June 3, 2007 No.

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The Stand-Off Between the Lebanese Army and "Fatah al-Islam":

A Test of the Siniora Government’s Determination

Dani Berkovich

Since May 20, the Lebanese Army has been involved in an ongoing and severe
confrontation with “Fatah al-Islam” -- an organization identified with al-Qaeda -- dozens
of whose members are holed up in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp near
Tripoli. The government of Fuad Siniora, which enjoys political and military backing
from regional and international actors, is determined to force Fatah al-Islam to surrender
and it views this event as not just a serious security challenge but mainly as an important
test of strength. The confrontation once again focuses attention on Lebanon’s fragile
stability, with several implications for the regional system, including Israel.
• The growing infiltration into Lebanon of al-Qaeda elements in recent years –
These elements are working to entrench their influence among Palestinian
refugees and the Lebanese Sunnis by exploiting the weakness of the central
government and the leadership of the Palestinian factions and building on the
existing infrastructure of extremist Sunni organizations. They are not a natural
part of the Lebanese environment and do not play according to accepted
"Lebanese rules," which even powerful Lebanese organizations like Hizbullah
take into account. Moreover, they see the Lebanese government as part of the
American-Israeli “project” for the region and therefore as a legitimate target of
jihad while striving to annihilate Israel. In Israel there is a longstanding
recognition of the dangerous potential for infiltration of “Iraqi veterans” into
Lebanon and intensification of their actions against Israel (which was realized at
least once in the form of Katyusha fire in December 2005) or against UNIFIL.
They pose an equally serious threat to destabilize Lebanon by propagating radical
Islamism among the Sunni population in a manner that might ignite the
simmering tensions between Sunnis and Shi’ites (perhaps leading to replay of
events in Iraq).
• The problem of Palestinians in Lebanon – The latest confrontation also
refocuses attention on the 400,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, who live in
dire humanitarian conditions and are seen by Lebanese as a ticking bomb. The
weakened authority of the local Palestinian leadership (riven by ceaseless

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 internecine conflicts), the sharp split in Palestinian politics and the lack of a
strong Palestinian political center outside Lebanon all provide fertile ground for
the infusion of more radical, militant elements, like Fatah al-Islam, which also
might be spreading into Gaza and even the West Bank. In this reality, the “right
of return” may again become the subject of regional and international debate,
though from the Lebanese government’s perspective that is the only solution to
the problem of the Palestinians in Lebanon.
• The question of the Lebanese army’s capacity to enforce state sovereignty
throughout the territory of the country – The Lebanese army bears most of the
burden for carrying out the Sinora government’s political and security agenda
with respect to implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 in south
Lebanon, preventing the smuggling of weapons across the Syrian border, and
confronting domestic terrorist threats. In none of these missions has it acquitted
itself with great distinction. The latest confrontation, which has only exacerbated
tensions among Palestinians, has again exposed the army’s clumsiness and limited
ability to function as an effective counter-terror force. Still, the way in which the
army concludes this affair will be an important indicator of its deterrence and
enforcement capabilities and a litmus test of its ability to meet a series of other
challenges. Failure to deal vigorously with the threat of al-Qaeda-type
organizations will play into Hizbullah’s hands; a show of army weakness will
legitimize Hizbullah demands to act as the country’s main defender.

In the midst of this maelstrom, Hizbullah prefers to adopt a neutral stance. It is

undoubtedly concerned that the incident will end in a way that raises the stature of the
Sinora government and the army and elicits more international backing for them; after all,
the army may eventually be called on to disarm Hizbullah, so Hizbullah prefers that it
remain nothing more than a hollow symbol of Lebanese unity. These developments may
also complicate its efforts to bring down the Sinora government and may generate a
renewed public debate about the disarming of all militias – first, the Palestinians’ but then
Hizbullah’s.

However, matters are too complicated to permit acting only on the basis of “my enemy’s
enemy is my friend.” Hizbullah, which is trying to rebuff charges that it is a servant of
foreign interests, does not want to be tied to an organization identified with al-Qaeda. On
the contrary, the strengthening in Lebanon of global jihad elements, most of whom are
anti-Shi’ite, constitutes a threat to Hizbullah as well, because their actions could suck
Hizbullah into an all-out Sunni-Shi’ite war or provoke another round of fighting with
Israel if they were to succeed in opening a terror front from Lebanon. Thus,
paradoxically, Hizbullah and the Sinora government find themselves in the same camp
against Sunni radicalism as represented by Fatah al-Islam and other such organizations.
Indeed, Syria is also part of this camp, since it, too, feels threatened by the activities of
global jihadists in its territory.

Any escalation of their activities could push Hizbullah into a united front with the Siniora
government, and that would force the two sides to reach some compromise in the
ongoing political confrontation between them. By contrast, it would be more difficult to

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bring Syria to play a constructive role – at least in of terms of more effective action to
prevent infiltration into Lebanon – because Syria has no interest in helping to stabilize
Lebanon. Instead, Syria can only gain from the crisis in Lebanon, especially now that the
United States, France and Britain have managed to pass a Security Council resolution
establishing an international tribunal to judge those responsible for the assassination of
former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri (a measure that requires Lebanese ratification).
Syria will probably make any assistance to Lebanon conditional on elimination of the
pressure on the Hariri issue.

Reducing the threat to turn Lebanon into a central base for al-Qaeda elements depends
not only on improving (with foreign help) the operational and intelligence capacities of
Lebanese security agencies but also on the ability of the Sinora government, on one hand,
and Hizbullah and Syria, on the other, to overcome their deep conflicts of interests in
order to cooperate against the common threat of global jihad organizations.

INSS Insight is published

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Sari and Israel Roizman, Philadelphia