that Member States are, inter alia,
convinced that cooperation fosters accelerated and harmonious economic
development and that they recognise that efforts at sub-regional cooperation
should not conflict with similar efforts being made at a wider level. The aims
of ECCAS as set out in Article 4 include promoting and strengthening
harmonious cooperation in fields including transport and communications,
trade and customs. These aims are further specified as:
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a. the elimination between Member States of customs duties and any
other charges having an equivalent effect levied on imports and
exports;
Harmonisation of laws
Article 5 of the ECCAS Treaty obliges Members to ‘direct their endeavours with
a view to creating favourable conditions for the development of the
Community’ and to refrain from any unilateral actions likely to hinder such
achievement. On the issue of customs administration, the Council is to propose
to the Conference ‘the adoption of a common customs and statistical
nomenclature for all Member States, while Article 37 obliges Members to ‘take
all necessary measures to harmonize and standardize their customs
regulations and procedures’ in accordance with Annex V. With regard to
transport, Article 47(1)(c) obliges Members to progressively harmonize their
transport and communications laws and regulations.
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Non-tariff barriers
Most-favoured-nation principle
Article 35 of the ECCAS Treaty provides, inter alia, that: Member States shall
accord to one another in relation to intra-Community trade the most-favoured-
nation treatment.
The Article further provides that ‘No Member State may conclude with any
third country an agreement whereby the latter would grant such Member
State tariff concessions not granted to the other Member States.’ This would
appear to prohibit any Member State being a member of any other REC in
which the others were not participating. However, it is clear that this
provision was never operationalized in view of the fact that it would have
required countries such as Burundi and Rwanda not to continue with their
memberships of COMESA when it was born out of the Preferential Trade
Area, which they did not do.
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Transport
Article 36 of the ECCAS Treaty provides that Members are to grant freedom
of transit through their territories to goods proceeding to or coming from
another Member State.
Article 47 then sets out the measures to be taken in order ‘to achieve a
harmonious and integrated development of the sub-regional transport and
communications network’. These include:
Status of regional integration and food trade in ECCAS After a long period of
inactivity, the ECCAS is now regarded as one of the pillars of the African
Union’s AEC having signed the protocol on relations between the AEC and the
RECs in October 1999. The ECCAS Member have adopted a scheme for
phasing out tariffs on intra-community trade, known as the ECCAS
Preferential Tariff, together with rules of origin and approval procedures at
the community level, which were supposed to enter into force on 1 July 2004.
Beyond the formation of a free trade area and a customs union by 1998,
CEMAC has taken some initiatives concerning the next phase formation of a
common market—notably, the free movement of persons, the free movement
of capital, and the harmonization and coordination of macroeconomic and
sector policies. As an instrument of the free movement of people within the
community, the CEMAC Passport and the Red Card for motor vehicle were
adopted in 2000. The responsibility for issuing and administering CEMAC
Passports rests with individual member states. The Red Card motor vehicle
insurance was adopted in compliance with the 1996 agreement of introducing
an international insurance card for protection against civil liabilities within
CEMAC.
Summary
One unusual feature of ECCAS is the provision in the MFN Article that
Member States are not to enter into any agreements with third parties if those
third parties do not extend the preferences to the other ECCAS Members.
Though admirable in intent, in the sense that its aim was to ensure that the
REC functioned as one unit, the level of compliance with the provision has
been low and this has partly led to the current situation of overlapping RECs.
The strength of the REC lies in its incorporation of the CEMAC countries who
are able to form a core around which liberalisation measures can proceed.
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At the time of its creation, it was seen as being the first step towards the
eventual unity of all Arab states. The operations of the AMU have been at a
virtual standstill since the last meeting of its highest organ, the Presidential
Council, in 1994.
Treaty provisions
These objectives are further elaborated in Article 3 which provides that the
aims of the organisation include the achievement of industrial, agricultural,
commercial and social development of the Member States. The programme to
be followed in achieving these objectives was not set out implying that these
were seen as details to be worked out at a later stage.
18
AMU Treaty, Article 2
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i. creation of an FTZ by 1992 involving the elimination of administrative
barriers and the introduction of preferential tariffs;
Very little progress has been made in these directions. The AMU has adopted
several agreements: key amongst them - the convention on trade in
agricultural products, which entered into force in July 1993, with the intention
of enhancing food security for the population of the Maghreb has not been
implemented; and the trade and tariffs agreement (March 2001) which
recommended free movement of originating products from the Maghreb and
the application of a single compensatory rate of 17.5 percent on import, was
only applied for a short period of time. Free movement of persons is effective
between three countries - Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.
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Summary
The AMU Member States have undertaken no more than the most general and
unenforceable obligations. No specific steps were spelt out regarding the
strategy to be employed in liberalising intra-regional trade and, it cannot be
considered as having taken any meaningful steps to liberalise intra-regional
trade. Membership of the AMU should not, as a result, prevent its members
from active participation in the liberalisation programmes of any other blocs
to which its members may belong. This presents a problem with regard to the
position of Algeria, which is not a member of any other REC and, in the event
that it does not join any other REC, it would need to decide how it would go
about liberalising agricultural trade. However, the existence of several regional
projects centred on the interconnection of road and rail networks gives hope
to enhanced trade and integration within the AMU countries.
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