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Reflective essay on the experienced Negotiation Simulation

Suruchi Sharma
Group 5, OAU TEAM
U7234634

“It is hard to ‘walk the talk' in real life”, the negotiation simulation conducted on 24th
may precisely made this point.This essay is a reflective document which draws a
reflective background of the events which took place during this simulation for group
five, the group, which did not reach a consensus for the Ceasefire Agreement.

Key takeaways
Group five teams were already divided before the collection of briefing packs, so a
sense of unawareness was there on the personalities or possible behavior of the
participants from the beginning. In real world situations, there usually exists pre
existing background knowledge on individuals or government foreign policy
behaviors.Indeed what was provided,on the briefing about the countries and their
leadership was certainly helpful,but leaders themselves do not represent the
delegation, the government diplomats also do not imitate their leaders,national
interests are more important than positions and stands.

The Organisation of African Union,made up of three participants went on to study the

material for three hours, a grave mistake, I would consider, because this time should
have been used to discuss and ultimately reach a consensus on the approach, style
and methodology in the negotiation which followed.Instead the OAU team had
disagreements about how to even discuss these important points. In a sense the OAU
team itself required mediators.This was very informative as a reflection to the real
world application of this, the mediation team itself needs to be in consensus and
harmony to be facilitating mediation.

The next stage was the setting up of the meeting with the two countries. Here I would
say there were a lot of mistakes but it is also most real world, since such meetings are
more formal, not to forget the depth of the conflict and ‘casualties’,to lighten this
atmosphere,any activity was unanimously considered disrespectful but there were
ample refreshments and comfortable placement.Another mistake would be the
separatist approach in discussing the conflict with the two countries, the OAU team
was divided into groups of two for the Tulia team and one in for Ibad team.These
discussions also took more than necessary amount of time, when almost everything
was mentioned in the briefings for the respective teams.The placement of the the two
teams should not have been opposing each other, this made the OAU team obsolete
and almost invisible at certain points in the discussion.Hand raising principle, was
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moderated by the chairman of the OAU team, but since there was no formed
methodology there were visible disagreements between the OAU team which did not
reflect well and was hence unsuccessful in gathering trust from both the delegations.In
real world, the UN as moderator is untrustworthy in the sense that it has no actual
authority but only a reflective authority as that of its five veto countries.The OAU itself
was presented as an imperfect and weak organization as it was structurally pacifist
which is a red flag.To avoid chaos,it even allowed an alleged corrupt tyrant such a
Tulia’s dictator, Large Papa to run the organization for a year.

Possible experienced challenges to the Yemen conflict

As such it is without a doubt that the real world Yemen conflict is unfolding the way it is.
If it was this difficult to solve a conflict with only one possible non state actor, it must be
quite a task to incorporate very voice into the discussion much less generate and
create a trustworthy dialogue with any of the participants.We requested from the Ibad
team to create such a dialogue with the Liberation front, which they accepted to initiate
with instance on no responsibility of acceptance or decline.Even the talk for the talks
were difficult for the Yemen conflict considering the blockade and the weak diplomatic
channels(Clements,2019,pg57). The regional nature of any conflict must and should
incorporate only regional members, the moment outside forces influence any
decision(s),the conflict turns chronic.Entry and exist when deemed profitable by foreign
elements only degresses and worsens the conflict and later the
resolution(Babbitt,2009,pg545:hume 1994).

Timing is everything in negotiation, when is a conflict negotiated also gives the power
positions in conflict resolution meeting.Ibad had encountered mass killings and this
showed in the meeting.Even in the Yemen conflict, the Month of Ramadan, April
proved to be a much more stable time to initiate dialogue utilizing the religious
sentiments of both Houthis and the Soudi led coalition(William,patton,fisher,Getting to
yes,1991,ch3,7)

At times, some conflicts do not require an over enthusiastic and overbearing Mediator,
the mediating team also needs to get their timing correct and mediation should ideally
not be used as means to achieve personal goals which is usually the case in real
world.OAU wanted to maintain peace but UN does not possess such clear and
transparent objective, it will certainly hold a dubious identity for both houthis and the
yemen saudi coalition.

Impact of personality and Negotiation style in the simulation

Based on a personality evaluation I am considered to be a Process oriented person.
This is probably true, if not for the fact that I suggested the natural resource
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exchange,and voting rights for the ‘oppressed community in Tulia” as actual actionable
and effective outcomes(Zartman,2013,pg113,115).The construction and appointment of
the chairman of the mediating team is therefore quite important.I would have
dominated the meeting more than necessary, had I been the chairman.

My negotiating style was to facilitate and placate the Ibad delegation into
understanding their interest and resultant positions, requirements and prospective
response to requests(babbitt,2009,pg541).That meeting went quite smoothly but since
there was less time to make the everyone aware of the current situation, I should not
have prolonged the initial meeting.There was lack of coordination from my side and an
immediate time crunch.I also consider myself not to possess a confident personality,
which is why I fumbled quite a lot while speaking, definitely in need of intensive
personality classes and drills.

Conclusion
We deflected from our motive to obtain a ceasefire, to reach conflict resolution.There
was no scope to agree to a ceasefire, both parties, especially Ibad representation
seemed firm on their agenda to receive actionable response as a resolution of the
entire conflict(sherman,2018,pg13). The concept of Ceasefire was proposed but there
was an absolute lack of trust.This is most likely true for the real world negotiations.The
ultimate objective of this simulation was most likely, achieved in my case,“ negotiations
are difficult, it is perfectly logical if the negotiation was unsuccessful,disagreements
speak and are valuable(Wright,2014,pg3),negotiations can never and should never be
hurried”.

References

Babbitt, Eileen F. "The evolution of international conflict resolution: From Cold War to
peacebuilding." Negotiation Journal 25, no. 4 (2009): 539-549.

Zartman, I. William. "Diplomacy as Negotiation and Mediation." Diplomacy in a Globalizing World:

Theories and Practices (2013): 110-126.

Clements, Ashley Jonathan. Humanitarian negotiations with armed groups: the frontlines of
diplomacy. Routledge, 2019.

Sherman, Ambassador Wendy R. Not for the Faint of Heart: Lessons in Courage, Power, and
Persistence. Hachette UK, 2018.

The Adversary Wright, Robin . The New Yorker ; New York Vol. 90, Iss. 14, (May 26, 2014)

Fisher, R., and WE Patton Ury. "Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in." (1991).
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Ury, William, Bruce Patton, and Roger Fisher. Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without
giving in. New York: Penguin Books, 1991.

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis