CRIMINAL LAW 1 anguish by failing to financially support his wife
Notes 2 and maintain open communication with her.
(JD 1 – SP-C)
G. General Principles
1. Mala In Se
It is an act that is "wrong in itself," in its
very nature being illegal because it violates the
natural, moral or public principles of a civilized
society.
 robbery
 rape
 murder
 theft
 shoplifting
 vandalism
 trespassing
Acharon v. People, G.R. No. 224946, November
9, 2021
Facts:
The petitioner, Christian Pantonial
Acharon, was charged with violating Section 5 (i)
of Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence
Against Women and their Children Act (VAWC
Law). The Information filed against him alleged
that he willfully and unlawfully caused mental or
emotional anguish to his wife by denying
financial support. Christian pleaded not guilty to
the charge and a trial ensued.
The prosecution presented evidence that
Christian and his wife had borrowed money to
send him to work in Brunei. However, Christian
failed to regularly send money to his wife, causing
her embarrassment and distress. It was also
revealed that Christian had a paramour in Brunei.
On the other hand, Christian denied the accusations
and claimed that he had sent money to his wife, but
she refused to accept it. He also argued that his
extended stay in Brunei was due to unforeseen
circumstances such as a fire and a vehicular
accident.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in finding Christian
guilty of causing psychological or emotional
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the appeal and
acquitted Christian of the charge. The Court
emphasized that Christian's criminal liability should
be based solely on his alleged failure to provide
financial support, as stated in the Information.
The Court held that the failure to provide
financial support alone is not punishable under
R.A. 9262 unless there is evidence that the accused
willfully withheld support to inflict mental or
emotional anguish. The Court clarified that the
actus reus of the offense is the willful denial of
financial support, while the mens rea is the intention
to inflict mental or emotional anguish. Both
elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt
for a conviction under Section 5 (i) of R.A. 9262.
2. Mens Rea and Actus Rea
Mens Rea
Mens rea refers to the guilty mind, the
wrongful intention, of an accused. Its function in
criminal law is to prevent the conviction of the
morally innocent- those who do not understand or
intend the consequences of their acts.
Mens rea is a contemporaneous mental
element comprising an intention to carry out the
prohibited physical act or omission to act; that is
to say a particular state of mind such as the intent to
cause, or some foresight of, the results of the act or
the state of affairs.
Thus, typically, mens rea is concerned with
the mental element accompanying the
consequences of the prohibited actus reus.
Actus Rea
Actus reus is a legal term used in criminal
law to describe the physical act or conduct that
constitutes a crime. It refers to the external or
observable elements of a crime, such as an
action, omission, or possession of an illegal
substance.

To establish criminal liability, the
prosecution must prove that the accused
committed a prohibited act, or actus reus, and had
the required mental state, or mens rea, at the time of
the offense.
For example, in a theft case, the actus reus
would be the physical act of taking someone else's
property without permission, while the mens rea
would be the intention or knowledge of
committing the theft.
3. Mala prohibita
Mala prohibita refers to actions that are
illegal simply because laws forbid them.
Mala prohibita is a Latin phrase that
translates to "wrong because it is prohibited." In
criminal law, the term mala prohibita refers to when
something is made illegal by a criminal statute.
Mala prohibita crimes also include (but are
not limited to), copyright infringement, drug
usage, government criticism, indecent exposure,
pornography, white-collar crimes, petty theft,
parking offenses, and disrupting funeral
ceremonies.
Lim v. People, 340 497 (2000)
Facts:
Rosa Lim bought various jewelries worth
300,000 PHP and 241,668 on separate dates from
Maria Antonia Seguan's store.
Lim issued two (2) separate checks, both
drawn on Metrobank, for the payment of the items.
When Seguan deposited the two (2) checks
with her bank, they were returned with a notice of
dishonor because Lim's account was closed.
Upon demand, Lim promised to pay
Seguan the amount of the dishonored checks, but
she never did.
Both the RTC and CA found Lim guilty of
violating BP 22 and was sentenced to one (1) year
imprisonment for each of the two (2) violations and
to pay two (2) fines, each amounting to 200,000
PHP.
Lim’s defense was that the checks were
never issued to Seguan and that they had no pre-
existing transaction. The checks were issued to
Aurelia Nadera as mere "guarantee" and as a
"security arrangement" to cover the value of jewelry
she was to sell on consignment basis
Issue:
WON Lim is guilty of violation of BP 22.
Held:
Yes. Petitioner never denied issuing the two
checks. She argued that the checks
were not issued to Seguan and that they had no pre-
existing transaction.
The checks were issued to Aurelia Nadera as
mere guarantee and as a security arrangement to
cover the value of jewelry she was to sell on
consignment basis.
The Court held that these defenses cannot
save the day for her. The first and last elements of
the offense are admittedly present. To escape
liability, she must prove that the second element
was absent, that is, at the time of issue of the
checks, she did not know that her funds in the
bank account
were insufficient. She did not prove this.
B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption
juris tantum that the second
element prima facie exists when the first and third
elements of the offense are present. If not rebutted,
it suffices to sustain a conviction.
4. Difference between Mala In Se and Mala
Prohibita

H. INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS
1. Doctrine of Pro Reo
The Doctrine of Pro Reo provides that
whenever a penal law is to be construed or
applied and the law admits of two interpretations,
one lenient to the offender and one strict to the
offender, that interpretation which is lenient or
favorable to the offender will be adopted.
Bongalon v. People, 694 SCRA 12 (2013)
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with child abuse, an
act in violation of Section 10(a) of RA 7610, for
allegedly committing acts of physical abuse
and/or maltreatment by striking Jayson Dela
Cruz (12 year old) with his palm hitting the
latter at his back and by slapping said minor
hitting his left cheek and uttering derogatory
remarks to the latter’s family, which acts of the
accused are prejudicial to the child’s development
and which demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of the said child as a human being.
Petitioner denied having physically
abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that
he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after his
minor daughters, Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn,
had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s
throwing stones at them and about Jayson’s
burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting
invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight,
insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his
sons from harming his daughters.
RTC and CA found and declared
petitioner guilty of child abuse.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was guilty of the crime
charged
Ruling: NO.
Although we affirm the factual findings of
fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the
petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his
hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree
with their holding that his acts constituted child
abuse within the purview of the above-quoted
provisions.
The records did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on
Jayson had been intended to debase the
“intrinsic worth and dignity” of Jayson as a
human being, or that he had thereby intended to
humiliate or embarrass Jayson.
The records showed the laying of hands on
Jayson to have been done at the spur of the
moment and in anger, indicative of his being then
overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the
personal safety of his own minor daughters who
had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson
and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he
lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
as a human being that was so essential in the
crime of child abuse.
What crime, then, did the petitioner
commit? Considering that Jayson’s physical injury
required 5-7 days of medical attention, the
petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries
under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the
decision of the CA; and ENTER a new judgment
finding him GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES
under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised
Penal Code.
People v. Gonzales, 361 SCRA350 (2001)
Facts:
Early February 1991: the police received an
information that Romeo Gonzales was selling
large quantities of marijuana.
February 13, 1991: After 4 days of
surveillance, they conducted a buy-bust
entrapment operation. Their informant introduced
Sgt. Ortiz to Gonzales as a buyer (poseur-buyer) of
1 kg. marijuana for P1,200.
Then, Ortiz took out his handkerchief as a
pre-arranged signal so the team immediately rushed
 to the scene introducing themselves as Narcom
agents and arrested Gonzales. Sgt. Ortiz handed
over the bag of marijuana to Pfc. Danilo Cruz.
The team confiscated 1 more bag
containing 2 blocks of marijuana weighing about
1.5 kg and 10 medium size plastic bags
containing 300 grams of marijuana. The tests
yielded positive indications for the presence of
tetrahydrocannabinol, or THC
Gonzales orally admitted that he was
selling marijuana to different buyers, but claimed
that somebody else owned the marijuana he
sold. When asked to identify the owner, he kept
silent.
2 informations charging Gonzales with
violation of RA 6425:
o Crim. Case No. 91-180: possession, custody and
control of 2 block size of marijuana weighing
(1.5 kilos) and 10 medium size plastic bags of dry
marijuana weighing (300 grams)
o Crim. Case No. 91-181: selling more or less 1 kilo
of high-grade marijuana
RTC: Romeo Gonzales guilty for Violation
of Sections 8 and 4, Art. II., RA 6425 and imposes
penalty of imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day and
a fine of P6,000 for Criminal Case No. 91-180,
life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000 for
Criminal Case No. 91-181.
Gonzales: Victim of a frame-up since he
was inside the comfort room of a neighbor from
whom he borrowed P100 to buy medicines for his
sick mother and he was just wearing underwear
when he was brought out of the house. – NOT
proven
A warrant of arrest is not essential
because the violator is caught in flagrante
delicto. Searches made incidental thereto are valid.
Issue:
W/N the Indeterminate Sentence Law should
apply to Crim. Case No. 91-180
Held:
YES. AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case No. 91-181,
life imprisonment and fine of P20,000. In Criminal
Case No. 91-180, indeterminate penalty of 2
years and 4 months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor,
as maximum, and to pay a fine of P6,000.
The Dangerous Drugs Act, Sec. 8 (special
law) prescribes as penalty for possession of Indian
hemp (marijuana), regardless of amount, an
imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years,
and a fine of P6,000 to P12,000. Applying the pro
reo doctrine in criminal law (when in doubt favour
the accused), we hold that the penalty prescribed in
R. A. No. 6425, Section 8 while not using the
nomenclature of the penalties under the RPC is
actually prision mayor. Consequently, it is the first
part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, which shall apply in imposing the
indeterminate sentence.
2. Rule of Lenity
This applies when the court is faced with
two interpretations of a penal statute, one that is
prejudicial to the accused and another that is
favorable to him. Rule of lenity dictates that the
court should adopt the interpretation more
favorable to the accused.
Go v. Dimagiba, 460 SCRA451 (2005)
Facts:
Dimagiba issued Go thirteen checks
that were subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for the reason “Account
Closed”.
Go lodged a complaint against Dimagiba
for violating B.P. 22 in the MTCC of Baguio
City (Branch 4) which convicted the
respondent on July 16, 1999 for 13 counts of
violation of the law a quo.
Dimagiba was also ordered to serve 2-
month imprisonment for each count and a
fine of 1,295,000 pesos.
The MTCC issued an Order directing
the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his
sentence and a Writ of Execution for the
enforcement of his civil liability. Dimagiba was
arrested on September 28, 2001.

Dimagiba filed a Petition of Habeas
Corpus in Baguio City RTC Branch 5. The
court ordered the immediate release of the
respondent and ordered Dimagiba to pay
100,000 pesos in lieu of his imprisonment.
The court justified this modification by
invoking the SC ruling on Vaca v. Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court Administrative
Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000, which allegedly
required the imposition of only a fine instead
of imprisonment for BP 22 violations,
provided that the accused was not a recidivist
or a habitual delinquent.
The RTC held that this rule should be
retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba. It
further noted that (1) he was a first-time
offender; and (2) the civil liability had already
been satisfied through the levy of his
properties.
Petitioner Susan Go elevated the case to the
Supreme Court assailing the order a quo.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not habeas corpus is a
proper remedy since the case has
conclusively been decided.
2. Whether or not the SC-AC No. 12-2000
deleted the imposition of the penalty of
imprisonment if a fine has already been
imposed.
3. Whether or not the preferential
imposition of a fine in lieu of
imprisonment as allegedly enunciated in
SA-AC No. 12-2000 shall be applied in
the case at bar as the respondent is not a
“first-time offender”.
RULING:
On the first question of law.
No, the writ of habeas corpus may not
be availed of when the person in custody is
under a judicial process or by virtue of a
valid judgment. The writ of habeas
corpus applies to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention in which individuals
are deprived of liberty. It was devised as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint; or, more
specifically, to obtain immediate relief for
those who may have been illegally confined
or imprisoned without sufficient cause and
thus deliver them from unlawful custody.
However, as a post-conviction remedy, it
may be allowed when, as a consequence of a
judicial proceeding, any of the following
exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1)
there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of
a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed
penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the
sentence as to such excess. The remedy should
have been an appeal of the MTCC Order
denying his Motions, in which he should have
prayed that the execution of the judgment be
stayed.
On the second question of law.
No, SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not
delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment.
The competence to amend the law belongs to
the legislature, not to the Court. The circular in
question, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001,
merely established a rule of preference in
imposing the above penalties. When the
circumstances of the case clearly indicate
good faith or a clear mistake of fact without
taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine
alone may be considered as the preferred
penalty.
On the third question of law.
Not necessarily. Being not a first-time
offender is not a sole factor in determining
whether he deserves the preferred penalty of
fine alone. It is in the trial court’s discretion
to impose any penalty within the confines of
the law (SC-AC No. 13-2001).
People v. Sultan, 331 SCRA 350 (2001)
Facts:
 Juditha M. Bautista. According to her, on 2
June 1997 at 9:00 o'clock in the evening she was on
her way home from a visit to her cousin Cristina
Mansilongan in Novaliches, Quezon City;... when
she passed the dark alley in her cousin's compound
she was accosted by someone, later identified as
accused-appellant Fernando L. Sultan, who
pointed a sharp instrument at her neck and
announcing it was a "hold-up."
He grabbed her and brought her to a house
along the alley... which turned out to be his. Once
inside the house, he made her sit down. He offered
her a drink; she refused it. Then he started
divesting her of her watch, ring, earrings, and
necklace the values of which are now reflected in
the Decision of the court a quo, and her cash of
P130.00.
After taking her valuables, he started
kissing her on the lips and cheeks. As if to
discourage him from making further sexual
advances, she told him that she was married with
two (2) children but accused-appellant was not
dissuaded from pursuing his intentions. While
pointing an ice pick at her he ordered her to
undress. She acceded for fear that he would kill her
as she was under constant threat. After she had
completely undressed, accused-appellant ordered
her to lie down on the floor. He then kissed her
again from head down. Still she could not resist him
because of fear. He went on top of her, held her two
(2) hands on the level of her head, spread her
thighs and inserted his penis into her vagina. The
coital encounter lasted for ten (10) to fifteen (15)
minutes.
Issues:
The Court held that the additional rapes
committed should not be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance despite a resultant
"anomalous situation" wherein robbery with rape
would be on the same level as robbery with multiple
rapes in terms of gravity.
Ruling:
The Court realized that there was no law
providing for the additional rape/s or homicide/s
for that matter to be considered as aggravating
circumstance. It further observed that the
enumeration of aggravating circumstances under
Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive,
unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code... which
enumerates the mitigating circumstances where
analogous circumstances may be considered, hence,
the remedy lies with the legislature. Consequently,
unless and until a law is passed providing that the
additional rape/s or homicide/s may be considered
aggravating, the Court must construe the penal law
in favor of the offender as no person may be
brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so
by the statute. Under this view, the additional rape
committed by accused-appellant is not considered
an aggravating circumstance. Applying Art. 63,...
par. (2), of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that "(i)n all cases in which the law prescribes a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application
thereof x x x x 2. (w)hen there are neither mitigating
nor... aggravating circumstances in the commission
of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied," the
lower penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed on accused-appellant.
RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF PENAL LAWS
Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term
is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code,
although at the time of the publication of such laws
a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same
.
Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874,
December 5, 2017
Facts:
Ophelia Hernan was convicted by the RTC
of the crime of malversation.
Hernan’s first counsel filed an appeal with
the Court of Appeals which had no appellate
jurisdiction over the case. The CA took cognizance
of the appeal and affirmed the conviction but later
set aside its decision for lack of jurisdiction.
Hernan procured a new counsel who
appealed to the Sandiganbayan. The SB affirmed
the conviction so the second counsel filed a motion
for reconsideration blaming the first counsel in
failing to elicit facts that would have acquitted
Hernan of the charge. The SB denied the MR in a
Resolution dated August 31, 2010 which became
final and executory on June 26, 2013.
On July 26, 2013, Hernan again changed to
a third counsel who filed a motion to reopen the
case and stay the execution of the judgment because
the second counsel allegedly failed to receive 2010
SB Resolution. Hernan’s second counsel was
appointed to the PAO and thus changed office
address. However, the SB was not notified of the
change of address.
Hernan’s counsel invoked the ruling in
People v. Chavez wherein the Court held that entry
of judgment without receipt of the Resolution
was premature. But the SB still denied the
motion to reopen on December 4, 2013 finding the
motion to be a prohibited second MR.
On January 9, 2014, Hernan’s third counsel
filed a “Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer
for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of Prayer
for Stay of Execution of Judgment”. On February
2, 2015, the SB denied the petition finding the
petition a third MR which was likewise prohibited.
Hernan’s counsel then filed a Rule 65
petition for certiorari against the final resolution
of the SB on May 14, 2015. Petitioner imputes
grave abuse of discretion in the denial of the
Sandiganbayan of her motion to reopen of the
case since evidence, not produced before the trial
court, would warrant reversal of the conviction.
Issue:
Did the Sandiganbayan gravely abuse its
discretion in denying the motion to reopen the
case? Is reopening of the case the proper remedy
after a judgment has already become final and
executory?
Ruling:
No. The SB did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying the motions to reopen the
case.
The requisites of reopening the case are:
1. the reopening must be before the
finality of a judgment of
conviction;
2. the order is issued by the judge on
his own initiative or upon motion;
3. the order is issued only after a
hearing is conducted;
4. the order intends to prevent a
miscarriage of justice; and
5. the presentation of additional and/or
further evidence should be
terminated within thirty days from
the issuance of the order.
Reopening must be before finality of
judgment. In this case, it took three years after the
entry of the judgment before a motion to reopen
the case was filed. The judgment has long
become final and executory.
But when exceptional circumstances exist,
such as the passage of an amendatory law imposing
penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused,
the Court can direct reopening of a final and
immutable judgment, the objective of which is to
correct not so much the findings of guilt but the
applicable penalties to be imposed.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL LAW
A. GENERALITY
1. Art. 14, NCC
ARTICLE 14. Penal laws and those of public
security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who
live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principles of public international law and to treaty
stipulations.
2. R.A 75
AN ACT TO PENALIZE ACTS WHICH
WOULD IMPAIR THE PROPER
OBSERVANCE BY THE REPUBLIC AND
INHABITANTS OF THE PHILIPPINES OF
THE IMMUNITIES, RIGHT, AND
PRIVILEGES OF DULY ACCREDITED
FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR
AGENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES
Section 1. Any person who shall falsely assume and
take upon himself to act as a diplomatic, consular,
or any other official of a foreign government duly
accredited as such to the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines with intent to defraud
such foreign government or the Government of the
Philippines, or any person, or in such pretended
character shall demand or obtain, or attempt to
obtain from person or from said foreign government
or the Government of the Philippines, or from any
officer thereof, any money, paper, document, or
other thing, of value, shall be fined not more than
five thousand pesos, or shall be imprisoned for not
more than five years, or both, in addition to the
penalties that may be imposed under the Revised
Penal Code.
Section 2. Any person, other than a diplomatic or
consular officer or attaché, who shall act in the
Republic of the Philippines as an agent of a foreign
government without prior notification to, and
registration with, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
shall be fined not more than five thousand pesos, or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both, aside
from other penalties that may be imposed by law.
Section 3. Any person, who with intent to deceive
or mislead, within the jurisdiction of the Republic,
wear any naval, military, police, or other official
uniform, decoration, or regalia of any foreign State,
nation or government with which the Republic of
the Philippines is at peace, or any uniform,
decoration or regalia so nearly resembling the same
as to be calculated to deceive, unless such wearing
thereof be authorized by such State, nation, or
government, shall upon conviction, be punished by
a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or by both
such fine and imprisonment.1awphil-itc-alf
Section 4. Any writ or process sued out or
prosecuted by any person in any court of the
Republic of the Philippines, or by any judge or
justice, whereby the person of any ambassador or
public minister of any foreign State, authorized and
received as such by the President, or any domestic
or domestic servant of any such ambassador or
minister is arrested or imprisoned, or his goods or
chattels are distrained, seized, or attached, shall be
deemed void, and every person by whom the same
is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as
attorney, and every officer concerned in executing
it, shall upon conviction, be punished by
imprisonment for not more than three years and a
fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos in the
discretion of the court.
Section 5. The provisions of section four hereof
shall not apply to any case where the person against
whom the process is issued is a citizen or inhabitant
of the Republic of the Philippines, in the service of
an ambassador or a public minister, and the process
is founded upon a debt contracted before he entered
upon such service; nor shall the said section apply
to any case where the person against whom the
process is issued is a domestic servant of an
ambassador or a public minister, unless the name of
the servant has, before the issuing thereof, been
registered in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and
transmitted by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to
the Chief of Police of the City of Manila, who shall
upon receipt thereof post the same in some public
place in his office. All persons shall have resort to
the list of names so posted in the office of the Chief
of Police, and take copies without fee.
Section 6. Any person who assaults, strikes,
wounds, imprisons or in any other manner offers
violence to the person of an ambassador or a public
minister, in violation of the law of nations, shall be
imprisoned not more than three years, and fined not
exceeding two hundred pesos, in the discretion of
the court, in addition to the penalties that may be
imposed under the Revised Penal Code.
Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall be
applicable only in case where the country of the
diplomatic or consular representative adversely
affected has provided for similar protection to duly
accredited diplomatic or consular representatives of
the Republic of the Philippines by prescribing like
or similar penalties for like or similar offenses
herein contained.itc-alf
Section 8. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.

U.S. v. Sweet, 1 Phil 18
CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL LAW
GENERAL
- Criminal Law is binding on all persons
who live or sojourn in PH territory. (Art.
14, Civ. Code)
- Jurisdiction of Civil Courts is not affected
by the military character of the accused.
-
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.
NATURE:
The offense charged in the complaint is punishable
under the Penal Code now in force by arresto
mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas. (Art.
418.) By Act No. 136 of the United States
Philippine Commission, section 56 (6), Courts of
First Instance are given original jurisdiction "in all
criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six
months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one
hundred dollars may be imposed." The offense was
therefore cognizable by the court below unless the
fact that the appellant was at the time of its alleged
commission an employee of the United States
military authorities in the Philippine Islands, and
the further fact that the person upon whom it is
alleged to have been committed was a prisoner of
war in the custody of such authorities, are sufficient
to deprive it of jurisdiction. We must assume that
both these facts are true, as found, either upon
sufficient evidence or upon the admissions of the
prosecuting attorney, by the court below.
FACTS:
Philip K. Sweet was an employee of the U.S. Army
in the PH. He assaulted a prisoner of war for which
he was charged with the crime of inflicting physical
injuries. The defendant-appellant interposed the
defense that the fact that he was an employee of the
U.S. military authorities deprived the court of the
jurisdiction to try and punish him.
ISSUE:
WON the fact that the offense was committed by
Philip K. Sweet, an employee of the U.S. military
authorities, deprive the court of jurisdiction
RULING:
NO.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The court found no provision limiting its
jurisdiction. The general jurisdiction conferred
upon the Courts of First Instance by Act No. 136 of
the United States Philippine Commission above
cited, and are not aware of the existence of any
such provision. The case is therefore open to the
application of the general principle that the
jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by
the military or other special character of the person
brought before them for trial, a principle firmly
established in the law of England and America and
which must, we think, prevail under any system of
jurisprudence unless controlled by express
legislation to the contrary. (United
States vs. Clark, 31 Fed. Rep., 710.)
B. TERRITORIALTY
1. Art. l, 1987 Constitution
The national territory comprises the Philippine
archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all other territories over
which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and
aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the
seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and
connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless
of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the
internal waters of the Philippines.
2. Art. 2, RPC
Application of Its Provisions. — Except as provided
in the treaties and laws of preferential application,
the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not
only within the Philippine Archipelago, including
its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime
zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against
those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine
ship or airship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency
note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and
securities issued by the Government of the
Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the
introduction into these islands of the obligations and
securities mentioned in the preceding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should
commit an offense in the exercise of their functions;
or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national
security and the law of nations, defined in Title One
of Book Two of this Code.
3. Extraterritorial Application of RA 11479 (Sec.
49)
Section 49. Extraterritorial Application. - Subject to
the provision of any treaty of which the Philippines
is a signatory and to any contrary provision of any
law of preferential application, the provisions of this
Act shall apply:
(a) To a Filipino citizen or national who
commits any of the acts defined and
penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11 and 12 of this Act outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines;
(b) To individual persons who, although
physically outside the territorial limits of the
Philippines, commit any of the crimes
mentioned in Paragraph (a) hereof inside the
territorial limits of the Philippines;
(c) To individual persons who, although
physically outside the territorial limits of the
Philippines, commit any of the said crimes
mentioned in Paragraph (a) hereof on board
Philippine ship or Philippine airship;
(d) To individual persons who commit any
of said crimes mentioned in Paragraph (a)
hereof within any embassy, consulate, or
diplomatic premises belonging to or
occupied by the Philippine government in an
official capacity;
(e) To individual persons who, although
physically outside the territorial limits of the
Philippines, commit said crimes mentioned
in Paragraph (a) hereof against Philippine
citizens or persons of Philippine descent,
where their citizenship or ethnicity was a
factor in the commission of the crime; and
(f) To individual persons who, although
physically outside the territorial limits of the
Philippines, commit said crimes directly
against the Philippine government.1avvphi1
In case of an individual who is neither a citizen or a
national of the Philippines who commits any of the
crimes mentioned in Paragraph (a) hereof outside
the territorial limits of the Philippines, the
Philippines shall exercise jurisdiction only when
such individual enters or is inside the territory of the
Philippines: Provided, That, in the absence of any
request for extradition from the state where the
crime was committed or the state where the
individual is a citizen or national, or the denial
thereof, the ATC shall refer the case to the BI for
deportation or to the DOJ for prosecution in the
same manner as if the act constituting the offense
had been committed in the Philippines.
William Reagan vs Commissioner of Internal
Revenue
William Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark
Air Base to help provide technical assistance to
the US Air Force (USAF). In April 1960 Reagan
imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at $6,. Two
months later, he got permission to sell the same
car provided that he would sell the car to a US
citizen or a member of the USAF. He sold it to
Willie Johnson, Jr. for $6, as shown by a Bill of
Sale. The sale took place within Clark Air Base.
As a result of this transaction, the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue calculated the net taxable
income of Reagan to be at P17, and that his
income tax would be P2,. Reagan paid the
assessed tax but at the same time he sought for a
refund because he claims that he is exempt.
Reagan claims that the sale took place in foreign
soil since Clark Air Base, in legal contemplation
is a base outside the Philippines. Reagan also
 cited that under the Military Bases Agreement, he,
by nature of his employment, is exempt from
Philippine taxation.
ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign
soil not subject to Philippine income tax?
HELD: No. The Philippines is independent and
sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its
entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is
beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are
supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws
govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies
must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its
jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. On the
other hand, there is nothing in the Military Bases
Agreement that lends support to Reagan’s
assertion. The Base has not become foreign soil or
territory. This country’s jurisdictional rights
therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax,
have been preserved, the Philippines merely
consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in
certain cases – this is just a matter of comity,
courtesy and expediency. It is likewise noted that
he indeed is employed by the USAF and his
income is derived from US source but the income
derived from the sale is not of US source hence
taxable.
AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, JANUARY 11,
2018.
FACTS:
Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1,
2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced two
children: CCC and DDD. In May of 2007, BBB
started working in Singapore as a chef, where he
acquired permanent resident status in September of
2008.
AAA claimed that BBB sent little to no financial
support, and only sporadically. There were also
allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of
her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual
violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly
started having an affair with a Singaporean woman
named Lisel Mok with whom he allegedly has been
living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April
19, 2011 when AAA and BBB had a violent
altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her
visit with their kids.
The investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis
to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and
emotional anguish through his alleged marital
infidelity. Accordingly, an Information was filed
against BBB for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A.
No. 9262.
On November 6, 2013, counsel of accused filed on
behalf of BBB an Omnibus Motion to Revive Case,
Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and
Warrant of Arrest. The RTC granted the motion to
quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
thereby dismissed the case. The RTC ruled that
since BBB’s acts complained of had occurred in
Singapore, said Court enjoys no jurisdiction over
the offense charged, it having transpired outside the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse
under R.A. No. 9262 may be filed within the
Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted
abroad.
HELD:
YES.
In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly
pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by
AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed
where the crime or any of its elements was
committed at the option of the complainant. While
the psychological violence as the means employed
by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable
element of the offense, equally essential also is the
element of mental or emotional anguish which is
personal to the complainant.
What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No.
9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of
violence against women and their children may
manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; x x x
Thus, a person charged with a continuing or
transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in
part committed.
We say that even if the alleged extra marital affair
causing the offended wife mental and emotional
anguish is committed abroad, the same does not
place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely
beyond the reach of Philippine courts.