A STUDY ON THE HUMANITARIAN AND

DEVELOPMENT POLICY OF MALAYSIAN

ISLAMIC FAITH-BASED ORGANISATIONS
(MFBOS) IN GAZA, PALESTINE

FEROOZE ALI BIN AHSAD AHMAD @ AZHAR

ALI

UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA

2021
 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The concept “fragile states” is often used within the context of international aid

and development to describe countries or regions facing development challenges

associated with either ongoing or post-conflict situations. Several functional

definitions are used to rationalise this phenomenon.

The World Bank observes such states as “sharing a common fragility in two

particular respects, i.e., state policies and institutions” (Grono, 2010). Such dilemmas

make affected countries vulnerable in their capacity to deliver services to their citizens,

control corruption or provide for sufficient voice and accountability. They face risks

of conflict and political instability. The working definition of the UK Department for

International Development (DfID) on fragile and conflict-affected states includes

countries where the government cannot or will not deliver core state functions such as

providing security and justice across the territory and basic services to the majority of

its people (ICAI, 2011).

While literature from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development (OECD) characterised fragile states as states that are weak in governance

and vulnerable to conflict as well as having differentiated constraints and opportunities

in situations where there are also (1) prolonged crisis or impasse, (2) post-conflict or

political transition, (3) gradual improvement and (4) deteriorating governance.

Despite having more than one definition for this concept, all analyses pointed

to some form of critical states or failures of a government in mobilising its basic

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functions. However, this study also proposed that different definitions provide

contextualisation on the different dilemmas that may exists within fragile states

themselves. Understanding this aspect may help policymakers to identify issues and

adapt relevant aid practices.

The OECD, for example, provided the key suggestions in engaging with fragile

states from different levels through the Fragile State Principles (FSPs). Some of the

FSPs involve approaches like (1) taking the local context as a starting point, (2) doing

no harm, (3) aligning with local priorities in different ways in different contexts and

(4) avoiding pockets of exclusion within each context (OECD, 2011).

In essence, these principles are meant for international donors, especially

OECD members involved in development cooperation and peace and state-building

efforts in regions deemed fragile. The underpinning aim for such policy suggestions is

for members to maximise the positive impact and minimise any unintended negative

effects of their international aid mechanism.

1.1.1 Assessing International Aid Policy in the Fragile State of Gaza

This research narrows its discussion of international aid policy within the

context of Gaza as a fragile state. For the purpose of this research, Qarmout’s specific

research in Gaza is useful for two reasons. First, is his unique use of the FSP

framework to analyse Western donors in the region. The second aspect is in his

analytical assessment on the differences that exists between Western and Islamic based

donors.

In the first fieldwork, Qarmout analysed the extent to which the FSPs of the

OECD affected the preferences and actions of donors in providing aid. From reviews

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on literatures, Qarmout can be argued to be the principal researcher that utilised the

FSP framework to analyse Western donors specifically in Gaza. Qarmout posited that

compliances on FSPs should, in principle, be expected from Western donors, given

their status as members of the OECD. In analysing the assumption, Qarmout studied

the compliance of donors based on the four FSPs mentioned earlier: (1) the need to

take the local context as the starting point for aid planning; (2) doing no harm through

aid distribution; (3) aligning of aid policy with local priorities; (4) avoiding pockets of

exclusion in aid provision.

There were at least three critical observations made by Qarmout (2017)

especially through dissecting donors such as the United States (US), European Union

(EU) and other European countries under the lens of the FSPs. First, Qarmout noted

that major donors from this sector provide aid delivery strictly under the strict No-

Contact Policy (NCP) in Gaza. The Quartet (European Union [EU], United Nations

[UN], US and Russia) proposed NCP as a political condition aiming at halting any

communication and cooperation with Hamas Government and its affiliated grass-root

machinery. Under this specific rule, aid from Western donors is provided only to the

Fatah-based Palestinian Authority (PA) or grass-roots organisations perceived to be

neutral.

Sidelining the Hamas Government under the NCP protocol has created a few

issues in aid coordination. Data accessibility is an example. Since information such as

statistics on Gazan aid needs is documented in the respective Hamas Ministries, the

enforcement of NCP makes this form of data inaccessible to Western officials. Hence,

needed data is usually gained through third-party intervention.

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 Concerning the above, Western donors’ officials are also disempowered from

seeking contact with Hamas government officials to discuss the type of aid that may

suit the fragile condition in Gaza. Qarmout remarked this detached form of

communication and coordination leads to the emergence of projects that are at times

duplicated. In other circumstances, projects funded were also not parallel with the local

context. During fieldwork, a representative from the Gaza’s Ministry of Interior

commented how donors’ plans did not identify or respond to true community needs as

highlighted by government ministries. A participant from the Ministry of Public Works

mentioned Western-funded donors once refuse to re-construct houses according to the

criteria set by the Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs. While another government

participant in Qarmout’s fieldwork commented that agriculture projects funded by

USAID usually deviate from the local priorities.

Beland and Qarmout (2012) articulated the NCP policy limits any window of

opportunity that Western donors could have in interacting with key parties for

humanitarian and development projects. This includes Hamas government agencies

that holds the local knowledge and administrative veto in Gaza. From a different angle,

since the NCP pushes for aid delivery to be channelled exclusively to Fatah – this

aspect in one way or other intensified the ongoing factional schism between Hamas

and Fatah. Qarmout commented the overall phenomenon creates social and economic

exclusion, apart from causing further harm to Gaza’s political fabric.

The second observation made by Qarmout centres on the tendency of Western

donors to provide short-term and immediate humanitarian needs as opposed to aid with

a robust developmental component. He reported this approach caused aid dependency

instead of empowering Palestinians to rebuild their economy and society through long-

term development projects (Ibid, 119). In this context, Western donors are known for

4
providing short-term aid assistance through the use of projects grants. Challand (2008)

commented that the grant modality is often conditioned on a short-term basis. To him,

this scenario implies the lack of flexibility and capacity to anticipate the financial needs

of the recipients living in a fragile context.

The third problem identified revolves around the interaction between Western

donors and Gazan local non-governmental stakeholders, with which the former chose

to work. Grass-roots NGOs stated that their discussion experience with certain donors

was usually democratic initially but became questionable towards the end. This is

specifically referring to the extent to which local inputs are taken into the final policy

execution. In different contexts, grassroots recipients highlighted the strict conditions

stipulated upon receiving assistance from USAID. In the case of the Agricultural

Development Association (ADA), Qarmout reported this organisation was restricted

from interacting with Hamas and its affiliated bodies for agriculture-related projects

upon signing the contract with USAID. Similar argument was made by IRADA’s

respondent. The organisation specialises in rehabilitative education. The respondent

narrated USAID tendency of insisting its agendas and objectives for rehabilitation

education projects over IRADA’s proposal.

Qarmout stated that the three aforementioned practices were collectively in

conflict with the FSPs of the OECD. Therefore, Qarmout’s findings concluded these

principles did not have a bearing on some policies of the Western state-based donors.

Most actors of concern are also members of the OECD.

The second phase of Qarmout’s fieldwork revolved on the key varying factors

between Islamic donors and Western donors in such fragile settings. Here, Qarmout

5
dissected the potential primary distinctions in terms of agendas and aid conditionality

between the two groups of funders.

In this specific study, the government participants in Qarmout’s research

singled out institutions such as Islamic Development Bank or countries like Malaysia,

Turkey and Qatar as some key actors working in the region. Field data obtained on

Islamic based donors contrasted those of Western based on few aspects. Participants

argued Islamic donors are generally more open towards assisting the Gaza

Government and Hamas-affiliated grassroots organisations in aid projects. They

reasoned this outcome to Islamic donors lack of compliance towards NCP which in-

turn allows them to interact actively with different stakeholders in Gaza.

Through his research, Qarmout similarly discovered that Islamic and Western

donors utilised different path to identify and finance projects. A key example revolves

around conditionality. Arab and Islamic donors applied no conditions during the

selection of program beneficiaries and the procurement of materials. Islamic donors

also funded long-term development projects as opposed to Western donors which, as

mentioned earlier, focused more on immediate humanitarian and relief projects. It was

also observed that Arab and Islamic donors provided more control and authority to

their partners on the ground. The interviewed participants perceived that Islamic

donors gave more trust and empowerment to them in the day-to-day planning and

implementing aid work in Gaza.

In this framework of discussion, we should note observers other than Qarmout

have similarly noted the different humanitarian paths taken by Arab or Islamic donors.

From his study, Villanger stated that Arab or Islamic donors allow their recipients to

choose their development path and not be obstructed by what he argued as seemingly

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“imperialist” ideas from donor countries. In this discussion, Villanger added Arab

donors have a long history of policy dialogue with recipient countries (Villanger,

2007). In one way or other we could likely trace these approaches to the mindset of

giving out in an unhindered and generous manner. This aspect is a cornerstone of the

Muslim faith (Lacey & Benthall, 2014)

Challand commented on the aid policy of international Islamic donors and the

bottom-line impact it produces. In this framework, he mentioned how Islamic donors

recipients in Palestine generally are provided with more autonomy on the ground. This

aspect grants Palestinian Islamic NGOs flexibility, especially in deciding the best

approach in adapting aid with local needs. These NGOs tap into local knowledge,

networks, and resources to tailor assistance, often more efficiently and quickly

(Challand, 2008).

Given all the preceding discussions, the question asked is, what could be the

underpinning reasons to Islamic donors’ differentiated path in providing humanitarian

and development aid? In this specific discourse, Qarmout narrowed the flexibility,

cooperative nature and less strict approach of Islamic donors down to two factors. First

is the inability of Arab or Islamic donors to protect Palestinians through their political

influence to end the occupation of Israel. Second is their sympathetic position on the

overall Palestinian cause.

1.2 Problem Statement

There are three critical dimensions concerning Islamic donors in Gaza that

should be explored. First is Qarmout’s specific arguments concerning the

differentiated Islamic approaches in the sector. The second aspect centres on the scope

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of FSP use by Qarmout in the region. The third aspect revolves around the non-state

Islamic donor in Gaza that have largely being side-lined by general literature.

As mentioned earlier, Qarmout’s debate on Islamic donors’ approach in Gaza

revolves mainly around the latter’s weak political influence and their sympathetic

position towards the Palestinian issues. While this could be a plausible argument, it

may not explain the deeper dimension of the Muslim donor sector that would, in most

instances, adopt the unique Islamic donorship approach. The puzzle here is to

understand whether the policy of Islamic donors, which is often influenced by the

sense of Islamic altruism and Islamic financing modality - could play a role?

Arguably, the impulse towards Islamic altruism is driven by the various

abstract values which the religion of Islam itself has as principles. Values provide the

moral compass to Muslim do-gooders. In most instances, Islamic altruistic values

encourages a recipient centred assistance. Take for example, the value of Al-

Dharuriyyat, which if translated means ‘critical things needed in life when certain life

threatening situation occurs’. Notwithstanding its lengthy interpretation, this value

provides the critical impulse for Muslim donors to act fast in providing unconditional

help to recipients facing life threatening scenarios. Ikhlas or sincerity especially in the

act of giving is also key. In this sense, there should not be any ulterior motives. Using

this specific framework, the approach of providing recipients with aid however with

attached political or economic conditions is not allowed within precepts of Islam.

Other values associated with the realm of human interaction such as Rahmatan Lil

Alamin (mercy to all mankind and animals), Ukhuwah (strong ties with fellow

Muslims), Ummah (a group of people with a similar faith and spiritual

objectives), Amanah (exhibiting trustworthiness tendencies) or the notion of Huquq

8
Al-Insan (enacting human rights of the oppressed) and Al-Adl (seeking or acting just

way) can equally be paired within the broader idea of Islamic giving.

There is also the concept of Islamic aid financing modality, which gravitates

mainly around the use of Sadaqah Jariyah (general charity), Zakat (Islamic tithe)

and Wakaf (Islamic endowment). Sadaqah for instance prohibits the inclusion of

complex conditions that may burden any needy recipients. While, the financing

modality of both Zakat and Waqaf focuses on the needs of the very deprived within

any community.

That said, the unrequited problem lies in determining whether the seemingly

laissez-faire policies by Islamic donors as identified by Qarmout and Challand could

be attributed to some form of the institutionalised aspect of Islamic altruism or Islamic

aid financing modalities? Any specific finding of this research could add further depth

to observation made by scholars on Islamic donors in Gaza.

The second issue pertains to the analysis of Western donors based on the FSPs

of the OECD by Qarmout. As we have understood earlier, the analysis showed that

Western donors adhered less towards the four FSPs of the OECD, which among others

stress (1) taking local context as the starting point for aid planning, (2) doing no harm

through aid distribution, (3) aligning of aid policy with local priorities and (4) avoiding

pockets of exclusion in aid provision.

This research believed a similar analysis should be conducted on Islamic

donors since they are equally an aid player in Gaza’s fragile landscape. This academic

exercise serves two functions. Primarily, it will give us the chance to contrast the level

of adherence towards FSPs between Islamic and Western-based donors. Second, any

9
outcome from this study may facilitate us in understanding the performance of the

Muslim aid sector within Gaza’s fragile context.

The third issue centres on non-state Islamic donors involvement in Gaza. This

sector has gone largely under the academic radar, over the years. This is despite an

emerging trend of such Islamic non-state actors especially from Qatar, Turkey and

Malaysia. Organisations such as IHH or Insani Yardım Vakfı which is an Islamic NGO

from Turkey, Qatar Charity (Qatar), and Aman Palestin (AP) from Malaysia are some

of the key organisations worth mentioning here. These organisations generally have

their local branches in Gaza manned independently by Palestinians. From the

researcher’s observation, aid from these donors covers the economic, social and public

sectors. Thus, it is the argument of this thesis that, a critical need exists to emphasise

the afore-mentioned sector as the sample for this explorative research.

1.3 Research Questions

To dissect the research problems, below are the three explorative questions

broached on this subject.

1. What is the potential institutionalisation of Islamic financing modalities

and altruistic-based religious values by Islamic donors in their aid

policy?

2. How does institutionalisation of such values and modalities shape the

humanitarian and development policies of Islamic based donors

towards aid recipients in Gaza?

3. To what extent the policies of Islamic based donors towards Gaza aid

recipients comply with the FSPs framework of the OECD?

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1.4 Research Objectives

1. For research question 1, the main objective is to explore the potential

institutionalisation of (1) Islamic financing modalities and (2)

altruistic-based Islamic values of a selected non-state Islamic donor

sector in Gaza. This aspect will be explored in this sector’s socio-

economic and public sector aid related projects;

2. The research objective in Question 2 aims at analysing the impact of

such institutionalisation in shaping the aid policy of a selected non-state

Islamic donor sector towards Palestinian recipients in Gaza throughout

socio-economic and public sector projects;

3. In research question 3, the objective is to analyse aid policies of a

selected non-state Islamic donor on the four FSPs, which emphasise (1)

taking local context as the starting point for aid planning, (2) doing no

harm through aid distribution, (3) aligning of aid policy with local

priorities, and (4) avoiding pockets of exclusion in aid provision. Any

outcomes from this research will be dissected to understand the

functionality of Islamic based aid in a fragile state situation.

1.5 Focus of the Study

In filling up the academic gap, this research identified and selected Malaysian

Islamic donors in Gaza as the sector to be researched. All Malaysian Islamic donors in

Gaza are NGOs and therefore are non-state actors. For theoretical purpose, the

researcher categorises all Malaysian Islamic donors in Gaza as Malaysian Islamic

Faith-Based Organisations (MFBO). The selected MFBOs for this study is Islamic

11
Relief Malaysia (IRM), Muslim Care (MC), Majlis Perundingan Pertubuhan Islam

Malaysia or Malaysian Consultative Council for Islamic Organization (MAPIM),

Cakna Palestin (CP), Malaysian Care (MyCare), Haluan (HL) and Aman Palestin

(AP).

Research is done on the afore-mentioned organisations involvement in both

Gaza’s socio-economic and public related projects. The study on this specific sector is

undertaken for three reasons. First, most MFBOs selected have been involved in

Gaza’s humanitarian and development assistance for more than a decade. Such

duration indicates their deep experience and insights into the region’s humanitarian

and developmental needs. Second, aid from this sector is rendered largely through the

nuances of Islamic beliefs and solidarity. Leaders and members of the sector are

generally well informed in the culture and practice of Islam. Varying aspects, as

highlighted, allow for relevant inputs to be collected and analysed for the purpose of

achieving previously stated research’s objectives. The third reason is due to the

researcher’s own engagement as a professional activist in the MFBO sector. Such

direct involvement allowed him the emic perspective on the functioning of this sector

in Gaza.

Given the above, chapter 4 explored how the religious element plays a role in

these MFBOs’ humanitarian and development projects within the remit of the socio-

economic and public sector. In Chapter 5, specific focus is given to understand these

MFBOs policies in relation to OECD FSPs framework. In this context, I have selected

the agricultural and education sectors for further exploration under the framework.

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1.6 Significance of the Study

This PhD study which focused on the engagement of MFBOs in Gaza has two

significance.

First, given that this was an exploratory research, the building block of this

research can be used for future studies on the donors of other existing Islamic Faith-

Based organisations in Gaza, including those from countries such as Turkey, Qatar and

Indonesia. Future studies can contribute to the understanding if Islamic Faith Based

Organisation engaging in Humanitarian and Development assistance could be an

alternative system for aid provision that not only focuses on assistance delivery - but

presents a systemic culture capable of being sensitive, democratic and flexible to the

Gazan fragile political, social and economic needs.

Second, this research is also significant to the Malaysian local context. This

research aimed to uncover the insights pertinently on the impact of the humanitarian

and development works of MFBOs as well as the strength, potential and weakness of

MFBOs. That said, this research is useful as a reference in formulating policies that

are helpful in solving the anticipated issues.

1.7 Organisation of the Study

The preliminary information and literature about aid in the fragile state of Gaza

have been discussed in Chapter 1. Also, the problem statement, research objectives,

research questions, the focus of the study and the significance of the study are

presented.

Chapter 2 dissects deeper into the literature related to the topic of this research.

The initial reviews, however, begin with a broad discussion on international aid in the

13
oPt. The chapter narrows into the issues of aid in fragile state of Gaza. Discussion will

include the emergence of Islamic based donors in the region. These discourses will be

followed by the conceptual and theoretical framework.

Chapter 3 explains the overall methodology used to achieve the three different

objectives highlighted earlier in this research. For the record, a qualitative strategy is

adopted. Also discussed in this chapter are the procedure of data collection, data

analysis and aspects of research trustworthiness.

Then, Chapters 4 and 5 present a wide-ranging analysis and discuss the

collected data on socio-economic and public sector related research. The discussion in

these chapters predicts the emerging patterns based on the analysis of the data and the

theoretical framework. These two chapters answer the three (3) research questions

presented earlier.

Chapter 6 focuses on the implications, recommendations and conclusion of this

study. For this thesis, Chapter 6 elaborates the implications from the theoretical and

policy perspective, especially on the overall research done on the MFBO sector. The

researcher also included viewpoints obtained from Tun Dr. Mahathir (through private

communication) in this chapter. Finally, this chapter also illustrated the research

limitations and suggestions for future studies.

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 CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Through a thematic approach, the literature review was carried out to examine

the general discourse on international aid. This chapter then narrows into analysing the

various aid practices between Western/international donors and local Palestinian Non-

Governmental Organisation (PNGO) that receives aid. Literatures on Islamic

donorship within the context of Gaza as a fragile state are introduced and dissected to

understand both its relevance and potential gap. From thereon, the conceptual and

theoretical frameworks are discussed to address the overall research puzzle.

2.2 International Aid: Understanding the Application and Impact

International or foreign aid is defined as the assistance (immediate

humanitarian or development assistance) to a recipient country or its population. It can

involve the transfer of capital, goods or services from a country or international

organisation to the recipients (Williams, 2021). Lancaster (2007) provided an

expanded explanation on this notion. She argued foreign aid as a “voluntary transfer

of public resources from a government to another independent government, to an NGO

or an international organisation, with at least 25% grant element”.

Generally, aid is rendered with the objectives of alleviating poverty, providing

social services, disaster relief, developing civil society, or advocacy. According to

Financial Tracking Service, a website run by the UN Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the five main donors in the world as of February 2021

15
are the EU, Germany, United Kingdom, Canada and the US (FTS, 2021). There are a

few examples to elaborate on donors from this sector as follows.

In Afghanistan, USAID launched a five-year agricultural program (2016 to

2021) that aims at fostering the expansion of sustainable agriculture-led economic

growth in eastern Afghanistan. A total of USD28 million is provided to the provinces

of Nangarhar, Logar, Laghman, Kapisa, Parwan, Wardak, Ghazni and Kabul to engage

in the project. USAID also cooperates closely with the Afghan Government in

launching 88 public-private partnerships, which cover sectors like construction, food

processing, consumer goods manufacturing, insurance, natural resource extraction,

apparel, communications/media and information technology (USAID, n.d).

Meanwhile, the EU, under its 2014 bilateral cooperation, allocated EUR688

million (USD900 million) to support Myanmar. The fundamental objective of the

allocation was to improve and support the initiative in food security, education,

governance, the rule of law and peacebuilding. Besides, the EU also engages actively

with 150 other countries ranging from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe in providing aid for

development and humanitarian purposes (OCHA, 2014).

In 2014, the DfID awarded the SNV Netherlands Development Organisation

USD32 million to engage in sustainable sanitation and hygiene projects across Nepal,

Bhutan, Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. The objectives of the projects were to assist the

preparation of district sanitation plans and improve the capacity of local governments

for steering improved sanitation (SNV Netherlands Development Organisation, 2014).

Apart from the individual states and intergovernmental organisations, major

and well-established Western NGOs have been equally instrumental in complementing

aid help. In West Africa, Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM) has engaged

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with Fahamu Pan African Fellowship and West Africa Civil Society Institute to

encourage the positive development of civil society. Ford Foundation, on the other

hand, has engaged in various socio-economic assistances in the Eastern Africa region

pertinently in agriculture for the past 50 years (Ford Foundation, 2012). Western

donors have been at the forefront in improving lives and the socio-economic level of

the population in the southern region. The origin for such motivation however can be

traced to the post-Second World War period, where aid was primarily linked to

development to stop the spreading of communism (Challand, 2008). In the 1960s, such

effort was further galvanized when Robert McNamara became the head of the World

Bank. He intensified the idea of donor-funded programs to meet the basic needs in

health, education, water and sanitation (Phillips, 2013).

The contemporary practices of international donorship are not without in-depth

discussion. Over the decade, various opinions on Western donors emerged because of

aid provision and the mixed impact it had on the poorest around the world (Phillips,

2013).

One of the critical discussions revolve around the use of terms and conditions.

In this context, Rauh (2010) highlighted three general impacts of how aid

conditionality commonly shapes the relationship between donors and recipients. The

three impacts are power relations, the flow of accountability and the

professionalisation & report culture. Below are brief explanations of these aspects.

2.2.1 Power Relations

The total dependency of recipients on international donor resources (money for

project financing) may lead to an unequal or asymmetrical relation. The donor in this

17
instance could set pro-donor conditionalities. Pre-determined aid programs without

consultations is one example. Here, recipients are in a passive role, only accepting and

implementing programs deemed suitable by a donor.

Rauh (2010) argued that the abovementioned approach is not workable since

Western donors often mould the program objectives in a different context.

Implementation of such aid is, in turn, problematic since it may not be in parallel with

the needs of the local population. In addition to this debate, donors may also choose

the programs that are likely to be “seen as successful” rather than addressing the root

of the problem (Lindenberg, 2001).

2.2.2 The flow of Accountability

Karen categorised recipient accountability into upward and downward

accountabilities. Upward accountability is defined as the general commitment towards

donors, trustees and host governments, and is usually arisen from conditions stipulated

by donors.

While downward accountability involves the commitment towards

constituencies and grass-roots members. Issues arise when a recipient becomes overly

stretched to maintain a certain level of pro-activeness or legitimacy towards donors,

trustees and host government to secure uninterrupted financial help. Defining it as

“extreme upward accountability”, Rauh argued that this scenario happens at the

expense of recipient NGO reducing their downward accountability to the principal

community they are serving.

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2.2.3 Professionalisation and Report Culture

Most Southern NGOs (SNGOs) started as small and informal grass-roots

organisations helping their community. Hence, the staff of SNGOs may be marginally

educated based on the Western standards for professionalism. However, over time,

their interaction with Western donors becomes a natural pressure for SNGOs to

professionalise. Various factors that can be conceived as the ways towards

professionalisation include the conditions to adopt the latest technology, specific

proposal drafting techniques and learning new approaches for project evaluation.

In this context, professionalisation may be an impediment based upon two

situations. First, when a recipient organisation is compelled to channel their time and

energy to learn a new methodology. Second, when the new working standards abrupt

the older method which has been proven effective. In a different scenario, some

conditionalities require additional organisation layers for diversity, accountability,

corporate governance or the participation of stakeholders. Additional layers

complicates the bureaucratic structure and the whole organisational process.

According to Rauh (2010), a complicated bureaucratic structure sacrifices efficiency

as compared to the time when recipients were interacting with the community that they

are serving through a much leaner organisational approach.

2.2.4 Summary

Aid conditions by their virtue should not be dismissed entirely as it provides

forms of governance and accountability in using donations. Also, it ensures that

information is communicated to donors in a timely manner in different circumstances.

Effective communication is crucial as related updates or reports can be critical for

evaluation and planning for future aid.

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 However, the few examples provided by Rauh also highlighted the common

irregularities pertaining to international aid, especially when conditions are

asymmetric. This scenario is further compounded if there is a wealth gap. The power

of the purse, which advance Western donors have, stands in contrast to the relatively

poor and dependent southern recipients.

More often than less, this phenomenon leads to the willingness of recipients to

accept aid with any conditionalities, even if the conditionalities may disempower the

recipients in the long run. The next section explores some of the similar arguments

made within the context of the oPt.

2.3 International Aid Within the Context of the Fragile Palestinian Territories

One of the key areas in the donor study in the oPt revolves around the

interaction between international donors and PNGO aid recipients. This study is

critical for two reasons. First, the oPt is a region that receives an extensive amount of

aid. From the signing of the Declaration of Principles in Oslo on 13 September 1993

to 2011, major international donors have collectively contributed nearly USD22.7

billion in aid to the oPt. Second, PNGOs receive not only aid but also the different

terms and conditions attached to aid. Arguable aid-based conditions have been the

common features in the region for the past 15 years (More, 2008). Early concerns

revolve around the impact of the conditionalities from Western donors on the broader

Palestinian civil society movement within their fragile political, development and

economic context.

Rema Hammami led the discourse in 1995 in which she articulated the

influence of foreign funding and the mass mobilisation politics of the left (Hammami,

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1995). Hammami stated that international donors, specifically those from the West,

played a significant role in introducing aid conditionalities after the Oslo Agreement

in 1993, and this approach stood in contrast to the funding received during the First

Intifada (uprising). During the First Intifada from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, aid

was rendered largely in solidarity towards the Palestinian cause, with fewer conditions

stipulated. Such ecology encouraged the relative flexibility in using aid to suit the

context of the Palestinian political struggle. It was easier to fund political movements

against the occupation of Israel by then.

That said, the scenario was different after Oslo Agreement was signed. Western

donors and their conditionalities required recipients to avoid politics and focus on

narrow professionally defined developmental works. Formal methods of aid

distribution, organisational hierarchies and specific aid priorities have replaced the

voluntary and organic work relations (Hammami, 1995).

This has resulted in the transformation of leftist PNGOs from a broad-based

grass-roots movement engaging in voluntary works into professional organisations

with a politically neutral mindset that operates this sector with an arm length distance

from their constituencies. Hammami (1995) opined that the aid modalities of Western

donors with conditions restrict PNGOs from interacting with their respective

constituencies on political terms. Overall, this factor affected the ability of leftist

PNGOs to mobilise Palestinians towards some forms of political movements in

realising their independence.

Tamer Qarmout (2017) dissected the involvement of international donors

within the context of Gaza. The centrality of Qarmout’s study was on donor conditions

and the way it narrows recipients capacity to coordinate with the governing structure

21
in Gaza. Qarmout argued that the No Contact Policy (NCP) position adopted by the

Quartet (EU, UN, US and Russia) effectively bars Western-funded PNGOs from

directly coordinating with or to fund projects related to Hamas’s led Government.

Instead, PNGOs were redirected to work with the selected project implementers

approved by the Quartet including Fatah officials and affiliated NGOs. On a side-note,

side-lining Hamas can be observed from a power relations perspective. It is a strategic

move by the Quartet, mainly driven by the United States to weaken Hamas as the veto

player in Gaza. The aim is about shifting the power dynamics from Hamas to Fatah

which is seen to be more receptive towards Israel.

The outcome from the overall approach has been less than sustainable. Given

Hamas holds the administrative authority in the region, side-lining this group created

a few coordinating issues. Qarmout documented there were issues on duplicated

projects or programmes that were not in parallel with the needs of the locals.

Other researchers such as Challand (2008) focused on the use of grant

financing from USAID. According to Challand (2008), a grant is often conditioned on

a short-term basis. This aspect implies the lack of flexibility and capacity in grant

modality to anticipate in advance the financial needs of the recipients living in a fragile

context. Grant may also come with political conditions, which is observed in most of

the USAID completed projects in the oPt. In early 2018, seven sectors involving

agribusiness, information and communications technology, tourism, fish rearing, stone

and marble, textile, and furniture were selected for grant assistance. However, the grant

aid was short-lived. The Trump administration ceased all related grants in January

2019 when Palestinian President Abbas declined to participate in the US-sponsored

“Deal of the Century” peace process (Al-Jazeera News Middle East, 2019). Funding

22
to all the projects in these sectors was affected, with 85% of the USAID employees

laid off (Staff, 2019).

Hanafi and Tabar (2005) performed an in-depth study on conditionalities and

the way it shapes the donor-recipient interaction in the oPt. The study highlighted three

broad contexts that determine how aid is managed through conditions. Specifically,

these involve aid eligibility, negotiation and distribution.

2.3.1 Aid Eligibility

Hanafi and Tabar (2005) isolated the three commonly used conditions by

Western donors in selecting the right recipients. In no particular order, these include

(1) political eligibility, (2) sectoral eligibility and (3) professional eligibility.

In terms of political eligibility, the priority is given to working with partners

that support the Oslo Peace Process. This criterion also restricts the type of actors that

is eligible to receive funding. For example, the Canadian International Development

Agency (CIDA) restricts its funding to Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. Other

international donors were also known to have disqualified organisations such as the

Union of Healthcare Committees because of its unclear position in the Oslo Peace

Process.

The US operationalises conditionality through its Partner Vetting System. This

system is used to screen for neutral recipients especially sectors having a neutral

position towards Israel or United States. This process is initiated before planning

efforts begins. In Gaza, this also means the system ensures only Fatah and neutral

NGOs have the chance to interact with USAID Gaza agents. In this context, the Israeli

23
military has also been trying to ensure that this rule is observed through its Coordinator

of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) governance in Gaza.

As for sectoral eligibility, this refers to the pre-defined conditions in terms of

project of interest, which is attached to the aid from Western donors. For instance,

Heinrich Boll Stiftung, an organisation affiliated with the German Green Party,

identified violence against women and informal education as two of its sectoral

priorities. Ford Foundation (2012) singled out broad thematic areas involving

institution building for educational-cultural and research centres for reproductive

health, public health and human rights. As for Oxfam-Quebec, the target was on

women (micro-credit programs and empowerment by advocacy).

Third, professional eligibility deals with requirements stipulating cooperation

with competent partners for projects. For instance, USAID requires all of its affiliated

PNGOs to undergo an internal audit to ensure the recipient organisations meet its

international standard. In this framework, organisations that meet certain

professionalism benchmarks are perceived as accountable and trustworthy.

2.3.2 Aid Negotiation and Distribution

The focus is on the factors that influence the negotiation for aid as well as the

distribution and evaluation of aid in Palestine. Three arguments are articulated, which

pertain to (1) the process of competition, (2) structural disparity and (3) reporting

mechanism.

Conditions That Require the Process of Competition

Under this condition, Western donors will determine the sector for intervention

and PNGOs must compete among themselves to receive the funding. According to

24
Hanafi and Tabar (2005), this modality limits the opportunity for negotiation between

donors and recipients in determining the areas deemed requiring assistance. Instead

this approach opens the possibility where donors may stipulate policies parallel with

its interest.

Negotiation and Structural Disparity

Another issue to consider within the realm of interaction is the existence of

power relations or structural disparity between donors and recipients. It was already

known that the action of giving aid from a donor to a recipient exhibited an

asymmetrical relationship. To Hanafi and Tabar (2005), however, this situation is

exacerbated in the oPt region as there is a feeble ability amongst PNGOs to organise

and coordinate the negotiation process, collectively.

Reporting Mechanism

Conditions for different monitoring and evaluation systems is also part of the

approach of Western donors in managing their funded projects. The role of the

“techno-bureaucrat” in performing international development advisory and evaluation

services in the oPt have been studied. Hanafi and Tabar (2005) reported how experts

in this field were largely constrained in evaluating the “most efficient means” to

achieve pre-defined goals. More critically, given their background (largely expertise

in modern evaluation methods over appreciation of local knowledge), this group of

experts marginalises indigenous knowledge and feedback.

Hanafi and Tabar further examined other variances of the evaluation method

and described how projects were examined inside a narrow “project box” through the

expenditure record. Here, accountability and evaluation remained upwardly oriented.

25
This form of “micro managing” on expenditure accountability (top-down) had led to

the disempowerment of PNGOs in deciding and representing critical societal interests

in a more financially democratic manner.

Another factor to consider is the linking between evaluation outcome and the

funding or defunding decision. As argued by Hanafi and Tabar (2005), the use of this

evaluation approach may come at the cost of side-lining the aspect of learning from

experiences, including failures. Recipients faces the prospect of defunding if they are

unable to achieve certain standards. Hanafi and Tabar argued this scenario is further

compounded by the unwillingness of certain donors to share their insights or

observation from any evaluation outcome. However, regarding this, the action of

donors may vary from total avoidance to only providing brief excerpts or details.

Hanafi and Tabar emphasised the importance of information sharing as it can improve

the learning curve not only for recipients but also donors.

2.4 Discourse on Alternative Donorship in the Occupied Palestinian

Territories

The articulation of the afore-mentioned issues has led to the discussion on

alternative sources for funding. The main aim is obvious as it seeks to reduce the

dependency of Palestinian recipients on Western donors which, as deliberated earlier,

arrive with multiple conditions. That said, this approach also aims at increasing the

financial independence and autonomy of recipients.

Hanafi and Tabar (2005) examined some of the Islamic organisations in the

oPt, focusing on their fundraising effort on Palestinian diasporas. These organisations

established networking and linkages with Palestinians abroad to raise the funding of

Sadaqah, Zakat or Waqaf contributions. Hanafi and Tabar (2005) generally observed,

26
the ability of these organisations to identify and apply such fundraising strategy

allowed them as recipients to be self-sufficient and autonomous. Challand (2008)

similarly perceived that organisations receiving aid from Islamic donors have more

autonomy in shaping their interaction policy towards the community they served.

The study by Roy on the House of Book and Sunnah (HBS), an orphanage in

Gaza Khan Younis reported same observation, but with richer insights (Roy, 2013).

HBS which is a Hamas social service organisation, is funded by international Islamic

donors (and some Christian NGOs). Apart from using the available finances to target

orphans (one of the neediest groups in the region), the HBS devised some of its

schooling education policies for this segment to be in line with accepted norms in

Gaza, i.e., segregating male and female orphans. This policy appealed to many parents

for cultural and religious reasons. This contrasts with certain conditionalities of

Western donors which requires the recipients to promote the establishment of co-ed

schools in the oPt with their funding.

Also, Qarmout conducted a more in-depth and descriptive research on the

Islamic donors in the oPt, specifically focused on Gaza. Qarmout dissected

international Islamic aid from the perspective of aid conditionality and autonomy. In

the study, the outcome of the fieldwork was compared with the approaches of Western

donors.

There are a number of findings describing the characteristics of international

Islamic donors. To illustrate, recipients perceived Arab and Muslim donors to be more

understanding, cooperative and less strict with their conditions compared with Western

donors. For example, Arab and Muslim donors did not impose conditions to the

selection of beneficiaries or recipients for recovery programs. In Qarmout’s fieldwork,

27
respondents singled out donors such as the Saudi Bank, the Islamic Development Bank

and the Turks as some actors that provide unconditional aid.

Gaza recipients also commented on the different management styles between

Islamic and Western donors. The recipients indicated that Muslim donors gave control

and authority to the receiving NGOs in the implementation process while Western

donors were more inclined to be involved in different stages of a project. The recipients

also stated that Muslim donors empowered them to take control over both the

implementation and direction of aid projects.

Besides, recipients that receive funding from Arab and Islamic donors were

also free to buy materials from local markets, regardless of whether the materials are

from Israel or through tunnels to Egypt. Western or international donors, on the other

hand, spent considerable time vetting material purchasing to ensure the purchased

items came through legal channels such as Israel checkpoints instead of tunnels leading

to Egypt. It is worth noting that the various tunnels which run deep from Rafah in

Southern Gaza to North Egypt are deemed illegal by Egypt, Israel the Quartet and

other Western donors. Thus, products obtained via the tunnels are labelled as illegal

purchases. Any partners caught purchasing from those tunnels will have their

partnership with the Quartet donors reassessed.

The issue of No Contact Policy (NCP) should be revisited here. As mentioned,

the Quartet (European Union [EU], United Nations [UN], US and Russia) proposed

NCP as a political condition aiming at halting any communication and cooperation

with Hamas Government and its affiliated grass-root machinery. That said, feedbacks

from government officials suggested – entities such as Islamic Development Bank or

state-based donors involving Malaysia, Turkey and Qatar as the few actors that are less

28
restricted by such no-contact condition set. Instead the participants highlighted their

perception on the solidarity shown by these actors with the Hamas Government during

the critical period. This group of donors is generally more open towards assisting the

Gaza Government and Hamas-affiliated grass-roots organisations in humanitarian and

development projects. It is worth adding, from the researcher’s own direct experience,

the Malaysian organisations or the MFBOs sector literally ignored the NCP.

In a nutshell, there are a few saturating points worth highlighting from all the

literatures on Islamic donors. First, it can be perceived that Islamic donors generally

provide autonomy with their aid provision. Islamic donors do not impose strict aid

conditionality on the management of ground projects. Muslim donors also empowered

the recipients to take control over both the implementation and direction of aid

projects.

Literature Gap

Recent literatures on international donorship, specifically within the context of

the oPt, has led to some discussion on the role of Islamic donors. The latter’s role is

being discussed within the framework of seeking an alternative aid arrangement for

oPt recipients. From an academic point of view however, there are at least three

research gaps which exists amongst related literatures.

First, research gap exists in exploring the rationale for the differentiated

approaches of the Islamic donors. The puzzle on what makes them different in-terms

of their interaction with recipients has not been thoroughly explored. Qarmout

attributed this different approach to Islamic donors’ sympathetic position towards the

Palestinian cause and also their inability to influence the policy of the international

community against Israel. Qarmout also suggested that through the less conditional

29
approach, the Islamic could at least help to ease the suffering of Palestinians and

enhance their humanitarian related resilience in facing the Israeli blockade, occupation

and attacks. While the realist hypothesis of Qarmout could be plausible, this study

believed that this argument may not entirely be sufficient in explaining the sociological

dimension of Islamic aid with its various rooted philosophies. As mentioned earlier,

the issue that should fairly be considered is the culture of Islamic donorship and how

it may also come into play.

The altruistic nature in different Islamic donorship approaches strongly

encourage a solidarity-based interaction. For example, the Sadaqah Jariyah (general

charity in Islam) prohibits the inclusion of complex conditions that burden the needy

recipients. Instead, the value of Ikhlas (sincerity in giving charity) is often advocated

with the provision of Sadaqah. Also, both the financing modality of Zakat (Islamic

tithe) and Waqaf (Islamic endowment) focuses on the needs of the very deprived in

any community. In principle, the approach of isolating or marginalising one needy

group over the other is not allowed in Islamic donorship. There are also other subtler

Islamic values embraced as the ideology and psyche forms in the communities. For

instance, the idea of Al-Dharuriyyat (important elements or assistance to ensure the

continuity of lives) is the concept that heavily influences the delivery of aid in a

community, i.e., aid should be the immediate and unconditional help towards

recipients facing any catastrophic conditions.

That being said, the unanswered question lies in whether the policy approach

by Islamic donors as identified in literatures including those of Qarmout’s could also

be the outcome of Islamic related altruism or perhaps the role of Islamic financing

modalities institutionalised? This specific niche is something that yet to be explored

thoroughly by most researchers studying international Islamic aid in the oPt.

30
 The second gap pertains to the absence of an analytical work to scrutinise the

performance of Islamic donors within Gaza’s current socio-political and economic

context - which as we have understood it, to be fragile. Most literature dissected earlier

has a pre-occupation on two phenomena. First, pertains to issue on Western donors aid

modalities and the impact it causes to Palestinians. Second aspect, centres on studies

contrasting Western and Islamic based donors. The thesis argues a need to advance

beyond these two discourses exists. Specifically, the need to analyse the effectiveness

of Islamic based donors in Gaza. This approach may further enrich our understanding

on Islamic donors in the region.

Finally, it is observed research attention is given less to dissect Islamic donors

of the non-actor strand in most literature including those of Qarmout’s field-work in

2017. This is despite the substantial aid investment made by this sector in Gaza. For

example, through direct involvement in the field, the researcher observed non-state

actors from Malaysia, Turkey and Qatar engages in numerous agriculture and

education aid projects, especially after the introduction of the blockade policy by

Israel. In most instances, these non-state actors have their own Gaza branch which is

independently manned by Palestinian citizens. Organisations such as IHH or Insani

Yardım Vakfı which is an Islamic NGO from Turkey, Qatar Charity, and Aman

Palestin (AP) from Malaysia are some of the key Faith-Based organisation (FBO)

actors in the region. Aid from these donors covers the economic, social and public

sectors.

Therefore as a seminal step, this study addressed these specific problems

through selecting and analysing the non-state Islamic aid sector from Malaysia. This

effort involved the Malaysian Islamic Faith Based Organisation (MFBOs) segment.

31
The focus of this research was on the assistance from MFBOs to the socio-economic

and public sectors in Gaza from 2008 to 2020.

First, this study aimed at exploring the institutionalisation (or not?) of altruistic

Islamic religious values and Islamic financing modalities. The second aspect explored

their potential in influencing the interactional behaviours of MFBOs towards

recipients. Third, the research opted to evaluate MFBOs humanitarian and

development work within the context of Gaza as a fragile state. To achieve this

objective, the research utilised the analytical OECD Fragile State Principles (FSPs)

framework. It is worth mentioning, this framework was previously utilised by Qarmout

to evaluate Western donors within the Gaza as a fragile state. In specific, the four main

FSPs used in the study of Qarmout: (1) taking local context as the starting point for aid

planning; (2) doing no harm through aid distribution; (3) aligning of aid policy with

local priorities; (4) avoiding pockets of exclusion in aid provision.

The next few sections will discuss the conceptual definition and theories

utilised in this research.

2.5 Conceptual Definitions of Key terms

This segment explained the five main concepts and one framework that has

been utilised to achieve this thesis objectives.

2.5.1 Faith-Based Organisation

Clarke (2007) defined FBO as charitable or development organisations that

mobilise the faithful to support the poor and other social groups. Usually, FBO funds

or manages various programmes to tackle issues like poverty and social exclusion.

32
Clark (2007) underscored the “element of faith” as the essential part of the charitable

humanitarian and development initiatives of FBOs and with such, informing it

completely.

In Malaysia, different MFBOs have been emerging out of various loosely

coordinated religious advocates and social activists sharing a common concern

towards Gaza. From observation, most MFBOs tend to frame their humanitarian and

development assistance based on Islamic tradition through emphasising selected

altruistic values, and practices. To put it differently, there is a seemingly distinct

Islamic mentality towards aid initiatives. This factor is illustrated in my exchange with

Ustaz Abdul Ghani who is an Islamic scholar and also the senior adviser for Malaysian

Islamic Consultative Council (MAPIM). He stated:

“It is critical for any Muslim or an Islamic organisation to think and

act in an Islamic way. All methodology of rendering aid should be
viewed directly through an Islamic lens.” (Abdul Ghani, personal
communication, March 08, 2019)

Islamic religious elements can be expressed through written words, i.e.,

websites, text speeches, press releases, letterheads, reports, or advocacy materials such

as brochures (See Appendix A vii). For example, AP publishes altruistic values such

as An-Nusrah (faith in Godly assistance) or Ad’-Da’mu (support) as precepts within

its humanitarian and development commitment. HALUAN underscores the value of

Ukhuwah, Istiqamah and Istimrariah as the values espoused.

The giveaway based on Islamic culture however can also be identified in the

financing of aid projects. Most MFBOs emphasises the use of aid financing modalities

such as Sadaqah, Zakat, Wakaf or Kafalah (Islamic sponsorship) as funding

approaches (Aman Palestin, 2017).

33
2.5.2 Islamic Altruistic Values

This subsection comprises two important components. The first few paragraphs

detailed how any Islamic values can be defined as altruistic. The second part discussed

how different altruistic values are segmented according to the different investigation

context, in this research.

To begin, the religion of Islam often projects altruism through a range of Arabic

themed values. It is the philosophical argument of this thesis that an Islamic value

(which inspires towards certain behaviour) is considered altruistic if it fulfils two sets

of conditions: (1) encourages behaviours that benefit others than oneself; (2) reminds

individuals to engage in selfless acts with the intention of pleasing God (Allah

SWT).Arguably, the two conditions provide us with the autonomy to discern a wide

spectrum of complex Islamic values to be altruistic.

In moving forward, it is key to ask how Islamic altruistic values are utilised for

exploratory purposes for this study. Here, Islamic altruistic values selected for

exploration are fitted within two overarching contexts i.e. Sectoral context (socio-

economic versus public sector) and project cycle context (planning, implementation

and evaluation). It is worth noting, values argued to be critical in this research is based

upon my observational experience (working experience with an MFBO) and the

reviews conducted on various Islamic values in scholarly literature.

Socio-Economic sector

I argue some Islamic values may have individual or communal oriented

nuances aiming at regulating a sense of harmony and fairness in social interaction or

daily activities. From this research perspective, values with such nuances may have

34
their relevance to be explored within the socio-economic sector. Generally, this sector

operates both at an individual/community level. Therefore, related values may help us

understand precisely two factors. First is their actual utility. Are selected values useful

in this context? If useful, the following aspect is about comprehending how selected

values would shape MFBOs’ policy behaviour towards recipients within the socio-

economic sector. Using this debate, in any Socio-economic projects, I theorised at

least 12 Islamic values associated with the broader Islamic community to be useful

for exploration.

First is Maslahah Al-Iqtisad. The Islamic scholar Murtada Al-Zabidi proposed

Iqtisad has its root from the classic word of Qasadu which means adopting a middle

path in spending. In modern Arabic, Iqtisad is commonly referred to as the operations

within an economy. The second value is Ikhlas. The notion, as summarised by Dr

Yusof Al-Qaradawi means performing an act with the sincere intention of pleasing

God or Allah SWT. Ikhlas also here means getting rid of worldly or individualistic

intentions. Thus, the aspect of sincerity in day-to-day behaviour is underscored (Al-

Qardhawy, 1996). Amanah, according to the Islamic scholar Al-Ghazali, was derived

from the word Al-Amn. It refers to a person who is free from the commission of any

breach against others (Shuhari et al., 2018). In modern Arabic translation, the word

Amanah specifically refers to the idea of trustworthiness. The next value centres on

Musyawarrah. The value, in essence, means a two-way discussion. Abdul Hamid Al-

Anshari defines Musyawarrah as the consultation or exchanging of ideas to solve

arising issues (Abdullah, 2014).

Ijma and Shura are two other values worth studying in this discussion context.

Al-Ghazali, expanding on al-Shafi ‘i’s thesis, argues ijma as including the agreement

35
of all the Muslim community regarding religious principles. Shura, on the other hand,

refers to the idea of a council with experts. While classic scholars underscore the

usefulness of these two concepts solely from the aspect of determining religious

principles or fatwas (edict) - modern scholars are beginning to discuss the practice of

these two values in non-religious settings. For example, Moussalli stated that “Shura

and ijma’ are two key doctrines that Muslims can use today for the religious

development of democratic notions of government and politics and human rights

(Bunglawala, 2016).

An-Nusrah is a value commonly utilised as an ethos for Islamic based

organisations around the world. In essence, the word is derived from the Al Quran

scripture of Surah Al-Nasr (Surah An-Nasr - 1–3, Al-Quran). The meaning revolves

around the theme of divine help from God (Allah SWT) which will happen over time,

with forbearance. The next value Al-Jiddul Wal-Ijtihad or Ijtihad is an Arabic word

derived from the root word jahada which means to struggle. Ijtihad means “to strive,

or making every effort, exerting oneself, or working hard in doing something. Al-

Shatibi defines it as “a process in which a jurist exerts his full efforts to his full

capacity to gain exact or probable knowledge or reach judgement in a certain case

(Man, 2014). While Ijtihad is commonly referred to aspect of decision making

specifically by religious scholars on religious matters, emerging discourse on this

concept suggests its usefulness within broader day to day living by commoners

(Tarmizi, 2020).

The other concept for discussion here is Ad-Dinnu Wa- Nasiha. Ad-Dinnu

means Religion. While Nasiha means advise. Thus, the translated meaning of Ad-

Dinnu Wa Nasiha means “religion is advice”. Qaradawi shaped his discussion on this

36
concept as a way to advise or counsel the government in establishing Amar ma’ruf

nahy Munkar–enjoining good and forbidding evil (Qaradawi, 2007). On other hand,

Husnuzhon is the value that underscores the approach of having fair thoughts on others

when issues arise in daily interaction.

The value of Fikh Aula-Wiyat refers to the “practice of prioritising main

matters” in daily arising related problems. Aula is an Arabic notion that can be

interpreted as ‘main’. However, from observational experience, Malay Muslims in

Malaysia equate Aula to also mean “better or more important” The last value to be

explored here for this study is Wasatiyah. This concept pushes for a sense of

moderation or balance in every aspect of life (Razif, 2018).

At this juncture, it is worth noting, all the aforementioned 12 values, will have

four each assigned separately under three project cycles of Planning, Implementation

and Evaluation. This effort is taken with the aim to both theoretically and logically

match related altruistic values with the distinct interaction requirements – needed for

the project cycles of planning, implementation and evaluation within the socio-

economic sector. The table below illustrated this approach clearly.

Table 2.1
Project Cycle within socio-economic projects

Planning Implementation Evaluation

Musyawarrah Al-Jiddul Wal Ijtihad Husnuzhon

Ijma Ikhlas Fikh Aulawiyat

Shura Ad-Dinnu Wa-Nasiha Wasatiyah

An-Nusrah Amanah Maslahah Al-Iqtisad

37
Public sector context

On other hand, there are also Islamic values that can be construed to have

subtlety close to the ideals of mass-mobilisation, solidarity, politics or the concept of

close cooperation between adherents professing similar spiritual beliefs. I theorised

such values or ethos are commonly utilised in non-neutral scenarios in Gaza. This is

especially so during any situation when there is a sense of threat against Islam and its

adherents. It is my opinion; the usage of related values could find relevance within

public sector projects in Gaza. Why? There are three rationales for this position.

Primarily, most public projects (for public consumption) are coordinated by Hamas; a

political entity perceived to be leading an impoverished Islamic government. This

government also faces asymmetrical threats from the Israeli military. Second, in

exercising such function, the Hamas Government is also seen to be protecting the

Muslim population of Gazan Palestinians from Israel. The third factor involves the

current political boycott against Hamas Government by major Western donors through

the No-Contact Policy (NCP). Therefore, using specific values may help us understand

precisely two factors. First is their actual relevance. The utility of appropriate values

may allow us to better explore their importance as a moral compass for MFBOs;

especially in navigating the three complexities highlighted earlier. While the second

aspect will help us rationalise how selected values may shape MFBOs’ policy

behaviour towards non-neutral recipients in any public related projects. Using this

debate, I similarly hypothesised at least 12 related Islamic altruistic values to be useful.

The first is Ukhuwah. Ukhuwah means brotherhood. The root word for

Ukhuwah comes from akhā which later formed into words, such as al-akh, or akhu

which means paying attention. Over time, akhu is morphed into the nuances which

connotes friendship. Friendship lexically refers to the meaning of “the one who is with

38
us in each circumstance” (Suriati et al., 2020). Ukhuwah commonly is also utilised to

emphasise unity and close cooperation between Muslims. Huquq Al-Insan is another

altruistic value which means ‘people’s rights. It is worth noting, the Islamic legal

tradition distinguishes between Huquq Allah (the rights of God) and Huquq Al-Insan

(the rights of people). Some Muslim scholars broached the value Huquq Al-Insan to

be paired with the ideals of human rights. Therefore Huquq Al-Insan for some Islamic

scholars, provides the ideal platform for developing a human rights-based discourse in

Islam (Iqbal, 2018).

Arguably, an associated value to Huquq Al-Insan is Al-Adl. Al-Adl as a matter

of fact is one of the 99 sacred names in which Muslims give to Allah (SWT). In

translation, it means the embodiment of justice that God possesses. In day to day living,

Al-Adl requires a justice-based interaction between humankind. Behaviour, in contrast

to the approach of Adl, is prohibited.

In moving forward, Muslim groups and political organisations commonly

utilised the concept of Ummah. Ummah is an Arabic concept suggesting the meaning

of “people” or “group” or “community” being formed based on some common and

coherent features like language, race, religion, culture, and economic interest with a

common leader, goal, and constitution (Dastagir & Ramzy, 2018). Ummah, as a

notion, is often politicised to emphasise the movement of Islam as a group towards

attaining spiritual objectives.

Al-Mukhlisin is another altruistic value that is mentioned in the holy Al-Quran.

The scripture described Mukhlisin metaphorically in one of its chapters. For example,

in section 98:5, Al-Mukhlisin is described as a group of pure people (from their faith

perspective) dedicating their trust solely to Allah SWT. Lexically, Mukhlisin comes

39
from the root kha-la-sa. This concept signifies something clear and not corrupted. It

can also denote the aspect of purifying something and refining it from other things

(Maktabdar, 2019). The value of Mukhlisin is parallel with Ikhlas. Both underscore

the importance of sincerity in day to day human dealings or interactions.

Another altruistic notion to be explored is Al-Dharuriyyat. Dharuriyyat

essentially means critical things needed for the continuity of life (Ghazali, 2015). For

instance, unavailability of food, water, safety and shelter will certainly lead to a

disastrous outcome for human mankind. In day to day understanding, however, the

concept of Al-Dharuriyyat is also often equated to any disastrous situation and people

that are affected by it. In this context the value of Al-Dharuriyyat pushes Muslims to

provide well needed aid to recipients in ensuring their life continuity.

Al-Mussawah refers to the idea of equality (Nasar, 2020). Mussawah can also

be inferred to mean justice. In one way or another, Al-Mussawah underscores a sense

of egalitarianism between mankind. Another commonly utilised value is Istiqamah.

Istiqamah means the aspect of consistency in the practice of religious obligations.

However, Qaradawi underscored the notion as representing the idea of

“straightforwardness (Qaradawi, 2010). In contemporary times, Muslims also pair the

idea of Istiqamah with the habit of engaging constructive act on a constant basis -

towards the betterment of oneself or Islam as the religion.

Fiqhul- Al Waqie is another relevant concept to be deliberated. Fiqhul or Fiqh

al-Waqie is a combination of two words, i.e. Fiqh means understanding and al-Waqie,

which is reality (Muda, 2021). Qaradawi refers Al-Waqie as a way of understanding

reality at its best, without making assumptions about matters relating to it (Man, 2021).

Man added that Fiqhul al-Waqie underscores factors of time, local conditions, culture,

40
technological sophistication or human moral value as being important in assisting

observations and decisions.

The literal translation of Ihsan means excellence. From an Islamic perspective,

Ihsan is commonly associated with the idea of performing any religious activities in

an Ihsan manner. However, of late, the value is espoused alongside acts relating to

one’s work/responsibility or service to the community. Qaradawi puts a deep spiritual

meaning on Ihsan as a value. He suggested God’s (Allah SWT) love befall anyone

conducting their rightful duties with Ihsan (Hidayah, 2021).

The two other values worth articulating within the context of discussion is Al-

Tawasaa’u and Maslahah Al- Siyasah. Al-Tawasaa’u refers to the idea of inclusivity

of any discourse on Ummah’s issues. On other hand, Maslahah Al- Siyasah’s principle

revolves around two concepts. First is Maslahah, which if translated from Arabic to

English, means public. Siyasah, on other hand, refers to politics or political authority.

Ibnu Manzhur refers to Siyasah as an act. It revolves around doing something which

renders goodness to the party under-managed by any authority (Tarmizi, 2018).

At this point, it is worth noting, all the aforementioned 12 values, will have

four each assigned separately under three project cycles of Planning, Implementation

and Evaluation. This effort is taken with the aim to both theoretically and logically

match related altruistic values with the distinct interaction requirements – needed for

the project cycles of planning, implementation and evaluation within the public sector

projects. The table below illustrated this approach clearly.

Table 2.2
Project Cycle within public sector projects

41
 Planning Implementation Evaluation

Ukhuwah Al-Mukhlisin Fiqhul Al-Waqi

Huquq Al-Insan Al-Dharuriyyat Ihsan

Al-Adl Al-Mussawah Al-Tawasaa’u

Ummah Istiqamah Maslahah Al-Siyasah

2.5.3 Islamic aid Financing Modalities

Table 2.3 is the list of financing modalities commonly utilised by all MFBOs

to channel aid to Palestinians in Gaza. It must be highlighted here, the below-

mentioned modalities will be explored of its relevance specifically within the project

cycle of financing stage of any socio-economic and public sector related projects. Here

the same Islamic aid financing modalities will be utilised across the socio-economic

and public sector projects. This approach is taken since, unlike altruistic values –

Islamic aid financing modalities are less abstract thus lack the nuances. Theoretically,

it is less loaded in its tendency to suggest the finer aspect of behavioural trajectory or

impulses. Instead Islamic aid financing modalities are set of rules or modalities that

governs the act of transacting money (financial donation) or other form of aid (in-kind)

to recipients in all circumstances and conditions.

Table 2.3
Islamic Financing Modalities utilised in Financing cycle

Islamic Religious
Translated Meaning
Values/Modalities
Zakat Islamic tithe: 2.5 % from
income for charity
Wakaf Endowment: The turning of a
self-owned asset into public
endowment
Imbued principles
To ensure a justifiable distribution of
wealth especially to those most
marginalised and desperate
Emphasises the use of an endowed
asset on perpetual and non-binding
basis to a broad number of beneficiaries

42
 Sadaqah Voluntary charity Unconditional generosity across time
and place which is done sincerely

2.5.4 Institutionalisation

Within the context of this research, institutionalisation is defined as the process

of incorporating or inculcating certain religious altruistic values and aid financing

modalities in MFBOs humanitarian and development aid policies within the project

cycles of Planning, Financing, Implementation and Evaluation.

2.5.5 MFBOs Humanitarian and Development aid policies

MFBOs Humanitarian and Development aid policies are the latter’s official

interactional or behavioural approach towards recipients within the four project cycles

of Planning, Financing, Implementation and Evaluation of any Socio-Economic and

Public sector projects. To understand this aspect, MFBOs policy behaviour towards

recipients are dissected and analysed through such four-project cycles.

2.5.6 Fragile State Principles framework

The FSPs have been adopted by the ministers of the OECD Development

Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries in 2007. These principles recognise

that fragile states require a different approach in humanitarian and development

assistance. The FSPs highlighted here are meant to be abided by development partners

(donors) as a good guide (or best practice) in interacting with the recipients in a fragile

situation.

As mentioned earlier, this research replicated the four main FSPs used in the

study of Qarmout: (1) taking local context as the starting point for aid planning; (2)

doing no harm through aid distribution; (3) aligning of aid policy with local priorities;

43
(4) avoiding pockets of exclusion in aid provision. In essence, this research aims at

understanding whether MFBOs overall policies in Gaza, does facilitate (or not ?) the

latter’s potentiality in achieving the four stipulated Fragile State Principles.

2.6 Theories Utilised

In this section, the theories that could potentially be used to explain the

discourse pertaining to the institutionalisation of certain elements of faith (Islamic

altruistic values and financing modalities) to the interactional behaviour of MFBOs

towards their recipients are explained. In addition, three international relations theories

are equally proposed to make sense of MFBOs participation within the international

arena.

One of the first paradigm adopted to interpret institutionalisation in this study

was the Smircich Organisational Theory. The second adopted theory was the

Sociological or New Institutionalism Theory which has a growing application in the

political science discourse. The institutional isomorphism by DiMaggio and Powell is

the next theory used to understand the phenomenon of MFBOs Islamic culture thus

their interaction the Gazan Palestinians. The graphical representation of these three

theories is depicted towards the end of this chapter, in figure 2.1

At a macro or international level, the Post-Secular International Relations

(PSIR) Theory was introduced as a primary framework to both posit and analyse the

involvement of MFBOs as an international actor with a religious outlook. This theory

is supplemented by Alexander Wendt’s argument on the constructivist nature of

International Relations. The final IR theory proposed in this study is Transnationalism.

44
2.6.1 Culture Institutionalisation and Organisational Behaviour

Smircich (1983) mooted the possibility of analysing the relationship between

the culture, values or practice of an organisation and its behavioural outcome. One of

the approaches for such analysis is through designating the culture, values or practice

of the organisation of interest and its potential behaviour as variables.

That being said, the key approach of situating the theory of Smircich as the

exploratory framework in this research was to posit all critical religious elements

(Islamic altruistic values and financing modalities) as the independent variables, which

in principle, have the potential to produce certain behavioural outcome if

institutionalised by MFBOs.

Given the above, this research proposed that Islamic religious elements can be

institutionalised by MFBOs via two approaches. The first approach is relatively

straightforward since it involves the application of financing modalities that are

tangible such as Sadaqah, Zakat and Wakaf. In this context, it was observed that all

the selected MFBOs in this research used Sadaqah, Zakat and Waqaf as their policies

to finance aid programs in Gaza. For example, AP uses Zakat approach to finance the

food and shelter for orphans in Gaza.

The second approach involves the complex discussion on the potential

institutionalisation of intangible or subjective Islamic altruistic values. To illustrate,

the leadership and members in the MFBO sector could hypothetically be motivated by

the internal logic of Al-Dharuriyyat (much needed aid for recipients facing life

threatening scenarios), the need to seek for Al-Adl (justice) or the implementation of

Huquq Al-Insan (human rights), Al-Tawasaa’u (inclusiveness), Ijma (consensus),

Shura (consultation) or Al-Mussawah (equality). In theory, such logic could influence

45
leaders and members of an MFBO to manifest the application of related altruistic

Islamic values into tangible policies. MAPIM for instance believe in the value of Shura

which refers to the Islamic idea of broad consultation amongst key stakeholders

including with the Palestinians. To demonstrate the seriousness in embracing this

value, the leadership of MAPIM established a specific unit named the Department of

Shura. From the researcher’s observation, this unit acts as a rallying point for different

stakeholders (between Palestinians and Malaysians) to discuss the coordinating effort

of delivering aid to Palestinian Gazan’s during critical situation.

Given the above, the task in this research however is to identify the potential

existence or link between the remaining intangible or subjective Islamic altruistic

values with those of MFBOs policies towards Gaza recipients.

2.6.2 The Theoretical Debate on Sociological Institutionalism

Sociological institutionalism is a form of new institutionalism arose primarily

within the subfield of organisation theory. The movement date roughly to the end of

the 1970s, when sociologists challenged the argument of rationality which was

commonly associated with modern organisations and the behaviours of the institutions

and their members. One of these sociologists is John Meyer with his published work

in 1977 (DiMaggio, 1991)

An advantage of this theory is that it interprets the process of

institutionalisation more broadly than political scientists do, especially those from the

rationalist school (Hall & Rosemary 1996, 947). Hall and Rosemary which are both

political scientists argued how sociologist defines institutionalisation which happens

not only through rules or policies that are formal (tangible), standard operating

46
procedures or norms but other intangible factors too, such as cognitive scripts, symbol

systems and moral templates that provide the “frames of meaning” in guiding human

actions or behaviours.

For Hall and Rosemary, this definition breaks down the conceptual divide

between institutions and culture. Here, the two aspects shade into each other. As

argued by Hall and Rosemary, it challenges the distinction that many political

scientists like to draw between “institutional explanations” that based on

organisational structure and “cultural explanations”. Hence, this approach redefines

“culture” itself as “institutions”.

One way of positing the sociologist institutionalism in this research is to

understand the entire process as an institutionalisation of embedded belief. This belief

system provides the cognitive scripts and moral templates, which in-turn give the

“frame of meaning” in guiding the behaviour of MFBOs, especially when reacting to

the issues faced by Palestinian in Gaza and its overall independence.

2.6.3 Institutional Isomorphism (Normative)

To paraphrase Hawley’s description, isomorphism is a constraining process that

forces one unit (institution) in a population to resemble other units that face the same

set of environmental conditions (Amos, 1968). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) described

three types of isomorphism amongst organisations in a set of environmental conditions.

This involves the coercive, mimetic, and normative aspects of isomorphism. For

relevance, the third isomorphism (normative) will be deliberated thoroughly in this

debate. DiMaggio and Powell argue normative isomorphism occurs in two ways and

that is through formal education and professional networks. The latter aspect acts as a

47
socialisation process to reinforce aspects that have been learned through education.

DiMaggio and Powell argued these mechanisms create individuals who possess a

similarity of orientation and disposition (Powell, 1983)

Within the context of this research, one could relate the education and exposure

of members of MFBOs to be critical. First, majority leaders in this sector are exposed

to some religious form of Islamic education. Some members are also Islamic scholars

and jurists. Holding these type of profession suggests their in-depth training in selected

areas of Islamic studies. Secondly members’ exposure to networks of other

organisations in a similar field (Malaysian Islamic activist engaging in humanitarian

help to Gaza) acts as a reinforcing factor. This could happen on three fronts. Members

socialisation and discussion with other Malaysian Muslim activists on the issue of

Palestinians through an Islamic lens. Second, discussion and awareness on the suitable

approach towards assisting Palestinian Muslims also happens through this type of

socialisation. An important factor to consider here is how Palestinians are considered

as Muslims suffering under a perceived non-Muslim aggressor (Israel government).

The third centres on the socialisation between MFBOs and Palestinian Muslims.

Hypothetically, these three types of socialisation lead to a shared mindset or identity

(Islamic oriented in culture and practices) for the majority MFBOs engaging with

humanitarianism work in Gaza.

The Theoretical Debate on Post-Secular International Relations

The concept of Post-Secularism was coined by Jurgen Habermas in 2008 as a

theoretical entry point towards restoring religion through dialogues in contemporary

society (Habermas, 2008). Habermas proposed to include faith in the secularist

48
dialogue was mainly to promote the inclusiveness of theoretical ideas as well as for

both religionist and secularist to enrich from each other.

The study of Mavelli and Petito (2012) was one of the early works that began

experimenting with the Post-Secularism Theory of Habermas in the discipline of

international relations. Beyond the simple inclusion of religion in a dialogue as

proposed by Habermas, Mavelli and Petito (2012) proposed in-depth research on

religion and its plurality involving the symbolical power of rituals or prayers, spiritual

values, and ideologues or organisational ethos to understand their implications in the

international relations ecology. Within this context, the theory of post-secular

international relations (PSIR) of Mavelli and Petito (2012) also debated the emergence

of new forms of identity and power, especially those that draw moral resources

embedded in the existing social structure to negotiate and influence. The outcome of

these complex theoretical explorations is documented in the book: Towards Post-

Secular International Politics.

Wilson (2014) as one of the contributors to the volume broached the function

of FBOs as international actors through case studies. Through the framework of PSIR,

Wilson (2014) debated the motivation of FBOs which are largely driven by religious

faith and how FBOs utilised such elements in addressing social and economic issues.

Below is the summary of the case studies of Wilson (2014).

Throughout the millennium, the Australian Government has been criticised

heavily for its mishandling of asylum seekers. Chief among the factors are methods

employed by the Australian Immigration in managing the arrivals of asylum seekers

from international waters, which involve arbitrary detention with the inclusion of

vulnerable infants and the appalling condition of the detention centres (Orner, 2017).

49
The rationale of the Australian Government to stop accepting asylum seekers is

primarily linked to economic security and domestic policy-related concerns (BBC,

2017).

In the early 2000s, Howard Administration referred to asylum seekers as

mostly “economic migrants”, “illegal immigrants with criminal records” or “queue

jumpers” (Wilson, 2014). This outlook was further enforced by Pacific Solution of

Howard Administration which withheld asylum seekers at Pacific Islands such as

Nauru, Manu and Christmas Island on a long-extended period for vetting processes.

While a portion of Australian citizens supported such a move, the faith sector,

on the other hand, viewed such policy as “Draconian”. The faith sector has also been

the vocal group in voicing support for the rights of illegal migrants in Australia.

Utilising spiritual resources involving “love or compassion for the wayfarer or

stranger” or religious messages such as “Seek justice, rescue the oppressed, defend the

orphan” (Isaiah 1:17) as a sloganeering strategy, FBOs rally aggressively against the

policies of the Australian Government on asylum seekers (Australian Churches

Refugee Taskforce, 2014).

In the midst of their protest effort, FBOs also promoted the urgency to care for

the vulnerable and marginalised, including small infants detained alongside adult

asylum seekers. In early 2005, a collective movement of FBOs known as “Love to

Make a Way” organised visits to asylum detention centres and provided food to

mitigate the conditions of the detained. The visits were followed by a mobilised protest

at the Australian Parliament indicting the government for the harsh treatment of

asylum seekers.

50
 The movement exerted some form of socio-political pressure on the Howard

Administration towards the end of 2005. In a specific case documented, the

administration was compelled to release unaccompanied infants and adopt a family or

community-friendly detention method for such a vulnerable group. The new detention

method was introduced by Christian FBOs (Hotham Mission ASP) as part of their

protest campaigns (Wilson, 2014).

The second case study by Wilson (2014) involved the World Council of

Churches (WCC), an FBO based in Switzerland. In general, the WCC takes religious

culture and values earnestly. Theological elements such as “the grace and provision of

God” and the concept of “sacrificial love” as described by St Paul in I Corinthian 13

and the notion of “every human is made in the image of God, hence, deserving equal

respect and dignity” are used as the ethos by WCC in championing the rights of the

poor and marginalised. Besides, the WCC also advocates for a more diverse,

participatory, justly and equal share of the global economy cake.

Such values or ideology is crucial as they form a distinct part of the interaction

between the WCC and external stakeholders, particularly through policy suggestions.

For instance, the WCC, along with other FBOs such as Christian Aid, has been actively

advocating a change in the systems of the World Bank and International Monetary

Fund in terms of income benchmarking and distribution since the 2000s. The WCC

has been lobbying the economists of both the World Bank and International Monetary

Fund to accept the idea of “greed line”, in contrast to the commonly utilised “poverty

line”. According to the WCC, “greed line” represents a way of living that is deviated

from Christianity teaching. It indicates the level of wealth and the lifestyle deemed

unsustainable for other people and the global environment (Wilson, 2014).

51
 In a nutshell, there are two key take-away lessons from the use of the PSIR

framework in Wilson’s cases demonstrated earlier. First, unlike other IR theories, the

PSIR framework sets the distinctive path for FBOs to be nominated as an actor (non-

state) in the international arena. For PSIR, this aspect is defined when FBOs choice of

activism empowers them to engage in cross-border actions or perhaps to get involved

in issues which has a bearing on their country image worldwide. The second factor

that should be taken into consideration is that the PSIR theory clearly showed how

religious values can play an active role in the organisational culture, outlook and

consequential behaviour of FBOs when it comes to communication. This observation

is parallel with that of Mavelli and Petito (2012), which was the “emergence of

alternative forms of identity and power” in the post-secular world.

There are two implications of PSIR theory within this research context. First,

it qualifies the mobilisation of MFBOs aid work in Gaza to be defined as a form of

cross border action. (from Malaysia to Gaza). Second, this theory allows the MFBO

sector in Gaza to be conceptualised as a non-state international actor similar as we

have observed with the World Council of Churches. However, what is equally critical

is that; in the process of acting in such a manner, MFBOs are taking along certain

embraced religious values or paradigm as a guiding factor for it to formulate their

policies towards the Gaza Palestinian.

The PSIR framework provides a fitting theory to interpret the involvement of

MFBOs as religious-based international actor pertinently within the context Gaza

donorship landscape.

52
2.6.4 Alexander Wendt’s Social Constructivist theory in International Relations

Alexander Wendt illustrated the actions of actors depend on their interests.

Though in this context, Wendt also interpreted that identity is a prerequisite for interest

because an actor cannot know what he wants until he knows who he is. Wendt also

argued both interest and identity equally influence each other (Wildavsky, 1994).

Deprived of interest, identity has no motivational power; without identity, interest has

no direction (Wendt, 1999) .According to Wendt’s constructivism, identity and interest

consist of shared ideas (Ibid, 138). Identity is a nexus towards interest, while they

influence each other; they jointly determine actions. For Wendt, the idea is the basis

of action.

In understanding the applicability of this theory to this research – we should

first explore the primary identity which most MFBOs utilised in their cross-border

activism. From here, another aspect to be explored is the actual motivation for adopting

such identity amongst MFBOs. From thereon, this theory will likely be helpful in

providing the hypothetical explanation on MFBOs interest trajectory within the global

stage.

Now, it is also worth reflecting on the power of NGOs (which most MFBOs

are also commonly referred to in literatures) and how this sector could further play its

role in international politics from a constructivist perspective. NGOs do not have the

kinds of power resources that states do (Potter, 2006). In this context both Ahmed and

Potter argued constructivism is a useful tool for thinking about how NGOs would

influence international politics through the exercise of power through communication.

To these authors, when people, governments, or non-state actors communicate with

one another over time, that communication can create common understandings of roles

53
and behaviours. Over time, these understandings become rules that govern behaviour

and further communication. Thus, the power of NGOs is persuasion of ideas that is

derived from their identity and interest. Similarly, their power comprises

demonstrating through persuasion and action that there are other ways of organizing

social and political arrangements besides those currently in use.

2.6.5 Transnationalism

The exclusion of transnationalism would lead to an incomplete analysis of the

involvement of MFBOs as a form of NGO within a global perspective. Ahmed and

Potter observed how transnationalism, is an outgrowth of interdependence theory

which re-emerged in the 1990s (Potter, 2006). It is an effort to revive the promise of

interdependence theory in broadening the study of international politics beyond the

state (Ibid, 12). An advocate to this renewal, Thomas Risse Kappen, outlines

transnational relations as “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least

one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government

or international organisation” (Risse-Kippen, 1995). Likewise, Fred Halliday refers to

global society as “the emergence of non-state links of economy, political association,

culture, ideology that transcends state boundaries and constitutes, more or less, a

society that goes beyond boundaries” (Halliday, 1994).

In this theoretical framework, NGOs forms part of a larger collection of non-

state actors that include MNCs, epistemic communities of scientists and technical

specialists, ethnic diasporas, cross-border terrorist and criminal organizations, and so

forth. It should be underscored that transnationalism does not concentrate only on

NGOs. However, the theory argues that there is increasing new space in international

relations for actors such as NGOs' on emerging issues. The transnational perspective

54
is practical for thinking about a dynamic form of NGOs cooperation. It is observed

NGOs formed coalitions across borders to tackle global issues, and they often do this

autonomously of governments.

In one way or other, transnationalism requires this research to identify MFBOs

pattern of cooperation in their cross-border activism. This is especially so on potential

factors that would indicate this sector’s inclination to work with foreign NGOs or

government towards achieving MFBOs aid objectives in Gaza, Palestine.

55
2.7 The Framework

Figure 2.1. Framework for discerning MFBOs behaviour policy towards

Palestinian recipients

56
 CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Religion, alongside its practices and belief system, intertwines with societal

experiences. The same for Islam. While the latter like all Abrahamic faith emphasises

the unitary idea of transcendental revealed knowledge, the actual role of the Islamic

society in constructing the reality on a certain aspect of their religion, associated values

and symbols (largely non-scriptural knowledge) and what it means to them, continue

to exist. This scenario becomes even more apparent within different Islamic

communities, sects, or scholars around the world. On other hand, different debates on

the function and the required contribution of Islamic organisations within the Islamic

community (Ummah) are constantly being revised and developed by Muslim

intelligentsia.

From an ontological perspective, this aspect suggests the potential existence of

multiple realities or meanings associated to the culture, values, and practices of Islam.

There is no single truth (on periphery practices) except for meanings from human

experiences. Experiences are also context-bound. Therefore, in this framework, the

appropriate epistemological relationship of the researcher towards to this sector is

emic. A need to dive into the subject and utilise the interpretivism paradigm exists. To

paraphrase Norman Blaikie, in interpretivism, social reality is regarded as the product

of its inhabitants; it is a world that is interpreted by the meaning’s participants produce

and reproduce as a necessary part of their everyday activities together (Blaikie, 2009).

Arguably, interpretivism helped to discern the underlying meaning of MFBOs’ use of

religion (altruistic values and financing modalities) and how it may shape their social

57
interaction both with the Gazan Palestinians and the dilemmas they are facing. At this

juncture, it is worth adding, the researcher’s previous direct working experience with

MAPIM (an MFBO) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Palestinian Desk) is

considered emic in nature and contributed in some way towards interpretivism.

In parallel with the epistemological stand, the research adopts phenomenology

as its methodology. The rationale here is that a need exists for the researcher to

understand the perception, feelings, ideas and organisational motives of a human group

in a given environment. An explorative qualitative research strategy is adopted

entirely. The qualitative strategy was both flexible and interpretive, making it useful

for the fieldwork in this study (Creswell, Hanson, Clark Plano & Morales, 2007;

Patton, 2014).

In Chapter 3, two main sections elaborated on two qualitative based fieldworks

that have been accomplished. Section 3.2 focused on the method utilised to explore

whether MFBOs institutionalised religious values and financing modalities in the aid

policies of MFBOs. This section also describes the potential and impact of

institutionalisation on the interactional behaviour of MFBOs towards their aid

recipients. Discussion on samples, procedures of collecting data and approaches to

analysis are also included. The overall synthesised data from this section were the basis

for the discussion in Chapter 4.

Section 3.6 discusses the overall method for exploring and analysing the aid

behavioural policy of MFBOs against the FSPs of the OECD. Specifically, the aid

policies of MFBOs in agricultural and education sectors were benchmarked with these

principles: (1) taking local context as a starting point for aid planning; (2) doing no

58
harm through aid distribution; (3) aligning of aid policy with local priorities; (4)

avoiding pockets of exclusion in aid provision.

3.2 Research Design for Field Work 1

Exploring the institutionalisation of Islamic altruistic values and Islamic aid

financing modality. Understanding its impact on the policy of Malaysian Islamic

Faith-Based Organisations towards recipients.

A qualitative inductive research design was implemented throughout the

research fieldwork. To extract the necessary data, semi-structured interviews were

employed (Appendix B). There were two parts in the semi-structured interviews,

which were parts A and B.

Part A of the semi-structured interview aimed at exploring the type of religious

altruistic values and financing modalities that the MFBO participants opined to be the

most relevant to their organisational policy-making, especially in socio-economic and

public related aid projects. To initiate a discussion with the participants, four options

(related religious elements) were explained and provided to them for selection in

different project stages of planning, financing, implementation and evaluation. In line

with the exploratory philosophy, the participants were encouraged to provide other

religious elements deemed critical to their organisational policy during the four stages.

It is worth noting that during the first fieldwork, this approach yielded a number of

religious values which were not included in the original list for interviews.

Part B of the semi-structured interview aimed at further exploring any

nominated religious elements in Part A, especially those obtained from the participants

based on their personal opinion. The participants were requested to provide the reason

59
why the selected elements are considered important to them and the ways in which the

elements influence the policies of their respective MFBOs towards aid recipients.

3.3 Sample Frame

The sample for the first fieldwork was determined through a purposive method.

This non-probability approach (also known as judgment, selective or subjective

sampling) is a sampling technique that relies on the judgement of the researcher in

selecting members of the population to take part in the research (Dudovskiy, 2019).

In this research, the purposive sampling method was driven by three sets of

conditions. First, organisations that are working on humanitarian and development

initiatives in Gaza. Second, organisations that are actors that exhibit both tangible

(observable) and intangible (non-observable) sentiments towards Islam and its aid

ideology. For example, organisations that use Islamic appeal and elements in their

highway billboards. In other instances, the use of letterheads with Islamic design or

having quotation of Quranic verses in websites that justifies an Islamic approach

towards almsgiving can be taken as a clue. Tangible Islamic influence can also be

evident in the ways an MFBO arranges its working committee. For instance, Majlis

Perundingan Pertubuhan Islam Malaysia (MAPIM) establishes a unit named SHURA

for discussion. The notion SHURA is taken from the Quranic verse which pushes the

spirit for collective discussion. Moreover, the religious approach can also be identified

through the choices of fundraising initiatives and the money disbursement methods

from principal donors to recipients. In this research, all the participated organisations

emphasised the modality of Sadaqah (Infaq), Zakat, Wakaf or Kafalah (Islamic

sponsorship) to collect fund from sympathisers and then disburse the collected fund to

needy Palestinians.

60
 Non-tangible elements are subtler. Such elements could potentially be

identified through frequent use of Quranic verses in public speeches or the implicit

Islamic culture practised within an organisation. The strict interpretation of the Islamic

worldview in daily conversation especially on issues pertaining to aid work may also

suggest these finer nuances that exist.

The third criteria involved the religiosity of the leadership and management of

MFBOs. This is because a robust implementation of Islamic culture or policy depends

largely on religiosity. The more religious these actors are, the stronger the likelihood

an MFBO would mobilise a strict form of Islamic donorship approach.

Seven MFBOs in Penang, Klang Valley and Kelantan were identified to have

matched the stipulated criteria. From these seven MFBOs, thirteen participants who

were holding various leadership and management roles were selected for interviews.

In specific, the selected MFBOs were Majlis Perundingan Pertubuhan Islam Malaysia

(three participants), MyCare (one participant), Aman Palestin (three participants),

Islamic Relief Malaysia (one participant), Muslim Care (one participant), Haluan (two

participants) and Cakna Palestin (two participants).

It is worth noting during the sampling process, some NGOs that were initially

surveyed, have been excluded. NGOs such as VIVA Palestina (VP) and Cinta Gaza

Malaysia (CGM) (For Palestine with Love) are such organisations. This decision is

made given the characteristics of these two organisations were not in parallel with the

second and third conditions highlighted within the sampling premise.

For instance, the outcome from inspecting CGM and Viva Palestina culture

produced mixed results. These organisations are characterised to have a crossover

culture between Islamic and secular approaches to humanitarianism. The two

61
organisations rarely utilise altruistic Islamic values or qur’anic verses in promoting

their aid initiatives in Gaza. This aspect is most observable in the organisations’

respective websites. In this context, unlike the seven MFBOs nominated, there is no

consistency in using Islamic appeal.

The other factor pertains to the use of Islamic aid financing modalities. Though

these two organisations utilise some aspect of Islamic financing modalities of either

Sadaqah (Infaq), Zakat, Wakaf, this approach however is not done in its entirety. As

opposed to the previous seven identified MFBOs - CGM and VP utilised these

modalities selectively. VP, for instance, while utilises Sadaqah or Zakat as some of its

modalities did not however choose to use Waqaf. CGM, on the other hand, has a

sketchy process of promoting related modalities on either its websites or brochures.

However, the most obvious aspect centres on the leadership of these

organisations. One key element that often distinguishes MFBOs from other NGOs is

their organisation structure, which contains at least one key Islamic scholar. In Malay

Muslim context, individuals as such is often described as Ustaz (religious teacher).

Generally, an Ustaz plays the role of strengthening the Islamic image of an MFBO,

apart from ensuring the Islamic culture in this type of organisation is maintained. This

key distinguishing factor has been invincible in either VP or CGM. During further

inspection, I discovered most members in CGM and VP have a generally secular

education background. The CEO of CGM, for example, is a Marine Biologist by

training.

In moving forward, table 3.1 provides the position of the selected participants

from their respective MFBOs. For privacy, the names of the participants are not

revealed.

62
Table 3.1
List of Participants for the First Fieldwork

List of the participants interviewed

Code Name Position Date interviewed

R1 President of MAPIM 15 January 2019 & 7
July 2020
R2 MAPIM Northern Region Coordinator 27 February 2019
R3 Chairman of MAPIM 8 March 2019
R4 Media Director of AP 7 March 2019
R5 Administrative Assistant of Donorship Unit in 1 March 2019
AP, Penang
R6 Administrative Assistant of Finance Unit in AP, 1 March 2019
Penang
R7 Research and Development Officer of MyCare 6 March 2019
R8 Director of Strategic Research and Development 8 March 2019
Division, Muslim Care
R9 Chief Executive Officer of Islamic Relief 26 March 2019
Malaysia (IRM)
R10 Secretary and Researcher of the Palestine Unit, 24 March 2019
HALUAN
R11 Head of Bureau of HALUAN 24 March 2019
R12 Head of Working Committee of Cakna 19 September 2019
PALESTIN
R13 Coordinator of CAKNA PALESTIN 19 September 2019

3.4 Procedure of Data Collection

The process of collecting primary data for the first fieldwork took nine (9)

months. Fieldwork was carried out primarily in Klang Valley, Penang and Kelantan

from January 2019 to early September 2019. However, the MAPIM President was

interviewed twice (7 July 2020) to confirm his previous information and clarify a few

findings.

Before the interview process, participants were contacted via email with an

attached official letter (using Universiti Sains Malaysia’s letterhead). Research

63
questions are also attached with the letter. All letters are signed and approved by my

main supervisor, Dr Azmil Bin Tayeb (See Appendix F). The interview sessions were

done individually with the participants in their offices and homes. To facilitate

understanding amongst respondents, research questions are translated into the Malay

language. Process of transcribing all data were however done immediately in the

English language.

All 13 participants were provided with a set of semi-structured interview to

gauge the sentiment of their respective MFBOs towards Islamic altruistic values and

financing modalities. The complete set of the research questions is documented in

Appendix B.

Three steps were taken in this research to ensure the reliability or dependability

of the obtained data. First, all interview sessions were recorded in a recording device

(Piaw, 2012). Second, all data obtained during fieldwork were transcribed from the

recording. The interview recordings were replayed when further clarity was needed

during data transcription. Third, the participants were referred to again when analysis

results were made from their previous interview session. Additional information was

included as needed.

Apart from extracting such data from the participants, primary data were also

obtained from author observations during his direct professional involvement with an

MFBO (MAPIM) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia. These were mainly

written notes taken during his attendance at meetings on issues pertaining to Gaza’s

humanitarian and political development.

Secondary data is obtained from MFBO brochures which depict their approach

towards assisting Palestinians in Gaza. Related information was also gathered from the

64
official website and Facebook account of the respective MFBOs, which are constantly

updated with their latest initiatives.

3.5 Data Analysis

Except for IRM, all interview sessions with the participants from another six

MFBOs were recorded by phone by the interviewer. Permission for recording was

denied by the CEO of IRM as the works of IRM were apolitical, hence, preferred not

to be linked to some of the debates mentioned in this research.

The voice recordings from the interview sessions were transcribed into field

reports with Microsoft Word. The data obtained from the questionnaires were clustered

based on the different stages of the humanitarian and development cycle as well as the

project types, i.e., socio-economic project or public related projects. The selected list

of field reports is attached in Appendix C.

3.5.1 Analytical Steps

In this research, a manual approach was used for thematic analysis. In specific,

the thematic approach by Braun and Clarke (2006) was used to analyse the emerging

themes from the feedback of the participants obtained in Parts A and B. Thematic

analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within

data. As argued by Braun and Clarke (2006), a theme captures something important

about the data and research question and represents some level of patterned response

or meaning. The six steps prescribed by Braun and Clarke (2006) were applied

consistently to synthesise the obtained data. The six steps are as follows:

65
1. Familiarising with data

The interview recordings were first transcribed and then the transcribed data

were read multiple times for familiarisation. The recordings were replayed as needed

for the same purposes too. During the process, initial ideas were noted down.

2. Code generation

The preliminary codes were identified once the data were familiarised. The

codes were the features of the data that appeared interesting and meaningful to the

research questions and objectives.

3. Searching for themes

In the third step, the generated codes were interpreted. This involved the

process of identifying the relationship between codes and combining different codes

to produce the initial themes.

4. Reviewing themes

A deeper review of the initial themes was done at this stage. As proposed by

Braun and Clarke (2006), the main approach was done through questioning whether

to combine, refine, separate or discard the initial themes. The data within the themes

were analysed to determine if they cohere together meaningfully as well as to ensure

the distinctions between the themes were clear and identifiable. The relevance of each

data to the research question and objectives was also checked. A few unrelated themes

were discarded throughout the process.

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5. Defining and naming themes

The themes and potential subthemes were defined and refined based on the

data.

6. Producing the report

The reports and analytical understanding of the whole process are provided in

Chapter 4 subsections 4.2.2 and 4.3.2. In these subsections, the institutionalisation of

religious values or financing modalities in the projects related to the socio-economic

and public sectors are discussed.

3.6 Research Design for Field Work 2

Analysing the Aid Policies of Malaysian Faith Based Organisations in Agriculture

and Education Sectors Against the Fragile State Principles of the OECD

A qualitative research design was implemented in the second fieldwork for

providing descriptive information through a set of comprehensive questions

(Appendix C).

To extract the necessary data, semi-structured research interviews were

employed to understand if the aid policies of the MFBOs in agriculture and education

sectors were in parallel with the FSPs, which were (1) taking the local context of Gaza

as a starting point for assistance planning, (2) doing no harm through aid projects in

Gaza, (3) aligning aid policy with the local priorities in Gaza and (4) avoiding pockets

of exclusion in Gaza through aid projects.

67
 The aforementioned principles were modified to suit the agricultural and

education-related themes in the fieldwork. Below are examples of the tailored themes.

Agriculture (FSP 1 – FSP 4)

FSP 1 Taking the local context of Gaza as a starting point for any agricultural
assistance;

FSP 2 Doing no harm through agricultural aid projects in Gaza;

FSP 3 Aligning agricultural aid policy with the local priorities in Gaza;

FSP 4 Avoiding pockets of exclusion in Gaza through agricultural aid projects.

Education (FSP 1 – FSP 4)

FSP 1 Taking the local context of Gaza as a starting point for any education
assistance planning;

FSP 2 Doing no harm through education aid projects in Gaza;

FSP 3 Aligning education aid policy with the local priorities in Gaza;

FSP 4 Avoiding pockets of exclusion in Gaza through education aid projects.

Additional four related questions were developed from each of the

aforementioned FSPs within the agricultural and education themes. The four questions

were meant to dissect the potential adherence (or not?) towards the aforementioned

FSPs from more than one perspective.

3.7 Sample Frame

The sampling strategy for the second fieldwork of this study was determined

through a purposive method. This non-probability approach (also known as judgment,

selective or subjective sampling) is a sampling technique the relies on the judgement

68
of the researcher in selecting members of the population to take part in the research

(Dudovskiy, 2019).

The purposive sampling method used in this research was driven by a similar

set of conditions as stipulated in Section 3.3, given this fieldwork was still on the

MFBO sector. However, since the specific interest of this fieldwork was on the aid

policies for agriculture and education sectors, only the MFBOs with existing long-term

projects as such in Gaza were selected. Four MFBOs in Penang and Klang Valley were

identified to have matched with the requirement. From these four MFBOs, ten

participants who were holding various leadership, management and policy-making

roles were interviewed.

Specifically, the selected MFBOs were MYC (two participants), AP (five

participants), MC (one participant) and HL (two participants). Among the participants,

three were Palestinians. The data obtained from interviewing these individuals were

invaluable given their rich insights on the implemented agricultural and education

projects.

Tables 3.2 provides the list of the interviewed participants with their position

in their respective MFBOs.

69
Table 3.2
List of Participants for the Second Fieldwork

List of the participants interviewed

Code Name Position Date interviewed

R14 AP ground staff/PR Coordinator in Gaza 7 November 2019
(Palestinian)
R15 Project Coordinator of AP/Dermasiswa 13 October 2020
(Palestinian) Scholarship Program

R16 CEO of MyCare 5 October 2020

R17 Project Coordinator of MyCare Scholarship 11 October 2020
(Palestinian) Program

R18 Current Secretary and Researcher of the Palestine 9 October 2020

Unit, HALUAN
R10 Former Secretary and Researcher of the Palestine 9 October 2020
Unit, HALUAN
R8 Director of Strategic Research and Development 12 October 2020
Division, Muslim Care
R4 Media Director of AP 6 October 2020
R5 Administrative Assistant of Donorship Unit in 28 September 2020
AP, Penang
R6 Administrative Assistant of Finance Unit in AP, 28 September 2020
Penang

3.8 Procedure of Data Collection for the Second Fieldwork

The process of collecting primary data for the second fieldwork took one month

(September to October 2020). Data for one Gazan Palestinian respondent however was

collected in late 2019. He was not available to meet me in 2020. This specific second

fieldwork was conducted primarily in Klang Valley and Penang. Before the interview

process, all participants were contacted via email with an attached official letter (using

Universiti Sains Malaysia’s letterhead) and research questions. All letters are signed

and approved by my main supervisor, Dr Azmil Bin Tayeb (See Appendix F). The

interview sessions were done individually with the participants in their offices and

homes. To facilitate understanding amongst respondents, research questions are all

70
translated into the Malay language. Though the original language of the research

questions (English) are maintained when Palestinians are interviewed. Process of

transcribing all data were however done immediately in the English language.

All 10 participants were interviewed using the semi-structured interview to

extract the required data. The complete set of the research questions are documented

in Appendix C. It must be noted out of 10 respondents, (R4, 5, 6, 8, 10) are repeated

respondents from Fieldwork 1. It is judged this set of respondents equally have the

credible insights on agriculture and education aid projects by their respective MFBOs.

A similar set of steps were taken in this fieldwork (as the first fieldwork) to

ensure the reliability or dependability of the collected data. One way to achieve

reliability and dependability is through having interviews recorded (Piaw, 2012).

Hence, in the second fieldwork, all interviews were recorded with Samsung Galaxy

JPrime mobile phone. All data obtained during the fieldwork were then transcribed.

The interview recordings were replayed when further clarity was needed during

transcribing.

Using the same approach as the first fieldwork, the primary data in the second

fieldwork were obtained from the brochures of the selected MFBOs which depict their

approach towards assisting Palestinians in Gaza. First-hand information was equally

gathered from the official website and Facebook account of the respective MFBOs.

3.9 Data Analysis for Fieldwork 2

As mentioned earlier, semi-structured research questionnaires were employed

to extract the necessary data. Specifically, the questions were constructed to

understand if the aid policies of the selected MFBOs in agriculture and education

71
sectors were in parallel with the FSPs, which were (1) taking the local context of Gaza

as a starting point for assistance planning, (2) doing no harm through aid projects in

Gaza, (3) aligning aid policy with the local priorities in Gaza and (4) avoiding pockets

of exclusion in Gaza through aid projects.

3.9.1 Analytical Steps

The key method used to explore and analyse the aid behavioural policy of

MFBOs against the FSPs of the OECD was through interviewing the participants with

four research questionnaires under each of the FSPs. Figure 3.1 provides the overall

approach including the process of data analysis, using FSP 1 as an example.

Figure 3.1. The process of querying related questions pertaining to FSP 1

Under each FSP, four related semi-structured questions were asked to the

participants. The four questions were meant to dissect the potential adherence (or not?)

to the respective FSPs from different perspectives. The data obtained from these

questions were then thematically analysed using the six steps as prescribed by Braun

and Clarke (2006). In summary, the data were coded and synthesised into different

72
themes. Only critical themes were included to ensure a succinct analysis. Figure 3.2

depicts the overall process.

Collection, Coding and Creating themes Analysis

Four types of Analyse themes

related questions Deriving Participants
participants explanation are against related
posed under explanations for coded and turned FSP
each different requirements
each questions into themes
FSP's

Figure 3.2. The process of analysing the policies of MFBOs within the FSP
framework

The final part of the analytical process involved benchmarking the produced

themes against the requirements stated in each FSPs (OECD, 2011). The reports and

analytical understanding of the whole process were provided in Chapter 5, subsections

5.2.2 (agriculture) and 5.3.2 (education).

3.10 Research Trustworthiness

Triangulation was used in this research to assure the trustworthiness of the

research process. Denzin (1989, p.237) defined triangulation as “researchers explicitly

search for as many data sources as possible that bear upon the events under analysis”.

For example, to obtain the updated information on the agricultural and education

projects of AP Malaysia in Gaza, a separate discussion was carried out in August 2019

with personnel of AP Malaysia who just returned from Gaza in mid-2019. This effort

was mainly to get an initial understanding of the education and agricultural projects

that were implemented by AP around the study period and to formulate a more tailored

approach to the semi-structured research questions. However, a similar discussion with

MyCare on its agricultural and education projects was not available. The data of this

73
research were compared with the notes accumulated by the researcher based on his

previous experience liaising with different MFBOs during his tenures as a researcher

for a human rights NGO in Penang.

Similarly, a Palestinian doctoral candidate from the University of Malaya, who

was working with Palestinian Cultural Organisation Malaysia (PCOM) in Kuala

Lumpur, was consulted on the collected notes in October 2020 to ensure all

information and analysis were reasonable. For the record, PCOM is a grass-roots

organisation affiliated with the Government in Gaza.

All semi-structured interview questionnaires were translated into the Malay

language. The Malay version of semi-structured interview questionnaires was used in

the fieldwork to enhance the comprehension of the local informants on the overall

research objective and the required information. English version of questionnaires was

used when interviewing Palestinians.

During the interviews, the instruments were constantly evaluated and the

participants were asked if they have any comments on the questions asked. The

participants were encouraged to provide new insights, where possible (Rubin & Rubin,

2005). Additionally, all interviews were recorded and transcribed in Word files after

each interview was completed. The recordings were replayed if there was any unclear

information to ensure the accuracy of the transcription and data reliability.

74