A.C. No.

11078 matter of the mortgage was under the

charge of respondent Atty. Ramon, but who
VERLITA V. MERCULLO and RAYMOND
was not around at that time.
VEDANO, Complainants,
vs.
On June 20, 2012, Carmelita received a letter
ATTY. MARIE FRANCESE RAMON,
from the sheriff of the Regional Trial Court
Respondent.
(RTC) in Caloocan City, stating that her
property would be put up for auction in July
2013. Verlita and Raymond thus went to the
DECISION
NHMFC to see the respondent, who advised
them about their right to redeem the
property within one year from the
BERSAMIN, J.:
foreclosure.3
This case concerns the complaint for the
disbarment of Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon
for violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code In August 2013, Verlita and Raymond called
of Professional Responsibility and the up the respondent, and expressed their
Lawyer's Oath for deceiving the intention to redeem the property by paying
complainants in order to obtain the the redemption price. The latter agreed and
substantial amount of P350,000.00 on the scheduled an appointment with them on
pretext of having the foreclosed asset of the August 30,2013.
latter's mother redeemed.

On August 30, 2013, the respondent arrived

Antecedents at the designated meeting place at around
1:30 p.m., carrying the folder that Verlita and
In the period from 2002 to 2011, the
Raymond had seen at the NHFMC when they
National Home Mortgage Finance
inquired on the status of their mother's
Corporation (NHMFC) sent several demand
property. After the respondent had oriented
letters to Carmelita T. Vedaño1 regarding
them on the procedure for redemption, the
her unpaid obligations secured by the
complainants handed P350,000.00 to the
mortgage covering her residential property
respondent, who signed an
in Novaliches, Caloocan City.2 To avoid the
acknowledgment receipt.4 The respondent
foreclosure of the mortgage, Carmelita
issued two acknowledgment receipts for the
authorized her children, Verlita Mercullo and
redemption price and for litigation
Raymond Vedaño (complainants herein), to
expenses,5 presenting to the complainants
inquire from the NHMFC about the status of
her NHMFC identification card. Before
the obligations. Verlita and Raymond
leaving them, she promised to inform them
learned that their mother's arrears had
as soon as the documents for redemption
amounted to P350,000.00, and that the
were ready for their mother's signature.6
 redemption, but discovered that the
respondent had already ceased to be
On September 4, 2013, the respondent met
connected with the NHMFC. On September
with Verlita and handed a letter7 that she
20, 2013, they met with her at Branch 145 of
had signed, along with the special power of
the Regional Trial Court in Makati City where
attorney (SPA) for Carmelita's signature.8
she was attending a hearing. She informed
The letter reads:
them that the redemption was under
process, and that the certificate of
redemption would be issued in two to three
Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio
weeks time.
Sheriff
Regional Trial Court
After communicating through text messages
Caloocan City
with the respondent, Verlita and Raymond
finally went to see the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City On
Re: Redemption of the property covered by
November 27, 2013 to inquire on the status
EJF No. 7484-2013
of the redemption. There, they discovered
that the respondent had not deposited the
redemption price and had not filed the letter
Dear Atty. Dabalos,
of intent for redeeming the property.10

Please assist Ms. Carmelita Vedano, through

On December 5, 2013, Verlita and Raymond
her Attorney-in-Fact in redeeming the
again went to Branch 145 of the Regional
property covered by EJF No. 7484-2013.
Trial Court in Makati City where the
Please provide the necessary computation
respondent had a hearing, and handed to
as to the full redemption amount in order for
her their demand letter requiring her to
Ms. Vedano to redeem the same.
return the amount she had received for the
redemption.11 She acknowledged the letter
and promised to return the money on
Thank you.
December 16, 2013 by depositing the
amount in Verlita's bank account. However,
she did not fulfill her promise and did not
Truly yours,
show up for her subsequent scheduled
hearings in Branch 145.12

(Sgd.) rances E. Ramon

Verlita and Raymond went to the NHMFC on With their attempts to reach the respondent
September 9, 2013 to follow up on the being in vain, V erlita and Raymond brought
their disbarment complaint in the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP).1âwphi1
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Marie
Frances E. Ramon is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for two (2) years and
Ordered to Return the amount of Three
Hundred Fifty Thousand (P350,000.00) Pesos
to Complainant.

The respondent did not submit her answer

when required to do so. She also did not Ruling of the Court
attend the mandatory conference set by the
The Court declares the respondent guilty of
IBP despite notice. Hence, the investigation
dishonesty and deceit.
proceeded ex parte.13

The Lawyer's Oath is a source of the

IBP Commissioner Arsenio P. Adriano
obligations and duties of every lawyer. Any
submitted his Report and
violation of the oath may be punished with
Recommendation,14 whereby he found the
either disbarment, or suspension from the
respondent to have violated Rule 1.01 of the
practice of law, or other commensurate
Code of Professional Responsibility for
disciplinary action.16 Every lawyer must at
engaging in deceitful conduct, and
no time be wanting in probity and moral
recommended her suspension from the
fiber which are not only conditions
practice of law for two years, and her return
precedent to his admission to the Bar, but
to the complainants of P350,000.00. with
are also essential for his continued
legal interest from December 2, 2013.
membership in the Law Profession.17 Any
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer constitutes
a violation of his oath.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted
Commissioner Adriano's recommendation
as stated in its Resolution No. XXI-2014-
The respondent certainly transgressed the
929,15 viz.:
Lawyer's Oath by receiving money from the
complainants after having made them
believe that she could assist them in
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
ensuring the redemption in their mother's
hereby ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the
behalf. She was convincing about her ability
Report and Recommendation of the
to work on the redemption because she had
Investigating Commissioner in the above-
worked in the NHFMC. She did not inform
entitled case, herein made part of this
them soon enough, however, that she had
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
meanwhile ceased to be connected with the
recommendation to be fully supported by
agency. It was her duty to have so informed
the evidence on record and applicable laws,
them. She further misled them about her
and for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
ability to realize the redemption by falsely
informing them about having started the
redemption process. She concealed from
them the real story that she had not even
initiated the redemption proceedings that
she had assured them she would do.
Everything she did was dishonest and
deceitful in order to have them part with the
substantial sum of P350,000.00. She took
advantage of the complainants who had
reposed their full trust and confidence in her
ability to perform the task by virtue of her
being a lawyer. Surely, the totality of her
actuations inevitably eroded public trust in
the Legal Profession.
As a lawyer, the respondent was proscribed
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct in her dealings
with others, especially clients whom she
should serve with competence and
diligence.18 Her duty required her to
maintain fealty to them, binding her not to
neglect the legal matter entrusted to her.
Thus, her neglect in connection therewith
rendered her liable.19 Moreover, the
unfulfilled promise of returning the money
and her refusal to communicate with the
complainants on the matter of her
engagement aggravated the neglect and
dishonesty attending her dealings with the
complainants.
The respondent's conduct patently breached
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal
processes.1âwphi1
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.
Evil intent was not essential in order to bring
the unlawful act or omission of the
respondent within the coverage of Rule 1. 01
of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.20The Code exacted from her
not only a firm respect for the law and legal
processes but also the utmost degree of
fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients
and the moneys entrusted by them pursuant
to their fiduciary relationship.21
Yet another dereliction of the respondent
was her wanton disregard of the several
notices sent to her by the IBP in this case.
Such disregard could only be wrong because
it reflected her undisguised contempt of the
proceedings of the IBP, a body that the Court
has invested with the authority to
investigate the disbarment complaint
against her. She thus exhibited her
irresponsibility as well as her utter disrespect
for the Court and the rest of the Judiciary. It
cannot be understated that a lawyer in her
shoes should comply with the orders of the
Court and of the Court's duly constituted
authorities, like the IBP, the office that the
Court has particularly tasked to carry out the
specific function of investigating attorney
misconduct.22
The respondent deserves severe
chastisement and appropriate sanctions. In
this regard, the IBP Board of Governors
recommended her suspension for two years
from the practice of law, and her return of
the amount of P350,000.00 to the
complainants. The recommended penalty is
not commensurate to the gravity of the
misconduct committed. She merited a
heavier sanction of suspension from the
practice of law for five years. Her
professional misconduct warranted a longer
suspension from the practice of law because
she had caused material prejudice to the
clients' interest.23 She should somehow be
taught to be more ethical and professional in
dealing with trusting clients like the
complainants and their mother, who were
innocently too willing to repose their utmost
trust in her abilities as a lawyer and in her
trustworthiness as a legal professional. In
this connection, we state that the usual
mitigation of the recommended penalty by
virtue of the misconduct being her first
offense cannot be carried out in her favor
considering that she had disregarded the
several notices sent to her by the IBP in this
case. As to the return of the P350,000.00 to
the complainant, requiring her to restitute
with legal interest is only fair and just
because she did not comply in the least with
her ethical undertaking to work on the
redemption of the property of the mother of
the complainants. In addition, she is sternly
warned against a similar infraction in the
future; otherwise, the Court will have her
suffer a more severe penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS
ATTY. MARIE FRANCES E. RAMON guilty of
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's
Oath; SUSPENDS HER FROM THE PRACTICE
OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS
EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with the STERN
WARNING that any similar infraction in the
future will be dealt with more severely;
ORDERS her to return to the complainants
the sum of P350,000.00 within 30 days from
notice, plus legal interest of 6% per annum
reckoned from the finality of this decision
until full payment; and DIRECTS her to
promptly submit to this Court written proof
of her compliance within the same period of
30 days from notice of this decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the
Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended
to Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon's personal
record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines; and to the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts throughout the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
 [ A.C. No. 8172. April 12, 2016 ]
ALEX NULADA, COMPLAINANT
VS.
ATTY. ORLANDO S. PAULMA, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from a
verified complaint1 for disbarment by
reason of dishonesty and conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude filed by
Complainant Alex Nulada (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma
(respondent).
The Facts
Complainant alleged that on September 30,
2005, respondent issued in his favor a check
in the amount of ₱650,000.00 as payment
for the latter's debt. Because of
respondent's standing as a respected
member of the community and his being a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Miagao,2 Province of Iloilo,
complainant accepted the check without
question.3
Unfortunately, when he presented the check
for payment, it was dishonored due to
insufficient fluids. Respondent failed to
make good the amount of the check despite
notice of dishonor and repeated demands,
prompting complainant to file a criminal
complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP) 224 against respondent,5 before
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor,
Province of Iloilo, docketed as I.S. No. 2006-
637,6 which issued a Resolution7 dated May
26, 2006 recommending the filing of the
appropriate information against respondent
before the Municipal Trial Court of Miagao,
Province of Iloilo (MTC).8 Subsequently, said
information was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 2604.9
After due proceedings, the MTC rendered a
Decision10 dated October 30, 2008 finding
respondent guilty of violation of BP 22 and
ordering him to pay the amount of
₱150,000.00 as fine, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of failure to pay.
Furthermore, he was ordered to pay: (1) the
sum of ₱650,000.00 representing the
amount of the check with interest pegged at
the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
computed from the time of the filing of the
complaint; (2) filing fees in the amount of
₱10,000.00; and (3) attorney's fees in the
amount of ₱20,000.00 plus appearance fees
of ₱1,500.00 per hearing.11
Records show that respondent appealed his
conviction to the Regional Trial Court of
Guimbal, Iloilo, Branch 67 (RTC), docketed as
Criminal Case No. 346.12 In a Decision13
dated March 13, 2009, the RTC affirmed in
toto the MTC ruling. On April 16, 2009, the
RTC Decision became final and executory.14
Prior to the promulgation of the RTC
Decision, or on February 12, 2009,
complainant filed this administrative
complaint before the Court, through the
Office of the Bar Confidant.
In his defense,15 respondent denied that he
committed dishonesty against complainant,
as prior to September 30, 2005, he informed
the latter that there were insufficient funds
to cover the amount of the check.
Respondent claimed that he merely issued
the check in order to accommodate a friend
in whose favor he obtained the loan,
stressing that he did not personally benefit
from the proceeds thereof.16
Unfortunately, said friend had died and
respondent had no means by which to pay
for the amount of the check.17 He also
claimed that complainant threatened him
and used his unfunded check to the latter's
personal advantage.18
Thereafter, the Court, in its Resolution dated
November 14, 2011,19 referred this
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for its investigation,
report, and recommendation.1aшphi1
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
After conducting mandatory conferences,
the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of
the IBP issued a Report and
Recommendation20 dated June 26, 2013,
recommending that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months for violation of the
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), as well as for having
been found guilty of a crime involving moral
turpitude.21
It found that the offense for which
respondent was found guilty of, i.e.,
violation of BP 22, involved moral turpitude,
and that he violated his lawyer's oath and
the CPR when he committed the said
offense. Stressing the importance of the
lawyer's oath, the IBP held that by his
conviction of the said crime, respondent has
shown that he is "unfit to protect the
administration of justice or that he is no
longer of good moral character"22 which
justifies either his suspension or
disbarment.23
Subsequently, or on October 10, 2014, the
IBP Board of Governors issued a Notice of
Resolution24 adopting and approving with
modification the IBP's Report and
Recommendation dated June 26, 2013,
suspending respondent from the practice of
law for a period of two (2) years for having
violated the lawyer's oath and the CPR, as
well as for having been found guilty of a
crime involving moral turpitude.25
The Issue Before the Court
The issue advanced for the Court's
resolution is whether or not respondent
should be administratively disciplined for
having been found guilty of a crime involving
moral turpitude.
The Court's Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and
conclusions of the CBD of the IBP, as
approved, adopted, and modified by the IBP
Board of Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, Or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of
the bar "to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law x x x." Rule 1.01
thereof specifically provides that "[a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." By taking the
lawyer's oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian
of the law and an indispensable instrument
for the orderly administration of justice.26
As such, he can be disciplined for any
conduct, in his professional or private
capacity, which renders him unfit to
continue to be an officer of the court.27
In Enriquez v. De Vera,28 the Court discussed
the purpose and nature of a violation of BP
22 in relation to an administrative case
against a lawyer, as in this case, to wit:
[BP] 22 has been enacted in order to
safeguard the interest of the banking system
and the legitimate public checking account
users. The gravamen of the offense defined
and punished by [BP] 22 [x x x] is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check, or any
check that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment and putting it in
circulation; the law is designed to prohibit
and altogether eliminate the deleterious and
pernicious practice of issuing checks with
insufficient funds, or with no credit, because
the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a
crime against public order to be abated.
xxxx
Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware
of the objectives and coverage of [BP] 22. If
he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to
know them, for the law was penal in
character and application. His issuance of
the unfunded check involved herein
knowingly violated [BP] 22, and exhibited his
indifference towards the pernicious effect of
his illegal act to public interest and public
order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's
Oath that enjoined him to support the
Constitution and obey the laws.29
Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in
violation of BP Blg. 22 indicates a lawyer's
unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed on him, shows such lack of personal
honesty and good moral character as to
render him unworthy of public confidence,
and constitutes a ground for disciplinary
action.30
In this case, respondent's conviction for
violation of BP 22, a crime involving moral
turpitude, had been indubitably established.
Such conviction has, in fact, already become
final. Consequently, respondent violated the
lawyer's oath, as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the CPR, as aptly found by the IBP and,
thus, must be subjected to disciplinary
action.
In Heenan v. Espejo, the Court suspended
therein respondent from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years when the latter
issued checks which were dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial
Services, Inc. v. Valerio, the same penalty
was imposed by the Court to respondent
who issued worthless checks to pay off her
loan. Likewise, in Dizon v. De Taza, the Court
meted the penalty of suspension for a period
of two (2) years to respondent for having
issued bouncing checks, among other
infractions. Finally, in Wong v. Moya II,34
respondent was ordered suspended from
the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years, because aside from issuing worthless
checks and failure to pay his debts,
respondent also breached his client's trust
and confidence to his personal advantage
and had shown a wanton disregard of the
IBP's Orders in the course of its proceedings.
Accordingly, and in view of the foregoing
instances when the erring lawyer was
suspended for a period of two (2) years for
the same violation, the Court finds it
appropriate to mete the same penalty to
respondent in this case.
As a final word, it should be emphasized that
membership in the legal profession is a
privilege burdened with conditions.35 A
lawyer is required to observe the law and be
mindful of his or her actions whether acting
in a public or private capacity.36 Any
transgression of this duty on his part would
not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer
but would also erode the public's faith in the
legal profession as a whole.37 In this case,
respondent's conduct fell short of the
exacting standards expected of him as a
member of the bar, for which he must suffer
the necessary consequences.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Orlando S.
Paulma is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years,
effective upon his receipt of this Resolution.
He is warned that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in
Atty. Paulma's personal record with the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and copies be
served to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts
in the land.
SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 9387 June 20, 2012
(Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562)
EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia
Hernandez (complainant) against her
lawyer, Atty. Venancio B. Padilla
(respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law
Offices, for his alleged negligence in the
handling of her case.
The records disclose that complainant and
her husband were the respondents in an
ejectment case filed against them with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).
In a Decision1 dated 28 June 2002, penned
by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge
Carandang), the RTC ordered that the Deed
of Sale executed in favor of complainant be
cancelled; and that the latter pay the
complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan),
attorney’s fees and moral damages.
Complainant and her husband filed their
Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter,
the Court of Appeals (CA) ordered them to
file their Appellants’ Brief. They chose
respondent to represent them in the case.
On their behalf, he filed a Memorandum on
Appeal instead of an Appellants’ Brief. Thus,
Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal.
The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution2
dated 16 December 2003.
No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the
Resolution dismissing the appeal was filed by
the couple. Complainant claims that because
respondent ignored the Resolution, he acted
with "deceit, unfaithfulness amounting to
malpractice of law."3 Complainant and her
husband failed to file an appeal, because
respondent never informed them of the
adverse decision. Complainant further
claims that she asked respondent "several
times" about the status of the appeal, but
"despite inquiries he deliberately withheld
response [sic]," to the damage and prejudice
of the spouses.4
The Resolution became final and executory
on 8 January 2004. Complainant was
informed of the Resolution sometime in July
2005, when the Sheriff of the RTC came to
her house and informed her of the
Resolution.
On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an
Affidavit of Complaint5 with the Committee
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), seeking the disbarment of
respondent on the following grounds:
deceit, malpractice, and grave misconduct.
Complainant prays for moral damages in the
amount of ₱ 350,000.
Through an Order6 dated 12 September
2005, Director of Bar Discipline Rogelio A.
Vinluan ordered respondent to submit an
answer to the Complaint. In his Counter-
Affidavit/Answer,7 respondent prayed for
the outright dismissal of the Complaint.
Respondent explained that he was not the
lawyer of complainant. He averred that prior
to the mandatory conference set by the IBP
on 13 December 2005, he had never met
complainant, because it was her husband
who had personally transacted with him.
According to respondent, the husband
"despondently pleaded to me to prepare a
Memorandum on Appeal because according
to him the period given by the CA was to
lapse within two or three days."8 Thus,
respondent claims that he filed a
Memorandum on Appeal because he
honestly believed that "it is this pleading
which was required."9
Before filing the Memorandum, respondent
advised complainant’s husband to settle the
case. The latter allegedly "gestured approval
of the advice."10
After the husband of complainant picked up
the Memorandum for filing, respondent
never saw or heard from him again and thus
assumed that the husband heeded his advice
and settled the case. When respondent
received an Order from the CA requiring him
to file a comment on the Motion to Dismiss
filed by Duigan, he "instructed his office staff
to contact Mr. Hernandez thru available
means of communication, but to no avail."11
Thus, when complainant’s husband went to
the office of respondent to tell the latter that
the Sheriff of the RTC had informed
complainant of the CA’s Resolution
dismissing the case, respondent was just as
surprised. The lawyer exclaimed, "KALA KO
BA NAKIPAG AREGLO NA KAYO."
In his 5 January 2009 Report,13 IBP
Investigating Commissioner Leland R.
Villadolid, Jr. found that respondent violated
Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (the Code). He
recommended that respondent be
suspended from practicing law from 3 to 6
months.
The board of governors of the IBP issued
Resolution No. XIX-2010-452 on 28 August
2010. Therein, they resolved to adopt and
approve the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent
was suspended from the practice of law for
six months.
Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.14 He prayed for the
relaxation of the application of the Canons of
the Code. On 14 January 2012, the IBP board
of governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-
1715 partly granting his Motion and reducing
the penalty imposed to one-month
suspension from the practice of law.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
acting Director for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B.
Funa, through a letter16 addressed to then
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, transmitted
the documents pertaining to the disbarment
Complaint against respondent.
We adopt the factual findings of the board of
governors of the IBP. This Court, however,
disagrees with its Decision to reduce the
penalty to one-month suspension. We thus
affirm the six-month suspension the Board
originally imposed in its 28 August 2010
Resolution.
Respondent insists that he had never met
complainant prior to the mandatory
conference set for the disbarment Complaint
she filed against him. However, a perusal of
the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the
appellate court revealed that he had signed
as counsel for the defendant-appellants
therein, including complainant and her
husband.17 The pleading starts with the
following sentence: "DEFENDANT[S]-
APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto this
Honorable Court submit the Memorandum
and further allege that: x x x."18 Nowhere
does the document say that it was filed only
on behalf of complainant’s husband.
It is further claimed by respondent that the
relation created between him and
complainant’s husband cannot be treated as
a "client-lawyer" relationship, viz:
It is no more than a client needing a legal
document and had it prepared by a lawyer
for a fee. Under the factual milieu and
circumstances, it could not be said that a
client entrusted to a lawyer handling and
prosecution of his case that calls for the strict
application of the Code; x x x19
As proof that none of them ever intended to
enter into a lawyer-client relationship, he
also alleges that complainant’s husband
never contacted him after the filing of the
Memorandum of Appeal. According to
respondent, this behavior was "very unusual
if he really believed that he engaged" the
former’s services.20
Complainant pointed out in her Reply21 that
respondent was her lawyer, because he
accepted her case and an acceptance fee in
the amount of ₱ 7,000.
According to respondent, however,
"[C]ontrary to the complainant’s claim that
he charged ₱ 7,000 as acceptance fee," "the
fee was only for the preparation of the
pleading which is even low for a
Memorandum of Appeal: x x x."22
Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship
and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the
client’s cause.23 Once a lawyer agrees to
handle a case, it is that lawyer’s duty to serve
the client with competence and diligence.24
Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty.
According to respondent, he merely drafted
the pleading that complainant’s husband
asked from him. Respondent also claims that
he filed a Memorandum of Appeal, because
he "honestly believed" that this was the
pleading required, based on what
complainant’s husband said.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner’s
observation on this matter, in the 5 January
2009 Report, is correct. Regardless of the
particular pleading his client may have
believed to be necessary, it was
respondent’s duty to know the proper
pleading to be filed in appeals from RTC
decisions, viz:
Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002
of the trial court, respondent should have
known that the mode of appeal to the Court
of Appeals for said Decision is by ordinary
appeal under Section 2(a) Rule 41 of the1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In all such
cases, Rule 44 of the said Rules applies.25
When the RTC ruled against complainant and
her husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal.
Consequently, what should apply is the rule
on ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires
that the appellant’s brief be filed after the
records of the case have been elevated to
the CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was
expected to know this procedure. Canon 5 of
the Code reads:
CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep abreast of
legal developments, participate in
continuing legal education programs,
support efforts to achieve high standards in
law schools as well as in the practical training
of law students and assist in disseminating
information regarding the law and
jurisprudence.
The obligations of lawyers as a consequence
of their Canon 5 duty have been expounded
in Dulalia, Jr. v. Cruz,26 to wit:
It must be emphasized that the primary duty
of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal
processes. They are expected to be in the
forefront in the observance and
maintenance of the rule of law. This duty
carries with it the obligation to be well-
informed of the existing laws and to keep
abreast with legal developments, recent
enactments and jurisprudence. It is
imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully
comply with such duty, they may not be able
to discharge competently and diligently their
obligations as members of the bar. Worse,
they may become susceptible to committing
mistakes.
In his MR, respondent begged for the
consideration of the IBP, claiming that the
reason for his failure to file the proper
pleading was that he "did not have enough
time to acquaint himself thoroughly with the
factual milieu of the case." The IBP
reconsidered and thereafter significantly
reduced the penalty originally imposed.
Respondent’s plea for leniency should not
have been granted.
The supposed lack of time given to
respondent to acquaint himself with the
facts of the case does not excuse his
negligence.
Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a
lawyer shall not handle any legal matter
without adequate preparation. While it is
true that respondent was not complainant’s
lawyer from the trial to the appellate court
stage, this fact did not excuse him from his
duty to diligently study a case he had agreed
to handle. If he felt he did not have enough
time to study the pertinent matters involved,
as he was approached by complainant’s
husband only two days before the expiration
of the period for filing the Appellant’s Brief,
respondent should have filed a motion for
extension of time to file the proper pleading
instead of whatever pleading he could come
up with, just to "beat the deadline set by the
Court of Appeals."27
Moreover, respondent does not deny that
he was given notice of the fact that he filed
the wrong pleading. However, instead of
explaining his side by filing a comment, as
ordered by the appellate court, he chose to
ignore the CA’s Order. He claims that he was
under the presumption that complainant
and her husband had already settled the
case, because he had not heard from the
husband since the filing of the latter’s
Memorandum of Appeal.
This explanation does not excuse
respondent’s actions.
First of all, there were several remedies that
respondent could have availed himself of,
from the moment he received the Notice
from the CA to the moment he received the
disbarment Complaint filed against him. But
because of his negligence, he chose to sit on
the case and do nothing.
Second, respondent, as counsel, had the
duty to inform his clients of the status of
their case. His failure to do so amounted to a
violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which
reads:
18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the
client’s request for information.
If it were true that all attempts to contact his
client proved futile, the least respondent
could have done was to inform the CA by
filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance
as counsel. He could have thus explained
why he was no longer the counsel of
complainant and her husband in the case
and informed the court that he could no
longer contact them.28 His failure to take
this measure proves his negligence.
Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the
proper pleading and a comment on Duigan’s
Motion to Dismiss is negligence on his
part.1âwphi1 Under 18.03 of the Code, a
lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the
client’s case, viz:
Philippines, and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts of the country for
their information and guidance.
No costs.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal SO ORDERED.

matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him
liable.

Lawyers should not neglect legal matters

entrusted to them, otherwise their
negligence in fulfilling their duty would
render them liable for disciplinary action.29

Respondent has failed to live up to his duties

as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his
duties to his client, he engages in unethical
and unprofessional conduct for which he
should be held accountable.30

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio

Padilla is found guilty of violating Rules
18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as well as Canon 5 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence,
he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
SIX (6) MONTHS and STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of the same or a similar offense
will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into

the personal records of respondent as a
member of the bar and furnished to the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
 A.C. No. 6368 June 13, 2012
FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO,
Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by
complainants Fidela G. Bengco (Fidela) and
Teresita N. Bengco (Teresita) against
respondent Atty. Pablo Bernardo (Atty.
Bernardo) for deceit, malpractice, conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar and
violation of his duties and oath as a lawyer.
The acts of the respondent which gave rise
to the instant complaint are as follows:
That sometime on or about the period from
April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty. Pablo
Bernardo with the help and in connivance
and collusion with a certain Andres Magat
[wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent
act with intent to defraud herein
complainants Fidela G. Bengco and Teresita
N. Bengco by using false pretenses, deceitful
words to the effect that he would expedite
the titling of the land belonging to the
Miranda family of Tagaytay City who are the
acquaintance of complainants herein and
they convinced herein complainant[s] that if
they will finance and deliver to him the
amount of [₱]495,000.00 as advance money
he would expedite the titling of the subject
land and further by means of other similar
deceit like misrepresenting himself as lawyer
of William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer
of the subject land, who is the owner of
Plastic City at Canomay Street, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila and he is the one handling
William Gatchalian’s business transaction
and that he has contracts at NAMREA, DENR,
CENRO and REGISTER OF DEEDS which
representation he well knew were false,
fraudulent and were only made to induce
the complainant[s] to give and deliver the
said amount ([₱]495,000.00) and once in
possession of said amount, far from
complying with his obligation to expedite
and cause the titling of the subject land,
[wilfully], unlawfully and illegally
misappropriated, misapplied and converted
the said amount to his personal use and
benefit and despite demand upon him to
return the said amount, he failed and
refused to do so, which acts constitute
deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar and Violation of Duties
and Oath as a lawyer.2
In support of their complaint, the
complainants attached thereto Resolutions
dated December 7, 19983 and June 22,
19994 of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga and the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando,
Pampanga, respectively, finding probable
cause for the filing of the criminal
information5 against both Atty. Bernardo
and Andres Magat (Magat) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando,
Pampanga, Branch 48, charging them with
the crime of Estafa punishable under Article
315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The respondent was required to file his
Comment.6 On September 24, 2004, the
respondent filed an undated Comment,7
wherein he denied the allegations against
him and averred the following:
2. He had not deceived both complainants
between the period from April 15, 1997 to
July 22, 1997 for purposes of getting from
them the amount of [₱]495,000.00. It was
Andy Magat whom they contacted and who
in turn sought the legal services of the
respondent. It was Andy Magat who
received the said money from them.
3. There was no connivance made and
entered into by Andy Magat and respondent.
The arrangement for titling of the land was
made by Teresita N. Bengco and Andy Magat
with no participation of respondent.
4. The acceptance of the respondent to
render his legal service is legal and allowed
in law practice.8
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
On February 16, 2005, the IBP ordered the
respondent to submit a verified comment
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 6 of the
Rules of Court as it appeared that the
respondent’s undated comment filed with
the Court was not verified.9
On March 15, 2005, respondent through
counsel requested for an additional fifteen
(15) days from March 17, 2005, or until April
1, 2005, within which to comply due to his
medical confinement.10
Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, the respondent
filed a second motion11 for extension
praying for another 20 days, or until April 22,
2005, alleging that he was still recovering
from his illness.
On August 3, 2005, the case was set for
mandatory conference.12 The respondent
failed to appear; thus, the IBP considered the
respondent in default for his failure to
appear and for not filing an answer despite
extensions granted. The case was then
submitted for report and
recommendation.13
Based on the records of the case,
Investigating Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala made the following
findings:
[O]n or before the period from 15 April 1997
to 22 July 1997, respondent with the help
and in connivance and collusion with a
certain Andres Magat ("Magat"), by using
false pretenses and deceitful words,
[wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent
acts to the effect that respondent would
expedite the titling of the land belonging to
the Miranda family of Tagaytay City, who
were the acquaintance of complainants.
Respondent and Magat convinced
complainants that if they finance and deliver
to them the amount of [₱]495,000.00 as
advance money, they would expedite the
titling of the subject land. Respondent
represented himself to be the lawyer of
William Gatchalian, the owner of Plastic City
located at Canomay Street, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, who was allegedly the buyer
of the subject land once it has been titled.
Respondent and Magat also represented
that they have contacts at NAMREA, DENR,
CENRO and the Register of Deeds which
representation they knew to be false,
fraudulent and were only made to induce
complainants to give and deliver to them the
amount of [₱]495,000.00. Once in
possession of the said amount, far from
complying with their obligation to expedite
and cause the titling of the subject land,
respondent and Magat [wilfully], unlawfully
and illegally misappropriated, misapplied
and converted the said amount to their
personal use and benefit and despite
demand upon them to return the said
amount, they failed and refused to do so.
In view of the deceit committed by
respondent and Magat, complainants filed a
complaint for Estafa against the former
before the Third Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga. In the preliminary
investigation conducted by the said court, it
finds sufficient grounds to hold respondent
and Magat for trial for the crime of Estafa
defined under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. The case
was transmitted to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for
appropriate action as per Order dated 7
December 1998.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pampanga conducted a re-investigation of
the case. During the re-investigation thereof,
Magat was willing to reimburse to
complainants the amount of [₱]200,000.00
because according to him the amount of
[₱]295,000.00 should be reimbursed by
respondent considering that the said
amount was turned over to respondent for
expenses incurred in the documentation
prior to the titling of the subject land. Both
respondent and Magat requested for several
extensions for time to pay back their
obligations to the complainants. However,
despite extensions of time granted to them,
respondent and Magat failed to fulfil their
promise to pay back their obligation. Hence,
it was resolved that the offer of compromise
was construed to be an implied admission of
guilt. The Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
believes that there was no reason to disturb
the findings of the investigating judge and an
Information for Estafa was filed against
respondent and Magat on 8 July 1999 before
the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando,
Pampanga.
The failure of the lawyer to answer the
complaint for disbarment despite due notice
on several occasions and appear on the
scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting
resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrates his despiciency for his oath of
office as a lawyer which deserves disciplinary
sanction x x x.
From the facts and evidence presented, it
could not be denied that respondent
committed a crime that import deceit and
violation of his attorney’s oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility under both of
which he was bound to ‘obey the laws of the
land.’ The commission of unlawful acts,
specially crimes involving moral turpitude,
acts of dishonesty in violation of the
attorney’s oath, grossly immoral conduct
and deceit are grounds for suspension or
disbarment of lawyers (Rule 138, Section 27,
RRC).
The misconduct complained of took place in
1997 and complainants filed the case only on
16 April 2004. As provided for by the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission of Bar
Discipline, as amended, dated 24 March
2004, "A complaint for disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys
prescribes in two (2) years from the date of
the professional misconduct" (Section 1,
Rule VIII).14
The Investigating Commissioner
recommended that:
x x x [R]espondent ATTY. PABLO A.
BERNARDO be SUSPENDED for a period of
TWO YEARS from receipt hereof from the
practice of his profession as a lawyer and as
a member of the Bar. 15
On February 1, 2007, the IBP Board of
Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2007-
065, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED with
modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, Atty. Pablo S.
Bernardo is hereby ordered, the restitution
of the amount of [₱]200,000.00 within sixty
(60) days from receipt of notice with
Warning that if he does not return the
amount with in sixty days from receipt of this
Order then he will be meted the penalty of
Suspension from the practice of law for one
(1) year.16
On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly
filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 of the
aforesaid Resolution of the IBP. The
respondent averred that: (1) the IBP
resolution is not in accord with the rules
considering that the complaint was filed
more than two (2) years from the alleged
misconduct and therefore, must have been
dismissed outright; (2) he did not commit
any misrepresentation in convincing Fidela
to give him money to finance the titling of
the land; (3) he was hired as a lawyer
through Magat who transacted with Teresita
as evidenced by a Memorandum of
Agreement18 signed by the latter; (4) he was
denied due process when the Investigating
Commissioner considered him as in default
after having ignored the representative he
sent during the hearing on August 3, 2005;
and (5) he long restituted the amount of
₱225,000.00 not as an offer of compromise
but based on his moral obligation as a lawyer
due to Teresita’s declaration that he had to
stop acting as her legal counsel sometime in
the third quarter of 1997. The respondent
pointed out the admission made by Fidela in
her direct testimony before the RTC that she
received the amount, as evidenced by
photocopies of receipts.
In an Order19 dated May 17, 2007 issued by
the IBP, the complainant was required to
comment within fifteen (15) days from
receipt thereof.
In her Comment,20 Fidela explained that it
took them quite some time in filing the
administrative case because they took into
consideration the possibility of an amicable
settlement instead of a judicial proceeding
since it would stain the respondent’s
reputation as a lawyer; that the respondent
went into hiding which prompted them to
seek the assistance of CIDG agents from
Camp Olivas in order to trace the
respondent’s whereabouts; that the
respondent was duly accorded the
opportunity to be heard; and finally, that no
restitution of the ₱200,000.00 plus
corresponding interest has yet been made
by the respondent.
On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a
Manifestation21 stating that the RTC
rendered a decision in the criminal case for
Estafa finding the accused, Atty. Bernardo
and Magat "guilty of conspiracy in the
commission of Estafa under Article 315 par.
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and both are
sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1)
day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum."22
In a Letter23 dated March 23, 2009,
addressed to the IBP, Fidela sought the
resolution of the present action as she was
already 86 years of age. Later, an Ex-parte
Motion to Resolve the Case24 dated
September 1, 2010 was filed by the
complainants. In another Letter dated
October 26, 2011, Fidela, being 88 years old,
sought for Atty. Bernardo’s restitution of the
amount of ₱200,000.00 so she can use the
money to buy her medicine and other needs.
The Court adopts and agrees with the
findings and conclusions of the IBP.
It is first worth mentioning that the
respondent’s defense of prescription is
untenable. The Court has held that
administrative cases against lawyers do not
prescribe. The lapse of considerable time
from the commission of the offending act to
the institution of the administrative
complaint will not erase the administrative
culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise, members
of the bar would only be emboldened to
disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no
private complainant would immediately
come forward, they stand a chance of being
completely exonerated from whatever
administrative liability they ought to answer
for.25
Further, consistent with his failure to file his
answer after he himself pleaded for several
extensions of time to file the same, the
respondent failed to appear during the
mandatory conference, as ordered by the
IBP. As a lawyer, the respondent is
considered as an officer of the court who is
called upon to obey and respect court
processes. Such acts of the respondent are a
deliberate and contemptuous affront on the
court’s authority which can not be
countenanced.
It can not be overstressed that lawyers are
instruments in the administration of justice.
As vanguards of our legal system, they are
expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
In so doing, the people’s faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
Lawyers may be disciplined – whether in
their professional or in their private capacity
– for any conduct that is wanting in morality,
honesty, probity and good demeanor.26
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit
to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.
There is no question that the respondent
committed the acts complained of. He
himself admitted in his answer that his legal
services were hired by the complainants
through Magat regarding the purported
titling of land supposedly purchased. While
he begs for the Court’s indulgence, his
contrition is shallow considering the fact that
he used his position as a lawyer in order to
deceive the complainants into believing that
he can expedite the titling of the subject
properties. He never denied that he did not
benefit from the money given by the
complainants in the amount of ₱495,000.00.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a
profession in which duty to public service,
not money, is the primary consideration.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is
not a capital that necessarily yields profits.
The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration. The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.27
It is likewise settled that a disbarment
proceeding is separate and distinct from a
criminal action filed against a lawyer despite
having involved the same set of facts.
Jurisprudence has it "that a finding of guilt in
the criminal case will not necessarily result in
a finding of liability in the administrative
case. Conversely, the respondent’s acquittal
does not necessarily exculpate him
administratively."28
In Yu v. Palaña,29 the Court held that:
Respondent, being a member of the bar,
should note that administrative cases
against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of criminal cases. A
criminal prosecution will not constitute a
prejudicial question even if the same facts
and circumstances are attendant in the
administrative proceedings. Besides, it is not
sound judicial policy to await the final
resolution of a criminal case before a
complaint against a lawyer may be acted
upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered
helpless to apply the rules on admission to,
and continuing membership in, the legal
profession during the whole period that the
criminal case is pending final disposition,
when the objectives of the two proceedings
are vastly disparate. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for
the public welfare and for preserving courts
of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice law. The attorney is
called to answer to the court for his conduct
as an officer of the court.30 (Citations
omitted)
As the records reveal, the RTC eventually
convicted the respondent for the crime of
Estafa for which he was meted the penalty of
sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1)
day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum. Such criminal
conviction clearly undermines the
respondent’s moral fitness to be a member
of the Bar. Rule 138, Section 27 provides
that:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. – A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for
a wilful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.
In view of the foregoing, this Court has no
option but to accord him the punishment
commensurate to all his acts and to accord
the complainants, especially the 88-year old
Fidela, with the justice they utmost
deserve.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,

respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found
guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE
(1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.

Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S.

Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount of
₱200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita
Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt of
this Decision and (2) to SUBMIT his proof of
compliance thereof to the Court, through
the Office of the Bar Confidant within TEN
(10) DAYS therefrom; with a STERN
WARNING that failure to do so shall merit
him the additional penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in his

record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 4973 March 15, 2010 General Santos City (SOCSARGEN) Chapter of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
resolved to refer to the IBP Board of
SPOUSES MANUEL C. RAFOLS, JR. and Governors in Manila, for appropriate action
LOLITA B. RAFOLS, Complainants, and investigation, the purported anomaly
involving Judge Teodoro Dizon Jr. and Atty.
vs.
Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr.1 Thus, on March 24,
ATTY. RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., 1998, Atty. Joeffrey L. Montefrio, the
Respondent. SOCSARGEN IBP Chapter President,
transmitted the referral to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA).
DECISION

The matter involving Judge Dizon, Jr., which

PER CURIAM: was docketed as Administrative Matter (AM)
No. RTJ-98-1426 entitled Manuel C. Rafols
The primary objective of administrative
and Lolita C. Rafols v. Judge Teodoro Dizon,
cases against lawyers is not only to punish
Jr., RTC, General Santos City, Branch 37,2
and discipline the erring individual lawyers
was resolved in a per curiam decision
but also to safeguard the administration of
promulgated on January 31, 2006,3 whereby
justice by protecting the courts and the
the Court dismissed Judge Dizon, Jr. from the
public from the misconduct of lawyers, and
service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except
to remove from the legal profession persons
accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to
whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath
re-employment in the government or any of
has proven them unfit to continue
its subdivisions, instrumentalities or
discharging the trust reposed in them as
agencies, including government-owned and
members of the bar. A lawyer may be
government -controlled corporations.
disbarred or suspended for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in
In the same per curiam decision, the Court
moral character, honesty, probity and good
reiterated its resolution of October 21, 1998
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an
for the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) to
officer of the court.
conduct an investigation of the actuations of
Atty. Barrios, Jr. (respondent), and to render
its report and recommendation.
– Rivera v. Corral, A.C. No. 3548, July 4, 2002,
384 SCRA 1.
Hence, this decision.

By its Board Resolution No. 1 dated March 7,

1998, the South Cotabato-Sarangani-
Antecedents In the resolution dated October 21, 1998,
the Court approved the recommendations,9
The anomaly denounced by the SOCSARGEN
and directed the Office of the Bar Confidant
IBP Chapter was narrated in the joint
to investigate the actuations of the
affidavit dated March 3, 1998 of Spouses
respondent, and to render its report and
Manuel C. Rafols, Jr. and Lolita B. Rafols
recommendation thereon.
(complainants),4 whose narrative was
corroborated by the affidavit dated March
11, 1998 of Larry Sevilla;5 the affidavit dated
Proceedings of the OBC
March 16, 1998 of Allan Rafols;6 and the
affidavit dated March 16, 1998 of Daisy
Rafols,7 all of which were attached to the
Only the respondent appeared during the
letter of the IBP Chapter President. Atty.
hearing before the OBC. Denying the charges
Erlinda C. Verzosa, then Deputy Clerk of
against him, he sought the dismissal of the
Court and Bar Confidant, referred for
complaint and re-affirmed the contents of
appropriate action a copy of the letter and
his comment. Despite notice, the
affidavits to then Court Administrator
complainants did not appear before the
Alfredo L. Benipayo.
OBC. However, the complainants and the
respondent had testified during the
administrative hearing involving Judge
In turn, then Senior Deputy Court
Dizon, Jr. before Court of Appeals Associate
Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez filed with
Justice Jose Sabio Jr. as the Investigating
the Court an Administrative Matter for
Justice. Also testifying thereat were the
Agenda, recommending in relation to Atty.
complainants’ witnesses, namely: Allan
Barrios, Jr., as follows:
Rafols, Daisy Rafols and Larry Sevilla.

xxx
A. Evidence for the Complainants

5. The Office of the Bar Confidant be

The complainants were the plaintiffs in Civil
FURNISHED with a copy of the letter-note
Case No. 6209 of the Regional Trial Court
and its attachments so that it may conduct
(RTC) in General Santos City, wherein they
its own investigation in the matter with
sought the cancellation of a deed of sale.
respect to the actuations of Atty. Ricardo
Civil Case No. 6209 was assigned to Branch
Barrios, Jr.8
37 of the RTC, presided by Judge Dizon, Jr.
The complainants were represented by the
respondent, paying to him ₱15,000.00 as
xxx
acceptance fee.
On December 22, 1997, at 9:30 a.m., the
respondent visited the complainants at their
residence and informed complainant
Manuel that the judge handling their case
wanted to talk to him. The respondent and
Manuel thus went to the East Royal Hotel’s
coffee shop where Judge Dizon, Jr. was
already waiting. The respondent introduced
Manuel to the judge, who informed Manuel
that their case was pending in his sala. The
judge likewise said that he would resolve the
case in their favor, assuring their success up
to the Court of Appeals, if they could deliver
₱150,000.00 to him. As he had no money at
that time, Manuel told the judge that he
would try to produce the amount. The judge
then stated that he would wait for the
money until noon of that day. Thus, Manuel
left the coffee shop together with the
respondent, who instructed Manuel to come
up with the money before noon because the
judge badly needed it. The two of them went
to a lending institution, accompanied by
Allan Rafols, but Manuel was told there that
only ₱50,000.00 could be released the next
day. From the lending institution, they went
to the complainants’ shop to look for Ditas
Rafols, Allan’s wife, who offered to withdraw
₱20,000.00 from her savings account.
On their way to the bank, Manuel, Allan and
Ditas dropped off the respondent at the
hotel for the latter to assure Judge Dizon, Jr.
that the money was forthcoming.
Afterwards, Ditas and Manuel withdrew
₱20,000.00 and ₱30,000.00 from their
respective bank accounts, and went back to
the hotel with the cash. There, they saw the
judge and his driver, who beckoned to them
to go towards the judge’s Nissan pick-up
then parked along the highway in front of
the hotel. Manuel alighted from his car and
approached the judge. Manuel personally
handed the money to the judge, who told
Manuel after asking about the amount that
it was not enough. Thereafter, Manuel
entered the hotel’s coffee shop and
informed the respondent that he had
already handed the money to the judge.
On December 24, 1997, at about 6:00 a.m.,
the respondent again visited the
complainants. He was on board the judge’s
Nissan pick-up driven by the judge’s driver.
The respondent relayed to the complainants
the message that the judge needed the
balance of ₱100,000.00 in order to complete
the construction of his new house in time for
the reception of his daughter’s wedding.
However, the complainants managed to
raise only ₱80,000.00, which they delivered
to the respondent on that same day.
On January 20, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. called
up the complainants’ residence and
instructed their son to request his parents to
return his call, leaving his cell phone number.
When Manuel returned the call the next day,
the judge instructed Manuel to see him in his
office. During their meeting in his chambers,
the judge demanded the balance of
₱30,000.00. Manuel clarified to the judge
that his balance was only ₱20,000.00 due to
the previous amount given being already
₱80,000.00. The judge informed him that the
amount that the respondent handed was
short. Saying that he badly needed the
money, the judge insisted on ₱30,000.00,
and even suggested that the complainants
should borrow in order to raise that amount.
On January 22, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. called
the complainants to inquire whether the
₱30,000.00 was ready for pick up. After
Manuel replied that he was ready with the
amount, the judge asked him to wait for 20
minutes. The judge and his driver later
arrived on board his Nissan pick-up. Upon
instructions of the judge’s driver, the
complainants followed the Nissan pick-up
until somewhere inside the Doña Soledad
Estate, Espina, General Santos City. There,
the judge alighted and approached the
complainants and shook their hands. At that
point, Manuel handed ₱30,000.00 to the
judge. The judge then told Manuel that the
RTC judge in Iloilo City before whom the
perpetuation of the testimony of Soledad
Elevencionado-Provido was made should
still testify as a witness during the trial in his
sala in order for the complainants to win.
The judge persuaded the complainants to
give money also to that judge; otherwise,
they should not blame him for the outcome
of the case.
The complainants were forced to give money
to the judge, because they feared that the
judge would be biased against them unless
they gave in to his demands. But when they
ultimately sensed that they were being
fooled about their case, they consulted Larry
Sevilla, their mediamen friend, and narrated
to Sevilla all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case. They agreed that the
details should be released to the media. The
exposẻ was published in the Newsmaker, a
local newspaper.
Thereafter, the respondent and Judge Dizon,
Jr. made several attempts to appease the
complainants by sending gifts and offering to
return a portion of the money, but the
complainants declined the offers.
According to the complainants, the
respondent demanded ₱25,000.00 as his
expenses in securing the testimony of
Soledad Elevencionado-Provido in Iloilo City
to be used as evidence in their civil case. In
addition, the respondent requested the
complainants to borrow ₱60,000.00 from
the bank because he wanted to redeem his
foreclosed Isuzu Elf, and because he needed
to give ₱11,000.00 to his nephew who was
due to leave for work abroad.
B. Evidence for the Respondent
In his verified comment dated March 22,
2006,10 the respondent confirmed that the
complainants engaged him as their counsel
in Civil Case No. 6209. His version follows.
On December 22, 1997, the respondent
introduced Manuel to Judge Dizon, Jr. inside
the East Royal Hotel’s coffee shop. The
respondent stayed at a distance, because he
did not want to hear their conversation.
Later, Manuel approached the respondent
and gave him ₱2,000.00. When the
respondent asked what the money was for,
Manuel replied that it was in appreciation of
the former’s introducing the latter to the
judge. The respondent stated that Manuel
did not mention what transpired between
the latter and the judge; and that the judge
did not tell him (respondent) what
transpired in that conversation.
Two days later, the respondent again visited
the complainants at their house in General
Santos City on board the judge’s Nissan pick-
up driven by the judge’s driver, in order to
receive the ₱80,000.00 from the
complainants. The amount was being
borrowed by the judge for his swimming
pool. Later on, the judge told the respondent
to keep ₱30,000.00 as a token of their
friendship. After Manuel handed the
₱80,000.00, the respondent and the judge’s
driver headed towards Davao City, where,
according to the judge’s instruction, they
redeemed the judge’s wristwatch for
₱15,000.00 from a pawnshop. The driver
brought the remaining amount of
₱35,000.00 to the judge in his home.
On January 27, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. visited
the respondent at the latter’s house to ask
him to execute an affidavit. Declining the
request at first, the respondent relented
only because the judge became physically
weak in his presence and was on the verge
of collapsing. Nonetheless, the respondent
refused to notarize the document.
In that affidavit dated January 27, 1998,11
the respondent denied that Judge Dizon, Jr.
asked money from the complainants; and
stated that he did not see the complainants
handing the money to the judge. He
admitted that he was the one who had
requested the judge to personally collect his
unpaid attorney’s fees from the
complainants with respect to their previous
and terminated case; and that the judge did
not ask money from the complainants in
exchange for a favorable decision in their
case.
On January 28, 1998, the respondent
returned to the complainants’ residence, but
was surprised to find complainant Lolita
crying aloud. She informed him that the
judge was again asking an additional
₱30,000.00 although they had given him
₱30,000.00 only the week before. She
divulged that the judge had told her that
their case would surely lose because: (a)
they had engaged a counsel who was
mahinang klase; (b) the judge hearing Civil
Case No. 5645 in Iloilo and the woman who
had testified in Civil Case No. 6029 had not
been presented; and (c) they would have to
spend at least ₱10,000.00 for said judge’s
accommodations in General Santos City.12
On January 31, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. went to
the house of the respondent, but the latter
was not home. The judge left a note
addressed to the complainants, and
instructed the respondent’s secretary to
deliver the note to the complainants along
with a gift (imported table clock).13
According to the respondent, the
complainants consistently refused to accept
the gift several times; it was later stolen from
his house in Cebu City.
On February 1, 1998, the respondent
delivered the note and gift to the
complainants, but the latter refused to
receive it, telling him that they were no
longer interested to continue with the case.
At the same time, the complainants assured
him that they bore no personal grudge
against him, because they had a problem
only with Judge Dizon, Jr.
On February 24, 1998, the respondent went
to the National Bureau of Investigation
Regional Office, Region XI, and the Philippine
National Police Regional Office, Region XI,
both in Davao City, to request the
investigation of the matter.14
On March 2, 1998, the respondent paid
Judge Dizon, Jr. a visit upon the latter’s
request. In that meeting, the respondent
told the judge about the refusal of the
complainants to accept the judge’s gift and
about their decision not to continue with the
case.15
On the next day, Judge Dizon, Jr. sent a note
to the respondent to inform him that the
judge had raised the amount that he had
borrowed from the complainants.16 The
judge requested the respondent to tell the
complainants that he (Judge Dizon, Jr.) was
going to return whatever he had borrowed
from them. However, the complainants
informed the respondent that he should tell
the judge that they were no longer
interested in getting back the money.
The respondent made a follow-up at the NBI
and PNP Regional Offices in Davao City of his
request for assistance after Manuel
mentioned to him that he (Manuel) knew of
many armed men ready at any time to help
him in his problem with the judge.
Report and Recommendation of the OBC
In its Report and Recommendation dated
May 15, 2008,17 the OBC opined that the
administrative case against the respondent
could not be dismissed on the ground of
failure to prosecute due to the
complainants’ failure to appear in the
scheduled hearing despite due notice.
Based on the facts already established and
identified, as rendered in the decision dated
January 21, 2006 in Manuel Rafols and Lolita
B. Rafols v. Judge Teodoro A. Dizon,18 the
OBC rejected the respondent’s denial of any
knowledge of the transaction between his
clients and the judge.
The OBC recommended:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
premises, it is respectfully recommended
that respondent ATTY. RICARDO BARRIOS, Jr.
be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) years with a stern warning that a
repetition of similar act in the future will be
dealt more severely."
Ruling of the Court shoulders of the complainant. The Court
exercises its disciplinary power only if the
We approve and adopt the report and
complainant establishes the complaint by
recommendations of the OBC, which we find
clearly preponderant evidence that warrants
to be fully and competently supported by
the imposition of the harsh penalty.19 As a
the evidence adduced by the complainants
rule, an attorney enjoys the legal
and their witnesses, but we impose the
presumption that he is innocent of the
supreme penalty of disbarment, which we
charges made against him until the contrary
believe is the proper penalty.
is proved. An attorney is further presumed
as an officer of the Court to have performed
his duties in accordance with his oath.20
I

Here, the complainants successfully

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
overcame the respondent’s presumed
which governs the disbarment and
innocence and the presumed regularity in
suspension of attorneys, provides:
the performance of his duties as an attorney
of the complainants. The evidence against
him was substantial, and was not
Section 27. Disbarment and suspension of
contradicted.
attorneys by the Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. – A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as
To begin with, the respondent’s denial of
attorney by the Supreme Court for any
knowledge of the transaction between the
deceit, malpractice, or other gross
complainants and Judge Dizon, Jr. was not
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
only implausible, but also unsubstantiated. It
conduct, or by reason of his conviction for a
was the respondent himself who had
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
introduced the complainants to the judge.
violation of the oath which he is required to
His act of introducing the complainants to
take before admission to practice, or for a
the judge strongly implied that the
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
respondent was aware of the illegal purpose
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
of the judge in wanting to talk with the
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
respondent’s clients. Thus, we unqualifiedly
without authority to do so. The practice of
accept the aptness of the following
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
evaluation made in the OBC’s Report and
gain, either personally or through paid
Recommendation, viz:
agents or brokers constitute malpractice.

xxx Being the Officer of the Court, he must

The burden of proof in disbarment and
have known that meeting litigants outside
suspension proceedings always rests on the
the court is something beyond the bounds of
the rule and that it can never be justified by
any reason. He must have known the
purpose of Judge Dizon in requesting him to
meet the complainants-litigants outside the
chamber of Judge Dizon. By his overt act in
arranging the meeting between Judge Dizon
and complainants- litigants in the Coffee
Shop of the East Royal Hotel, it is crystal clear
that he must have allowed himself and
consented to Judge Dizon’s desire to ask
money from the complainants-litigants for a
favorable decision of their case which was
pending before the sala of Judge Dizon.21
Secondly, the respondent’s insistence that
he did not see the complainants’ act of
handing the money to the judge is
unbelievable. In his comment, the
respondent even admitted having himself
received the ₱80,000.00 from the
complainants, and having kept ₱30,000.00
of that amount pursuant to the instruction of
the judge as a token of the friendship
between him and the judge.22 The
admission proved that the respondent had
known all along of the illegal transaction
between the judge and the complainants,
and belied his feigned lack of knowledge of
the delivery of the money to the judge.
Thirdly, his attempt to explain that the
complainants had given the money to the
judge as a loan, far from softening our strong
impression of the respondent’s liability,
confirmed his awareness of the gross
impropriety of the transaction. Being the
complainants’ attorney in the civil case being
heard before the judge, the respondent
could not but know that for the judge to
borrow money from his clients was highly
irregular and outrightly unethical. If he was
innocent of wrongdoing, as he claimed, he
should have desisted from having any part in
the transaction. Yet, he did not, which
rendered his explanation unbelievable.
Compounding the unworthiness of his
explanation was his admission of having
retained ₱30,000.00 of the "borrowed"
money upon the judge’s instruction.
And, lastly, the OBC has pointed out that the
respondent’s act of requesting the NBI
Regional Office in Davao City to investigate
was an afterthought on his part. We agree
with the OBC, for the respondent obviously
acted in order to anticipate the
complainants’ moves against him and the
judge. To be sure, the respondent sensed
that the complainants would not simply
forgive and forget the mulcting they had
suffered at the hands of the judge and their
own attorney from the time that the
complainants assured him that they were no
longer interested to get back their money
despite their being very angry at the judge’s
greed.
Overall, the respondent’ denials were
worthless and unavailing in the face of the
uncontradicted evidence showing that he
had not only personally arranged the
meeting between Manuel and Judge Dizon,
Jr., but had also communicated to the
complainants the judge’s illegal reason for
the meeting. It is axiomatic that any denial,
to be accepted as a viable defense in any
proceeding, must be substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence. This need derives
from the nature of a denial as evidence of a
negative and self-serving character,
weightless in law and insufficient to
overcome the testimony of credible
witnesses on affirmative matters.23
II
The practice of law is a privilege heavily
burdened with conditions.24 The attorney is
a vanguard of our legal system, and, as such,
is expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency but also a
very high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing in order that the
people’s faith and confidence in the legal
system are ensured.25 Thus, he must
conduct himself, whether in dealing with his
clients or with the public at large, as to be
beyond reproach at all times.26 Any
violation of the high moral standards of the
legal profession justifies the imposition on
the attorney of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment.27
Specifically, the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins an attorney from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful
conduct.28 Corollary to this injunction is the
rule that an attorney shall at all times uphold
the integrity and dignity of the Legal
Profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.291avvphi1
The respondent did not measure up to the
exacting standards of the Law Profession,
which demanded of him as an attorney the
absolute abdication of any personal
advantage that conflicted in any way,
directly or indirectly, with the interest of his
clients. For monetary gain, he disregarded
the vow to "delay no man for money or
malice" and to "conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients" that he made when
he took the Lawyer’s Oath.30 He also
disobeyed the explicit command to him as an
attorney "to accept no compensation in
connection with his client’s business
except from him or with his knowledge and
approval."31 He conveniently ignored that
the relation between him and his clients was
highly fiduciary in nature and of a very
delicate, exacting, and confidential
character.32
Verily, the respondent was guilty of gross
misconduct, which is "improper or wrong
conduct, the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies a wrongful intent and
not mere error of judgment."33 Any gross
misconduct of an attorney in his professional
or private capacity shows him unfit to
manage the affairs of others, and is a ground
for the imposition of the penalty of
suspension or disbarment, because good
moral character is an essential qualification
for the admission of an attorney and for the
continuance of such privilege.34
The conclusion that the respondent and the
disgraced Judge Dizon, Jr. were conspirators
against the former’s own clients, whom he
was sworn to protect and to serve with
utmost fidelity and morality, is inevitable for
the Court to make in this administrative
case. And, being conspirators, they both
deserve the highest penalty. The disbarment
of the respondent is in order, because such
sanction is on par with the dismissal of Judge
Dizon, Jr.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is

disbarred.

This decision shall be entered in the records

of Atty. Barrios, Jr. as a member of the
Philippine Bar.

Copies of the decision shall be furnished to

the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for record purposes; and to
the Court Administrator, for circulation to all
courts nationwide.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C.
TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T.
SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS,
DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO
TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE
HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN),
FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN,
TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE,
MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL
KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO,
CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG,
ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA,
WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED
LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION,
ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS
CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE
TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN
DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL
INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS,
INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND
TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND
RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO
REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS,
INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY
TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO
P. MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is
weighted with significance for it concerns on
one hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade
the ethics of lawyers in government service
and on the other, its effect on the right of
government to recruit competent counsel to
defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company
(GENBANK) encountered financial
difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital
Development Corporation causing it to incur
daily overdrawings on its current account
with the Central Bank.1 It was later found by
the Central Bank that GENBANK had
approved various loans to directors, officers,
stockholders and related interests totaling
₱172.3 million, of which 59% was classified
as doubtful and ₱0.505 million as
uncollectible.2 As a bailout, the Central Bank
extended emergency loans to GENBANK
which reached a total of ₱310 million.3
Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to
recover from its financial woes. On March
25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a
resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general public,
and ordering its liquidation.4 A public
bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held from
March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan
group submitted the winning bid.5
Subsequently, former Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the
then Court of First Instance praying for the
assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by
Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution
toppled the Marcos government. One of the
first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was
to establish the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) to recover the
alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies.
Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July
17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for "reversion, reconveyance,
restitution, accounting and damages"
against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao
Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos,
Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan
Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong,
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng
Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo,
Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo,
Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T.
Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita,
Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied
Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance
Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic
Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc.,
Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan
Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris
Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel
Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and
Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort
Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant,
Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc.,
Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings &
Development Corp., (collectively referred to
herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea,
Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the
Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.6 In
connection therewith, the PCGG issued
several writs of sequestration on properties
allegedly acquired by the above-named
persons by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former
President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this
Court and filed petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction to nullify, among
others, the writs of sequestration issued by
the PCGG.7 After the filing of the parties’
comments, this Court referred the cases to
the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.
These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos.
0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents
Tan, et al. were represented by their
counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, who has then resumed his private
practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions
to disqualify respondent Mendoza as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the
Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil
Case Nos. 00058 and 0096-0099.9 The
motions alleged that respondent Mendoza,
as then Solicitor General10 and counsel to
Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the
liquidation of GENBANK, which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan,
et al. and became Allied Banking
Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly
"intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK
by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his
capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised
the Central Bank’s officials on the procedure
to bring about GENBANK’s liquidation and
appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in
connection with its petition for assistance in
the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed
with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting "engagement or
employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in said
service."
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying
PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent
Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005.11 It found
that the PCGG failed to prove the existence
of an inconsistency between respondent
Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor
General and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that
respondent Mendoza did not take a position
adverse to that taken on behalf of the
Central Bank during his term as Solicitor
General.12 It further ruled that respondent
Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-
year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of
Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be
Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said
section prohibits a former public official or
employee from practicing his profession in
connection with any matter before the office
he used to be with within one year from his
resignation, retirement or separation from
public office.13 The PCGG did not seek any
reconsideration of the ruling.14
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099
were transferred from the Sandiganbayan’s
Second Division to the Fifth Division.15 In its
resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth
Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the
other PCGG’s motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza.16 It adopted the
resolution of its Second Division dated April
22, 1991, and observed that the arguments
were the same in substance as the motion to
disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The
PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling
but its motion was denied in its resolution
dated December 5, 2001.17
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the
PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11,
2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth
Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.18 The
PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a former
government lawyer from accepting
employment in connection with any matter
in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in
the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central
Bank could not waive the objection to
respondent Mendoza’s appearance on
behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in
Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus
res judicata does not apply.19
The petition at bar raises procedural and
substantive issues of law. In view, however,
of the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility to the
legal profession and the government, we
shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the
substantive issue.
I.Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility applies
to respondent Mendoza. Again, the
prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened
while in the said service."
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates
that we trace the historical lineage of Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were
pervasive in England and other parts of
Europe. The early statements of standards
did not resemble modern codes of conduct.
They were not detailed or collected in one
source but surprisingly were comprehensive
for their time. The principal thrust of the
standards was directed towards the
litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored
the central duty of truth and fairness in
litigation as superior to any obligation to the
client. The formulations of the litigation
duties were at times intricate, including
specific pleading standards, an obligation to
inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to
explore settlement alternatives. Most of the
lawyer's other basic duties -- competency,
diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable
fees and service to the poor -- originated in
the litigation context, but ultimately had
broader application to all aspects of a
lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial
and early post-revolutionary America did not
differ markedly from those in England. The
colonies and early states used oaths,
statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural
rules to govern attorney behavior. The
difference from England was in the
pervasiveness and continuity of such
regulation. The standards set in England
varied over time, but the variation in early
America was far greater. The American
regulation fluctuated within a single colony
and differed from colony to colony. Many
regulations had the effect of setting some
standards of conduct, but the regulation was
sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive
standards. Only three of the traditional core
duties can be fairly characterized as
pervasive in the formal, positive law of the
colonial and post-revolutionary period: the
duties of litigation fairness, competency and
reasonable fees.20
The nineteenth century has been termed the
"dark ages" of legal ethics in the United
States. By mid-century, American legal
reformers were filling the void in two ways.
First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the
highly influential New York "Field Code,"
introduced a new set of uniform standards of
conduct for lawyers. This concise statement
of eight statutory duties became law in
several states in the second half of the
nineteenth century. At the same time, legal
educators, such as David Hoffman and
George Sharswood, and many other lawyers
were working to flesh out the broad outline
of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote
about legal ethics in unprecedented detail
and thus brought a new level of
understanding to a lawyer's duties. A
number of mid-nineteenth century laws and
statutes, other than the Field Code,
governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of
colonial regulations – e.g., the "do no
falsehood" oath and the deceit prohibitions
-- persisted in some states. Procedural law
continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an
attorney's litigation behavior. The
developing law of agency recognized basic
duties of competence, loyalty and
safeguarding of client property. Evidence
law started to recognize with less
equivocation the attorney-client privilege
and its underlying theory of confidentiality.
Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely
exception of service to the poor, had some
basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and
early post-revolutionary periods, these
standards were isolated and did not provide
a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's
duties. The reformers, by contrast, were
more comprehensive in their discussion of a
lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a
new era in American legal ethics.21
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a
new form of ethical standards began to
guide lawyers in their practice — the bar
association code of legal ethics. The bar
codes were detailed ethical standards
formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They
combined the two primary sources of ethical
guidance from the nineteenth century. Like
the academic discourses, the bar association
codes gave detail to the statutory
statements of duty and the oaths of office.
Unlike the academic lectures, however, the
bar association codes retained some of the
official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths.
Over time, the bar association codes became
extremely popular that states adopted them
as binding rules of law. Critical to the
development of the new codes was the re-
emergence of bar associations themselves.
Local bar associations formed sporadically
during the colonial period, but they
disbanded by the early nineteenth century.
In the late nineteenth century, bar
associations began to form again, picking up
where their colonial predecessors had left
off. Many of the new bar associations, most
notably the Alabama State Bar Association
and the American Bar Association, assumed
on the task of drafting substantive standards
of conduct for their members.22
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with
a comprehensive bar association code of
ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was
the model for several states’ codes, and it
was the foundation for the American Bar
Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.23
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the
oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient
to attain the full measure of public respect to
which the legal profession was entitled. In
that year, the Philippine Bar Association
adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.24
As early as 1924, some ABA members have
questioned the form and function of the
canons. Among their concerns was the
"revolving door" or "the process by which
lawyers and others temporarily enter
government service from private life and
then leave it for large fees in private practice,
where they can exploit information,
contacts, and influence garnered in
government service."25 These concerns
were classified as adverse-interest conflicts"
and "congruent-interest conflicts."
"Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the
matter in which the former government
lawyer represents a client in private practice
is substantially related to a matter that the
lawyer dealt with while employed by the
government and the interests of the current
and former are adverse.26 On the other
hand, "congruent-interest representation
conflicts" are unique to government lawyers
and apply primarily to former government
lawyers.27 For several years, the ABA
attempted to correct and update the canons
through new canons, individual
amendments and interpretative opinions. In
1928, the ABA amended one canon and
added thirteen new canons.28 To deal with
problems peculiar to former government
lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which
disqualified them both for "adverse-interest
conflicts" and "congruent-interest
representation conflicts."29 The rationale
for disqualification is rooted in a concern
that the government lawyer’s largely
discretionary actions would be influenced by
the temptation to take action on behalf of
the government client that later could be to
the advantage of parties who might later
become private practice clients.30 Canon 36
provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or
public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as
an advocate in any matter upon the merits
of which he has previously acted in a judicial
capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or
having been in the public employ should not,
after his retirement, accept employment in
connection with any matter he has
investigated or passed upon while in such
office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA
continued to amend many of the canons and
added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937,
respectively.31
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again
adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.32
By the middle of the twentieth century,
there was growing consensus that the ABA
Canons needed more meaningful revision. In
1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell
asked for the creation of a committee to
study the "adequacy and effectiveness" of
the ABA Canons. The committee
recommended that the canons needed
substantial revision, in part because the ABA
Canons failed to distinguish between "the
inspirational and the proscriptive" and were
thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal
profession in the United States likewise
observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons
of Professional Ethics resulted in
unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for
negligible participation in matters during
their employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA
to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.33 The basic
ethical principles in the Code of Professional
Responsibility were supplemented by
Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum
rules of conduct to which the lawyer must
adhere.34 In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-
101(b)35 became the applicable
supplementary norm. The drafting
committee reformulated the canons into the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of
Delegates approved the Model Code.36
Despite these amendments, legal
practitioners remained unsatisfied with the
results and indefinite standards set forth by
DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus,
in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model
Rules of Professional Responsibility. The
Model Rules used the "restatement format,"
where the conduct standards were set-out in
rules, with comments following each rule.
The new format was intended to give better
guidance and clarity for enforcement
"because the only enforceable standards
were the black letter Rules." The Model
Rules eliminated the broad canons
altogether and reduced the emphasis on
narrative discussion, by placing comments
after the rules and limiting comment
discussion to the content of the black letter
rules. The Model Rules made a number of
substantive improvements particularly with
regard to conflicts of interests.37 In
particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9,
citing the hopeless dependence of the
concept of impropriety on the subjective
views of anxious clients as well as the norm’s
indefinite nature.38
In cadence with these changes, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
adopted a proposed Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to
this Court for approval. The Code was
drafted to reflect the local customs,
traditions, and practices of the bar and to
conform with new realities. On June 21,
1988, this Court promulgated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility deals
particularly with former government
lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in said
service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility retained the general structure
of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics but replaced the
expansive phrase "investigated and passed
upon" with the word "intervened." It is,
therefore, properly applicable to both
"adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-
interest conflicts."
The case at bar does not involve the "adverse
interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse
interest problem when he acted as Solicitor
General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as
counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil
Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099
before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless,
there remains the issue of whether there
exists a "congruent-interest conflict"
sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza
from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule
6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in
comprehending first, the meaning of
"matter" referred to in the rule and, second,
the metes and bounds of the "intervention"
made by the former government lawyer on
the "matter." The American Bar Association
in its Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter"
as any discrete, isolatable act as well as
identifiable transaction or conduct involving
a particular situation and specific party, and
not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the
"matter" which was the subject of
intervention by respondent Mendoza while
he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG
relates the following acts of respondent
Mendoza as constituting the "matter" where
he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:40
The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s
Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth
Division) in issuing the assailed Resolutions
dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001
denying the motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et
al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as
then Solicitor General, actively intervened in
the closure of GENBANK by advising the
Central Bank on how to proceed with the
said bank’s liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation with the CFI of
Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the
Memorandum dated March 29, 1977
prepared by certain key officials of the
Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy
Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy
Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy
Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C.
Singson, then Special Assistant to the
Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then
Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B.
Aurellano and then Director of Department
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a
of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T.
petition in the Court of First Instance reciting
Castro, Jr., where they averred that on
the proceedings which had been taken and
March 28, 1977, they had a conference with
praying the assistance of the Court in the
the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who
liquidation of Genbank.
advised them on how to proceed with the
liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent
portion of the said memorandum states:
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13
dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary
Board where it was shown that Atty.
Immediately after said meeting, we had a
Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent
conference with the Solicitor General and he
documents relating to GENBANK in order to
advised that the following procedure should
aid him in filing with the court the petition
be taken:
for assistance in the bank’s liquidation. The
pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:
1. Management should submit a
memorandum to the Monetary Board
The Board decided as follows:
reporting that studies and evaluation had
been made since the last examination of the
bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed
...
that the bank can not be reorganized or
placed in a condition so that it may be
permitted to resume business with safety to
E. To authorize Management to furnish the
its depositors and creditors and the general
Solicitor General with a copy of the subject
public.
memorandum of the Director, Department
of Commercial and Savings Bank dated
March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
2. If the said report is confirmed by the
Monetary Board, it shall order the
liquidation of the bank and indicate the
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor,
manner of its liquidation and approve a
Supervision and Examination Sector, to the
liquidation plan.
Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977,
containing a report on the current situation
of Genbank;
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal
stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing
decision to liquidate the bank and the
liquidation plan approved by the Monetary
Board.
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts
Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March
23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director,
Department of Commercial and Savings
Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March
24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29
of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No.
1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of
Genbank, together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be
necessary or needed by the Solicitor General
for his use in then CFI-praying the assistance
of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or
the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor
General involved in the case at bar is
"advising the Central Bank, on how to
proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and
even filing the petition for its liquidation with
the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should
resolve whether his act of advising the
Central Bank on the legal procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is included within the
concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The
procedure of liquidation is given in black and
white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. –
Whenever, upon examination by the head of
the appropriate supervising or examining
department or his examiners or agents into
the condition of any bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions, it shall be disclosed that
the condition of the same is one of
insolvency, or that its continuance in
business would involve probable loss to its
depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of
the department head concerned forthwith,
in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of
the facts, and the Board may, upon finding
the statements of the department head to
be true, forbid the institution to do business
in the Philippines and shall designate an
official of the Central Bank or a person of
recognized competence in banking or
finance, as receiver to immediately take
charge of its assets and liabilities, as
expeditiously as possible collect and gather
all the assets and administer the same for
the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the
powers necessary for these purposes
including, but not limited to, bringing suits
and foreclosing mortgages in the name of
the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and
confirm within the said period that the bank
or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions is
insolvent or cannot resume business with
safety to its depositors, creditors and the
general public, it shall, if the public interest
requires, order its liquidation, indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a
liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by
the Solicitor General, file a petition in the
Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which have been taken and
praying the assistance of the court in the
liquidation of such institution. The court
shall have jurisdiction in the same
proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims
against the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions and enforce individual liabilities of
the stockholders and do all that is necessary
to preserve the assets of such institution and
to implement the liquidation plan approved
by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board
shall designate an official of the Central
Bank, or a person of recognized competence
in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall
take over the functions of the receiver
previously appointed by the Monetary Board
under this Section. The liquidator shall, with
all convenient speed, convert the assets of
the banking institution or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions to money or sell, assign or
otherwise dispose of the same to creditors
and other parties for the purpose of paying
the debts of such institution and he may, in
the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, institute such actions as may be
necessary in the appropriate court to collect
and recover accounts and assets of such
institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the actions of the
Monetary Board under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act
shall be final and executory, and can be set
aside by the court only if there is convincing
proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and
made in bad faith. No restraining order or
injunction shall be issued by the court
enjoining the Central Bank from
implementing its actions under this Section
and the second paragraph of Section 34 of
this Act, unless there is convincing proof that
the action of the Monetary Board is plainly
arbitrary and made in bad faith and the
petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or
judge of the court in which the action is
pending a bond executed in favor of the
Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the
court. The restraining order or injunction
shall be refused or, if granted, shall be
dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a
bond, which shall be in the form of cash or
Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount
twice the amount of the bond of the
petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will
pay the damages which the petitioner or
plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the
dissolution of the injunction. The provisions
of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar
as they are applicable and not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Section shall
govern the issuance and dissolution of the
restraining order or injunction contemplated
in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be
understood to mean the inability of a bank
or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to pay
its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and
ordinary course of business. Provided,
however, That this shall not include the
inability to pay of an otherwise non-
insolvent bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions caused by extraordinary demands
induced by financial panic commonly
evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions in the banking or financial
community.
The appointment of a conservator under
Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment
of a receiver under this Section shall be
vested exclusively with the Monetary Board,
the provision of any law, general or special,
to the contrary notwithstanding. (As
amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827,
Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent
Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is not the "matter" contemplated
by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342
is clear as daylight in stressing that the
"drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law" are acts which do not fall
within the scope of the term "matter" and
cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the
sake of argument that the above act of
respondent Mendoza falls within the
definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion
No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of
respondent Mendoza which is the "matter"
involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely
different from the "matter" involved in Civil
Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak
for themselves. It is given that respondent
Mendoza had nothing to do with the
decision of the Central Bank to liquidate
GENBANK. It is also given that he did not
participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied
Bank. The "matter" where he got himself
involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate
GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the
necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in
the then Court of First Instance. The subject
"matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore,
is not the same nor is related to but is
different from the subject "matter" in Civil
Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves
the sequestration of the stocks owned by
respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the
alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The
case does not involve the liquidation of
GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the
shares of stock of the reorganized Allied
Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the
issue of the dissolution and liquidation of
GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the
Central Bank due, among others, to the
alleged banking malpractices of its owners
and officers. In other words, the legality of
the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in
the sequestration cases. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the
dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes
without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a
matter different from the matter involved in
Civil Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and
bounds of the "intervention" contemplated
by Rule 6.03. "Intervene" means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or
extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to
occur, fall, or come in between points of
time or events . . . 3: to come in or between
by way of hindrance or modification:
INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two
things (Paris, where the same city lay on
both sides of an intervening river . . .)41
On the other hand, "intervention" is defined
as:
1: the act or fact of intervening:
INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may
affect the interests of others.42
There are, therefore, two possible
interpretations of the word "intervene."
Under the first interpretation, "intervene"
includes participation in a proceeding even if
the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect
or little influence.43 Under the second
interpretation, "intervene" only includes an
act of a person who has the power to
influence the subject proceedings.44 We
hold that this second meaning is more
appropriate to give to the word
"intervention" under Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility in light of its
history. The evils sought to be remedied by
the Rule do not exist where the government
lawyer does an act which can be considered
as innocuous such as "x x x drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law."
In fine, the intervention cannot be
insubstantial and insignificant. Originally,
Canon 36 provided that a former
government lawyer "should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in
connection with any matter which he has
investigated or passed upon while in such
office or employ." As aforediscussed, the
broad sweep of the phrase "which he has
investigated or passed upon" resulted in
unjust disqualification of former
government lawyers. The 1969 Code
restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b),
the prohibition extended only to a matter in
which the lawyer, while in the government
service, had "substantial responsibility." The
1983 Model Rules further constricted the
reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that
"a lawyer shall not represent a private client
in connection with a matter in which the
lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a public officer or
employee."
It is, however, alleged that the intervention
of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is significant and substantial. We
disagree. For one, the petition in the special
proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence,
it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza
as the then sitting Solicitor General. For
another, the record is arid as to the actual
participation of respondent Mendoza in the
subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case
was in slumberville for a long number of
years. None of the parties pushed for its
early termination. Moreover, we note that
the petition filed merely seeks the assistance
of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK.
The principal role of the court in this type of
proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
determining claims of creditors against the
GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly
as a court of justice but as an agent to assist
the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding, the
participation of the Office of the Solicitor
General is not that of the usual court litigator
protecting the interest of government.
II. Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of
Professional Responsibility represents a
commendable effort on the part of the IBP to
upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the
government service. As aforestressed, it is a
take-off from similar efforts especially by the
ABA which have not been without
difficulties. To date, the legal profession in
the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-
101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule
6.03 of our Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court took account of
various policy considerations to assure that
its interpretation and application to the case
at bar will achieve its end without necessarily
prejudicing other values of equal
importance. Thus, the rule was not
interpreted to cause a chilling effect on
government recruitment of able legal talent.
At present, it is already difficult for
government to match compensation offered
by the private sector and it is unlikely that
government will be able to reverse that
situation. The observation is not inaccurate
that the only card that the government may
play to recruit lawyers is have them defer
present income in return for the experience
and contacts that can later be exchanged for
higher income in private practice.45 Rightly,
Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of
entering government service would be too
great for most men to endure should ethical
rules prevent them from engaging in the
practice of a technical specialty which they
devoted years in acquiring and cause the
firm with which they become associated to
be disqualified.46 Indeed, "to make
government service more difficult to exit can
only make it less appealing to enter."47
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast
a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to
harass opposing counsel as well as deprive
his client of competent legal representation.
The danger that the rule will be misused to
bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere
guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has noted "the tactical
use of motions to disqualify counsel in order
to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing
party of counsel of its choice, and harass and
embarrass the opponent," and observed
that the tactic was "so prevalent in large civil
cases in recent years as to prompt frequent
judicial and academic commentary."48 Even
the United States Supreme Court found no
quarrel with the Court of Appeals’
description of disqualification motions as "a
dangerous game."49 In the case at bar, the
new attempt to disqualify respondent
Mendoza is difficult to divine. The
disqualification of respondent Mendoza has
long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated
after the lapse of many years and only after
PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the
hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact,
the recycled motion for disqualification in
the case at bar was filed more than four
years after the filing of the petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction with
the Supreme Court which were
subsequently remanded to the
Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 0096-0099.50 At the very least, the
circumstances under which the motion to
disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put
petitioner’s motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03
was not unconcerned with the prejudice to
the client which will be caused by its
misapplication. It cannot be doubted that
granting a disqualification motion causes the
client to lose not only the law firm of choice,
but probably an individual lawyer in whom
the client has confidence.51 The client with
a disqualified lawyer must start again often
without the benefit of the work done by the
latter.52 The effects of this prejudice to the
right to choose an effective counsel cannot
be overstated for it can result in denial of
due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible
adverse effect of a truncated reading of the
rule on the official independence of lawyers
in the government service. According to
Prof. Morgan: "An individual who has the
security of knowing he or she can find
private employment upon leaving the
government is free to work vigorously,
challenge official positions when he or she
believes them to be in error, and resist illegal
demands by superiors. An employee who
lacks this assurance of private employment
does not enjoy such freedom."53 He adds:
"Any system that affects the right to take a
new job affects the ability to quit the old job
and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits
official independence."54 The case at bar
involves the position of Solicitor General, the
office once occupied by respondent
Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that
the position of Solicitor General should be
endowed with a great degree of
independence. It is this independence that
allows the Solicitor General to recommend
acquittal of the innocent; it is this
independence that gives him the right to
refuse to defend officials who violate the
trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of
the independence of the Solicitor General
will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the
deprivation of the former government
lawyer of the freedom to exercise his
profession. Given the current state of our
law, the disqualification of a former
government lawyer may extend to all
members of his law firm.55 Former
government lawyers stand in danger of
becoming the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief
sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is the
possible appearance of impropriety and loss
of public confidence in government. But as
well observed, the accuracy of gauging
public perceptions is a highly speculative
exercise at best56 which can lead to
untoward results.57 No less than Judge
Kaufman doubts that the lessening of
restrictions as to former government
attorneys will have any detrimental effect on
that free flow of information between the
government-client and its attorneys which
the canons seek to protect.58 Notably, the
appearance of impropriety theory has been
rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct59 and some courts
have abandoned per se disqualification
based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual
conflict of interest exists, and demand an
evaluation of the interests of the defendant,
government, the witnesses in the case, and
the public.60
It is also submitted that the Court should
apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it
correctly disfavors lawyers who "switch
sides." It is claimed that "switching sides"
carries the danger that former government
employee may compromise confidential
official information in the process. But this
concern does not cast a shadow in the case
at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of
respondent Mendoza in informing the
Central Bank on the procedure how to
liquidate GENBANK is a different matter
from the subject matter of Civil Case No.
0005 which is about the sequestration of the
shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied
Bank. Consequently, the danger that
confidential official information might be
divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure,
there are no inconsistent "sides" to be
bothered about in the case at bar. For there
is no question that in lawyering for
respondents Tan, et al., respondent
Mendoza is not working against the interest
of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is
indirectly defending the validity of the action
of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and
selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests
coincide instead of colliding. It is for this
reason that Central Bank offered no
objection to the lawyering of respondent
Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of
respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching
of sides for no two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should
consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid
conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government
employee might be subject to a conflict of
loyalties while still in government service.61
The example given by the proponents of this
argument is that a lawyer who plans to work
for the company that he or she is currently
charged with prosecuting might be tempted
to prosecute less vigorously.62 In the
cautionary words of the Association of the
Bar Committee in 1960: "The greatest public
risks arising from post employment conduct
may well occur during the period of
employment through the dampening of
aggressive administration of government
policies."63 Prof. Morgan, however,
considers this concern as "probably
excessive."64 He opines "x x x it is hard to
imagine that a private firm would feel secure
hiding someone who had just been disloyal
to his or her last client – the government.
Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm
that law firms want the ‘best’ government
lawyers – the ones who were hardest to beat
– not the least qualified or least vigorous
advocates."65 But again, this particular
concern is a non factor in the case at bar.
There is no charge against respondent
Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on
how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in
later defending respondents Tan, et al. of
Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending
both the interests of Central Bank and
respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the
need to curtail what is perceived as the
"excessive influence of former officials" or
their "clout."66 Prof. Morgan again warns
against extending this concern too far. He
explains the rationale for his warning, viz:
"Much of what appears to be an employee’s
influence may actually be the power or
authority of his or her position, power that
evaporates quickly upon departure from
government x x x."67 More, he contends
that the concern can be demeaning to those
sitting in government. To quote him further:
"x x x The idea that, present officials make
significant decisions based on friendship
rather than on the merit says more about the
present officials than about their former co-
worker friends. It implies a lack of will or
talent, or both, in federal officials that does
not seem justified or intended, and it ignores
the possibility that the officials will tend to
disfavor their friends in order to avoid even
the appearance of favoritism."68
III. The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of
the view, among others, that the congruent
interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility should be subject
to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga
opines that the rule cannot apply
retroactively to respondent Mendoza.
Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted
by the fact that (1) when respondent
Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule
6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and
approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to
disqualify respondent Mendoza was made
after the lapse of time whose length cannot,
by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At
bottom, the point they make relates to the
unfairness of the rule if applied without any
prescriptive period and retroactively, at that.
Their concern is legitimate and deserves to
be initially addressed by the IBP and our
Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the
resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the
Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099
is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 4018 March 8, 2005 The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in
favor of respondent. The investigating
officer, Enrique Basa, absolved respondent
OMAR P. ALI, Complainant, of all the charges brought against him, thus:

vs.
ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent. It is crystal clear from the foregoing that
complainant not only failed to prove his case
but that he has no case at all against
DECISION respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore,
premises considered, it is respectfully
recommended that the complaint against
PER CURIAM: respondent be dismissed for lack of merit
and evidence.4
This is a verified petition for disbarment1
filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for
having been found guilty of grave
The case was then forwarded to the
misconduct while holding the position of
Department of Justice for review and in a
Register of Deeds of Marawi City.
report dated 08 September 1992, then
Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon
exonerated respondent of the charges of
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is
illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody
an off-shoot of the administrative case
of documents. He, however, found
earlier filed by complainant against
respondent guilty of grave misconduct for
respondent. In said case, which was initially
his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821
investigated by the Land Registration
and manipulating the criminal case for
Authority (LRA), complainant charged
violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted
respondent with illegal exaction;
against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the
indiscriminate issuance of Transfer
latter's co-accused. As a result of this finding,
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the
Secretary Drilon recommended
names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona
respondent's dismissal from service.
Abdullah,2 Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae
Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu,
and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and
On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel
manipulating the criminal complaint filed
V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41
against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others
adopting in toto the conclusion reached by
for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It
Secretary Drilon and ordering respondent's
appears from the records that the Baudali
dismissal from government service.
Datus are relatives of respondent.3
Respondent subsequently questioned said
administrative order before this Court
through a petition for certiorari, mandamus,
and prohibition5 claiming that the Office of
the President did not have the authority and
jurisdiction to remove him from office. He
also insisted that respondents6 in that
petition violated the laws on security of
tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V.
Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA
committed a breach of Civil Service Rules
when he abdicated his authority to resolve
the administrative complaint against him
(herein respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994,
we dismissed the petition "for failure on the
part of petitioner to sufficiently show that
public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the questioned order."7
Respondent thereafter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied with
finality in our Resolution of 15 November
1994.
On the basis of the outcome of the
administrative case, complainant is now
before us, seeking the disbarment of
respondent. Complainant claims that it has
become obvious that respondent had
"proven himself unfit to be further entrusted
with the duties of an attorney"8 and that he
poses a "serious threat to the integrity of the
legal profession."9
In his Comment, respondent maintains that
there was nothing irregular with his issuance
of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli
Datus. According to him, both law10 and
jurisprudence support his stance that it was
his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds
of Marawi City, to act on applications for
land registration on the basis only of the
documents presented by the applicants. In
the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the
documents they presented to his office
warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-
bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing
to do with the dismissal of criminal
complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting
Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad
Abdullah and the latter's co-defendants.
Respondent explains that his participation in
said case was a result of the two subpoenas
duces tecum issued by the investigating
prosecutor who required him to produce the
various land titles involved in said dispute.
He further claims that the dismissal of said
criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was
based solely on the evidence presented by
the parties. Complainant's allegation,
therefore, that he influenced the outcome of
the case is totally unjustified.
Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995,11
this Court referred this matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
Acting on this resolution, the IBP
commenced the investigation of this
disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996,
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued
the following order relative to the transfer of
venue of this case. The pertinent portion of
this order provides:
ORDER
When this case was called for hearing, both
complainant and respondent appeared.
The undersigned Commissioner asked them
if they are willing to have the reception of
evidence vis-à-vis this case be done in
Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the
president of the local IBP Chapter. Both
parties agreed. Accordingly, transmit the
records of this case to the Director for Bar
Discipline for appropriate action.12
On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of
Governors passed a resolution approving
Commissioner Fernandez's
recommendation for the transfer of venue of
this administrative case and directed the
Western Mindanao Region governor to
designate the local IBP chapter concerned to
conduct the investigation, report, and
recommendation.13 The IBP Resolution
states:
Resolution No. XII-96-153
Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong
RESOLVED TO APPROVE the
recommendation of Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the
above-entitled case and direct the Western
Mindanao Region Governor George C. Jabido
to designate the local IBP Chapter concerned
to conduct the investigation, report and
recommendation.
Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B.
Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline,
wrote a letter dated 23 October 1996
addressed to Governor George C. Jabido,
President of IBP Cotabato Chapter
requesting the latter to receive the evidence
in this case and to submit his
recommendation and recommendation as
directed by the IBP Board of Governors.14
In an undated Report and Recommendation,
the IBP Cotabato Chapter15 informed the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) that
the investigating panel16 had sent notices to
both complainant and respondent for a
series of hearings but respondent
consistently ignored said notices. The IBP
Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by
recommending that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for five
years.
On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion
dated 30 June 1998 praying for the
transmittal of the records of this case to the
Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the IBP
pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well
as Commissioner Fernandez's Order dated
23 February 1996.
Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered
the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato
Chapter to comment on respondent's
motion.17 Complying with this directive, the
panel expressed no opposition to
respondent's motion for the transmittal of
the records of this case to IBP Marawi City.18
On 25 September 1998, Commissioner
Fernandez ordered the referral of this case
to IBP Marawi City for the reception of
respondent's evidence.19 This order of
referral, however, was set aside by the IBP
Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-
98-268 issued on 4 December 1998. Said
resolution provides:
RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the
transmittal of the case records of the above-
entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is
directed to re-evaluate the recommendation
submitted by Cotabato Chapter and report
the same to the Board of Governors.20
Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-
98-268, respondent filed on 08 October 1998
a motion praying that the recommendation
of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken from
the records.21 Respondent insists that the
investigating panel constituted by said IBP
chapter did not have the authority to
conduct the investigation of this case since
IBP Resolution XII-96-153 and Commissioner
Fernandez's Order of 23 February 1996
clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the
power to investigate this case. Moreover, he
claims that he was never notified of any
hearing by the investigating panel of IBP
Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of
his right to due process.
Complainant opposed22 this motion arguing
that respondent is guilty of laches. According
to complainant, the report and
recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato
Chapter expressly states that respondent
was duly notified of the hearings conducted
by the investigating panel yet despite these,
respondent did nothing to defend himself.
He also claims that respondent did not even
bother to submit his position paper when he
was directed to do so. Further, as
respondent is a member of IBP Marawi City
Chapter, complainant maintains that the
presence of bias in favor of respondent is
possible. Finally, complainant contends that
to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would
only entail a duplication of the process which
had already been completed by IBP Cotabato
Chapter.
In an Order dated 15 October 1999,23
Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP
Cotabato Chapter to submit proofs that
notices for the hearings conducted by the
investigating panel as well as for the
submission of the position paper were duly
received by respondent. On 21 February
2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the IBP
Cotabato Chapter investigating panel,
furnished Commissioner Fernandez with a
copy of the panel's order dated 4 August
1997.24 Attached to said order was Registry
Receipt No. 3663 issued by the local post
office. On the lower portion of the registry
receipt was a handwritten notation reading
"Atty. Mosib A. Bubong."
On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez
ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman of
the Commission on Bar Discipline for
Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and
recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato
Chapter. This directive had the approval of
the IBP Board of Governors through its
Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued on 30
June 2001, to wit:
RESOLVED to APPROVE the
recommendation of Director Victor C.
Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the
above-entitled case and direct the CBD
Mindanao to conduct an investigation, re-
evaluation, report and recommendation
within sixty (60) days from receipt of
notice.25
Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD
Mindanao of the death of her father, Omar
P. Ali, complainant in this case. According to
her, her father passed away on 12 June 2002
and that in interest of peace and Islamic
brotherhood, she was requesting the
withdrawal of this case.26
Subsequently, respondent filed another
motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to
direct the chairman of the Commission on
Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and
authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur
Chapter to conduct an investigation of this
case.27 This motion was effectively denied
by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order dated
19 July 2002.28 According to Atty. Castillo –
After going over the voluminous records of
the case, with special attention made on the
report of the IBP Cotabato City Chapter, the
Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of
respondent, the undersigned sees no need
for any further investigation, to be able to
make a re-evaluation and recommendation
on the Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato
City.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the
IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga del
Norte is hereby denied. The undersigned will
submit his Report to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10)
days from date hereof.
In his Report and Recommendation, Atty.
Castillo adopted in toto the findings and
conclusion of IBP Cotabato Chapter
ratiocinating as follows:
The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily
based on the Decision by the Office of the
President in Administrative Case No. 41
dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein
respondent was found guilty of Grave
Misconduct in:
a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-
2821; and,
b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for
violation of the anti-squatting law.
And penalized with dismissal from the
service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City.
In the Comment filed by respondent in the
instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is
good faith in the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-
2821 and a denial of the charge of
manipulating the criminal complaint for
violation of the anti-squatting law, which by
the way, was filed against respondent's
relatives. Going over the Decision of the
Office of the President in Administrative
Case No. 41, the undersigned finds
substantial evidence were taken into
account and fully explained, before the
Decision therein was rendered. In other
words, the finding of Grave Misconduct on
the part of respondent by the Office of the
President was fully supported by evidence
and as such carries a very strong weight in
considering the professional misconduct of
respondent in the present case.
In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned
sees no reason for amending or disturbing
the Report and Recommendation of the IBP
Chapter of South Cotabato.29
In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002,
the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved, with modification, the afore-
quoted Report and Recommendation of
Atty. Castillo. The modification pertained
solely to the period of suspension from the
practice of law which should be imposed on
respondent – whereas Atty. Castillo
concurred in the earlier recommendation of
IBP Cotabato Chapter for a five-year
suspension, the IBP Board of Governors
found a two-year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP
which the latter denied as by that time, the
matter had already been endorsed to this
Court.
The issue thus posed for this Court's
resolution is whether respondent may be
disbarred for grave misconduct committed
while he was in the employ of the
government. We resolve this question in the
affirmative.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does
not cease to apply to a lawyer simply
because he has joined the government
service. In fact, by the express provision of
Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the
conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their
official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's
misconduct as a government official is of
such nature as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then
he may be disciplined as a member of the bar
on such grounds.31 Although the general
rule is that a lawyer who holds a government
office may not be disciplined as a member of
the bar for infractions he committed as a
government official, he may, however, be
disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct
constitutes a violation of his oath a member
of the legal profession.32
Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty.
Vicente C. Renomeron,33 we ordered the
disbarment of respondent on the ground of
his dismissal from government service
because of grave misconduct. Quoting the
late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we
declared –
[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted
to the bar which is designed to impress upon
him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes
an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders
rests the grave responsibility of assisting the
courts in the proper, fair, speedy and
efficient administration of justice. As an
officer of the court he is subject to a rigid
discipline that demands that in his every
exertion the only criterion be that truth and
justice triumph. This discipline is what has
given the law profession its nobility, its
prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to
paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are
expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a
high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual
honesty, and the strictest observance of
fiduciary responsibility – all of which,
throughout the centuries, have been
compendiously described as moral
character.34
Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v.
Atty. Felina Dasig,35 this Court found
sufficient basis to disbar respondent therein
for gross misconduct perpetrated while she
was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of
the Commission on Higher Education. As we
had explained in that case –
… [A] lawyer in public office is expected not
only to refrain from any act or omission
which might tend to lessen the trust and
confidence of the citizenry in government,
she must also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing.
Otherwise said, a lawyer in government
service is a keeper of the public faith and is
burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than her
brethren in private practice.36 (Emphasis
supplied)
In the case at bar, respondent's grave
misconduct, as established by the Office of
the President and subsequently affirmed by
this Court, deals with his qualification as a
lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as
the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and
employing his knowledge of the rules
governing land registration for the benefit of
his relatives, respondent had clearly
demonstrated his unfitness not only to
perform the functions of a civil servant but
also to retain his membership in the bar.
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It
reads:
Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government
service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests,
nor allow the latter to interfere with his
public duties.
Respondent's conduct manifestly
undermined the people's confidence in the
public office he used to occupy and cast
doubt on the integrity of the legal
profession. The ill-conceived use of his
knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls
for nothing less than the withdrawal of his
privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the
deceased complainant's daughter,
requesting for the withdrawal of this case,
we cannot possibly favorably act on the
same as proceedings of this nature cannot
be "interrupted or terminated by reason of
desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of the charges or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same."37 As we have previously explained in
the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty.
Orlando A. Rayos:38
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A.
Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered in the respondent's record as a
member of the Bar, and notice of the same
be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.
SO ORDERED.

… A case of suspension or disbarment may

proceed regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainant. What matters is
whether, on the basis of the facts borne out
by the record, the charge of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct has been duly
proven. This rule is premised on the nature
of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not in any sense
a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve
no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare.
They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the
court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense
a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administrative of
justice.39
Adm. Case No. 7332 June 18, 2013
EDUARDO A. ABELLA, Complainant,
vs.
RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Far the Court's resolution is an
administrative complaint1 for disbarment
filed by Eduardo A. Abella (complainant)
against Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. (respondent)
based on the latter's violation of Rules 1.01
and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.Q2, Canon 6 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code).
The Facts
On January 21, 1999, complainant filed an
illegal dismissal case against Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
(PT&T) before the Cebu City Regional
Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
docketed as RAB-VII-01-0128-99. Finding
merit in the complaint, Labor Arbiter (LA)
Ernesto F. Carreon, through a Decision dated
May 13, 1999,2 ordered PT&T to pay
complainant ₱113,100.00 as separation pay
and ₱73,608.00 as backwages. Dissatisfied,
PT&T appealed the LA’s Decision to the
NLRC. In a Decision dated September 12,
2001,3 the NLRC set aside LA Carreon’s
ruling and instead ordered PT&T to reinstate
complainant to his former position and pay
him backwages, as well as 13th month pay
and service incentive leave pay, including
moral damages and attorney’s fees. On
reconsideration, it modified the amounts of
the aforesaid monetary awards but still
maintained that complainant was illegally
dismissed.4 Consequently, PT&T filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals (CA).
In a Decision dated September 18, 2003 (CA
Decision),5 the CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling
with modification, ordering PT&T to pay
complainant separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement. Complainant moved for
partial reconsideration, claiming that all his
years of service were not taken into account
in the computation of his separation pay and
backwages. The CA granted the motion and
thus, remanded the case to the LA for the
same purpose.6 On July 19, 2004, the CA
Decision became final and executory.7
Complainant alleged that he filed a Motion
for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the
Cebu City RAB on October 25, 2004. At this
point, the case had already been assigned to
the new LA, herein respondent. After the
lapse of five (5) months, complainant’s
motion remained unacted, prompting him to
file a Second Motion for Execution on March
3, 2005. Eight (8) months thereafter, still,
there was no action on complainant’s
motion. Thus, on November 4, 2005,
complainant proceeded to respondent’s
office to personally follow-up the matter. In
the process, complainant and respondent
exchanged notes on how much the former’s
monetary awards should be; however, their
computations differed. To complainant’s
surprise, respondent told him that the
matter could be "easily fixed" and
thereafter, asked "how much is mine?"
Despite his shock, complainant offered the
amount of ₱20,000.00, but respondent
replied: "make it ₱30,000.00." By force of
circumstance, complainant acceded on the
condition that respondent would have to
wait until he had already collected from
PT&T. Before complainant could leave,
respondent asked him for some cash,
compelling him to give the latter ₱1,500.00.8
On November 7, 2005, respondent issued a
writ of execution,9 directing the sheriff to
proceed to the premises of PT&T and collect
the amount of ₱1,470,082.60, inclusive of
execution and deposit fees. PT&T moved to
quash10 the said writ which was, however,
denied through an Order dated November
22, 2005.11 Unfazed, PT&T filed a
Supplemental Motion to Quash dated
December 2, 2005,12 the contents of which
were virtually identical to the one
respondent earlier denied. During the
hearing of the said supplemental motion on
December 9, 2005, respondent rendered an
Order13 in open court, recalling the first writ
of execution he issued on November 7, 2005.
He confirmed the December 9, 2005 Order
through a Certification dated December 14,
200514 and eventually, issued a new writ of
execution15 wherein complainant’s
monetary awards were reduced from
₱1,470,082.60 to ₱114,585.00, inclusive of
execution and deposit fees.
Aggrieved, complainant filed on December
16, 2005 a Petition for Injunction before the
NLRC. In a Resolution dated March 14,
2006,16 the NLRC annulled respondent’s
December 9, 2005 Order, stating that
respondent had no authority to modify the
CA Decision which was already final and
executory.17
Aside from instituting a criminal case before
the Office of the Ombudsman,18
complainant filed the instant disbarment
complaint19 before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), averring that respondent
violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility for (a) soliciting money from
complainant in exchange for a favorable
resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision
to give benefit and advantage to PT&T.
In his Comment,20 respondent denied the
abovementioned accusations, maintaining
that he merely implemented the CA Decision
which did not provide for the payment of
backwages. He also claimed that he never
demanded a single centavo from
complainant as it was in fact the latter who
offered him the amount of ₱50,000.00.
The Recommendation and Action of the IBP
In the Report and Recommendation dated
May 30, 2008,21 Investigating Commissioner
Rico A. Limpingco (Commissioner Limpingco)
found that respondent tried to twist the
meaning of the CA Decision out of all logical,
reasonable and grammatical context in
order to favor PT&T.22 He further observed
that the confluence of events in this case Issue
shows that respondent deliberately left
The sole issue in this case is whether
complainant’s efforts to execute the CA
respondent is guilty of gross immorality for
Decision unacted upon until the latter
his violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1,
agreed to give him a portion of the monetary
and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code.
award thereof. Notwithstanding their
agreement, immoral and illegal as it was,
respondent later went as far as turning the
The Court’s Ruling
proceedings into some bidding war which
eventually resulted into a resolution in favor
of PT&T. In this regard, respondent was
The Court concurs with the findings and
found to be guilty of gross immorality and
recommendation of Commissioner
therefore, Commissioner Limpingco
Limpingco as adopted by the IBP Board of
recommended that he be disbarred.23
Governors.

On July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors

The pertinent provisions of the Code
passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-345 (IBP
provide:
Resolution),24 adopting and approving
Commissioner Limpingco’s
recommendation, to wit:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
"A"; and finding the recommendation fully
conduct.
supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and for
Respondent’s violation of the provisions of
xxxx
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the
Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt
and Employees, Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr.
motive or interest, encourage any suit or
is hereby DISBARRED.25
proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO
LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE
DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.
xxxx
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government
service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests,
nor allow the latter to interfere with his
public duties.
The above-cited rules, which are contained
under Chapter 1 of the Code, delineate the
lawyer’s responsibility to society: Rule 1.01
engraves the overriding prohibition against
lawyers from engaging in any unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct;
Rule 1.03 proscribes lawyers from
encouraging any suit or proceeding or
delaying any man’s cause for any corrupt
motive or interest; meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is
particularly directed to lawyers in
government service, enjoining them from
using one’s public position to: (1) promote
private interests; (2) advance private
interests; or (3) allow private interests to
interfere with public duties.26 It is well to
note that a lawyer who holds a government
office may be disciplined as a member of the
Bar only when his misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer.27
In this light, a lawyer’s compliance with and
observance of the above-mentioned rules
should be taken into consideration in
determining his moral fitness to continue in
the practice of law.
To note, "the possession of good moral
character is both a condition precedent and
a continuing requirement to warrant
admission to the Bar and to retain
membership in the legal profession."28 This
proceeds from the lawyer’s duty to observe
the highest degree of morality in order to
safeguard the Bar’s integrity.29
Consequently, any errant behavior on the
part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer’s public
or private activities, which tends to show
deficiency in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to
warrant suspension or disbarment.30
In this case, records show that respondent
was merely tasked to recompute the
monetary awards due to the complainant
who sought to execute the CA Decision
which had already been final and executory.
When complainant moved for execution –
twice at that – respondent slept on the same
for more than a year. It was only when
complainant paid respondent a personal visit
on November 4, 2005 that the latter speedily
issued a writ of execution three (3) days
after, or on November 7, 2005. Based on
these incidents, the Court observes that the
sudden dispatch in respondent’s action soon
after the aforesaid visit casts serious doubt
on the legitimacy of his denial, i.e., that he
did not extort money from the complainant.
The incredulity of respondent’s claims is
further bolstered by his complete
turnaround on the quashal of the November
7, 2005 writ of execution.
To elucidate, records disclose that
respondent denied PT&T’s initial motion to
quash through an Order dated November
22, 2005 but later reversed such order in
open court on the basis of PT&T’s
supplemental motion to quash which was a
mere rehash of the first motion that was
earlier denied. As a result, respondent
recalled his earlier orders and issued a new
writ of execution, reducing complainant’s
monetary awards from ₱1,470,082.60 to
₱114,585.00, inclusive of execution and
deposit fees.
To justify the same, respondent contends
that he was merely implementing the CA
Decision which did not provide for the
payment of backwages. A plain and cursory
reading, however, of the said decision belies
the truthfulness of the foregoing assertion.
On point, the dispositive portion of the CA
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The decision of public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission dated
September 12, 2001 and October 8, 2002 are
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION,
ordering petitioner PT&T to pay private
respondent Eduardo A. Abella separation
pay (as computed by the Labor Arbiter) in
lieu of reinstatement.31
Noticeably, the CA affirmed with
modification the NLRC’s rulings dated
September 12, 2001 and October 8, 2002
which both explicitly awarded backwages
and other unpaid monetary benefits to
complainant.32 The only modification was
with respect to the order of reinstatement as
pronounced in both NLRC’s rulings which
was changed by the CA to separation pay in
view of the strained relations between the
parties as well as the supervening removal of
complainant’s previous position.33 In other
words, the portion of the NLRC’s rulings
which awarded backwages and other
monetary benefits subsisted and the
modification pertained only to the CA’s
award of separation pay in lieu of the NLRC’s
previous order of reinstatement. This
conclusion, palpable as it is, can be easily
deduced from the records.
Lamentably, respondent tried to distort the
findings of the CA by quoting portions of its
decision, propounding that the CA’s award
of separation pay denied complainant’s
entitlement to any backwages and other
consequential benefits altogether. In his
Verified Motion for Reconsideration of the
IBP Resolution,34 respondent stated:
From the above quoted final conclusions, the
Court is very clear and categorical in
directing PT&T to pay complainant his
separation pay ONLY in lieu of
reinstatement. Clearly, the Court did not
direct the PT&T to pay him his backwages,
and other consequential benefits that were
directed by the NLRC because he could no
longer be reinstated to his previous position
on the ground of strained relationship and
his previous position had already gone, and
no equivalent position that the PT&T could
offer. x x x.
Fundamental in the realm of labor law is the
rule that backwages are separate and
distinct from separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement and are awarded
conjunctively to an employee who has been
illegally dismissed.35 There is nothing in the
records that could confound the finding that
complainant was illegally dismissed as LA
Carreon, the NLRC, and the CA were all
unanimous in decreeing the same. Being a
labor arbiter, it is hardly believable that
respondent could overlook the fact that
complainant was entitled to backwages in
view of the standing pronouncement of
illegal dismissal.1âwphi1 In this regard,
respondent’s defense deserves scant
consideration.
Therefore, absent any cogent basis to rule
otherwise, the Court gives credence and
upholds Commissioner Limpingco’s and the
IBP Board of Governor’s pronouncement of
respondent’s gross immorality. Likewise, the
Court observes that his infractions constitute
gross misconduct.
Jurisprudence illumines that immoral
conduct involves acts that are willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and that show a
moral indifference to the opinion of the
upright and respectable members of the
community.36 It treads the line of grossness
when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency.37 On the
other hand, gross misconduct constitutes
"improper or wrong conduct, the
transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies a wrongful intent and not mere error
of judgment."38
In this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court states that when a lawyer is
found guilty of gross immoral conduct or
gross misconduct, he may be suspended or
disbarred:
SEC. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds. — A
member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willful
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, as respondent’s violations clearly Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to
constitute gross immoral conduct and gross pay a FINE of ₱40,000.00.
misconduct, his disbarment should come as
a matter of course.1âwphi1 However, the
Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
had already been disbarred in a previous Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the
v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr.,39 which therefore Court Administrator for circulation to all the
precludes the Court fromduplicitously courts.
decreeing the same. In view of the foregoing,
the Court deems it proper to, instead,
impose a fine in the amount of ₱40,000.0040 SO ORDERED.
in order to penalize respondent’s
transgressions as discussed herein and to
equally deter the commission of the same or
similar acts in the future.

As a final word, the Court staunchly

reiterates the principle that the practice of
law is a privilege41 accorded only to those
who continue to meet its exacting
qualifications. Verily, for all the prestige and
opportunity which the profession brings lies
the greater responsibility to uphold its
integrity and honor. Towards this purpose, it
is quintessential that its members
continuously and unwaveringly exhibit,
preserve and protect moral uprightness in
their activities, both in their legal practice as
well as in their personal lives. Truth be told,
the Bar holds no place for the deceitful,
immoral and corrupt.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ricardo G. Barrios,

Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of gross immoral
conduct and gross misconduct in violation of
Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02,
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
 A.C. No. 6622 July 10, 2012
MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06
December 2004 with the Office or the Bar
Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya
(complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S.
'L1halingcos (resrondent) with unlawful
solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or
Professional Responsibility for nonpayment
of fees to complainant, and gross immorality
for marrying two other women while
respondent’s first marriage was subsisting.1
In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the
Second Division of this Court required
respondent to file a Comment, which he did
on 21 March 2005.3 The Complaint was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from
receipt of the record.4
On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a
Notice5 setting the mandatory conference
of the administrative case on 05 July 2005.
During the conference, complainant
appeared, accompanied by his counsel and
respondent. They submitted for resolution
three issues to be resolved by the
Commission as follows:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by nonpayment
of fees to complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule
against unlawful solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross
immoral conduct for having married thrice.6
The Commission ordered the parties to
submit their respective verified Position
Papers. Respondent filed his verified
Position Paper,7 on 15 July 2005 while
complainant submitted his on 01 August
2005.8
Complainant’s Accusations
Complainant averred that on February 2002,
he was employed by respondent as a
financial consultant to assist the latter on
technical and financial matters in the latter’s
numerous petitions for corporate
rehabilitation filed with different courts.
Complainant claimed that they had a verbal
agreement whereby he would be entitled to
₱ 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the
court in the cases they would handle, in
addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees
paid by their clients. He alleged that, from
February to December 2002, respondent
was able to rake in millions of pesos from the
corporate rehabilitation cases they were
working on together. Complainant also
claimed that he was entitled to the amount
of ₱ 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by
the courts as a result of his work with
respondent, and a total of ₱ 4,539,000 from
the fees paid by their clients.9 Complainant
appended to his Complaint several annexes
supporting the computation of the fees he
believes are due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent
engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in
violation of Section 27 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Allegedly
respondent set up two financial consultancy
firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and
Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them
as fronts to advertise his legal services and
solicit cases. Complainant supported his
allegations by attaching to his Position Paper
the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and
Jane,10 letter-proposals to clients signed by
respondent on various dates11 and proofs of
payment made to the latter by their
clients.12
On the third charge of gross immorality,
complainant accused respondent of
committing two counts of bigamy for having
married two other women while his first
marriage was subsisting. He submitted a
Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the
Office of the Civil Registrar General-National
Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S.
Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted
marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with
Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in
Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on 28
September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia
Piñon in the City of Manila; and the third on
07 September 1989 with Mary Jane
Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila.13
Respondent’s Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the
charges against him. He asserted that
complainant was not an employee of his law
firm – Tabalingcos and Associates Law
Office14 – but of Jesi and Jane Management,
Inc., where the former is a major
stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that
complainant was unprofessional and
incompetent in performing his job as a
financial consultant, resulting in the latter’s
dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they
presented in their court cases.16
Respondent also alleged that there was no
verbal agreement between them regarding
the payment of fees and the sharing of
professional fees paid by his clients. He
proffered documents showing that the
salary of complainant had been paid.17
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation,
respondent denied committing any. He
contended that his law firm had an
agreement with Jesi and Jane Management,
Inc., whereby the firm would handle the
legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation
case; and that the latter would attend to the
financial aspect of the case’ such as the
preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be
presented in court. To support this
contention, respondent attached to his
Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement
dated 10 December 2005 entered into by
Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and
Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.;18 and an
Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-
President for Operations of the said
company.19
On the charge of gross immorality,
respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted
by William Genesis, a dismissed messenger
of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having
no probative value, since it had been
retracted by the affiant himself.20
Respondent did not specifically address the
allegations regarding his alleged bigamous
marriages with two other women.
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a
Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage
Contracts.21 To the said Motion, he
attached the certified true copies of the
Marriage Contracts referred to in the
Certification issued by the NSO.22 The
appended Marriage Contracts matched the
dates, places and names of the contracting
parties indicated in the earlier submitted
NSO Certification of the three marriages
entered into by respondent. The first
marriage contract submitted was a marriage
that took place between respondent and
Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15
July 1980.23 The second marriage contract
was between respondent and Ma. Rowena
G. Piñon, and it took place at the
Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of
Manila on 28 September 1987.24 The third
Marriage Contract referred to a marriage
between respondent and Mary Jane E.
Paraiso, and it took place on 7 September
1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and
third Marriage Contracts, respondent was
described as single under the entry for civil
status.
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted
his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed
by complainant, claiming that the document
was not marked during the mandatory
conference or submitted during the hearing
of the case.25 Thus, respondent was
supposedly deprived of the opportunity to
controvert those documents.26 He disclosed
that criminal cases for bigamy were filed
against him by the complainant before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
Respondent further informed the
Commission that he had filed a Petition to
Declare Null and Void the Marriage Contract
with Rowena Piñon at the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Biñan, Laguna, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270.27 He also
filed another Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage Contract with Pilar
Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271.28 In both
petitions, he claimed that he had recently
discovered that there were Marriage
Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing
his name and allegedly executed with
Rowena Piñon and Pilar Lozano on different
occasions. He prayed for their annulment,
because they were purportedly null and
void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its
reorganization, the Commission scheduled a
clarificatory hearing on 20 November
2007.29 While complainant manifested to
the Commission that he would not attend
the hearing,30 respondent manifested his
willingness to attend and moved for the
suspension of the resolution of the
administrative case against the latter.
Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed
with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the
nullification of the Marriage Contracts he
discovered to be bearing his name.31
On 10 November 2007, complainant
submitted to the Commission duplicate
original copies of two (2) Informations filed
with the RTC of Manila against respondent,
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Atty.
Bede S. Tabalingcos."32 The first criminal
case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-
257125, was for bigamy for the marriage
contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena
Garcia Piñon while his marriage with Pilar
Lozano was still valid.33 The other one,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257126,
charged respondent with having committed
bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary
Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage
with Pilar Lozano was still subsisting.34 Each
of the Informations recommended bail in the
amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty
as accused in the criminal cases.35
On 20 November 2007, only respondent
attended the clarificatory hearing. In the
same proceeding, the Commission denied
his Motion to suspend the proceedings
pending the outcome of the petitions for
nullification he had filed with the RTC–
Laguna. Thus, the Commission resolved that
the administrative case against him be
submitted for resolution.36
IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission
promulgated its Report and
Recommendation addressing the specific
charges against respondent.37 The first
charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment
of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed
for lack of merit. The Commission ruled that
the charge should have been filed with the
proper courts since it was only empowered
to determine respondent’s administrative
liability. On this matter, complainant failed
to prove dishonesty on the part of
respondent.38 On the second charge, the
Commission found respondent to have
violated the rule on the solicitation of client
for having advertised his legal services and
unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended
that he be reprimanded for the violation. It
failed, though, to point out exactly the
specific provision he violated.39
As for the third charge, the Commission
found respondent to be guilty of gross
immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. It found that complainant was able to
prove through documentary evidence that
respondent committed bigamy twice by
marrying two other women while the latter’s
first marriage was subsisting.40 Due to the
gravity of the acts of respondent, the
Commission recommended that he be
disbarred, and that his name be stricken off
the roll of attorneys.41
On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of
Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-154, adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.42 On 01 August 2008,
respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, arguing that the
recommendation to disbar him was
premature. He contends that the
Commission should have suspended the
disbarment proceedings pending the
resolution of the separate cases he had filed
for the annulment of the marriage contracts
bearing his name as having entered into
those contracts with other women. He
further contends that the evidence
proffered by complainant to establish that
the latter committed bigamy was not
substantial to merit the punishment of
disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution to disbar
him and likewise moved to archive the
administrative proceedings pending the
outcome of the Petitions he separately filed
with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of
Marriage Contracts.43
On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
denied the Motions for Reconsideration and
affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April
2008 recommending respondent’s
disbarment.44
The Court’s Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of
the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the
fees
While we affirm the IBP’s dismissal of the
first charge against respondent, we do not
concur with the rationale behind it.
The first charge of complainant against
respondent for the nonpayment of the
former’s share in the fees, if proven to be
true is based on an agreement that is
violative of Rule 9.0245 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is
proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to
divide the fees for legal services rendered
with a person not licensed to practice law.
Based on the allegations, respondent had
agreed to share with complainant the legal
fees paid by clients that complainant
solicited for the respondent. Complainant,
however, failed to proffer convincing
evidence to prove the existence of that
agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an
agreement between a lawyer and a
layperson to share the fees collected from
clients secured by the layperson is null and
void, and that the lawyer involved may be
disciplined for unethical conduct.
Considering that complainant’s allegations in
this case had not been proven, the IBP in such a manner as to be inconsistent with
correctly dismissed the charge against the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar.
respondent on this matter. This inconsistency arises when the business
is one that can readily lend itself to the
procurement of professional employment
Second Charge: for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak
for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s
Unlawful solicitation of clients
behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a
lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of
law.
Complainant charged respondent with
unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising
legal services through various business
It is clear from the documentary evidence
entities. Complainant submitted
submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane
documentary evidence to prove that Jesi &
Management, Inc., which purports to be a
Jane Management Inc. and Christmel
financial and legal consultant, was indeed a
Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as
vehicle used by respondent as a means to
fronts by respondent to advertise the latter’s
procure professional employment;
legal services and to solicit clients. In its
specifically for corporate rehabilitation
Report, the IBP established the truth of these
cases. Annex "C"49 of the Complaint is a
allegations and ruled that respondent had
letterhead of Jesi & Jane
violated the rule on the solicitation of clients,
but it failed to point out the specific
provision that was breached.
Management, Inc., which proposed an
agreement for the engagement of legal
services. The letter clearly states that, should
A review of the records reveals that
the prospective client agree to the proposed
respondent indeed used the business
fees, respondent would render legal services
entities mentioned in the report to solicit
related to the former’s loan obligation with
clients and to advertise his legal services,
a bank. This circumvention is considered
purporting to be specialized in corporate
objectionable and violates the Code,
rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of
because the letter is signed by respondent as
the case, he violated Rule 2.0347 of the
President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc.,
Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting
and not as partner or associate of a law firm.
cases for the purpose of profit.

Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the

A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in
lawyer is mandated to inform the client
business or other lawful occupation.
whether the former is acting as a lawyer or
Impropriety arises, though, when the
in another capacity. This duty is a must in
business is of such a nature or is conducted
those occupations related to the practice of
law. The reason is that certain ethical
considerations governing the attorney-client
relationship may be operative in one and not
in the other.51 In this case, it is confusing for
the client if it is not clear whether
respondent is offering consultancy or legal
services.
Considering, however, that complainant has
not proven the degree of prevalence of this
practice by respondent, we affirm the
recommendation to reprimand the latter for
violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed
bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To
substantiate this allegation, complainant
submitted NSO-certified copies of the
Marriage Contracts entered into by
respondent with three (3) different women.
The latter objected to the introduction of
these documents, claiming that they were
submitted after the administrative case had
been submitted for resolution, thus giving
him no opportunity to controvert them.52
We are not persuaded by his argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment
case is sui generis. Its focus is on the
qualification and fitness of a lawyer to
continue membership in the bar and not the
procedural technicalities in filing the case.
Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:53
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with
procedure — such as the verification of
pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this
case, prescription of offenses or the filing of
affidavits of desistance by the complainant
— do not apply in the determination of a
lawyer's qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in
the past and we see no reason to depart
from this ruling. First, admission to the
practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of
public interest because it involves service to
the public. The admission qualifications are
also qualifications for the continued
enjoyment of the privilege to practice law.
Second, lack of qualifications or the violation
of the standards for the practice of law, like
criminal cases, is a matter of public concern
that the State may inquire into through this
Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant.1âwphi1
For the court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent
must be established by convincing and
satisfactory proof.54 In this case,
complainant submitted NSO-certified true
copies to prove that respondent entered
into two marriages while the latter’s first
marriage was still subsisting. While
respondent denied entering into the second
and the third marriages, he resorted to
vague assertions tantamount to a negative
pregnant. He did not dispute the
authenticity of the NSO documents, but
denied that he contracted those two other
marriages. He submitted copies of the two
Petitions he had filed separately with the
RTC of Laguna – one in Biñan and the other
in Calamba – to declare the second and the
third Marriage Contracts null and void.55
We find him guilty of gross immorality under
the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense
proffered by respondent. He has not
disputed the authenticity or impugned the
genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of
the Marriage Contracts presented by
complainant to prove the former’s marriages
to two other women aside from his wife. For
purposes of this disbarment proceeding,
these Marriage Contracts bearing the name
of respondent are competent and
convincing evidence proving that he
committed bigamy, which renders him unfit
to continue as a member of the bar. The
documents were certified by the NSO, which
is the official repository of civil registry
records pertaining to the birth, marriage and
death of a person. Having been issued by a
government agency, the NSO certification is
accorded much evidentiary weight and
carries with it a presumption of regularity. In
this case, respondent has not presented any
competent evidence to rebut those
documents.
According to the respondent, after the
discovery of the second and the third
marriages, he filed civil actions to annul the
Marriage Contracts. We perused the
attached Petitions for Annulment and found
that his allegations therein treated the
second and the third marriage contracts as
ordinary agreements, rather than as special
contracts contemplated under the then Civil
Code provisions on marriage. He did not
invoke any grounds in the Civil Code
provisions on marriage, prior to its
amendment by the Family Code.
Respondent’s regard for marriage contracts
as ordinary agreements indicates either his
wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage
or his gross ignorance of the law on what
course of action to take to annul a marriage
under the old Civil Code provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the
fact that respondent entered into marriage
twice while his first marriage was still
subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v.
Alejandro,56 we held thus:
We have in a number of cases disciplined
members of the Bar whom we found guilty
of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of
that good moral character required of them
not only as a condition precedent for their
admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their
continued membership therein. No
distinction has been made as to whether the
misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s
professional capacity or in his private life.
This is because a lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. He is
expected to be competent, honorable and
reliable at all times since he who cannot
apply and abide by the laws in his private
affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his
professional dealings nor lead others in
doing so. Professional honesty and honor are
not to be expected as the accompaniment of
dishonesty and dishonor in other relations.
The administration of justice, in which the
lawyer plays an important role being an
officer of the court, demands a high degree
of intellectual and moral competency on his
part so that the courts and clients may
rightly repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of
that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing
bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral
conduct and are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court.58
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED
for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral
conduct.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the
personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos
in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out
the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the
Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the

IBP to disbar respondent and order that his
name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the

following charges against Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos as follows:

1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for

lack of merit.

2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of

illegal advertisement and solicitation.
 [ A.C. No. 9226 (Formerly CBD 06-1749).
June 14, 2016 ]
MA. CECILIA CLARISSA C. ADVINCULA,
COMPLAINANT
VS.
ATTY. LEONARDO C. ADVINCULA,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the
complaint for disbarment dated June 16,
2006 brought to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Leonardo C.
Advincula (Atty. Advincula) by no less than
his wife, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula
(Dr. Advincula).
In her complaint,1 Dr. Advincula has averred
that Atty. Advincula committed unlawful and
immoral acts;2 that while Atty. Advincula
was still married to her, he had extra-marital
sexual relations with Ma. Judith Ortiz
Gonzaga (Ms. Gonzaga);3 that the extra-
marital relations bore a child in the name of
Ma. Alexandria Gonzaga Advincula
(Alexandria);4 that Atty. Advincula failed to
give financial support to their own children,
namely: Ma. Samantha Paulina, Ma. Andrea
Lana, and Jose Leandro, despite his having
sufficient financial resources;5 that he
admitted in the affidavit of late registration
of birth of Alexandria that he had contracted
another marriage with Ms. Gonzaga;6 that
even should Atty. Advincula prove that his
declaration in the affidavit of late
registration of birth was motivated by some
reason other than the fact that he truly
entered into a subsequent marriage with
Ms. Gonzaga, then making such a
declaration was in itself still unlawful;7 that
siring a child with a woman other than his
lawful wife was conduct way below the
standards of morality required of every
lawyer;8 that contracting a subsequent
marriage while the first marriage had not
been dissolved was also an unlawful
conduct;9 that making a false declaration
before a notary public was an unlawful
conduct punishable under the Revised Penal
Code;10 and that the failure of Atty.
Advincula to provide proper support to his
children showed his moral character to be
below the standards set by law for every
lawyer.11 Dr. Advincula prayed that Atty.
Advincula be disbarred.12
In his answer,13 Atty. Advincula denied the
accusations. He asserted that during the
subsistence of his marriage with Dr.
Advincula but prior to the birth of their
youngest Jose Leandro, their marital
relationship had deteriorated; that they
could not agree on various matters
concerning their family, religion, friends, and
respective careers; that Dr. Advincula
abandoned the rented family home with the
two children to live with her parents; that
despite their separation, he regularly gave
financial support to Dr. Advincula and their
children; that during their separation, he got
into a brief relationship with Ms. Gonzaga;
and that he did not contract a second
marriage with Ms. Gonzaga.14
Atty. Advincula further acknowledged that
as a result of the relationship with Ms.
Gonzaga, a child was born and named
Alexandra;15 that in consideration of his
moral obligation as a father, he gave support
to Alexandra;16 that he only learned that the
birth of Alexandra had been subsequently
registered after the child was already
enrolled in school;17 that it was Ms.
Gonzaga who informed him that she had the
birth certificate of Alexandria altered by a
fixer in order to enroll the child;18 that he
strived to reunite his legitimate family,
resulting in a reconciliation that begot their
third child, Jose Leandro; that Dr. Advincula
once again decided to live with her parents,
bringing all of their children along; that
nevertheless, he continued to provide
financial support to his family and visited the
children regularly; that Dr. Advincula
intimated to him that she had planned to
take up nursing in order to work as a nurse
abroad because her medical practice here
was not lucrative; that he supported his
wife's nursing school expenses;19 that Dr.
Advincula left for the United States of
America (USA) to work as a nurse;20 that the
custody of their children was not entrusted
to him but he agreed to such arrangement to
avoid further division of the family;21 that
during the same period he was also busy
with his law studies;22 that Dr. Advincula
proposed that he and their children migrate
to the USA but he opposed the proposal
because he would not be able to practice his
profession there;23 that Dr. Advincula stated
that if he did not want to join her, then she
would just get the children to live with
her;24 that when Dr. Advincula came home
for a vacation he was not able to accompany
her due to his extremely busy schedule as
Chief Legal Staff of the General Prosecution
Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation;25 and that when they finally
met arguments flared out, during which she
threatened to file a disbarment suit against
him in order to force him to allow her to
bring their children to the USA.26 Atty.
Advincula prayed that the disbarment case
be dismissed for utter lack of merit.27
Findings and Recommendations of the IBP-
CBD
After exhaustive hearings, Commissioner
Angelito C. Inocencio of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) rendered the
following findings and observations, and
recommended the following sanctions, to
wit:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Based on Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Code of
Professional Responsibility for Lawyers
comes this provisions (sic): "A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct."
This means that members of the bar ought
to possess good moral character. Remember
we must (sic) that the practice of law is a
mere privilege. The moment that a lawyer no
longer has the required qualifications
foremost of which is the presence of that
character earlier mentioned, the Honorable
Supreme Court may revoke the said practice.
No doubt, Respondent Leonardo (sic) C.
Advincula, probably due to the weakness of
the flesh, had a romance outside of marriage
(sic) with Ma. Judith Ortiz Gonzaga. This he
admitted.
From such affair came a child named Ma.
Alexandria. He supported her as a moral
obligation.
How, then, must we categorize his acts? It
cannot be denied that he had committed an
adulterous and immoral act.
Was his conduct grossly immoral?
Before answering that, let us recall what the
highest Court of the Land defined as immoral
conduct: "that conduct which is willful,
flagrant or shameless and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the
community."28
xxxx
It is the Commissioner's view that what he
did pales when compared to Respondent Leo
Palma's case earlier cited.
In that case, the Honorable Supreme Court
stressed that Atty. Palma had made a
mockery of marriage, a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity.
The highest Court of the Land intoned in the
same case: "But what respondent forgot is
that he has also duties to his wife. As a
husband, he is obliged to live with her;
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity:
and render help and support."
Deemed favorable to Respondent's cause
were the various exhibits he presented
evidencing the fact that he supported their
children financially. Such conduct could not
illustrate him as having championed a
grossly immoral conduct.
Another factor to consider is this:
Complainant should share part of the blame
why their marriage soured. Their constant
quarrels while together would indicate that
harmony between them was out of the
question.
The possibility appears great that she might
have displayed a temper that ignited the
flame of discord between them.
Just the same, however, while this
Commissioner would not recommend the
supreme penalty of disbarment for to
deprive him of such honored station in life
would result in irreparable injury and must
require proof of the highest degree pursuant
to the Honorable Supreme Court's ruling in
Angeles vs. Figueroa, 470 SCRA 186 (2005),
he must be sanctioned.
And the proof adduced is not of the highest
degree.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing disquisition,
having, in effect, Respondent's own
admission of having committed an extra-
marital affair and fathering a child, it is
respectfully recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for at
least one month with the additional
admonition that should he repeat the same,
a more severe penalty would be imposed.
It would be unjust to impose upon him the
extreme penalty of disbarment. What he did
was not grossly immoral.29
The IBP Board of Governors unanimously
adopted the findings and recommendations
of the Investigating Commissioner with slight
modification of the penalty, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A" and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering
respondent's admission of engaging in a
simple immorality and also taking into
account the condonation of his extra-marital
affair by his wife, Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for two (2) months.30
Atty. Advincula accepted the Resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors as final and
executory, and manifested in his compliance
dated February 26, 2013, as follows:
1. That on 28 November 2011 this Honorable
Court issued a resolution suspending the
undersigned Attorney from the practice of
law for two (2) months under "A.C. No. 9226
(formerly CBD Case No. 06-1749) (Ma. Cecilia
Clarissa C. Advincula vs. Atty. Leonardo C.
Advincula) x x x
2. That on 30 October 2012 in faithful
compliance with the above order, the
undersigned attorney applied for Leave for
two (2) months starting November up to
December thereby refraining himself from
the practice of law as Legal Officer on the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x
3. That the undersigned Attorney would like
to notify this Honorable Court of his
compliance with the above resolution/order
so that he may be able to practice his law
profession again.31
Ruling of the Court
The good moral conduct or character must
be possessed by lawyers at the time of their
application for admission to the Bar, and
must be maintained until retirement from
the practice of law. In this regard, the Code
of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.1aшphi1
Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer,
being an officer of the Court, must not only
be in fact of good moral character, but must
also be seen to be of good moral character
and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community.
More specifically, a member of the Bar and
officer of the Court is required not only to
refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping mistresses but also to conduct
himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those
moral standards. If the practice of law is to
remain an honorable profession and attain
its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its
ranks should not only master its tenets and
principles but should also, in their lives,
accord continuing fidelity to them. The
requirement of good moral character is of
much greater import, as far as the general
public is concerned, than the possession of
legal learning.32
Immoral conduct has been described as
conduct that is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the
opinion of good and respectable members of
the community. To be the basis of
disciplinary action, such conduct must not
only be immoral, but grossly immoral, that is,
it must be so corrupt as to virtually
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree or
committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.33
On different occasions, we have disbarred or
suspended lawyers for immorality based on
the surrounding circumstances of each case.
In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,34 the
extreme penalty of disbarment was imposed
on the respondent who had abandoned his
wife and maintained an illicit affair with
another woman. Likewise, disbarment was
the penalty for a lawyer who carried on an
extra-marital affair with a married woman
prior to the judicial declaration that her
marriage was null and void, while he himself
was also married.35 In another case we have
suspended for two years, a married attorney
who had sired a child with a former client.36
In Samaniego v. Ferrer,37 suspension of six
months from the practice of law was meted
on the philandering lawyer.
Yet, we cannot sanction Atty. Advincula with
the same gravity. Although his siring the
child with a woman other than his legitimate
wife constituted immorality, he committed
the immoral conduct when he was not yet a
lawyer. The degree of his immoral conduct
was not as grave than if he had committed
the immorality when already a member of
the Philippine Bar. Even so, he cannot escape
administrative liability. Taking all the
circumstances of this case into proper
context, the Court considers suspension
from the practice of law for three months to
be condign and appropriate.
As a last note, Atty. Advincula manifested in
his compliance dated February 26, 2013 that
he had immediately accepted the resolution
of the IBP Board of Governors suspending
him from the practice of law for two months
as final and executory; that he had then gone
on leave from work in the NBI for two
months starting in November and lasting
until the end of December, 2012; and that
such leave from work involved refraining
from performing his duties as a Legal Officer
of the NBI.
The manifestation of compliance is
unacceptable. A lawyer like him ought to
know that it is only the Court that wields the
power to discipline lawyers. The IBP Board of
Governors did not possess such power,
rendering its recommendation against him
incapable of finality. It is the Court's final
determination of his liability as a lawyer that
is the reckoning point for the service of
sanctions and penalties. As such, his
supposed compliance with the
recommended two-month suspension could
not be satisfied by his going on leave from his
work at the NBI. Moreover, his being a
government employee necessitates that his
suspension from the practice of law should
include his suspension from office. A leave of
absence will not suffice. This is so
considering that his position mandated him
to be a member of the Philippine Bar in good
standing. The suspension from the practice
of law will not be a penalty if it does not
negate his continuance in office for the
period of the suspension. If the rule is
different, this exercise of reprobation of an
erring lawyer by the Court is rendered inutile
and becomes a mockery because he can
continue to receive his salaries and other
benefits by simply going on leave for the
duration of his suspension from the practice
of law.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND
DECLARES ATTY. LEONARDO C. ADVINCULA
GUILTY of immorality; and SUSPENDS him
from the practice of law for a period of
THREE MONTHS EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE
HEREOF, with a STERN WARNING that a
more severe penalty shall be imposed should
he commit the same offense or a similar
offense; DIRECTS ATTY. ADVINCULA to
report the date of his receipt of the Decision
to this Court; and ORDERS the Chief of the
Personnel Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation to implement the suspension
from office of ATTY. ADVINCULA and to
report on his compliance in order to
determine the date of commencement of his
suspension from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be made part of

the records of the respondent in the Office
of the Bar Confidant; and furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil
Service Commission for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 [ A.C. No. 10731. October 05, 2021 ]
CRISANTA G. HOSOYA, COMPLAINANT
VS.
ATTY. ALLAN C. CONTADO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case arose from a
Complaint for Disbarment1 filed by
complainant Crisanta G. Hosoya (Crisanta)
charging respondent Atty. Allan C. Contado
(Atty. Contado) with violations of the
Lawyers' Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The Factual Antecedents:
This Complaint for Disbarment was filed
before the Office of the Bar Confidant on
February 15, 2015. The Court ordered
respondent to file a comment,2 and
subsequently, complainant to file a reply.3
The matter was referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation, and was
docketed as CBD Case No. 16-5086.4
Proceedings before the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) ensued.
Crisanta claimed that she met Atty. Contado
in 2003.5 She alleged that he immediately
courted her and represented that he was
already separated-in-fact from his wife.6
Atty. Contado also mentioned that he was
already working out the dissolution of his
marriage through a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage or through
annulment.7
In 2010, Crisanta agreed with Atty.
Contado's proposal to live together as
husband and wife.8 During that time,
however, Crisanta discovered that Atty.
Contado was also cohabiting with and
impregnated other women (apart from
her).9 Despite knowledge of these, Crisanta
admitted that she continued living with
him.10 Their cohabitation resulted in two
children that were born in 2011 and 2013.11
Crisanta claimed that they were having
financial problems, and that Atty. Contado
left her alone in settling the obligations.12 At
this point, the parties had already
terminated their relationship. Crisanta and
her children were constrained to move to
another place.13
Crisanta claimed that she and her children
no longer received support from Atty.
Contado.14 Thus, she sent him a demand
letter asking him to provide support.15 In
the letter though, Crisanta stated that Atty.
Contado was providing support albeit not
sufficient for their needs.16 She claimed that
he did not respond to the demand as of the
time of the filing of the instant complaint.17
Crisanta also claimed that Atty. Contado
took her vehicle (subject vehicle).18 She also
sent him a demand letter asking for its
return, but to no avail.19
Crisanta alleged in her Complaint that Atty.
Contado's acts constituted continuous
violations of several laws: Republic Act No.
(RA) 7610 or the Special Protection of
Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act;20 RA 9262 or the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004;21 and, carnapping.22
In response, Atty. Contado denied the
allegations in the Complaint. He posited that
Crisanta's allegations were not supported by
evidence and were meant to exact revenge
for a relationship that had gone sour.23
Atty. Contado confirmed that he met
Crisanta in 2003.24 At that time, he
represented that he was already separated-
in-fact with his wife.25 He and Crisanta
became friends and they had a relationship
where they agreed to help each other on
mutual concerns.26 She helped him in
running for governor of Eastern Samar in
2009, although the run was unsuccessful.27
It was during this election campaign when
Crisanta used the subject vehicle to travel to
Eastern Samar.28 After his loss in the
elections, they went back to Manila. He
opened a law office, while Crisanta tended to
her personal transactions.29
Atty. Contado likewise confirmed that they
had their first child in 2011 and their second
child in 2013.30
In 2013, Atty. Contado ran for mayor of the
Municipality of Balangkayan, Eastern Samar,
and won this time.31 He claimed that
Crisanta was again supportive and the
subject vehicle was again used during the
campaign.32
Atty. Contado claimed that their relationship
became complicated, so they parted ways.
Crisanta, however, threatened to destroy his
reputation by going public online.33
On the allegation of non-support of his
daughters, Atty. Contado insisted that he
was not remiss in his obligations to them; he
in fact provided support within his means.34
In this connection, Atty. Contado attached
receipts and deposit slips to show that he is
sending money and supplies to Crisanta.35
He asserted that the amount she demanded
was huge and beyond his financial
capabilities.36 Atty. Contado deflected the
blame and pointed out that Crisanta is the
one guilty of child abuse in depriving their
daughters of the right to see and be with
him. He claimed that Crisanta did not inform
him of the whereabouts of their children.37
On the allegations of having sexual relations
with many other women, Atty. Contado
pointed out that Crisanta offered no
evidence to support these claims.38
On the subject vehicle, Atty. Contado
admitted that it is still with him.39 He
insisted, however, that there is no
carnapping as he did not take it through
violence or intimidation. Crisanta voluntarily
brought the subject vehicle to him for his use
in the 2010 and 2013 election campaigns.40
He reasoned that the subject vehicle could
not be transported to Manila because it
needs major repairs due to wear and tear.41
In her Reply,42 Crisanta averred that Atty.
Contado has abandoned their children by
keeping silent on the demand for support.43
She also cited discussions of the
psychological effects of the father's absence
or unavailability during the growth of
daughters.44 She also imputed immorality
to Atty. Contado's acts of deceiving her in
stating that his former marriage was already
legally dissolved and in having sexual
relations with many other women.45
The parties reiterated their allegations and
discussions in their Position Papers46 filed
before the CBD.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP:
On May 2, 2017, the CBD, through
Investigating Commissioner Jose Alfonso M.
Gomos, rendered a Report and
Recommendation47 on the matter.
On the allegations of non-support, the CBD
ruled that there is no sufficient evidence to
fault Atty. Contado.48 Crisanta was not able
to rebut Atty. Contado's presentation of
receipts and deposit slips.49 The same was
true with respect to the allegation of
multiple sexual relations: this was also not
supported by evidence.50
However, the CBD ruled that Atty. Contado
is guilty of immorality.51 Atty. Contado had
a relationship and children with Crisanta
despite having a legal wife, which he
admitted although he stated that they were
already separated-in-fact at that time.52
Further, the Committee stated that Atty.
Contado's failure to return Crisanta's vehicle
constituted conduct unbecoming of a
member of the Bar; it was imperative for him
to find a way to return the subject vehicle to
her.53 Hence, it recommended that Atty.
Contado be suspended from the practice of
law for one year. It also recommended that
he be directed to return the subject vehicle
to Crisanta. Further, respondent must be
censured for failure to return the subject
vehicle, and be admonished to regularly give
support to their children. The pertinent
portion of the Report and Recommendation
reads:
It is, therefore, recommended that the
respondent, for having had an immoral
relationship with the complainant, be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year.
It is further recommended that the
respondent be CENSURED for holding on to
the complainant's Ford Expedition, despite
demand for its return, and that he be
directed to immediately return the same.
It is finally recommended that the
respondent be ADMONISHED to regularly
give the necessary support to his children
with the complainant.54
The IBP Board of Governors (BOG) adopted
the findings of fact and recommendation of
the CBD. However, it resolved to increase
the penalty to disbarment. The BOG
Resolution dated September 28, 2017 reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and
recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, with modification, to impose
upon the Respondent the penalty of
DISBARMENT and that his name be stricken
off from the Roll of Attorneys for engaging in
an illicit affairs [sic] and failure to support his
children with complainant.55
Notably, the IBP BOG did not issue an
extended resolution to explain the increase
in penalty.
Our Ruling
The Court adopts the findings of fact by the
IBP CBD as affirmed by the BOG, and agrees
with the imposition of the penalty of
disbarment.
Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR state:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit or the legal
profession.
For the imposition of the penalty of
disbarment on the ground of immortality,
the conduct complained of must not only be
immoral, but must be grossly immoral.56
Panagsagan v. Panagsagan57 (Panagsagan)
defines grossly immoral conduct as "one that
is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act,
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to
a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency."58
It is well-settled that married person's
abandonment of his or her spouse to live
with and cohabit with another constitutes
gross immorality as it amounts to either
adultery or concubinage.59
The Court finds the case of Chan v. Carrera60
(Chan) applicable to the instant case. The
instant case and Chan have similar factual
settings, except that the paramour-
complainant in Chan is also married, and that
the respondent therein did not make a
promise to terminate his previous marriage.
Here, there is no allegation that Crisanta was
also married at the time of their
cohabitation.
In Chan, complainant met respondent
lawyer who represented that he is a
widower.61 That time, complainant therein
was still married, but her husband left her for
another woman, leaving her to raise their
daughter alone.62 Respondent even
promised to help her annul her previous
marriage.63 The two eventually had a
relationship and started to cohabit.64 Their
relationship resulted in the birth of their
child.65 After some time, complainant
discovered that respondent was not in fact a
widower and had children with other
women.66 Nonetheless, she continued to
cohabit with him, though their relationship
was no longer harmonious.67 These events
eventually led to their separation and the
filing of the administrative case.68 The Court
imposed the penalty of disbarment on
respondent, thus:
The facts of the present case are beyond
dispute. Both Chan and Carrera
acknowledged their undeniable love affair,
with the latter designating the same as a
"chemistry of two consensual adults." At the
same time, both of them did not deny the
reality that they were still legally married to
another. In a heartbeat, they left their
respective homes and moved into a house
that Carrera had bought and where they
wilfully resided for a good three (3) years. It
is in said house that they played husband
and wife to each other and father and
mother to their child. All of these facts, both
parties do not contest. x x x
It is this clear and outright admission that is
the basis for Carrera's disbarment. His
endless accomplishments listed in his
curriculum vitae cannot render him innocent
of the charges against him. On the contrary,
the Court wonders how despite all these
achievements in his professional career.
Carrera allowed himself to falter in such a
highly scandalous manner. His level of
knowledge and experience should have
alerted him of his duty to keep with the
standards of morality imposed on every
lawyer. To recall, he even proposed to Chan
his services in annulling her marriage. Hence,
all of this could have been avoided had he
made an effort to make things right. In
Amalia R. Ceniza v. Atty. Ceniza, Jr., the Court
enunciated that any lawyer guilty of gross
misconduct should be suspended or
disbarred even if the misconduct relates to
his or her personal life for as long as the
misconduct evinces his or her lack of moral
character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. Every lawyer is expected to be
honorable and reliable at all times, for a
person who cannot abide by the laws in his
private life cannot be expected to do so in his
professional dealings.
As regards the penalty to be imposed, the
Court has been consistent. In Ceniza, as well
as in Narag v. Atty. Narag, Dantes v. Atty.
Dantes, Bustamante-Alejandro v. Atty.
Alejandro, and Guevarra v. Atty. Eala, We
resolved to disbar the respondents therein
for abandoning their legitimate spouses and
maintaining illicit affairs wi1h another. By
necessary implication, as a consequence of
Carrera's scandalous and highly immoral
conduct, the Court similarly finds him to be
deserving of the extreme penalty of
disbarment, although three (3) of its
members considered the penalty too
harsh.69 (Emphases supplied; citations
omitted)
The respondent in Chan admitted that he
was still married when he cohabited (that
resulted in a child) with complainant therein.
The Court gave weight and credence to this
admission in finding that respondent therein
violated the CPR, resulting in the imposition
of the penalty of disbarment.
In the instant case, Atty. Contado likewise
admitted the fact of his relationship with
Crisanta, while being married to his wife. In
so admitting, he effectively admitted to
living a life of deceit and immorality. He also
admitted that their relationship resulted in
two daughters. In his Comment, he made the
following statements:
x x x We supported each other. And with the
relationship we had, she bore our love-child
and christened her x x x burn on 24 October
2011.70
x x x Less than a month after I assumed
office[,] our second child was born on 21 July
2013 and christened her x x x.71
It must stress [sic] that when I met complaint
[sic] sometime in 2003. I was already
separated-in-fact with my wife. Such fact
was known to the complainant even before
we were still friends until we had this
relationship where we help each other on
matters of mutual concerns.72
Atty. Contado made similar statements in his
Position Paper as filed with the IBP, wilh the
following specifically reiterating that he had
a wife during the cohabitation: "Respondent
has severed his relationship with
complainant. And respondent did not
abandon his lawful wife."73
These admissions strongly support and
corroborate Crisanta's statements that they
cohabited. Instead of disputing Crisanta's
allegations, he affirmed them in giving these
statements; he did not present any denial on
these specifics. Atty. Contados statements,
therefore, made it clear to the Court that he
abandoned his legal wife and family to
cohabit with Crisanta that resulted in two
children. Applying Chan, Atty. Contado's
admissions can serve as basis to find him
guilty of violating the CPR for committing
grossly immoral acts.
Resultantly, and again based on Chan, the
penalty of disbarment is proper. In other
case law such as Ceniza v. Ceniza,74
Panagsagan,75 and Villarente v.
Villarente,76 the Court imposed the penalty
of disbarment on the erring lawyers in these
cases for being guilty of committing grossly
immoral conduct in abandoning the legal
spouse in order to cohabit with another
woman.
Further, the fact that Atty. Contado has not
yet returned the subject vehicle to Crisanta
despite demand bolsters this disciplinary
case against him.
Refusal to return property despite lawful
demand is akin to deliberate failure to pay
debt. Jurisprudence is clear that a lawyer's
failure to pay debts despite repeated
demands constitutes dishonest and deceitful
conduct77 also a violation of Rule 1.01 of the
CPR. Prompt payment of financial
obligations is one of the duties of a lawyer;
this is in accord with a lawyer's mandate to
"faithfully perform at all times his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients."78 The Court may impose the
penalty of disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law against the erring lawyer
for failure to pay debts.79
In the instant case, Atty. Contado admitted
that the subject vehicle is still with him but
that it cannot be transported to Manila as it
needs to undergo major repairs. The Court
finds this excuse to be flimsy and
unacceptable. He should have found a way
to return the subject vehicle to Crisanta
upon her demand. If he really had the
intention to return it, he should have just
taken the subject vehicle to the shop to
undergo the "major repairs" he was insisting
upon in order for the vehicle to be capable
of transport to Manila. It would have been
more prudent to do that instead of just
alleging it as defense in this case.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Atty.
Contado guilty of violating the CPR: for his
abandonment of his legal wife and family in
order to cohabit with another woman; and
for failure to return the subject vehicle
despite demand. The Court therefore
imposes the penalty of disbarment upon
respondent.
The Court, however, takes exception to IBP's
recommendation of returning the subject
vehicle to Crisanta. The Court cannot order
Atty. Contado to return the vehicle, as this is
not the proper forum. The instant case is a
disciplinary proceeding, the issue of which is
confined on whether Atty. Contado is still fit
to continue to be a member of the Bar.80
Matters that have no relation to the lawyer's
administrative liability, such as those civil or
criminal nature, should be resolved in a
proper proceeding, not in an administrative
proceeding.81 As Atty. Contado's failure to
return the subject vehicle is civil in nature (or
may even be criminal in nature), the Court
cannot properly order him to return the
vehicle in this case. The proper remedy
would be a civil or criminal case before the
trial courts for its recovery.
WHEHEFORE, the Court FINDS Atty. Allan C.
Contado GUILTY of gross immorality in
violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
DISBARRED from the practice of law
effective upon receipt of this Decision. His
name is ORDERED stricken off from the Roll
of Attorneys.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to

Atty. Allan C. Contado's personal record in
the Office of the Bar Confidant

Furnish a copy of this Decision to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its
information and guidance, and the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all courts of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
 [ A.C. No. 7253, February 18, 2020 ]
ATTY. PLARIDEL C. NAVA II, COMPLAINANT
VS
ATTY. OFELIA M. D. ARTUZ,* RESPONDENT.
[A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717 (FORMERLY OCA IPI
NO. 07-1911-MTJ)]
ATTY. PLARIDEL C. NAVA II, COMPLAINANT,
VS. JUDGE OFELIA M. D. ARTUZ, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH 5, ILOILO
CITY, ILOILO, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution are two (2)
administrative cases for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Ofelia M. D. Artuz
(respondent), namely: (a) A.C. No. 7253 filed
by complainant Atty. Plaridel C. Nava II (Atty.
Nava II) for respondent's acts of allegedly
willfully and viciously maligning, insulting,
and scorning him and his father, in a case;
and (b) A.M No. MTJ-08-1717 where the
Court dismissed her from the service as a
judge, and thereafter, directed her to show
cause why she should not be disbarred for
the same acts which caused her dismissal.
The Facts
Sometime in 2006, Atty. Nava II filed a
Petition for Disbarment1 against respondent
for violation of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), and for
Grave Misconduct and violation of Republic
Act No. 6713, docketed as A.C. No. 7253. He
claimed that on July 28, 2005, he filed a
Request for Inhibition and Re-Raffle2 of his
client's case before the City Prosecutor's
Office on the ground that he and
respondent, then a Prosecutor, are not in
good terms as they are adversaries in various
administrative and criminal cases. In her
comment3 to his request, however, she
willfully and viciously maligned, insulted,
and scorned him and his father, who is not a
party to the case. Further, Atty. Nava II
alleged that respondent: (1) falsely and
maliciously imputed a crime against him; (2)
maliciously filed criminal cases against him,
along with others, before the Department of
Justice (DOJ), intended clearly to harass,
annoy, vex, and humiliate them; and (3)
maligned her former superior and colleague,
City Prosecutor Efrain V. Baldago.4
During the pendency of A.C. No. 7253,
respondent was appointed and
subsequently took her Oath of Office as
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Branch 5, Iloilo City on October 9,
2006,5
notwithstanding Atty. Nava II's written
opposition6 thereto. Thus, Atty. Nava II filed
a complaint-petition7 docketed as A.M. No.
MTJ-08-1717, seeking to nullify respondent's
nomination and appointment as judge. In
said complaint-petition, Atty. Nava II alleged
that respondent is unfit and incompetent to
be appointed as a judge as she faces "several
criminal and administrative cases, the nature
of which involves her character,
competence, probity, integrity and
independence which should not have been
disregarded in her application to the
judiciary."8 Upon verifying that there are
indeed pending cases against respondent
which she failed to disclose in her Personal
Data Sheets (PDS) dated October 28, 2005
and November 6, 2006, the Court directed9
her to show cause why no disciplinary action
should be taken against her.10 Due
investigation and proceedings commenced
thereafter.
The two (2) cases were subsequently
consolidated in a Resolution11 dated June
17, 2015.
In a Decision12 dated August 29, 2017, the
Court found respondent guilty of Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Falsification in
connection with A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717, and
accordingly, meted her with the penalty of
dismissal from the service effective
immediately, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits, and with prejudice to
re-employment in any branch or agency of
the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, without
prejudice to her criminal liabilities therein. In
addition, the Court: (a) in connection with
A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717, required respondent
to show cause why she should not be
disbarred for the acts she committed which
led to her dismissal, i.e., failure to disclose in
her PDS the pendency of various cases
against her; and (b) in connection with A.C.
No. 7253, required respondent to comment
on Atty. Nava II's complaint, which she has
yet to submit.
Aggrieved, respondent moved for
reconsideration,13 praying for the reversal
of the August 29, 2017 Decision, including
the removal of the penalties of dismissal and
disqualification, as well as for permission to
retire with all the benefits due her. She also
filed a Comment14 dated November 30,
2017 which: (a) simply denied the allegations
in the disbarment petition in A.C. No. 7253
and instead largely discussed the
administrative cases filed and sanctions
meted against Atty. Nava II; and (b)
attributed the false statements in her two (2)
PDS subject of A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717 to
mere error in judgment, explaining that
while she was aware that there were
complaints lodged against her, the clearance
from the DOJ led her to honestly believe that
the same have not ripened into formal
charges to be disclosed in her PDS.
Thereafter, respondent filed a Supplement
to the Motion for Reconsideration15 dated
December 4, 2018, which the Court noted
without action in a Resolution16 dated
January 8, 2019.
In a Resolution17 dated January 10, 2018,
the Court resolved to, among others: (1)
deny with finality respondent's motion for
reconsideration; and (2) referred the
Petition for Disbarment, as well as
respondent's Comment, to the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report,
and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the OBC
In a Report and Recommendation18 dated
March 22, 2019, the OBC recommended that
respondent be disbarred pursuant to A.M.
No. 02-9-02-SC for violation of Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, Canon 7, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10,
and Canon 11 of the CPR, as well as Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and that
her name be ordered stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.19 The OBC noted that
respondent was already found by the Court
guilty of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and
Falsification of Official Documents for her
false statements in her two (2) PDS and for
her willful defiance of Court directives,
which findings, it held, already constitute
sufficient grounds to warrant her
disbarment. Moreover, notwithstanding the
opportunity given her, she failed to provide
sufficient explanation why she should not be
suspended, disbarred, or otherwise
administratively dealt with, after having
been dismissed from the service, and instead
opted to focus more on attacking and
impugning Atty. Nava II's integrity and
credibility.20
Meanwhile, respondent filed a Motion for
Leave to Admit Second Motion for
Reconsideration with the Attached Second
Motion for Reconsideration21 in connection
with A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717, arguing that
there were no evidence showing that she
had knowledge of the cases allegedly filed
against her nor was there a showing that she
received any notice, order or resolution
requiring her to comment on the same.
Additionally, she reiterates that she was
denied due process as the investigating
Judge, Vice Executive Judge Danilo P. Galvez,
did not inform her of the hearing between
the parties.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution
is whether or not respondent should be
disbarred.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, the Court notes that the above
report and recommendation of the OBC
resolved to disbar respondent based on the
Court's findings in the August 29, 2017
Decision in A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717 sans any
findings on the subject matter of A.C. No.
7253. Thus, while the Court is inclined to
adopt the OBC's findings and
recommendations relative to A.M. No. MTJ-
08-1717, the Court shall also determine
respondent's administrative liability, if any,
in A.C. No. 7253 in order to write finis to
these consolidated cases against
respondent.
I.
Anent A.M No. MTJ-08-1717, it is well to
note that in an earlier Decision dated August
29, 2017, the Court had already found
respondent guilty of the administrative
offenses of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty,
and Falsification of Official Documents for
deliberately and calculatedly lying in her
October 28, 2005 and November 6, 2006 PDS
about the fact that she had been formally
charged and had pending cases to make it
appear that she is qualified for the judgeship
position. Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC22
- which provides that administrative cases
against a judge for grave misconduct,
dishonesty, and falsification are
automatically considered as disciplinary
proceedings against him or her as a member
of the Bar - respondent was made to show
cause why she should not be disbarred. As
the OBC correctly pointed out, "[i]nstead of
showing cause and proving to the Court why
she should not be suspended, disbarred, or
otherwise administratively dealt with,
[respondent] opted to focus more on
attacking and impugning [Atty. Nava II's]
integrity and credibility"23 and conveniently
brushed aside her omissions in her PDS as
"mere error in judgment."24 Verily,
respondent's untruthful statements in her
PDS constitute breaches of Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, Canon 7, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10,
and Canon 11 of the CPR, all of which
respectively read:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
act.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the
integrated bar.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court
to be misled by any artifice.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and
to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.
Furthermore, said misdemeanor likewise
constitutes a contravention of Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 27. Disbarment and suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphases supplied)
It cannot therefore be denied that Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Falsification of
Official Documents constitute grounds to
disbar an attorney. In respondent's case, she
was herein found to have committed all of
these grounds warranting her immediate
disbarment as a consequence.
II.
As for A.C. No. 7253, it is well to recall that in
his complaint, Atty. Nava II claimed, among
others, that respondent willfully and
viciously maligned, insulted, and scorned
him and his father, who was not a party to
the case, in her comment to his request for
her inhibition from said case then being
investigated by her as the Prosecutor. Said
comment pertinently states:
1. That Plaridel C. Nava, II should not
compare me to the barbaric, nomadic and
outrageous attitude he had displayed when
he kicked one Som1y Decena on December
8, 2004, while his otherwise barbaric,
nomadic and outrageous father would
punch Decena on his eyes which I have seen
with my own two eyes at the Lobby of the
Hall of Justice x x x;
2. That Nava, II should be made aware that
as Provincial Legal Officer of the Province of
Guimaras, his practice of law is with
limitations. Unless he can show proof that he
was authorized by his immediate supervisor
in the dates and time that he acts as
Guiamaras legal Officer and at the same
time, counsel of any party in this case with
the Iloilo City Prosecutor's Office, I WILL
ACCEDE to such request. Otherwise, this
Office should not make itself bound by all the
malicious allegations of counsel and should
not allow a barbaric and nomadic person to
rule this Office.
Lastly, counsel should not flaunt the
personal circumstances of this Investigating
Prosecutor, as he himself is a respondent of
DISBARMENT cases not only from me, but
likewise from the residents of Guimaras,
hence, he should not boldly display his bad
manners and wrong conduct and arrogance
in this Office, by virtue of his being the
godson of the City Prosecutor and that the
latter should not only take cognizance, but
should handle with care.
x x x25 (Emphases supplied; underscoring in
the original).
In her defense, respondent simply
contended that there was no intention to
malign, insult, or falsely accuse Atty. Nava II
or anyone else as she simply wanted to
defend her impartiality. She also denied all
the other charges against her.
The Court finds respondent's contentions
untenable.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts
who are empowered to appear, prosecute,
and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities, and liabilities are devolved
by law as a consequence. Membership in the
Bar imposes upon them certain obligations.
Mandated to maintain the dignity of the
legal profession, they must conduct
themselves honorably and fairly.26 Any
violation of these standards exposes the
lawyer to administrative liability.27 To this
end, Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the CPR
commands:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness and candor towards
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Case law instructs that "[l]awyers should
treat their opposing counsels and other
lawyers with courtesy, dignity[,] and civility.
A great part of their comfort, as well as of
their success at the bar, depends upon their
relations with their professional brethren.
Since they deal constantly with each other,
they must treat one another with trust and
respect. Any undue ill feeling between
clients should not influence counsels in their
conduct and demeanor toward each other.
Mutual bickering, unjustified
recriminations[,] and offensive behavior
among lawyers not only detract from the
dignity of the legal profession, but also
constitute highly unprofessional conduct
subject to disciplinary action."28 Thus, in
Noble III v. Ailes,29 the Court held that the
hurling of insulting language to describe the
opposing counsel is considered conduct
unbecoming of the legal profession which, as
ruled in Buot v. Jubay,30 should never be
countenanced as it tends to degrade the
dignity of the legal profession.
In this case, respondent's acts of calling Atty.
Nava II and his father "barbaric, nomadic,
and outrageous" and baselessly imputing to
Atty. Nava II the use of his alleged influence
as the godson of the City Prosecutor who, by
virtue thereof, allegedly had the audacity to
display "his bad manners and wrong conduct
and arrogance" in an official pleading falls
short of the conduct being exhorted by
Canon 8 to all members of the Bar. Verily,
such use of intemperate language and
aspersions has no place in the dignity of
judicial forum.31 On this score, it must be
emphasized that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions such that
a lawyer's words and actions directly affect
the public's opinion of the legal profession.
Any violation of these conditions exposes
the lawyer to administrative liability,32 as in
this case.
III. dated August 12, 2019 in A.M. No. MTJ-08-
1717 are NOTED WITHOUT ACTION in view
of the Resolution dated January 10, 2018
All told, the Court finds that respondent had denying with finality respondent's Motion
violated several canons of professional and for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated
ethical conduct expected from her as a August 29, 2017).
lawyer and an officer of the court.
Membership in the legal profession is a
privilege, and whenever it is made to appear SO ORDERED.
that an attorney is no longer worthy of the
trust and confidence of his clients and the
public, it becomes not only the right but also
the duty of the Court to withdraw the
same.33

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent

Atty. Ofelia M.D. Artuz (respondent) GUILTY
of violating the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, Canon 7, Rule 8.01 of Canon 8, Rule
10.01 of Canon 10, and Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, and the
Canons of Professional Ethics. Accordingly,
she is hereby DISBARRED from the practice
of law and her name is ordered STRICKEN off
the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished to:

(a) the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the
country for their information and guidance;
(b) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
(c) the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to the respondent's personal
record as a member of the Bar.

The Motion for Leave to Admit Second

Motion for Reconsideration and the
attached Second Motion for Reconsideration
 A.C. No. 6396 October 25, 2005
ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO,
Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
Tinga, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer
who hurled invectives at a Clerk of Court.
Members of the bar decorum must at all
times comfort themselves in a manner
befitting their noble profession.
Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao
is the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On
8 May 2003, she filed with the Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) a Complaint-
Affidavit1 with supporting documents2
against respondent Atty. Virgil R. Castro for
Unprofessional Conduct, specifically
violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.3 The charge in the complaint
is summed up as follows:
Respondent Atty. Castro was a private
practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva
Vizcaya Chapter. On 5 May 2003, respondent
went to complainant’s office to inquire
whether the complete records of Civil Case
No. 784, entitled Sps. Crispino Castillano v.
Sps. Federico S. Castillano and Felicidad
Aberin, had already been remanded to the
court of origin, MCTC Dupax del Norte,
Alfonso Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must be
noted that respondent was not the counsel
of record of either party in Civil Case No. 784.
Complainant informed respondent that the
record had not yet been transmitted since a
certified true copy of the decision of the
Court of Appeals should first be presented to
serve as basis for the transmittal of the
records to the court of origin. To this
respondent retorted scornfully, "Who will
certify the Court of Appeals’ Decision, the
Court of Appeals? You mean to say, I would
still have to go to Manila to get a certified
true copy?" Surprised at this outburst,
complainant replied, "Sir, it’s in the Rules but
you could show us the copy sent to the party
you claim to be representing." Respondent
then replied, "Then you should have notified
me of the said requirement. That was two
weeks ago and I have been frequenting your
office since then, but you never bothered to
notify me." Complainant replied, "It is not
our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said
requirement."
Respondent then answered, "You mean to
say it is not your duty to remand the record
of the case?" Complainant responded, "No,
Sir, I mean, it’s not our duty to notify you
that you have to submit a copy of the Court
of Appeals’ decision." Respondent angrily
declared in Ilocano, "Kayat mo nga saw-en,
awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay?" ("You mean
to say you don’t care anymore? Is that the
way it is?") He then turned and left the
office, banging the door on his way out to
show his anger. The banging of the door was
so loud it was heard by the people at the
adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a hearing
was taking place.4
After a few minutes, respondent returned to
the office, still enraged, and pointed his
finger at complainant and shouted,
"Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek
haan mo nga ibales kaniak ah!" ("Vulva of
your mother! If you are harboring ill feelings
against my client, don’t turn your ire on
me!") Complainant was shocked at
respondent’s words but still managed to
reply, "I don’t even know your client, Sir."
Respondent left the office and as he passed
by complainant’s window, he again shouted,
"Ukinnam nga babai!" ("Vulva of your
mother, you woman!")5
Complainant suffered acute embarrassment
at the incident, as it happened in her office
of which she was, and still is, the head and in
front of her staff. She felt that her credibility
had been tarnished and diminished, eliciting
doubt on her ability to command full respect
from her staff.6
The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days
after the incident, was supported by an
Affidavit7 signed by employees of RTC-
Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the
incident. The Affidavit narrated the same
incident as witnessed by the said employees.
A Motion to File Additional
Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was filed by
complainant on 25 September 2003.8
On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an
Order9 requiring respondent to submit his
answer to the complaint. Respondent
submitted his Compliance10 dated 18 June
2003. Respondent explained that he was
counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
847, entitled Sps. Federico Castillano, et al.
v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et al., filed with the
RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30. He learned
of the finality of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 64962 with respect to
Civil Case No. 847 before the lower court.
Prior to the incident, he went to the office of
the complainant to request for the
transmittal of the records of the case to the
MCTC and the complainant reassured him of
the same.
Respondent admits having inquired about
the status of the transmittal of the records
on 5 May 2003. However, he has no
explanation as to what transpired on that
day. Instead, he narrates that on 25 May
2003, twelve days after the incident, the
records had not yet been transmitted, and
he subsequently learned that these records
were returned to the court of origin.
The hearing for the administrative complaint
before the CBD was set on 25 September
2003 by the Investigating Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan. However, on said date,
only complainant appeared. The latter also
moved that the case be submitted for
resolution.11 Respondent later on filed a
Manifestation stating that the reason for his
non-appearance was because he was still
recuperating from physical injuries and that
he was not mentally fit to prepare the
required pleadings as his vehicle was rained
with bullets on 19 August 2003. He also
expressed his public apology to the
complainant in the same Manifestation.12
Complainant filed a Manifestation
expressing her desire not to appear on the
next hearing date in view of respondent’s
public apology, adding that respondent
personally and humbly asked for forgiveness
which she accepted.13
The Investigating Commissioner
recommended that respondent be
reprimanded and warned that any other
complaint for breach of his professional
duties shall be dealt with more severely.14
The IBP submitted to this Court a Notice of
Resolution adopting and approving the
recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.15
At the onset, it should be noted that
respondent was not the counsel of record of
Civil Case No. 784. Had he been counsel of
record, it would have been easy for him to
present the required certified true copy of
the decision of the Court of Appeals. He need
not have gone to Manila to procure a
certified true copy of the decision since the
Court of Appeals furnishes the parties and
their counsel of record a duplicate original or
certified true copy of its decision.
His explanation that he will enter his
appearance in the case when its records
were already transmitted to the MCTC is
unacceptable. Not being the counsel of
record and there being no authorization
from either the parties to represent them,
respondent had no right to impose his will on
the clerk of court.
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states:
Rule 8.02—A lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it
is the right of any lawyer, without fear or
favor, to give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.
Through his acts of constantly checking the
transmittal of the records of Civil Case No.
784, respondent deliberately encroached
upon the legal functions of the counsel of
record of that case. It does not matter
whether he did so in good faith.
Moreover, in the course of his questionable
activities relating to Civil Case No. 784,
respondent acted rudely towards an officer
of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk
of court and uttered at her the most vulgar
of invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered
but also unbecoming considering that he did
all these to a woman and in front of her
subordinates.
As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,16
respondent ought to have realized that this
sort of public behavior can only bring down
the legal profession in the public estimation
and erode public respect for it.17 These acts
violate Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to
wit:
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness
to practice law, now shall he, whether in
public or private life behave in scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility demands that
lawyers conduct themselves with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward their fellow
lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold
the dignity of the legal profession. They must
act honorably, fairly and candidly towards
each other and otherwise conduct
themselves without reproach at all times.18
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating
Commissioner, respondent did not
categorically deny the charges in the
complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy
narration of the prefatory facts of the case as
well as of the incident on 5 May 2003.
Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-
Affidavit that respondent’s uncharacteristic
behavior was not an isolated incident. He has
supposedly done the same to Attys.
Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy
Lambino, the latter having filed a case
against respondent pending before this
Court.19 We, however, cannot acknowledge
such allegation absent any evidence showing
the veracity of such claim. No affidavits to
that effect were submitted by either Atty.
Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.
Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed
should be tempered owing to the fact that
respondent had apologized to the
complainant and the latter had accepted it.
This is not to say, however, that respondent
should be absolved from his actuations.
People are accountable for the
consequences of the things they say and do
even if they repent afterwards. The fact
remains that things done cannot be undone
and words uttered cannot be taken back.
Hence, he should bear the consequences of
his actions.
The highest reward that can be bestowed on
lawyers is the esteem of their brethren. This
esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily
created, or gained by artifice or contrivance.
It is born of sharp contexts and thrives
despite conflicting interest. It emanates
solely from integrity, character, brains and
skills in the honorable performance of
professional duty.20

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of
TEN THOUSAND (₱10,000.00) PESOS with a
warning that any similar infraction with be
dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant for
appropriate annotation in the record of the
respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 6317 August 31, 2006
LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO, Respondent.
Complainant alleged that respondent failed
to appear before the trial court in the
hearing for the issuance of the Writ of
Possession and did not protect her interests
in the Compromise Agreement which she
subsequently entered into to end LRC Case
No. B-2610.2

DECISION Respondent denied the accusations against

him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he
received from complainant was payment for
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: legal services for the recovery of the deposit
with Planters Development Bank and did not
On February 13, 2004, an administrative
include LRC Case No. B-2610 pending before
complaint1 was filed by complainant
the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna.
Luzviminda C. Lijauco against respondent
Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross
misconduct, malpractice and conduct
The complaint was referred3 to the
unbecoming of an officer of the court when
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him
investigation, report and recommendation.
despite receipt of payment representing
On September 21, 2005, the Investigating
attorney’s fees.
Commissioner submitted his report finding
respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and
9.02 of the Code of Professional
According to the complainant, she engaged
Responsibility which provide:
the services of respondent sometime in
January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in
recovering her deposit with Planters
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in
Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
in the amount of P180,000.00 and the
conduct.
release of her foreclosed house and lot
located in Calamba, Laguna. The property
identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered
Rule 9.02 – A lawyer shall not divide or
as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said bank
stipulate to divide a fee for legal services
is the subject of a petition for the issuance of
with persons not licensed to practice law,
a writ of possession then pending before the
except:
Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch
24 docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement
with a partner or associate that, upon the
latter’s death, money shall be paid over a
reasonable period of time to his estate or to
the persons specified in the agreement; or
b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete
unfinished legal business of a deceased
lawyer; or
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-
lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even
if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a
profit-sharing arrangement.
In finding the respondent guilty of violating
Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Investigating
Commissioner opined that:
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant. To be
made the suspension or disbarment of a
lawyer, the charge against him must be
established by convincing proof. The record
must disclose as free from doubt a case
which compels the exercise by the Supreme
Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious
character of the act done as well as of the
motivation thereof must be clearly
demonstrated. x x x.
In the instant scenario, despite the strong
protestation of respondent that the
Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely and solely
for the recovery of the Php180,000.00
savings account of complainant subsequent
acts and events say otherwise, to wit:
1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the
recovery of a Php180,000.00 savings deposit
is too high;
2.) Respondent actively acted as
complainant’s lawyer to effectuate the
compromise agreement.
By openly admitting he divided the
Php70,000.00 to other individuals as
commission/referral fees respondent
violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides
that a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to
divide a fee for legal services with persons
not licensed to practice law. Worst, by luring
complainant to participate in a compromise
agreement with a false and misleading
assurance that complainant can still recover
after Three (3) years her foreclosed property
respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
which says a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.4
The Investigating Commissioner thus
recommended:
WHEREFORE, finding respondent
responsible for aforestated violations to
protect the public and the legal profession
from his kind, it is recommended that he be
suspended for Six (6) months with a stern
warning that similar acts in the future will be
severely dealt with.5
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the
recommendation of the investigating
commissioner.6
We agree with the findings of the IBP.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed
on those who show that they possessed and
continue to possess the legal qualifications
for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. They must perform
their fourfold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.7
Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct8 and are mandated to serve their
clients with competence and diligence.9
They shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to them, and this negligence in
connection therewith shall render them
liable.10
Respondent’s claim that the attorney’s fee
pertains only to the recovery of
complainant’s savings deposit from Planter’s
Development Bank cannot be sustained.
Records show that he acted as complainant’s
counsel in the drafting of the compromise
agreement between the latter and the bank
relative to LRC Case No. B-2610. Respondent
admitted that he explained the contents of
the agreement to complainant before the
latter affixed her signature. Moreover, the
Investigating Commissioner observed that
the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in
the recovery of the deposit amounting to
P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall
charge only fair and reasonable fees.11
Respondent’s disregard for his client’s
interests is evident in the iniquitous
stipulations in the compromise agreement
where the complainant conceded the
validity of the foreclosure of her property;
that the redemption period has already
expired thus consolidating ownership in the
bank, and that she releases her claims
against it.12 As found by the Investigating
Commissioner, complainant agreed to these
concessions because respondent misled her
to believe that she could still redeem the
property after three years from the
foreclosure. The duty of a lawyer to
safeguard his client’s interests commences
from his retainer until his discharge from the
case or the final disposition of the subject
matter of litigation. Acceptance of money
from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship and gives rise to the duty of
fidelity to the client’s cause. The canons of
the legal profession require that once an
attorney agrees to handle a case, he should
undertake the task with zeal, care and
utmost devotion.13
Respondent’s admission14 that he divided
the legal fees with two other people as a
referral fee does not release him from
liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate
to divide a fee for legal services with persons
not licensed to practice law, except in certain
cases.15
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred
or suspended on the following grounds: 1)
deceit; 2) malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral
conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyer’s
oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful
order of a superior court; and 7) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority.
In Santos v. Lazaro16 and Dalisay v.
Mauricio, Jr.,17 we held that Rule 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility is a
basic postulate in legal ethics. When a
lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants
that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting his rights. The failure to exercise
that degree of vigilance and attention makes
such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in
him by his client and makes him answerable
not just to his client but also to the legal
profession, the courts and society.
A lawyer should give adequate attention,
care and time to his client’s case. Once he
agrees to handle a case, he should undertake
the task with dedication and care. If he fails
in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a
lawyer. Thus, a lawyer should accept only as
much cases as he can efficiently handle in
order to sufficiently protect his clients’
interests. It is not enough that a lawyer
possesses the qualification to handle the
legal matter; he must also give adequate
attention to his legal work. Utmost fidelity is
demanded once counsel agrees to take the
cudgels for his client’s cause.18
In view of the foregoing, we find that
suspension from the practice of law for six
months is warranted. In addition, he is
directed to return to complainant the
amount he received by way of legal fees
pursuant to existing jurisprudence.19
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is
found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02,
18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months effective
from notice, and STERNLY WARNED that any
similar infraction will be dealt with more
severely. He is further ordered to RETURN,
within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum
of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C.
Lijauco and to submit to this Court proof of
his compliance within three (3) days
therefrom.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the
record of respondent and served on the IBP,
as well as on the Court Administrator who
shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 5246 March 20, 2003 of his hearings which led complainant to
plead with respondent to withdraw formally
as his counsel so he could hire another
EDGAR O. PEREA, complainant, lawyer. Because of Atty. Almadro’s neglect,
complainant is now facing the loss of his
vs.
freedom and livelihood.1
ATTY. RUBEN ALMADRO, respondent.

Respondent filed three motions for

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a complaint for
disbarment filed by Edgar O. Perea against
Atty. Ruben Almadro for gross neglect of his
duties as lawyer of herein complainant.
extension of time to file comment.2 On
November 13, 2000, the Court resolved to
grant the said motions with a warning that
no further extensions shall be granted.3 On
November 17, 2000, respondent, through
the law firm Sua and Alambra, filed a
Manifestation and Motion that respondent
has not yet received a copy of the complaint
hence it asked the Court to order the
complainant to furnish them a copy.4

Complainant narrates: Respondent was his

counsel before the Regional Trial Court of
On December 20, 2000, respondent through
Quezon City (Branch 99) where he
said law firm submitted an Answer5 to the
(complainant Perea) is being charged with
complaint, contending that: two days after
the crime of Frustrated Homicide. On
the RTC granted the manifestation of
February 26, 1996, the said RTC issued an
defense to file motion for leave to file
order granting Atty. Almadro’s motion for
demurrer to evidence, he had finished the
leave to file demurrer to evidence within ten
draft of the motion and the accompanying
(10) days from said date. All the while,
pleading which he stored in a magnetic
complainant thought that respondent filed
computer diskette intended for editing prior
said demurrer and the case against him
to its submission in court; a few days before
dismissed. It was only sometime in 1999 that
the deadline, herein respondent tried to
complainant learned that Atty. Almadro
retrieve the draft from the diskette but said
failed to file any demurrer. The trial court
drafts were nowhere to be found despite
ordered the herein complainant to present
efforts to retrieve them; this led him to
evidence in his defense. Later, a warrant was
believe that the drafts must have been
issued for his arrest prompting him to
finalized and the edited versions accordingly
surrender to the court and post bail.
filed since it is his practice to expunge from
Complainant suffered financially and
the diskette drafts that were already
emotionally due to respondent’s neglect of
finalized and acted upon; meanwhile, the
his duties. Respondent has not attended any
presiding judge of the RTC retired, as a
consequence, actions on pending cases were
held in abeyance; moreover,
communications with the herein
complainant had become rarer; thereafter,
towards the end of 1997 up to the next five
months of 1998, respondent was
preoccupied with the congressional
elections in Biliran where he ran and
subsequently lost; then he was offered a
position at the Philippine Stock Exchange as
head of the Compliance and Surveillance
Division which he accepted; his time and
attention was spent in the performance of
his demanding job at the PSE as well as in the
preparation of his testimony before the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee in
connection with the "BW" scam; anent the
case of herein complainant, he offered on
several occasions to withdraw as one of the
defense counsel of the complainant even to
the extent of offering to return his
acceptance fee which the latter however
refused;6 it is not true that complainant
pleaded with respondent to withdraw as his
counsel, the truth being that it was
complainant who refused to let go of
respondent as his counsel; also, while he is a
counsel of complainant in the criminal case
before the RTC, he was merely a
collaborating counsel, the lead counsel being
Atty. Solomon Villanueva;7 finally, he was
actually mulling over the possible procedural
steps to take with regard to complainant’s
case when he received instead, a copy of the
present complaint.8
On February 28, 2001, the Court issued a
Resolution9 referring the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On June 13, 2001, the IBP through
Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan submitted
its report, pertinent portions of which are
quoted verbatim:
"We are not convinced about the truth of
respondent’s affirmative allegations. It is
clear that he as well as his counsels are lying.
First off, the manifestation with motion filed
by respondent’s counsels, Sua and Alambra
is incredibly unbelievable. In fact, to be blunt
about it, respondent’s counsels were clearly
lying when they manifested that the
respondent "has yet to receive a copy of the
complaint..." This is an outrageous lie. The
respondent’s three (3) motions never once
mentioned that he had not received copy of
the complaint. In fact, in his second motion
for further extension of time to file
comment, Atty. Almadro CLEARLY stated in
the second paragraph thereof that:
‘He is in the process of reviewing an initial
draft of said comment and will need said
period of ten (10) days to complete and
finalize the draft.’
"From the afore-quoted portion of Mr.
Almadro’s manifestation and motion, it is
obvious he already had a copy of the
complaint. The manifestation and motion
filed on his behalf by Attys. Sua and Alambra
with the Honorable Supreme Court is a
brazen and deliberate misrepresentation
which deserves an uncompromising and
vigorous condemnation.
"The respondent claims he is in solo practice.
How then can he honestly claim that when
he could not find the draft of his demurrer in
the magnetic computer diskette where he
allegedly stored it, he was led "to believe
that the drafts must have been finalized and
the edited versions thereof accordingly
filed." This allegation is pure unadulterated
garbage. All Mr. Almadro had to do was
check his case folder to see if a demurrer had
indeed been filed. As a solo practitioner like
this representation, we can only surmise
that logically, nothing happens or "goes
down" in Mr. Almadro’s office without his
knowledge and indispensable participation.
If so, how could he have been led to believe
anything? To be sure, he would have read
and signed the demurrer before it was
"accordingly filed." Being a solo practitioner
no one else could have signed that
demurrer. And does Mr. Almadro expect
anyone to believe that after finishing the
draft (in his computer) he would not even
bother to print a hard copy for him to read,
edit and correct without having to do so
from his computer monitor?
"Incidentally, this representation verified the
records of the complainant’s criminal case
before RTC-Branch 99, Quezon City. We
came upon an Order of the incumbent
presiding judge declaring the respondent
herein in contempt of court for repeatedly
failing to submit an explanation as ordered
by the court.
"The undersigned is convinced that Atty.
Ruben L. Almadro’s actuations reveal not
only serious neglect or indifference to his
duties as a lawyer but more gravely his open
disrespect for the court and the authority it
represents.
"We wish to put on record our extreme
DISPLEASURE at the behavior of respondent
Atty. Ruben L. Almadro. We strongly
recommend that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for two (2) years and
that he be fined Ten Thousand
(PhP10,000.00) Pesos. We likewise
recommend strongly that Attys. Sua and
Alambra be ordered to explain why they
should not be held in contempt for
deliberately foisting a deliberate falsehood
and misrepresentation on the Honorable
Supreme Court by declaring that their client
had not received a copy of the complaint
when such was not true. By their
misrepresentation the afore-named
counsels have exhibited contemptible
disrespect not only for the Court but also the
authority it represents."10
The report was adopted and approved by
the Board of Governors of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline with some
modifications thus:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, with modification, and
considering that Atty. Ruben L. Almadro’s
actuations reveal not only serious neglect or
indifference to his duties as a lawyer but
more gravely his open disrespect for the
court and the authority it represent.
Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year and FINED for
Ten Thousand (P 10,000.00) Pesos. Likewise,
Atty. Sua and Atty. Alambra are ordered to
explain why they should not be held in
contempt for deliberately foisting a
deliberate falsehood and
misrepresentation."11
Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration on September 11, 2002, this
time in his own behalf, of the above quoted
IBP Board Resolution.12 This was denied on
October 19, 2002.13
We are in full accord with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP.
As clearly stated in the Code of Professional
Responsibility -
CANON 18 --- A lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 --- A lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
Rule 18.04 --- A lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the
client’s request for information.
It is plain from the records that respondent
lawyer failed to submit a demurrer to
evidence for which he had earlier asked
permission from the trial court and which his
client, herein complainant was relying on.
More than that, he failed to contact his client
and to apprise the latter about the
developments of the case leaving
complainant completely surprised and
without any protection when years later, he
received summons from the trial court
asking him to present evidence in his
defense and, not long after, the trial court
issued a warrant for his arrest.
In the recent case of Sps. Galen et al. vs. Atty.
Paguirigan14 the Court is explicit in its
pronouncement that:
"An attorney is bound to protect his client’s
interest to the best of his ability and with
utmost diligence. A failure to file brief for his
client certainly constitutes inexcusable
negligence on his part. The respondent has
indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty
owed by him to his client as well as to the
Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the
speedy administration of justice.
xxx xxx xxx
"A lawyer is expected to be familiar with
these rudiments of law and procedure and
anyone who acquires his service is entitled to
not just competent service but also whole-
hearted devotion to his client’s cause. It is
the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with
competence and diligence and he should
exert his best efforts to protect within the
bounds of law the interest of his client. A
lawyer should never neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence in
fulfilling his duty will render him liable for
disciplinary action."15
In other cases, the Court also held that while
a lawyer may decline a person to become his
client for valid reasons, once he agrees to
take up the cause of a client, he begins to
owe fidelity to such cause and must always
be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. As a lawyer, he must serve
the client with competence and diligence,
and champion the latter’s cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.
Indeed, he owes entire devotion to the
interest of his client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client’s
rights, and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing
be taken or withheld from his client, save by
the rules of law legally applied.16 His client
is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by
the law of the land and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense.17
Respondent’s negligence is compounded by
his attempt to have this tribunal believe the
story of how his draft, stored in a magnetic
diskette, mysteriously disappeared and how
the absence of such file in his diskette led
him to believe that the same was already
filed in court. In his Answer, he even tried to
depict himself as a conscientious lawyer by
stating that he was actually mulling on the
procedural steps he would undertake
regarding complainant’s case when instead
he received a copy of this complaint for
disbarment. Such story, as observed by the
IBP, is not only outrageous but is
contemptuous as it makes a mockery of the
Court.
Again, the Code of Professional
Responsibility is explicit on this matter:
CANON 10--- A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 ---A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court
to be misled by any artifice.
In Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs Atty.
Flores,18 the Court, aside from citing Canon
10 above stated that "a lawyer must be a
disciple of truth." Indeed, it cannot be
stressed enough how important it is for a
lawyer as an officer of the court to observe
honesty at all times, especially before the
courts.
Respondent would have this Court believe a
very preposterous story of how his draft
disappeared, all the time avoiding the simple
fact that he failed to submit the necessary
pleading before the trial court. Such
behavior cannot be countenanced and
deserves stern penalty therefor.
Let the records of herein case be remanded
to the Office of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for further action on the
contempt proceedings against Atty. Kenton
Sua and Atty. Alan Alambra.
SO ORDERED.

The act of the IBP in requiring Atty. Kenton

Sua and Atty. Alan Alambra to show cause
why they should not be held in contempt of
court for deliberate falsehood and
misrepresentation in the preparation of the
Answer for herein respondent is
appropriate. Records reveal that both Attys.
Sua and Alambra have filed their joint
Explanation.19

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty.

Ruben Almadro guilty of serious neglect of
his duties as a lawyer and of open disrespect
for the court and the authority it represents,
as embodied in Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and
18.04 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year and FINED in the amount of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, with a
WARNING that any or similar acts of
dishonesty would be dealt with more
severely.

Let a copy of the Resolution be attached to

the personal records of Atty. Alambra in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) and all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
G.R. No. 144412 November 18, 2003
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and POTENCIANO L.
GALANIDA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1
assailing the Decision2 of 27 April 2000 and
the Resolution of 8 August 2000 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451. The
Court of Appeals upheld the Decision3 of 18
September 1998 and the Resolution of 24
December 1998 of the National Labor
Relations Commission ("NLRC") in NLRC Case
No. V-000180-98. The NLRC modified the
Decision dated 23 December 1997 of Labor
Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante ("Labor
Arbiter") in NLRC Case No. RAB VII-05-0545-
94 holding that Allied Banking Corporation
("Allied Bank") illegally dismissed Potenciano
L. Galanida ("Galanida"). The NLRC awarded
Galanida separation pay, backwages, moral
and exemplary damages, and other amounts
totaling ₱ 1,264,933.33.
Antecedent Facts
For a background of this case, we quote in
part from the Decision of the Court of
Appeals:
Private respondent Potenciano Galanida was
hired by petitioner Allied Banking
Corporation on 11 January 1978 and rose
from accountant-book(k)eeper to assistant
manager in 1991. His appointment was
covered by a "Notice of Personnel Action"
which provides as one of the conditions of
employment the provision on petitioner’s
right to transfer employees:
"REGULAR APPOINTMENT: xxx It is
understood that the bank reserves the right
to transfer or assign you to other
departments or branches of the bank as the
need arises and in the interest of
maintaining smooth and uninterrupted
service to the public."
Private respondent was promoted several
times and was transferred to several
branches as follows:
"a) January, 1978 to March, 1982 –
Tagbilaran City Branch
"b) April, 1982 to May, 1984 – Lapulapu City
Branch
"c) June, 1984 – Mandaue City Branch
"d) July, 1984 to April, 1986 – Tagbilaran City
Branch
"e) May, 1986 to May, 1987 – Dumaguete
City Branch
"f) June, 1987 to August, 1987 – Carbon
Branch, Cebu City
"g) September, 1987 to Sept. 1989 –
Lapulapu City Branch, Cebu
"h) October, 1989 to Sept. 1992 – Carbon
Branch, Cebu City
"i) October 1992 to Sept. 1994 – Jakosalem
Regional Branch, Cebu City" (Rollo, p. 47)
Effecting a rotation/movement of officers
assigned in the Cebu homebase, petitioner
listed respondent as second in the order of
priority of assistant managers to be assigned
outside of Cebu City having been stationed
in Cebu for seven years already. Private
respondent manifested his refusal to be
transferred to Bacolod City in a letter dated
19 April 1994 citing as reason parental
obligations, expenses, and the anguish that
would result if he is away from his family. He
then filed a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter for constructive dismissal.
Subsequently, petitioner bank informed
private respondent (Rollo, p. 86) that he was
to report to the Tagbilaran City Branch
effective 23 May 1994. Private respondent
refused. In a letter dated 13 June 1994,
petitioner warned and required of private
respondent as follows:
"There is no discrimination in your transfer.
In fact, among the officers mentioned, only
you have refused the new assignment citing
difficulty of working away from your family
as if the other officers concerned do not
suffer the same predicament. To exempt you
from the officer transfer would result in
favoritism in your favor and discrimination
as against the other officers concerned.
"In furtherance of maintaining a smooth and
uninterrupted service to the public, and in
accordance with the Bank’s order of priority
of rotating its accountants’ places of
assignments, you are well aware that
Roberto Isla, AM/Accountant, assigned in
Cebu for more than ten (10) years, was, on
February 14, 1994, reassigned to Iligan City
Branch and then to Cagayan de Oro City
Branch on June 8, 1994. Hence, your
objection on the ground of your length of
service is without merit.
xxx
"As discussed, your refusal to follow
instruction concerning your transfer and
reassignment to Bacolod City and to
Tagbilaran City is penalized under Article XII
of the Bank’s Employee Discipline Policy and
Procedure [which] provides:
‘XII Transfer and Reassignment
Refusal to follow instruction concerning
transfers and reassignments.
First and subsequent offenses –
The penalty may range from suspension to
dismissal as determined by management.
The employee shall be required to comply
with the order of transfer and reassignment,
if the penalty is not termination of
employment.’
"In view of the foregoing, please explain in
writing within three (3) days from receipt
hereof why no disciplinary action should be
meted against you for your having refused to
follow instructions concerning the foregoing
transfer and reassignment." xxx4
On 16 June 1994, Galanida replied that
"(w)hether the bank’s penalty for my refusal
be Suspension or Dismissal xxx it will all the
more establish and fortify my complaint now
pending at NLRC, RAB 7."5 In the same letter,
he charged Allied Bank with discrimination
and favoritism in ordering his transfer, thus:
xxx What I cannot decipher now under the
headship of Mr. Olveda is management’s
discriminatory act of transferring only the
long staying accountants of Cebu in the guise
of its exercise of management prerogative
when in truth and in fact, the ulterior motive
is to accommodate some new officers who
happen to enjoy favorable connection with
management. How can the bank ever justify
the transfer of Melinda T. Co, a new officer
who had experienced being assigned outside
of Cebu for more than a year only to
Tabunok Branch? If the purpose is for check
and balance, is management implying that
Melinda Co can better carry out such
function over Mr. Larry Sabelino, who is a
seasoned and experienced accountant or
any of the Metro Cebu accountants for that
matter? Isn’t this act of management an
obvious display of favoritism? xxx6
On 5 October 1994, Galanida received an
inter-office communication7 ("Memo")
dated 8 September 1994 from Allied Bank’s
Vice-President for Personnel, Mr. Leonso C.
Pe. The Memo informed Galanida that Allied
Bank had terminated his services effective 1
September 1994. The reasons given for the
dismissal were: (1) Galanida’s continued
refusal to be transferred from the
Jakosalem, Cebu City branch; and (2) his
refusal to report for work despite the denial
of his application for additional vacation
leave. The salient portion of the Memo
reads:
Therefore, your refusal to follow instruction
concerning your transfer and reassignment
to Bacolod City and to Tagbilaran City is
without any justifiable reason and The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
constituted violations of Article XII of the
After several hearings, the Labor Arbiter held
Bank’s EDPP xxx
that Allied Bank had abused its management
prerogative in ordering the transfer of
Galanida to its Bacolod and Tagbilaran
In view of the foregoing, please be informed
branches. In ruling that Galanida’s refusal to
that the Bank has terminated your services
transfer did not amount to insubordination,
effective September 1, 1994 and considered
the Labor Arbiter misquoted this Court’s
whatever benefit, if any, that you are
decision in Dosch v. NLRC,9 thus:
entitled as forfeited in accordance with 04, V
Administrative Penalties, page 6 of the
Bank’s EDPP which provides as follows:
As a general rule, the right to transfer or
reassign an employee is recognized as an
employer’s exclusive right and the
"04. Dismissal.
prerogative of management (Abbott
Laboratories vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 713 [1987]).

Dismissal is a permanent separation for

cause xxx
The exercise of this right, is not however,
absolute. It has certain limitations. Thus, in
Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et al. 123 SCRA 296
Notice of termination shall be issued by the
(1983), the Supreme Court, ruled:
Investigation Committee subject to the
confirmation of the President or his
authorized representative as
"While it may be true that the right to
officer/employee who is terminated for
transfer or reassign an employee is an
cause shall not be eligible to receive any
employer’s exclusive right and the
benefit arising from her/his employment
prerogative of management, such right is not
with the Bank or to termination pay."
absolute. The right of an employer to freely
select or discharge his employee is limited by
the paramount police power xxx for the
It is understood that the termination of your
relations between capital and labor are not
service shall be without prejudice to
merely contractual but impressed with
whatever legal remedies which the Bank
public interest. xxx And neither capital nor
may have already undertaken and/or will
labor shall act oppressively against each
undertake against you.
other.

Please be guided accordingly. (Emphasis

Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be
supplied)8
considered insubordination where
employee cited reason for said refusal, such
(sic) as that of being away from the
family."10 (Underscoring supplied by the
Labor Arbiter)
The Labor Arbiter reasoned that Galanida’s
transfer was inconvenient and prejudicial
because Galanida would have to incur
additional expenses for board, lodging and
travel. On the other hand, the Labor Arbiter
held that Allied Bank failed to show any
business urgency that would justify the
transfer.
The Labor Arbiter also gave credence to
Galanida’s claim that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co
special treatment. The Labor Arbiter stated
that Allied Bank deliberately left out Ms. Co’s
name from the list of accountants
transferred to Cebu as contained in Allied
Bank’s letter dated 13 June 1994. However,
Mr. Regidor Olveda, Allied Bank’s Vice
President for Operations Accounting,
testified that the bank transferred Ms. Co to
the Tabunok, Cebu branch within the first
half of 1994.
Still, the Labor Arbiter declined to award
Galanida back wages because he was not
entirely free from blame. Since another bank
had already employed Galanida, the Labor
Arbiter granted Galanida separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement. The dispositive
portion of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision of 23
December 1997 provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering
respondent Allied Banking Corporation to
pay complainant the aggregate total amount
of Three Hundred Twenty Four Thousand
Pesos (₱ 324,000.00) representing the
following awards:
a) Separation pay for ₱ 272,000.00;
b) Quarter bonus for 1994 – ₱ 16,000.00;
c) 13th month pay for 1994 – ₱ 16,000.00;
d) Refund of contribution to Provident Fund
- ₱ 20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.11
The Ruling of the NLRC
On appeal, the NLRC likewise ruled that
Allied Bank terminated Galanida without just
cause. The NLRC agreed that the transfer
order was unreasonable and unjustified,
considering the family considerations
mentioned by Galanida. The NLRC
characterized the transfer as a demotion
since the Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches
were smaller than the Jakosalem branch, a
regional office, and because the bank
wanted Galanida, an assistant manager, to
replace an assistant accountant in the
Tagbilaran branch. The NLRC found unlawful WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
discrimination since Allied Bank did not decision of the Labor Arbiter dated
transfer several junior accountants in Cebu. December 23, 1997 is hereby MODIFIED by
The NLRC also held that Allied Bank gave Ms. increasing the award of separation pay and
Co special treatment by assigning her to granting in addition thereto backwages,
Cebu even though she had worked for the moral and exemplary damages. The
bank for less than two years. respondent-appellant, ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION, is thus ordered to pay to
herein complainant-appellee, POTENCIANO
The NLRC ruled that Galanida’s termination L. GALANIDA, the following amounts:
was illegal for lack of due process. The NLRC
stated that Allied Bank did not conduct any
hearing. The NLRC declared that Allied Bank a) ₱ 336,000.00, representing
failed to send a termination notice, as separation pay
required by law for a valid termination. The
b> ₱ 833,600.00, representing
Memo merely stated that Allied Bank would
backwages
issue a notice of termination, but the bank
did not issue any notice. c> ₱ 5,333.23 representing
proportional 1994 13th month pay
d> ₱ 20,000.00 representing refund
The NLRC concluded that Allied Bank
of Provident Fund Contribution
dismissed Galanida in bad faith, tantamount
to an unfair labor practice as the dismissal e> ₱ 50,000.00 representing moral
undermined Galanida’s right to security of damages
tenure and equal protection of the laws. On
f> ₱ 20,000.00 representing
these grounds, the NLRC promulgated its
exemplary damages
Decision of 18 September 1998, the relevant
portion of which states:

===========₱ 1,264,933.33 TOTAL AWARD

In this particular case, We view as All other claims are dismissed for lack of
impractical, unrealistic and no longer basis. The other respondents are dropped
advantageous to both parties to order for lack of sufficient basis that they acted in
reinstatement of the complainant. xxx For excess of their corporate powers.
lack of sufficient basis, We deny the claim for
1994 quarter bonus. Likewise, no attorney’s
fees is awarded as counsels for complainant- SO ORDERED.12
appellee are from the City Prosecutor’s
Office of Cebu.
Allied Bank filed a motion for
reconsideration which the NLRC denied in its
Resolution of 24 December 1998.13
Dissatisfied, Allied Bank filed a petition for
review questioning the Decision and
Resolution of the NLRC before the Court of
Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing Dosch v. NLRC,14 the Court of Appeals
held that Galanida’s refusal to comply with
the transfer orders did not warrant his
dismissal. The appellate court ruled that the
transfer from a regional office to the smaller
Bacolod or Tagbilaran branches was
effectively a demotion. The appellate court
agreed that Allied Bank did not afford
Galanida procedural due process because
there was no hearing and no notice of
termination. The Memo merely stated that
the bank would issue a notice of termination
but there was no such notice.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of
the NLRC in its Decision of 27 April 2000,
thus:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is
DISMISSED and the assailed Decision of
public respondent NLRC is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 15
Allied Bank filed a motion for
reconsideration which the appellate court
denied in its Resolution of 8 August 2000.16
On 26 April 2001, Allied Bank appealed the
appellate court’s decision and resolution to
the Supreme Court. Allied Bank prayed that
the Supreme Court: (1) issue a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction ex parte to restrain the
implementation or execution of the
questioned Decision and Resolution; (2)
declare Galanida’s termination as valid and
legal; (3) set aside the Court of Appeals’
Decision and Resolution; (4) make
permanent the restraining order or
preliminary injunction; (5) order Galanida to
pay the costs; and (6) order other equitable
reliefs.
The Issues
Allied Bank raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED
THERE IS LEGAL BASIS IN PETITIONER’S
EXERCISE OF ITS MANAGEMENT
PREROGATIVE.
2. WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S
VIOLATIONS OF COMPANY RULES
CONSTITUTE A GROUND TO WARRANT THE
PENALTY OF DISMISSAL.
3. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED,
THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT ALLIED
BANK AFFORDED PRIVATE RESPONDENT THE
REQUIRED DUE PROCESS.
4. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS, THERE IS
LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT CANNOT RECOVER ANY
MONETARY AWARD.17
In sum, Allied Bank argues that the transfer
of Galanida was a valid exercise of its
management prerogative. Allied Bank
contends that Galanida’s continued refusal
to obey the transfer orders constituted
willful disobedience or insubordination,
which is a just cause for termination under
the Labor Code.
On the other hand, Galanida defended his
right to refuse the transfer order. The
memorandum for Galanida filed with this
Court, prepared by Atty. Loreto M. Durano,
again misquoted the Court’s ruling in Dosch
v. NLRC, thus:
xxx His [Galanida’s] refusal to transfer falls
well within the ruling of the Supreme Court
in Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et. al., 123 SCRA
296 (1983) quoted as follows:
xxx
Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be
considered insubordination where
employee cited reason for said refusal, such
as that of being away from the family."18
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
Preliminary Matter: Misquoting Decisions of
the Supreme Court
The memorandum prepared by Atty. Durano
and, worse, the assailed Decision of the
Labor Arbiter, both misquoted the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Dosch v. NLRC. The Court
held in Dosch:
We cannot agree to Northwest’s submission
that petitioner was guilty of disobedience
and insubordination which respondent
Commission sustained. The only piece of
evidence on which Northwest bases the
charge of contumacious refusal is
petitioner’s letter dated August 28, 1975 to
R.C. Jenkins wherein petitioner
acknowledged receipt of the former’s
memorandum dated August 18, 1975,
appreciated his promotion to Director of
International Sales but at the same time
regretted "that at this time for personal
reasons and reasons of my family, I am
unable to accept the transfer from the
Philippines" and thereafter expressed his
preference to remain in his position, saying:
"I would, therefore, prefer to remain in my
position of Manager-Philippines until such
time that my services in that capacity are no
longer required by Northwest Airlines."
From this evidence, We cannot discern even
the slightest hint of defiance, much less
imply insubordination on the part of
petitioner.19
The phrase "[r]efusal to obey a transfer
order cannot be considered insubordination
where employee cited reason for said
refusal, such as that of being away from the
family" does not appear anywhere in the
Dosch decision. Galanida’s counsel lifted the
erroneous phrase from one of the italicized
lines in the syllabus of Dosch found in the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated ("SCRA").
The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial
reports of Supreme Court decisions or
resolutions is not the work of the Court, nor
does it state this Court’s decision. The
syllabus is simply the work of the reporter
who gives his understanding of the decision.
The reporter writes the syllabus for the
convenience of lawyers in reading the
reports. A syllabus is not a part of the court’s
decision.20 A counsel should not cite a
syllabus in place of the carefully considered
text in the decision of the Court.
In the present case, Labor Arbiter Almirante
and Atty. Durano began by quoting from
Dosch, but substituted a portion of the
decision with a headnote from the SCRA
syllabus, which they even underscored. In
short, they deliberately made the quote
from the SCRA syllabus appear as the words
of the Supreme Court. We admonish them
for what is at the least patent carelessness,
if not an outright attempt to mislead the
parties and the courts taking cognizance of
this case. Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility mandates that
a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the text of a decision or
authority. It is the duty of all officers of the
court to cite the rulings and decisions of the
Supreme Court accurately.21
Whether Galanida was dismissed for just
cause
We accord great weight and even finality to
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals,
particularly when they affirm the findings of
the NLRC or the lower courts. However,
there are recognized exceptions to this rule.
These exceptions are: (1) when the findings
are grounded on speculation, surmise and
conjecture; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in
the appreciation of facts; (4) when the
factual findings of the trial and appellate
courts are conflicting; (5) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, has gone
beyond the issues of the case and such
findings are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (6) when the
judgment of the appellate court is premised
on a misapprehension of facts or when it has
failed to consider certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion; (7) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
and (8) when the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but are contradicted by the
evidence on record.22 After a scrutiny of the
records, we find that some of these
exceptions obtain in the present case.
The rule is that the transfer of an employee
ordinarily lies within the ambit of the
employer’s prerogatives.23 The employer
exercises the prerogative to transfer an
employee for valid reasons and according to
the requirement of its business, provided the
transfer does not result in demotion in rank
or diminution of the employee’s salary,
benefits and other privileges.24 In illegal
dismissal cases, the employer has the
burden of showing that the transfer is not
unnecessary, inconvenient and prejudicial to
the displaced employee.25
The constant transfer of bank officers and
personnel with accounting responsibilities
from one branch to another is a standard
practice of Allied Bank, which has more than
a hundred branches throughout the
country.26 Allied Bank does this primarily for
internal control. It also enables bank
employees to gain the necessary experience
for eventual promotion. The Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, in its Manual of Regulations for
Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries,27
requires the rotation of these personnel. The
Manual directs that the "duties of personnel
handling cash, securities and bookkeeping
records should be rotated" and that such
rotation "should be irregular, unannounced
and long enough to permit disclosure of any
irregularities or manipulations."28
Galanida was well aware of Allied Bank’s
policy of periodically transferring personnel
to different branches. As the Court of
Appeals found, assignment to the different
branches of Allied Bank was a condition of
Galanida’s employment. Galanida consented
to this condition when he signed the Notice
of Personnel Action.29
The evidence on record contradicts the
charge that Allied Bank discriminated against
Galanida and was in bad faith when it
ordered his transfer. Allied Bank’s letter of
13 June 199430 showed that at least 14
accounting officers and personnel from
various branches, including Galanida, were
transferred to other branches. Allied Bank
did not single out Galanida. The same letter
explained that Galanida was second in line
for assignment outside Cebu because he had
been in Cebu for seven years already. The
person first in line, Assistant Manager
Roberto Isla, who had been in Cebu for more
than ten years, had already transferred to a
branch in Cagayan de Oro City. We note that
none of the other transferees joined
Galanida in his complaint or corroborated his
allegations of widespread discrimination and
favoritism.
As regards Ms. Co, Galanida’s letter of 16
June 1994 itself showed that her assignment
to Cebu was not in any way related to
Galanida’s transfer. Ms. Co was supposed to
replace a certain Larry Sabelino in the
Tabunok branch. The employer has the
prerogative, based on its assessment of the
employees’ qualifications and competence,
to rotate them in the various areas of its
business operations to ascertain where they
will function with maximum benefit to the
company.31
Neither was Galanida’s transfer in the nature
of a demotion. Galanida did not present
evidence showing that the transfer would
diminish his salary, benefits or other
privileges. Instead, Allied Bank’s letter of 13
June 1994 assured Galanida that he would
not suffer any reduction in rank or grade,
and that the transfer would involve the same
rank, duties and obligations. Mr. Olveda
explained this further in the affidavit he
submitted to the Labor Arbiter, thus:
19. There is no demotion in position/rank or
diminution of complainant’s salary, benefits
and other privileges as the
transfer/assignment of branch officers is
premised on the role/functions that they will
assume in the management and operations
of the branch, as shown below:
(a) The Branch Accountant, as controller of
the branch is responsible for the proper
discharge of the functions of the accounting
section of the branch, review of
documentation/proper accounting and
control of transaction. As such, the
accounting functions in the branch can be
assumed by any of the following officers with
the rank of: Senior Manager/Acctg.;
Manager/ Acctg.; Senior Asst.
Manager/Acctg.; Asst. Manager/Acctg.;
Accountant or Asst. Accountant.
xxx
20. The transfer/assignment of branch
officer from one branch, to another
branch/office is lateral in nature and carries
with it the same position/rank, salary,
benefits and other privileges. The
assignment/transfer is for the officer to
assume the functions relative to his job and
NOT the position/rank of the officer to be
replaced.
There is also no basis for the finding that
Allied Bank was guilty of unfair labor practice
in dismissing Galanida. Unfair labor practices
relate only to violations of "the
constitutional right of workers and
employees to self-organization"32 and are
limited to the acts enumerated in Article 248
of the Labor Code, none of which applies to
the present case. There is no evidence that
Galanida took part in forming a union, or
even that a union existed in Allied Bank.
This leaves the issue of whether Galanida
could validly refuse the transfer orders on
the ground of parental obligations,
additional expenses, and the anguish he
would suffer if assigned away from his
family.
The Court has ruled on this issue before. In
the case of Homeowners Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. v. NLRC,33 we held:
The acceptability of the proposition that
transfer made by an employer for an illicit or
underhanded purpose – i.e., to defeat an
employee’s right to self-organization, to rid
himself of an undesirable worker, or to
penalize an employee for union activities –
cannot be upheld is self-evident and cannot
be gainsaid. The difficulty lies in the situation
where no such illicit, improper or
underhanded purpose can be ascribed to the
employer, the objection to the transfer
being grounded solely upon the personal
inconvenience or hardship that will be
caused to the employee by reason of the
transfer. What then?
This was the very same situation we faced in
Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v.
Laplana. In that case, the employee, Alicia
Laplana, was a cashier at the Baguio City
Branch of PT&T who was directed to transfer
to the company’s branch office at Laoag City.
In refusing the transfer, the employee
averred that she had established Baguio City
as her permanent residence and that such
transfer will involve additional expenses on
her part, plus the fact that an assignment to
a far place will be a big sacrifice for her as she
will be kept away from her family which
might adversely affect her efficiency. In
ruling for the employer, the Court upheld the
transfer from one city to another within the
country as valid as long as there is no bad
faith on the part of the employer. We held
then:
"Certainly the Court cannot accept the
proposition that when an employee opposes
his employer’s decision to transfer him to
another work place, there being no bad faith
or underhanded motives on the part of
either party, it is the employee’s wishes that
should be made to prevail."
Galanida, through counsel, invokes the
Court’s ruling in Dosch v. NLRC.34 Dosch,
however, is not applicable to the present
case. Helmut Dosch refused a transfer
consequential to a promotion. We upheld
the refusal because no law compels an
employee to accept a promotion, and
because the position Dosch was supposed to
be promoted to did not even exist at that
time.35 This left as the only basis for the
charge of insubordination a letter from
Dosch in which the Court found "not even
the slightest hint of defiance, much less xxx
insubordination."36
Moreover, the transfer of an employee to an
overseas post, as in the Dosch case, cannot
be likened to a transfer from one city to
another within the country,37 which is the
situation in the present case. The distance
from Cebu City to Bacolod City or from Cebu
City to Tagbilaran City does not exceed the
distance from Baguio City to Laoag City or
from Baguio City to Manila, which the Court
considered a reasonable distance in PT&T v.
Laplana.38
The refusal to obey a valid transfer order
constitutes willful disobedience of a lawful
order of an employer.39 Employees may
object to, negotiate and seek redress against
employers for rules or orders that they
regard as unjust or illegal. However, until
and unless these rules or orders are declared
illegal or improper by competent authority,
the employees ignore or disobey them at
their peril.40 For Galanida’s continued
refusal to obey Allied Bank’s transfer orders,
we hold that the bank dismissed Galanida for
just cause in accordance with Article 282 (a)
of the Labor Code.41 Galanida is thus not
entitled to reinstatement or to separation
pay.
Whether Galanida’s dismissal violated the
requirement of notice and hearing
To be effective, a dismissal must comply with
Section 2 (d), Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code
("Omnibus Rules"), which provides:
For termination of employment based on
just causes as defined in Article 282 of the
Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee
specifying the ground or grounds of
termination, and giving said employee
reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the
employee concerned, with the assistance of
counsel if he so desires is given opportunity
to respond to the charge, present his
evidence, or rebut the evidence presented
against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on
the employee indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances,
grounds have been established to justify his
termination.
The first written notice was embodied in
Allied Bank’s letter of 13 June 1994. The first
notice required Galanida to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against
him for his refusal to comply with the
transfer orders.
On the requirement of a hearing, this Court
has held that the essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard.42 An
actual hearing is not necessary. The
exchange of several letters, in which
Galanida’s wife, a lawyer with the City
Prosecutor’s Office, assisted him, gave
Galanida an opportunity to respond to the
charges against him.
The remaining issue is whether the Memo
dated 8 September 1994 sent to Galanida
constitutes the written notice of termination
required by the Omnibus Rules. In finding
that it did not, the Court of Appeals and the
NLRC cited Allied Bank’s rule on dismissals,
quoted in the Memo, that, "Notice of
termination shall be issued by the
Investigation Committee subject to the
confirmation of the President or his
authorized representative."43 The appellate
court and NLRC held that Allied Bank did not
send any notice of termination to Galanida.
The Memo, with the heading "Transfer and
Reassignment," was not the termination from the Memorandum for Private
notice required by law. Respondent-Appellee, as follows:

We do not agree. The proceedings may be capsulized as

follows:

Even a cursory reading of the Memo will

show that it unequivocally informed 1. On March 13, 199447 Private Respondent-
Galanida of Allied Bank’s decision to dismiss Appellee filed before the Region VII
him. The statement, "please be informed Arbitration Branch a Complaint for
that the Bank has terminated your services Constructive Dismissal. A copy of the
effective September 1, 1994 and considered Complaint is attached to the Petition as
whatever benefit, if any, that you are Annex "H";
entitled [to] as forfeited xxx"44 is plainly
worded and needs no interpretation. The
Memo also discussed the findings of the xxx
Investigation Committee that served as
5. On September 8, 1994, Petitioner-
grounds for Galanida’s dismissal. The Memo
Appellant issued him a Letter of
referred to Galanida’s "open defiance and
Termination. A copy of said letter is attached
refusal" to transfer first to the Bacolod City
to the Petition as Annex "N";
branch and then to the Tagbilaran City
branch. The Memo also mentioned his
continued refusal to report for work despite
6. Private Respondent-Appellee filed an
the denial of his application for additional
Amended/ Supplemental Complaint wherein
vacation leave.45 The Memo also refuted
he alleged illegal dismissal. A copy of the
Galanida’s charges of discrimination and
Amended/Supplemental Complaint is
demotion, and concluded that he had
attached to the Petition as Annex "O"; xxx 48
violated Article XII of the bank’s Employee
(Emphasis supplied)
Discipline Policy and Procedure.

The Memorandum for Private Respondent-

The Memo, although captioned "Transfer
Appellee refers to the Memo as a "Letter of
and Reassignment," did not preclude it from
Termination." Further, Galanida amended
being a notice of termination. The Court has
his complaint for constructive dismissal49 to
held that the nature of an instrument is
one for illegal dismissal50 after he received
characterized not by the title given to it but
the Memo. Clearly, Galanida had understood
by its body and contents.46 Moreover, it
the Memo to mean that Allied Bank had
appears that Galanida himself regarded the
terminated his services.
Memo as a notice of termination. We quote
The Memo complied with Allied Bank’s
internal rules which required the bank’s
President or his authorized representative to
confirm the notice of termination. The
bank’s Vice-President for Personnel, as the
head of the department that handles the
movement of personnel within Allied Bank,
can certainly represent the bank president in
cases involving the dismissal of employees.
Nevertheless, we agree that the Memo
suffered from certain errors.1âwphi1
Although the Memo stated that Allied Bank
terminated Galanida’s services as of 1
September 1994, the Memo bore the date 8
September 1994. More importantly,
Galanida only received a copy of the Memo
on 5 October 1994, or more than a month
after the supposed date of his dismissal. To
be effective, a written notice of termination
must be served on the employee.51 Allied
Bank could not terminate Galanida on 1
September 1994 because he had not
received as of that date the notice of Allied
Bank’s decision to dismiss him. Galanida’s
dismissal could only take effect on 5 October
1994, upon his receipt of the Memo. For this
reason, Galanida is entitled to backwages for
the period from 1 September 1994 to 4
October 1994.
Under the circumstances, we also find an
award of ₱ 10,000 in nominal damages
proper. Courts award nominal damages to
recognize or vindicate the right of a person
that another has violated.52 The law entitles
Galanida to receive timely notice of Allied
Bank’s decision to dismiss him. Allied Bank
should have exercised more care in issuing
the notice of termination.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of 27 April 2000
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
51451 upholding the Decision of 18
September 1998 of the NLRC in NLRC Case
No. V-000180-98 is AFFIRMED, with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1) The awards of separation pay, moral
damages and exemplary damages are
hereby deleted for lack of basis;
2) Reducing the award of backwages to cover
only the period from 1 September 1994 to 4
October 1994; and
3) Awarding nominal damages to private
respondent for ₱ 10,000.
This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter
for the computation, within thirty (30) days
from receipt of this Decision, of the
backwages, inclusive of allowances and
other benefits, due to Potenciano L.
Galanida for the time his dismissal was
ineffectual from 1 September 1994 until 4
October 1994.
Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante and
Atty. Loreto M. Durano are ADMONISHED to
be more careful in citing the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the future.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1864 December 16, 2004
ATTY. ANTONIO D. SELUDO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ANTONIO J. FINEZA, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 131, Caloocan City,
respondent.
respondent judge filed with the same court
(Branch 128), a complaint for revocation of
notarial commission against him
(complainant), docketed as Revocation of
Commission No. C-001-(2003).
During the hearing on July 8, 2003,
respondent judge uttered "vulgar and
insulting words" against complainant, thus:

"Court:
DECISION

Do you have anything to say Atty. Seludo?

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Atty. Seludo:
Besides possessing the requisite learning in
the law, a magistrate must exhibit that
hallmark judicial temperament of utmost
Yes, Your Honor. May we know also, under
sobriety1 and self-restraint which are
what authority is the complainant appearing
indispensable qualities of every judge.2 A
in this case, Your Honor? Is he going to
judge should be the last person to be
prosecute this case?
perceived as petty, sharp-tongued tyrant.
Sadly, respondent judge failed to live up to
such standards of judicial conduct.
Court:

In a complaint3 dated July 24, 2003 filed with

He is appearing for himself as petitioner.
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
Atty. Antonio D. Seludo charged Judge
Antonio J. Fineza of the Regional Trial Court
Atty. Seludo:
of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with violation
of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Under what authority, Your Honor?

In his complaint, Atty. Antonio D. Seludo

Judge Fineza:
alleged inter alia that on June 28, 2003,
If the respondent knows how to read English,
he would find in the petition itself that under
the rule, we are obligated to bring to the
court any anomaly or dishonesty or
dereliction in the performance of a duty of a
Court Officer. And may I point out and make
it on record that this time, despite the fact of
respondent’s answer, last paragraph of page
1 states and I quote; I think page 2, and I
read: ‘That the undersigned has taken steps
to prevent a recurrence of the lapses in the
notarial registry.’ An informal inquiry made
by this Judge this afternoon from the Office
of the Clerk of Court, the reply was that the
respondent has not filed any notarial report
for the year 2003, x x x.
Court:
You want to put that on record?
Judge Fineza:
Not only to put on record . . . , and courtesy
calls that when someone is speaking, a
courtesy should require. May I ask the Judge
to remind him . . .
Court:
Let him finish first, Atty. Seludo.
Atty. Seludo:
Yes, Your Honor.
Judge Fineza: (continuation)
Before the Executive Judge or Investigating
Judge finally inhibits himself, he should order
the Office of the Clerk of Court to issue a
certification to the effect that for the year
2003, no notarial report has been made by
the respondent which is a ground for
cancellation of his notarial commission.
That’s why I raised this, so that while the
case is pending, he should be suspended
from the practice of . . . . and may I ask that
he be declared in contempt for laughing?
Court:
Judge Fineza, will you please stay calm.
Judge Fineza: (to respondent)
‘Putang-ina mo eh!’
Court:
Please be just civil with each other, Judge
Fineza.
Judge Fineza:
Why is he laughing? Let it be put on record
that he has a moronic attitude. That’s why he
was laughing.
Court:
Judge Fineza, are you making an additional
manifestation or additional charge against
the respondent because of the information
that you got now from the Office of the Clerk
of Court?
Judge Fineza:
No, Your Honor. It is in accordance with my
petition, that during the pendency of this
case, the respondent should be suspended.
Court:
He should be suspended because of the non-
compliance?
Judge Fineza:
Yes, Your Honor. He promised in his answer,
that he has remedied the situation.
xxx
Atty. Seludo:
Yes, Your Honor. I just want that all the
manifestations of the complainant be put on
record, Your Honor.
Judge Fineza:
If Your Honor please, I don’t know if this guy
is really stupid. This is a court proceeding and
everything that is being taken is recorded. If
you want to use that for libel, you cannot.
This is a Court proceeding, we should have
privileged communication.
Court:
Judge Fineza, will you please refrain from
calling the other person, who is a brother in
profession?
Judge Fineza:
I’m just telling the truth, Your Honor.
Court:
But I would like to ask you to use temperate
words. You are brother lawyers. If you have
nothing more to say, I would like to adjourn
this preliminary conference. I will indorse all
the records to the 1st Vice Executive Judge Judge Fineza:
who will notify you of the schedule for the
continuation of the investigation.
And now you adjourn?

continuation . . .
Court:

We will prepare the minutes and we will let

you sign, Judge Fineza. You are requesting for that? I will give you
copy so that you can be satisfied. What do
you say, Atty. Basa? You are the
Judge Fineza: collaborating counsel. Probably, you are
being more civil with us.

Where is the minutes? This is not the

prescribed form for minutes, Your Honor? Atty. Basa:
Okay.

May we just ask for the adjournment of the

Court: session, Your Honor.

I have not yet adjourned, Judge Fineza? I Judge Fineza:

hope you will be more civil to everybody
here just like anybody who is civil with you.
You will give me the minutes now?

Judge Fineza:
Court:

Okay, okay. My apologies, Your Honor.

We will provide you including with the copy
of the Order of the Court inhibiting itself."4
Court:

In his comment5 dated September 8, 2003,

Accepted. respondent judge admitted that he uttered
derogatory words during the proceeding
held on July 8, 2003. He, however, explained
that he has been suffering from a heart
ailment and diabetes since November, 2002,
causing him considerable anxiety and pain.
This must be the reason why he could not
control his outburst. Besides, the incident
was precipitated by the conduct of the
complainant and the Executive Judge.
Complainant was unkind and impolite to
him. He kept on interrupting him. In fact,
after his oral manifestation, complainant
began to laugh and ridicule him. Moreover,
when he (respondent) asked the Executive
Judge to cite complainant in contempt of
court, the latter stood up with clenched fists
and acted in a menacing manner.
Respondent further admitted in his answer
that he is aware that there is no justification
for his use of improper language, and for
this, he is sincerely contrite and penitent.
But as a member of the bench for over
twenty years, he expected the complainant
to respect him, to treat him with politeness,
dignity and courtesy, and to give him his due
as a magistrate.
On January 9, 2004, complainant filed a
Motion to Withdraw Complaint6 on the
ground that he is no longer interested in
pursuing the case since respondent has
retired from the judiciary.7
In his Report and Recommendation,8 Court
Administrator Presbitero Velasco made the
following evaluation:
"EVALUATION: We will dwell first on the
issue of desistance of complainant to pursue
instant complaint. The settled rule is that the
complainant’s withdrawal of his complaint,
or desistance from pursuing the same, does
not necessarily warrant the dismissal of the
administrative case. The outcome of an
administrative action cannot depend on the
will or pleasure of the complainant who, for
reasons of his own, may condone what may
be detestable. Certainly, complainant’s
desistance cannot divest this Court of its
jurisdiction, under Section 6, Article VIII of
the Constitution, to investigate and decide
complaints against erring employees of the
judiciary. Otherwise stated, such unilateral
act does not bind this Court on a matter
relating to its disciplinary power.
As to the fact that respondent has already
retired from the service, the Court has
pointed out in several cases that the
retirement of a judge or any judicial officer
from the service does not preclude the
finding of any administrative liability to
which he shall still be answerable. The Court
retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce
the respondent official innocent of the
charges or declare him guilty thereof.
Proceeding thereon with the issues, we find
ourselves in accord with complainant’s
observation that respondent has indeed
consciously ignored to heed the Court’s
advice and warning when he was
admonished for using intemperate language
in A.M. No. P-01-1522. A careful scrutiny of
the transcripts taken on that unfateful day
reveals that respondent has precisely
uttered the following vitriolic language
against complainant:
a) ‘Putang ina mo!’
b) ‘If respondent knows how to read English.’
c) ‘Let it be put on record, that he has a
moronic attitude.’
d) ‘If Your Honor plese, I don’t know if this
guy is really stupid.’
As shown by the records, respondent’s
attention was called several times by the
Investigating Executive Judge to stay calm
and be civil. In fact, his attitude was generally
antagonistic not only to complainant but
also to the Executive Judge who dared to
question his motives/oppose his view. Such,
is a glaring display of haughtiness and
arrogance of respondent. His disgraceful
behavior reflected adversely on the good
image of the judiciary and fell short of the
standards expected of a magistrate of the
law. His justifications of "provocation"
(which we found none), discourtesy of
complainant and the various illnesses he
professed to be suffering should not be
viewed to exculpate him from liability. As a
member of the bench he should have
adhered to that standard of behavior
expected of all those who don the judicial
robe. His choice of words, aside from being
inflammatory and uncalled for, betrays a lack
of judicial decorum. The respect and dignity
of the court has to be upheld hence,
respondent should not have acted with
anger and shouted at complainant who must
have suffered embarrassment in front of
many people. He should have maintained his
composure for patience and courtesy are
marks of culture and good-breeding.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that a
judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety
not only with respect to his performance of
official duties, but also to his behavior
outside his sala and as a private individual.
The Code dictates that a judge must behave
with propriety at all times.
Because respondent has already retired
from the service, dismissal or suspension is
no longer feasible as a penalty for the
present charges. Therefore, we opine that a
fine is appropriate under the circumstances.
Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct is
classified as a serious charge under Rule 140
of the Rules of Court, the penalty of which is
either dismissal, suspension for 3 to 6
months without salary and benefits or a fine
of not less than P20,000.00 but not more
than P40,000.00. Considering that this is not
the first offense of similar nature committed
by respondent, we believe a penalty of
P20,000.00 is commensurate, to the acts
complained of, which amount should be
taken from his retirement benefits."
Court Administrator Velasco recommended
that (1) the instant administrative case be re-
docketed as an administrative matter; and
that (2) respondent judge be fined in the
amount of P20,000.00 for violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, the amount to be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
In our Resolution9 dated June 21, 2004, we
required the parties to manifest whether
they are submitting the case for resolution
on the basis of the pleadings and records
filed.
On August 12, 2004, respondent submitted a
Manifestation10 requesting a formal hearing
of this case. In our Resolution dated
September 20, 2004, 11 we denied his
request for lack of merit.
For his part, complainant, in his
Manifestation dated August 12, 2004,12
stated that he is submitting the matter to our
sound discretion.
Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Canon 3, Rule 3.04 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct provide:
"Canon 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND
THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL
ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01. – A judge should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
xxx
Canon 3
A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL
DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY
AND DILIGENCE ADJUDICATIVE
RESPONSIBLITIES
xxx
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient,
attentive, and courteous to lawyers,
especially the inexperienced, to litigants,
witnesses, and others appearing before the
court. A judge should avoid unconsciously
falling into the attitude of mind that the
litigants are made for the courts, instead of
the courts for the litigants."
In ascribing the words "moronic attitude,"
"stupid", "if he knows how to read English"
and "putang ina mo" to complainant during
the proceeding before the Executive Judge,
respondent displayed a conduct so
unbecoming of a magistrate. The remarks
uttered are patently defamatory and
outrageous. That respondent was suffering
from heart ailment and diabetes is not an
excuse. He could have asked the assistance
of a lawyer to represent him in prosecuting
the case. As correctly observed by the Court
Administrator, his disgraceful behavior
tainted the good image of the judiciary he is
expected to uphold at all times.
We have admonished judges to observe
judicial decorum which requires that they
must at all times be temperate in their
language,13 refraining from inflammatory or
excessive rhetoric14 or from resorting "to
the language of vilification."15 In the same
vein, in Fidel vs. Caraos,16 we held that
although, respondent judge may attribute
his intemperate language to human frailty,
his noble position in the bench nevertheless
demands from him courteous speech in and
out of the court. Judges are demanded to be
always temperate, patient and courteous
both in conduct and in language.
Respondent judge’s behavior is incompatible
with judicial temperament expected of him.
He was discourteous, not only to
complainant, but also to the trial judge. His
actuation constitutes palpable violation of
Canon 2, Rule 2.01, and Canon 3, Rule 3.04
of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
This is not respondent's first offense. In A.M.
No. P-01-1522,17 we reprimanded him for
failing to exercise prudence and restraint in
his language. Obviously, he has not
reformed.
We thus find respondent judge guilty of
gross misconduct constituting violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. Under Rule 140
of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended,
this administrative offense is considered
serious,18 punishable under Section 8,
paragraph 1(3), and Section 11, paragraph
A(3), thus:
"Sec. 8. Serious charges. – Serious charges
include:
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations
of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
or order as determined by a competent
court in an appropriate proceeding;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
x x x."
"Sec.11. Sanctions.- A. If the respondent is
guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all
or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however,
That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no
case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three (3) but
not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not

exceeding P40,000.00."

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonio J.

Fineza is hereby found GUILTY of gross
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He
is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P21,000.00) to be
deducted from his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8920 September 28, 2011
JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the resolution1 of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) finding Atty. Melchor
Battung liable for violating Rule 11.03, Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and recommending that he be reprimanded.
The complainant is Judge Rene B. Baculi,
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City. The
respondent, Atty. Battung, is a member of
the Bar with postal address on Aguinaldo St.,
Tuguegarao City.
Background
Judge Baculi filed a complaint for
disbarment2 with the Commission on
Discipline of the IBP against the respondent,
alleging that the latter violated Canons 113
and 124 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Violation of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Judge Baculi claimed that on July 24, 2008,
during the hearing on the motion for
reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the
respondent was shouting while arguing his
motion. Judge Baculi advised him to tone
down his voice but instead, the respondent
shouted at the top of his voice. When
warned that he would be cited for direct
contempt, the respondent shouted, "Then
cite me!"5 Judge Baculi cited him for direct
contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00.
The respondent then left.
While other cases were being heard, the
respondent re-entered the courtroom and
shouted, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance
against you! I am not afraid of you!"6 Judge
Baculi ordered the sheriff to escort the
respondent out of the courtroom and cited
him for direct contempt of court for the
second time.
After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and
saw the respondent at the hall of the
courthouse, apparently waiting for him. The
respondent again shouted in a threatening
tone, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance
against you! I am not afraid of you!" He kept
on shouting, "I am not afraid of you!" and
challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and
lawyers escorted him out of the building.7
Judge Baculi also learned that after the
respondent left the courtroom, he continued
shouting and punched a table at the Office of
the Clerk of Court.8
Violation of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
According to Judge Baculi, the respondent
filed dilatory pleadings in Civil Case No. 2640,
an ejectment case.
Judge Baculi rendered on October 4, 2007 a
decision in Civil Case No. 2640, which he
modified on December 14, 2007. After the
modified decision became final and
executory, the branch clerk of court issued a
certificate of finality. The respondent filed a
motion to quash the previously issued writ of
execution, raising as a ground the motion to
dismiss filed by the defendant for lack of
jurisdiction. Judge Baculi asserted that the
respondent knew as a lawyer that ejectment
cases are within the jurisdiction of First Level
Courts and the latter was merely delaying
the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.
The respondent filed his Answer,9
essentially saying that it was Judge Baculi
who disrespected him.10 We quote from his
Answer:
23. I only told Judge Rene Baculi I will file
Gross ignorance of the Law against him once
inside the court room when he was
lambasting me[.]
24. It was JUDGE BACULI WHO
DISRESPECTED ME. He did not like that I just
submit the Motion for Reconsideration
without oral argument because he wanted
to have an occasion to just HUMILIATE ME
and to make appear to the public that I am A
NEGLIGENT LAWYER, when he said "YOU
JUSTIFY YOUR NEGLIGENCE BEFORE THIS
COURT" making it an impression to the
litigants and the public that as if I am a
NEGLIGENT, INCOMPETENT, MUMBLING,
and IRRESPONSIBLE LAWYER.
25. These words of Judge Rene Baculi made
me react[.]
xxxx
28. Since I manifested that I was not going to
orally argue the Motion, Judge Rene Baculi
could have just made an order that the
Motion for Reconsideration is submitted for
resolution, but what he did was that he
forced me to argue so that he will have the
room to humiliate me as he used to do not
only to me but almost of the lawyers here
(sic).
Atty. Battung asked that the case against him
be dismissed.
The IBP conducted its investigation of the
matter through Commissioner Jose de la
Rama, Jr. In his Commissioner’s Report,11
Commissioner De la Rama stated that during
the mandatory conference on January 16,
2009, both parties merely reiterated what
they alleged in their submitted pleadings.
Both parties agreed that the original copy of
the July 24, 2008 tape of the incident at the
courtroom would be submitted for the
Commissioner’s review. Judge Baculi
submitted the tape and the transcript of
stenographic notes on January 23, 2009.
Commissioner De la Rama narrated his
findings, as follows:12
At the first part of the hearing as reflected in
the TSN, it was observed that the
respondent was calm. He politely argued his
case but the voice of the complainant
appears to be in high pitch. During the
mandatory conference, it was also observed
that indeed, the complainant maintains a
high pitch whenever he speaks. In fact, in the
TSN, where there was already an argument,
the complainant stated the following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
Court: This court has been constantly under
this kind of voice Atty. Battung, we are very
sorry if you do not want to appear before my
court, then you better attend to your cases
and do not appear before my court if you do
not want to be corrected! (TSN, July 24,
2008, page 3)
(NOTE: The underlined words – "we are very
sorry" [– were] actually uttered by Atty.
Battung while the judge was saying the
quoted portion of the TSN)
That it was during the time when the
complainant asked the following questions
when the undersigned noticed that Atty.
Battung shouted at the presiding judge.
Court: Did you proceed under the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure?
*
Atty. Battung: It is not our fault Your Honor
to proceed because we were asked to
present our evidence ex parte. Your Honor,
so, if should we were ordered (sic) by the
court to follow the rules on summary
procedure. (TSN page 3, July 24, 2008)
It was observed that the judge uttered the
following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
(Page 3, TSN July 24, 2008)
Note: * it was at this point when the
respondent shouted at the complainant.
Thereafter, it was observed that both were Court: Next case.
already shouting at each other.

Interpreter: Civil Case No. 2746.

Respondent claims that he was provoked by
the presiding judge that is why he shouted
back at him. But after hearing the tape, the (Note: Atty. Battung entered again the
undersigned in convinced that it was Atty. courtroom)
Battung who shouted first at the
complainant.
Atty. Battung: But what we do not like … (not
finished)
Presumably, there were other lawyers and
litigants present waiting for their cases to be
called. They must have observed the Court: The next time…
incident. In fact, in the joint-affidavit
submitted by Elenita Pacquing et al., they
stood as one in saying that it was really Atty. Atty. Battung: We would like to clear …
Battung who shouted at the judge that is
why the latter cautioned him "not to shout."
Court: Sheriff, throw out the counsel, put
that everything in record. If you want to see
The last part of the incident as contained in me, see me after the court.
page 4 of the TSN reads as follows:

Next case.
Court: You are now ordered to pay a fine of
₱100.00.
Civil Case No. 2746 for Partition and
Damages, Roberto Cabalza vs. Teresita
Atty. Battung: We will file the necessary Narag, et al.
action against this court for gross ignorance
of the law.
(nothing follows)

Court: Yes, proceed.

Commissioner De la Rama found that the
respondent failed to observe Canon 11 of
(NOTE: Atty. Battung went out the the Code of Professional Responsibility that
courtroom) requires a lawyer to observe and maintain
respect due the courts and judicial officers.
The respondent also violated Rule 11.03 of
Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer shall
abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the
courts. The respondent’s argument that
Judge Baculi provoked him to shout should
not be given due consideration since the
respondent should not have shouted at the
presiding judge; by doing so, he created the
impression that disrespect of a judge could
be tolerated. What the respondent should
have done was to file an action before the
Office of the Court Administrator if he
believed that Judge Baculi did not act
according to the norms of judicial conduct.
With respect to the charge of violation of
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Commissioner De la Rama
found that the evidence submitted is
insufficient to support a ruling that the
respondent had misused the judicial
processes to frustrate the ends of justice.
Commissioner De la Rama recommended
that the respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months.
On October 9, 2010, the IBP Board of
Governors passed a Resolution adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, with the
modification that the respondent be
reprimanded.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the IBP’s finding that the
respondent violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty.
Battung disrespected Judge Baculi by
shouting at him inside the courtroom during
court proceedings in the presence of litigants
and their counsels, and court personnel. The
respondent even came back to harass Judge
Baculi. This behavior, in front of many
witnesses, cannot be allowed. We note that
the respondent continued to threaten Judge
Baculi and acted in a manner that clearly
showed disrespect for his position even after
the latter had cited him for contempt. In fact,
after initially leaving the court, the
respondent returned to the courtroom and
disrupted the ongoing proceedings. These
actions were not only against the person, the
position and the stature of Judge Baculi, but
against the court as well whose proceedings
were openly and flagrantly disrupted, and
brought to disrepute by the respondent.
Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter
because of their position and avowed duty to
the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly
ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and
the court that he represents. The Code of
Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the Courts.
We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr.13
that it is the duty of a lawyer, as an officer of
the court, to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts. Respect for the
courts guarantees the stability of the judicial
institution; without this guarantee, the
institution would be resting on very shaky
foundations.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a
courtroom completely disregards the latter’s
role, stature and position in our justice
system. When the respondent publicly
berated and brazenly threatened Judge
Baculi that he would file a case for gross
ignorance of the law against the latter, the
respondent effectively acted in a manner
tending to erode the public confidence in
Judge Baculi’s competence and in his ability
to decide cases. Incompetence is a matter
that, even if true, must be handled with
sensitivity in the manner provided under the
Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining
lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the
courts in a bad light and bring the justice
system into disrepute.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended
that Atty. Battung be reprimanded, while the
Investigating Commissioner recommended a
penalty of six (6) months suspension.
We believe that these recommended
penalties are too light for the offense.
In Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z.
Bagabuyo, Former Senior State
Prosecutor,14 we suspended Atty. Bagabuyo
for one year for violating Rule 11.05, Canon
11, and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and for violating
the Lawyer’s Oath for airing his grievances
against a judge in newspapers and radio
programs. In this case, Atty. Battung’s
violations are no less serious as they were
committed in the courtroom in the course of
judicial proceedings where the respondent
was acting as an officer of the court, and
before the litigating public. His actions were
plainly disrespectful to Judge Baculi and to
the court, to the point of being scandalous
and offensive to the integrity of the judicial
system itself.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty.
Melchor A. Battung is found GUILTY of
violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for which he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year effective upon the finality of this
Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended
to the respondent’s personal record as an
attorney; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; the Department of Justice; and
all courts in the country, for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
 ADM. CASE No. 7006 October 9,
2007
RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z.
BAGABUYO, FORMER SENIOR STATE
PROSECUTOR.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the
events of the proceedings in Crim. Case No.
5144, entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza,
heard before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose
Manuel P. Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Surigao City, Branch 29.
Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to
the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of
Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order dated
March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the
Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused,
declaring that the evidence thus presented
by the prosecution was sufficient to prove
the crime of homicide and not the charge of
murder. Consequently, the counsel for the
defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of
Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z.
Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and
the deputized prosecutor of the case,
objected thereto mainly on the ground that
the original charge of murder, punishable
with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to
bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court.1
In an Order dated August 30, 2002,2 Judge
Buyser inhibited himself from further trying
the case because of the "harsh insinuation"
of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo
that he "lacks the cold neutrality of an
impartial magistrate," by allegedly
suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the
amount of bail bond by counsel for the
accused.
The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the
RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Jose
Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated November
12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the
Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and
fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.
Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated
November 12, 2002, which motion was
denied for lack of merit in an Order dated
February 10, 2003. In October, 2003,
respondent appealed from the Orders dated
November 12, 2002 and February 10, 2003,
to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Instead of availing himself only of judicial
remedies, respondent caused the
publication of an article regarding the Order
granting bail to the accused in the August 18,
2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily.
The article, entitled "Senior prosecutor
lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder
suspect to bail out," reads:
SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a
judge in Surigao City for allowing a murder
suspect to go out on bail.
Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo
lambasted Judge Manuel Tan of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in Surigao
City for ruling on a motion that sought a
bailbond for Luis Plaza who stands charged
with murdering a policeman . . . .
Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail
bond.
Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is
a non-bailable offense. But Bagabuyo
admitted that a judge could still opt to allow
a murder suspect to bail out in cases when
the evidence of the prosecution is weak.
But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the
judge who previously handled it, Judge
F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence
to be strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the
case for an unclear reason.
xxx
Bagabuyo said he would contest Tan's
decision before the Court of Appeals and
would file criminal and administrative
charges of certiorari against the judge.
Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being
cited in contempt by Judge Tan.
"This is the only way that the public would
know that there are judges there who are
displaying judicial arrogance." he said.3
In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC
of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed
respondent and the writer of the article,
Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star
Daily, to appear in court on September 20,
2003 to explain why they should not be cited
for indirect contempt of court for the
publication of the article which degraded the
court and its presiding judge with its lies and
misrepresentation.
The said Order stated that contrary to the
statements in the article, Judge Buyser
described the evidence for the prosecution
as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt
of the accused only for homicide. Moreover,
it was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited
himself from the case for an unclear reason.
Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30,
2002, declared in open court in the presence
of respondent that he was inhibiting himself
from the case due to the harsh insinuation of
respondent that he lacked the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge.
On the scheduled hearing of the contempt
charge, Mark Francisco admitted that the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the
publication of the article. He disclosed that
respondent, in a press conference, stated
that the crime of murder is non-bailable.
When asked by the trial court why he printed
such lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his
only source was respondent.4 Mr. Francisco
clarified that in the statement alleging that
Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case
for an unclear reason, the phrase "for an
unclear reason," was added by the
newspaper's Executive Editor Herby S.
Gomez.5
Respondent admitted that he caused the
holding of the press conference, but refused
to answer whether he made the statements
in the article until after he shall have filed a
motion to dismiss. For his refusal to answer,
the trial court declared him in contempt of
court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court.6 The Court's Order dated
September 30, 2003 reads:
ORDER
Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article
which is a lie clothed in half truth to give it a
semblance of truth is hereby ordered to pay
a fine of P10,000. Prosecutor Bagabuyo, for
obstinately refusing to explain why he
should not be cited for contempt and
admitting that the article published in the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily on August 18,
2003 and quoted in the Order of this Court
dated August 21, 2003 which is
contemptuous was caused by him to be
published, is hereby adjudged to have
committed indirect contempt of Court
pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court and he is hereby ordered to suffer
the penalty of 30 days in jail. The BJMP is
hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio
Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a bond of
P100,000.00.
SO ORDERD.7
Respondent posted the required bond and
was released from the custody of the law. He
appealed the indirect contempt order to the
CA.
Despite the citation of indirect contempt,
respondent presented himself to the media
for interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and
again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and
the trial court's disposition in the
proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.
In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC
of Surigao City, Branch 29, required
respondent to explain and to show cause
within five days from receipt thereof why he
should not be held in contempt for his media
interviews that degraded the court and the
presiding judge, and why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law for
violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of
Canon 118 and Rule 13.02 of Canon 13.9
In the Order, the trial court stated that
respondent was interviewed by Jun Clergio,
and that the interview was repeatedly aired
on September 30, 2003 and in his news
program between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on
October 1, 2003. He was also interviewed by
Tony Consing on October 1 and 2, 2003,
between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio
program. In those radio interviews,
respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a
judge who does not know the law, a liar, and
a dictator who does not accord due process
to the people.
The hearing for the second contempt charge
was set on December 4, 2003.
On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an
Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File
Answer to Contempt alleging that he was
saddled with work of equal importance and
needed ample time to answer the same. He
also prayed for a bill of particulars in order to
properly prepare for his defense.
In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the
trial court denied the motion. It stated that a
bill of particulars is not applicable in
contempt proceedings, and that
respondent's actions and statements are
detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.
On the scheduled hearing of December 4,
2003 respondent neither appeared in court
nor informed the court of his absence. The
trial court issued an Order dated December
4, 2003 cancelling the hearing "to give
Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances he asks
for," and ordered him to appear on January
12, 2004 to explain in writing or orally why
he should not be cited in contempt of court
pursuant to the facts stated in the Order
dated October 20, 2003. However,
respondent did not appear in the scheduled
hearing of January 12, 2004.
On January 15, 2004, the trial court received
respondent's Answer dated January 8, 2004.
Respondent denied the charge that he
sought to be interviewed by radio station
DXKS. He, however, stated that right after
the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was
approached by someone who asked him to
comment on the Order issued in open court,
and that his comment does not fall within
the concept of indirect contempt of court.
He also admitted that he was interviewed by
his friend, Tony Consing, at the latter's
instance. He justified his response during the
interview as a simple exercise of his
constitutional right of freedom of speech
and that it was not meant to offend or
malign, and was without malice.
On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an
Order, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderant
evidence that Prosecutor Bagabuyo has
grossly violated the Canons of the legal
profession and [is] guilty of grave
professional misconduct, rendering him
unfit to continue to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities belonging to the
office of an attorney, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law.
Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect
contempt of court, for which he is hereby
ordered to suffer the penalty of
IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days to be
served at the Surigao City Jail and to pay the
maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00). Future acts of contempt will be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of the relevant records be
immediately forwarded to the Supreme
Court for automatic review and for further
determination of grounds for [the]
disbarment of Prosecutor Rogelio Z.
Bagabuyo.10
The trial court found respondent's denials to
be lame as the tape of his interview on
October 2, 2003, duly transcribed, showed
disrespect of the court and its officers, thus:
TONY CONSING: Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga
oras, nanglabay ang gamay'ng panahon ang
samad sa imong kasingkasing nagpabilin pa
ba ni. O ingnon nato duna na bay pagbag-o
sa imong huna-huna karon?
(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still
hurt? Or have you not changed your mind
yet?)
BAGABUYO : Ang akong huna-huna kon
aduna man ugaling pagbag-o ang pagsiguro,
ang mga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod
tangtangon pagka abogado, mao kana.
(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I
ensure that all judges who are ignorant of
the law should be disbarred. That's it.)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug
kining akong guibatonan karon nga
hunahuna mahitungod nianang mga Huwes
nga dili kahibalo sa balaod, magkadugay
magkalami. Kada adlao nagatoon ako.
Nagabasa ako sa mga bag-ong jurisprudence
ug sa atong balaod aron sa pagsiguro gayod
nga inigsang-at unya nako sa kaso nga
disbarment niining di mahibalo nga Huwes,
sigurado gayod ako nga katangtangan siya sa
lisensiya . . . . Ang kini nga Huwes nga dili
mahibalo sa balaod, pagatangtangon na, dili
lamang sa pagka-Huwes kon dili sa pagka-
abogado. Tan-awa ra gyod kining iyang
gibuhat nga Order, Ton, ang iyang
pagkabakakon . . . .
(That's true, Ton, and this conviction I have
now about judges who are ignorant of the
law is made firmer by time. I study everyday.
I read new jurisprudence and the law to
insure that when I file the disbarment case
against this Judge who does not know his
law, I am certain that he loses his license. . .
. This judge who is ignorant of the law should
not only be removed as a judge but should
also be disbarred. Just take a look at his
Order, Ton, and see what a liar he is . . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order.
. . . Ngano nga nakaingon ako nga bakakon
kini, nag-ingon nga kini konong order given
in open court, ang kalooy sa dios, ang iyang
order sa Korte wala siya mag-ingon ug
kantidad nga P100,000.00 nga bail bond. . . .
(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say
that he is a liar? It states that this Order was
"given in open court," and in God's mercy, he
did not state the amount of P100,000.00 as
bail bond. . . .)
BAGABUYO : Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa
balaod, ako
siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the
right to appeal. Mibalik dayon, ug miingon
siya, BJMP arrest Bagabuyo.
(Because he does not know the law, I said,
"Your Honor, I have the right to appeal."
Then he came back and said, "BJMP, arrest
Bagabuyo.")
xxx
BAGABUYO : . . . P100,000.00 ang iyang
guipapiyansa.
Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang iyang
pagka gross ignorance of the law. . . .
(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How
come? This is where you will see his gross
ignorance of the law. . . . )
xxx
TONY CONSING : So karon, unsay plano nimo
karon?
(So what is your plan now?)
BAGABUYO : Sumala sa akong gui-ingon
moundang lang ako kon matangtang na siya
sa pagka abogado. . . .
(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already
disbarred. . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Nasuko siya niini kay
hambugero kuno, pero angayan niyang
hibaw-an nga ang trabajo sa Huwes dili ang
pagtan-aw kon ang tawo hambugero . . . . Ug
ang akong gisulti mao lamang ang balaod
nga siya in fact at that time I said he is not
conversant of the law, with regards to the
case of murder. . . .
(He got angry because I was allegedly
bragging but he should know that it is not for
a judge to determine if a person is a braggart.
. . .And what I said was based on the law. In
fact, at that time, I said he is not conversant
of the law, with regards to the case of
murder . . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Ah, mi sit down sab ako,
contempt ra ba kadto . . . . Mao kana, pero
unsa may iyang katuyoan – ang iyang
katuyoan nga ipa-adto ako didto kay didto,
iya akong pakauwawan kay iya kong sikopon,
iya kong ipa-priso, pero kay di man lagi
mahibalo sa balaod, ang iyang gui orderan
BJMP, intawon por dios por Santo, Mr. Tan,
pagbasa intawon ug balaod, naunsa ka ba
Mr. Tan? Unsa may imong hunahuna nga kon
ikaw Huwes, ikaw na ang diktador, no way,
no sir, ours is a democratic country where all
and everyone is entitled to due process of
law – you did not accord me due process of
law . . . .
(I sat down. . . . That's it. But what was his
purpose? He made me come in order to
humiliate me because he wanted me
arrested, he wanted me imprisoned, but
because he is ignorant of the law, he ordered
the BMJP. For God's sake, Mr. Tan, what's
wrong with you, Mr. Tan? Please read the
law. What is your thinking? That when you
are a judge, you are also a dictator? No way,
no sir, ours is a democratic country where all
and everyone is entitled to due process of
law – you did not accord me due process of
law. . . .)
TONY CONSING: So mopasaka kang
disbarment, malaumon kita nga
maaksiyonan kini, with all this problem sa
Korte Suprema.
(So you are filing a disbarment case? We
hope that this be given action with all the
problems in the Supreme Court.)
BAGABUYO : Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa
ka truck ang akong jurisprudence, nga ang
mga Huwes nga di mahibalo sa balaod
pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang pagka
Huwes. . . . Apan unsa man intawon ang
balaod ang iyang gibasa niini nadunggan ko
nga kini kuno siya madjongero, mao bitaw
na, madjong ang iyang guitunan?
(I am not worried because I have a truckload
of jurisprudence that judges who are
ignorant of the law must be removed from
the Bench. But what law has he been
reading? I heard that he is a mahjong
aficionado (mahjongero) and that is why he
is studying mahjong.11
The trial court concluded that respondent, as
a member of the bar and an officer of the
court, is duty bound to uphold the dignity
and authority of the court, and should not
promote distrust in the administration of
justice.
The trial court stated that it is empowered to
suspend respondent from the practice of law
under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court12 for any of the causes mentioned in
Sec. 2713 of the same Rule. Respondent was
given the opportunity to be heard, but he
opted to be silent. Thus, it held that the
requirement of due process has been duly
satisfied.
In accordance with the provisions of Sec.
29,14 Rule 138 and Sec. 9,15 Rule 139 of the
Rules of Court, the RTC of Surigao City,
Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the
Bar Confidant the Statement of Facts of
respondent's suspension from the practice
of law, dated July 14, 2005, together with the
order of suspension and other relevant
documents.
In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the
Office of the Bar Confidant found that the
article in the August 18, 2003 issue of the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned
the integrity and independence of the court
and its officers, and respondent's criticism of
the trial court's Order dated November 12,
2002, which was aired in radio station DXKS,
both in connection with Crim. Case No. 5144,
constitute grave violation of oath of office by
respondent. It stated that the requirement
of due process was complied with when
respondent was given an opportunity to be
heard, but respondent chose to remain
silent.
The Office of the Bar Confidant
recommended the implementation of the
trial court's order of suspension dated
February 8, 2004, and that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one
year, with a stern warning that the repetition
of a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
The Court approves the recommendation of
the Office of the Bar Confidant. It has been
reiterated in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr.16
that:
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
any violation of his oath, a patent disregard
of his duties, or an odious deportment
unbecoming an attorney. Among the
grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice;
gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral
conduct; conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before
admission to the practice of law; willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; corrupt or willful appearance
as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The grounds are not
preclusive in nature even as they are broad
enough as to cover practically any kind of
impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in
his professional career or in his private life. A
lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity
and moral fiber which are not only
conditions precedent to his entrance to the
Bar, but are likewise essential demands for
his continued membership therein.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts
who are empowered to appear, prosecute
and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved
by law as a consequence.17 Membership in
the bar imposes upon them certain
obligations.18 Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates a
lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers and
[he] should insist on similar conduct by
others." Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a
lawyer "shall submit grievances against a
judge to the proper authorities only."
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11
when he admittedly caused the holding of a
press conference where he made
statements against the Order dated
November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in
Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he
indirectly stated that Judge Tan was
displaying judicial arrogance in the article
entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao
judge for allowing murder suspect to bail
out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003
issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily.
Respondent's statements in the article,
which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144
was still pending in court, also violated Rule
13.02 of Canon 13, which states that "a
lawyer shall not make public statements in
the media regarding a pending case tending
to arouse public opinion for or against a
party."
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony
Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for not resorting to the proper
authorities only for redress of his grievances
against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated
Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and
its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was
ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong
aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead
of studying the law, and that he was a liar.
Respondent also violated the Lawyer's Oath,
as he has sworn to "conduct [himself] as a
lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to [his]
clients."
As a senior state prosecutor and officer of
the court, respondent should have set the
example of observing and maintaining the
respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers. Montecillo v. Gica19 held:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain
towards the courts a respectful attitude. As
an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold
the dignity and authority of the court to
which he owes fidelity, according to the oath
he has taken. Respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of our democratic
institutions which, without such respect,
would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
The Court is not against lawyers raising
grievances against erring judges but the
rules clearly provide for the proper venue
and procedure for doing so, precisely
because respect for the institution must
always be maintained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty.
Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of
violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule
13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and of violating the Lawyer's
Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year effective
upon finality of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that the repetition of a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the

Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended
to respondent's personal record as an
attorney, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Department of Justice, and
all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-43757-58 July 30, 1976
REGINO GABRIEL and JAIME TAPEL,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
In re: Contempt citation against Atty.
Cornelio M. Orteza, respondent.
RESOLUTION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
In the Court's Resolution of June 11, 1976,
the petition (filed on May 31, 1976) in the
cases at bar for review of the Court of
Appeals decision of November 28, 1975
which affirmed in toto the Manila court of
first instance's judgment of September 27,
1968 convicting, after joint trial, the two
petitioners accused of the crime of theft,
was denied for lack of merit. The Court
further noted therein that a first petition for
the same purpose filed through another
lawyer on March 6, 1976 had been
previously denied and final judgment
entered on May 10, 1976, and cited Atty.
Cornelio M. Orteza who filed the second
petition at bar for contempt and/or for
disciplinary action, as follows:
... Considering the allegations, issues and
arguments adduced in the petition for
review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, the Court Resolved to
DENY the petition for lack of merit, a
previous petition for review of the same
decision docketed as G.R. Nos. L- 43113-14
having filed by petitioners on March 6, 1976
thru Atty. Rodolfo D. Mapile and denied as
per resolution of March 15, 1976 and entry
of final judgment having been made on May
10, 1976. Atty. Cornelio M. Orteza is hereby
required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not
be held in contempt and/or disciplinary dealt
with for filing a second petition on behalf of
the same petitioners for review of the same
decision of the Court of Appeals which was
already previously denied with finality within
ten (10) days from notice hereof.
Respondent Atty. Orteza still filed without
leave of court on July 6, 1976 a motion for
reconsideration of the Court's above-quoted
resolution denying his petition for review
and after having secured for the purpose an
extension (on the ground of pressure of
work) filed on July 12, 1976 his explanation.
The burden of both pleadings is that the first
petition to set aside the Court of Appeals
affirmance of petitioners conviction was a
special civil action of certiorari under Rule
65, while the second petition was one for
review under Rule 45. 1
The explanation is manifestly unsatisfactory.
However zealous may be counsel's concern
and belief in the alleged innocence of the
petitioners, it is elementary that counsel
may not split their appeal into one to set
aside the appellate court's denial of
petitioners appellants' motion for
reconsideration of its decision affirming the
trial court's judgment of conviction and/or
for new trial (the first petition) and into
another to set aside the appellate court's
decision itself, which affirmed the trial
court's conviction of the petitioners-
appellants (the second petition).
Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes
abuse of the Court's processes and improper
conduct that tends to impede obstruct and
degrade the administration of justice and
will be punished as contempt of court. 2
Needless to add, the lawyer who filed such
multiple or repetitious petitions (which
obviously delays the execution of a final and
executory judgment) subjects himself to
disciplinary action for incompetence (for not
knowing any better or for willful violation of
his duties as an attorney to act with all good
fidelity to the courts and to maintain only
such actions as appear to him to be just and
are consistent with truth and honor. 3
Thus in several instances in the past, the
Court has admonished that (L)itigants and
their counsels are warned under pain of
contempt and disciplinary action that a party
who has already failed to have a decision of
the Court of Appeals set aside through a
petition for review by certiorari with the
denial of his petition (by the First Division to
which such petitions for review are assigned
under the Court's standing resolution of
November 15, 1973) should not under the
guise of a special civil action file a second
petition for the same purpose of setting
aside the same Court of Appeals' decision to
be acted upon by the Second Division (to
which special civil actions are assigned under
the Court's resolution of November 15,
1973). and vice-versa, for such conduct
would tend to trifle with the Court and
impede, obstruct and impede the
administration of justice". 4
Respondent Atty. Orteza is therefore
adjudged guilty of contempt of court and is
ordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred
(P500.00) pesos with ten (10) days from
notice hereof failing which, he shall be
imprisoned for a period of (50) days. While
further administrative action against him is
herewith forborne, he is hereby warned that
a future repetition or the same or similar
incident will be dealt with more severely.
Petitioners' purported motion for
reconsideration of the Court's resolution of
June 11, 1976 denying their second petition
is ordered expunged from the records as a
sham motion, (as is the second petition
itself), since the decision sought, to be
reviewed has long become final and
executory with the entry on May 10, 1976 of
final judgment of denial of the first petition.
Let copies hereof be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
attached to his Personal record.
SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 6252 October 5, 2004
JONAR SANTIAGO, complainant,
vs.
Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Notaries public are expected to exert utmost
care in the performance of their duties,
which are impressed with public interest.
They are enjoined to comply faithfully with
the solemnities and requirements of the
Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to
mete out appropriate sanctions to those
who violate it or neglect observance thereof.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Complaint1 filed by
Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau
of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP),
for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V.
Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan
with deceit; malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule
1382 of the Rules of Court; and violation of
Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.033, Canon 54, and
Canons 12.075 and 12.08 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
In his Report, IBP Investigating
Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr.
summarized the allegations of the
complainant in this wise:
"x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant
alleged, among others, that Respondent in
notarizing several documents on different
dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the
proper notation regarding the cedula or
community tax certificate of the affiants; b)
enter the details of the notarized documents
in the notarial register; and c) make and
execute the certification and enter his PTR
and IBP numbers in the documents he had
notarized, all in violation of the notarial
provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code.
"Complainant likewise alleged that
Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of
his client and offered the same as evidence
in the case wherein he was actively
representing his client. Finally, Complainant
alleges that on a certain date, Respondent
accompanied by several persons waited for
Complainant after the hearing and after
confronting the latter disarmed him of his
sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting
words and veiled threats."6
On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January
19, 2001 Order of the CBD,7 Atty. Rafanan
filed his verified Answer.8 He admitted
having administered the oath to the affiants
whose Affidavits were attached to the
verified Complaint. He believed, however,
that the non-notation of their Residence
Certificates in the Affidavits and the
Counter-affidavits was allowed.
He opined that the notation of residence
certificates applied only to documents
acknowledged by a notary public and was
not mandatory for affidavits related to cases
pending before courts and other
government offices. He pointed out that in
the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn
to before government prosecutors, did not
have to indicate the residence certificates of
the affiants. Neither did other notaries
public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were
older practitioners -- indicate the affiants’
residence certificates on the documents
they notarized, or have entries in their
notarial register for these documents.
As to his alleged failure to comply with the
certification required by Section 3 of Rule
1129 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
respondent explained that as counsel of the
affiants, he had the option to comply or not
with the certification. To nullify the
Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-
bound to bring the said noncompliance to
the attention of the prosecutor conducting
the preliminary investigation.
As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of
the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers
could testify on behalf of their clients "on
substantial matters, in cases where [their]
testimony is essential to the ends of justice."
Complainant charged respondent’s clients
with attempted murder. Respondent
averred that since they were in his house
when the alleged crime occurred, "his
testimony is very essential to the ends of
justice."
Respondent alleged that it was complainant
who had threatened and harassed his clients
after the hearing of their case by the
provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001.
Respondent requested the assistance of the
Cabanatuan City Police the following day,
January 5, 2001, which was the next
scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of
the incident and to allay the fears of his
clients. In support of his allegations, he
submitted Certifications10 from the
Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint
Affidavit11 of the two police officers who
had assisted them.
Lastly, he contended that the case had been
initiated for no other purpose than to harass
him, because he was the counsel of Barangay
Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by
the latter before the ombudsman and the
BJMP against complainant.
After receipt of respondent’s Answer, the
CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R.
Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on June
5, 2001, at two o’clock in the afternoon.
Notices12 of the hearing were sent to the
parties by registered mail. On the scheduled
date and time of the hearing, only
complainant appeared. Respondent was
unable to do so, apparently because he had
received the Notice only on June 8, 2001.13
The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two
o’clock in the afternoon.
On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant
filed his Reply14 to the verified Answer of
respondent. The latter’s Rejoinder was
received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.15 It
also received complainant’s Letter-
Request16 to dispense with the hearings.
Accordingly, it granted that request in its
Order17 dated July 24, 2001, issued through
Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby
directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within fifteen days
from receipt of the Order, after which the
case was to be deemed submitted for
resolution.
The CBD received complainant’s
Memorandum18 on September 26, 2001.
Respondent did not file any.
The IBP’s Recommendation
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of
Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-
17219 approving and adopting the
Investigating Commissioner’s Report that
respondent had violated specific
requirements of the Notarial Law on the
execution of a certification, the entry of such
certification in the notarial register, and the
indication of the affiant’s residence
certificate. The IBP Board of Governors
found his excuse for the violations
unacceptable. It modified, however, the
recommendation20 of the investigating
commissioner by increasing the fine to
"₱3,000 with a warning that any repetition
of the violation will be dealt with a heavier
penalty."
The other charges -- violation of Section 27
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons
1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR --
were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors.
Respondent’s Administrative Liability
Violation of the Notarial Law
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations
and duties of notaries public. They are
required to certify that the party to every
document acknowledged before them has
presented the proper residence certificate
(or exemption from the residence tax); and
to enter its number, place of issue and date
as part of such certification.21 They are also
required to maintain and keep a notarial
register; to enter therein all instruments
notarized by them; and to "give to each
instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before [them] a number
corresponding to the one in [their] register
[and to state therein] the page or pages of
[their] register, on which the same is
recorded."22 Failure to perform these duties
would result in the revocation of their
commission as notaries public.23
These formalities are mandatory and cannot
be simply neglected, considering the degree
of importance and evidentiary weight
attached to notarized documents. Notaries
public entering into their commissions are
presumed to be aware of these elementary
requirements.
In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,24 the Court
explained the value and meaning of
notarization as follows:
"The importance attached to the act of
notarization cannot be overemphasized.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization converts a private
document into a public document thus
making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
Courts, administrative agencies and the
public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary
public and appended to a private
instrument."
For this reason, notaries public should not
take for granted the solemn duties
pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods
in their performance of the notarial act are
never to be countenanced. They are
expected to exert utmost care in the
performance of their duties,25 which are
dictated by public policy and are impressed
with public interest.
It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and
respondent has readily admitted -- that he
violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter
in the documents notations of the residence
certificate, as well as the entry number and
the pages of the notarial registry.
Respondent believes, however, that
noncompliance with those requirements is
not mandatory for affidavits relative to cases
pending before the courts and government
agencies. He points to similar practices of
older notaries in Nueva Ecija.
We cannot give credence to, much less
honor, his claim. His belief that the
requirements do not apply to affidavits is
patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with
these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial
Law makes no qualification or exception. It is
appalling and inexcusable that he did away
with the basics of notarial procedure
allegedly because others were doing so.
Being swayed by the bad example of others
is not an acceptable justification for breaking
the law.
We note further that the documents
attached to the verified Complaint are the
Joint Counter-Affidavit of respondent’s
clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as
well as their witnesses’ Affidavits relative to
Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted
murder, filed by complainant’s brother
against the aforementioned clients. These
documents became the basis of the present
Complaint.
As correctly pointed out by the investigating
commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly
requires respondent as notary -- in the
absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer
the oath -- to "certify that he has personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied
that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits." Respondent
failed to do so with respect to the subject
Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the
belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he
was not required to comply with the
certification requirement.
It must be emphasized that the primary duty
of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal
processes.26 They are expected to be in the
forefront in the observance and
maintenance of the rule of law. This duty
carries with it the obligation to be well-
informed of the existing laws and to keep
abreast with legal developments, recent
enactments and jurisprudence.27 It is
imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully
comply with such duty, they may not be able
to discharge competently and diligently their
obligations as members of the bar. Worse,
they may become susceptible to committing
mistakes.
Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver
responsibility is placed upon them by reason
of their solemn oath to obey the laws.28 No
custom or age-old practice provides
sufficient excuse or justification for their
failure to adhere to the provisions of the law.
In this case, the excuse given by respondent
exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial
Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
the importance of his office as a notary
public.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with
complainant’s plea to disbar respondent
from the practice of law. The power to disbar
must be exercised with great caution.29
Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only
in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and the character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a
member of the bar. Where any lesser
penalty can accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should not be decreed.30
Considering the nature of the infraction and
the absence of deceit on the part of
respondent, we believe that the penalty
recommended by the IBP Board of
Governors is a sufficient disciplinary
measure in this case.
Lawyer as Witness for Client are expected to tell the facts as they recall
them. In contradistinction, advocates are
Complainant further faults respondent for
partisans -- those who actively plead and
executing before Prosecutor Leonardo
defend the cause of others. It is difficult to
Padolina an affidavit corroborating the
distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a
defense of alibi proffered by respondent’s
disinterested witness from the zeal of an
clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of
advocate. The question is one of propriety
the CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid testifying in
rather than of competency of the lawyers
behalf of his client."
who testify for their clients.

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

"Acting or appearing to act in the double
capacity of lawyer and witness for the client
will provoke unkind criticism and leave many
"Rule 12.08 – A lawyer shall avoid testifying
people to suspect the truthfulness of the
in behalf of his client, except:
lawyer because they cannot believe the
lawyer as disinterested. The people will have
a plausible reason for thinking, and if their
a) on formal matters, such as the mailing,
sympathies are against the lawyer’s client,
authentication or custody of an instrument
they will have an opportunity, not likely to be
and the like;
neglected, for charging, that as a witness he
fortified it with his own testimony. The
testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted
b) on substantial matters, in cases where his
and is looked upon as partial and
testimony is essential to the ends of justice,
untruthful."33
in which event he must, during his
testimony, entrust the trial of the case to
another counsel."
Thus, although the law does not forbid
lawyers from being witnesses and at the
same time counsels for a cause, the
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is
preference is for them to refrain from
not disqualified from being a witness,31
testifying as witnesses, unless they
except only in certain cases pertaining to
absolutely have to; and should they do so, to
privileged communication arising from an
withdraw from active management of the
attorney-client relationship.32
case.34

The reason behind such rule is the difficulty

Notwithstanding this guideline and the
posed upon lawyers by the task of
existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty.
dissociating their relation to their clients as
Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot
witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses
hastily make him administratively liable for
the following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to
assert every remedy and defense that is
authorized by law for the benefit of the
client, especially in a criminal action in which
the latter’s life and liberty are at stake.35 It
is the fundamental right of the accused to be
afforded full opportunity to rebut the
charges against them. They are entitled to
suggest all those reasonable doubts that
may arise from the evidence as to their guilt;
and to ensure that if they are convicted, such
conviction is according to law.
Having undertaken the defense of the
accused, respondent, as defense counsel,
was thus expected to spare no effort to save
his clients from a wrong conviction. He had
the duty to present -- by all fair and
honorable means -- every defense and
mitigating circumstance that the law
permitted, to the end that his clients would
not be deprived of life, liberty or property,
except by due process of law.36
The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was
clearly necessary for the defense of his
clients, since it pointed out the fact that on
the alleged date and time of the incident, his
clients were at his residence and could not
have possibly committed the crime charged
against them. Notably, in his Affidavit,
complainant does not dispute the
statements of respondent or suggest the
falsity of its contents.
Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08
contemplates a situation in which lawyers
give their testimonies during the trial. In this
instance, the Affidavit was submitted during
the preliminary investigation which, as such,
was merely inquisitorial.37 Not being a trial
of the case on the merits, a preliminary
investigation has the oft-repeated purposes
of securing innocent persons against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecutions;
protecting them from open and public
accusations of crime and from the trouble as
well as expense and anxiety of a public trial;
and protecting the State from useless and
expensive prosecutions.38 The investigation
is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to
be followed by the trial proper.
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress
and remind respondent to refrain from
accepting employment in any matter in
which he knows or has reason to believe that
he may be an essential witness for the
prospective client. Furthermore, in future
cases in which his testimony may become
essential to serve the "ends of justice," the
canons of the profession require him to
withdraw from the active prosecution of
these cases.
No Proof of Harassment
The charge that respondent harassed
complainant and uttered insulting words and
veiled threats is not supported by evidence.
Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a
bare charge cannot be equated with
liability.39 It is not the self-serving claim of
complainant but the version of respondent
that is more credible, considering that the
latter’s allegations are corroborated by the
Affidavits of the police officers and the
Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is

found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby FINED ₱3,000
with a warning that similar infractions in the
future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 7199 July 22, 2009
[Formerly CBD 04-1386] On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero
(Cordero) purportedly bought from a
grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods
FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant, including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June
27, 2004, as Cordero and his relatives were
vs.
eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they
ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., found the spread to be sour and soon
Respondent. discovered a colony of worms inside the can.

DECISION Cordero’s wife thus filed a complaint with

the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration
(BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed
CARPIO MORALES, J.: the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.

Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a

corporation engaged in the business of meat
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA
processing and manufacture and
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993,
distribution of canned goods and grocery
the BFAD conducted a conciliation hearing
products under the brand name "CDO," filed
on July 27, 2004 during which the spouses
a Verified Complaint1 for disbarment before
Cordero demanded ₱150,000 as damages
the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of
from complainant. Complainant refused to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
heed the demand, however, as being in
against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr.,
contravention of company policy and, in any
popularly known as "Batas Mauricio"
event, "outrageous."
(respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids
including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong
TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host of a
Complainant instead offered to return actual
television program KAKAMPI MO ANG
medical and incidental expenses incurred by
BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio
the Corderos as long as they were supported
program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired
by receipts, but the offer was turned down.
over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct;
And the Corderos threatened to bring the
(2) violation of lawyer’s oath and (3)
matter to the attention of the media.
disrespect to the courts and to investigating
prosecutors.
Complainant was later required by the BFAD
to file its Answer to the complaint. In the
The facts that spawned the filing of the
meantime or on August 6, 2004, respondent
complaint are as follows:
sent complainant via fax a copy of the front
page of the would-be August 10-16, 2004
issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS,
Vol. 1, No. 122 which complainant found to
contain articles maligning, discrediting and
imputing vices and defects to it and its
products. Respondent threatened to publish
the articles unless complainant gave in to the
₱150,000 demand of the Corderos.
Complainant thereupon reiterated its
counter-offer earlier conveyed to the
Corderos, but respondent turned it down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the
matter for ₱50,000, ₱15,000 of which would
go to the Corderos and ₱35,000 to his Batas
Foundation. And respondent directed
complainant to place paid advertisements in
the tabloids and television program.
The Corderos eventually forged a
KASUNDUAN3 seeking the withdrawal of
their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD
thus dismissed the complaint.4 Respondent,
who affixed his signature to the
KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one
of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he
prepared the document.
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent
complainant an Advertising Contract5 asking
complainant to advertise in the tabloid
Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly
issues at ₱15,000 per issue or a total amount
of ₱360,000, and a Program Profile6 of the
television program KAKAMPI MO ANG
BATAS also asking complainant to place spot
advertisements with the following rate
cards: (a) spot buy 15-second TVC at ₱4,000;
(b) spot buy 30-second TVC at ₱7,700; and
(c) season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-
second TVC for ₱130,000.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to
buy three full-page advertisements in the
tabloid amounting to ₱45,000 at ₱15,000
per advertisement, and three spots of 30-
second TVC in the television program at
₱7,700 each or a total of ₱23,100. Acting on
complainant’s offer, respondent relayed to it
that he and his Executive Producer were
disappointed with the offer and threatened
to proceed with the publication of the
articles/columns.7
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio
program Double B- Batas ng Bayan at radio
station DZBB, announced the holding of a
supposed contest sponsored by said
program, which announcement was
transcribed as follows:
"OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total
magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest si
Batas Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung
ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo
sa telepono, 433-7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga
premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod
pero ito muna ang contest, o, ‘aling liver
spread ang may uod?’ Yan kita ninyo yan,
ayan malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan
yan ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver
spread ang may uod at anong companya ang
gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-
7549 st 433-7553. Open po an[g] contest na
ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin
ang mananalo, kung tama ang inyong sagot.
Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas
an[g] may uod? 8 (Emphasis and italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the
tabloids articles which put complainant in
bad light. Thus, in the August 31- September
6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he
wrote an article captioned "KADIRI ANG CDO
LIVER SPREAD!" In another article, he wrote
"IBA PANG PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN!"9
which appeared in the same publication in
its September 7-13, 2004 issue. And still in
the same publication, its September 14-20,
2004 issue, he wrote another article entitled
"DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO."10
Respondent continued his tirade against
complainant in his column LAGING HANDA
published in another tabloid, BAGONG
TIKTIK, with the following articles:11 (a)
"Uod sa liver spread," Setyembre 6, 2004
(Taon 7, Blg.276);12 (b) "Uod, itinanggi ng
CDO," Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.277);13 (c) "Pagpapatigil sa CDO,"
Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278);14 (d)
"Uod sa liver spread kumpirmado,"
Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279);15 (e)
"Salaysay ng nakakain ng uod," Setyembre
10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280);16 (f) "Kaso VS.
CDO itinuloy," Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.281);17 (g) "Kasong Kidnapping laban sa
CDO guards," Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.284);18 (h) "Brutalidad ng CDO guards,"
Setyembre 15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285);19 (i)
"CDO guards pinababanatan sa PNP,"
Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287);20 (j)
"May uod na CDO liver spread sa Puregold
binili," Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.288);21 (k) "Desperado na ang CDO,"
Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290);22 (l)
"Atty. Rufus Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO,"
Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291);23 (m)
"Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero,"
Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 292);24 (n)
"Bakit nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO,"
Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 293).25
In his September 8, 2004 column "Anggulo
ng Batas" published in Hataw!, respondent
wrote an article "Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO
Liver Spread."26
And respondent, in several episodes in
September 2004 of his television program
Kakampi Mo ang Batas aired over UNTV,
repeatedly complained of what complainant
claimed to be the "same baseless and
malicious allegations/issues" against it.27
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints
against respondent and several others for
Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under
Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal
Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The
complaints were pending at he time of the
filing of the present administrative
complaint.28
In the criminal complaints pending before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Valenzuela City, docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-
2917-2933, respondent filed his Entry of
Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to
Elevate These Cases to the Department of
Justice,29 alleging:
xxxx
2.N. The question here is this: What gives,
Honorable (???) Prosecutors of the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?
xxxx
2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez
simply be tossed around, waiting for
miracles to happen?
2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to
happen here before this Office would ever
act on his complaint?
xxxx
8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he
did in the case filed by Villarez, and with an
investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing
to the wishes of his boss, the Chief
Prosecutor, can Respondents expect justice
to be meted to them?
9. With utmost due respect, Respondents
have reason to believe that justice would
elude them in this Office of the City
Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not because
of the injustice of their cause, but, more
importantly, because of the injustice of the
system;
10. Couple all of these with reports that
many a government office in Valenzuela City
had been the willing recipient of too many
generosities in the past of the Complainant,
and also with reports that a top official of the
City had campaigned for his much coveted
position in the past distributing products of
the Complainant, what would one expect the
Respondents to think?
11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is
the attitude and behavior displayed even by
mere staff and underlings of this Office to
people who dare complain against the
Complainant in their respective turfs.
Perhaps, top officials of this Office should
investigate and ask their associates and
relatives incognito to file, even if on a
pakunwari basis only, complaints against the
Complainant, and they would surely be given
the same rough and insulting treatment that
Respondent Villarez got when he filed his
kidnapping charge here;30
And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack
of Jurisdiction31 which respondent filed, as
counsel for his therein co-respondents-
staffers of the newspaper Hataw!, before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:
xxxx
5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely
used even a little of whatever is inside their
thick skulls, they would have clearly deduced
that this Office has no jurisdiction over this
action.32 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004,
complainant filed a civil case against
respondent and several others, docketed as
Civil Case No. 249-V-04,33 before the
Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City and
raffled to Branch 75 thereof.
The pending cases against him and the
issuance of a status quo order
notwithstanding, respondent continued to
publish articles against complainant34 and
to malign complainant through his television
shows.
Acting on the present administrative
complaint, the Investigating Commissioner
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
came up with the following findings in his
October 5, 2005 Report and
Recommendation:35
I.
xxxx
In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled
"Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio]
Mauricio, et al.", the Order dated 10
December 2004 (Annex O of the Complaint)
was issued by Presiding Judge Dionisio C.
Sison which in part reads:
"Anent the plaintiff’s prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order included in
the instant plaintiff’s motion, this Court,
inasmuch as the defendants failed to appear
in court or file an opposition thereto, is
constrained to GRANT the said plaintiff’s
prater, as it is GRANTED, in order to maintain
STATUS QUO, and that all the defendants,
their agents, representatives or any person
acting for and in behalf are hereby
restrained/enjoined from further publishing,
televising and/or broadcasting any matter
subject of the Complaint in the instant case
more specifically the imputation of vices
and/or defects on plaintiff and its products."
Complainant alleged that the above-quoted
Order was served on respondent by the
Branch Sheriff on 13 December 2004.
Respondent has not denied the issuance of
the Order dated 10 December 2004 or his
receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December
2004.
Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10
December 2004, and the clear directive
therein addressed to him to desists [sic] from
"further publishing, televising and/or
broadcasting any matter subject of the
Complaint in the instant case more
specifically the imputation of vices and/or
defects on plaintiff and its products",
respondent in clear defiance of this Order
came out with articles on the prohibited
subject matter in his column "Atty. Batas",
2004 in the December 16 and 17, 2004 issues
of the tabloid "Balitang Bayan –Toro"
(Annexes Q and Q-1 of the Complaint).
The above actuations of respondent are also
in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of
Professional Responsibility which reads: "A
lawyer shall not make public statements in
the media regarding a pending case tending
to arouse public opinion for or against a
party."
II.
xxxx
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Valenzuela City, respondent filed his "Entry
of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to
Elevate These Cases To the Department of
Justice". In said pleading, respondent made
the following statements:
xxxx
The above language employed by
respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on
the integrity of the Office of the City
Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors
connected with said Office. Respondent
clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness
of the said Office in handling cases filed
before it and did not even design to submit
any evidence to substantiate said wild
allegations. The use by respondent of the
above-quoted language in his pleadings is
manifestly violative of Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which
provides: "A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and
[m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he
[c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd
[s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y
[o]thers."
III.
The "Kasunduan" entered into by the
Spouses Cordero and herein complainant
(Annex C of the Complaint) was admittedly
prepared, witnessed and signed by herein
respondent. …
xxxx
In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the
Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized that
the said "Kasunduan" was not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order and
policy, and this accordingly dismissed the
complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero
against herein complainant.
However, even after the execution of the
"Kasunduan" and the consequent dismissal
of the complaint of his clients against herein
complainant, respondent inexplicably
launched a media offensive intended to
disparage and put to ridicule herein
complainant. On record are the numerous
articles of respondent published in 3 tabloids
commencing from 31 August to 17
December 2004 (Annexes G to Q-1). As
already above-stated, respondent continued
to come out with these articles against
complainant in his tabloid columns despite a
temporary restraining order issued against
him expressly prohibiting such actions.
Respondent did not deny that he indeed
wrote said articles and submitted them for
publication in the tabloids.
Respondent claims that he was prompted by
his sense of public service, that is, to expose
the defects of complainant’s products to the
consuming public. Complainant claims that
there is a baser motive to the actions of
respondent. Complainant avers that
respondent retaliated for complainant’s
failure to give in to respondent’s "request"
that complainant advertise in the tabloids
and television programs of respondent.
Complainant’s explanation is more credible.
Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of
respondent for his barrage of articles against
complainant does not detract from the fact
that respondent consciously violated the
spirit behind the "Kasunduan" which he
himself prepared and signed and submitted
to the BFAD for approval. Respondent was
less than forthright when he prepared said
"Kasunduan" and then turned around and
proceeded to lambaste complainant for
what was supposedly already settled in said
agreement. Complainant would have been
better of with the BFAD case proceeding as
it could have defended itself against the
charges of the Spouses Cordero.
Complainant was helpless against the
attacks of respondent, a media personality.
The actuations of respondent constituted, to
say the least, deceitful conduct
contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.36
(Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution
No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20, 2006,
adopted the findings and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner to
suspend respondent from the practice of law
for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of
the IBP well-taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to
emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to
act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity
of the legal profession,37 which confidence
may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent
violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates
lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For,
as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful
conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of
the complaint against CDO to advance his
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself
interest – to obtain funds for his Batas
with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
Foundation and seek sponsorships and
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
advertisements for the tabloids and his
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
television program.

Rule 8.01 – A lawyer shall not, in his

He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of
professional dealings, use language which is
Professional Responsibility, which
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, by
mandates:
using intemperate language.

A lawyer shall not make public statements in

Apropos is the following reminder in
the media regarding a pending case tending
Saberon v. Larong:38
to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our

legal system has tempted members of the
For despite the pendency of the civil case
bar to use strong language in pursuit of their
against him and the issuance of a status quo
duty to advance the interests of their clients.
order restraining/enjoining further
publishing, televising and broadcasting of
any matter relative to the complaint of CDO,
However, while a lawyer is entitled to
respondent continued with his attacks
present his case with vigor and courage, such
against complainant and its products. At the
enthusiasm does not justify the use of
same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also
offensive and abusive language. Language
of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
abounds with countless possibilities for one
which mandates lawyers to "uphold the
to be emphatic but respectful, convincing
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
but not derogatory, illuminating but not
promote respect for law and legal
offensive.1awphi1
processes." For he defied said status quo
order, despite his (respondent’s) oath as a
member of the legal profession to "obey the
On many occasions, the Court has reminded
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
members of the Bar to abstain from all
constituted authorities."
offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and
justice of the cause with which he is charged.
Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
In keeping with the dignity of the legal
Responsibility which mandate, viz:
profession, a lawyer’s language even in his when he filed falsification charges against
pleadings must be dignified.39 the therein complainant.43
(Underscoring supplied)

To the Court, suspension of respondent from

By failing to live up to his oath and to comply
with the exacting standards of the legal
profession, respondent also violated Canon
7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which directs a lawyer to "at all times uphold
the integrity and the dignity of the legal
profession."401avvph!1
The power of the media to form or influence
public opinion cannot be underestimated. In
Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,41 the therein
complainant engaged therein-herein
respondent’s services as "she was impressed
by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of
respondent, a media personality,"42 only to
later find out that after he demanded and
the therein complainant paid an exorbitant
fee, no action was taken nor any pleadings
prepared by him. Respondent was
suspended for six months.
the practice of law for three years is, in the
premises, sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for
violation of the lawyer’s oath and breach of
ethics of the legal profession as embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility,
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three years effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his
personal record and copies furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
On reading the articles respondent
published, not to mention listening to him
over the radio and watching him on
television, it cannot be gainsaid that the
same could, to a certain extent, have
affected the sales of complainant.

Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying

therein-herein respondent’s motion for
reconsideration, took note of the fact that
respondent was motivated by vindictiveness
 Adm. Case No. 8108 July 15, 2014
DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE,
Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR.,
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
Adm. Case No. 10299
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR.,
Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court is the Resolution1 of the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty.
Felisberto Verano liable for improper and
inappropriate conduct tending to influence
and/or giving the appearance of influence
upon a public official. The Joint Report and
Recommendation submitted by
Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III
recommended that respondent beissued a
warning not to repeat the same nor any
similar action, otherwise the Commission
will impose a more severe penalty. The
Commission adopted the said ruling on 16
April 2013.2
The complainants in Administrative Case
(A.C.) No. 8108 are Dante La Jimenez and
Lauro G. Vizconde, while complainant in
Adm. Case No. 10299 is Atty. Oliver O.
Lozano. At the time of the filing of the
complaints, respondent Atty. Verano was
representing his clients Richard S. Brodett
and Joseph R. Tecson.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Brodett and Tecson (identified in media
reports attached to the Complaint as the
"Alabang Boys") werethe accused in cases
filed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) for the illegal sale and use of
dangerous drugs.3 In a Joint Inquest
Resolution issued on 2 December 2008, the
charges were dropped for lack of probable
cause.4
Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R.
Resado to ask clarificatory questions during
the evaluation of the case, several media
outlets reported on incidents of bribery and
"cover-up" allegedly prevalent in
investigations of the drug trade.This
prompted the House Committee on Illegal
Drugs to conduct its own congressional
hearings. It was revealed during one such
hearing that respondenthad prepared the
release order for his three clients using the
letterhead ofthe Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the stationery of then Secretary Raul filed by Dante Jimenez.11 On 2 June 2009,
Gonzales.5 the Court referred both cases to the IBP for
consolidation, as well as for investigation,
report and recommendation.
Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as
founders of Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of complaint RESPONDENT’S VERSION
to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated
In his Comment, respondent alludes to the
that respondent had admitted to drafting
Joint Inquest Resolution dropping the
the release order, and had thereby
charges against his clients for lack of
committed a highly irregular and unethical
probable cause, arguing that the resolution
act. They argued that respondent had no
also ordered the immediate release of
authority to use the DOJ letterhead and
Brodett and Tecson. He reasoned that the
should be penalized for acts unbecoming a
high hopes of the accused, together with
member of the bar.6
their families, came crashing down when the
PDEA still refused to release his clients.12
Sheer faith in the innocence of his clients and
For his part, Atty. Lozano anchoredhis
fidelity to their cause prompted him to
Complaint on respondent’s alleged violation
prepare and draft the release order.
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Respondent admits that perhaps he was
Responsibility, which states that a lawyer
overzealous; yet, "if the Secretary of Justice
shall upholdthe Constitution, obey the laws
approves it, then everything may be
of the land, and promote respectfor legal
expedited."13 In any case, respondent
processes.7 Atty. Lozano contended that
continues, the drafted release order was not
respondent showed disrespect for the law
signed by the Secretary and therefore
and legal processes in drafting the said order
remained "a mere scrap of paper with no
and sending it to a high-ranking public
effect at all."14
official, even though the latter was not a
government prosecutor.8 Atty. Lozano’s
verified ComplaintAffidavit was filed with
FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING
the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP
COMMISSIONER
and docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2356.9
The Commissioner noted that both
complaints remained unsubstantiated, while
Officers of the IBP, Cebu CityChapter, issued the letter-complaint of Jimenez and
a Resolution condemning the unethical Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore,
conduct of respondent and showing no evidence was adduced to prove the
unqualified support for the VACC’s filing of charges.
disbarment proceedings.10 On 27 February
However, by his own admissions
2009, Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint
inparagraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment,
on the ground that a similar action had been
respondent drafted the release order
specifically for the signature of the DOJ
Secretary. This act of "feeding" the draft
order to the latter was found to be highly
irregular, as it tended to influence a public
official. Hence, Commissioner Abelita found
respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended that he be issued a warning
not to repeat the same or any similar
action.15
RULING OF THE COURT
We emphasize at the outset thatthe Court
may conduct its own investigation into
charges against members of the bar,
irrespective of the form of initiatory
complaints brought before it. Thus, a
complainant in a disbarment case is not a
direct party to the case, but a witness who
brought the matter to the attention of the
Court.16 By now, it is basic that there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The
real question for determination in these
proceedings is whether or not the attorney
is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges of a member of the bar.17
As to Atty. Lozano’s withdrawal of his
verified Complaint, we reiterate our ruling in
Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the
disbarment case allegedly executed by
complainant does not, in any way, exonerate
the respondent. A case of suspension or
disbarment may proceed regardless of
interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on
the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct has been duly proven x x x.
The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorney's
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party,
and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice.Hence, if the
evidence on record warrants, the
respondent may be suspended or disbarred
despite the desistance of complainant or his
withdrawal of the charges.18 (Emphasis
supplied)
After a careful review of the records,we
agree with the IBP in finding reasonable
grounds to hold respondent administratively
liable. Canon 13, the provision applied by the
Investigating Commissioner, states that "a
lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause
and refrain from any impropriety which
tends to influence, or gives the appearance
of influencing the court." We believe that
other provisions in the Code of Professional
Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of
influence-peddling not limited to the regular
courts, but even in all other venues in the
justice sector, where respect for the rule of
law is at all times demanded from a member
of the bar.
During the mandatory hearing conducted by
the Committee on Bar Discipline,
respondent stated that the PDEA refused to
release his clients unless it received a direct
order from the DOJ Secretary. This refusal
purportedly impelled him to take more
serious action, viz.:
ATTY VERANO: x x x By Monday December
22 I think my only recourse was to see the
Secretary himself personally. The Secretary
is the type of a person who opens his [sic]
kasihe is very political also so he opens his
office. If I’m not mistaken that day because
of the timing we will afraid [sic] that
Christmas time is coming and that baka nga
sila maipit sa loob ng Christmas time. So the
family was very sad x x x kung pwede ko raw
gawan ng paraan na total na-dismissed na
ang kaso. So, what I did was thinking as a
lawyer now…I prepared the staff to make it
easy, to make it convenient for signing
authority that if he agrees with our appeal he
will just sign it and send it over to PDEA. So
hinanda ko ho yon. And then I sent it first to
the Office of the other Secretary si
Blancaflor.
xxxx
So I think it’s a Tuesday I had to do
something and I said I will see the Secretary
first with the parents of Rodette, yong nanay
at saka tatay, so we went to see him after
1:00 o’clock or 1:30 in the afternoon. By
then, that draft was still with Blancaflor.
Andon ho ang Secretary tinanggap naman
kami, so we sat down with him x x x
Pinaliwanag ho namin inexplain x x x
Anyway, sabi niya what can I do if I move on
this, they will think that kasama rin ako dyan
sa Fifty Million na yan. Sabi ko, Your Honor,
wala akong Fifty Million, hindi naman ho
milyonaryo ang mga pamilyang ito. So, sabi
ko pwede ho bang maki-usap…sabi niya okay
I will see what I can do. I will study the
matter, those particular words, I will study
the matter. Tumuloy pa ho ang kwentuhan,
as a matter of fact, 2 oras ho kami ron eh.
They were not pushing us away, he was
entertaining us, and we were discussing the
case.19
Respondent likewise stated that his
"experience with Secretary Gonzales is, he is
very open;" and that "because of my practice
and well, candidly I belong also to a political
family, my father was a Congressman. So, he
(Gonzalez) knows of the family and he knows
my sister was a Congresswoman of Pasay
and they weretogether in Congress. In other
words, I am not a complete stranger to
him."20 Upon questioning by Commissioner
Rico A. Limpingco, respondent admitted that
he was personally acquainted with the
Secretary; however, they were not that
close.21
These statements and others made during
the hearing establish respondent’s
admission that 1) he personally approached
the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the
case was still pending before the latter; and
2) respondent caused the preparation of the
draft release order on official DOJ stationery
despite being unauthorized to do so, with
the end in view of "expediting the case."
The way respondent conducted himself
manifested a clear intent to gain special
treatment and consideration from a
government agency. This is precisely the
type of improper behavior sought to be
regulated by the codified norms for the bar.
Respondentis duty-bound to actively avoid
any act that tends to influence, or may be
seen to influence, the outcome of an
ongoing case, lest the people’s faith inthe
judicial process is diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their
clients but to the administration of
justice.1âwphi1 To that end, their clients’
success is wholly subordinate. The conduct
of a member of the bar ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of the law
and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair
and honest which is resorted to bythe
lawyer, even inthe pursuit of his devotion to
his client’s cause, is condemnable and
unethical.22
Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel
or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system." Further, according to Rule 15.06, "a
lawyershall not state or imply that he is able
to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body." The succeeding rule, Rule
15.07, mandates a lawyer "to impress upon
his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness."
Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s
cause must always be within the bounds of
the law.23 A self-respecting independence in
the exercise of the profession is expected if
an attorney is to remain a member of the
bar. In the present case, we find that
respondent fell short of these exacting
standards. Given the import of the case, a
warning is a mere slap on the wrist that
would not serve as commensurate penalty
for the offense.
In Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-
Chua, the Court saw fit to impose a six-
month suspension against a judge who
likewise committed acts of influence
peddling whenshe solicited ₱100,000.00
from complainant Santos when the latter
asked for her help in the case of her friend
Emerita Muñoz, who had a pendingcase with
the Supreme Court, because respondent
judge was a former court attorney of the
high court.24 We find that the same penalty
is appropriate in the present case.
WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, Atty.
Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found GUILTYof
violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation to
Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for which he is
SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for six
(6) months effective immediately. This also
serves as an emphaticWARNING that
repetition of any similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be appended to
the respondent’s bar records. The Court
Administrator is hereby directed to inform
the different courts of this suspension.
SO ORDERED.