Gooptu EconomicLiberalisationWork 2007

Economic Liberalisation, Work and Democracy: Industrial Decline and Urban Politics in
Kolkata
Author(s): Nandini Gooptu
Source: Economic and Political Weekly , May 26 - Jun. 1, 2007, Vol. 42, No. 21 (May 26 -
Jun. 1, 2007), pp. 1922-1933
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4419634
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Economic Liberalisation,
Work and Democracy
Industrial Decline and Urban Politics in Kolkata
Economic liberalisation has brought about significant changes in the experience and meanin
of work, as well as in the social consciousness and political subjectivity of workers. This pap
explores the transformation of ideas about the state, democracy and rights, and the impact on
political action. A case study of declining jute industrial areas of Kolkata shows that the
labouring poor interpret their experience of unemployment and "casualisation" not primarily
as an economic phenomenon, but as a political crisis involving the betrayal of the working
classes. This perception has led the poor to abandon political activism, to condemn democra
politics as unrepresentative, and to confine their engagement with institutional politics
merely to extracting patronage benefits. Working class youth seek to exercise their agency
within the urban locality in diverse ways, ranging from extortion and coercion to local
community-oriented social work. Politics among this section of the poor is undergoing
intense localisation, shunning the wider arena of democratic politics, thus
spelling a crisis of political representation and participation.
NANDINI GOOPTU
conomic reforms in India since the 1980s have brought only for economic opportunities, but also as an arena of political
about significant changes in the organisation of work,action, often in rejection of interventionist states.1 Economic
labour markets, employment relations and workplace reforms are also understood to energise civil society organisations
and thus, ultimately boost political pluralism and dynamise
practices, as well as a re-evaluation of the social worth, public
status and discursive meanings of various forms of workdemocracy
and [Bratton 1989, Bratton and van de Walle 1992]. The
labour. As is well known, the legitimacy of labour rightsbeneficial
and links between market liberalisation and political lib-
of working class political activism has yielded to the perceived
eralism constitute the analytical crux of these accounts. Other
compulsion to augment efficiency, international competitivenessinterpretations, however, are less positive. In Africa, for instance,
and private investment. Technology and business now dominate the adverse economic consequences of structural adjustment in
the 1980s, often implemented by authoritarian governments,
public imagination as the sources of both individual social mobility
and national economic growth. The economic importance of
undermined the post-colonial "social contract" with the state, led
manual and industrial work has been devalued, and the role of
to "popular departicipation in the political process", and elicited
political protests [Olukoshi (ed) 1998: pp 20-21, 28; Gibbon,
labour has also been undermined as a constituency in democratic,
Bangura and Ofstad (ed) 1992]. From a range of different, and
party politics or as a major presence in left wing politics. These
not necessarily converging, perspectives, it has been suggested
normative shifts have implications for work, not only in the small
that "casualisation", rapid turnover of jobs, unemployment,
and shrinking "formal" or "organised" sector, but also in the wider
economy. As the experience and meanings of work change under declining living standards, and downward social and economic
globalisation, so do social consciousness and political subjec-mobility of the labouring poor, compounded by urban social and
tivity of workers, variously affecting relations of community, spatial polarisation, retreat of the state, lack of state protection,
class, gender and generation; political and social norms; ideasgrowing physical insecurity and lawlessness have variously led
about difference and hierarchy; conceptions of the state, democ-
to the decline of class-based action, fragmented the working class,
racy and citizenship. Changing notions of work, social percep- fuelled ethnic or religious tensions and identity politics, generated
tions and political attitudes and practices, in turn, have apolitical
far- unrest and protest, and turned urban areas into sites of
reaching impact on wider political processes, which formspoliticalthe instability, conflict, vigilantism, crime, drug trafficking,
subject of this paper, with a focus on the labouring poor in andareasviolence, even civil wars.2 Despite differences in interpre-
of industrial decline. tation, the analytical accent in these various discussions is on
A voluminous literature on developing countries has drawn the experience of marginalisation, vulnerability and insecurity
attention to the diverse political consequences of globalisationin determining political outcomes. On a somewhat less pessi-
mistic note, particularly for Latin America, while it is acknowl-
and economic reforms. On the positive side, freeing of the market
and the curtailment of state regulations are believed to have given
edged that economic restructuring has intensified both material
an impetus to self-employment, micro-enterprise and market- deprivation and social exclusion, and stimulated crime as a form
based institutions, and thus strengthened the informal sector, of
notentrepreneurship, yet at the same time, it is argued, collective
1922 Economic and Political Weekly May 26, 2007

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action and community mobilisation have thrived among the poor analytical angle of the transformation of political perceptions and
and contributed to the electoral success of populist, left-leaning ideas, which are, in turn, approached through the prism of changes
political parties [Portes and Hoffman 2003; Oxhor and Starr in the experience and meanings of work and labour. The aim
(eds) 1999]. Similarly, among the "new poor" - those adversely here is not to unearth hitherto unknown forms of political action
affected by structural adjustment policies - new forms of asso- or to devise a fresh model of correlation between economic
ciation, political engagement and strategy for coping or survival liberalisation and its political impact, but to suggest a different
have been detected. Where older institutions like trade unions analytical approach that would shed new light on the subject
from the hitherto largely neglected vantage point of the
have lost their importance or where erstwhile patterns of clientelism
centred on state institutions have declined, in their place, new
interplay of work, labour, political ideas and practice. In the light
mediating institutions or charismatic individuals and "strong" of various interpretations of politics noted above, the paper
leaders or "big men" have, at times, emerged to represent the probes
poor the proposition that economic restructuring has fuelled
criminalisation of politics, violence or sectarian conflict, espe-
or act as their patrons [Vilas 1997; de la Rocha et al 2004]. This
politics of "new poverty" in Latin America is often markedcially by among unemployed and economically marginalised urban
historical continuities with social movements and rights-based youth. Rather than starting with the premise that the disaffected
urban political action, and is set within an institutional context
poor contribute to urban violence and political conflict, this paper
of democratisation, decentralisation, participatory governance,devotes attention to uncovering how, for instance, ideas about
NGO activism and increasing local level development policy democracy, rights, public morality or political responsibility
interventions, albeit with the limited integration and accessmightof have been transformed, and how such changes mediate
the poor to political institutions. In these diverse analyses,democratic
in- participation and political behaviour, with or withou
stitutional political change in the neoliberal era is emphasised,
violence. The paper examines whether the history of democratic
politics and labour activism in the past several decades left any
alongside economic or material aspects of structural adjustment,
enduring mark on working class consciousness, or whether
in shaping the politics of "new poverty". The literature on economic
reforms and politics has also drawn attention to the increasingapparently "primordial" or ascriptive religious and ethnic iden-
localisation of politics in the context of decentralisation andtities
the have proved to be more durable and led working class
development of the local arena as a meaningful site of popular communities and the poor to succumb easily to political
political engagement [Harriss, Stokke and Tornquist 2006].
mobilisation along these lines.
On India too, a variety of perspectives have emerged on urbanTo analyse political attitudes and action, this research is based
on a case study, set in the context of unemployment and
popular politics in the era of economic reforms. Within the broad
analytical framework of social marginalisation, Jan Breman"informalisation"
has or "casualisation" of the labour market. The
examined the impact of industrial decline in Ahmedabad geographical
and focus is on areas of industrial decline in Kolkata,
concluded that with the decline of the textile mill economy,specifically
the jute mill districts. The research covered erstwhile mill
erstwhile political tradition of working class collective action
workers as well as others in the locality, especially young people,
who have not been in factory employment, but are affected by
gave way to narrow sectarian identities and religious mobilisation,
within a wider context of the rise of fundamentalism, caste the impact of industrial decline on the local economy. Fieldwork
conflict and communal tensions [Breman 2002,2004]. Similarly, for this research, including interviews, focus group discussions,
Mahadeviapoints to the communalisation of politics in Ahmedabad
non-participant observation, was undertaken in slums and working
class neighbourhoods, between 2000 and 2005, in a municipality
in the context of informalisation of work, increasing vulnerability
and spatial exclusion of the poor [Mahadevia 2002; Kunduof and
the Kolkata Metropolitan Area, which has a population of over
1,24,000 and a remarkable population density of over 38,000
Mahadevia 2001 ]. Chitra Joshi too links the history of mill decline
in Kanpur with the crystallisation of communal identities [Joshi
per sq km, with over 78 per cent of the population living in slums,3
2002]. On a different note, general studies on Indian democracy,
and over 70 per cent classed as living below poverty line (BPL).4
based on electoral and survey data, have demonstrated the Research was also conducted in and around the "coolie lines"
commitment of the underprivileged to democracy and their (residential quarters) of a jute mill in the adjacent municipality.
sustained electoral participation [Alam 1999, 2004; Yadav 1999].
Most people in these areas have historically depended on six jute
John Harriss has shown with evidence from Delhi, that in Indian mills in the locality, or on jobs in the local economy servicing
the factories and mill population. Mills in the area, as also in
cities, political parties, their local leaders and events organised
by them hold sway among the labouring poor. Unlike in Latin Mumbai, Ahmedabad and Kanpur, have been in a state of acute
America, alternative forms of political organisation and associa-
crisis from the early 1980s, with the gradual onset of policies
tion or social movements have not manifested themselves toto any
liberalise the economy. Factories here face long-term lockout
significant extent. Concentrating on political action or andperiodic closure, and offer only irregular jobs and pay, mos
organisation of the urban poor to "tackle their collective social
often on a casual basis. There is now an enormous pressure of
problems" under liberalisation, Harriss concludes that poor people
job seekers on local petty trade, transport and construction, and
continue to rely on their local political representatives - "big
on a handful of small manufacturing workshops - readymade
men", often through the vehicle of neighbourhood associations
clothing, car and bicycle repair, plastic toys and the like. Pressure
[Harriss 2005]. While Harriss gives an interesting insight on
intolocal jobs and economic opportunities has led to what Mike
political behaviour, his study is not concerned with politicalDavis characterises as "urban involution", following Clifford
attitudes and norms that underpin action, and, thus, he doesGeertz's
not description of overcrowding in the economy that has
to "provide everyone with some niche, however small, in the
fully address the meaning and significance of this type of politics
to the poor. overall system" [Davis 2006:182-83]. Some, brief supplementary
In this paper, the changing nature of the politics of the urban research was done in another area where a mill has been closed
labouring poor under economic reforms is examined from the for a while, but where alternative job opportunities have
Economic and Political Weekly May 26, 2007 1923

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developed, albeit in conditions of highly exploitative labour. brutally repressed nationwide in this period, and jute employers
Here 'zari' work (gold and silver thread embroidery on cloth) resorted to large scale retrenchment in their mills [Roy Chowdhury
has started to provide workshop or home-based employment to 1997:120-22; Basu 1984a:277]. Although workers thus suffered
young men, women and children, who work for middlemen political reversals in the 1970s, yet this decade was crucial in
contractors. In both areas, more and more workers and job seekers shaping their attitudes to work, labour, rights and the state,
- old and young, with or without any experience of mill work precisely because of the intensity of political conflict in this
- have become economically vulnerable, with uncertain and period. Through the history of militant labour struggles and left-
intermittent work, and with low earnings in an intensely com- wing politics in working class milieus, work and employment
petitive market for self-employment and casual wage labour. developed as concepts redolent with ideas of rights and entitle-
ments, and came to assume a significant normative force in the
I social and political imagination of mill workers, as well as others
Crisis of Jute Labour in working class communities involved in the politics of the time.
The notion of work with rights then did not simply represent
The jute industry in West Bengal, centred on Kolkata, expe- the source of material privileges of a labour elite in this case,
rienced a range of problems after independence and partition, but it was also a potent political construct for all workers. If
with employment rising and falling in waves over the years [de workers' rights did not exist in practice they had to be earned
Haan 1996:121; Ghosh 1999]. Despite the fluctuating numbers, and consolidated, either in mills or elsewhere, through powerful
by the early 1970s, jute workers had gradually benefited from political mobilisation. In their struggle for rights, workers drew
government policy and come to be protected, to a certain extent, ideological legitimacy from extensive communist mobilisation
by state legislation [RoyChowdhury 1997:124; Roy 1976]. and A trade union political action in the locality, from state leg-
survey of jute workers conducted by researchers at the Indian islation and government policy, and from the post-colonial state's
Statistical Institute, Kolkata, in 1969-70, found that, in the years
projected role, at least in rhetoric, as the protector of labour and
after independence, workers had profited from "progressive labour
the guarantor of workers' rights against capital. A familiar image
legislation, increased and standardised wage rates, abolition now of invoked by workers frequently is of a trade union leader
'sardari' [labour recruitment through intermediaries] and con- and communist politician promising in his speech in the early
tract systems, greater security of service, improved working 1970s that, if his party ascended to power, he would ensure that
conditions, social security measures, and welfare activities" mill owners were tied with ropes around their waist and paraded
[Bhattacharya and Chatterjee 1973]. By the early 1970s, the norm in public. Although in practice the state did not always fulfil
of job security and the notion of workers' rights and entitlementsthis role of disciplining and restraining capital, so graphically
in the jute industry had come to be recognised by the state, oftendepicted in this imagery of being kept on a leash, it had come
in response to workers' mobilisation, in particular, after a strike
to be accepted as the expected or normative function of the state
wave in 1966, and general strikes in 1969 and 1970.5 However, or the governing party from the workers' perspective. This is
actual implementation of policies was often a contentious and primarily because the state played a central role in the industrial
fraught process, with employers seeking to circumvent and subvert relations regime, and most rights and benefits of workers were
them, as far as possible. not directly wrested from employers but came through state laws
That workers in the jute industry had come to internalise the or negotiations involving the state, such as rulings of industrial
legitimacy of their newly gained and hard-earned rights, and were tribunals, awards of wage boards, and tripartite agreements in
prepared to fight in their defence is amply demonstrated by the which the government was a party, alongside employers' asso-
fact that the late- 1960s and the 1970s were dominated by militantciations and trade unions. Neera Chandhoke has recently drawn
labour movements in the jute industry,6 along with working class attention to the powerful role that the state plays in popular
engagement in communist politics in West Bengal. This history imagination, because the government "through most of India's
is now remembered by most older workers as a period of ex- post-colonial history presented itself as the guardian of the
hilarating activism and assertion of workers' strength.7 The collective interest". Chandhoke emphasises that the "historical
industry witnessed three major general strikes between 1974 and memory" of this state shapes present political perceptions
1979, not to mention regular protests and political militancy [Chandhoke
in 2005:1039]. In tune with this line of interpretation,
individual mills, and spectacular mass meetings and demonstra- workers' history of political activism in the 1970s, the
tions that earned Kolkata the epithet of "city of processions" andcrystallisation of the idea of their rights, and their conception
conferred it notoriety as the city of industrial 'gheraoes'. As of a the role of the state have to be central to our understanding
of the experience of "casualisation" and unemployment in the
popular political slogan of workers and wall graffiti of this period
1980s and 1990s.
put it: "This is a fight for life. We must win it" (Ei lorai banchar
lora; Ei lorai jitboi), referring to the entirety of a worker's humanIn the wake of the 1970s struggles and at the end of the period
existence that depended on the realisation of their rights of as Emergency, the Left Front, led by the Communist Party of
workers (Ganashakti, August 5, 1969). To be a worker was not India (Marxist) (CPM), ascended to state power in West Bengal
merely to be employed and paid a basic wage for livelihood, butThis raised great expectation among workers, not least because
to have rights, entitlements, and the power to express political
the CPM's trade union wing - Centre of Indian Trade Union
protest and challenge exploitation. (CITU) - had led many of the jute labour struggles of the 1970s,
To deny workers' rights and to blunt labour militancy and trade
and the party had actively opposed the repression of labour and
union mobilisation, employers began to take recourse to lockoutchampioned its cause. However, the situation in the jute industry
of mills in the 1970s. Employers' hands were strengthened worsened in the 1980s and 1990s.8 Labour militancy of the 1970
between 1975 and 1977 when the government of India promul- culminated in a 84-day general strike in 1984 [Basu 1984a].
gated a state of national emergency. Labour movements were Following this, the problems that beset jute workers became more

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acute [Basu 1984b; Roy 1992], and they are indeed considered Within this changing context, the process of taming of labour
unprecedented and catastrophic by workers themselves. Threat- by employers peaked in the early 1990s, as jute workers mounted
ening workers with mill closure and keeping mills locked out what they now perceive to be their last-ditch struggle, in which
for long periods, mill owners forced workers to accept work on they felt they were completely routed. The early 1990s is seen
whatever terms they dictated. New factory recruitment was almost by workers as the watershed. A 49-day general strike in 1992,
entirely on a casual basis, with workers not being formally after a decade long crisis ended in what is seen as state betrayal
registered, paid low wages and deprived of pension, health and and a tripartite agreement between the government, employers
other entitlements. Various estimates suggest that the number and trade unions that failed to redress the situation [Roy 1992].
of permanent workers had been reduced by as much as about Following this, in 1993 and 1994, numerous individual mills
1,00,000 by the early 1990s out of a total workforce of about witnessed labour unrest, with workers repudiating their union
2,50,000, and only about 30 per cent of workers enjoyed "per- leaders of all hues, whether or not affiliated to the ruling
manent" status by 2000 [RoyChowdhury 1997:122, 125-26; Roy party. In some cases, this rejection of unions led to violence in
1992; Pal 2000; Bagchi 1998]. Not only was the workforce being and around mills against leaders, with the most well known
"casualised" in this way, but also the rights of those still listed case of Victoria Jute Mills in October 1993 [Special Correspon-
as registered, permanent workers, with entitlement to all benefits, dent 1994a]. Violence here involved arson and attack by mill
were being blatantly violated, with arbitrary increase in workload, workers on a trade union office, union leaders and policemen,
wage-cuts, and non-payment or irregular payment of bonus, causing the death of one; and police firing on workers killing
dearness allowance, health benefits, and retirement dues. A three. Subsequently several workers were arrested, one of whom
worker comments on the present situation: went missing, and was widely believed to have died in police
Our employer ... pays his workers the weekly wage.... You work, custody. While the police cracked down on workers' militancy
you get money [implying bare wages only, no other entitlements].and the ruling party condemned the violent outbreak,9 workers
Don't ask for your rights (huq) [a reference to the lack ofin the jute industry hailed the actions of Victoria mill workers
dearness allowance, bonus, pensions, gratuity, guaranteed em-as a brave initiative to be emulated elsewhere. Slogans like the
ployment, etc]. What you work for, ask only to be paid for that,following were reported to have been chanted or written on
but no more.
posters and wall graffiti in other mills: "Learn a lesson from
Workers increasingly found employers' onslaught difficult Victoria
to mill. Spread the flames in all mills and factories"
resist, not least because trade unions appeared to fail them.(Bartanman,
The October 29 and November 20, 1993). However, the
most influential and militant labour union of the 1970s, CITU,
fate of Victoria mills' militant workers, much publicised in the
dramatically attenuated its militancy in the 1980s, towing the ultimately came to symbolise the decisive defeat of the
media,
government line to avoid alienating employers in search juteof
workers' struggle, and instilled a sense, not only of the futility
industrial investment [Ramaswamy 1988, Chapter 5]. At the of overt protest, but also of fear of repression and reprisal.
same
time, all trade unions, not only CITU, often worked closely A with
vast majority of workers today claim that they do not organise
mill managements to enhance their influence over local themselves mill for activist protest for fear of "death" or "murder",
affairs and employment, for the ability to control and dispense although sporadic, seemingly spontaneous, violence in mills,
scarce jobs was a valuable resource in patronage politics inincludingthe attack on managerial personnel and trade union leaders,
continues.10
locality. This, in turn, served as atool of mass electoral mobilisation
Elsewhere at Kanoria jute mills in Howrah, workers formed
for political parties. Trade unions and their leadership appeared
to be more and more complicit with employers and as mere an autonomous, non-party union - the Sangrami Shramik
appendages of political parties [Roy 1991; Ramaswamy 1988, (Militant Workers') Union in February 1993.11 They adopted,
Chapter 5; Fernandes 1999: 81-88]. The detrimental conse- in alliance with some middle class political activists, what they
quences of the failure of unions in the eyes of workers were identified as a third way. Instead of waiting upon fruitless trade
compounded by the lack of action against employers on theunion part negotiations with no hope of success, and eschewing the
of the state government. Workers now highlight the fact that path
theyof seemingly self-destructive violence as in Victoria mills,
played a historic role in communist politics in the 1970s,they andespoused what they saw as the constructive route of oc-
they also see their support as crucial in the sustained electoral
cupying their closed mill and resuming production in December
success of the Left Front government for nearly three decades 1993, with the hope of running the mill on the basis of a workers'
from 1977. However, they now point out that the Left Front cooperative with state support. Unfortunately, government
help was not forthcoming, and the mill eventually returned
government in power tempered its erstwhile radicalism in labour
to the control of the management. The Kanoria workers'
matters. Operating within the framework of a gradually liberalising
national economy, the government proved to be less supportivemovement was significant because here workers asserted
their right to work by opening a closed mill, instead of
of labour and more solicitous of capital in an attempt to attract
industrial investment to the region [Ramaswamy 1988, Chapter 5;
refraining from work by going on strike. They projected their
Das Gupta 1995; Fernandes 1999:34]. The governmentstruggle, in- which also came to involve workers' families and
creasingly deplored the lack of "work culture" of workers,neighbourhood
and communities, as a constructive endeavour of
urged them to pull themselves up by their bootstraps inanthe entire working class community for the right to dignity
interest of industrial efficiency and competitiveness, in order
and decent livelihood through legitimate work, of which the
to make West Bengal more attractive to investors. Workers' employers sought to deprive them [Kanoria Jute Mill Union
agitations were argued to be detrimental to the industrial 1998]. Despite much initial euphoria in Kanoria and among
revival of the state, and negotiated settlements with employers
workers throughout the jute industry, the ultimate collapse
were designated to be the only legitimate means of conductingof the Kanoria effort represented yet another workers' defeat
industrial relations. and the destruction of hope.

202.41.10.105 on Mon, 11 Mar 2024 11:36:05 +00:00
II heightened consciousness and condemnation of corruption are
Transformation of not necessarily a reflection of an appreciably higher incidence
Political Attitudes and Action of corruption in public life. Actions of politicians or public
servants are now identified as corrupt and illegitimate because
there is now a far firmer public belief in and commitment to
How have these developments in the jute industry in the 1980s
certain political rights and norms [Parry 2000]. Following the
and 1990s changed workers' political perceptions and behaviour?
Workers and their families in slums and mill "coolie lines" logic of these arguments, it can be postulated that, corruption
comment on their predicament as follows: plays such a central role in the political imagination of jute
workers because of the gradual entrenchment, in past decades,
Here there is nothing [pointing to the surroundings in the coolie
of a belief in the legitimacy of their hard-earned rights at work
lines]. They [mill authorities] have cut off the electric supply [while
the mill is closed]. Next they will cut off the water supply. and the seemingly irreversible devastation of such rights in recent
Don't
drink supplied water, drink dirty water. Somehow the workers years.
have Some claim that the Constitution enshrines their rights as
to be broken in every way. ... If we have nothing to live onworkers.
for They, thus, seem to envisage that citizenship is conferred
a week or two, one is bound to run away. Leave the struggle and
through rights at work, and invoke a sense of unassailability of
run away... their rights under the highest law of the land. However, powerful,
See this [battered] pole of bamboo. We are like this - left to rot people are seen to violate the Constitution and trample
corrupt
away; we are still standing upright today with difficulty, but
uponwethese rights with impunity. It is this idea of corruption,
will collapse soon as we rot away.
expressed by workers, as a moral indictment of the ruling classes,
We are writhing and thrashing about in pain like fish being fried
rather than any objective reality of corruption, that enables us
alive on a pan
to understand labour's political response to "casualisation". The
There is no future for us. We [young people] will die away.
notion of corruption here serves as a mode of articulating a sense
Even after taking into account the propensity to paint the past of lack of accountability or responsibility of the state to the
as a golden age, it still appears from workers' testimonies that labouring classes, and a sense of failure of political elites to
despite a history of economic and political turmoil in the jute represent labour.
industry, workers see the current situation as an unprecedented The experience of "informalisation" is, thus, perceived by the
state of terminal crisis, without the hope of a solution. The current workers not merely as an economic crisis, entailing the worsening
impasse is perceived to be a product of a colossal act of betrayal of labour relations or economic vulnerability, but more crucially,
and of the sacrifice of the cause of labour and a denial of their
as a political crisis that involves, first, the supposedly immoral
legitimate rights by a corrupt nexus of the government, political
connivance or complicity of the government and political parties
parties, trade unions and mill owners, all driven by greed andwith employers; second, the apparently unjust abdication of
an absence of a sense of political morality or responsibility.public and state responsibility towards the well-being of labour;
Workers now believe firmly that it is escalating corruption that
and third, a denial of their history of struggle, their self-image
has enabled capital to become so overwhelmingly powerful and as militant and upright workers, who had earned their rights and
to destroy labour's power to bargain or sustain a struggle. Faced
had the ability to challenge the power of employers. Workers
with the seemingly inexplicable situation of being deserted bylament that they no longer have a firm ground to stand on, from
all allies or guardians and the apparent impossibility of stemming
which to mount a struggle, for the legitimacy of their rights has
the steady dissolution of their rights, corruption appears to workers
been undercut. From the workers', perspective then, their present
to be the only plausible explanation for their present condition.
predicament involves the destruction of the normative founda-
As workers frequently put it, in the past, governments, politicians
tions of their rights. They construe this as the cause of the
and leaders worked at least 25 per cent in the interest of workers
decimation of labour's capacity to resist or protest against
and 75 per cent in the interest of employers of labour, now theyemployers, not just in the mills, but anywhere in the labour
are 100 per cent against labour. As some workers saw it: market. As one mill worker said: "When the judge and the
policeman are thieves, who can you appeal or complain to?"
Earlier there used to be agitation on behalf of the workers; now
there is agitation on behalf of the employer. The power of theAnother drew some unexpected parallels with contemporary
employer has increased. ...Those who looked after us [unions, developments in international politics to illustrate the nature of
the government] have gone in favour of the owner. ... They havewhat he saw as the impunity of capital, achieved with the
filled their pockets with notes. .. The days of real agitation connivance
are of the government:
gone and so are the people. They now get our votes and cut our
throats. ... The worker is helpless. [Osama bin] Laden made a cremation ground of America and
no one could catch him. Our bastard employer is not getting into
The idea of corruption of the political classes as reflected in the hands of any union or the government. So you can say he is
their apparent sell-out to the power of capital has thus come to Laden no 2. ... He [bin Laden] is not going to come into anyone's
grip workers' imagination. hands [meaning he cannot be captured or brought to justice]. He
No doubt, the workers' interpretation of "casualisation" as [bin a Laden] is no 1, and our employer is no 2. He is not going
function of political corruption is bred partly by numerousto come into anyone's hands either. The government here [West
controversies in India in the past 20 years focusing on corruptionBengal] and the government in Delhi are in his pocket - he says
in national politics and also partly by the apparent or real com-so openly. He says he has power. He says a third of the High Court
is under him.
plicity of trade unions, political parties and the government
with employers. There is more to it, however. Akhil Gupta hasWorkers' diagnosis of the crisis of mills as corrupt betrayal
drawn attention to the importance of popular narratives has of bred muted rage, coupled with an acute sense of despair.
corruption in imagining the state, its legitimacy and notionsWorkers
of repeatedly invoke the metaphors of having their hands
citizenship [Gupta 2005]. Jonathan Parry has argued that peoples'
and feet tied and being immobilised; of backs being broken; of

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lying prone in defeat; of being beaten into abject submission; closure of mills and the consequent loss of jobs for all, the latter
of being down on their knees in despair and in the hope of mercy; metaphorically representing death. The inevitable or certain
of wandering around crying hopelessly, of dying and being dead. "death" he seeks to court is not that of heroic martyrdom that
These images of themselves expressed by a predominantly male would contribute towards achieving a desired goal. Instead,
labour force with a history of political militancy, in effect, suggest death and destruction in a final struggle would be an epic
a strong sense of public diminution and loss of dignity. To them, suicidal act of symbolic self-sacrifice or self-extinction, crucially
the corrupt system has simply marginalised them and reduced to reclaim one's sense of agency. Such death in a struggle would
them to cogs in the wheel, and expendable non-entities. The term bring the public recognition of agency and "presence" that workers
'bekar' or unemployed evokes this sense, for it carries the have now been robbed of in their life. This would be preferable
connotation of a state of uselessness or worthlessness. Worse
to dying silently of starvation or privately committing suicide
or killing one's family members for failure to earn a living to
still, they feel dehumanised: "The mill management thinks, 'these
people - these workers - they are like donkeys; kick them,feed
kick them, as some have done in the past two decades, whose
them even more, and they will work"'. tragedy has been etched in workers' minds and is frequently
An overwhelming sense of fear and loss of ability to fight recounted.
accompanies the sense of powerlessness. Workers say theyWorkers' are disillusionment with political struggles, and a sense
afraid of starvation if mills are closed; or of physical violence
of destruction of all rights and violation of political norms by
and summary dismissal if they protest at work; or of reprisal corruption,
from have in turn bred political cynicism and a view of
local trade union and party leaders if they fail to fall in line;democratic
and institutional politics merely as a source of patronage
of police repression as in Victoria mills and elsewhere. "Heand who benefits. This tendency has, no doubt, been encouraged by
is frightened is dead. We are frightened. We are dead. Are thewerole of unions as patrons and intermediaries in mill politics
alive? We are no longer alive." Being so mortally afraid, and theylabour relations, coupled with their growing party political
feel they are immobilised into inaction, let alone fight:approach. "No It is understandable that politics in such a context
capacity or power ['khamata' in Bengali; 'takat' in Hindi]comes re- to be viewed as being driven only by contacts and currying
mains. Say someone is walking along the road and a childfavour falls to "fill pockets". Workers now try to steer clear of
dwvn on the road. No one has the capacity to pick up the democratic
child. party politics as "corrupt", other than to manipulate
That you pick up the child and take it home, that capacity and integrate themselves into local patronage networks of poli-
is not
there. It is finished. The workers are dying...". Fear and the ticians
loss and notables as a means of addressing their escalating
material and practical problems. This does not mean that they
of power and capacity constitute a frequent refrain among workers,
in contrast to courage and the ability to struggle that are accept
seen this politics of networks or machine politics as the de-
as their past attributes and that had once struck terror among sirable norm. However, most people choose to play along with
employers in the heyday of labour struggles in the 1970s. "Once the "corrupt" system, and many even join political parties and
we workers had agitations, we had a labour community [shramik attend party political meetings and events, in a cynical pursuit
jati]. There are no labourers any more. There is so much torture."
of self-interest in line with what they see as the broader trend
"We are like beggars on the street". The end of labour strugglesof politics, where morality and an ideology of public respon-
thus marks the erasure of their identity as a community, in sibility
their or political commitment no longer play a legitimate role.
eyes. Here is a conception of work that is not primarily related
If workers thus embroil themselves in local party and represen-
to employment or livelihood, but based on a sense of being tativea politics, from their perspective, this does not signal their
community with the power to struggle, devoid of which, democratic
they engagement, but rather its opposite. It suggests their
are akin to beggars. Beggars are not just destitute without capitulation
work, to what they condemn as anti-democratic and un-
ethical. The significance of an increasing trend of party political
but more importantly, they are seen to have no political capacity,
activity here is, thus, complex and ambiguous. The seemingly
presence or identity; they are not treated as citizens or political
actors; they are not even registered to vote, let alone being vigorous party political engagement in the locality is not a form
invested with any other rights that would enable them to engage of democratic enfranchisement or inclusion, from the vantage
in political struggles. point of the poor, but a desperate strategy to grapple with their
The crippling perception of impotence, as well the over- increasing everyday material difficulties.
powering sense of fear, corruption and betrayal, have contributed It is worth clarifying that the idea of politicians as brokers in
to a sense of futility about collective action or agitational politics,
a system of patronage has not suddenly erupted into the political
based on an ideological challenge to exploitation, or for justice
consciousness of workers, nor is the sphere of employment
and rights. relations the only source of these ideas. The important new
inflection
In the past, 'andolan' used to happen in the interest of the here is the notion that politics is now entirely driven
by the logic of "filling pockets". Workers feel they have the option
neighbourhood or a locality, but now they happen to fill pockets.
There are still agitations [referring to political and union agita-
of joining party politics, but only if they too embrace or connive
tions]; but they are to fill pockets, not for us. ... If you join
at an
corruption. Or else they have to "sit down", as workers put
andolan you could be left high and dry. You could be beaten up become politically recumbent; in other words, retreat or
it, or
while others run away.
resign from political engagement, abjure political activity and
Only a minority of seemingly reckless mill workers, while lapse into silent inaction, as most "true people" (saccha admi)
admitting the dangers and irrelevance of agitational politics,
or "good people" (bhale admi) and erstwhile militant workers
strongly advance the idea of a last ditch fierce struggle. Rather
and activists are said to have done. Unless one opts for political
than dying a 100 deaths everyday or dying slowly of attrition,
abstinence or quietism in this way, workers claim that corruption
one worker argued, it is better to mount a do-or-die struggleengulfs
once one and entraps one in its tentacles. Within, what is seen
and for all, and then meet inevitable death, alluding to a large-scale
as an unjust and lawless system and a culture of corruption,

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workers perceive themselves to be crushed. Over and over, they thought to be able to indulge in easily because of the absence
of risk of pregnancy after sterilisation. In a markedly different
lament the demise of public morality, and condemn their betrayal
by the state and the current political system. response to women's work, a group of young men have planned
to raise money from the local community to initiate small-scale
Ill income generating activities for women within the neighbourhood,
Youth and Politics to prevent them from going elsewhere to work, particularly as
domestic servants. Many men stressed that women need employ-
Workers' sense of marginalisation in a supposedly corrupt
ment, but most argued that these have to be home-based, partly
polity and in the mill economy is compounded by a crisis of because women need to be protected from the harsh world of
identity in the household and the local community. This affects men's work and partly because women will have to continue to
the large majority of young men in particular, who have not play a key domestic and maternal role. Many emphasised that
worked in mills and now face either unemployment or precarioushome-based low paid work is not likely to be accepted by men,
self-employment or underpaid and irregular wage labour, with for men are used to a different work regime and culture, and it
long hours, poor working conditions, and absence of bargaining would be demeaning or beneath their dignity and status to do these
power. The decline in household earnings, absence of income seemingly menial, "feminine" jobs, of low status and poor pay.
security and uncertain long-term economic prospects have forced With a male literacy rate in the locality of about 60 per cent
households to commit more and more members to the workforce,in the early 1990s, and 80 per cent according to the 2001 Census,
especially women. The jute labour force had come to be defined young men are now increasingly better educated than previous
overwhelmingly as a male preserve by the 1970s. Between 1950 generations.13 They aspire to either paid work that carry rights,
and 1971, the number of women employees in jute mills de- entitlements and security, such as government "service", or to
creased from 13.6 per cent to 2.5 per cent [de Haan 1996:202]. embark on business or some form of self-employed, lucrative
Mill families, by the 1970s, came to depend on one major earner entrepreneurial activity.14 In reality, though, most find them-
- the male head of the family, expected to be followed in due selves dragged into the overcrowded petty trading and transport
course by his adult male heirs [Ibid 204-05]. In the social and sector or in casual construction work, all of which expose them
political milieu of mills, a "male public sphere" had been forged,
to low earnings and insecurity of work. In frustration, young men
and this was accompanied by an ideological emphasis on the
and boys are now often inclined to abandon their education,
domestic role of women, often drawing upon caste and religiouswhich, they argue, does not help them to secure decent work.
ideologies [Ibid; Fernandes 1999, Chapter 5]. Against this back-
Moreover, having expected to become male heads of families,
ground, women's recent re-entry into the workforce has had they often find that their sisters and mothers contribute to family
significant implications for social identities and genderedincome, while they remain unemployed or intermittently em-
subjectivities. Not only are women now taking up employment, ployed, partly because they discriminate between male and female
usually part-time self-employment and working as domestic jobs and partly because some work, like domestic service, is
servants, they have adopted other coping strategies as well. Theyprimarily available to women. Young men have no choice but
have sometimes drawn upon the resources of their natal families,to watch their mothers or sisters accept what is considered the
and frequently sought to limit their family size, often against the
demeaning option of domestic service which undermines family
will of their husbands and in-laws, by taking advantage of thestatus and respectability.
growing availability of birth control technologies in slums, through In some areas, small workshops for petty production or home-
several new or expanding government schemes to promote based work, such as zari or gold and silver thread embroidery
women's reproductive health.12 In search of economic oppor- work, have emerged, with young men, and sometimes women
tunities, women have also joined local organisations or associa- and children, working for low wages, usually at piece rates for
tions of various kinds, including political parties, as a source of
12 to 14 hours-a-day, seven days a week, often sitting in the same
information and as a means of establishing networks of contact. posture all day at their embroidery frame, in cramped, unhealthy
Recently, many of them have eagerly joined neighbourhood conditions. Many complain of family and social problems due
groups or community self-help groups, sponsored by the localto long working hours. They also dread an early burnout and
municipality to implement poverty alleviation programmes with fear the onset of occupational health problems or disability, thus
a focus on women's empowerment, funded by the governmentforcing an involuntary and premature exit from the labour market
of India or foreign donors. These women's groups have also at that might eventually reduce them to destitution. Importantly,
times attempted to deal with cases of men's drunkenness or despite being employed or engaged in economic activities in
alcoholism, physical abuse of wives, and intervened in domestic various ways, and often earning a reasonable sum of money, many
disputes in favour of women. young men identify themselves as 'bekar' or unemployed, doing
Men have responded in contradictory ways to this situation odd jobs or yielding to exploitative work, for want of anything
of women's workforce participation and their assertiveness. While
better. Work of this nature, even if they give cash in hand, seems
to be seen as non-work or sub-standard work, because these fail
they are eager for women to generate income, they fear the erosion
of their own authority or they fear that this could lead to sexualto give them any rights, dignity, social or community status, or
laxity, especially because women now have access to sterilisation a sense of political agency, let alone a degree of economic stability
or other contraceptive techniques. One woman, suffering from or long-term work prospects. In this context, some young men
domestic violence, whose secret sterilisation became known vented their anger at the government and the ruling party for their
to her husband when she developed some subsequent health hypocrisy in celebrating May Day. These young men, although
complications, explained that her husband beats her if she does
never themselves employed in the "organised" or "formal" sector,
not go to work, but then if she does go to work, he beats her had grown up in a political milieu in which they had learnt to
too on suspicion of sexual promiscuity at work, which she associate
is May Day with workers' historical struggles for their

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rights, including limited working hours and regulated working Interestingly, a police officer recounted a number of occasions
conditions. They argued, the government that was once commit- when young men involved in petty extortion were arrested, and
ted to the cause of labour, but was now presiding over the then the family turned up for bail, genuinely taken aback that
dissolution of labour rights and turning a blind eye to appalling the young man had been up to such "crime" at all, when at home
working conditions and labour exploitation, should not have the he was a timid and docile "boy", unemployed and dependent
audacity to celebrate May Day. They, thus, condemn a govern- on the family, who lacked confidence even to look anyone in
,ment that, they think, rules in the name of the poor, but is the face when speaking. What this, and comments of slum people,
unaccountable to them, nor does it represent their interest. To seem to point to is that young men feel so diminished, that they
them, particularly striking is also the contrast with the visible seek a sense of identity and agency through expressions of power
expansion of a middle class consumer culture, property owner- in the locality. It appears that these activities represent an as-
ship, and private education and healthcare, all encouraged by piration for recognition of adult malehood and a sense of ex-
the government, precisely at a time when they feel their own ercising local influence, within a context of perceived
access to these is blocked due to decreasing and uncertain family marginalisation and devaluation in the family, community,
income and the loss of welfare entitlements. Young people see economy and politics. It is worth emphasising here that crime
themselves as a dying generation and the working class as a dying of this nature cannot be simply interpreted in terms of a criminal
community that cannot socially, politically or economically pathology of the unemployed poor or a straightforward trans-
reproduce itself, because of the wholesale destruction of what lation of frustration into aggression, but as an activity with a
are seen as legitimate forms of work, endowed with rights. They socially constructed meaning at a particular historical conjunc-
express an overwhelming sense of despair for being caught in ture. Young men are not simply turning to any crime, but to certain
what they see as an irreversible downward spiral. specific types of crime like petty extortion and intimidation, for
Some of these young men, though not a majority by any means, it enables them to define a new persona as the powerful, rather
resort to petty extortion, bullying and intimidation in the than as a common criminal or petty thief or burglar. It should
neighbourhood, and are able to make a few rupees in the process. also not be assumed that unemployment or casual employment
They exact petty dues from neighbourhood hawkers, traders, inevitably predisposes youth to crime, for it only affects a small
transport operators and builders at construction sites, or they raise section of young men, and this is only one of many forms of
money coercively from local residents. Commenting on the their self-assertion.
patterns of crime, violence and illegal activities in the locality, Neighbourhood youth clubs constitute an important site of
a police officer referred to the peddling of illicit liquor, running expression of identity for young men. Clubs are not new in urban
gambling dens, wagon-breaking on railway sidings to gather coal, male associational life. Body-building clubs with a Hindu re-
and "hooking" of power supply cables to access electricity il- ligious orientation used to be prevalent in the municipality under
legally. However, these involve only a minority of young people, study until the 1960s, but they gradually lost importance in the
and do not amount to endemic violence or extensive gang clashes. 1970s. It is believed by local people that the culture of physical
Instead, the police officer pointed to a significant change in the prowess had been eroded with increasing literacy in mill
character of crime in the locality in recent decades. Not major neighbourhoods and a tendency towards the gentrification of the
professional gang violence, such as armed robbery, as in the past, self-image of youth. Others comment that clubs had become
but a range of small-scale illegal activities, particularly extortion, embroiled in political violence in the 1970s and the Left Front
have in recent years been the key forms of crime involving local government, after ascending to power, had gradually disarmed
youth. In a small handful of cases, an extension of this petty and pacified them through the intervention of local units of the
extortion might be the entry of young men into wider professional party and its patronage system, and with the help of the police.
protection rackets, usually under the tutelage of influential local Moreover, when trade union politics was still vibrant, the locus
notables, which might then lead them into street violence. In- of male identity and leisure activities of the previous generation
terestingly, such violent or criminal activities by poor young men had often revolved around work and workplace-oriented
in the service of local bigwigs have been glamorised in recent organisations, rather than clubs.
popular Bengali films, where they are portrayed as tormented, By all accounts, however, clubs in many working class areas
tragic heroes, trapped in a world of corruption, but with a moral have proliferated extensively in the past two or three decades.
conscience and a sense of justice and altruism towards their own The function and social meaning of clubs have also undergone
community.15 Local people do not usually romanticise criminal recent transformation. Men, mostly young men, come together
youth in this way, and often see them as a source of neighbourhood in clubs for games and recreation. The term club conjures up
violence and insecurity, but at the same time they do not blame the image of a room in the neighbourhood where young men
young men for entering into these activities. It is often said in meet regularly, play indoor games and watch the ubiquitous TV.
the locality, including by young people, that some men are driven In public perception, clubs are often the dens of idle, useless
to crime because of the economic crisis; others say that the young men, who sometimes take to local bullying, drinking, gambling
are merely emulating on a small, local scale what they see as and street fighting. To the men who take refuge there, clubs are
the large-scale theft from the people of the nation, perpetrated safe havens from social and family pressures, and a form of
by self-seeking politicians. Indeed, extortion activities on behalf escape from the role expected of them as men. Clubs for team
of local notables can be regarded as a way for youth to break games like football and volleyball, now increasingly rare, are
into the exclusive, though corrupt, world of privilege and power. favoured by older men, who are anxious about the potential
Evidently, while these young men are by no means seen as social social problems that might beset unemployed youth and see
bandits, they are also not demonised within their own milieu and clubs of this nature as a safe forum for recreation. A moral
are sometimes even seen to be democratising crime and corrup- discourse towards youth has, thus, at times led older men to
tion by joining the exclusive ranks of the powerful in this respect. encourage "sporting" clubs, but this is a limited phenomenon.

202.41.10.105 on Mon, 11 Mar 2024 11:36:05 +00:00
International donor-funded slum improvement programmes have through social work. Their normative discourse is one of
also recently patronised local clubs as representative "commu- service and civic duty, not political participation, with its
nity-based organisations", and sought to support their activities negative connotation.
through the provision of sports and physical training equipment,
but they have been less forthcoming with coloured television that IV
is at the top of the wish-list of club members. Most clubs, Implications for Democracy and Urban Politics
however, go well beyond games and recreation, and play a role
in the symbolic expression of power and influence in the Faced with a sense of social marginalisation, young working
locality by youth. class men now define a presence and a public role in the urban
Clubs have historically engaged in various "constructive" forms locality in diverse ways, ranging from petty crime and extortion
of activities, and these are now re-emphasised and expanded by to social service. Violence, crime and the assertion of masculinity
the newly emerging or revitalised clubs. Virtually all clubs raise are by no means the only or the dominant forms of self-expression
local subscription, and organise a range of activities broadly of youth in these localities, contrary to many recent depictions
classified as social work, social service, or social welfare, in- of youth politics in the globalised third world. These activities
cluding health and educational initiatives, such as free eye clinics coexist with various community-oriented initiatives that are
with volunteer doctors, blood donation camps, tuition centres informed by a moral critique of public politics and a sense of
for poor young children, textbook libraries for school students, civic virtue. They represent an articulation of the normative value
adult literacy classes, raising funds for dowry for poor young attached to ethical, responsible and accountable politics. How-
women or for the funeral rites of those who are destitute or without ever, when some young men get involved in local extortion, street
relatives. Clubs may also play a role in local dispute mediation violence, electric cable "hooking" or wagon-breaking, their
and in campaigning for local issues. Some clubs are, at times, assertion of local power clearly goes beyond social duty and
involved in maintaining neighbourhood safety and security. For assumes a coercive mode. It would be too narrow, however, to
instance, in the context of rising communal violence elsewhere interpret these activities as nothing but the criminalised behaviour
in India, at one stage, young men actively organised nocturnal of the so-called "lumpen", with social work providing the cover.
neighbourhood patrols through "resident guard parties", with Rather, it is precisely this dual orientation which most interest-
the support of the police, in order to prevent communal outbreaks ingly manifests the key feature of the politics and identity of
in the locality. One young man explained that apart from the young men. This is a youth in search of a role and public
obvious need to ensure communal harmony, they had been recognition, which they seek to achieve in many different, often
motivated to take part in these guard duties to demonstrate their contradictory, ways. Social work and coercive or criminal ac-
own ability to do useful work for the neighbourhood community, tivities are two sides of the same coin. It also leads some of them
the state and its law and order machinery, and thus to make into local party political networks in an attempt to set themselves
others recognise their worth, when people usually treated up as locally influential individuals, with direct access or prox-
them as "dirt". Most clubs raise subscription a few times a imity to influential political patrons. Ultimately, then, politics
year to celebrate religious festivals. It is widely claimed that of the youth is about a search for identity and agency in the context
these celebrations are rapidly multiplying and that there is of a loss of sense of self.
greater public display with street decorations and illumina- Cooptation of such young men or youth groups by powerful
tions, often with new innovations in this respect. Through elites into illegal activities, criminalised politics, mafia-type
what are projected as public-spirited, community and underground gangs, protection rackets or into aggressive ethnic
neighbourhood based activities, the young men of these clubs militias has been argued to be a major source of overt and endemic
try to define a leadership role and autonomous agency for urban violence in Africa and elsewhere in the third world [Maegher
themselves in the locality and in the community. In some 2007]. While low intensity or sporadic street violence can be
ways, without these clubs, young men would indeed be dreaded found in these erstwhile industrial neighbourhoods of Kolkata,
non-entities. yet violent outbreaks or endemic clashes, of the kind witnessed
Since party and institutional democratic politics are seen to elsewhere, are rare here. This is possibly because of relatively
be monopolised by corrupt, unrepresentative and unaccountable very low levels of criminalisation of politics and limited
communal mobilisation by religious or ethnic political parties
politicians, clubs are also projected to be the site of affirmation
of ethical public conduct and a critique of wider politics. Here here, compared, not only to Africa and Latin America, but
young men claim moral superiority over the corrupt. Within the also to some other Indian states and major cities, such as
Mumbai or Ahmedabad, that have seen extensive urban violence
context of collective social activities in clubs for public benefit,
many members claim vocally to be non-political, staying clear and the involvement of youth in sectarian riots. Moreover, other
of power plays, patronage nexus and factional rivalries. Of than in a few exceptional cases, youth clubs or groups here are
course, they become individually involved in local patronage primarily engaged in local petty intimidation or extraction, as
politics of parties in search of jobs or other benefits, and theyseen above, and not, as yet, organised against rival armed gangs
also admit to clubs getting drawn into party politics and election over control of territory or resources. Nor are they poised in a
campaigns, but, this is argued to be extraneous to the real essencesustained, direct confrontation with an overtly repressive state,
of clubs. Some point out that political parties simply exploit or geared to protect themselves and local residents in an armed,
clubs, deploying them for election campaigns and then for-vigilante mode within a context of growing state failure, law-
getting about them until they are needed again for politicallessness and insecurity, as has happened in Latin America
purposes. Despite such party political entanglements, clubsor Africa in some cases, for instance. A degree of stability
are portrayed as the arena where youth can rise above in the law and order regime and institutional politics in West
partisan, "dirty" politics and work for the common good Bengal has contained or prevented political developments of this

202.41.10.105 on Mon, 11 Mar 2024 11:36:05 +00:00
kind in Kolkata, which may explain the low levels of violence has both fed into and fed off this process. They have chosen to
here among youth, despite some petty coercion and illegal exercise their agency in municipal institutions to elicit patronage
activities in urban neighbourhoods. benefits through network politics, rather than seeking to engage
What are the wider implications of the developments described themselves in local institutions for democratic participation and
so far for urban politics, democracy and representative decision-making. As noted above, a large number of women have
institutions? While there is an acute awareness of the violation also participated in local development projects, which emphasise
gender empowerment as a key goal. However, these women,
of rights and dignity, a critique of corruption and immoral politics,
there is no organised attempt to forge any agitational or oppo- while deriving a personal sense of achievement and agency
sitional movement. This political passivity - a politics of silencethrough participation in development projects, also view the
relevance of their participation in terms of access to local re-
- is clearly related to the all-pervading sense of futility, despair
and fear, and a loss of faith in the possibility of change through sources, patronage, and information networks for the availability
ideologically driven political activism in a seemingly corrupt of work or credit. Democratic devolution and participatory
world. As one worker put it, workers' revolution that he had development initiatives in the locality have come to be re-
believed in and fought for in the past was now pushed back 200 interpreted by the poor as individual or group opportunities
years by the corrupt 'chamcha raj' - rule of venal sycophants to join patronage networks and to extract benefits to address
specific material or practical problems, rather than as the
and clients, a reference to patronage politics. Without this betrayal,
he argued, workers would have achieved revolution by 2010, orlaunching ground collectively to democratise and change the
2015 at the latest. To him, it does not seem worth fighting for system from below by demanding transparency, accountabil-
citizenship rights, social equality or class power now. Thisity, better services or public goods, let alone seeking a greater voice,
reveals the formidable obstacles to the self-mobilisation of power or rights of citizens in decision-making in local or wider
the poor for wider social or political change. It leadspolitics. to the The liberal institutionalist theory of democratisation
conclusion that, in the foreseeable future, politics among through decentralisation and participatory governance is under-
these groups will remain largely confined to intensifying mined on the ground by the political practice of the despondent
local level party political activity and patronage networks, and cynical labouring poor. A political culture of clientelism and
on the one hand, as seen above, and expending their energy patronage, which is not conducive to substantive
on defining a sense of agency and a "politics of presence"16 democratisation, is clearly reinforced through the changing
in the neighbourhood community, on the other. Politics experience
here of labour and work, although, of course, this is
has increasingly turned inwards into the locality, shunning not the only source of patronage politics. This points up a
the wider arena of democratic politics, and is undergoing paradox of current processes of democratisation in India from
intense localisation. Urban economic involution, as defined the perspective of the poor, which might be characterised as
by Mike Davis (2006:182-83), seems to be accompanied by "low intensity democracy",17 in which well functioning formal
political involution in this case, in which more and more political institutions, including electoral participation, coex-
people are jostling for political space within a restricted, ist with a crisis of political representation and participation
insular, local arena of intensifying micro-politics. However,of the poor to ensure their citizenship rights or to make an
evidently, this cannot be equated with the emergence of aimpact on government action and public policy.
local civil society space for political mobilisation or of a The destruction of rights at work and the consequent sense
meaningful decentralised site of democratic political engage- of all-encompassing marginalisation have also crystallised a
ment of the poor, for the process of localisation is, at thenotion of social and political disenfranchisement and erosion of
same time, marked by a rejection of wider democratic and citizenship. The vote is the only democratic institution and the
representative politics and of state institutions, as they func- symbol of citizenship that some workers seem to have faith in,
tion in practice. even while others see electoral politics to be corrupt. Whether
Workers have little faith that the state and representative or not the electoral process functions effectively, and whether
institutions, as they are now seen to operate through corruption, or not their votes count in making and unmaking governments
would ever effectively represent or be accountable to them or or changing public policy, many workers still feel the need to
allow their genuine political engagement. This sense of the crisis cast their votes to confirm their identity as citizens of the nation,
of accountability, participation and representation in democratic who cannot be ignored or cast into oblivion. In a context of
institutions arise, as we have seen, not necessarily from the actualoverwhelming powerlessness and a sense of marginalisation, the
deficiencies of these institutions or their elite control, but relate
poor appear to see voting as the only residual democratic action
to the wider perception of betrayal of the labouring poor by the
in a corrupt polity that gives them a sense of agency and affirms
state and the ruling classes in cahoots with capital. In recent
their citizenship. It is debatable though whether this particular
decades, an emphasis on democratic decentralisation has facili- construction of the vote could be celebrated as a mode of meaningful
tated the devolution of financial and administrative powers to democratic participation, although it could be construed as an
urban local bodies, with a mandate to mobilise the involvement expression of the democratic will of the labouring poor and an
of local populations. Participatory development initiatives haveexpression of a "politics of presence". It should be emphasised
also been implemented in the locality with overseas fundingin - this context that disillusionment with democratic institutions,
notably a slum improvement programme. These projects observe practice and procedure has not meant a denial of democratic
all the well orchestrated drills of participation and community norms. On the contrary, as seen above, the poor strongly assert
involvement. Ironically, all this has served to boost patronage the need for public responsibility, accountable and representative
based politics centred on municipal councils and councillors, and
politics, civic virtue, and rights, and they express their commit-
on the officials who implement participatory development ment tojustice, equality, welfare and ethical politics. Indeed, they
programmes. Poor peoples' own changing approach to politics see themselves as the true champions of these ideals, in contrast

202.41.10.105 on Mon, 11 Mar 2024 11:36:05 +00:00
to self-seeking elites. Young men claim to practise these through Notes
their community-based activities. In addition, many people in
the locality still continue to vote for the Left Front and CPM, 1 Chazan 1988; The best known celebration of the informal sector is to
be found in de Soto 1989.
because, they argue, that even if corrupt leaders have vitiated
2 Portes, Castells and Benton (eds), 1989, Chapter 1; Moser and Mcllwain
communist politics, the ideology and principles ('niti') of the
2006; Pratten and Sen (eds), 2007 forthcoming; Koonings and Krui
party ought still to be upheld, as they stand for equality and rights (eds), 2004; Meagher, 2007 forthcoming; Rotker (ed), 2002; Sanchez
of the poor. However, democratic or radical political aspirations 2006; Ukiwo 2002; Yunusa Zakari Ya'u (2000) and Abubakar Momoh
are not matched with any activist politics or any other attempts (2000), both in Jega (ed), 2000; Baker 2002; Special issue of Developmen
and Change, 37, July 4, 2006. For arguments about deindustrial
to translate these into practice.
sation and the new "underclass" in US, primarily ethnic minoritie
How might informalisation affect religious resurgence or affected by unemployment and decline of the welfare state, see Wilso
fundamentalism and communalism or sectarian conflict? As seen 1987.
3 Census of India 2001 figures, as documented in Urban West Benga
in other Indian cities, the experience of industrial decline and
the scarcity of jobs may unleash competition among various 2000-2002, pp 23, 38, 44.
4 'Project Memorandum: India: Calcutta Slum Improvemrnt Project, Phas
communities, and there can be a tendency to blame a rival IC', Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority, February, 1998, p 1
community for many ills and to nurse communal stereotypes, 5 For the history of jute mill labour and politics since 1947 and until th
particularly when wider Indian political developments encourage 1980s, see: Sengupta 1982; Basu 1979, 1984a; de Haan 1996, 1999
Fernandes 1999; Labourin WestBengal, 1970 onwards (annual publication
an atmosphere of communal polarisation. There is little evidence
6 Ibid.
in the areas studied here, though, that the decline of the conditions
7 Joshi 1999, describes complex forms of remembering of the past by mill
of labour has led to either communal identity politics on a workers in Kanpur.
significant scale or dramatically deepened so-called "primordial"
8 For the condition of jute industrial labour in this period, see Labour File,
cleavages, surmounting or obliterating a history of powerful 2001; Nagarik Mancha Report, 2001; 'Chatshilper Baromashya' by
Sailen Chatterjee, Ganashakti, March 20, 1991; 'Pat arthaniti o shramiker
collective political struggles for rights. As seen above, poor dabi' by Animesh Goswami, Ganashakti, January 17, 1992.
people have focused their political antagonism on the state and9 Ganashakti, October 22, 1993; Editorial, Ganashakti (official organ of the
ruling elites for the violation of rights, and so far refrained from CPM), November 12, 1993; 'Victoria: Oikyobaddho Shramik Andolan
turning against each other along religious fault lines. However, Ekmatra Path' (Victoria: Organised and United Labour Movement is the Only
Way), by Shantashri Chattopadhyay (MLA and president of CITU, Hooghly
religious fundamentalism, and hence communal polarisation, District Committee) in Ganashakti, November 19, 1993; Roy 1995.
might strike roots here for other reasons. As seen above, the10 Some important incidents include: Titagarh Jute Mill workers barricaded
celebration of religious festivals has become more elaborate as the main arterial road near the mill against suspension of work at the
a neighbourhood-based activity of the youth in search of a local mill and fought pitched battle with police (The Telegraph, April 17,
1999). Chief executive officer of Baranagar Jute Mills and his colleague
role. This might serve to fuel competitive religious mobilisation
burnt to death after he shot and killed a protesting worker (Ganashakti,
and indirectly exacerbate communal tensions. On a different note, January 14, 2001). Attack on mill managers, personnel managers and
as observed above, with the transformation of gender relations, on union offices and leaders at a number of mills after the unions
some men harbour apprehensions about women's workforce concluded a statewide agreement with employers and the government
to bring in productivity-linked payment (The Telegraph, January 9,
participation, sexual autonomy and independence and fear the
2002). Labour officer at Hastings Mills died after assault by angry workers
potentially adverse impact on male authority. This has bred a protesting against non-payment of bonus before the annual festive season
degree of social conservatism towards women and a tendency (The Statesman, October 10 and 17, 2002).
to espouse a moral approach to women's conduct. Among older11 [Special Correspondent 1994b] This incident was extensively reported
men, no longer acting as primary bread-winners and with dimin- in the press at the time. Kanoria Jute Mill Sangrami Shramik Union
(Militant Workers' Union), Kanoria Jibaner Jaigaan (Kanoria Song of
ished social standing in the community, a fear of loss of control Life), February 2, 1988.
over both women and young men, as well as an anxiety about
12 For example, India Population Project VIII, Calcutta Urban Development
the possibility of youth being corrupted and led astray into crime Programme-Ill and Integrated Child Development Services.
and violence, can encourage an emphasis on morality, domes- 13 Census of India 2001 figures, as documented in Urban West Bengal,
2000-2002, p 38.
ticity and family cohesion. Such social conservatism could14 Not only young men, but also school boys and girls in classes 9 to 12
potentially merge with wider ideological trends of religious mentioned, during interviews, focus group discussions and casual chats,
resurgence, both Hindu and Muslim, not least because social that their preferred future job would be "business", since good, well-
conservatism, patriarchy and hierarchical notions of family paid employment with rights is now scarce.
15 For example, Chaka (Director: Nepaldeb Bhattacharya); Chakravyuha
relationships resonate well with religious fundamentalist ideo- (Director: Raja Sen). More recently, however, the film Yuva (Director:
logies. Similarly, with the failure of secular ideologies of Mani Ratnam 2004), in Hindi but set in Kolkata, fails to redeem the
democracy, development, socialism, and especially locally domi- character of a violent, angry, and ambitious poor young man, working
nant communism, in achieving political morality and commit- for corrupt politicians, and casts him in a negative light in contrast to
equally violent middle class youth, who succeed in fighting their way
ment to the poor, they could potentially be drawn towards into formal institutional politics (the state assembly), challenging the
religious ideologies as the fount of ethical politics. However, entrenched cadre of seasoned and corrupt politicians.
the critique of representative politics here shows no propen-16 The term is used here in a different sense from Anne Phillips (1998).
sity so far to invoke religious legitimacy, and continues to 17 A term used in Gills, Rocamora and Wilson (eds), 1993.
draw upon a discourse of rights and justice without reference
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