G.R. No.

132601 January 19, 1999

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.

Constitutional Law; Criminal Law; Death Penalty; Republic Act No. 8177; Punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as
used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.—Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons, this Court held that “[p]unishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as
used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.” Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection
render said law “cruel, degrading or inhuman?” The Court believes not. For reasons hereafter discussed, the
implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of
administrative officials.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The “court” which designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted
the accused, that is, after this Court has reviewed the entire records of the case and has affirmed the judgment of
the lower court.—Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which “court” will fix the time and
date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the
“court” which designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused, that is, after this Court has
reviewed the entire records of the case and has affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Thereupon, the procedure is
that the “judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to
the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out
“not earlier than one (1) year nor later than eighteen (18) months after the judgment has become final and
executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times.—
Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section
15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which
provides that the death sentence shall be carried out “not earlier than one (1) year nor later than eighteen (18) months
after the judgment has become final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive
clemency powers at all times.” Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the
judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to
all his temporal and spiritual affairs.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty
inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to
extinguish life humanely.—Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of the
death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. “In a
limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering
to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for
this reason, is to go unpunished.” The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent
in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.
Numerous federal and state courts of the United States have been asked to review whether lethal injections constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. No court has found lethal injections constitute cruel and unusual punishment. No court has
found lethal injections to implicate prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights. In fact, most courts that have addressed the issue
state in one or two sentences that lethal injection clearly is a constitutional form of execution. A few jurisdictions, however,
have addressed the merits of the Eighth Amendment claims. Without exception, these courts have found that lethal
injection does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. After reviewing medical evidence that indicates that improper
doses or improper administration of the drugs causes severe pain and that prison officials tend to have little training in the
administration of the drugs, the courts have found that the few minutes of pain does not rise to a constitutional violation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; What is cruel and unusual “is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice” and “must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”—What is cruel and unusual “is not fastened to
the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice” and “must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Indeed, “[o]ther (U.S.)
courts have focused on ‘standards of decency’ finding that the widespread use of lethal injections indicates that it
comports with contemporary norms.” The primary indicator of society’s standard of decency with regard to capital
punishment is the response of the country’s legislatures to the sanction. Hence, for as long as the death penalty remains
in our statute books and meets the most stringent requirements provided by the Constitution, we must confine our inquiry
to the legality of R.A. No. 8177, whose constitutionality we duly sustain in the face of petitioner’s challenge. We find that
the legislature’s substitution of the mode of carrying out the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection infringes no
constitutional rights of petitioner herein.

Same; Distribution and Separation of Powers; Delegation of Legislative Authority; The separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in the framing of our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.—The separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in the
framing of our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.

Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; Death Penalty; R.A. No. 8177; Bureau of Corrections; Empowering the
Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, to
promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of delegation of legislative authority
to administrative bodies.—Corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers.
“The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non
delegari potest.” The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows: (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President
under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section
23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (3) Delegation to the people at large; (4) Delegation to local governments; and (5)
Delegation to administrative bodies. Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of
delegation of legislative authority to administrative bodies.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies
is the increasing complexity of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.—The reason for delegation of
authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the task of government requiring expertise as well as
the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of
society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected
to attend to by itself. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. On many problems involving day-to-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the needed competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to
say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in
the particular fields assigned to them.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the death
penalty, sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.—
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that
said law: (a) be complete in itself—it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate—and (b) fix a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable—to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions. Considering the scope and the definiteness of R.A. No. 8177, which
changed the mode of carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be
done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that “the death sentence shall
be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to
mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the
proceedings prior to the execution.”—R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy,
mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that “[t]he death sentence shall
be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate
the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the
execution.” Further, “[t]he Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be
administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict.” The legislature also mandated that “all
personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task.” The
Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the
definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Courts.
In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned
is, to use the words of Justice Benjamin Cardozo, canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Existence of an area for exercise of discretion by the Secretary
of Justice and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections under delegated legislative power is proper where
standards are formulated for the guidance and the exercise of limited discretion, which though general, are
capable of reasonable application.—Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise of discretion by the
Secretary of Justice and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections under delegated legislative power is proper where
standards are formulated for the guidance and the exercise of limited discretion, which though general, are capable of
reasonable application.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Secretary of Justice should supervise the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in consultation with the Department of Health.
—A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is no undue delegation of legislative power from the Secretary
of Justice to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that under the Administrative Code of 1987,
the Bureau of Corrections is a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice. Further, the Department of Justice is
tasked, among others, to take charge of the “administration of the correctional system.” Hence, the import of the
phraseology of the law is that the Secretary of Justice should supervise the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in
promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in consultation with the Department of Health.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the
Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative
superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177.—Thus, the Court finds in the
first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a veritable vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically
abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by
not providing for a mode of review and approval thereof. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the
Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior,
the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental
responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.

Same; Guarantee of Access to Information of Public Concern; Lethal Injection Manual; The contents of the
manual are matters of public concern “which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect
their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen.”—As to the second
paragraph of section 19, the Court finds the requirement of confidentiality of the contents of the manual even with respect
to the convict unduly suppressive. It sees no legal impediment for the convict, should he so desire, to obtain a copy of the
manual. The contents of the manual are matters of public concern “which the public may want to know, either because
these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen.”

Same; Same; Same; Incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern
is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy.—The incorporation in
the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free
flow of ideas and information in a democracy. In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope
with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making
by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.
Same; Same; Same; Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead
remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and
regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law.—While Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty
while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1)
year period following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension
of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve
after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner’s view, tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans
statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law. Being merely an implementing
rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply
and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law.
An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. In case of discrepancy between a provision of statute and a
rule or regulation issued to implement said statute, the statutory provision prevails. Since the cited clause in Section 17
which suspends the execution of a woman within the three (3) years next following the date of sentence finds no support
in Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, perforce Section 17 must be declared invalid. Echegaray vs.
Secretary of Justice, 297 SCRA 754, G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998

G.R. No. L-37878 November 25, 1932

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET AL., respondents.

1.Constitutional Law; Act No. 1446, Section 11, Validity of; Members of the Supreme Court Sitting as a Board of
Arbitrators; Division of Powers.—The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of
power in the Philippine Government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or
to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.

2.Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.—The Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction as a court and this
jurisdiction does not include the exercise of jurisdiction by the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of
arbitrators.

3.Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.—A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term and possesses none of the ju-
risdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court.

4.Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Arbitration and Award.—Arbitration represents a method of the parties' own choice. A submission
to arbitration is a contract. A clause in a contract providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred
to arbitrators and to them alone is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction. However, unless the
arbitration agreement is such as absolutely to close the doors of the courts against the parties, the courts should look with
favor upon such amicable arrangements.

5.Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Case at Bar.—Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of
a democratic government constitutionally established.

6.Id.; Id,; Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.—It would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, to sit as a board of
arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final. Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil,.
600, No. 37878 November 25, 1932

G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, MA. CORAZON M. AKOL, MIGUEL UY,
EDUARDO H. LOPEZ, AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, REX C. DRILON, MIGUEL HILADO, LEY SALCEDO, and MANUEL
ALCUAZ JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; COMELEC CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS SR.;
COMELEC BIDDING and AWARD COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN EDUARDO D. MEJOS and MEMBERS GIDEON DE
GUZMAN, JOSE F. BALBUENA, LAMBERTO P. LLAMAS, and BARTOLOME SINOCRUZ JR.; MEGA PACIFIC
eSOLUTIONS, INC.; and MEGA PACIFIC CONSORTIUM, respondents.
Ombudsman; Policy of Noninterference; As a general rule, the Supreme Court (SC) does not intervene with the
Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and
independence inherent in the Office of the Ombudsman which, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the
people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.—Our pronouncements in the June 13, 2006
Resolution are consistent with the Court’s policy of noninterference with the Ombudsman’s conduct of preliminary
investigations, and to leave the Ombudsman sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. As a general rule, the Court does not intervene with the Ombudsman’s
exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and inde-pendence inherent in the Office
of the Ombudsman which, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the
public service. This policy rests on the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, which is one of the foundations of
our republican government.

Same; The 1987 Constitution clothed the Ombudsman with authority to investigate offenses committed by public
officers and employees.—The 1987 Constitution clothed the Ombudsman with authority to investigate offenses
committed by public officers and employees. In Casing v. Ombudsman, 672 SCRA 500 (2012), we stated that: The
Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise of its
investigatory and prosecutory powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and employees.
Specifically, the determination of whether probable cause exists is a function that belongs to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not is basically its
call.

Political Law; Executive Power; Probable Cause; The determination of probable cause — that is, one made for
the purpose of filing an information in court — is essentially an executive function and not a judicial one.—The
determination of probable cause — that is, one made for the purpose of filing an information in court — is essentially an
executive function and not a judicial one. The State’s self-preserving power to prosecute violators of its penal laws is a
necessary component of the Executive’s power and responsibility to faithfully execute the laws of the land.

Same; Judicial Power; The Constitution vests the Supreme Court (SC) with judicial power, defined under Section
1, Article VIII as “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.”—The
Constitution vests the Supreme Court with judicial power, defined under Section 1, Article VIII as “the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.” Conspicuously absent in the provision is the power of the judiciary to
prosecute crimes — much less the broader power to execute laws from which it can be inferred. As early as 1932, we
held that: “It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme
Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the
government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred
on it by the Organic Act.”

Same; Same; Under our constitutional structure, courts of law have no right to directly decide matters over which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to another office or branch of government.—Under our
constitutional structure, courts of law have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to another office or branch of government. We confine ourselves to the exercise of judicial power and are
careful not to encroach upon the functions of the other branches of the government. Lest it be forgotten, separation of
powers is not merely a hollow doctrine in constitutional law; rather, it serves a very important purpose in our democratic
republic government, that is, to prevent tyranny by prohibiting the concentration of the sovereign powers of state in one
body. The power to prosecute and the power to adjudicate must remain separate; otherwise, as James Madison warned,
“[the judge] might behave with all the violence of [an oppressor].”

Ombudsman; Jurisdiction; For cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the function of determining probable
cause primarily lies with the Office of the Ombudsman, which has the presumed expertise in the laws it is
entrusted to enforce.—For cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the function of determining probable cause
primarily lies with the Office of the Ombudsman, which has the presumed expertise in the laws it is entrusted to enforce.
Same; Same; The Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause may only be assailed through certiorari
proceedings before this Court on the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.—
The Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause may only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court
on the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Not every error in the proceedings or
every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, however, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. It has been stated that the
Ombudsman may err or even abuse the discretion lodged in her by law, but such error or abuse alone does not render her
act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. To justify judicial intrusion into what is
fundamentally the domain of another constitutional body, the petitioner must clearly show that the Ombudsman committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making her determination and in arriving at the
conclusion she reached. For there to be a finding of grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown that the discretionary
power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.

Probable Cause; To engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and to determine if the
suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements of the crime charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be
present.—We find that the action taken by the Ombudsman cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or
despotic. The Ombudsman found no evidence to prove probable cause. Probable cause refers to facts and circumstances
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondents probably
committed it. It signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. To engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and to determine if the suspect is probably guilty of the same, the
elements of the crime charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. Here, the Ombudsman determined the
nonexistence of probable cause only after conducting numerous hearings, reviewing copious documents, and evaluating
these against the constitutive elements of the crimes punished under the anti-graft law — it was not as if the decision to
dismiss the complaints was pulled out of thin air. The issuance of the Supplemental Resolution is clearly a valid exercise
of the Ombudsman’s discretion.

Fraud; In its general sense, fraud is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts,
omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed,
resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another.—At the
outset, it must be clarified that fraud has no technical legal meaning in our laws. In its general sense, fraud is deemed to
comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or
equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and
unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human
ingenuity can devise, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false
suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which
another is cheated. While the generic concept of fraud is similar for both civil and criminal cases, the term is descriptive
rather than substantive. In its specific and substantive sense, a right of action occasioned by fraud is dependent on the
law upon which the action is based. Based on its nature, actionable fraud may be civil or criminal.

Same; Civil Fraud; To be actionable, the fraudulent act must cause loss or injury to another.—There are two broad
classes of actionable civil fraud in this jurisdiction. First is fraud that gives rise to an action for damages, generally in case
of contravention of the normal fulfillment of obligations or as a tort under the human relations provisions of the Civil Code,
as well as in specific instances mentioned by law. To be actionable, the fraudulent act must cause loss or injury to another.
Second is fraud that creates a vice in the intent of one or more parties in juridical transactions, such as wills, marriages,
and contracts, among others. With respect to the latter, fraud may render the contract defective in varying degrees:
voidable, when consent is obtained through fraud; rescissible, when the contract is undertaken in fraud of creditors; and
“reformable,” when by reason of fraud, the parties’ true intention is not expressed in the instrument.

Same; Criminal Fraud; Criminal fraud may pertain to the means of committing a crime or the classes of crimes
under Chapter Three, Title Four, Book Two and Chapter Three, Title Seven, Book Two of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).—Criminal fraud, on the other hand, may pertain to the means of committing a crime or the classes of crimes under
Chapter Three, Title Four, Book Two and Chapter Three, Title Seven, Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As a means,
fraud may be an essential element of the crime (e.g., estafa by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts or through
fraudulent means) or a generic aggravating circumstance. Meanwhile, the crimes classified as frauds under the penal
code punish specific types of fraud: machinations in public auctions; monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade;
importation and disposition of falsely marked articles or merchandise made of gold, silver, or other precious metals or their
alloys; subsisting and altering trade-mark, trade-names, or service marks; unfair competition, fraudulent registration of
trademark, trade name or service mark, fraudulent designation of origin, and false description; frauds against the public
treasury and similar offenses; and frauds committed by public officers. As with other criminal offenses, liability for these
punishable frauds depends on the concurrence of the essential elements of each type of crime.

Same; Civil Fraud; Attachment; Under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, one of the grounds for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment is when the party against whom attachment is sought is guilty of
fraud in “contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought.”—Under Rule 57 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, one of the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment is when the party against
whom attachment is sought is guilty of fraud in “contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is
brought.” The type of fraud referred to by this rule is civil in nature; in the law of contracts, it is commonly referred to as
dolo causante or causal fraud, or those deceptions or misrepresentations of a serious character employed by one party
and without which the other party would not have entered into the contract. The finding of fraud in Republic v. Mega
Pacific eSolutions, Inc., 794 SCRA 414 (2016), inasmuch as it involved fraud committed by MPEI in the execution of the
procurement contract with COMELEC, pertains to causal fraud, which falls under the broad classification of civil fraud
rather than criminal fraud. The issue of criminal fraud was not considered in Republic and no determination about the
commission of any particular crime was made.

Ombudsman; Policy of Noninterference; The Supreme Court (SC) respects the relative autonomy of the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute, and refrains from interfering when the latter exercises such powers;
except when there is grave abuse of discretion.—The Court respects the relative autonomy of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute, and refrains from interfering when the latter exercises such powers, except when there is grave
abuse of discretion. The Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause may only be assailed before this Court through
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. The requirement for judicial intrusion, however, is still for the petitioners to
demonstrate clearly that the Ombudsman acted arbitrarily or despotically. Absent such clear demonstration, the
intervention must be disallowed in deference to the doctrine of noninterference.

G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS, respondents.

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; WHEN QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY MAY BE RAISED; JUSTICIABLE

CONTROVERSY.—Where the petitioning private schools are actually operating by virtue of permits issued to them by the
Secretary of Education under Act No. 2706, who is not shown to have threatened to revoke their permits, there is no
justiciable controversy that would authorize the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of said Act.

2.ID.; POLICE POWER; SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES; PREVIOUS PERMIT SYSTEM.—The Government, in the
exercise of its police power to correct a great evil, which consisted in that the great majority of the private schools from
primary grade to university are money-making devices for the profit of those who organize and administer them, may
validly establish the previous permit system provided for by Commonwealth Act No. 180.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCRETION OF SECRETARY OF EDUCATION; FIXING OF MINIMUM STANDARDS OF

INSTRUCTION.—To confer, by statute, upon the Secretary of Education power and discretion to prescribe rules fixing
minimum standards of adequate and efficient instruction to be observed by all private schools and colleges, is not to
unduly delegate legislative powers.

4.ID.; OFFICIALS' ABUSE, NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.—Abuse, if any, by the officials entrusted with the execution
of a statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute.

5.ID; CIRCULAR OR MEMORANDUM ALLEGED TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL MUST BE SPECIFIED.—In order that

a circular or memorandum issued by the Department of Education may be constitutionally assailed, the circular or
memorandum must be indicated, the wrong inflicted or threatened must be alleged and proved, and the constitutional
point raised and argued specifically.

6.ID. ; ID. ; COMPLETE CONTROL OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS, INVALID.—If any of the Department circulars or
memoranda issued by the Secretary go beyond the bounds of regulation and seek to establish complete control of the
various activities of private schools, it would surely be invalid.

7.ID.; ASSESSMENT OF ONE PER CENT ON GROSS RECEIPTS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS; JURISDICTION OF
COURTS OF FlRST INSTANCE.—The constitutionality of the one per cent levied on gross receipts of all private schools
for additional Government expenses in connection with their supervision and regulation, which is assessed in section 11-A
of Act No. 2706 as amended by Republic Act No. 74—whether it be considered a fee or a tax—involves investigation and
examination of relevant data, which should best be carried out in the courts of first instance.

8.ID.; JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY.—There is no justiciable contro-versy as regards section 1 of Republic Act No.
139, abut textbooks, where the petitioners have not shown that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that
textbook, or that he petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing
substantial privileges or rights for so doing. Phil. Assn. of Colleges & Univ. vs. Sec. of Edu., 97 Phil. 806, No. L-5279
October 31, 1955

[G.R. No. 152295. July 9, 2002]

ANTONIETTE V.C. MONTESCLAROS, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

Sangguniang Kabataan (SK); Courts; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers; Petitioners’ prayer to prevent
Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an
actual justiciable controversy; There can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a
proposed bill—the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.—In the
instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent
a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections
to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to
petitioners. With respect to the date of the SK elections, there is therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial
intervention. Petitioners’ prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age
in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is
not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having
no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or
unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The
power of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
states—“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” (Emphasis
supplied) Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional
rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal processes or
procedures of Congress.—Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or
from setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the
exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members of Congress, the
approval of bills by each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of approved bills, and the
eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific
constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review
over the internal processes or procedures of Congress.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills that
Congress should enact into law.—The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills that
Congress should enact into law. The judicial power to review the constitutionality of laws does not include the power to
prescribe to Congress what laws to enact. The Court has no power to compel Congress by mandamus to enact a law
allowing petitioners, regardless of their age, to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. To do so would
destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finely crafted by the Constitution for the three co-equal, coordinate
and independent branches of government.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement
under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991.—Under RA No. 9164, Congress merely restored the age
requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to
youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under
Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Every law passed by Congress is always subject to amendment or
repeal by Congress. The Court cannot restrain Congress from amending or repealing laws, for the power to make laws
includes the power to change the laws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; A party must also show that he has a real interest in the suit, and
by “real interest” is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future,
contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest.—Petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in
maintaining this suit. A party must show that he has been, or is about to be denied some personal right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled. A party must also show that he has a real interest in the suit. By “real interest” is meant a
present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or
inconsequential interest. In the instant case, petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred by law on those who
were at least 15 but not more than 21 years old. Now, with the passage of RA No. 9164, this right is limited to those who
on the date of the SK elections are at least 15 but less than 18 years old. The new law restricts membership in the SK to
this specific age group. Not falling within this classification, petitioners have ceased to be members of the SK and are no
longer qualified to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Plainly, petitioners no longer have a personal and
substantial interest in the SK elections.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court will not strike down a law unless its constitutionality is properly raised in
an appropriate action and adequately argued.—This petition does not raise any constitutional issue. At the time
petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164, which reset the SK elections and reduced the age requirement for SK
membership, was not yet enacted into law. After the passage of RA No. 9164, petitioners failed to assail any provision in
RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional. To grant petitioners’ prayer to be allowed to vote and be voted for in the July
15, 2002 SK elections necessitates assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164. This, petitioners have not done. The
Court will not strike down a law unless its constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate action and adequately
argued.

Same; Administrative Law; Public Officers; SK membership is not a property right protected by the Constitution
because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law—Congress may amend at any time the law to change or
even withdraw the statutory right.—Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership.
One who is no longer qualified because of an amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary
right to SK membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can contest, based on a statutory right, any act
disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right
protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the
law to change or even withdraw the statutory right.

Same; Same; Same; A public office is not a property right—no one has a vested right to any public office, much
less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office; The constitutional principle of a public office as a
public trust precludes any proprietary claim to public office.—A public office is not a property right. As the
Constitution expressly states, a “[P]ublic office is a public trust.” No one has a vested right to any public office, much less
a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel, decided in 1920, the Court already ruled:
“Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office a
“property.” It is, however, well settled x x x that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional
guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency. x x x The basic idea of the government x x x is that of a
popular representative government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or
set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the
provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people he represents.” (Emphasis supplied) Petitioners, who
apparently desire to hold public office, should realize from the very start that no one has a proprietary right to public office.
While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local government legislative council, the law does not confer
on petitioners a proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative councils. The constitutional
principle of a public office as a public trust precludes any proprietary claim to public office. Even the State policy directing
“equal access to opportunities for public service” cannot bestow on petitioners a proprietary right to SK membership or a
proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices.

Same; Same; Same; Congress has the power to define who are the youth qualified to join the SK, which itself is a
creation of Congress, and those who do not qualify because they are past the age group defined as the youth
cannot insist on being part of the youth.—While the State policy is to encourage the youth’s involvement in public
affairs, this policy refers to those who belong to the class of people defined as the youth. Congress has the power to
define who are the youth qualified to join the SK, which itself is a creation of Congress. Those who do not qualify because
they are past the age group defined as the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth. In government service, once an
employee reaches mandatory retirement age, he cannot invoke any property right to cling to his office. In the same
manner, since petitioners are now past the maximum age for membership in the SK, they cannot invoke any property right
to cling to their SK membership.

Same; Election Law; Presumption of Regularity; The Comelec’s acts enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties.—The Comelec exercised its power and duty to “enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall” and to “recommend to
Congress effective measures to minimize election spending.” The Comelec’s acts enjoy the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties. These acts cannot constitute proof, as claimed by petitioners, that there “exists a
connivance and conspiracy (among) respondents in contravention of the present law.” As the Court held in Pangkat
Laguna v. Comelec, the “Comelec, as the government agency tasked with the enforcement and administration of elections
laws, is entitled to the presumption of regularity of official acts with respect to the elections.”

Courts; Actions; Certiorari; Words and Phrases; Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law.—Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that
is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Public respondents having acted strictly pursuant to their constitutional powers and duties, we find no grave abuse of
discretion in their assailed acts.

G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ
BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG,
Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL
GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO
LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; Judicial Review; One of the greatest
contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated in Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).—One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept
of judicial review enunciated in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). This concept rests on the extraordinary simple
foundation—The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all political
authority. It confers limited powers on the national government. x x x If the government consciously or unconsciously
oversteps these limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional
attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution. This power
the courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites; The power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a “self-
starting capacity.”—The power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a “self-starting capacity.” Courts may
exercise such power only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy;
second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the
case itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal
right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution—it is “definite and concrete, touching the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interest,” a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief.
—An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution.
It is “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest”; a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief. The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy,
contending that the present petitions were rendered “moot and academic” by President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Moot and Academic Questions; The “moot and academic” principle is not a
magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case; Courts will decide cases,
otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution, second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved, third, when constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.—A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. The Court holds that President
Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP
1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be
resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that “an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it
imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.” The “moot and academic” principle is
not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise
moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Locus standi is defined as “a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”—Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule as contained in
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s
standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits, as here,
the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public.—The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff
who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general
public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a “stranger,” or in
the category of a “citizen,” or ‘taxpayer.” In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of
relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Taxpayer’s Suits; Citizen’s Suits; The plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a
different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit—in the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of
public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern.—Case law in most jurisdictions
now allows both “citizen” and “taxpayer” standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v.
Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In
the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of
the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: “In matter of mere public
right, however . . . the people are the real parties . . . It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and
see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied.” With respect to
taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordanheld that “the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the
unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Direct Injury” Test; To prevent just about any person
from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the
activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United States Supreme Court laid down the
more stringent “direct injury” test, which test has been adopted in this jurisdiction.—To prevent just about any
person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the
activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United States Supreme Court laid down the more
stringent “direct injury” test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private
individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he
has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all
members of the public. This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), it
held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as,
Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of
Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi
may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion, such as in cases of “transcendental importance,” or
where the issues raised have “far-reaching implications.”—Being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of
locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers
Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949), where the “transcendental importance” of the cases prompted the Court
to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec, 62 SCRA 275 (1975), this Court
resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the “far-reaching implications” of the petition notwithstanding its categorical
statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal
policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions
involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites in order that Taxpayers, Voters, Concerned Citizens and
Legislators may be Accorded Standing to Sue; Recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Court’s
attitude toward legal standing.—By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this
Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met: (1) cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of
obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the
issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim
that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. Significantly, recent decisions show a
certain toughening in the Court’s attitude toward legal standing.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is in the interest of justice that those affected by Presidential Proclamation
(PP) 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their
basic rights.—In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They
also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident
to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by
their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the
petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.—In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court
applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994), Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan
ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Basco
v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA 52 (1991), and Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985),
that when the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the
execution of the laws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their
members.—In G.R. No. 171483, KMU’s assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly
may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their
members. We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all
permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; National officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no
legal standing where they failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its
members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.—In G.R. No. 171489,
petitioners, Cadiz, et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing,
having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a
consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA
81 (2000), the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is
shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court
declares that petitioner have locus standi.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The claim of a petitioner that she is a media personality does not aid
her where there is no showing that the enforcement of the issuances in question prevented her from pursuing
her occupation, and neither does her submission that she has a pending electoral protest before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal have any relevance where she has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the
proceedings or result of her case.—In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the
instant petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is
of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have
been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because
there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her
submission that she has pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance.
She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more
the transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing rules.

Same; Same; Same; Presidency; Parties; It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent—settled is
the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law; It will degrade the dignity of the
high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
—It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure
of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged
into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the
discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation
of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official,
he remains accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by
impeachment.
Presidency; Calling-Out Power; Declaration of State of National Emergency; Petitioners failed to show that
President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis.—As to
how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that “judicial inquiry can go no
further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct,” but that “the President did not act arbitrarily.”
Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further
ruled that “it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis” and
that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then “this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleadings.” Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP
1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum
shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in
the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was
also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance
between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.

Same; Same; Same; In times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain
amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to
operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.—In the final analysis, the various approaches to
emergency of the above political theorists—from Lock’s “theory of prerogative,” to Watkins’ doctrine of “constitutional
dictatorship” and, eventually, to McIlwain’s “principle of constitutionalism”—ultimately aim to solve one real problem in
emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief Executive, while insuring
that such powers will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under effective limitations and checks. Our
Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters of a repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, in drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the concept of Justice Jackson’s
“balanced power structure.” Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and
the Supreme Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in times of
emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the other. This system does not weaken the
President, it just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain. In other words, in times of emergency, our Constitution
reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but,
at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.

Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; Facial Challenges; Overbreadth Doctrine; The overbreadth doctrine
is an analytical tool developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases, also known under the
American Law as First Amendment cases; A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to
speech or even speech-related conduct—it is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence.—A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for. First and foremost, the
overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases, also known
under the American Law as First Amendment cases. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to
speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence. In United States v. Salerno, the US Supreme Court held that “we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment” (freedom of speech).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law
that “reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct”—“overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.”—The overbreadth doctrine is not
intended for testing the validity of a law that “reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.” Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
“harmful” and “constitutionally unprotected conduct.” In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, it was held: It remains a ‘matter of no little
difficulty’ to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and when ‘such summary action’ is inappropriate.
But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional
rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it
forbids the State to sanction moves from ‘pure speech’ toward conduct and that conduct—even if expressive—falls within
the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only “spoken words” and again, that “overbreadth claims, if entertained at
all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.”
Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is
manifestly subject to state regulation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Facial invalidation of laws is considered as “manifestly strong
medicine,” to be used “sparingly and only as a last resort,” and is “generally disfavored.”—Facial invalidation of
laws is considered as “manifestly strong medicine,” to be used “sparingly and only as a last resort,” and is “generally
disfavored”; The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the
principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may
conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court. A writer and scholar in
Constitutional Law explains further: The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception
to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional
as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the
rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute “on its face,” not merely “as applied
for” so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The
factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the “chilling;” deterrent effect
of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law’s
“very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” An
overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; Related to the “overbreadth” doctrine is
the “void for vagueness doctrine” which holds that “a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,” and like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant
may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications.—Petitioners likewise seek a
facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted. Related to the “overbreadth” doctrine is
the “void for vagueness doctrine” which holds that “a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine.
For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is
said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners
did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common
intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017. Same; Same; Same; Under the calling-out
power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion.—
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence,
invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out
power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He
cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the
greater the power, the greater are the limitations.

Same; Same; Same; In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion but also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over
privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest—indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of
an awesome power.—President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words
of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In
declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a
provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17,
Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected
with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be
deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.

Same; Same; Same; Martial Law; PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law—it is plain therein that what the
President invoked was her calling-out power.—Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a
declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what
the President invoked was her calling-out power. The declaration of Martial Law is a “warn[ing] to citizens that the military
power has been called upon by the executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency
lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the
restoration of order and the enforcement of law.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted from Former President
Marcos’ Proclamation No. 1081; We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative
powers.—A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted from Former President Marcos’ Proclamation
No. 1081, which partly reads: NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of
the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire
Philippines as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. We all
know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: “to enforce
obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.” Upon
the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to
all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.”
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decrees; President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to Executive Orders,
Administrative Orders, Proclamations, Memorandum Orders, Memorandum Circulars, and General or Special
Orders—she cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081.—The
President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987). She may issue any of the following: Sec. 2. Executive Orders.—Acts of the President providing for rules of a
general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated
in executive orders. Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.—Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of
governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations.—Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest,
upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders.—Acts of the President on
matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of
the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders. Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars.—Acts of the President on
matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the
departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in
memorandum circulars. Sec. 7. General or Special Orders.—Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders. President
Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by
Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding
force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of
Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate “decrees.”—This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section
1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Same; Same; Same; Same; With respect to “laws,” President Arroyo cannot call the military to enforce or
implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations
and contracts and the like—she can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to
suppress lawless violence.—As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows
that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws,” she cannot call the military to
enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on
obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty
to suppress lawless violence.

Same; Same; Same; President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in
the absence of a Congressional enactment but the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter.—It may be pointed out
that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to “other national emergency.” If the
intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a “state of national
emergency” pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the
existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should
first authorize the President before he can declare a “state of national emergency.” The logical conclusion then is that
President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a
Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.

Same; Same; Same; Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted,
relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of
emergency powers.—Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together.
Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will
be construed together and considered in the light of each other. Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23
of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of
the exercise of emergency powers.
Same; Same; Same; Emergency Powers; Requisites for Valid Delegation; Generally, Congress is the repository of
emergency powers.—Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section
23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not
reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to
meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency
powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: (1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The
delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers
clause, and the taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the
emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress—Section 17 refers to Congress, not the President.—
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private
business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress.
Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,”
it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on
whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of
conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is
accepted as normal—implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and perception;
Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the United States since 1933, have been occasioned by
a wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic, b) natural disaster, and c)
national security; “Emergency,” as contemplated in our Constitution, may include rebellion, economic crisis,
pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect.
—Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term “emergency” under Section 17, Article XII refers to “tsunami,”
“typhoon,” “hurricane” and “similar occurrences.” This is a limited view of “emergency.” Emergency, as a generic term,
connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that
which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and perception. Emergencies,
as perceived by legislature or executive in the United States since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of
situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic, b) natural disaster, and c) national security.
“Emergency,” as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis,
pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect.

Same; Same; Same; Same; While the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
—Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules
that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. Let it be
emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has
no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide
whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be
taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17,
Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

Same; Same; Same; Same; One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security,
is that military necessity and the guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible.—One of the
misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that military necessity and the guaranteed
rights of the individual are often not compatible. Our history reveals that in the crucible of conflict, many rights are
curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right against unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless
arrest; and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of Rights suffered the
greatest blow.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial Review; Courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be
abused and misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application—the validity of a
statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end
desired, not from its effects in a particular case.—Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes
invalid although they may be abused and misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of
application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to
accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President’s
calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in
PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens’ constitutional
rights. Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed
illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the
essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion. This is logical. Just
imagine the absurdity of situations when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because the officers implementing
them have acted arbitrarily. If this were so, judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon
by the Court, majority of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been declared unconstitutional a long time
ago.

Same; Same; Same; General orders are “acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines”—they are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his
subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law.—President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to
carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are “acts and commands of the President in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.” They are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his
subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law. Such rules and regulations create no relation
except between the official who issues them and the official who receives them. They are based on and are the product
of, a relationship in which power is their source, and obedience, their object. For these reasons, one requirement for these
rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious. G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to
immediately carry out the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism
and lawless violence.”

Same; Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; The plain import of the language of the Constitution is that
searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant
or warrant of arrest.—The Constitution provides that “the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”The plain import of the language of the
Constitution is that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued
search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection given by this provision is that between person and
police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or
warrants of arrest.

Same; Same; Same; Right of Assembly; Words and Phrases; “Assembly” means a right on the part of the
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs—it is a necessary consequence of our
republican institution and complements the right of speech; The right of the people to peaceably assemble is not
to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent.—”Assembly” means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the
right of speech. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, like other
rights embraced in the freedom of expression, the right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It
may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities except, of
course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the
assembly itself, may be validly required.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime.—The ringing truth here is that petitioner
David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They were not committing any
crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. As can be
gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought. Even the
Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to justify the arresting officers’ conduct. In De Jonge v. Oregon, it was
held that peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime, thus: Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a
crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of
such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceful
assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting was held but as to its purpose; not
as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the
Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in
a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of valid
laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere
participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle
that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent”—tolerance is the rule and limitation is the
exception.—On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of
KMU, et al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacañang’s
directive canceling all permits previously issued by local government units. This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of
all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.” Tolerance is
the rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that
the State may deny the citizens’ right to exercise it. Indeed, respondents failed to show or convince the Court that the
rallyists committed acts amounting to lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. With the blanket revocation of permits, the
distinction between protected and unprotected assemblies was eliminated.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local
government units; When a person’s right is restricted by government action, it behooves a democratic
government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to procedure.—Under BP 880, the
authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units. They have the power to issue
permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present
danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits. The first time they learned of
it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. When a person’s right is restricted by
government action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according
to procedure.

Same; Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; The warrantless search of the Daily Tribune’s offices is illegal.—G.R.
No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of the press.
Petitioners’ narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute, established the following: first, the Daily
Tribune’s offices were searched without warrant; second, the police operatives seized several materials for publication;
third, the search was conducted at about 1:00 o’ clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was
conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building; and fifth, policemen
stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices. x x x The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant
be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the
search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of
his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in
the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is
on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any
time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom of the Press; The search of the Daily Tribune’s offices also violated freedom
of the press; The best gauge of a free and democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its
media.—The search violated petitioners’ freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and democratic society rests in
the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v. Chief of Staff this Court held that—As heretofore stated, the
premises searched were the business and printing offices of the “Metropolitan Mail” and the “We Forum” newspapers. As
a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the
printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or
censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial
of petitioners’ freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic
framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the
citizenry.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of
policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to
media, are plain censorship—it is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen
that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of
punishment should he be so rash as to disobey; The Supreme Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a
constitutional right even if it involves the most defiant of our citizens—freedom to comment on public affairs is
essential to the vitality of a representative democracy.—While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and
sealed like the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG
operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of
policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are
plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if
allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash
as to disobey.Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-
government sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves the
most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative
democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon. The motto should always be obsta principiis.

Same; Same; Same; PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence but PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express or
implied power (1) to issue decrees, (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to
lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President, and (3) to impose standards on media or any
form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional.—The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017
is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The
proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier.
However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to
direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated
by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and
unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence
of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The words “acts of terrorism” found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally
defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O.—The Court
finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President—acting as Commander-in-Chief—addressed to subalterns in
the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard—that the military and the
police should take only the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence.” But the words “acts of terrorism” found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by
Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While “terrorism” has been denounced generally in
media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFP’s
authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.

Same; Same; Same; It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights
are ends in themselves; How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic without unnecessarily
trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state; Two vital principles of
constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and, political responsibility of the
government to the governed.—It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil
rights are ends in themselves. How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic without unnecessarily
trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state. During emergency, governmental
action may vary in breadth and intensity from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our
people’s liberty. Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various competing political
philosophies is that, it is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two vital
principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the
government to the governed. David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160, G.R. No. 171409, G.R. No. 171483, G.R. No.
171400, G.R. No. 171489, G.R. No. 171424 May 3, 2006

Almario vs. Executive Secretary

GR 189028, July 16, 2013

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality of a statute or an
official act must have a direct and personal interest.—The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality of a
statute or an official act must have a direct and personal interest. They must show not only that the law or any
governmental act is invalid, but also that they sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that they suffer thereby in some indefinite way. They must show that they have
been or are about to be denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled or that they are about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.

Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; No real and substantial distinction between respondents and
petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established
procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position. The undue classification was not germane to
the purpose of the law. Instead, it contradicted the law and well-established guidelines, rules and regulations
meant to carry the law into effect.—Among the other petitioners, Prof. Gemino Abad presents a unique valid personal
and substantial interest. Like respondents Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno, he was among the 87 nominees for the 2009
Order of National Artists. Like respondent Moreno, he made it to the preliminary shortlist. As he did not make it to the
second shortlist, he was not considered by the Final Deliberation Panel, more so by the former President. It should be
recalled too that respondent Guidote-Alvarez was disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive Director of the
NCCA at that time while respondents Mañosa and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent
Moreno was not included in the second shortlist. Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably
when they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of
National Artists. The Committee on Honors and the former President effectively treated respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno as a preferred class. The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between respondents and
petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and
placing respondents in an exceptional position. The undue classification was not germane to the purpose of the law.
Instead, it contradicted the law and well-established guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law into effect.
While petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement to the Order of National Artists, he is entitled to be given an equal
opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abad’s right to equal
protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Taxpayer’s Suit; A taxpayer’s suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the
spending or taxing power of the Congress.—As regards the other concerned artists and academics as well as the
CAP, their claim of deep concern for the preservation of the country’s rich cultural and artistic heritage, while laudable,
falls short of the injury in fact requirement of standing. Their assertion constitutes a generalized grievance shared in a
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens. Nor can they take refuge in their status as taxpayers as the
case does not involve any illegal appropriation or taxation. A taxpayer’s suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the
spending or taxing power of the Congress.

Same; Prohibition; Injunction; It has been held that the remedies of prohibition and injunction are preventive and,
as such, cannot be availed of to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.—The present action is a petition for
prohibition, certiorari, injunction, restraining order and all other legal, just and equitable reliefs. It has been held that the
remedies of prohibition and injunction are preventive and, as such, cannot be availed of to restrain an act that is already
fait accompli. Where the act sought to be prohibited or enjoined has already been accomplished or consummated,
prohibition or injunction becomes moot. Nevertheless, even if the principal issue is already moot, this Court may still
resolve its merits for the future guidance of both bench and bar. Courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
Presidency; Order of National Artists; The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National
Artists should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws.—In the matter of
the conferment of the Order of National Artists, the President may or may not adopt the recommendation or advice of the
NCCA and the CCP Boards. In other words, the advice of the NCCA and the CCP is subject to the President’s discretion.
Nevertheless, the President’s discretion on the matter is not totally unfettered, nor the role of the NCCA and the CCP
Boards meaningless. Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it pleases but is reined in to
keep it from straying. In its classic formulation, “discretion is not unconfined and vagrant” but “canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing.” The President’s power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws. Section 17, Article
VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful execution of the laws by the President: Sec. 17. The President shall have control
of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis
supplied.) The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be exercised in accordance
with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation
imposed on the President, not a separate grant of power. It simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal
principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them. This is precisely why the law
provides that “[a]dministrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
the laws or the Constitution.”

Administrative Regulations; Statutes; An administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and
effect of law.—We have held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect of law.
Thus, the rules, guidelines and policies regarding the Order of National Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board of Trustees
and the NCCA pursuant to their respective statutory mandates have the force and effect of law. Until set aside, they are
binding upon executive and administrative agencies, including the President himself/herself as chief executor of laws.

Presidency; Order of National Artists; In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process and
as a consequence of his/her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the discretion of the President in the
matter of the Order of National Artists is confined to the names submitted to him/her by the National Commission
for Culture and Arts (NCCA) and the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) Boards.—In view of the various stages
of deliberation in the selection process and as a consequence of his/her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the
discretion of the President in the matter of the Order of National Artists is confined to the names submitted to him/her by
the NCCA and the CCP Boards. This means that the President could not have considered conferment of the Order of
National Artists on any person not considered and recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. That is the proper
import of the provision of Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, that the NCCA and the CCP “shall advise the President on
the conferment of the Order of National Artists.” Applying this to the instant case, the former President could not have
properly considered respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno, as their names were not recommended
by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. Otherwise, not only will the stringent selection and meticulous screening process be
rendered futile, the respective mandates of the NCCA and the CCP Board of Trustees under relevant laws to administer
the conferment of Order of National Artists, draft the rules and regulations to guide its deliberations, formulate and
implement policies and plans, and undertake any and all necessary measures in that regard will also become
meaningless.

Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Law; There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution when the former President gave preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Mañosa and Moreno; The conferment of the Order of National Artists on said respondents was therefore made
with grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.—There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution when the former President gave preferential treatment to respondents Guidote- Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa
and Moreno. The former President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws and observe the rules, guidelines and
policies of the NCCA and the CCP as to the selection of the nominees for conferment of the Order of National Artists
proscribed her from having a free and uninhibited hand in the conferment of the said award. The manifest disregard of the
rules, guidelines and processes of the NCCA and the CCP was an arbitrary act that unduly favored respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The conferment of the Order of National Artists on said respondents was
therefore made with grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside. National Artist for Literature Virgilio Almario, et al.
vs. The Executive Secretary<br/>, 701 SCRA 269, G.R. No. 189028 July 16, 2013

G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION,petitioners,
vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.
1. PROBATION ; AUTHORITY OF PROBATION COURT TO LOOK INTO CIRCUMSTANCES OF OFFENSE;
SUPERIOR AND INFERIOR COURTS; LEGAL RELATION AND ETHICAL STANDARD.—Probation implies guilt by final
judgment. While a probation court hearing a probation case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of
the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusions of the Supreme Court, either directly or
indirectly, especially where from its own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and
pleadings of the parties. As observed in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent
cases," if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court,
there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands
conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of
the nation.

2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; THE PRESIDENT AND HIS VETO POWER; PRESIDENT'S VETO NOT BINDING ON THE
SUPREME COURT.—In vetoing a bill, the President may express the reasons which he may deem proper, but his
reasons are not binding upon the Supreme Court in the determination of actual controversies submitted to it for
determination. Whether or not the Executive should express or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter
encompassed within his cons titutional pow er of ve to but which happens- to be at the same time pending determination
before the Supreme Court is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is
expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway the judgment of the court one way or another and
prevent it from taking what in its opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given case.

3.ID. ; INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.—If it is ever necessary to make any vehement affirmance during this
formative period of our political history, it is that the judiciary is independent of the Executive no less than of the
Legislative department of our government—independent in the performance of its functions, undeterred by any
consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of its sworn duty
as it sees it and understands it.

4.ID.; WHEN CONSTITUTIONALITY MAY BE RAISED.—The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be
determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case; i. e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.

5.ID. ; ID. ; RESORT TO EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES; ADJUDICATED CASES.—The question of the
constitutionality of an Act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions. Nevertheless, resort may be made to
extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of law, even if available, are not plain,
speedy and adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922], 42 Phil., 818), the Supreme Court held that the question
of the constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus proceedings (see also 12 C. }., p. 783);
and in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259, affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in
an" action of., quo warranto brought in the name of- the Government of the Philippines. It has also been. held "that the
constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. 3., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas
Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there are authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action
under the challenged statute (mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even on an application for
preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the case. (12 C.
J., p. 783.) The same may be said as regards prohibition and certiorari. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385;
[1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059; Bell vs. First Judicial District Court [1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S.
R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L, R. A. [N. S.], 843, and cases cited.)

6.ID.; ; ID. ; ID. ; PROHIBITION ; RULE WHERE JURISDICTION is EXCLUSIVELY DERIVED FROM
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE.—The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of
superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. The general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the writ of
prohibition will not lie where the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is
questioned, because in such cases the inferior court having jurisdiction may itself determine the constitutionality of the
statute, and its decision may be subject to review, and consequently the complainant in such cases ordinarily has
adequate remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of prohibition. But where the inferior court or tribunal derives its
jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that
statute.

7.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE; LIMITED JURISDICTION IN PROBATION CASES.—A Court
of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is
conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature.

8.ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONALITY MUST BE RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY; EXCEPTIONS.—As a

general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the
pleadings, ordinarily it may be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. But
the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time when a
question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. Thus, in. criminal cases, although there is a very
sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings,
either in the trial court or on appeal. Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the
constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is
necessary to a decision of the case. And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate
court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below.

9.ID.; ID.; PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST OF PARTY; RIGHT AND INTEREST OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO CHALLENGE CONSTITUTIONALITY.—The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in
whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that 'the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.

10.ID. ; ID. ; RELIANCE ON PROBATION ACT; BY FISCAL DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE
PEOPLE.—The mere fact that. the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon in the past and all that time has not
been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as
constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines estopped from now assailing its validity. For
courts will pass upon a constitutional question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the
fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal
and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts in proper
cases.

11.ID.; ID. ; WHEN DETERMINATION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY NECESSARY ; WAIVER IF CASE CAN BE DECIDED
ON OTHER POINTS.—While the court will meet the question with firmness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the
part of wisdom, and a just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be
decided on other points. (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No 11,558; 2 Brock., 447, Vide, also Hoover vs. Wood
[1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is
essential to the decision of the case, as where the right of a party is founded solely on a statute the validity of which is
attacked. (12 C. J., p. 782.)

12.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY JUSTIFYING CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY.—The Supreme Court will
take cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act is a new addition to our statute books and its validity has never before
been passed upon by the courts; that many persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for
probation; that some of them are already on probation; that more people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in
the future; and that the respondent M. C. U, has been at large for a period of about four years since his first conviction. All
await the decision of this court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant
case has assumed and to prevent muItiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of
Act No. 4221 be now resolved.

13.ID. ; THE JUDICIARY; ITS DUTY TO ENFORCE THE CONSTITUTION.—Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is
the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. The Supreme .Court, by clear implication from the
provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the National
Legislature invalid because in conflict with the fundamental law. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the
Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to- the supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict
therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.

14.ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF CONSTITUTIONALITY; RATIONALE OF

PRESUMPTION.—All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the
legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding
the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is
first determined by the legislative department of the government itself." (U. S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs.
Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U. S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes
before the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive
have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in
enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. Then, there is that peculiar
political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective
Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It follows that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution
except in clear cases.

15.ID.; THE PARDONING POWER UNDER THE JONES LAW AND THE CON STITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.
—Section 21 of the Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, vests in the Governor-Gerieral of the
Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures." This power is now vested
in the President of the Philippines. The provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution of the Philippines differ in some
respects. The adjective "exclusive" found in the Jones Law has been omitted from the Constitution. Under the Jones Law,
as at common law, pardon could be granted any time after the commission of the offense, either before or after conviction.
The Governor-General of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the United States, to pardon a person
before the facts of his case were fully brought to light. The framers of our Constitution thought this undesirable and,
following most of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can only be exercised "after conviction". So
too, under the new Constitution, the pardoning power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the rule
generally followed in the United States.

16.ID. ; ID.; ROYAL PARDON UNDER ENGLISH LAW; POWER OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS.—The rule in England is
different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an impeachment; "but," says Blackstone, "after the
impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is not understood that the king's royal grace is further
restrained or abridged." The reason for the distinction is obvious. In England, judgment on impeachment is not confined to
mere "removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Government"
but extends to the whole punishment attached by law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a conviction may,
by its sentence, inflict capital punishment, perpetual banishment, fine or imprisonment, depending upon the gravity of the
offense committed, together with removal from office and incapacity to hold office.

17.ID.; ID.; COMMUTATION AND AMNESTY UNDER THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION.—Our Constitution makes
specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the pardons he may grant, such
conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty may be granted by the President under the
Constitution but only with the concurrence of the National Assembly.

18.ID. ; ID.; EXCLUSIVE CHARACTER OF THE PARDONING POWER.—The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in
the Executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any legislative restrictions, nor can like power be given by the
legislature to any other officer or authority. The coordinate departments of government have nothing to do with the
pardoning power, since no person properly belonging to one, of the departments can exercise any powers appertaining to
either of the others except in cases expressly provided for by the constitution. (20 R. C. L., pp. 540, 541.) Where the
pardoning power is conferred on the executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the
legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper
exercise thereof (12 C. J., pp. 838, 839).

19.ID.; PROBATION; POWER OF THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO ENACT A PROBATION LAW.—The Philippine
Legislature, like the Congress of the United States, may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the
punishment of any and all penal offenses. The legislative power to set punishment for crime is very broad, and in the
exercise of this power the legislature may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to be
imposed, as to the beginning and end of the punishment, and whether it should be certain, or indeterminate, or
conditional. Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably,
the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts—particularly the trial courts—large discretion in imposing-
the penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by vesting this
power in the courts, they being in a position to best determine the penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly
circumstanced, should suffer.

20.ID. ; ID. ; PROBATION AND PARDON NOT COTERMINOUS; PROBATION DlSTINGUISHED FROM REPRIEVE
AND COMMUTATION.—Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually distinct and
different from each other, both in origin and in nature. In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free
man. He is not finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts.
Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. The
probationer, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody—subject to the control of the probation officer and of
the court, he may be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be
committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. Probation should also be distinguished from
reprieve and from commutation of the sentence.

21.ID. ; ID.; ID. ; PROBATION NOT IN CONFLICT WITH PARDONING POW-ER.—The Probation Act does not conflict
with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences,
remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the
probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment.

22.ID.; DIVISION OF POWERS.—Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three
coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these
departments of the government derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of the
popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.

23.ID. ; ID. ; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY; HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.—The power to make laws
—the legislative power—is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law and in a unicameral National Assembly by
the Constitution. The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by
delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on
the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was
introduced into English law through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of agency, was established by
Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions forbidding the delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America
as an enlightened principle of free government. It has since become an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of
powers.

24.ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE FORBIDDING DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY NOT INFLEXIBLE; EXCEPTIONS.
—The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of
exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative
powers to local authorities. On quite the same principle, Congress is empowered to delegate legislative power to such
agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select, Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative
power to the people at large, though some authorities maintain that this may not be done. Doubtless, also, legislative
power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of Article VI of the Constitution of the
Philippines ilippines provides that "The National As limitations and restrictions as it may impose, -to fix within specified
limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the Same article of the
Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to
carry out a declared national policy."

25.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; TEST OF UNDUE DELEGATION ; DETAILS OF EXECUTION.—In testing whether a statute constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so -that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or
delegate of the legislature. In United States vs. Ang Tang Ho {[1922], 43 Phil., 1), the Supreme Court adhered to the
foregoing rule. The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to
be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. As a
rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which
the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.

26.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PROBATION ACT MAKES VIRTUAL SURRENDER OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO PROVINCIAL
BOARDS.—The Probation Act does not, by the 'force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards
any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted is a "roving commission" which enables
the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the Act, the legislature does seemingly on its own
authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various
provincial boards to determine. If a provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to
do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of
legislative power to the provincial boards.

27.ID.; ID.; ID.; TRUE DlSTINCTION BETWEEN POWER TO MAKE LAW AND DlSCRETION AS. TO ITS EXECUTION;
ADJUDICATED CASES.—The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. &
Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. [1852], 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 68.)
To the same effect are decisions of the Supreme Court in the Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan
([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919], 39 Phil., 660) ; and Cruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56
Phil., 234).

28.ID. ; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF A LAW; RELAXATION OF THE DOCTRINE.—Laws may be made
effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular
community (6 R. C. L., 118, 170172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs. Southard
([1825], 10 Wheat, 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the legisture may delegate a
power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be
delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the
taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government. Notwithstanding the
apparent tendency to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from
social and economic forces at work in this modern industrial age, the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his
work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Professor Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United
States and is accepted.

29.ID.; ID.; ID.; OPERATION OF PROBATION ACT NOT CONTINGENT ON SPECIFIED FACTS OR CONDITIONS;
DlSCRETION VESTED IN PROVINCIAL BOARDS ARBITRARY.—The legislature has not made the operation of the
Probation Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves the entire
operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial boards. The discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute
and unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any- fact, or await the happening of any specified
contingency. It is bound by no rule—limited by no principle of expediency announced by the legislature.. It may take into
consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not
give any reason or have any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a.
probation officer. This is a matter which rests entirely at its pleasure.

30.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; LOCAL OPTION LAWS ; EIGHT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT; SUSPENSION OF OPERATION
OF A GENERAL LAW NOT COUNTENANCED.—The legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from
those applicable to other localities and, while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts in many
jurisdictions have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the vote of the people. (6 R. C. L., p.
171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character which should receive different treatment in
different localities placed under different circumstances. Without denying the right of local self-government and the
propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities
to pass upon in matters of general legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general
subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221.
31.ID.; ID. ; ID. ; PROVINCIAL BOARDS EMPOWERED TO SUSPEND OPERATION OF PROBATION ACT.—The
statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular
provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the
salaries of probation officers they thereby are given absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law should take
effect or operate in their respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend
the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the provincial boards should
decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done, but by
what may be done under its provisions. (Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. J.,
p. 786.)

32.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; LEGISLATIVE POLICY; EXECUTION THEREOF; CONSTITUTION BOTH A GRANT AND
LlMITATION OF POWER.—A great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the expression of what
may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would
become oppressive and yet imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that popular government lives
because of the unexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of government is
vested in the representatives of the people and that these representatives are no further restrained under our system than
by the express language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment,
have that effect. But it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a limitation. of power and one of
these time-honored limitations is that, subject to certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.

33.ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS; CLASS LEGISLATION; CLASSIFICATION ON REASONABLE BASIS.
—" * * * nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." This basic individual right sheltered by the
Constitution is a restraint on all the three grand departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities
and subdivisions thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. What
may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that
will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited.
But classification on a reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however,
to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.

34.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; RESULTANT INEQUALITY FROM UNWARRANTED DELEGATION; PROBATION ACT PERMITS
DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION.—In the case of Act No. 4221, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the
unwarranted delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards. While inequality may result in the application of the
law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever
may be the case, it is clear that section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality
are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the
law before courts should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances
considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law
and is on that account bad. We see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of
such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal
discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition. In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because
of their effect in operation. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional.

35.ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 11 OF PROBATION ACT; GOVERNMENT OF LAWS; EQUALITY CLAUSE NOT "A ROPE
OF SAND".—Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not
be in force in the other provinces, but one province may appropriate for the salary of a probation officer of a given year—
and have probation during that year—and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation in
subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated
to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it
is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand."
36.ID.; PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ; PRESUMPTION AGAINST MUTILATION OF STATUTE.—In seeking the
legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and the courts will resort to elimination only where
an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its
removal will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process.
37.ID. ; SECTION 11 OF PROBATION ACT INSEPARABLE FROM REST OF ACT; PROBATION AND PROBATION
OFFICERS.—Section 11 of the Probation Act (No. 4221) is inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that with
the elimination of the section what would be left is the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a
large number of people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial results of that system. The clear policy of the
law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the system
dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards. If not one of the provinces—and this is the
actual situation now—appropriates the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221
would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without a
probation system.

38.ID.; ID.; PROBATION ACT ANALYZED; SECTIONS 10 AND 11 OF ACT; RULE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
—The probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in section 10 are clearly not those probation officers
required to be appointed for the provinces under section 11. It may be said, reddendo singula singulis, that the probation
officers referred to in section 10 are to act as such, not in the various provinces, but in the central office known as the
Probation Office established in the Depart ment of Justice, under the supervision of a Chief Probation Officer, When the
law provides that "the probation officer" shall investigate and make reports to the court; that "the probation officer" shall
supervise and visit the probationer; that the probationer shall report to the "probation officer", shall allow "the probation
officer" to visit him, shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of "the probation officer" concerning his
conduct or condition; that the court shall notify "the probation officer" in writing of the period and terms of probation, it
means the probation officer who is in charge of a particular probationer in a particular province. It never could have been
the intention of the legislature, for instance, to require a probationer in Batanes, to report to a probation officer in the City
of Manila, or to require a probation officer in Manila to visit the probationer in the said province of Batanes, to place him
under his care, to supervise his conduct, to instruct him concerning the conditions of his probation or to perform such
other functions as are assigned to him by law.

39.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WlSDOM AND PROPRIETY OF LEGISLATION; PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATION AND
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION.—That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as
there are provinces or groups of provinces is, of course, possible. But this would be arguing on what the law may be or
should be and not on what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is
not for us to pass upon. We may think a law better otherwise than it is. But much as has been said regarding progressive
interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are not permitted to read into the law matters and
provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose—not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity.

40.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS; APPOINTMENT OF PROBATION OFFICERS BY SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE; JUDICIAL NOTICE.—The clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insular Government defray
the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to make the provinces defray them should they desire to have the
Probation Act apply thereto. The sum of P50,000, appropriated "to carry out the purposes of this Act", is to be applied,
among other things, for the salaries of probation officers in the central office at Manila. These probation officers are to
receive such compensation as the Secretary of Justice may fix "until such positions shall have been included in the
Appropriation Act". It was not the intention of the legislature to empower the Secretary of Justice to fix the salaries of
probation officers in the provinces or later on. to include said salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further, that the
sum of P50,000, appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among other things, the salaries of the administrative personnel of
the Probation Office, what would be left of the amount can hardly be said to be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to
probation officers in the provinces, We take judicial notice of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines, and we
do not think it is seriously contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos appropriated for the central office, there can be in.
each province, as intended, a probation officer with a salary not lower than that of a provincial fiscal. If this is correct, the
contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is complete is an impracticable thing under the remainder of
the Act, unless it is conceded that there can be a system of probation in the provinces without probation officers.

41.ID. ; PROBATION AS DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN PENOLOGY; PROBATION ACT AS REPUGNANT TO

FUNDAMENTAL LAW.—Probation as a development of modern penology is a commendable system. Probation laws
have been enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern criminologists call the "individualization of
punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the character of 'the criminal and the circumstances of his particular case. It
provides a period of grace in order to aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is believed that, in many cases,
convicts may be reformed and their development into hardened criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes advantage of an
opportunity for reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as the convict gives promise of reform. The welfare of
society is its chief end and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely incidental. But while probation is
commendable as a system and' its implantation into the Philippines should be welcomed, the law is set aside because of
repugnancy to the fundamental law.

42.ID. ; CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS; RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; DECISIONS OF UNITED

STATES COURTS; LOCAL CONDITIONS AND ENVIRONMENT.—The constitutional relations between the Federal and
the State governments of the United States and the dual character of the American Government is a situation which does
not obtain in the Philippines. The situation of a state of the American Union or of the District of Columbia with reference to
the Federal Government of the United States is not the situation of a province with respect to the Insular Government; the
distinct federal and state judicial organizations of the United States do not embrace the integrated judicial system of the
Philippines; "General propositions do not decide concrete cases" and "to keep pace with * * * new developments of times
and circumstances", fundamental principles should be interpreted having in view existing local conditions and
environments. People vs. Vera., 65 Phil. 56, No. 45685 November 16, 1937

[G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002]

MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A.
TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services
Department of the Commission on Elections, respondents.

Courts; Judicial Review; An employee’s personal and substantial injury, if a particular appointee is not the lawful
COMELEC Chairman, clothes her with the requisite locus standi to raise the constitutional issue regarding the ad
interim appointment of said COMELEC Chairman.—Benipayo reassigned petitioner from the EID, where she was
Acting Director, to the Law Department, where she was placed on detail service. Respondents claim that the
reassignment was “pursuant to x x x Benipayo’s authority as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, and as the
Commission’s Chief Executive Officer.” Evidently, respondents anchor the legality of petitioner’s reassignment on
Benipayo’s authority as Chairman of the COMELEC. The real issue then turns on whether or not Benipayo is the lawful
Chairman of the COMELEC. Even if petitioner is only an Acting Director of the EID, her reassignment is without legal
basis if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC Chairman, an office created by the Constitution. On the other hand, if
Benipayo is the lawful COMELEC Chairman because he assumed office in accordance with the Constitution, then
petitioner’s reassignment is legal and she has no cause to complain provided the reassignment is in accordance with the
Civil Service Law. Clearly, petitioner has a personal and material stake in the resolution of the constitutionality of
Benipayo’s assumption of office. Petitioner’s personal and substantial injury, if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC
Chairman, clothes her with the requisite locus standi to raise the constitutional issue in this petition.

Same; Same; The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a
competent court that can resolve the same.—Respondents harp on petitioner’s belated act of questioning the
constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason. Petitioner filed the instant petition only on
August 3, 2001, when the first ad interim appointments were issued as early as March 22, 2001. However, it is not the
date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity. The
earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve
the same, such that, “if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the
trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.” Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason when she filed her petition before this Court, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the
constitutional issue before a competent body. Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of sound discretion,
the time when a constitutional issue may be passed upon. There is no doubt petitioner raised the constitutional issue on
time.

Same; Same; In keeping with the Supreme Court’s duty to determine whether other agencies of government have
remained within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the discretion given them, the Supreme Court
may even brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve any constitutional issue raised.—In any event, the
issue raised by petitioner is of paramount importance to the public. The legality of the directives and decisions made by
the COMELEC in the conduct of the May 14, 2001 national elections may be put in doubt if the constitutional issue raised
by petitioner is left unresolved. In keeping with this Court’s duty to determine whether other agencies of government have
remained within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the discretion given them, this Court may even brush
aside technicalities of procedure and resolve any constitutional issue raised. Here the petitioner has complied with all the
requisite technicalities. Moreover, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Appointments; Words and Phrases; An ad interim appointment is a
permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President
once the appointee has qualified into office—the fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character.—An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified
into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows: “The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no
longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for
any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim
appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment takes effect immediately; In case of an appointment made by
the President when Congress is in session, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the
Commission on Appointments may the person thus named assume office, while with reference to an ad interim
appointment, it takes effect at once, and the individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his function without
loss of time.—The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad
interim appointment takes effect immediately. The appointee can at once assume office and exercise, as a de jure officer,
all the powers pertaining to the office. In Pacete vs. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, this Court elaborated
on the nature of an ad interim appointment as follows: “A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such
presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session and
when it is in recess. In the former, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission on
Appointments may the person thus named assume office. It is not so with reference to ad interim appointments. It takes
effect at once. The individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his function without loss of time. His title to such office
is complete. In the language of the Constitution, the appointment is effective ‘until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.’ ”

Same; Same; Same; Same; The term “ad interim appointment,” as used in letters of appointment signed by the
President, means a permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess.—
The term “ad interim appointment”, as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a permanent
appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary
appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the text of the Constitution,
has acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. The Court had again occasion to explain the nature
of an ad interim appointment in the more recent case of Marohombsar vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court stated: “We
have already mentioned that an ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the nature of the appointment, that is, it is not
indicative of whether the appointment is temporary or in an acting capacity, rather it denotes the manner in which the
appointment was made. In the instant case, the appointment extended to private respondent by then MSU President
Alonto, Jr. was issued without condition nor limitation as to tenure. The permanent status of private respondent’s
appointment as Executive Assistant II was recognized and attested to by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office
No. 12. Petitioner’s submission that private respondent’s ad interim appointment is synonymous with a temporary
appointment which could be validly terminated at any time is clearly untenable. Ad interim appointments are permanent
but their terms are only until the Board disapproves them.” (Emphasis supplied)

Same; Same; Same; Same; An ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee
has qualified into office, and the withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is
communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, as any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is
tantamount to removal from office.—An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that
moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitutional protection that “[n]o
officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.” Thus, an ad
interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office. The withdrawal or
revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he
qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee has
qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can
only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.

Same; Same; Same; An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution—
first, by the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments, and, second, by the
adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment.—An ad interim
appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad
interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the adjournment of Congress without the
Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed
by the Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles
over the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the Constitution itself that places
the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad interim appointees.

Same; Same; Same; Security of Tenure; An appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity is the
kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three independent
constitutional commissions.—While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by
law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the
appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the
kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional
commissions, including the COMELEC.

Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Commissions; Commission on Elections; Statutory Construction; To hold that
the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim
appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim
appointments.—While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be independent,” this provision should be
harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the
COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can
assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory
construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the
framers of the Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Commission on Appointments; Principle of Check and Balance; An ad interim appointee
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment—the
disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the
appointing authority of the President.—There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the
Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. The
disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent after
deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such
decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the
President can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but
because of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the
merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress.—An ad interim appointment
that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A
by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at
the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its
consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad
interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the Commission on
Appointments, which provides as follows: “Section 17. Unacted Nominations or Appointments Returned to the President.
Nominations or appointments submitted by the President of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon at the close of
the session of Congress shall be returned to the President and, unless new nominations or appointments are made, shall
not again be considered by the Commission.” (Emphasis supplied) Hence, under the Rules of the Commission on
Appointments, a by-passed appointment can be considered again if the President renews the appointment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution
governing ad interim appointments by the President is doubtless applicable to the present Constitution.
—Guevara was decided under the 1935 Constitution from where the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
present Constitution on ad interim appointments was lifted verbatim. The jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution
governing ad interim appointments by the President is doubtless applicable to the present Constitution. The established
practice under the present Constitution is that the President can renew the appointments of by-passed ad interim
appointees. This is a continuation of the well-recognized practice under the 1935 Constitution, interrupted only by the
1973 Constitution which did not provide for a Commission on Appointments but vested sole appointing power in the
President.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution applies neither to disapprove nor by-passed ad interim appointments.—The prohibition on
reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim
appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment because the
disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim
appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new
appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The framers of the Constitution made it quite clear that any person who has
served any term of office as COMELEC member—whether for a full term of seven years, a truncated term of five
or three years, or even for an unexpired term of any length of time—can no longer be reappointed to the
COMELEC.—The framers of the Constitution made it quite clear that any person who has served any term of office as
COMELEC member—whether for a full term of seven years, a truncated term of five or three years, or even for an
unexpired term of any length of time—can no longer be reappointed to the COMELEC. Commissioner Foz succinctly
explained this intent in this manner: “MR. FOZ. But there is the argument made in the concurring opinion of Justice
Angelo Bautista in the case of Visarra vs. Miraflor, to the effect that the prohibition on reappointment applies only when
the term or tenure is for seven years. But in cases where the appointee serves only for less than seven years, he would
be entitled to reappointment. Unless we put the qualifying words “without reappointment” in the case of those appointed,
then it is possible that an interpretation could be made later on their case, they can still be reappointed to serve for a total
of seven years. Precisely, we are foreclosing that possibility by making it clear that even in the case of those first
appointed under the Constitution, no reappointment can be made.” (Emphasis supplied)

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on
Appointments does not constitute a term of office—the period from the time the ad interim appointment is made
to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term.—However, an ad interim appointment that has
lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the
ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would
mean that the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of office in the COMELEC
without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the
Commission on Appointments.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase “without reappointment” applies only to one
who has been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not
such person completes his term of office.—The phrase “without reappointment” applies only to one who has been
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes
his term of office. There must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment before
the prohibition on reappointment can apply. To hold otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the President’s power to
make ad interim appointments.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court will not subscribe to a proposition that will wreak havoc
on vital government services.—In the great majority of cases, the Commission on Appointments usually fails to act, for
lack of time, on the ad interim appointments first issued to appointees. If such ad interim appointments can no longer be
renewed, the President will certainly hesitate to make ad interim appointments because most of her appointees will
effectively be disapproved by mere inaction of the Commission on Appointments. This will nullify the constitutional power
of the President to make ad interim appointments, a power intended to avoid disruptions in vital government services. This
Court cannot subscribe to a proposition that will wreak havoc on vital government services.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The framers of the present Constitution prohibited reappointments for two
reasons—first, to prevent a second appointment for those who have been previously appointed and confirmed
even if they served for less than seven years, and, second, to insure that the members of the three constitutional
commissions do not serve beyond the fixed term of seven years.—The prohibition on reappointment is common to
the three constitutional commissions. The framers of the present Constitution prohibited reappointments for two reasons.
The first is to prevent a second appointment for those who have been previously appointed and confirmed even if they
served for less than seven years. The second is to insure that the members of the three constitutional commissions do not
serve beyond the fixed term of seven years.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; One who has been given an ad interim appointment as COMELEC Chairman is
a de jure officer, and consequently, he has full authority to exercise all the powers of that office for so long as his
ad interim appointment remains effective; The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly
empowered on his own authority, without having to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc, to transfer or
reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance with Civil Service Law.—Petitioner’s posturing will hold water if
Benipayo does not possess any color of title to the office of Chairman of the COMELEC. We have ruled, however, that
Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman, and consequently he has full authority to exercise all the powers of that
office for so long as his ad interim appointment remains effective. Under Section 7 (4), Chapter 2, Subtitle C, Book V of
the Revised Administrative Code, the Chairman of the COMELEC is vested with the following power: “Section 7.
Chairman as Executive Officer; Powers and Duties. The Chairman, who shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the
Commission, shall: x x x (4) Make temporary assignments, rotate and transfer personnel in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Service Law.” (Emphasis supplied) The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is
expressly empowered on his own authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. In the exercise of this power, the Chairman is not required by law to secure the approval of the COMELEC
en banc.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Transfers; Security of Tenure; Career Executive Service; One who is not a
Career Executive Service (CES) officer, nor a holder of a Career Executive Service Eligibility, which are necessary
qualifications for holding the position of Director IV as prescribed in the Qualifications Standards (Revised 1987)
issued by the Civil Service Commission, does not enjoy security of tenure as Director IV.—Petitioner’s appointment
papers dated February 2, 1999, February 15, 2000 and February 15, 2001, attached as Annexes “X”, “Y” and “Z” to her
Petition, indisputably show that she held her Director IV position in the EID only in an acting or temporary capacity.
Petitioner is not a Career Executive Service (CES) officer, and neither does she hold Career Executive Service Eligibility,
which are necessary qualifications for holding the position of Director IV as prescribed in the Qualifications Standards
(Revised 1987) issued by the Civil Service Commission. Obviously, petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure as Director
IV. In Secretary of Justice Serafin Cuevas vs. Atty. Josefina G. Bacal, this Court held that: “As respondent does not have
the rank appropriate for the position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that position cannot be considered
permanent, and she can claim no security of tenure in respect of that position.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The COMELEC Chairman is the sole officer specifically vested with the
power to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel, the COMELEC en banc cannot arrogate unto itself this power
because that will mean amending the Revised Administrative Code, an act the COMELEC en banc cannot legally
do.—The proviso in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, requiring due notice and hearing before any transfer or
reassignment can be made within thirty days prior to election day, refers only to COMELEC field personnel and not to
head office personnel like the petitioner. Under the Revised Administrative Code, the COMELEC Chairman is the sole
officer specifically vested with the power to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. The COMELEC Chairman will
logically exercise the authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 3300.
The COMELEC en banc cannot arrogate unto itself this power because that will mean amending the Revised
Administrative Code, an act the COMELEC en banc cannot legally do.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Election Period; COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that
every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel, should carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a
collegial body.—COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC
personnel should carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body. Interpreting Resolution No. 3300 to require
such concurrence will render the resolution meaningless since the COMELEC en banc will have to approve every
personnel transfer or reassignment, making the resolution utterly useless. Resolution No. 3300 should be interpreted for
what it is, an approval to effect transfers and reassignments of personnel, without need of securing a second approval
from the COMELEC en banc to actually implement such transfer or reassignment.

G.R. No. 213181 August 19, 2014

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Petitioner, vs. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.

Constitutional Law; Judicial and Bar Council; Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the
creation of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The Supreme Court (SC) was given supervisory authority over it.
—Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of the JBC. The Court was given supervisory
authority over it. Section 8 reads: Section 8. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

Same; Same; Supervision; Supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties.—As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope of supervision. It is
the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and
the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that
rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace
them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may
not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the
rules are followed.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty; There is no question that the Judicial
and Bar Council’s (JBC’s) duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be compelled to do something.—The
Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not available. Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to
control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and
duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be
exercised and not that of the court. There is no question that the JBC’s duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be
compelled to do something.

Same; Same; Certiorari; Under Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial function.—Respondent JBC opposed the petition for certiorari on the ground that it does not
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Under Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. “Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer clothed with authority to
determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. Quasi-
judicial function is a term that applies to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies given the
authority to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis
for their official action using discretion of a judicial nature.” It asserts that in the performance of its function of
recommending appointees for the judiciary, the JBC does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Hence, the
resort to such remedy to question its actions is improper.

Same; Same; Same; It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the
act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.—It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a
proper remedy to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter
does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. In a case like this, where constitutional bearings are too
blatant to ignore, the Court does not find passivity as an alternative. The impasse must be overcome.

Judicial and Bar Council; Judges; The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has been tasked to screen aspiring judges
and justices, among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and
suitably best for appointment.—The purpose of the JBC’s existence is indubitably rooted in the categorical
constitutional declaration that “[a] member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence.” To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to
screen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all
qualified and suitably best for appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility of
extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified.

Same; Same; The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) may even conduct a discreet background check and receive
feedback from the public on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, the merits of which shall be
verified and checked.—As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of qualification laid down in JBC-
009, “integrity” is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty,
incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. That is why proof of an
applicant’s reputation may be shown in certifications or testimonials from reputable government officials and
nongovernmental organizations and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, and the police, among
others. In fact, the JBC may even conduct a discreet background check and receive feedback from the public on the
integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, the merits of which shall be verified and checked. As a qualification,
the term is taken to refer to a virtue, such that, “integrity is the quality of person’s character.”

Same; Same; Unanimity Rule; The “unanimity rule” only comes into operation when the moral character of a
person is put in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicant’s moral
uprightness.—Does Rule 2, Section 10 of JBC-009, in imposing the “unanimity rule,” contemplate a doubt on the moral
character of an applicant? Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides: SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified
applicant is challenged.—In every case where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for nomination
is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the Members of the Council must be obtained for the favorable
consideration of his nomination. A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher voting
requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an applicant is questioned. Simply put, when an integrity question
arises, the voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes “unanimous” instead of the
“majority vote” required in the preceding section. Considering that JBC-009 employs the term “integrity” as an essential
qualification for appointment, and its doubtful existence in a person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the
unanimous vote of all the members of the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that “integrity” as used in the rules must
be interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an applicant’s moral
fitness is challenged. It follows then that the “unanimity rule” only comes into operation when the moral character of a
person is put in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicant’s moral
uprightness.

Attorneys; A lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him provided
that he lives up to his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and that he exert his best efforts to
protect the interests of his client within the bounds of the law.—Verily, disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal,
if not an essential form of, interaction among members of the legal community. A lawyer has complete discretion on what
legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him provided that he lives up to his duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence, and that he exert his best efforts to protect the interests of his client within the bounds of the
law. Consonantly, a lawyer is not an insurer of victory for clients he represents. An infallible grasp of legal principles and
technique by a lawyer is a utopian ideal. Stripped of a clear showing of gross neglect, iniquity, or immoral purpose, a
strategy of a legal mind remains a legal tactic acceptable to some and deplorable to others. It has no direct bearing on his
moral choices.

Judicial and Bar Council; Judges; Unanimity Rule; To fall under Section 2, Rule 10 of Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC)-009, there must be a showing that the act complained of is, at the least, linked to the moral character of the
person and not to his judgment as a professional.—The Court notes the zeal shown by the Chief Justice regarding
international cases, given her participation in the PIATCO case and the Belgian Dredging case. Her efforts in the
determination of Jardeleza’s professional background, while commendable, have not produced a patent demonstration of
a connection between the act complained of and his integrity as a person. Nonetheless, the Court cannot consider her
invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as conformably within the contemplation of the rule. To fall under Section 2,
Rule 10 of JBC-009, there must be a showing that the act complained of is, at the least, linked to the moral character of
the person and not to his judgment as a professional. What this disposition perceives, therefore, is the inapplicability of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to the original ground of its invocation.

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Judges; Immorality; A lawyer who engages in extra-marital affairs is deemed to have
failed to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of the Judiciary is
expected to observe. In fact, even relationships which have never gone physical or intimate could still be subject
to charges of immorality, when a lawyer, who is married, admits to having a relationship which was more than
professional, more than acquaintanceship, more than friendly.—Unlike the first ground which centered on Jardeleza’s
stance on the tactical approach in pursuing the case for the government, the claims of an illicit relationship and acts of
insider trading bear a candid relation to his moral character. Jurisprudence is replete with cases where a lawyer’s
deliberate participation in extra-marital affairs was considered as a disgraceful stain on one’s ethical and moral principles.
The bottom line is that a lawyer who engages in extra-marital affairs is deemed to have failed to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency which every member of the Judiciary is expected to observe. In fact, even relationships
which have never gone physical or intimate could still be subject to charges of immorality, when a lawyer, who is married,
admits to having a relationship which was more than professional, more than acquaintanceship, more than friendly. As the
Court has held: Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and
public welfare. Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. To have a good moral
character, a person must have the personal characteristic of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good
reputation, that is, the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public
in the place where she is known. Hence, lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community
approbation.

Same; Same; Same; Insider Trading; Insider trading involves the trading of securities based on knowledge of
material information not disclosed to the public at the time.—Insider trading is an offense that assaults the integrity of
our vital securities market. Manipulative devices and deceptive practices, including insider trading, throw a monkey
wrench right into the heart of the securities industry. When someone trades in the market with unfair advantage in the
form of highly valuable secret inside information, all other participants are defrauded. All of the mechanisms become
worthless. Given enough of stock market scandals coupled with the related loss of faith in the market, such abuses could
presage a severe drain of capital. And investors would eventually feel more secure with their money invested elsewhere.
In its barest essence, insider trading involves the trading of securities based on knowledge of material information not
disclosed to the public at the time. Clearly, an allegation of insider trading involves the propensity of a person to engage in
fraudulent activities that may speak of his moral character.

Judicial and Bar Council; The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), as a body, is not required by law to hold hearings
on the qualifications of the nominees.—The JBC, as a body, is not required by law to hold hearings on the
qualifications of the nominees. The process by which an objection is made based on Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 is not
judicial, quasi-judicial, or fact-finding, for it does not aim to determine guilt or innocence akin to a criminal or administrative
offense but to ascertain the fitness of an applicant vis-à-vis the requirements for the position. Being sui generis, the
proceedings of the JBC do not confer the rights insisted upon by Jardeleza. He may not exact the application of rules of
procedure which are, at the most, discretionary or optional. Finally, Jardeleza refused to shed light on the objections
against him. During the June 30, 2014 meeting, he did not address the issues, but instead chose to tread on his view that
the Chief Justice had unjustifiably become his accuser, prosecutor and judge.

Attorneys; It is well-established in jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis in
that they are neither purely civil nor purely criminal; they involve investigations by the Supreme Court (SC) into
the conduct of one of its officers, not the trial of an action or a suit.—The fact that a proceeding is sui generis and is
impressed with discretion, however, does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process. It is well-
established in jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis in that they are neither purely
civil nor purely criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers, not the trial of an
action or a suit. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney.

In such posture, there can be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. On the whole, disciplinary
proceedings are actually aimed to verify and finally determine, if a lawyer charged is still qualified to benefit from the rights
and privileges that membership in the legal profession evoke.

Judicial and Bar Council; Judges; The Supreme Court (SC) subscribes to the view that in cases where an
objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders
illusory the fulfillment of the duty of Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) to recommend.—Notwithstanding being “a class
of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing. The Court subscribes to the view that in cases where
an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory
the fulfillment of the duty of JBC to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination
process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When
an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented
with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious
assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its
assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with
the dictates of fairness for the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.

Same; Same; The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the discretion to hold or not to hold a hearing when an
objection to an applicant’s integrity is raised and that it may resort to other means to accomplish its objective.—
The conduct of a hearing under Rule 4 of JBC-009 is permissive and/or discretionary on the part of the JBC. Even the
conduct of a hearing to determine the veracity of an opposition is discretionary for there are ways, besides a hearing, to
ascertain the truth or falsity of allegations. Succinctly, this argument suggests that the JBC has the discretion to hold or
not to hold a hearing when an objection to an applicant’s integrity is raised and that it may resort to other means to
accomplish its objective. Nevertheless, JBC adds, “what is mandatory, however, is that if the JBC, in its discretion,
receives a testimony of an oppositor in a hearing, due notice shall be given to the applicant and that shall be allowed to
cross-examine the oppositor.”

Same; Same; Any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10)
days from the publication of the notice and a list of candidates.—As threshed out beforehand, due process, as a
constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when
a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Even as Jardeleza
was verbally informed of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him and was later asked to explain
himself during the meeting, these circumstances still cannot expunge an immense perplexity that lingers in the mind of the
Court. What is to become of the procedure laid down in JBC-010 if the same would be treated with indifference and
disregard? To repeat, as its wording provides, any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the
Secretary within ten (10) days from the publication of the notice and a list of candidates. Surely, this notice is all the more
conspicuous to JBC members. Granting ex argumenti, that the 10-day period is only applicable to the public, excluding
the JBC members themselves, this does not discount the fact that the invocation of the first ground in the June 5, 2014
meeting would have raised procedural issues. To be fair, several members of the Council expressed their concern and
desire to hear out Jardeleza but the application of JBC-010 did not form part of the agenda then. It was only during the
next meeting on June 16, 2014, that the Council agreed to invite Jardeleza, by telephone, to a meeting that would be held
on the same day when a resource person would shed light on the matter.

Due Process; In criminal and administrative cases, the violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.—In criminal and administrative cases, the
violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded
at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right
is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule may well be applied to the current situation for an opposing view submits to an
undue relaxation of the Bill of Rights. To this, the Court shall not concede. As the branch of government tasked to
guarantee that the protection of due process is available to an individual in proper cases, the Court finds the subject short
list as tainted with a vice that it is assigned to guard against. Indeed, the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 must
be deemed to have never come into operation in light of its erroneous application on the original ground against
Jardeleza’s integrity. At the risk of being repetitive, the Court upholds the JBC’s discretion in the selection of nominees,
but its application of the “unanimity rule” must be applied in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-010 being invoked
by Jardeleza. Having been able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion left to propound is that a
majority of the members of the JBC, nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for the position of Associate Justice and
this grants him a rightful spot in the short list submitted to the President.

G.R. No. 202242. July 17, 2012.*

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and
REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., respondents.

Constitutional Law; Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; Declaratory Relief; Notwithstanding the fact that only questions
of law are raised in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.―The Constitution as the subject
matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8 (1), Article VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be
considered as that which would result in the adjudication of rights sans the execution process because the only relief to be
granted is the very declaration of the rights under the document sought to be construed. It being so, the original
jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC). Notwithstanding the fact that only
questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction
of this Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Same; Same; Judicial Review; Limitations on the Supreme Court’s Power of Judicial Review.―The Courts’ power
of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has
sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a
party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality
of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.

Same; Judicial and Bar Council (JBC); The claim that the composition of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is
illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens
who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.―A vast number of aspirants to
judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process
of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The Court considers this a constitutional
issue that must be passed upon, lest a constitutional process be plagued by misgivings, doubts and worse, mistrust.
Hence, a citizen has a right to bring this question to the Court, clothed with legal standing and at the same time, armed
with issues of transcendental importance to society. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and
unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to
seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

Same; Statutory Construction; It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed.―One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-
settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum―from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

Statutory Construction; Noscitur a Sociis; Under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase
is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear
and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.―Under
the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is
founded or with which it is associated. This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with
other words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the latter. The particular words, clauses
and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so
construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. In short, every meaning to be given to
each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is
always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter.

Constitutional Law; Judicial and Bar Council; Doubtless, the Framers of our Constitution intended to create a
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) as an innovative solution in response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating
politics in the appointment of members of the Judiciary.―Doubtless, the Framers of our Constitution intended to
create a JBC as an innovative solution in response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment
of members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial independence, they adopted a holistic approach and hoped that, in
creating a JBC, the private sector and the three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the
selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the
JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would, as one former
congressman and member of the JBC put it, “negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government
which is enshrined in the Constitution.”

Same; Doctrine of Operative Facts; In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions
previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.―In the interest of fair play under the
doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not
nullified. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, 548 SCRA 485 (2008), the Court explained: The doctrine of
operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of
an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on
those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality
would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law
creating it.

Razon vs. Tagitis,

GR 182498, Dec. 3, 2009

Writs of Amparo; Nature; Words and Phrases; The Writ of Amparo—a protective remedy against violations or
threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security—does not deter¬mine guilt nor pinpoint criminal
culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance; Responsibility
refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever
way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the
proper courts; Accountability refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.—This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo
—a protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security. It embodies,
as a remedy, the court’s directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the
disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal
culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsi¬bility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to
the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to
file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the
other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who
are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who
carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.

Same; Same; The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points
remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may
promulgate.—We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the unique situations that call
for the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these situations, may not at
all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a
work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the
substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.

Same; Pleadings and Practice; While, as in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the
ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details, in an Amparo petition, however,
this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation
of uncertainty—the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or
who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these
information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance.—The framers of the
Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a
victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause
of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the
nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to
describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or
where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the
disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners
apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the
unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to
the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life,
liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in
terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements—namely, of the disappearance, the State or
private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security—are present.

Same; Same; Where the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified
petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an affidavit
represents is essentially fulfilled.—If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting
affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and
to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the
annotation that these can be used as the affiant’s direct testimony. This requirement, however, should not be read as an
absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the
petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts
relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the
failure to attach the required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally
testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of
the petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.

Same; Same; Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition—that otherwise is not supported
by sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of action—as a means to “fish” for evidence.—These
allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have been made to the police authorities, and that investigations
should have followed. That the petition did not state the manner and results of the investigation that the Amparo Rule
requires, but rather generally stated the inaction of the police, their failure to perform their duty to investigate, or at the
very least, their reported failed efforts, should not be a reflection on the completeness of the petition. To require the
respondent to elaborately specify the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority, as
well the manner and conduct of the investigation is an overly strict interpretation of Section 5(d), given the respondent’s
frustrations in securing an investigation with meaningful results. Under these circumstances, we are more than satisfied
that the allegations of the petition on the investigations undertaken are sufficiently complete for purposes of bringing the
petition forward. Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition—that otherwise is not supported by
sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of action—as a means to “fish” for evidence. The petitioners contend
that the respondent’s petition did not specify what “legally available efforts were taken by the respondent,” and that there
was an “undue haste” in the filing of the petition when, instead of cooperating with authorities, the respondent immediately
invoked the Court’s intervention.

Same; Extralegal Killings and Enforced Disappearances; The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising
from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitler’s Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of
December 7, 1941; In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and
outraging the world when individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have
“disappeared” during the military regime in Argentina.—The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from
State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitler’s Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941.
The Third Reich’s Night and Fog Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories “endangering
German security”; they were transported secretly to Germany where they disappeared without a trace. In order to
maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited government officials from providing information about the
fate of these targeted persons. In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and
outraging the world when individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have “disappeared”
during the military regime in Argentina. Enforced disappearances spread in Latin America, and the issue became an
international concern when the world noted its widespread and systematic use by State security forces in that continent
under Operation Condor and during the Dirty War in the 1970s and 1980s. The escalation of the practice saw political
activists secretly arrested, tortured, and killed as part of governments’ counter-insurgency campaigns. As this form of
political brutality became routine elsewhere in the continent, the Latin American media standardized the term
“disappearance” to describe the phenomenon. The victims of enforced disappearances were called the “desaparecidos,”
which literally means the “disappeared ones.”

Same; Same; Three Different Kinds of “Disappearance” Cases.—In general, there are three different kinds of
“disappearance” cases: 1) those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification of the arresting
agents and are never found again; 2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held
in complete isolation for weeks or months while their families are unable to discover their whereabouts and the military
authorities deny having them in custody until they eventually reappear in one detention center or another; and 3) those of
victims of “salvaging” who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later discovered.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Although the writ of amparo specifically covers “enforced disappearances,”
this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction; As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal
acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the
Revised Penal Code and special laws.—The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the “writ shall cover extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.” We note that although the writ specifically covers “enforced
disappearances,” this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court
Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing
an elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance: x x x In the end, the Committee took cognizance of
several bills filed in the House of Representatives and in the Senate on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,
and resolved to do away with a clear textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead focused on the
nature and scope of the concerns within its power to address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that
an elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts. As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts
undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code
and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts
are criminal and what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive law that only
the Legislature has the power to enact under the country’s constitutional scheme and power structure.

Same; Same; Supreme Court; Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own
constitutional mandate to promulgate “rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,” since extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by their
nature and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life,
liberty and security—the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the
procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.—Even without the benefit of
directly applicable substantive laws on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is
not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to promulgate “rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,” since extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional rights of
individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the
procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its procedural
rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened
violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference—even if only
procedurally—in a situation when the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or
actual violations of constitutional rights.

Same; Same; Same; The Court’s intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance has taken
place and who is responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate
remedies to address it; The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo, is twofold: the first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken
under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual
situations require; and, the second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and
his or her liberty and security restored.—Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we
do not rule on any issue of criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is an issue that
requires criminal action before our criminal courts based on our existing penal laws. Our intervention is in determining
whether an enforced disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to
define and impose the appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these
situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and
investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what
the individual situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved
and his or her liberty and security restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing
efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the
complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the disappeared person and
the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against
the guilty parties.

Same; Same; International Law; From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced disappearance
is considered a flagrant violation of human rights.—From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced
disappearance is considered a flagrant violation of human rights. It does not only violate the right to life, liberty and
security of the desaparecido; it affects their families as well through the denial of their right to information regarding the
circumstances of the disappeared family member. Thus, enforced disappearances have been said to be “a double form of
torture,” with “doubly paralyzing impact for the victims,” as they “are kept ignorant of their own fates, while family members
are deprived of knowing the whereabouts of their detained loved ones” and suffer as well the serious economic hardship
and poverty that in most cases follow the disappearance of the household breadwinner. The UN General Assembly first
considered the issue of “Disappeared Persons” in December 1978 under Resolution 33/173. The Resolution expressed
the General Assembly’s deep concern arising from “reports from various parts of the world relating to enforced or
involuntary disappearances,” and requested the “UN Commission on Human Rights to consider the issue of enforced
disappearances with a view to making appropriate recommendations.”

Same; Same; Same; Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention); In
1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced disappearance had become a global
phenomenon, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance, and fourteen years later (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly
adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.—In 1992, in
response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced disappearance had become a global phenomenon, the UN
General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Declaration).
This Declaration, for the first time, provided in its third preambular clause a working description of enforced
disappearance, as follows: Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced
disappearances occur, in the sense that persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise
deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private
individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, followed
by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the law. Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006),
the UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (Convention). The Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France on February 6, 2007. Article 2 of
the Convention defined enforced disappearance as follows: For the purposes of this Convention, “enforced
disappearance” is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of
the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed
by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a
right not to be subject to enforced disappearance and that this right is non-derogable.—The Convention is the first
universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a right not to be subject to enforced disappearance and that this
right is non-derogable. It provides that no one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be
it a state of war, internal political instability, or any other public emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify enforced
disappearance as an offense punishable with appropriate penalties under their criminal law. It also recognizes the right of
relatives of the disappeared persons and of the society as a whole to know the truth on the fate and whereabouts of the
disappeared and on the progress and results of the investigation. Lastly, it classifies enforced disappearance as a
continuing offense, such that statutes of limitations shall not apply until the fate and whereabouts of the victim are
established.

Same; Same; Same; Same; To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the
country is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime.—To date, the
Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country is not yet committed to enact any law
penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific penal law, however, is not a stumbling block for
action from this Court, as heretofore mentioned; underlying every enforced disappearance is a violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through
its rule-making powers.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is guided,
in acting on Amparo cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and by
the various conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans rights.—
Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is guided, in acting on Amparo cases, by the
reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and by the various conventions we signed and
ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans rights. Under the UN Charter, the Philippines pledged to
“promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as
to race, sex, language or religion.” Although no universal agreement has been reached on the precise extent of the
“human rights and fundamental freedoms” guaranteed to all by the Charter, it was the UN itself that issued the Declaration
on enforced disappearance, and this Declaration states: Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is
condemned as a denial of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of
human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed and
developed in international instruments in this field. As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy
matter made in a UN Declaration, the ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country, given our
own adherence to “generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply “international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”—The most widely accepted statement of sources of
international law today is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court
shall apply “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” The material sources of custom
include State practice, State legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other
international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions
relating to legal questions in the UN General Assembly. Sometimes referred to as “evidence” of international law, these
sources identify the substance and content of the obligations of States and are indicative of the “State practice” and
“opinio juris” requirements of international law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Enforced disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by the international
community so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of international law, which we should
consider a part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws
and the international conventions that bind us.—While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the
Convention on enforced disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared
enforced disappearance as a specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced disappearance as a State practice has
been repudiated by the international community, so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of international
law, which we should consider a part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already allowed
under our laws and the international conventions that bind us.

Same; Same; Past experiences in other jurisdictions relative to enforced disappearances show that the
evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold: first, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the
direct perpetrators; second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct
possibility; and, third is the element of denial.—These difficulties largely arise because the State itself—the party
whose involvement is alleged—investigates enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that
the evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold. First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the
direct perpetrators. Experts note that abductors are well organized, armed and usually members of the military or police
forces. Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central
piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance—i.e., the corpus delicti or the victim’s body—is usually concealed to
effectively thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of one that may have begun. The problem for the victim’s
family is the State’s virtual monopoly of access to pertinent evidence. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR)
observed in the landmark case of Velasquez Rodriguez that inherent to the practice of enforced disappearance is the
deliberate use of the State’s power to destroy the pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the concealment as a clear
attempt by the State to commit the perfect crime. Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities
deliberately deny that the enforced disappearance ever occurred. “Deniability” is central to the policy of enforced
disappearances, as the absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the application of legal
standards ensuring the victim’s human rights. Experience shows that government officials typically respond to requests for
information about desaparecidos by saying that they are not aware of any disappearance, that the missing people may
have fled the country, or that their names have merely been invented.

Same; Same; Evidence; Burden of Proof; The characteristics of the Amparo Rule of being summary and the use
of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or
proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings)—reveal the clear intent of the framers to have the
equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations; In these
proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of
a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence, and once a
rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the
standard of diligence required.—These characteristics—namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence
as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in
court proceedings)—reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative
proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of diligence required—the duty of
public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence—point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected in
the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearance cases. Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the
substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by
substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their
defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced
disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victim’s constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond.

Same; Same; Same; Quantum of Evidence; Substantial Evidence; Words and Phrases; The landmark case of Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940), provided the Court its first opportunity to define the
substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings.—The landmark case of
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations provided the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence
required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay: Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute provides that ‘the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall
not be controlling.’ The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion
of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would
not invalidate the administrative order. [citations omitted] But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The fair and proper rule is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in
their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced—we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason, i.e., to
the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence.
—Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances that enforced disappearance
cases pose to the courts; to have an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be responsive to the evidentiary
difficulties faced. On the one hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the admission and appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness
entails violation of rights and cannot be used as an effective counter-measure; we only compound the problem if a wrong
is addressed by the commission of another wrong. On the other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules and
cannot consider evidence the way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely, the proceedings before us are
administrative in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of evidence are not strictly observed. Thus, while we must follow
the substantial evidence rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take into account. The fair
and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any
evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason—i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to
the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be
admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.

Same; Same; Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; Elements of Enforced
Disappearance.—The Convention defines enforced disappearance as “the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form
of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.” Under this
definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold: (a) arrest, detention, abduction or
any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State; (c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a
concealment of the fate of the disappeared person; and (d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of
the law.

Same; Same; Evidence; Witnesses; As a rule, minor inconsistencies indicate truthfulness rather than
prevarication and only tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses
dovetailing on every detail — the latter cannot but generate witnesses that the material circumstances they
testified to were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated story.—Upon deeper consideration of these
inconsistencies, however, what appears clear to us is that the petitioners never really steadfastly disputed or presented
evidence to refute the credibility of the respondent and her witness, Mrs. Talbin. The inconsistencies the petitioners point
out relate, more than anything else, to details that should not affect the credibility of the respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the
inconsistencies are not on material points. We note, for example, that these witnesses are lay people in so far as military
and police matters are concerned, and confusion between the police and the military is not unusual. As a rule, minor
inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication and only tend to strengthen their probative
value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate
suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated story.
Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary situation in enforced disappearance cases, we hold it duly
established that Col. Kasim informed the respondent and her friends, based on the informant’s letter, that Tagitis,
reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been under surveillance since January 2007, was “in good hands” and under
custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain “Santos” of
Bulacan, a “Balik Islam” charged with terrorism. The respondent’s and Mrs. Talbin’s testimonies cannot simply be defeated
by Col. Kasim’s plain denial and his claim that he had destroyed his informant’s letter, the critical piece of evidence that
supports or negates the parties’ conflicting claims. Col. Kasim’s admitted destruction of this letter—effectively, a
suppression of this evidence—raises the presumption that the letter, if produced, would be proof of what the respondent
claimed. For brevity, we shall call the evidence of what Col. Kasim reported to the respondent to be the “Kasim evidence.”

Same; Same; Same; The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern
for constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and timely remedies, using and profiting from
local and international experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as the situation may
require—the Court has no choice but to meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances
with the flexibility that these difficulties demand.—To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible
evidence of what it substantively states is to acknowledge—as the petitioners effectively suggest—that in the absence of
any direct evidence, we should simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this reason is no
different from a statement that the Amparo Rule—despite its terms—is ineffective, as it cannot allow for the special
evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present in Amparo situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this intent or with the intent to make it a token gesture of
concern for constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and timely remedies, using and profiting from
local and international experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as the situation may require.
Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the
flexibility that these difficulties demand.

Same; Same; Same; In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful results or details on the
depth and extent of the investigation made—to be sure, reports of top police officials indicating the personnel
and units they directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal
detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search for the missing subject; Indisputably, the
police authorities from the very beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule
requires.—As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best haphazard since the authorities
were looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even secure. The returns and reports made to the CA fared no
better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching for custodial records of Tagitis in their various
departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis was a “black” operation because it was
unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record of custody would ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not
be detained in the usual police or CIDG detention places. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful
results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. To be sure, reports of top police officials indicating the
personnel and units they directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal
detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from the
very beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.

Same; Same; Same; The consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point to
the conclusion that there was government complicity in the disappearance, for why would the government and
its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny what they already knew of
the disappearance?—Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure, made in an unguarded
moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials
and the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why would the government and its officials
engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny what they already knew of the disappearance?
Would not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the
government’s cap under the circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and
developments, particularly the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the
Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted, the evidence at hand and the
developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance and government complicity, under a background
of consistent and unfounded government denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well effectively placed
Tagitis outside the protection of the law—a situation that will subsist unless this Court acts.

Same; Same; Same; The Court believes and so holds that the government in general, through the Philippine
National Police (PNP) and the Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (PNP-CIDG), and in particular, the
Chiefs of these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Tagitis—the Court holds these organizations accountable through their incumbent Chiefs who,
under this Decision, shall carry the personal responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in the
manner the Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing the enforced disappearnce of Tagitis.—Following the
lead of this Turkish experience—adjusted to the Philippine legal setting and the Amparo remedy this Court has
established, as applied to the unique facts and developments of this case—we believe and so hold that the government in
general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations together with Col.
Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. The PNP and CIDG are accountable
because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the “PNP Law,” specifies the PNP as the governmental
office with the mandate “to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice
and assist in their prosecution.” The PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane Pante (then Chief of CIDG Region 9) testified, is
the “investigative arm” of the PNP and is mandated to “investigate and prosecute all cases involving violations of the
Revised Penal Code, particularly those considered as heinous crimes.” Under the PNP organizational structure, the PNP-
CIDG is tasked to investigate all major crimes involving violations of the Revised Penal Code and operates against
organized crime groups, unless the President assigns the case exclusively to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
No indication exists in this case showing that the President ever directly intervened by assigning the investigation of
Tagitis’ disappearance exclusively to the NBI. Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were
the ones who were remiss in their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence
that the Amparo Rule requires. We hold these organization accountable through their incumbent Chiefs who, under this
Decision, shall carry the personal responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in the manner the Amparo Rule
requires, is applied in addressing the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.

Same; Same; Same; The Court holds Col. Kasim accountable for his failure to disclose under oath information
relating to the enforced disappearance, and for the purpose of this accountability, he is impleaded as a party to
this case.—We hold Col. Kasim accountable for his failure to disclose under oath information relating to the enforced
disappearance. For the purpose of this accountability, we order that Col. Kasim be impleadead as a party to this case.
The PNP is similarly held accountable for the suppression of vital information that Col. Kasim could and did not provide,
and, as the entity with direct authority over Col. Kasim, is held with the same obligation of disclosure that Col. Kasim
carries. We shall deal with Col. Kasim’s suppression of evidence under oath when we finally close this case under the
process outlined below.

G.R. No. 226679

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner, vs. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Courts; Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; It is within the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) power to make exceptions to the
rules of court. Under proper conditions, it may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties’ arguments
and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural flaws.—On matters
of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct. Nonetheless, without much further ado, it must be
underscored that it is within this Court’s power to make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may
permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties’ arguments and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities
of a petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the
Court shall not shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching
implications.

Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when
issues of substantial and transcendental importance are present.—Matters of procedure and technicalities normally
take a backseat when issues of substantial and transcendental importance are present. We have acknowledged that the
Philippines’ problem on illegal drugs has reached “epidemic,” “monstrous,” and “harrowing” proportions, and that its
disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the
future of thousands especially our young citizens. At the same time, We have equally noted that “as urgent as the
campaign against the drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the
rights of the accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the law
enforcers, may be unjustly accused and convicted.” Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that has beset our
country and its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to
lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers and users.

Courts; Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now
the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments.—The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no
longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments. In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96 (1999),
then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puna traced the history of the Court’s rulemaking power and
highlighted its evolution and development.

Political Law; Separation of Powers; The separation of powers among the three (3) coequal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure within the sole province of the Supreme Court (SC).—The separation of powers among the three coequal
branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they
enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its
legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules).

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Plea Bargaining; Speedy Trial Act of 1998; Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No.
8493 (“Speedy Trial Act of 1998”) required that plea bargaining and other matters that will promote a fair and
expeditious trial are to be considered during pretrial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC), Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Regional Trial Court
(RTC), and the Sandiganbayan.—When R.A. No. 8493 (“Speedy Trial Act of 1998”) was enacted, Section 2, Rule 118 of
the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining and other matters that will promote
a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered during pretrial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal
Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.

Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The Supreme Court’s (SC’s) sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal
procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase
or modify the latter.—The Supreme Court’s sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the
preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter. “Substantive law is
that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a
cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law,
which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions.”

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Promulgation of Judgments; Failure to Appear at the Promulgation; The
Supreme Court (SC) said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 746 SCRA 452 (2015), that Section 6, Rule 120 of
the Rules, which provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction shall lose the remedies available against the judgment, does not take away substantive rights but
merely provides the manner through which an existing right may be implemented.—We said in Jaylo, et al. v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., 746 SCRA 452 (2015), that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which provides that an accused who
failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the judgment,
does not take away substantive rights but merely provides the manner through which an existing right may be
implemented. Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted accused to
avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled
date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the
judgment. It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the substantive
rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to “provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases.” This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of
criminal cases — delay arising from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled
promulgation of the judgment of conviction.

Same; Same; Plea Bargaining; In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.”
—In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.” There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea
bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid
potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system —
speed, economy, and finality — can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court. Considering
the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right.
Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

Same; Same; Same; Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right
but depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid
plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged.—The decision to plead guilty is
often heavily influenced by the defendant’s appraisal of the prosecution’s case against him and by the apparent likelihood
of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted. In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to a
lesser crime, a guilty plea is a “serious and sobering occasion” inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental
rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses
face to face, to bail (except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. Yet a
defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a
plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an
offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which
is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The
reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute
the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.

Same; Same; Same; Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that
actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of
the accused.—The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to
plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denotes an exercise of
discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in
mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of
bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.

Same; Same; Same; Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pretrial, or even up to the point when
the prosecution already rested its case.—Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pretrial, or even up to
the point when the prosecution already rested its case. As regards plea bargaining during the pretrial stage, the trial
court’s exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof. “Grave abuse of discretion” is a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion
or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.

Same; Same; Same; If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after
the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient
evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.—If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense
subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the
prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and
nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or against said
motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution’s evidence as well as all the circumstances upon
which the accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. The
ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. Absent any finding on the
weight of the evidence on hand, the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is improper and irregular.

GSIS vs. Caballero,

GR 158090, Oct. 4, 2010

Actions; Counterclaims; Tests to Determine Whether a Counterclaim is Compulsory or Permissive.—To determine

whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law
raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.

Same; Same; Docket Fees; Jurisdiction; The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.—The rule in permissive counterclaims
is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. This,
petitioner did not do, because it asserted that its claim for the collection of rental payments was a compulsory
counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive
counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals which he
collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be
struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The provision in the Charter of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts it from “all taxes, assessments, fees,
charges or duties of all kinds,” cannot operate to exempt it from the payment of legal fees—the Supreme Court
now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.—In In
Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees,
612 SCRA 193 (2010), the Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No.
8291, which exempts it from “all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds,” cannot operate to exempt it
from the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress
to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987
Constitution removed this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.

Same; Same; Same; The third rule laid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989),
regarding awards of claims not specified in the pleading, refers only to damages arising after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
—Petitioner also invoked our ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989), where the
Court held that: x x x x 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading
and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fee. In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag, 181 SCRA 687 (1990), the Court, in interpreting
the third rule laid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989), regarding awards of
claims not specified in the pleading, held that the same refers only to damages arising after the filing of the complaint or
similar pleading as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. The amount of any
claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading should be specified. While it
is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the
court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may
make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated
as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any
damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant
to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.