MODULE 3 THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces
Territory
Clyde
● Magallona v Ermita, G.R. 187167 (2011)
Facts:
In 2009, Congress amended Republic Act No.
3046 (RA 3046) a law demarcating the maritime
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic
State by enacting RA 9552. The change was
prompted by the need to make RA 3046
compliant with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III), which the Philippines ratified on 27
February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS III
prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and
contour of baselines of archipelagic States like
the Philippines and sets the deadline for the
filing of application for the extended continental
shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA
9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the
location of some basepoints around the
Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent
territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group
(KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of
islands" whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and
a legislator, in their respective capacities as
"citizens, taxpayers" as the case may be, assail
the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal
grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces
Philippine maritime territory, and logically,
the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign
power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987
Constitution, embodying the terms of the
Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and (2)
RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward
of the baselines to maritime passage by all
vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine
sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy,
and damaging marine resources, in violation of
relevant constitutional provisions.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and
a legislator, in their respective capacities as
"citizens, taxpayers. As the case may be, assail
the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal
Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the
reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power,
in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,
embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and
ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522 opens the
country’s waters landward of the baselines to
maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts,
undermining Philippine sovereignty and
national security, contravening the country’s
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions.
Commenting on the petition, respondents
defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance
with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving
Philippine territory over the KIG or
Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA
9522 does not undermine the country’s security,
environment and economic interests or
relinquish the Philippines’ claim over Sabah..
Respondents also question the normative force,
under international law, of petitioners’ assertion
that what Spain ceded to the United States
under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and
all the waters found within the boundaries of the
rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of
Paris.
Issue 1: Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional
Ruling 1: No, RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the
Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf
Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine
Territory.
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a
large portion of the national territory" because
it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of
Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris
and related treaties, successively encoded in
the definition of national territory under the
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners
theorize that this constitutional definition
trumps any treaty or statutory provision
denying the Philippines sovereign control over
waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at
the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain
supposedly ceded to the United States.
Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’
technical description, Philippine sovereignty
over territorial waters extends hundreds of
nautical miles around the Philippine
archipelago, embracing the rectangular area
delineated in the Treaty of Paris.
Here, UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the
acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others,
sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles
from the baselines], exclusive economic zone
[200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and
continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.
UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-
long negotiations among United Nations
members to codify norms regulating the
conduct of States in the world’s oceans and
submarine areas, recognizing coastal and
archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a
limited span of waters and submarine lands
along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA
9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties
to mark-out specific basepoints along their
coasts from which baselines are drawn, either
straight or contoured, to serve as geographic
starting points to measure the breadth of the
maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48
of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours
could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf. – The
breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous
zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf shall be measured from
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance
with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory
mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to
delimit with precision the extent of their
maritime zones and continental shelves. In
turn, this gives notice to the rest of the
international community of the scope of the
maritime space and submarine areas within
which States parties exercise treaty-based rights,
namely, the exercise of sovereignty over
territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to
enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article
33), and the right to exploit the living and non-
living resources in the exclusive economic zone
(Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Issue 2: Whether RA 9522 use of framework of
Regime Islands to determine the Maritime
Zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal is
not consistent with the Philippine’s claim of
Sovereignty over the Areas.
Ruling 2: No, RA 9522’s Use of the Framework
of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal is not Inconsistent with the Philippines’
Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas.
The configuration of the baselines drawn under
RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522
merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA
3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA
9522 skipped to optimize the location of
basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline
(and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation
on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA
3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines
drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This
undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out
of petitioners’ argument branding RA 9522 as a
statutory renunciation of the Philippines’ claim
over the KIG, assuming that baselines are
relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000
square nautical miles of territorial waters" under
RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and
law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing
the location of basepoints, increased the
Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its
internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive
economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical
miles.
Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now
lies outside Philippine territory because the
baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the
KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the
law commits to text the Philippines’ continued
claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over
which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be
determined as "Regime of Islands" under the
Republic of the Philippines consistent with
Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as
constituted under Presidential Decree
No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as
Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate,
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to
emphasize the foregoing during the Senate
deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or
what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and
the Scarborough Shoal are outside our
archipelagic baseline because if we put them
inside our baselines we might be accused of violating
the provision of international law which states: "The
drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general configuration
of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline,
dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang
Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit
sila sa atin although we are still allowed by
international law to claim them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our
configuration. We see that our archipelago is
defined by the orange line which [we] call[]
archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo
ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is
Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa
ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys.
Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis
pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para
lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila
magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United
Nations because of the rule that it should follow the
natural configuration of the archipelago.
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’
claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal,
Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’
under the Republic of the Philippines
consistent with Article 121"of UNCLOS III
manifests the Philippine State’s responsible
observance of its pacta sunt servanda
obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article
121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area
of land, surrounded by water, which is above
water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG,
qualifies under the category of "regime of
islands," whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones.
Evan
● Province of North Cotabato v GRP Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain, 568
SCRA 402 (2008)
Facts:
Subject of this case is the Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
which is scheduled to be signed by the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and the MILF in August 05, 2008. Five cases
bearing the same subject matter were
consolidated by this court namely:
● GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato
and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer to
declare unconstitutional and to have the
MOA-AD disclosed to the public and be
open for public consultation.
● GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et
al on its prayer to declare null and void
said MOA-AD and to exclude the city to
the BJE.
● GR 183893 by the City of Iligan
enjoining the respondents from signing
the MOA-AD and additionally
impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.
● GR 183951 by the Province of
Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to
declare null and void the MOA-AD and
without operative effect and those
respondents enjoined from executing
the MOA-AD.
● GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and
Pimentel III, praying for a judgment
prohibiting and permanently enjoining
respondents from formally signing and
 executing the MOA-AD and or any
other agreement derived therefrom or
similar thereto, and nullifying the
MOA-AD for being unconstitutional
and illegal and impleading Iqbal.
The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements
entered into by and between the government
and the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they
signed the Agreement on General Cessation of
Hostilities; and the following year, they signed
the General Framework of Agreement of Intent
on August 27, 1998. However, in 1999 and in the
early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of
municipalities in Central Mindanao. In March
2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte; hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an
all-out war-which tolled the peace negotiation. It
was when then Pres. Arroyo assumed office,
when the negotiation regarding peace in
Mindanao continued. MILF was hesitant;
however, this negotiation proceeded when the
government of Malaysia interceded. Formal
peace talks resumed and MILF suspended all its
military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001
lead to the ceasefire between the parties. After
the death of MILF Chairman Hashim and Iqbal
took over his position, the crafting of MOA-AD
in its final form was born.
MOA-AD Overview
This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP
and the MILF. Used as reference in the birth of
this MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement,
organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international
laws such as ILO Convention 169, the UN
Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e
compact right entrenchment (law of compact,
treaty and order). The body is divided into
concepts and principles, territory, resources, and
governance.
Embodied in concepts and principles, is the
definition of Bangsamoro as all indigenous
peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands.
These people have the right to self- governance
of their Bangsamoro homeland to which they
have exclusive ownership by virtue of their
prior rights of occupation in the land. The MOA-
AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people
as "the ‘First Nation' with defined territory and
with a system of government having entered
into treaties of amity and commerce with
foreign nations." It then mentions for the first
time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to
which it grants the authority and jurisdiction
over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands
of the Bangsamoro.
As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the
BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region, involving the present
ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in
the inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The
territory is divided into two categories, “A”
which will be subject to plebiscite not later than
12 mos. after the signing and “B” which will be
subject to plebiscite 25 years from the signing of
another separate agreement. Embodied in the
MOA-AD that the BJE shall have jurisdiction
over the internal waters-15kms from the
coastline of the BJE territory; they shall also have
"territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond
the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the
Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and
south west of mainland Mindanao; and that
within these territorial waters, the BJE and the
government shall exercise joint jurisdiction,
authority and management over all natural
resources. There will also be sharing of minerals
in the territorial waters; but no provision on the
internal waters.
Included in the resources is the stipulation that
the BJE is free to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relations with foreign
countries and shall have the option to establish
trade missions in those countries, as well as
environmental cooperation agreements, but not
to include aggression in the GRP. The external
defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and
obligation of the government. The BJE shall have
participation in international meetings and
events" like those of the ASEAN and the
specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be
entitled to participate in Philippine official
missions and delegations for the negotiation of
border agreements or protocols for
environmental protection and equitable sharing
of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of
water adjacent to or between the islands forming
part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also
have the right to explore its resources and that
the sharing between the Central Government
and the BJE of total production pertaining to
natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the
BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel or
modify concessions and TLAs.
And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD
claims that the relationship between the GRP
and MILF is associative i.e. characterized by
shared authority and responsibility. This
structure of governance shall be further
discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a
stipulation which was highly contested before
the court. The BJE shall also be given the right to
build, develop and maintain its own institutions,
the details of which shall be discussed in the
comprehensive compact as well.
Issues:
1. WON the petitions have complied with the
procedural requirements for the exercise of
judicial review
2. WON respondents violate constitutional and
statutory provisions on public consultation and
the right to information when they negotiated
and later initialed the MOA-AD; and
3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated
the Constitution and the laws
Ruling:
The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law
and the Constitution.
On the Procedural Issue
1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC
upheld that there is indeed a need for the
exercise of judicial review.
The power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases or controversy, that is the court will
decline on issues that are hypothetical, feigned
problems or mere academic questions. Related
to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness. The
contention of the SolGen is that there is no issue
ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is only
a proposal and does not automatically create
legally demandable rights and obligations. Such
was denied.
The SC emphasized that the petitions are
alleging acts made in violation of their duty or
in grave abuse of discretion. Well-settled
jurisprudence states that acts made by authority
which exceed their authority, by violating their
duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of
the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make
a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition,
and Mandamus, and an actual case or
controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When
an act of a branch of government is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute. This is aside
from the fact that concrete acts made under the
MOA-AD are not necessary to render the
present controversy ripe and that the law or act
in question as not yet effective does not negate
ripeness.
With regards to the locus standi, the court
upheld the personalities of the Province of
Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga del norte,
City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in
intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of
Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to have
locus standi since it is their LGUs which will be
affected in whole or in part if include within the
BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel
Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers,
assert that government funds would be
expended for the conduct of an illegal and
unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE
territory. On that score alone, they can be given
legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also given a
standing as an intervenor. And lastly, the
Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral
Movement for Peace and Development, an
advocacy group for justice and the attainment of
peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and
Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-
government organization of Muslim lawyers
since they stand to be benefited or prejudiced in
the resolution of the petitions regarding the
MOA-AD.
On the contention of mootness of the issue
considering the signing of the MOA-AD has
already been suspended and that the President
has already disbanded the GRP, the SC
disagrees. The court reiterates that the moot and
academic principle is a general rule only, the
exceptions, provided in David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, that it will decide cases, otherwise
moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the
situation is of exceptional character and
paramount public interest is involved; (c) the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review; and that where
there is a voluntary cessation of the activity
complained of by the defendant or doer, it does
not divest the court the power to hear and try
the case especially when the plaintiff is seeking
for damages or injunctive relief.
Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the
MOA-AD and the disbandment of the GRP did
not render the petitions moot and academic. The
MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments
including possible Constitutional amendments
more than ever provides impetus for the Court
to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the
government and its negotiating entity.
At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over
most if not the rest of the petitions. There is a
reasonable expectation that petitioners will
again be subjected to the same problem in the
future as respondents' actions are capable of
repetition, in another or any form. But with
respect to the prayer of Mandamus to the
signing of the MOA-AD, such has become moot
and academic considering that parties have
already complied thereat.
On the Substantive Issue
2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a
matter of public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State,
which directly affects the lives of the public at
large.
As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to
information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, and integrated therein is
the recognition of the duty of the officialdom to
give information even if nobody demands. The
policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete
ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs
in a genuinely open democracy, with the
people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a
mandate of the State to be accountable by
following such policy. These provisions are vital
to the exercise of the freedom of expression and
essential to hold public officials at all times
accountable to the people.
Also, it was held that such stipulation in the
Constitution is self-executory with reasonable
safeguards —the effectivity of which need not
await the passing of a statute. Hence, it is
essential to keep open a continuing dialogue or
process of communication between the
government and the people. It is in the interest
of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to
the people's will.
The idea of a feedback mechanism was also
sought for since it is corollary to the twin rights
to information and disclosure. And feedback
means not only the conduct of the plebiscite as
per the contention of the respondents. Clearly,
what the law states is the right of the petitioners
to be consulted in the peace agenda as corollary
to the constitutional right to information and
disclosure. As such, respondent Esperon
committed grave abuse of discretion for failing
to carry out the furtive process by which the
MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority,
and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise
thereto. Moreover, he cannot invoke of
executive privilege because he already waived it
when he complied with the Court’s order to the
unqualified disclosure of the official copies of
the final draft of the MOA-AD.
In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to
be involved in matters related to such peace
talks as enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-
AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally
and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the
right to participate fully at all levels on decisions
that would clearly affect their lives, rights and
destinies. The MOA-AD is an instrument
recognizing ancestral domain, hence it should
have observed the free and prior informed
consent to the ICC/IPPs; but it failed to do so.
More specially noted by the court is the excess in
authority exercised by the respondent—since
they allowed delineation and recognition of
ancestral domain claim by mere agreement and
compromise; such power cannot be found in
IPRA or in any law to the effect.
3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the
MOA-AD, there can be no question that they
cannot be all accommodated under the present
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying
them:
On matters of the Constitution.
Association as the type of relationship
governing between the parties. The parties
manifested that in crafting the MOA-AD, the
term association was adapted from the
international law. In international law,
association happens when two states of equal
power voluntarily establish durable links i.e. the
one state, the associate, delegates certain
responsibilities to the other, principal, while
maintaining its international status as state; free
association is a middle ground between
integration and independence. The MOA-AD
contains many provisions that are consistent
with the international definition of association
which fairly would deduced that the agreement
vest into the BJE a status of an associated state,
or at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The court vehemently objects because the
principle of association is not recognized under
the present Constitution.
On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state.
The concept implies power beyond what the
Constitution can grant to a local government;
even the ARMM do not have such recognition;
and the fact is such concept implies recognition
of the associated entity as a state. There is
nothing in the law that contemplate any state
within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence. The court
disagrees with the respondent that the MOA-
AD merely expands the ARMM. BJE is a state in
all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid
down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into
relations with other states. As such the MOA-
AD clearly runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic.
On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The
territory included in the BJE includes those areas
who voted in the plebiscite for them to become
part of the ARMM. The stipulation of the
respondents in the MOA-AD that these areas
need not participate in the plebiscite is in
contrary to the express provision of the
Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he
creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
the autonomous region." Clearly, assuming that
the BJE is just an expansion of the ARMM, it
would still run afoul the wordings of the law
since those included in its territory are areas
which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and
not to the BJE.
On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity.
The respondents contend that the powers vested
to the BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-
paragraph 9 of sec 20, art. 10 of the constitution
and that a mere passage of a law is necessary in
order to vest in the BJE powers included in the
agreement. The Court was not persuaded. SC
ruled that such conferment calls for amendment
of the Constitution; otherwise new legislation
will not concur with the Constitution. Take for
instance the treaty making power vested to the
BJE in the MOA-AD. The Constitution is clear
that only the President has the sole organ and is
the country’s sole representative with foreign
nation. Should the BJE be granted with the
authority to negotiate with other states, the
former provision must be amended
consequently. Section 22 must also be amended
—the provision of the law that promotes
national unity and development. Because
clearly, associative arrangement of the MOA-AD
does not epitomize national unity but rather, of
semblance of unity. The associative ties between
the BJE and the national government, the act of
placing a portion of Philippine territory in a
status which, in international practice, has
generally been a preparation for independence,
is certainly not conducive to national unity.
On matters of domestic statutes.
o Provisions contrary to the organic act of
ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the adoption of the
definition of Bangsamoro people used in the
MOA-AD. Said law specifically distinguishes
between the Bangsamoro people and the Tribal
peoples that is contrary with the definition of
the MOA-AD which includes all indigenous
people of Mindanao.
o Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also,
the delineation and recognition of the ancestral
domain is a clear departure from the procedure
embodied in the IPRA law which ironically is
the term of reference of the MOA-AD.
On matters of international law.
The Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principle of international law as part of the law
of the land. In international law, the right to self-
determination has long been recognized which
states that people can freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic,
social, and cultural development. There are the
internal and external self-determination—
internal, meaning the self-pursuit of man and
the external which takes the form of the
assertion of the right to unilateral secession. This
principle of self-determination is viewed with
respect accorded to the territorial integrity of
existing states. External self-determination is
only afforded in exceptional cases when there is
an actual block in the meaningful exercise of the
right to internal self-determination.
International law, as a general rule, subject only
to limited and exceptional cases, recognizes that
the right of disposing national territory is
essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of
every state.
On matters relative to indigenous people,
international law states that indigenous peoples
situated within states do not have a general
right to independence or secession from those
states under international law, but they do have
rights amounting to what was discussed above
as the right to internal self-determination; have
the right to autonomy or self-government in
matters relating to their internal and local
affairs, as well as ways and means for financing
their autonomous functions; have the right to
the lands, territories and resources which they
have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise
used or acquired.
Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required
the State to guarantee the indigenous people
their own police and security force; but rather, it
shall be the State, through police officers, that
will provide for the protection of the people.
With regards to the autonomy of the indigenous
people, the law does not obligate States to grant
indigenous peoples the near-independent status
of a state; since it would impair the territorial
integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent states.
On the basis of the suspensive clause.
o It was contented by the respondents that
grave abuse of discretion cannot be had, since
the provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall
not take effect until the necessary changes to the
legal framework are effected.
The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive
clause runs contrary to Memorandum of
Instructions from the President stating that
negotiations shall be conducted in accordance to
the territorial integrity of the country—such was
negated by the provision on association
incorporated in the MOA-AD. Apart from this,
the suspensive clause was also held invalid
because of the delegated power to the GRP
Peace panel to advance peace talks even if it will
require new legislation or even constitutional
amendments. The legality of the suspensive
clause hence hinges on the query whether the
President can exercise such power as delegated
by EO No.3 to the GRP Peace Panel. Well settled
is the rule that the President cannot delegate a
power that she herself does not possess. The
power of the President to conduct peace
negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution but is rather implied from her
powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-
chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the
general responsibility to promote public peace,
and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more
specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion
and lawless violence.
As such, the President is given the leeway to
explore, in the course of peace negotiations,
solutions that may require changes to the
Constitution for their implementation. At all
event, the president may not, of course,
unilaterally implement the solutions that she
considers viable; but she may not be prevented
from submitting them as recommendations to
Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act
upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for
constitutional amendment and revision.
While the President does not possess constituent
powers - as those powers may be exercised only
by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the
people through initiative and referendum - she
may submit proposals for constitutional change
to Congress in a manner that does not involve
the arrogation of constituent powers. Clearly,
the principle may be inferred that the President -
in the course of conducting peace negotiations -
may validly consider implementing even those
policies that require changes to the Constitution,
but she may not unilaterally implement them
without the intervention of Congress, or act in
any way as if the assent of that body were
assumed as a certainty. The President’s power is
limited only to the preservation and defense of
the Constitution but not changing the same but
simply recommending proposed amendments
or revisions.
o The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is
not a suspensive condition but is a term because
it is not a question of whether the necessary
changes to the legal framework will take effect;
but, when. Hence, the stipulation is mandatory
for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal
framework –which changes would include
constitutional amendments. Simply put, the
suspensive clause is inconsistent with the limits
of the President's authority to propose
constitutional amendments, it being a virtual
guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be
adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points"
found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck
down as unconstitutional.
On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.
While the MOA-AD would not amount to an
international agreement or unilateral declaration
binding on the Philippines under international
law, respondents' act of guaranteeing
amendments is, by itself, already a
constitutional violation that renders the MOA-
AD fatally defective. The MOA-AD not being a
document that can bind the Philippines under
international law notwithstanding, respondents'
almost consummated act of guaranteeing
amendments to the legal framework is, by itself,
sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they
considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem,
the creation of a state within a state, but in their
brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress
and the sovereign Filipino people would give
their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding
such an act would amount to authorizing a
usurpation of the constituent powers vested
only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention,
or the people themselves through the process of
initiative, for the only way that the Executive
can ensure the outcome of the amendment
process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process.
Philippine Citizenship
Joyce
● Republic v Chule Lim, GR No. 153883
Facts:
The respondent, Chule Y. Lim, is an illegitimate
daughter of a Chinese father and a Filipina
mother, who never got married due to a prior
subsisting marriage of her father. The
respondent petitioned that there were few
mistakes as to her citizenship and identity, to
wit:
1. That her surname “Yu” was misspelled as
“Yo”. She has been using “Yu” in all of her
school records and in her marriage certificate.
2. That her father’s name in her birth record was
written as “Yo Diu To (Co Tian)” when it should
have been “Yu Dio To (Co Tian).”
3. That her nationality was entered as Chinese
when it should have been Filipino considering
that her father and mother got married.
4. That she was entered as a legitimate child on
her birth certificate when in fact, it should have
been illegitimate. Both the trial court and Court
of Appeals granted the respondent’s petition.
Issue:
The Republic of the Philippines appealed the
decision to the Supreme Court on the following
grounds:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
ordering the correction of the citizenship of
respondent Chule Y. Lim from “Chinese” to
“Filipino” despite the fact that respondent never
demonstrated any compliance with the legal
requirements for election of citizenship.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
allowing respondent to continue using her
father’s surname despite its finding that
respondent is an illegitimate child.
Held:
1. No. The Republic avers that respondent did
not comply with the constitutional requirement
of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached
the age of majority as mandated in Article IV,
Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution and Section
1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 625. The
Supreme Court held that the two above
provisions only apply to legitimate children.
These do not apply in the case of the respondent
who was an illegitimate child considering that
her parents never got married. By being an
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino
upon birth, and as such, there was no more need
for her to validly elect Filipino citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. Also, she registered
as a voter inside the country when she reached
18 years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage
and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship.
2. No. The Republic’s submission was
misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow
respondent to use her father’s surname. What it
did allow was the correction of her father’s
misspelled surname which she has been using
ever since she can remember. The court held
that prohibiting the respondent to use her
father’s surname would only sow confusion.
Also, Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142
which regulates the use of aliases as well as the
jurisprudence state that it is allowed for a
person to use a name “by which he has been
known since childhood”. Even legitimate
children cannot enjoin the illegitimate children
of their father from using his surname. While
judicial authority is required for a chance of
name or surname, there is no such requirement
for the continued use of a surname which a
person has already been using since childhood.
The doctrine that disallows such change of name
as would give the false impression of family
relationship remains valid but only to the extent
that the proposed change of name would in
great probability cause prejudice or future
mischief to the family whose surname it is that is
involved or to the community in general. In this
case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu
family in China would probably be prejudiced
or be the object of future mischief.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petition brought by the Republic is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Pabs
● Republic v Nora Sagun, GR 187567 (2012)
Facts:
Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S.
Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo,
a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8,
1959, in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In
1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married
to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Said document was notarized but was not
recorded and registered with the Local Civil
Registrar of Baguio City. In 2005, Sagun applied
for a Philippine passport. Her application was
denied due to the citizenship of her father and
there is no annotation on her birth certificate
that she has elected Philippine citizenship.
Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration
of her election of Philippine citizenship averring
that she was raised as a Filipino she is a
registered voter in Baguio City, and had voted
in local and national elections as shown in the
Voter Certification. She asserted that by virtue of
her positive acts, she has effectively elected
Philippine citizenship and such fact should be
annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle
her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.
After the hearing, the trial court granted the
petition and declared Sagun a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed a
petition for review on certiorari, pointing out
that while Sagun executed an oath of allegiance
before a notary public, there was no affidavit of
her election of Philippine citizenship.
Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was
not registered with the nearest local civil
registry was executed when she was already 33
years old or 12 years after she reached the age of
majority.
Issues:
1. Is an action or proceeding for judicial
declaration of Philippine citizenship
procedurally and jurisdictionally
permissible?
2. Has Norma complied with the
procedural requirements in the election
of Philippine citizenship?
Rulings:
1. No. There is no proceeding established by law
or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. There is no specific
legislation authorizing the institution of a
judicial proceeding to declare that a given
person is part of our citizenry. Clearly, it was
erroneous for the trial court to make a specific
declaration of the respondent’s Filipino
citizenship as such pronouncement was not
within the court’s competence.2. When the
respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the
governing charter was the 1935Constitution,
which declares as citizens of the Philippines
those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV
of the 1935 Constitution reads: Section 1. The
following are citizens of the Philippines:(4)
Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship. Under
Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution,
the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching
the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. Being a legitimate child, the
citizenship followed that of her father who is
Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of
majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. For
the respondent to be considered a Filipino
citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, the
respondent clearly failed to comply with the
procedural requirements for a valid and
effective election of Philippine citizenship.
Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of
suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship since the law specifically
lays down the requirements for the acquisition
of citizenship by election. All that is required of
the elector is to execute an affidavit of the
election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter,
file the same with the nearest civil registry.
Having failed to comply with the foregoing
requirements, the respondent’s petition before
the trial court must be denied.
Clyde
● In Re Ching, Bar Matter 914 (1999)
Facts: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of
the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and
Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in
Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964.
Since his birth, Ching has resided in the
Philippines.
In 1998, Ching, after having completed a
Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis
University in Baguio City, filed an application to
take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution
of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was
allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to
the condition that he must submit to the Court
proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations
were released and Ching was one of the
successful Bar examinees but because of the
questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he
was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the
resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he
was required to submit further proof of his
citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file
a comment on Ching's petition for admission to
the bar and on the documents evidencing his
Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment in1999, stating that
Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935
Constitution was a Chinese citizen and
continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age
of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" in
strict compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act
Providing for the Manner in which the Option to
Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by
a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen."
The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best
was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship
which he could perfect by election upon
reaching the age of majority." In this regard, the
OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must
concur in order that the election of Philippine
citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the
mother of the person making the election must
be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said
election must be made upon reaching the age of
majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning
of the phrase "upon reaching the age of
majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority"
has been construed to mean a reasonable time
after reaching the age of majority which had
been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to
be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing
Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940).
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching
has not formally elected Philippine citizenship
and, if ever he does, it would already be
beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by
present jurisprudence. However, due to the
peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's
case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of
the standing rule on the construction of the
phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance
of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking
his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Issue: Whether a legitimate child born under the
1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an
alien father validly elects Philippine citizenship
fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age
of majority.
Ruling: No, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No.
625 did not prescribe a time period within
which the election of Philippine citizenship
should be made. The 1935 Charter only
provides that the election should be made
"upon reaching the age of majority." The age of
majority then commenced upon reaching
twenty-one (21) years. In the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this
dilemma was resolved by basing the time period
on the decisions of this Court prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these
decisions, the proper period for electing
Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of
the United States Government to the effect that
the election should be made within a
"reasonable time" after attaining the age of
majority. The phrase "reasonable time" has
been interpreted to mean that the election
should be made within three (3) years from
reaching the age of majority.
Here, Ching, having been born on 11 April
1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of
C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen
(14) years after he had reached the age of
majority. Based on the interpretation of the
phrase "upon reaching the age of majority,"
Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any
reasonable yardstick, the allowable period
within which to exercise the privilege. It should
be stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines and his being a certified public
accountant, a registered voter and a former
elected public official, cannot vest in him
Philippine citizenship as the law specifically
lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the
plight of Ching. However, even if we consider
the special circumstances in the life of Ching like
his having lived in the Philippines all his life
and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino,
controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain
us to disagree with the recommendation of the
OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed
to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span
of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time
he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine
citizenship is clearly way beyond the
contemplation of the requirement of electing
"upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover,
Ching has offered no reason why he delayed
his election of Philippine citizenship. The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
painstaking process. All that is required of the
elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the
same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making
his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated
like a commodity that can be claimed when
needed and suppressed when convenient. One
who is privileged to elect Philippine
citizenship has only an inchoate right to such
citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right
with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.
Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his
opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and,
as a result. this golden privilege slipped away
from his grasp
Evan
● Co v HRET 199 SCRA 692
Facts:
The petitioner is asking for the setting aside
and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The
HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for
the second district of Northern Samar was
held. Among the candidates who vied for
the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co
and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly
elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar. The records show that in
the year 1895, the private respondent's
grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines
from China. Ong Te established his residence in
the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land
which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to
obtain a certificate of residence from the then
Spanish colonial administration. The father of
the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was
born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong
Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan
spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In
Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring
relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his
easy assimilation into the community. As Jose
Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and
seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed
Filipino cultural values and practices. He was
baptized into Christianity. As the years passed,
Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipina,
Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and,
thereafter, got married in 1932 according to
Catholic faith and practice. The couple bore
eight children, one of whom is the private
respondent who was born in 1948. The
private respondent's father never emigrated
from this country. He decided to put up a
hardware store and shared and survived the
vicissitudes of life in Samar. The business
prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a
result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila.
In the meantime, the father of the private
respondent, unsure of his legal status and in
an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast
his life and family, filed with the Court of
First Instance of Samar of application for
naturalization on February 15, 1954. On April
28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared
Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines
Ruling:
YES. Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino)
citizens as: "Natural-born citizens are those
who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof
shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Article
IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987
Constitution provides that: "Section 1. The
following are citizens of the Philippines: . . .
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority."
It would appear then that the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution in defining a
natural-born Filipino citizen was to equalize
the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino
mothers as to their children becoming
natural-born Filipino citizens. In other words,
after 17 January 1973, effectivity date of the
1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino
fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers
(with alien spouse) are natural-born Filipino
citizens. But those born to Filipino mothers
prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority, in order to be deemed natural-born
Filipino citizens. The election, which is related to
the attainment of the age of majority, may be
made before or after 17 January 1973. This
interpretation appears to be in consonance with
the fundamental purpose of the Constitution
which is to protect and enhance the people's
individual interests, and to foster equality
among them.
Joyce
● Bengson v HRET, GR 142840
FACTS:
Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino
parents. The fundamental law then applicable
was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5,
1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the
United States Marine Corps and without the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took
an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,
among other, "rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. On
March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and
was elected as the Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections. He won over petitioner Antonio
Bengson III, who was then running for
reelection.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural
born citizen of the Philippines in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall
be a Member of the House of Representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: Respondent is a natural
born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished
from the lengthy process of naturalization,
repatriation simply consists of the taking of an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippine and registering said oath in the Local
Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided. This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand,
if he was originally a natural-born citizen before
he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
Pabs
● So v RP, 513 SCRA 267 (2007)
Facts:
Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for
Naturalization3 under Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, as amended. He alleged the
following in his petition:
• He was born on February 17, 1982, in
Manila;
• He is a Chinese citizen who has lived in
No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since
birth;
• As an employee, he derives an average
annual income of around P100,000.00 with free
board and lodging and other benefits;
• He is single, able to speak and write
English, Chinese and Tagalog;
• He is exempt from the filing of
Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of
the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, as amended,
because he was born in the Philippines, and
studied in a school recognized by the
Government where Philippine history,
government and culture are taught; and
• He has all the qualifications provided
under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473, as amended.
No one opposed the petition.
So also testified and attempted to prove that he
has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a citizen of the
Philippines.
RTC: Granted the petition. The trial court ruled
that the witnesses for So had known him for the
period required by law, and they had affirmed
that So had all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen.
Thus, the court concluded that petitioner had
satisfactorily supported his petition with
evidence.
Republic, through the OSG, appealed the
decision to the CA. That Adasa and Salcedo
were not qualified witnesses, and that So is not
qualified to be admitted as citizen of the
Philippines. So failed to prove that he possesses
all the qualifications under Section 2 and none of
the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No.
473.
So avers that the requirements for naturalization
under C.A. No. 473, as amended by LOI 270, in
relation to Presidential Decree Nos. 836 and
1379, had been relaxed after the Philippine
government entered into diplomatic relations
with the People’s Republic of China; the
requirements were further relaxed when
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 was signed into
law. So insisted that he has all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications to become
Filipino. This was clearly established by his
witnesses.
Republic alleged that R.A. No. 9139 applies to
administrative naturalization filed with the
Special Committee on Naturalization. It insisted
that even in the absence of any opposition, a
petition for naturalization may be dismissed.
CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and
dismissed the petition for naturalization without
prejudice. So’s motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Issues:
1. WON So was entitled to become a
Filipino citizen
2. WON R.A. No. 9139 applies to petitions
for naturalization by judicial act; and
3. WON the witnesses presented by
petitioner are "credible" in accordance
with the jurisprudence and the
definition and guidelines set forth in
C.A. No. 473.
Ruling:
NO. Under current and existing laws, there are
three ways by which an alien may become a
citizen by naturalization:
(a) Administrative naturalization pursuant
to R.A. No. 9139;
(b) Judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A.
No. 473, as amended; and
(c) Legislative naturalization in the form of
a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine
citizenship to an alien.
FIRST. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are
separate and distinct laws – the former covers all
aliens regardless of class while the latter covers
native-born aliens who lived here in the
Philippines all their lives, who never saw any
other country and all along thought that they
were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love
and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the
customs and traditions.
To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in
enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process
of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious,
less technical and more encouraging which is
administrative rather than judicial in nature.
There is nothing from which it can be inferred
that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended
or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. The only
implication is that, a native born alien has the
choice to apply for judicial or administrative
naturalization, subject to the prescribed
qualifications and disqualifications.
In the instant case, So applied for naturalization
by judicial act, though at the time of the filing of
his petition, administrative naturalization under
R.A. No. 9139 was already available.
Consequently, his application should be
governed by C.A. No. 473.
SECOND. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A.
No. 9139 would be made applicable even to
judicial naturalization, the coverage of the law
would be broadened since it would then apply
even to aliens who are not native born. It must
be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only to
aliens who were born in the Philippines and
have been residing here.
THIRD. One of the qualifications set forth in
R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant was born in
the Philippines and should have been residing
herein since birth. Thus, one who was born here
but left the country, though resided for more
than ten (10) years from the filing of the
application is also disqualified. On the other
hand, if we maintain the distinct qualifications
under each of the two laws, an alien who is not
qualified under R.A. No. 9139 may still be
naturalized under C.A. No. 473.
Thus, absent a specific provision expressly
amending C.A. No. 473, the law stands and the
qualifications and disqualifications set forth
therein are maintained.
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of
the applicant to prove not only his own good
moral character but also the good moral
character of his/her witnesses, who must be
credible persons. This implies that such person
must have a good standing in the community;
that he is known to be honest and upright; that
he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and
that his word may be taken on its face value, as
a good warranty of the applicant’s worthiness.
Thus, So failed to show full and complete
compliance with the requirements of
naturalization law. For this reason, we affirm the
decision of the CA denying the petition for
naturalization without prejudice.
Clyde
● David v Agbay, GR 1991113, Mar 18, 2015
Facts: In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada
where he became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner
and his wife returned to the Philippines and
bought a residential house. However, in the year
2004, they came to know that the portion where
they built their house is public land and part of
the salvage zone. In 2007, petitioner filed a
Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over
the subject land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at
the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the
said application, petitioner indicated that he is
a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed
the application on the ground that petitioner, a
Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land.
She also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents under Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No.
08-6463) against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino
citizenship under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 9225, (R.A. 9225) as evidenced by
Identification Certificate No. 266-10-07. issued
by the Consulate General of the Philippines
(Toronto) on October 11, 2007.
In 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting
petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s
subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA
which was void ab initio.
The Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s
argument regarding the retroactivity of R.A.
9225 is without merit.1âwphi1 It is contended
that this Court’s rulings in Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections19 and Altarejos v.
Commission on Elections on the retroactivity of
one’s re- acquisition of Philippine citizenship
to the date of filing his application therefor
cannot be applied to the case of herein
petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of
argument that such doctrine applies in the
present situation, it will still not work for
petitioner’s cause for the simple reason that he
had not alleged, much less proved, that he had
already applied for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship before he made the declaration in
the Public Land Application that he is a
Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in
falsification of public document, it is not
necessary that the idea of gain or intent to injure
a third person be present. As to petitioner’s
defense of good faith, such remains to be a
defense which may be properly raised and
proved in a full- blown trial.
Issue: Whether the re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225 has retroactive effect
upon the time he filed the Miscellaneous Lease
Application when he declared that he was a
Filipino but when in fact he was a Canadian
citizen by naturalization.
Ruling: No, the re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225 has no retroactive
effect. R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act
of 2003,
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared
the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any
provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed
to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who,
after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens
of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
While Section 2 declares the general policy that
Filipinos who have become citizens of another
country shall be deemed "not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship," such is qualified by
the phrase "under the conditions of this Act."
Section 3 lays down such conditions for two
categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to
in the first and second paragraphs. Under the
first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country who shall
re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. The second paragraph covers
those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the same oath. The taking of oath of
allegiance is required for both categories of
natural-born Filipino citizens who became
citizens of a foreign country, but the
terminology used is different, "re-acquired" for
the first group, and "retain" for the second
group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those
natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A.
9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is
"Retention of Philippine Citizenship", the
authors of the law intentionally employed the
terms "re-acquire" and "retain" to describe the
legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident
from the title of the law using both re-
acquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a
foreign country, they shall be deemed to have
re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which
was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which
naturalization in a foreign country is one of the
ways by which Philippine citizenship may be
lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA
63 by doing away with the provision in the old
law which takes away Philippine citizenship
from natural-born Filipinos who become
naturalized citizens of other countries and
allowing dual citizenship, and also provides
for the procedure for re-acquiring and
retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of
those who became foreign citizens after R.A.
9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine
citizenship despite having acquired foreign
citizenship provided they took the oath of
allegiance under the new law.
Here, the petitioner was naturalized as a
Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A.
9225, he belongs to the first category of natural-
born Filipinos under the first paragraph of
Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country. As the new
law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-
acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking
the required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship
of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is
not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo
and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such
reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats
those of his category as having already lost
Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to
those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force.
In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy
that considers Filipinos who became foreign
citizens as not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship, should be read together with
Section 3, the second paragraph of which
clarifies that such policy governs all cases after
the new law’s effectivity.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the
MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino
citizen at the time of the filing of said
application, when in fact he was then still a
Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing
law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian
citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was
among those ways by which a natural-born
citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he
re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9225 six months later, the falsification was
already a consummated act, the said law having
no retroactive effect insofar as his dual
citizenship status is concerned.
The Doctrine of State Immunity
o Suits vs the Philippine State
Evan
● Philippine Agila Satellite v Lichauco, G.R.
No. 134887 (2006)
Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. is a duly
organized corporation, whose President and
Chief Executive Officer is co-petitioner Michael
C.U. De Guzman. PASI was established by a
consortium of private telecommunications
carriers which in 1994 (June 6) had entered into
a Memorandum of Understanding with the
DOTC, through its then Secretary (July 1992-
March 1996) Jesus Garcia, concerning the
planned launch of a Philippine-owned satellite
into outer space. The Philippine government,
through the DOTC, was tasked under the MOU
to secure from the International
Telecommunication Union the required orbital
slots and frequency assignments for the
Philippine satellite.
They requested the then DOT Secretary Amado
S. Lagdameo, Jr. (Apr 1996-1997) for official
government confirmation of the assignment of
Philippine orbital slots 161ºEand 153ºE to PASI
for its AGILA satellites by a letter dated June 28,
1996.
When it was confirmed, PASI undertook
preparations for the launching, operation and
management of its satellites by, among other
things, obtaining loans, increasing its capital,
conducting negotiations with its business
partners, and making an initial payment. When
they requested the Land bank’s confirmation of
its participation in a club loan for the
government’s assignment to PASI of orbital slots
161ºE and 153ºE, DOTC Undersecretary Josefina
T. Lichauco sent a letter to the bank
controverting the said assignment, clearly
stating that orbital slot 153°E can no longer be
assigned to PASI. She subsequently issued a
Notice of Offer for several orbital slots including
153ºE in December 1997.
PASI, claiming that the offer was without its
knowledge and that it subsequently came to
learn that another company whose identity had
not been disclosed had submitted a bid and won
the award for orbital slot 153ºE, filed on January
23,1998 a complaint7before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City against
Lichauco and the "Unknown Awardee," for
injunction to enjoin the award of orbital slot
153ºE, declare its nullity, and for damages.
PASI filed on February 23, 1998 a complaint
before the Office of the Ombudsman against
Secretary Josefina Trinidad Lichauco. In his
affidavit-complaint, de Guzman charged
Lichauco with gross violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No.3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended, reading:(e) Causing any undue injury
to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers
and employees of officers or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions. Because a
prejudicial question was found by the
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau (EPIB), the criminal suit was dismissed
and reconsideration was denied by Order dated
July 17, 1998. Hence, PASI is in petition for
review on certiorari, arguing that the
Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the suit is against the state.
Ruling:
The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in
the performance of official functions against an
officer of the government by a private citizen
that would result in a charge against or financial
liability to the government must be regarded as
a suit against the State itself, although the latter
has not been formally impleaded. However,
government immunity from suit will not shield
the public official being sued if the government
no longer has an interest to protect in the
outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer
is personal because it arises from a tortious act
in the performance of his duties.
As earlier noted, the complaint alleges three
causes of action against Lichauco: one for
injunction against her performing any act in
relation to orbital slot 153º East Longitude; one
for declaration of nullity of award, seeking to
nullify the alleged award of orbital slot 153º East
Longitude; and one for damages against
Lichauco herself.
As stated earlier, it is when the acts done in the
performance of official functions by an officer of
the government will result in a charge against or
financial liability to the government that the
complaint must be regarded as a suit against the
State itself. However, the distinction must also
be raised between where the government official
concerned performs an act in his/her official
and jurisdictional capacity and where he
performs an act that constitutes grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In
the latter case, the Constitution itself assures the
availability of judicial review, and it is the
official concerned who should be impleaded as
the proper party- defendant or respondent.
As to the first two causes of action, the Court
ruled that the defense of state immunity from
suit do not apply since said causes of action
cannot be properly considered as suits against
the State in constitutional contemplation. These
causes of action do not seek to impose a charge
or financial liability against the State, but merely
the nullification of state action. The prayers
attached to these two causes of action are for the
revocation of the Notice of Bid and the
nullification of the purported award, nothing
more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally
sought damages in relation to said causes of
action, the suit would have been considered as
one against the State. Had the petitioner
impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorporated
government agency, and not Lichauco herself,
the suit would have been considered as one
against the State. But neither circumstance
obtains in this case.
The doctrine, as summarized in Shauf v. Court
of Appeals states: “While the doctrine appears
to prohibit only suits against the state without
its consent, it is also applicable to complaints
filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of
their duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the state itself
to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,
such as the appropriation of the amount needed
to pay the damages awarded against them, the
suit must be regarded as against the state itself
although it has not been formally impleaded. It
must be noted, however, that the rule is not so
all-encompassing as to be applicable under all
circumstances.”
It is a different matter where the public official is
made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of
plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice
Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et
al.: “Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal
acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of
the State, and an action against the officials or
officers by one whose rights have been invaded
or violated by such acts, for the protection of his
rights, is not a suit against the State within the
rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the
same tenor, it has been said that an action at law
or suit in equity against a State officer or the
director of a State department on the ground
that, while claiming to act for the State, he
violates or invades the personal and property
rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional
act or under an assumption of authority which
he does not have, is not a suit against the State
within the constitutional provision that the State
may not be sued without its consent.' The
rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of
state immunity cannot be used as an instrument
for perpetrating an injustice.
RATIONALE:
When a public officer acts without or in excess
of jurisdiction, any injury caused by him is his
own personal liability and cannot be imputed to
the State. (p.34, Political Law, Isagani Cruz)
Joyce
● Sayson v Singson 54 SCRA 282)
Facts:
 January, 1967: the Office of the District
Engineer requisitioned various items of spare
parts for
the repair of a D-8 bulldozer
o The requisition was signed by the District
Engineer, and the Requisitioning Officer (civil
engineer)
o It was approved by the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications.
 May 5 1967: a canvass or public bidding was
conducted.
o The committee on award accepted the bid of
the Singkier Motor Service [owned by
respondent Felipe Singson] for the sum of
P43,530.00.
 it was approved by the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications
 the Secretary sent a letter-order to the Singkier
Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu requesting it to
immediately deliver the items listed therein for
the lot price of P43,530.00.
 It would appear that a purchase order signed
by the District Engineer, the Requisitioning
Officer and the Procurement Officer, was
addressed to the Singkier Motor Service.
 Voucher No. 07806 reached the hands of
Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit.
o He then made inquiries about the
reasonableness of the price.
o After finding from the indorsements of the
Division Engineer and the Commissioner of
Public Highways that the prices of the various
spare parts are just and reasonable and that the
requisition was also approved by no less than
the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications with the verification of V.M.
Secarro, a representative of the Bureau of
Supply Coordination, Manila, he approved it for
payment in the sum of P34,824.00, with the
retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00.
 His reason for withholding the 20%
equivalent to P8,706.00 was to submit the
voucher with the supporting papers to the
Supervising Auditor, which he did.
 June 9, 1967: The voucher was paid on in the
amount of P34,824.00 to the respondent Singson.
 June 10, 1967, Sayson received a telegram
from Supervising Auditor Fornier quoting a
telegraphic message of the General Auditing
Office which states: 'In view of excessive prices
charge for purchase of spare parts and
equipment shown by vouchers already
submitted this Office direct all highway auditors
refer General Office payment similar nature for
appropriate action.
o when the voucher and the supporting papers
reached the GAO, a canvass was made of the
spare parts among the suppliers in Manila,
particularly, the USI (Phil.), which is the
exclusive dealer of the spare parts of the
caterpillar tractors in the Philippines.
o Said firm thus submitted its quotations at
P2,529.64 only which is P40,000.00 less than the
price of the Singkier.
 July 18, 1987: The GAO took up the matter
with the Secretary of Public Works
o The Secretary then circularized a telegram
holding the district engineer responsible for
overpricing."
 Charges for malversation were filed against
the district engineer and the civil engineer
involved.
 Singson filed a mandamus case to compel the
payment of the balance.
 Lower court: in favor of Singson
 Thus the present appeal
Issue:
Whether or not the State can be sued.
Ruling:
No. The State cannot be sued without its
consent.
With the facts undisputed and the statute far
from indefinite or ambiguous, the appealed
decision defies explanation. It would be to
disregard a basic corollary of the cardinal
postulate of non-suability. It is true that once
consent is secured, an action may be filed. There
is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such
statutory grant, to require that certain
administrative proceedings be had and the
exhausted.
Pabs
● UP v. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, 679 SCRA 54,
23 August 2012
Facts:
• In 1990, the UP through its President
Abueva entered into a General Construction
Agreement with Stern Builders Corp.
o For the construction of the extension
building and the renovation of the College of
Arts and Science Building in the Ccampus of
UPLB.
• In the course of the implementation of
the contract, Stern Building submitted 3
progress billings corresponding to the work
accomplished by the UP paid only 2 of the
billings.
o The 3 billing was not paid because it
was disallowed by the Commission on Audit.
• Despite the lifting of the disallowance,
the UP failed to pay the billing. Such failure
prompted Stern Building to file an action against
the UP and its co-respondent officials to collect
the unpaid billing and to recover various
damages.
RTC: Ordered UP to pay Stern Building
• UP filed a MR, but it was denied by the
RTC on the ground that irs notice of appeal was
filed out of time.
• Thereafter, the RTC issued the writ of
execution and accordingly, the sheriff served the
writ of execution and notice of demand upon
the UP.
CA: Aggrieved, UP assailed the denial of its
appeal to the CA but the CA dismissed the
same.
• As a recourse, the UP sought
reconsideration from the SC
o SC’s decision: Denied the petition for
review; such decision became final and
executory.
• Meanwhile, Stern Builders filed their
motions for execution despite their previous
motion having already been granted and despite
the Writ of execution having already issued.
o Thus, acting upon Stern’s motion,
another motion for execution was issued by the
RTC
• Implementing the writs, the sheriff, on 2
different occasions, served notices of
garnishment on the UP’s depository banks
namely: LandBank (Buendia Branch) and the
DBP (Commonwealth Branch)
• UP assailed the garnishment through an
Urgent Motion to Quash the notices of
garnishment. = RTC denied the UP’s urgent
motion to quash.
• In the instant case, UP filed a
supplemental petition alleging that the RTC
gravely erred in ordering the immediate release
of the garnished amount despite the pendency
of the petition for review in the SC.
Issue:
WON the funds of the UP were the proper
subject of garnishment in order to satisfy the
judgment award.
UP’s Argument: Insists that the decision was
inconsistent with the rulings in Commissioner of
Public Highways vs San Diego to the effect that
government funds and properties could not be
seized under writs of execution or garnishment
to satisfy judgment awards.
• UP contends that the CA contravened
Sec 5Art 14 of the Consitution by allowing the
garnishment of UP funds, because the
garnishment resulted in a substantial reduction
of the UP’s limited budget allocated for the
remuneration, job satisfaction and fulfillment of
the best available teachers.
Respondent’s Argument/s: Averred that the
petition was fatally defective for its failure to
mention the other cases upon the same issues
pending between the parties
• that the ruling in Commissioner of
Public Works v. San Diego had no application
because there was an appropriation for the
project;
• that the UP retained the funds allotted
for the project only in a fiduciary capacity; that
the contract price had been meanwhile adjusted
to ₱ 22,338,553.25, an amount already more than
sufficient to cover the judgment award
Rulings:
• Up was founded through Act 1870 to
provide advanced instruction to deserving
students. Despite the establishment as a body
corporate, UP remained to be a chartered
institution performing a legitimate government
function.
o In enacting RA 9500, Congress has
declared the UP as the UP as the national
university dedicated to the search for truth and
knowledge as well as the development of future
leaders.
• Irrefragably, UP is a government
instrumentality, performing the State’s
constitutional mandate of promoting quality
and accessible education.
o As a government instrumentality, the
UP administers special funds sourced from the
fees and income enumerated under Act 1870
and Sec 1 of EO 714.
o All the funds going into the possession
of the UP, including any interest accruing from
the deposit of such funds in any banking
institution, constitute a special fund, the
disbursement of which should always be
aligned with UP’s mission and purpose and
should always be subject to auditing by the
COA.
• TRUST FUNDS; As per PD 1445: a fund
that officially comes in the possession of an
agency of the government or of a public officer
as trustee, agent or administrator or that is
received for the fulfillment of some obligations.
• The funds of the UP are government
funds that are public in character. They include
the income accruing from the use of real
property ceded to the UP that may be spent only
for the attainment of its institutional objectives.
o Hence, the subject funds could not be
validly made the subject of the RTC’s Writ of
Execution or garnishment.
o The adverse judgment rendered against
the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly
consented was not immediately enforceable by
execution against the UP, because the suability
of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.
• Suability vs Liability
o Suability- depends on the consent of the
state to be sued, liability on the applicable law
and the established facts. The circumstance that
the state is suable does not necessarily mean that
it is liable
o Liability: not conceded by the mere fact
that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When
the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it
only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it
can, that the defendant is liable.
• The Court reiterated that in Republic vs
Villasor, where the issuance of an alias writ of
execution directed against the funds of the AFP
to satisfy a final and executory judgment was
nullified.
o It was held that the universal rule that
where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it
may limit claimant’s action only up to the
completion of the proceedings anterior to the
stage of execution and that the power of the
Courts ends when the judgment is rendered,
since government funds and properties may not
be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgment.
o UP correctly submits here that the
garnishment of its funds to satisfy the judgment
awards of actual and moral damages was not
validly made if there was no special
appropriation by Congress to cover the liability.
o It was, therefore, legally unwarranted
for the CA to agree with the RTC’s holding in
the order issued on April 1, 2003 that no
appropriation by Congress to allocate and set
aside the payment of the judgment awards was
necessary because "there were already an
appropriations earmarked for the said project."
o The CA and the RTC thereby
unjustifiably ignored the legal restriction
imposed on the trust funds of the Government
and its agencies and instrumentalities to be used
exclusively to fulfill the purposes for which the
trusts were created or for which the funds were
received except upon express authorization by
Congress or by the head of a government
agency in control of the funds, and subject to
pertinent budgetary laws, rules and regulations
Dispositive Portion:
• The Court GRANTS the petition for
review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals
under review; ANNULS the orders for the
garnishment of the funds of the University of
the Philippines and for the release of the
garnished amount to Stern Builders Corporation
and Servillano dela Cruz
• The Court orders Stern Builders to
redeposit the amount of ₱ 16,370,191.74 within
10 days from receipt of this decision.
Clyde
● DOTC v Sps. Abecina, GR 206484, Jan 29,
2016
Facts: The Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) and Digitel entered
into several Facilities Management Agreements
(FMA) for Digitel to manage, operate, maintain,
and develop the RTDP and NTPI-1 facilities
comprising local telephone exchange lines in
various municipalities in Luzon. The FMAs
were later converted into Financial Lease
Agreements (FLA) in 1995.
Later on, the municipality of Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, donated a one thousand two
hundred (1,200) square-meter parcel of land to
the DOTC for the implementation of the RDTP
in the municipality. However, the municipality
erroneously included portions of the
respondents’ property in the donation. Pursuant
to the FLAs, Digitel constructed a telephone
exchange on the property which encroached on
the properties of the respondent spouses.
The respondent spouses filed an accion
publiciana complaint against the DOTC and
Digitel for recovery of possession and
damages.
In its answer, the DOTC claimed immunity
from suit and ownership over the subject
properties.
The DOTC asserts that its Financial Lease
Agreement with Digitel was entered into in
pursuit of its governmental functions to
promote and develop networks of
communication systems. Therefore, it cannot
be interpreted as a waiver of state immunity.
The DOTC also maintains that while it was
regrettable that the construction of the telephone
exchange erroneously encroached on portions of
the respondent’s properties, the RTC erred in
ordering the return of the property. It argues
that while the DOTC, in good faith and in the
performance of its mandate, took private
property without formal expropriation
proceedings, the taking was nevertheless an
exercise of eminent domain.
On the other hand, the respondents counter
that the state immunity cannot be invoked to
perpetrate an injustice against its citizens. They
also maintain that because the subject properties
are titled, the DOTC is a builder in bad faith
who is deemed to have lost the improvements it
introduced.24 Finally, they differentiate their case
from Heirs of Mateo Pidacan v. ATO because
Pidacan originated from a complaint for
payment of the value of the property and rentals
while their case originated from a complaint for
recovery of possession and damages.25
Issue: Whether the DOTC can invoke the State
immunity.
Ruling: No, the State through then DOTC may
not be sued without its consent. This
fundamental doctrine stems from the principle
that there can be no legal right against the
authority which makes the law on which the
right depends. This generally accepted principle
of law has been explicitly expressed in both the
1973 and the present Constitutions. But as the
principle itself implies, the doctrine of state
immunity is not absolute. The State may waive
its cloak of immunity and the waiver may be
made expressly or by implication.
Over the years, the State’s participation in
economic and commercial activities gradually
expanded beyond its sovereign function as
regulator and governor. The evolution of the
State’s activities and degree of participation in
commerce demanded a parallel evolution in the
traditional rule of state immunity. Thus, it
became necessary to distinguish between the
State’s sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) and its private, commercial, and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Presently, state
immunity restrictively extends only to acts jure
imperii while acts jure gestionis are considered
as a waiver of immunity.
Here, the DOTC encroached on the respondents’
properties when it constructed the local
telephone exchange in Daet, Camarines Norte.
The exchange was part of the RTDP pursuant to
the National Telephone Program. We have no
doubt that when the DOTC constructed the
encroaching structures and subsequently
entered into the FLA with Digitel for their
maintenance, it was carrying out a sovereign
function. Therefore, we agree with the DOTC’s
contention that these are acts jure imperii that fall
within the cloak of state immunity.
However, as the respondents repeatedly
pointed out, this Court has long established in
Ministerio v CFI,33 Amigable v. Cuenca, 34the
2010 case Heirs of Pidacan v. ATO, 5and more
recently in Vigilar v. Aquino36that the doctrine
of state immunity cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a
citizen.
The Constitution identifies the limitations to
the awesome and near-limitless powers of the
State. Chief among these limitations are the
principles that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of
law and that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just
compensation. These limitations are enshrined
in no less than the Bill of Rights that guarantees
the citizen protection from abuse by the State.
Consequently, our laws require that the State’s
power of eminent domain shall be exercised
through expropriation proceedings in court.
Whenever private property is taken for public
use, it becomes the ministerial duty of the
concerned office or agency to initiate
expropriation proceedings. By necessary
implication, the filing of a complaint for
expropriation is a waiver of State immunity.
If the DOTC had correctly followed the regular
procedure upon discovering that it had
encroached on the respondents’ property, it
would have initiated expropriation proceedings
instead of insisting on its immunity from suit.
The petitioners would not have had to resort to
filing its complaint for reconveyance.
o Suits vs Foreign States
Evan
● Arigo v Swift, G.R. 206510 (2014)
Facts:
● A petition for the issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance
of a Temporary Environmental Order
 (TEPO), otherwise known as the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
involving violations of environmental
laws and regulations in relation to the
grounding of the US military ship USS
Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.
● Tubbataha is composed of two huge
coral atolls - the north atoll and the
south atoll. The reefs of Tubbataha are
considered part of Cagayancillo, a
remote island municipality of Palawan.
● Tubbataha was declared a National
Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation
No. 306 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino on August 11, 1988.
● Tubbataha was inscribed by the United
Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a
World Heritage Site. It was recognized
as one of the Philippines' oldest
ecosystems; an example representing
significant on-going ecological and
biological processes; and an area of
exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic
importance.
● On April 6, 2010, Congress passed
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3
otherwise known as the "Tubbataha
Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009"
"to ensure the protection and
conservation of the globally significant
economic, biological, sociocultural,
educational and scientific values of the
Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the
enjoyment of present and future
generations." Under the "no-take"
policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is
strictly regulated and many human
activities are prohibited and penalized
or fined, including fishing, gathering,
destroying and disturbing the resources
within the TRNP. The law likewise
created the Tubbataha Protected Area
Management Board (TPAMB) which
shall be the sole policy-making and
permit-granting body of the TRNP.
Issues:
● The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class
mine countermeasures ship of the US
Navy.
● In December 2012, the US Embassy in
the Philippines requested diplomatic
clearance for the said vessel "to enter
and exit the territorial waters of the
Philippines and to arrive at the port of
Subic Bay for the purpose of routine
ship replenishment, maintenance, and
crew liberty.”
● While transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship
ran aground on the northwest side of
South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs. No
cine was injured in the incident, and
there have been no reports of leaking
fuel or oil.
● U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice
Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret
for the incident in a press statement.
● US Ambassador to the Philippines
Harry K. Thomas, Jr., "reiterated his
regrets over the grounding incident and
assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert
F. del Rosario that the United States will
provide appropriate compensation for
damage to the reef caused by the ship.”
● By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led
salvage team had finished removing the
last piece of the grounded ship from the
coral reef.
● The above-named petitioners on their
behalf and in representation of their
respective sector/organization and
others, including minors or generations
yet unborn, filed the present petition
against US Respondents in their official
capacities as US Navy Officers and PH
Respondents, including President
Benigno S. Aquino III in his official
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the
AFP and others in their official
capacities.
 1. Whether or not the petitioners have
legal standing to file the present
petition.
2. Whether or not this court has
jurisdiction over the US respondents
who did not submit any pleading or
manifestation in this case.
3. Whether or not there is a waiver of
immunity from suit found in the VFA.
4. Whether or not the present petition had
become moot.
5. Whether or not the present petition is
the proper remedy to assail the
constitutionality of VFA’s provisions.
Rulings:
1. YES. The Petitioners have legal standing
to file the present petition.
This Court ruled that not only do
ordinary citizens have legal standing to
sue for the enforcement of
environmental rights, they can do so in
representation of their own and future
generations. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can
only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned.
Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors' assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the
same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come.
2. NO. This court does not have
jurisdiction over the US respondents
who did not submit any pleading or
manifestation in this case.
The US respondents were sued in their
official capacity as commanding officers
of the US Navy who had control and
supervision over the USS Guardian and
its crew. The alleged act or omission
resulting in the unfortunate grounding
of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was
committed while they were performing
official military duties.
Considering that the satisfaction of a
judgment against said officials will
require remedial actions
and appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be
one against the
US itself.
3. NO. There is no waiver of immunity
from suit found in the VFA.
The waiver of State immunity under the
VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil
actions such as the present petition for
issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.
4. YES. The petition had become moot.
This petition has become moot in the
sense that the salvage operation sought
to be enjoined or restrained had already
been accomplished when petitioners
sought recourse from this Court.
Still, petitioners are entitled to these
reliefs notwithstanding the completion
of the removal of the USS Guardian
from the coral reef.
5. NO. The present petition is not the
proper remedy to assail the
constitutionality of VFA’s provisions.
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora,41 the
VFA was duly concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and has been
recognized as a treaty by the United
States as attested and certified by the
duly authorized representative of the
United States government.
The VFA being a valid and binding
agreement, the parties are required as a
matter of international law to abide by
its terms and provisions.
 The Court cannot grant the additional
reliefs prayed for in the petition to order
a review of the VFA and to nullify
certain immunity provisions thereof.
Conclusion:
The petition for the issuance of the
privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is
hereby DENIED.
Joyce
● The Holy See v Rosario, (December 17, 1994)
Facts:
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises
sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy,
and is represented in the Philippines by the
Papal Nuncio. Private respondent, Starbright
Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation
engaged in the real estate business.
The petition arose from a controversy over a
parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters
(Lot 5-A, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 390440)
located in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro
Manila and registered in the name of petitioner.
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup,
through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as
agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his
rights to the sale to private respondent. In view
of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots
sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to
who of the parties has the responsibility of
evicting and clearing the land of squatters.
Complicating the relations of the parties was the
sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana
Properties and Development Corporation
(Tropicana).
Advertisement
Respondent filed a complained for the
annulment of the sale of the land and damages
against the petitioner, as represented by the
Papal Nuncio and other defendants.
Petitioner answered, saying that the complaint
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
based on sovereign immunity from suit.
Respondent contended that the petitioner “shed
off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the
business contract in question.”
Issue:
Whether the petitioner Holy See is immune from
suit from its act of entering into a contractual
relations centering on the sale of lot to a private
person.
Held:
Yes, Holy See is immune from suit in the case at
hand.
The burden of the petition is that respondent
trial court has no jurisdiction over petitioner,
being a foreign state enjoying sovereign
immunity. On the other hand, private
respondent insists that the doctrine of non-
suability is not anymore absolute and that
petitioner has divested itself of such a cloak
when, of its own free will, it entered into a
commercial transaction for the sale of a parcel of
land located in the Philippines.
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the
Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The
Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal
Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations
with the Philippine government since 1957. This
appears to be the universal practice in
international relations.
In a community of national states, the Vatican
City represents an entity organized not for
political but for ecclesiastical purposes and
international objects. Despite its size and object,
the Vatican City has an independent
government of its own, with the Pope, who is
also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the
Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its
traditions, and the demands of its mission in the
world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and
activities of the Vatican City are such as to make
it in a sense an “international state.”
As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987
Constitution, the country has adopted the
generally accepted principles of International
Law. Even without this affirmation, such
principles of International Law are deemed
incorporated as part of the law of the land as a
condition and consequence of our admission in
the society of nations.
In the absence of legislation defining what
activities and transactions shall be considered
“commercial” and as constituting acts jure
gestionis, we have to come out with our own
guidelines, tentative they may be. Certainly, the
mere entering into a contract by a foreign state
with a private party cannot be the ultimate test.
Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry.
The logical question is whether the foreign state
is engaged in the activity in the regular course of
business. If the foreign state is not engaged
regularly in a business or trade, the particular
act or transaction must then be tested by its
nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign
activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act
jure imperii, especially when it is not
undertaken for gain or profit.
Advertisement
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and
sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate
business, surely the said transaction can be
categorized as an act jure gestionis. However,
petitioner has denied that the acquisition and
subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for
profit but claimed that it acquired said property
for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Nunciature in the Philippines. Private
respondent failed to dispute said claim.
The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire
property, real or personal, in a receiving state,
necessary for the creation and maintenance of its
diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and entered into force in the
Philippines on November 15, 1965.
In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic
envoy is granted immunity from the civil and
administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state
over any real action relating to private
immovable property situated in the territory of
the receiving state which the envoy holds on
behalf of the sending state for the purposes of
the mission. If this immunity is provided for a
diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason
should immunity be recognized as regards the
sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy
See.
The decision to transfer the property and the
subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed
with a governmental character. Petitioner did
not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely
wanted to dispose off the same because the
squatters living thereon made it almost
impossible for petitioner to use it for the
purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters
have occupied and are still occupying the lot,
and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the
premises, has been admitted by private
respondent in its complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-
183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.
IV. Philippine Constitutional Principles and
Policies
Principles and Policies
Pabs
● Pable Ocampo v HRET, GR No. 158466 (2004)
Facts:
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rues of Civil Procedure, as amended, filed
by petitioner Pablo V. Ocampo. He alleged that
the HRET committed a grave abuse of discretion
in issuing case no. 01-024, Pablo Ocampo vs.
Mario Mark Jimenez Crespo.
On May 23, 2001, the Manila City Board of
Canvassers proclaimed private respondent
Mario B. Crespo, a.k.a. Mark Jimenez, the duly
elected Congressman of the 6th District of
Manila pursuant to the May 14, 2001 elections.
He was credited with 32,097 votes or a margin
of 768 votes over petitioner who obtained 31,329
votes.
On May 31, 2001, petitioner filed with the HRET
an electoral protest against private respondent,
impugning the election in 807 precincts in the
6th District of Manila on the following grounds:
(1) misreading of votes garnered by petitioner;
(2) falsification of election returns; (3)
substitution of election returns; (4) use of
marked, spurious, fake
and stray ballots; and (5) presence of ballots
written by one person or two persons (docketed
as HRET Case No. 01-024). Petitioner prayed
that a revision and appreciation of the ballots in
the 807 contested precincts be conducted; and
that, thereafter, he be proclaimed the duly
elected Congressman of the 6th District of
Manila.
On June 18, 2001, private respondent filed his
answer with counter-protest vehemently
denying that he engaged in massive vote
buying. He also opposed petitioner’s allegation
that there is a need for the revision and
appreciation of ballots.
March 6, 2003, the HRET, in HRET Cases Nos.
01-020, Bienvenido Abante & Prudencio
Jalandoni vs. Mario Crespo, and 01-023,
Rosenda
Ann M. Ocampo vs. MarioCrespo, issued
Resolutions declaring that private respondent is
ineligible for the Office of Representative of
Sixth District of Manila for lack of residence in
the district and ordering him to vacate his office,
Private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.
March 12, 2003, petitioner filed a motion to
implement Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646
which reads; Section 6 Effects of Disqualification
Case.
Issues:
1) Whether massive vote-buying was committed
by the private respondent
2) Whether petitioner can be proclaimed the
duly elected Representative of the 6th District of
Manila
Rulings:
1) Yes, HRET issued a Resolution holding that
private respondent was guilty of vote-buying
and disqualifying him as Congressman of the
6th District of Manila. Anent the second issue of
whether petitioner can be proclaimed the duly
elected Congressman
2) No, it is settled jurisprudence that the
subsequent disqualification of a candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes does not
entitle the candidate who garnered the second
highest number of votes to be declared the
winner. The latter could not be proclaimed
winner as he could not be considered the first
among the qualified candidates.
Clyde
● Maquiling v COMELEC, G.R. 195649 (2013)
DOCTRINE: The use of foreign passport after
renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of representation as to one’s
nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but
it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to
qualify one to run for an elective position.
Facts:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino
citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the
United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship.
Arnado applied for repatriation under R.A. 9225
before the Consulate General of the Philippines
in San Francisco, and took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of
Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor.
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua
(Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a
petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel
his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection
with the 10 May 2010 local and national
elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not
a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and
that he is a foreigner, attaching a certification
issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23
April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado
as "USA-American." Balua also presented in his
Memorandum a computer-generated travel
record from 2009 indicating that Arnado has
been using his US Passport in entering and
departing the Philippines, records showing trips
from April to November 2009.

COMELEC (First Division) required the
respondent to personally file his answer and
memorandum within 3 days from receipt. After
Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua
moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been
overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes and was
subsequently proclaimed as the winning
candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado
filed his verified answer, wherein he presented:
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of
Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio
Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of
Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time
resident of Kauswagan and that he has been
conspicuously and continuously residing in his
family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay
of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona
fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado
went to the United States in 1985 to work and
returned to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from
the Municipal Local Government Operations
Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P.
Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan,
from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15
February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the
Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that
Arnado has been a registered voter of
Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for
the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy
based on misrepresentation, the COMELEC First
Division considered it as one for
disqualification. In the matter of the issue of
citizenship, the First Division disagreed with
Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen,
stating that "although Arnado appears to have
substantially complied with the requirements of
R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using
his US passport after renouncing his US
citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated
his Affidavit of Renunciation." Arnado’s
continued use of his US passport is a strong
indication that Arnado had no real intention to
renounce his US citizenship and that he only
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable
him to run for office.
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution
before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground
that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the
Resolution and that the said Resolution is
contrary to law."
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling, another
candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who
garnered the second highest number of votes in
the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and
filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to
Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration.
Maquiling argued that while the First Division
correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code is not applicable in this case.
Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation
of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of
his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate
candidate who obtained the highest number of
lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the
winner.
COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of
the candidate whose qualifications for office is
questioned."
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the
treatment by the First Division of the petition as
one for disqualification, and ruled that the
petition was filed well within the period
prescribed by law.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and
set aside the ruling of the First Division and
granted Arnado’s MR, on the following
premises:
1. By renouncing his US citizenship as
imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent
embraced his Philippine citizenship as though
he never became a citizen of another country. It
was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the
respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen
again. The use of a US passport … does not
operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen
prior to his renunciation as there is no law
saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US
passport does not operate to "un-renounce"
what he has earlier on renounced.
2. In his Separate Concurring Opinion,
COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that
the use of foreign passport is not one of the
grounds provided for under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which
Philippine citizenship may be lost.
3. On the other hand, Commissioner Rene
V. Sarmiento dissented, saying respondent
evidently failed to prove that he truly and
wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the
United States. The latter’s continued use of his
US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges
of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation
of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary
to his declaration that he chose to retain only his
Philippine citizenship.
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning
the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to
run for public office despite his continued use of
a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be
proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty
race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of a foreign passport
after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s
qualifications to run for public office.
Ruling:
YES. Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath.
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to
qualify to run for a public office. He took the
Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign
citizenship. There is no question that after
performing these twin requirements required
under Section 5(2) of R.A. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003, he became eligible to run for public office.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship,
Arnado renounced his American citizenship by
executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus
completing the requirements for eligibility to
run for public office. By renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a
Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign
country.
However, this legal presumption does not
operate permanently and is open to attack
when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship,
the citizen performs positive acts showing his
continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his
citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his
foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US
passport to travel in and out of the country
before filing his certificate of candidacy.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a
hollow oath that can simply be professed at any
time, only to be violated the next day. It requires
an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all
civil and political rights granted by the foreign
country which granted the citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not
one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth
Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of
Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act
which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also
a citizen of another country to be qualified to
run for a local elective position.
This act of using a foreign passport after
renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to
Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively
imposed on him a disqualification to run for an
elective local position.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by
which foreign citizenship is acquired through a
positive act of applying for naturalization. This
is distinct from those considered dual citizens by
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to
take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing
of the certificate of candidacy already carries
with it an implied renunciation of foreign
citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on
the other hand, are required to take not only the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines but also to personally renounce
foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a
candidate for public office.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US
passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of
Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. He is
disqualified not only from holding the public
office but even from becoming a candidate in
the May 2010 elections.
DISPOSITVE: WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2
February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y
CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any
local elective position. CASAN MACODE
MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly
elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
in the 10 May 2010 elections.
Evan
● Villavicencio v Lukban, 39 Phil 778 (1919)
Facts:
The Lukban as mayor of Manila ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute be
closed, for the purpose of exterminating vices in
the city. The women were kept confined to their
houses by the police while the city authorities
made arrangements with the bureau of labor for
sending the women to Davao as laborers. Later
at midnight of October 25, the police, Anton
Hohmann and the Mayor descended upon the
houses and placed them aboard the steamers.
The women were given no opportunity to collect
their belongings and thought that they would be
brought to the police station for an investigation.
They have not been asked if they wish to depart
from the region and neither been asked of their
consent for the deportation.
Upon their arrival in Davao, the provincial
governor of Davao had no previous notification
that the women were prostitutes who had been
expelled in the city of Manila. Then the relatives
of the deportees presented an application for
habeas corpus to the SC. The application alleged
that the women were illegally deported by the
order of Lukban. Lukban and Hohman admitted
certain facts but prayed that the writ should not
be granted because the petitioners were not
proper parties to the case that it should have
begun in Davao because the women are not in
their custody now.
According to the fiscal attachment, the women
were destined to be laborers at good salaries on
the hacienda of Ynigo and governor sales. Fiscal
also admitted that the deportation was without
consent of the women.
Issue:
Whether or not Mayor Lukban has the authority
in expelling the prostitutes in his city (Manila)
without due process of law.
Ruling:
NO. Law defines power. No official, no matter
how high, is above the law. Lukban committed a
grave abuse of discretion by deporting the
prostitutes to a new domicile against their will.
There is no law expressly authorizing his action.
On the contrary, there is a law punishing public
officials, not expressly authorized by law or
regulation, who compels any person to change
his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are
still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the
same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as
every other citizen. Their choice of profession
should not be a cause for discrimination. It may
make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable
but it does not authorize anyone to compel said
prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of
the human race. These women have been
deprived of their liberty by being exiled to
Davao without even being given the
opportunity to collect their belongings or,
worse, without even consenting to being
transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban et. al
must be severely punished.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the
Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by
law or by regulations of a general character in
force in the Philippines who shall banish any
person to a place more than two hundred
kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be
by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be
punished by a fine of not less than three
hundred and twenty-five and not more than
three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly
authorized by law or by regulation of a general
character in force in the Philippines who shall
compel any person to change his domicile or
residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro
and a fine of not less than six hundred and
twenty-five and not more than six thousand two
hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
Court reasoned further that if the chief executive
of any municipality in the Philippines could
forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and
place him beyond the boundaries of the
municipality, and then, when called upon to
defend his official action, could calmly fold his
hands and claim that the person was under no
restraint and that he, the official, had no
jurisdiction over this other municipality, then
the more the writ of habeas corpus should be
enforced.
Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed
has illegally parted with the custody of a person
before the application for the writ is no reason
why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and
the chief of police, acting under no authority of
law, could deport these women from the city of
Manila to Davao, the same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them
from Davao to Manila.
The Supreme Court said that the women were
not chattels but Filipino citizens who had the
fundamental right not to be forced to change
their place of residence.
In resume — as before stated, no further action
on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The
respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax,
Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in
contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found
in contempt of court and shall pay into the office
of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five
days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The
motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike
from the record the Replica al Memorandum de
los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted.
Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So
ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task,
may we not be permitted to express the hope
that this decision may serve to bulwark the
fortifications of an orderly government of laws
and to protect individual liberty from illegal
encroachment.
Joyce
● Pamatong v Comelec GR No. 161872 (2004)
FACTS:
When the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong,
filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Presidency,
the Commision on Elections (COMELEC)
refused to give the petition its due course.
Pamatong requested a case for reconsideration.
However, the COMELEC again denied his
request. The COMELEC declared Pamatong,
along with 35 other people, as nuisance
candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election
Code. The COMELEC noted that such
candidates “could not wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are either not nominated by a
political party or not supported by a registered
political party with national constituency.”
Pamatong argued that this was against his right
to “equal access to opportunities for public
service,” citing Article 2, Section 26 of the
Constitution, and that the COMELEC was
indirectly amending the Constitution in this
manner. Pamatong also stated that he is the
“most qualified among all the presidential
candidates” and supported the statement with
his legal qualifications, his alleged capacity to
wage national and international campaigns, and
his government platform.
Advertisement
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of
Pamatong’s request for presidential candidacy,
along with the grounds for such refusal, violate
the right to equal access to opportunities for
public service.
RULING:
NO
The Court noted that the provisions under
Article II are generally considered not-self
executing. As such, the provision in section 26,
along with the other policies in the article, does
not convey any judicially enforceable rights.
Article 2 “merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action” by presenting
ideals/standards through the policies presented.
Article 2, Section 26 recognizes a privilege to run
for public office, one that is subject to limitations
provided by law. As long as these limitations are
enforced without discrimination, then the equal
access clause is not violated. The Court justified
the COMELEC’s need for limitations on
electoral candidates given the interest of
ensuring rational, objective, and orderly
elections. In the absence of any limitations, the
election process becomes a “mockery” if anyone,
including those who are clearly unqualified to
hold a government position, is allowed to run.
Note: Pamatong presented other evidence that
he claims makes him eligible for candidacy. The
Court however stated that it is not within their
power to make such assessments.
Pabs
● Republic v Albios, 707 SCRA 584 (2013)
NATURE: This is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court
assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No.
95414, which affirmed the April 25,
2008Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Imus,
Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel
Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty
Albios (Albios) as void from the beginning.
FACTS:
• Fringer (American citizen) and Albios
were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59,
Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-
1588.3
• Albios filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had
any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital
obligations. She described their marriage as one
made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab
initio.
• The RTC declared the marriage void ab
initio. The RTC was of the view that the parties
married each other for convenience only. Giving
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated
that she contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American
citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that
after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the
United States and never again communicated
with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him
the $2,000.00 because he never processed her
petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled
that when marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a
conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception. CA
affirmed.
ISSUE:
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration
of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack
of consent? Neither can their marriage be considered
voidable on the ground of fraud under Article
45 (3) of the Family Code. Entering into a
HELD/RATIO: marriage for the sole purpose of evading
immigration laws does not qualify under any of
No. Under Article 2 of the Family Code for the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under
consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given Article 4 7 (3 ), the ground of fraud may only be
and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing brought by the injured or innocent party. In the
officer. But consent was not lacking between present case, there is no injured party because
Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered the sham marriage.
defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
understood the nature and the beneficial and September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is
nothing impaired their ability to do so. That ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is
their consent was freely given is best evidenced DISMISSEDfor utter lack of merit.
by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such
plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was
a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship.
There was a full and complete understanding of
the legal tie that would be created between
them, since it was that precise legal tie which
was necessary to accomplish their goal.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all

analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and
Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound
in order to create the very bond necessary to
allow the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be
married would allow them to further their
objective, considering that only a valid marriage
can properly support an application for
citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent
intention to enter into the actual marriage status
and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited
purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly
present.

Although the Court views with disdain the

respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for
dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the
marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s
marriage may be considered a sham or
fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is
not void ab initio and continues to be valid and
subsisting.