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HOME  ISSUE 31  Federalism at the SPECIAL ISSUE TRENDSETTERS


Forefront of Myanmar’s Revolution (ISSUE 34)
Holdin

Federalism at the g the


Reigns:
Steerin
Forefront of Recognizing the
g
develo
Myanmar’s instrumental role of
former Japanese
pment
in
Revolution Prime Minster Shinzo
Abe for both the
Thailan
d

HTET MIN LWIN establishment of the


Indo-Pacific as a Ambiv
geopolitical concept alent
and the development Alignm
of Japanese-Southeast ent?
The
Asian relations, the Sino-
essays in this special Russia
issue investigate the n
legacy of his Partne
rship
government for the and
future of the region. Thailan
Since independence, Myanmar has been d’s
Perspe
in search of a political system to ctives
accommodate its rich cultural, linguistic, on the R
Ukrainia
ethnic, and religious identities. Ethnic
minorities have called for federalism as a
– Indonesia
way to ensure the equality and rights of Shinzo Abe’s Military Thai
all groups. However, under the highly PM
Legacy for
Srettha
centralized system imposed by the Indonesia: The Seed 100
military dictatorships that controlled Planted for the Day
Future Scorec
Myanmar from 1962 to 2010, any ard:
Bima Prawira Utama,
discussion of federalism was impossible. Thailan
PhD candidate, d is
The political transition under the 2008
Universitas Open
Constitution created a centralized form Padjadjaran, for
of federalism, but even under the Indonesia Busine
ss
National League for Democracy (NLD)
government (2016-2021), the actual work
and vision of Burmese government Thaksi
remained centralized. n’s
– Philippines Check
Philippine-Japan mate
After summarizing this history, this Relations: Friends and
article focuses on the ways in which the with Benefits the
Unrave
2021 coup fundamental altered the Karl Ian Cheng Chua, lling of
political debate on federalism. It Visiting Professor, Thailan
considers how young ethnic minority Hitotsubashi d’s
University, Japan Constit
leaders put federalism at the center of utional
the demands of the anti-coup Order
movement, and notes a shift in
discourse around ethnicity: there is a Why
move away from the previous focus on – Singapore foreign
ethnic-genealogical models of Japan-Singapore MSMEs
Relations and Shinzo sponta
federalism, and towards an inclusive neousl
Abe
civil-territorial model. It then considers y
Kei Koga, Associate promot
the significance of the Committee Professor, Nanyang e CSR:
Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Technological A case
(CRPH)’s abolition of the 2008 University, Singapore of the
oolong
Constitution and adoption of a Federal tea
Democracy Charter, Part I of which industry
enshrines broad-minded federal
principles. These developments and the The
– Thailand
acceptance of federalism as the political Japanese-Thai Absenc
future of Myanmar show the success of e of
Relations through
any
efforts to provide federalism training Two Coups: Back to Move
over the past decade. However, deep, Business Forwar
David M. Malitz, d in
multi-faceted and multi-layered societal Thailan
Senior Research
divides remain around ethnicity, d
Fellow, DIJ, Japan
geography, citizenship, and religion,
among other cleavages. The current
Seekin
situation has not resolved these divides g Love
and united people overnight; there are and
– Vietnam Marria
still significant issues of trust. Moreover,
Vietnam-Japan ge in
practical negotiations, particularly on Japan
Relations under the
Part II of the Federal Democracy Charter Among
Abe Administration Indone
will be needed to put into practice the Hoang Minh Hang, sian
values set out in Part I and establish a Senior Researcher, Migran
t
federal system. Institute of Northeast
Worker
Asian Studies, s
Vietnam Academy of
Social Sciences,
Vietnam Bendin
g with
the
Wind
OLDER PAST
Again?
ISSUES
Thailan
d’s
Foreign
Policy
after
the
May
Electio
n
The Federal Dilemma in Digital
Myanmar repress
ion of
protest
Myanmar is an immensely diverse movem
country in ethnic, religious, linguistic, ents:
#What
and cultural terms, but the Buddhist shappe
Bamar form the numeric majority and ninginS
have traditionally dominated the outhea
stAsia
government. Ethnic minority leaders
(both from political parties and Ethnic
Armed Organizations (EAOs)) have long Furthe
seen federalism as a way to protect the r
reflecti
rights and interests of their populations, on:
including from exploitation or Finding
a
oppression by the Bamar, and to shift balanc
power from the central government to e
the state level. These calls for betwee
n
decentralization and federalism were comfor
rarely welcomed by national leaders. As t zone
and
early as 1959, Silverstein coined the “new
term “federal dilemma” to describe the normal
situation in which the leadership ”
teachi
preferred a form of majoritarian ng
democracy, but for political reasons had online
to allow a certain flavor of federalism for
the ethnic minorities. The
Unforg
The military regimes that controlled ettable
Periph
Myanmar from 1962 to 2010 established ery:
a highly centralized system. As one of Southe
the justifications given for military rule ast
Asian
was the need to prevent the breakup of Nature
Myanmar, federalism (which was seen as of
China’s
a possible step towards secession by
ethnic states) was viewed with suspicion. Southw
Frontier
With the political transition initiated in
2010, federalism ceased to be a taboo
subject, but power nonetheless Thailan
remained centralized under the 2008 d’s
Planne
Constitution. d F-35A
Purcha
Under the NLD government, as with se: Is It
a
previous administrations, the political Necess
elite remained divided on which political ity or a
structures could provide the autonomy Strong
man
that ethnic minorities demanded, while Leader
not creating or exacerbating other ship
Ego?
problems. There were important
concessions, however: negotiations
around the peace process converged on The
the agreement that the future of Fantas
y of
Myanmar was as a federal state. Despite Homog
this, heated disagreements remained enous
Time:
around terminology, in particular the When
difference between “federal democracy” the
and “democratic federal state”. This Cold
War
reflected the lack of trust among Never
stakeholders, but also contributed to Existed
and
ethnic leaders’ perception that the NLD Thailan
was prioritizing democratization over d
federalism. Fought
for
Vietna
Meanwhile, civil society organizations m’s
used the opportunities offered by the Indepe
ndence
opening up of civil space following the
political transition to carry out a wide
range of educational activities on Same
federalism, from town-hall style Same –
only
meetings to more tailored and advanced Differen
Reflecti
courses. This amplified the issue and Squand
secured its place in development America
discourse, as well as won over new Prestige
advocates.
From
Federalism in the anti- Social
Regula
coup movement and the tion to
GSC-N Social
Movem
ents:
Federalism was not at the forefront of Interna
tional
political demands in the immediate
networ
aftermath of the coup on 1 February k in
2021. Early protests demanded the organiz
ing the
release of political leaders and the ALTERS
restoration of the democratically-elected EA
Confer
government, but did not mention ence
federalism. In other words, these
protesters called for the reversal of the
coup, but remained within the A
Counte
conceptual framework provided by the r-Peace
2008 Constitution. Perspe
ctive
on
It was the General Strike Committee of Thailan
Nationalities (GSC-N) that brought the d’s
political call for federal democracy into Southe
rn
the anti-coup movement, as both a Conflic
popular demand and an objective t
endorsed by the CRPH. The GSC-N is an
alliance of youth networks, many of
Transg
whom had been exposed to federalism ender
and other concepts from the social Studies
in the
sciences during the previous decade. Kathoe
Although most were Yangon-based, they is’
were born in ethnic states, and have Commu
both personal and institutional
connections with ethnic political parties Brazil’s
and EAOs. With this background, it is Quadr
unsurprising that the GSC-N’s demands uple
Crisis –
included the establishment of a federal And
democratic union, as well as collective Why It
Matter
leadership, equality and justice, mutual s For
respect, and self-determination. These Southe
demands set the GSC-N apart from other ast
Asia
protest groups, which focused on the
release of prisoners and respect for the
2020 election result. As one GSC-N Hinderi
ng
leader said, “we, the ethnic minorities,
Democ
have deeper demands. Our vision is to ratizati
establish a federal democratic union on:
Thailan
with all nationalities who belong in d’s
Myanmar.” This vision proved popular, Well-
Travele
especially in ethnic States where protests d
were held in the name of the GSC-N and Trojan
echoed their five demands. Horse

The
State
of
Creativ
e
Activis
m in
Post-
Cold
War
Southe
Taunggyi, Myanmar – March 2021: Peaceful
protesters against the military coup: R. Bociaga / ast
Shutterstock.com Asia
and
the
2021
The need for an inclusive Myanm

imagination: a collective
public apology Throug
h Thick
and
Traditionally, calls for federalism in Thin:
Myanmar have envisaged an ethnic- The
Solidar
genealogical model, with the creation of ity of
states for the ethnic minorities within the
Crown
which they form the majority, thus and
enabling them to preserve their own Capital
languages and cultures. As a result, ists in
the
questions of ethnicity and federalism Face of
have been closely linked. It is therefore Thai
Protest
interesting to note that the GSC-N also s
tried to redefine the conception and
narrative of ethnicity in Myanmar.
Vietna
Traditionally, the term “ethnicity” is m’s
COVID-
equated with the Burmese “taìn-yìn-dhà”, 19
which is understood as referring to only Succes
s Story:
the 135 “national races” recognized by From
the state; it thus excludes other ethnic Low-
minorities such as ethnic Chinese and Cost to
High-
Rohingya. In order to distance Flexibil
themselves from the narrow definition ity
Strateg
evoked by “taìn-yìn-dhà”, the GSC-N y
called themselves “lu-myò-zoun”
meaning “variety of lu-myò” (kinds of
people). In their list of lu-myòs, they Calls
from
include “ka-byà” and “Myanmar Profess
Muslims”, neither of which were ionals
for a
recognized as “taìn-yìn-dhà”. In adopting ‘Digital
the GSC-N’s name and principles, Culture
Policy’
protesters across the country have also in Vietn
adopted this shift in the conception of
ethnicity. Lawfar
e
Meanwhile, witnessing the Myanmar Strateg
military’s brutality firsthand led many y of
the
people to reexamine their perceptions Nation
on the sufferings of ethnic minorities, al
Unity
including the Rohingya. Social media Govern
users have apologized for their past ment
attitudes and expressed solidarity. For of
Myan
example, one said, “We will take lessons mar
from all these events. From now on, for
every human right violation and every
A
injustice done to Rohingya taìn-yìn-dhà questio
and others, regardless of geography, n of
ethnicity and religion, we will object and agency
:
fight for federal democracy union and Southe
for justice. We will continue our battle ast
Asia
together with all taìn-yìn-dhà people of and
Myanmar”. Young people on social AUKUS
media also started to question the – Being
‘stuck
concept of ‘taìn-yìn-dhà’ and its use as in the
the basis of an ethnic-genealogical middle’
does
model of federalism, instead arguing for not
a civic-territorial model. Meanwhile mean
protesters on the streets called for non- ‘ASEAN
Central
discrimination on the grounds of ity’
ethnicity and religion. Thus, the call for
federal democracy from the GSC-N and a
Southe
public catharsis of apologies combined ast
to become a strong popular demand for Asia’s
federal democracy. Democ
racies
have
Collapse
Politics
Stagnat
COVID-1
That?

Comm
unity
Land
Muslim Rohingya waiting the foods in the refugee Titling
camp in Bangladesh. HAFIZIE SHABUDIN / Policy
Shutterstock.com and
Bureau
CRPH and its young cratic
Resista
leadership nce in
Thailan
d
During discussions on forming a national
unity government, the National Unity
Consultative Council (NUCC) became a Can
place for CRPH, ethnic political parties, the
Victims
and movement leaders to discuss the Speak?
political situation and organize the new Localit
y in
civilian government. In this context, Conflic
CRPH members met with the GSC-N, t
who proposed that the CRPH show its Resolu
tion in
commitment to federal democracy by Papua
abolishing the 2008 Constitution and
signing a formal agreement endorsing
The
the GSC-N’s principles. The GSC-N’s School
slogans also revived the debate on and
whether “federalism” or “democracy” Society
amid
should come first in the official political the
vocabulary. The wording “federal Pande
mic: A
democracy” had gained public traction Teache
and was strongly supported by high level r’s
Reflect
ion
leaders, including ethnic minority
political parties and EAOs.
Japan:
The
Members of the CRPH were aware of the Despot
never-ending debates on vocabulary that s’
Accom
had arisen during the peace process plice in
negotiations, and of their pressing need Asia
to form a united alliance. The CRPH
therefore yielded to the demands of
ethnic political groups and on March 5,
formally adopted “federal democracy” as
the official term. At the same time, in an
unprecedented political breakthrough,
the CRPH departed from the NLD’s
previous official policy of national
reconciliation, and pledged that they
would abolish the 2008 Constitution,
replacing it with a federal constitution.
To follow through on these promises, the
NUCC drafted the Federal Democracy
Charter, Part I of which sets out broad-
minded federal principles, and the CRPH
announced the abolition of the 2008
Constitution. As a legal advisor noted,
this decision was driven by politics,
rather than legal considerations. Legally,
it is odd to have removed the 2008
Constitution, which provides legal
continuity and legitimacy as the elected
government, and thus potential for
international recognition.

Of course, there were concerns that


CRPH’s concessions were just a way to
please the public, rather than reflecting a
real commitment to federal democracy.
In other words, that this was a return to
Silverstein’s “federal dilemma” and that
like previous federal initiatives by Bamar
political leaders, these would prove
“cynical and expedient instead of sincere
and consistent”. These concerns are
heightened by the CRPH’s inheritance of
the NLD’s political legacy, since the CRPH
was formed mostly around NLD
members, and has been endorsed by the
NLD leadership. The CRPH is therefore
reasonable seen as NLD-dominated (and
consequently Bamar-dominated), leaving
some suspicious that it may simply be a
repackaging of its predecessor’s
positions. On the other hand, the CRPH
was not formed by the top leadership of
the NLD, supporting the view that its
new and young leaders are genuine in
their desire to see a federal Burma. In
this respect, the apology from one CRPH
member to Rohingya people was seen as
an important indication of their attitude.

Conclusion
This article is an attempt to understand
the development of the federalism
debate in the post-transition years
generally, but especially in the complex
and complicated aftermath of the coup.
While the anti-coup movement’s initial
focus was on removing the military
dictatorship, it rapidly shifted to the
broader political goal of transforming
the state’s structure, especially following
the growing profile of the GSC-N and
related social movements. Achieving this
obviously requires removing the military
junta. But as importantly, it requires a
unified political leadership among anti-
coup parties, which will come about only
when deep-rooted grievances held by
ethnic political parties are addressed,
racism and prejudice reduced, and
historic trust deficits overcome.

While this may seem an almost


insurmountable obstacle, there has been
a substantial shift in public attitudes,
with people embracing not only the idea
of federalism, but also increasingly
looking towards a civic-territorial rather
than an ethnic-genealogical model of
federalism. This helped push the CRPH
to commit to establishing a federal
system and abolishing the 2008
Constitution. These are positive
developments, even if they have not
resolved the decades-long discussion of
what form of federal system is best for
Myanmar. In short, the coup has
fundamentally transformed Myanmar’s
deliberations on federalism and
prompted constructive discussions
around the issue of “taing-yin-dhà”, but
the road to reforming the political
system nonetheless remains long.

Htet Min Lwin


PhD Candidate, York University, UK

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