Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 122 (2023) 102883

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Environmental Economics

and Management
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jeem

Endogenous bifurcation into environmental CSR and

non-environmental CSR firms by activist shareholders
Yasunobu Tomoda a, b, *, Yasunori Ouchida b
a
Faculty of Economics, Osaka University of Economics, 2-2-8 Osumi, Higashiyodogawa-ku, Osaka 533-8533, Japan
b
School of Economics, Hiroshima University, 1-2-1 Kagamiyama, Higashi-Hiroshima 739-8525, Japan

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This paper proposes a new and simple partial equilibrium model in which environmental
Environmental CSR firms corporate social responsibility (ECSR) firms arise endogenously through changes in the compo­
Environmental activist sition of their shareholders. Our model has two types of shareholders: profit seekers who aim to
Stock market
maximize dividends from their equities and environmental activists who demand not only
Shareholder
monetary profits but also environmental investments from firms. The objective function of firms
is a weighted average of both types of shareholders’ utilities, and its weight is the proportion of
their shareholdings. As a result of equity trades in a perfect competitive market, firms bifurcate
into ECSR and non-ECSR firms even if they were homogeneous at establishment.

1. Introduction

In recent years, growing global concern over environmental issues has led to a wave of environment-related shareholder proposals
against companies. Headlines such as “DuPont loses plastic pollution vote with record 81% rebellion” (Bloomberg, May 4, 2021) and
“ExxonMobil loses a proxy fight with green investors” (The Economist, May 27, 2021) have become commonplace. In many cases,
boards of directors oppose environment-related shareholder proposals. These cases describe the situation where conflicts between
environmental activists and other shareholders usually occur. In contrast, shareholder proposals are sometimes accepted. In May 2021,
Climate Action 100+, the world’s largest investor initiative on climate change, requested disclosure on whether General Electric (GE)
would rise to the occasion and meet the criteria of the net 0 indicator as laid out in the Climate Action 100+ net-zero company
benchmark.1 GE’s board of directors was asked to vote in favor of this shareholder proposal, and nearly all shareholders voted in favor,
with a 98% approval rate.2 Environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) and sustainability reporting are important issues for
companies (KPMG (2022)); in particular, companies can no longer ignore activist shareholders.3 Accordingly, academic interest in
shareholder activism on environmental issues is rising, especially in the fields of accounting and business administration. For example,
Rodrigue and Michelon (2021) present a comprehensive survey including its nature, history, current development and academic
research.

* Corresponding author. Faculty of Economics, Osaka University of Economics, 2-2-8 Osumi, Higashiyodogawa-ku, Osaka 533-8533, Japan .
E-mail addresses: y.tomoda@osaka-ue.ac.jp (Y. Tomoda), ouchida@hiroshima-u.ac.jp (Y. Ouchida).
1
This edited transcript is available at the following website: https://www.ge.com/sites/default/files/ge_webcast_transcript_05042021.pdf.
2
For this information, see the press release of As You Sow, a non-profit foundation, at the following website: https://www.asyousow.org/press-
releases/2021/5/4/shareholders-want-ge-take-climate-action.
3
In recent years, in addition to requests from activist shareholders, firms have also been required to comply with due diligence-related laws. See
also footnote 9.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2023.102883
Received 3 December 2022; Received in revised form 17 June 2023; Accepted 11 September 2023
Available online 17 September 2023
0095-0696/© 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Y. Tomoda and Y. Ouchida Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 122 (2023) 102883

In contrast, environmental economics has focused on corporate behaviors and government policies rather than environmental
shareholder activism in ECSR research. Previous research on ECSR can be categorized into the following two streams. The first stream
is voluntary action taken by profit-maximizing firms.4 Hirose et al. (2020) classify the reasons for ECSR as a voluntary initiative: (1)
demand expansion by targeting consumers interested in green design and pollution reduction, (2) avoidance or relaxation of strict
government regulations, and (3) avoidance of negative activist campaigns and boycotts. The second stream assumes that the objective
function of ECSR firms is a weighted average of profit and environmental damage (including consumer surplus in some cases) and then
analyzes how the existence of such ECSR firms affects equilibrium and economic welfare in an oligopolistic market.5
The first research stream above attempts to explain firms’ voluntary ECSR behavior as a result of their strategic actions, taking into
account stakeholders such as consumers, governments and others. However, even though the most influential stakeholder in corporate
management is the owner of the company, i.e., the shareholder, few existing theoretical studies on environmental economics have
considered the influence of shareholders on corporate behavior.6 In the second research stream above, the weight of environmental
considerations in the firm’s objective function has been given exogenously.7 However, as mentioned above, conflicts of interest be­
tween shareholders over attitudes toward the environment have arisen, such as at the DuPont, ExxonMobil and GE shareholder
meetings, which are symbolic cases where shareholders significantly influence corporate decision-making on environmental issues.
This suggests that the weight of environmental considerations should be determined endogenously by the firm’s shareholder
composition because the purpose of stock companies is to maximize shareholders’ benefits. Thus, changes in a firm’s shareholder
composition must change its objective function. However, there is little literature on the endogenous determination of shareholder
composition and how it affects firms’ ECSR behaviors.
Based on the above awareness of the issues, we analyze how some firms transform themselves into ECSR firms through stock
trading by environmental activists. This paper presents a simplified partial equilibrium model focusing on the stock market. In our
model, there are many homogeneous entrepreneurs who need capital to set up their firms. The equities are purchased by two types of
investors: profit seekers interested only in monetary gain, and environmental activists interested not only in stock dividends but also
environmental issues. Firms’ environmental investments reduce both environmental pollution and corporate profits, causing a conflict
of interest between the two types of shareholders. The composition of shareholders has a critical impact on corporate decision making.
The results of our analysis are as follows. A firm with a high proportion of environmental activists among its shareholders makes
environmental investments and thus becomes a less attractive investment destination for profit seekers. Conversely, even if envi­
ronmental activists purchase the equities of a firm with a high proportion of profit-seeking shareholders, it would be difficult to induce
the firm to invest in the environment. In the stock market, investors buy (sells) when the stock price is lower (higher) than their
willingness-to-pay (WTP). Therefore, even if similar entrepreneurs initially established similar firms, changes in shareholder
composition through stock market trading result in firm bifurcation: ECSR and non-ECSR firms.
Furthermore, we consider two extended models to verify the robustness of the above results. The first extended model considers the
case where profit-maximizing firms engage in voluntary ECSR behavior; we also confirm that a bifurcation occurs through stock
market trading. The second extension analyzes the case where there is a distribution of firms with heterogeneous abatement costs. The
second extended model shows that environmental activists preferentially purchase equities of firms with low abatement costs and that
the ratio of ECSR firms in the economy depends on the amount funds held by environmental activists.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 analyzes the stock market equi­
librium and shows that homogeneous firms endogenously bifurcate into ECSR and non-ECSR firms. Section 4 examines two extensions
of the basic model. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.

2. The model

We consider a partial equilibrium model focusing on the stock market. Entrepreneurs raise capital by issuing equities to establish
their firms. The amount of equity issued by a single entrepreneur is normalized to 1. There are two types of investors: those who
demand maximum dividends and those who are concerned with both dividends and firms’ pollution abatement. We refer to the former
as profit seekers and the latter as environmental activists. The shareholder composition of the two types of investors determines the
objective function of the firms. For simplicity, we do not consider any government policies.
Firms gain revenue R from their products without any production cost while generating pollution. For simplicity, R is given
exogenously. We assume that firms can reduce pollution by making abatement investments; the cost of abatement is given as C = zXα ,
where α > 1. Therein, X and z denote the amount of the abatement and a positive parameter associated with the efficiency of
abatement technology, respectively. Thus, the profit including the cost of the abatement is

4
See, for example, Hirose et al. (2020), Hirose and Matsumura (2022), Liu et al. (2015), Lambertini and Tampieri (2015) and Lyon and Maxwell
(2004).
5
See, for example, Bárcena-Ruiz and Sagasta (2022), Buccella et al. (2022), Fukuda and Ouchida (2020), Wang (2021) and Xu et al. (2022). The
paper by Buccella et al. (2022) is one of the seminal works that examines strategic ECSR under green managerial delegation.
6
On the other hand, there is much debate in the field of business administration over CSR-interested investors’ influence over corporate managers
to adopt CSR behaviors. For example, Mackey et al. (2022) compare reward and punishment strategies by large institutional investors seeking to
promote CSR.
7
For example, see Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Fukuda and Ouchida (2020), Wang (2021) and others.

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Y. Tomoda and Y. Ouchida Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 122 (2023) 102883

Π = R − zX α . (1)

The profit seeker is only interested in dividends and, thus, claims to maximize Π. The environmental activist demands maximizing the
weighted average of the profits and reductions in environmental pollution. Assume that investors’ utility is measured in monetary
units. Each type of investor receives utility from one unit of equity as follows:
UPS = Π, (2)

UEA = γΠ + (1 − γ)μX, (3)

where γ ∈ (0, 1). The subscripts PS and EA denote profit seekers and environmental activists, respectively. μ > 0 is the monetary value
per unit of abatement assessed by the environmental activist.
The firm’s objective function is the weighted average of the proportion of equities held by each type of investor, as given by
V = βUPS + (1 − β) UEA . (4)

Denote β ∈ [0, 1] and 1 − β as the proportion of equities held by profit seekers and environmental activists, respectively, in a repre­
sentative firm.
Our model consists of the following two stages:

Stage 1 Investors trade equities in the stock market; the equity price is formulated. The shareholder composition β is determined.
Stage 2 Each firm produces goods and decides the level of abatement X. All profits are distributed to shareholders as dividends.

3. Equilibrium

First, we focus on Stage 2. From (2), (3) and (4), we have the firm’s objective function as V = [β + (1 − β)γ](R − zXα ) + (1 − β)(1 −
γ)μX. The smaller β and γ are, the higher is this firm’s interest in ECSR. Because the production level is given exogenously, the firm
decides X to maximize V. Thus, we obtain
[ ]1 [ ]α−1 1 [ ]α
(1 − β)(1 − γ)μ α− 1 1 (1 − β)(1 − γ)μ α− 1
X= ,Π=R − . (5)
[β + (1 − β)γ]αz z [β + (1 − β)γ]α

A larger β leads to a lower abatement X and a higher dividend Π from the firm.
Next, we consider Stage 1. Since investors trade equities by comparing the utility gained from one unit of equity with the price of
the equity, (2) and (3) are the WTPs for equities. Substituting (5) into (2) and (3), investors’ WTPs for equity are, respectively,

Fig. 1. Changes in stock price and shareholder composition.

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Y. Tomoda and Y. Ouchida Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 122 (2023) 102883

[ ]α−1 1 [ ]α
1 (1 − β)(1 − γ)μ α− 1
WTPPS = Π = R − , (6)
z [β + (1 − β)γ]α

[ ]α−1 1
(1 − β)(1 − γ) [αβ + (α − 1)(1 − β)γ](1 − γ)
(7)
α
WTPEA = γΠ + (1 − γ)μX = γR + μα− 1 .
[β + (1 − β)γ]αz [β + (1 − β)γ]α

From (6) and (7), we straightforwardly have

α [ ]α−1 1 [ ]2αα−− 11
∂WTPPS [(1 − γ)μ]α− 1 1 − β 1
= > 0, (8)
∂β α− 1 αz β + (1 − β)γ

[ ]α−α 1 [ ]α−1 1 [ ]2αα−− 11

∂WTPEA β (1 − γ)μ 1 1
=− < 0. (9)
∂β α− 1 1− β αz β + (1 − β)γ

From (8), WTPPS is a monotonic increasing function of β and has a maximum value of R at β = 1. On the other hand, WTPEA is a
[ ]α−1 1 [ ]α
(1− γ)μ α− 1
monotonic decreasing function of β with a maximum value of γR + (α − 1) zγ1 α at β = 0. That is, firms in which environ­
mental activists (profit seekers) hold a large number of shares are less attractive for profit seekers (environmental activists) as equity
investment targets.
See Fig. 1. The equity price is denoted by P. When the equity price is higher (lower) than the WTPs of both types of investments,
they sell (buy) equities, and thus the stock price falls (rises). In the region between the WTPs of both types of investments, the
shareholder composition β changes because one type of investor buys equities and the other type sells equities. Therefore, Fig. 1 has
two stable equilibria, EPS and EEA . This result is summarized as follows.
Proposition 1. The shareholder composition of all firms converges to either β = 0 or β = 1. That is, firms bifurcate into ECSR and non-ECSR
firms.
When two types of shareholders hold equities in a firm, their relative powers depend proportionally on their equity holdings.
Investors buy equities in firms that increase their own utility and sell equities in firms that do not. Firms with more profit seekers
(environmental activists) in their shareholder composition become more attractive to profit-seeker (environmental activist) investors.
Thus, the shareholder composition of each firm becomes homogeneous through equity trading, and eventually β converges to zero or
one. That is, ECSR firms with β = 0 and non-ECSR firms with β = 1 arise endogenously.
There are two market equilibria in Fig. 1: EPS and EPS . When a firm reaches EPS (EPS ), all shareholders become profit seekers
(environmental activists). Substituting β = 0 or β = 1 into (5), we have
XPS = 0, Π PS = R, (10)

[ ]1 [ ]α−1 1 [ ]α
(1 − γ)μ α− 1 1 (1 − γ)μ α− 1
XEA = , Π EA = R − . (11)
γ αz z γα

Firms for which all of their shareholders are profit seekers become non-ECSR firms and thus do not engage in any abatements. In
contrast, firms for which all of their shareholders are environmental activists become ECSR firms. From (10) and (11), the profits of
non-ECSR firms are higher than those of ECSR firms, Π PS − Π EA > 0. In contrast, the sign of PPS − PEA is ambiguous. Since the investor’s
WTP equals the stock price in equilibria, we have
PPS = R, (12)
[ [ ]α−1 1 [ ]α]
1 (1 − γ)μ α− 1
PEA = γ R + (α − 1) . (13)
z γα

[ ] α [ ]α−1 1
If R < (α − 1) αμ α− 1 1−γzγ , then PPS < PEA is valid. Consequently, non-ECSR firms pay higher dividends than ECSR firms, while the
equity prices of ECSR firms can be higher.

4. Extended model

In the previous section, we consider a simple model to show how firms diverge into ECSR and non-ECSR firms. In this section, we
examine two extensions to verify the robustness of the model.

4.1. Demand expansion from ECSR

In the basic model in the previous section, firms owned solely by profit seekers do not make abatement investments because

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Y. Tomoda and Y. Ouchida Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 122 (2023) 102883

emission abatement does not improve firms’ revenues. However, as discussed in the Introduction, results in the literature indicate that
profit-maximizing firms could make voluntary ECSR-related investments because ECSR behaviors increase a firm’s profitability in
several cases. Thus, we examine whether the results derived in the previous section hold even when the firm’s revenue is an increasing
function of emissions abatement.
We set the firm’s revenue as R + φX, where R is a positive constant as in the previous model. The demand-expansion effect from
abatement is represented by φX, where φ > 0 denotes the marginal effect of abatement on revenue. In the same manner as in the
previous section, the firm’s objective function is rewritten as V = [β + (1 − β)γ](R + φX − zXα ) + (1 − β)(1 − γ)μX. By maximizing V
with respect to X, we have
[ ( )] 1
1 (1 − β)(1 − γ)μ α− 1
X= φ+ , (14)
αz β + (1 − β)γ

[ 1 ]α−1 1 [ ]α2−− 1α
instead of (5). From (14), ∂X
∂β = − αz
β)(1− γ)μ
φ + (1−β+(1− β)γ
(1− γ)μ
(α− 1)[β+(1− β)γ]2
< 0, which implies that the more profit-seeking shareholders
there are, the less firms abate emissions.
The willingness-to-pay for each type of investor is rewritten as follows:
[ ]
(α − 1)φ (1 − β)(1 − γ)μ
WTPPS = Π = R + φX − zX α = R + − X, (15)
α α[β + (1 − β)γ]
[ ]
(α − 1)γφ [αβ + (α − 1)(1 − β)γ](1 − γ)μ
WTPEA = γΠ + (1 − γ)μX = γR + + X. (16)
α α[β + (1 − β)γ]

From (15) and (16), we have

[ ]
∂WTPPS (1 − β)(1 − γ)μ ∂X
= − > 0, (17)
∂β β + (1 − β)γ ∂β
[ ]
∂WTPEA β(1 − γ)μ ∂X
= < 0. (18)
∂β β + (1 − β)γ ∂β
Equations (17) and (18) are monotonic increasing and monotonic decreasing functions of β, respectively, and essentially same as
(8) and (9). That is, for each type of investor, firms in which another type of investor has a lower shareholding ratio are also more
attractive investment targets, even when voluntary abatement increases profits. Therefore, the process of changes in stock price and
shareholder composition in the stock market is illustrated in the same manner as in Fig. 1. That is, there is a bifurcation into proactive
ECSR firms that abate at a level above profit maximization and profit-maximizing firms that engage in voluntary emissions abatement.
In our model, environmental activists gain utility by a weighted average of dividends and abatement achieved by firms. Thus, even
if firms voluntarily engage in ECSR behaviors at profit-maximizing levels, environmental activists demand further abatement. Firms
attempt to maximize the weighted average of the utilities of both types of shareholders. Therefore, there is a conflict of interest over
management policies between profit seekers and environmental activists. Since the share composition of firms owned by both types of
shareholders is unstable, they diverge into proactive ECSR and profit-maximizing firms through stock trading.

4.2. Firm heterogeneity

The basic model assumes that homogeneous entrepreneurs issue equities to raise capital and establish homogeneous firms. In
contrast, this subsection considers heterogeneous firms with different abatement cost parameters z. As in the basic model, the firm’s
revenue R is assumed to be a positive constant, but z ∈ R++ follows a probability density function f(z).
From (8) and (9), WTPPS and WTPEA are increasing and decreasing functions of β, respectively. Thus, regardless of the value of z,
there is the conflict of interest between the two types of shareholders. Fig. 1 and Proposition 1 hold for firms with any z. Therefore, for
all firms, either β = 0 or β = 1 is the only stable equilibrium candidate for the shareholder composition achieved in the stock market.
The stock prices in equilibrium are given by (12) and (13). Fig. 2 shows the stock prices PPS and PEA after the homogeneous
shareholder structure has been reached in the stock market. PPS is independent of z because PS firms do not abate emissions. On the
other hand, environmental activists gain utility from the abatement achieved. Since PEA is a decreasing function of z, they prefer firms
with low abatement costs. Here, we define ̃ z as the abatement cost parameter of the firm which will face with the same stock price
( )α− 1 ( μ)α
regardless of whether the firm becomes an ECSR or a non-ECSR firm. From (12), (13) and PPS = PEA , then we have ̃ z = 1−γ γ α−R 1 α .
Thus, PPS < PEA (z) (PPS > PEA (z)) is valid for z < ̃
z (z > ̃
z).
The ratio of ECSR firms in the economy depends on the amount of funds held by both types of investors. For simplicity, we assume
that profit seekers have sufficient funds to purchase equities of all firms with z ∈ [̃
z, ∞) at the equilibrium price. In this case, envi­
ronmental activists have no incentive to purchase equities of a firm with z ∈ [̃
z, ∞) because WTPEA is lower than PPS with z ∈ [̃z,∞); all
firms with z ∈ [̃
z, ∞) become non-ECSR firms.
On the other hand, firms with z ∈ (0, ̃z] can potentially be ECSR firms. The amount of funds needed to purchase all the equities of
∫ z̃
these firms is K ≡ 0 PEA (z)f(z)dz. Define FEA as the total amount of funds held by environmental activists. If FEA ≥ K, environmental

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Y. Tomoda and Y. Ouchida Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 122 (2023) 102883

Fig. 2. The stock prices if each type of shareholder holds shares in a firm with z.

activists purchase all equities with z ∈ (0,̃

z], and thus profit seekers have no incentive to purchase equities of these firms because WTPPS
is lower than PEA with z ∈ (0, ̃z]. Therefore, firms with z ∈ (0, ̃ z] become ECSR firms. On the other hand, if FEA < K, environmental
activists cannot buy all the equities of firms with z ∈ (0, ̃z]. In this case, environmental activists purchase the equities from firms with
∼ ∫ ẑ
high WTPEA ; there exists ̂z such that 0 < ̂z < z and FEA = 0 PEA (z)f(z)dz. In conclusion, firms with z ∈ (0, ̂z ] (with z ∈ [̂z ,∞)) become
ECSR firms (non-ECSR firms).

5. Concluding remarks

The above model explains a mechanism by which ECSR and non-ECSR firms rise through stock market adjustments. The ratio of
ECSR and non-ECSR firms in the economy depends on the total amounts of funds of profit seekers versus environmental activists. This
means that as long as profit-seeking investors exist, not all firms voluntarily adopt ECSR. Our model provides the insight that the
environmental activist is behind in the voluntary initiative.
Voluntary greenhouse gas (GHG) emission restrictions/abatements and concerns over sustainability are widely observed. For
example, the Chemistry Industry Association of Canada, which includes firms from Canada’s chemistry and plastics sectors as members
and partners, has engaged in voluntary initiatives to continuously improve environmental, health, and safety performance since 1985.
Furthermore, the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) started the Keidanren Voluntary Action Plan on the Environment in 1997.
Thus, it may be justified that environmental regulations become unnecessary if all firms sufficiently adopted voluntary actions for the
environment or the ECSR.8 On the other hand, the fundamental question of whether CSR can be an alternative for public regulation has
been approached by Frynas (2012), Levis (2006), Polishchuk (2009) and others. This paper also addresses significant implications for
this question. From our analysis, two types of firms invariably arise—ECSR and non-ECSR firms. Thus, public regulations are also
needed to make non-ECSR firms socially concerned.9 In conclusion, the presence of environmental activists in the stock market plays
an important role in turning some firms into ECSR firms, but it cannot turn all firms into ECSR firms. Therefore, public regulation such
as the due diligence in the EU, should coexist with voluntary CSR behaviors.
The theoretical contributions of this paper can be summarized by the following two points. The first is that this paper presents a
theory for explaining the endogenous emergence of ECSR firms, which has been overlooked in previous studies even though it is a
fundamental question in ECSR research. We show that if the stock market is perfectly competitive, where all shareholders are price
takers, endogenous bifurcation into CSR firms and non-CSR firms occurs. The second contribution of this paper is to succeed in
connecting the discussion of ECSR models and finance, especially with respect to shareholders, which have been considered separately.
The tractable model of this paper may provide a benchmark for future research.
Our results depend on the assumption that the stock market is perfectly competitive where all shareholders cannot take strategic

8
In previous studies, environmental regulation has been understood to be aimed at internalizing the negative externality from firms and to
provide incentives for pollution abatement. For example, see Buccella et al. (2021), Greaker and Rosendahl (2008), Lambertini (2017), Lambertini
et al. (2017), Nicolaï (2019) and Requate (2005a, 2005b).
9
In fact, CSR is not only voluntary but also currently becoming mandatory. For example, in February 2022, the European Commission published a
legislative proposal for mandatory corporate due diligence obligations with respect to human rights and environmental issues. For details, see
European Commission (2022a, b). Such public regulations have been enacted in some countries, e.g., France, Germany (European Commission
2022b).

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Y. Tomoda and Y. Ouchida Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 122 (2023) 102883

actions. However, empirical findings suggest that activist shareholders target specific companies. Rehbein et al. (2004) find that
activists target the most visible (largest) companies and those that raise specific issues of interest to society. Additionally, Lenox and
Eesley (2009) propose that the larger, more visible, and more polluting a firm is, the more likely it will be targeted. Our perfectly
competitive model does not allow us to analyze such strategic behavior by activists. Furthermore, the result in our extended model that
environmental activists preferentially purchase the equities from firms with superior pollution-reducing technologies is not necessarily
consistent with the empirical results. A next step would be to fill this theoretical and empirical gap by accounting for the strategic
behavior of shareholders. It is expected that the analysis of the strategic behaviors of institutional investors interested in environmental
issues versus those seeking only financial gain will be complex and could be a topic for future research.

Declaration of interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest associated with this manuscript.

Funding

This study was financially supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Grant
Numbers 19K01606 and 19K01675.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are
the sole responsibility of the authors.

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