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Analytical Philosophy
Anscombe and Davidson on Practical Knowledge: A
Volume 5, Number 6 Reply to Hunter
Olav Gjelsvik
Editor in Chief
Kevin C. Klement, University of Massachusetts
Editorial Board
Annalisa Coliva, University of Modena and UC Irvine David Hunter has recently argued (in this journal) that Don-
Gary Ebbs, Indiana University Bloomington ald Davidson and Elizabeth Anscombe were in basic agreement
Greg Frost-Arnold, Hobart and William Smith Colleges about practical knowledge. In this reply, it is my contention
Henry Jackman, York University that Hunter’s fascinating claim may not be satisfactorily war-
Sandra Lapointe, McMaster University ranted. To throw light on why, a more careful consideration of
Consuelo Preti, The College of New Jersey the role of the notion of practical knowledge in Anscombe’s ap-
Marcus Rossberg, University of Connecticut proach to intentional action is undertaken. The result indicates
Anthony Skelton, Western University a possible need to distinguish between what is called ‘practical
Mark Textor, King’s College London knowledge’ and ‘(non-observational) knowledge of what one is
Audrey Yap, University of Victoria doing’, and shows that Hunter’s claim concerning the closeness
Richard Zach, University of Calgary of Anscombe to Davidson only has plausibility for knowledge
of what one is doing. Contrary to an interesting suggestion by
Review Editors Hunter, the paper argues that it is hard to see how Davidson’s
Sean Morris, Metropolitan State University of Denver position can benefit substantially from making use of the notion
Sanford Shieh, Wesleyan University of knowledge of what one is doing.
Design
Daniel Harris, Hunter College
jhaponline.org
Let me again repeat what Hunter writes: ‘a careful study of their I am very grateful to Jennifer Hornsby and Natalia Waights
writings shows that in fact they held remarkably similar views Hickman for help and comments on this material. Anonymous
on the nature and need for practical knowledge’ (2015, 3). We referees gave very constructive and helpful suggestions; a big
now see that this is not warranted. We have, however, reached thank you to them as well. The research for this paper has
some agreement with Hunter to the effect that Anscombe and been supported by the Norwegian Research Council, project
Davidson might have held somewhat similar views about the 179566/F30.
role of ‘agential knowledge’ in determining the extension of the
class of intentional actions. But we have also concluded that Olav Gjelsvik
the point where they really differ is on the nature and need for University of Oslo
practical productive knowledge, and, more generally, on what a olav.gjelsvik@csmn.uio.no
metaphysical account of intentional action should be.
Davidson does not in his writings attempt to make use of a References
notion of productive knowledge, nor is there any direct comment
upon Anscombe’s notion of ‘practical knowledge’. We could Anscombe, G. E. M., 1957. Intention. Oxford: Blackwell.
see the divide between the two as part of the big divide in , 1996. ‘Practical Inference.’ Reprinted in Virtues and Rea-
philosophy between those who try and make do with causal sons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory, edited by R. Hursthouse,
notions in accounting for something that other philosophers G. Lawrence and W. Quinn, pp. 1–24. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
account for by some concept of knowledge. (Of course, the sity Press.
causal approach can extend to knowledge itself.20) Davidson, Donald, 1980. Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford:
Simply put: Davidson tries to do without a notion of pro- Oxford University Press.
ductive practical knowledge, or a notion doing some equivalent Haddock, Adrian, 2011. ‘The Knowledge That a Man Has of His
metaphysical job, although he also acknowledges that his at- Intentional Actions.’ In Essays on Anscombe’s Intention, edited
tempt to account for intentional action in terms of its cause had by Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby and Frederick Stoutland,
not ultimately succeeded. Agential knowledge in the form he pp. 147–69. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
accepts cannot, it seems, easily be brought in to complete his Hunter, David, 2015. ‘Davidson on Practical Knowledge.’ Journal
own type of account; at the very least quite a lot more needs for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3.9: 1–19.
to be said to make that plausible. I thus throw the ball back Hursthouse, Rosalind, 1991. ‘Arational Actions.’ The Journal of
into Hunter’s court, and encourage him to try and do more to Philosophy 88: 57–68.
achieve this. Peacocke, Christopher, 2014. The Mirror of the World: Subjects,
Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
20Note that by saying that something is accounted for by some notion of sity Press.
knowledge, and not from for instance causal notions, does not stand in the way
of seeing what is thus accounted for as having causes and effects. In this sense Schwenkler, John, 2015. ‘Understanding Practical Knowledge.’
‘practical knowledge’ is a ‘causal concept’; namely a concept of something Philosophers’ Imprint 15: 1–32.
with causal properties.