In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place where the document is

actually falsified, to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a third person, regardless
whether or not the falsified document is put to the improper or illegal use for which it was
[17]
intended.

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761 Phil. 142

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 182926. June 22, 2015 ]

ANA LOU B. NAVAJA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO, OR THE

ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF MCTC JAGNA-GARCIA-HERNANDEZ, DKT

PHILS., INC., REPRESENTED BY ATTY. EDGAR BORJE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the

Decision[1] dated August 28, 2007 and the Resolution[2] dated May 7, 2008 rendered by the

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 02353, which affirmed the Order dated September 21,

2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50, in SP Civil Action No.

0356.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

The instant case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit[3] filed by private respondent DKT

Philippines, Inc., represented by Atty. Edgar Borje, against petitioner Ana Lou B. Navaja,

alleging that while she was still its Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by making
it appear that she incurred meal expenses in the amount of P1,810.00, instead of the actual

amount of P810.00, at Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and claimed reimbursement for it.

Navaja is charged with the crime of falsification of private document before the Municipal

Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Jagna-Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, docketed as Criminal Case No.

2904. The accusatory portion of the Information filed against her reads:

That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality of Jagna, province of Bohol,

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with

intent to prejudice a juridical person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously

falsify a commercial receipt No. 6729 of Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making an alteration or

intercalation in the said receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P810.00) to ONE

THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P1,810.00) and thereafter accused used the said

receipt to claim reimbursement with DKT Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty. Edgar Borje

and accused as a result of which received the amount of P1,810.00 to her own benefit; to the

damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during trial. Acts

committed contrary to the provision of Article 172, No. 2, in relation to Article 171, No. 6 of the

Revised Penal Code.

Tagbilaran City, (for Jagna, Bohol) February 10, 2005.[4]

On August 1, 2005, Navaja filed a Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment [5] on the ground that

none of the essential elements of the crime of falsification of private document occurred in

Jagna, Bohol, hence, the MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to

improper venue.

In the Order dated November 2, 2005, the MCTC denied the motion to quash and set the case

for arraignment, the decretal portion of the Order reads:

WHEREFORE, the motion is DENIED, but considering however that accused has already

submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court by filing cash bond for their respective

temporary liberty, set this case for ARRAIGNMENT on November 22, 2005, at 10:00 o'clock in

the morning at the Session Hall, 10th MCTC, Jagna, Bohol.

The previous Court Order setting these cases for arraignment on November 09, 2005, is hereby

set aside.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 2005 Order, but the MCTC denied

it in a Resolution[7] dated January 24, 2006.

Navaja filed a petition for certiorari[8] before the RTC, assailing the November 2, 2005 Order

and January 24, 2006 Resolution of the MCTC for having been issued with grave abuse of

discretion.

On September 21, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the petition for certiorari for lack of

legal basis or merit.[9] On Navaja's contention that the case for falsification of private

document against her was filed with the MCTC which has no jurisdiction due to wrong venue,

hence, the RTC ruled:

The contention of the petitioner is untenable. As correctly pointed out by the MCTC, the

improper venue was already resolved squarely by the Regional State Prosecutor when he held

that “there are sufficient evidences (sic) indicating that the falsification took place in Jagna”.

This court notes that in that particular resolution, reference was made to the sworn statement

of Ms. Cherly Lavaro who narrated that after she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja, the latter

borrowed her pen and in her presence wrote something on the said receipt. The Regional
State Prosecutor then concluded that Ms. Lavaro's statement “describes an apparent scheme

or pattern of altering receipts right after issuance. The borrowing of the cashier's pen and the

use thereof must have been intended to create an impression that the receipt was prepared by

the cashier herself.”

In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit of another witness, which

categorically states that Ms. Navaja was in Jagna when the questioned receipt was issued.

If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that her request for

reimbursement was made in Cebu City not in Jagna, Bohol, would likewise give no showing or

indication that the falsification was done in Cebu City. In other words, the said contention

would necessarily result in a “neither here no there” situation. [10]

Navaja elevated the case on appeal with the CA.

In the Decision dated August 28, 2007, the CA dismissed Navaja's appeal and affirmed in

toto the September 21, 2006 RTC Order.

Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it in the Resolution dated May 7,

2008. Aggrieved, she filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the following

issues:

I. THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF JAGNA, BOHOL[,] DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER

THE INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE.

i. Not one of the essential elements of the alleged crime of falsification of a private document

was committed in Jagna, Bohol.

ii. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional and cannot be presumed or established from the

alleged acts of the petitioner on a totally different and unrelated time and occasion.
iii. The strict rules on venue in criminal cases were established for the protection of the rights

of the accused and to prevent undue harassment and oppression.

II. HEREIN PETITIONER PROPERLY AVAILED OF THE REMEDY OF FILING A PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI IN QUESTIONING IMPROPER VENUE IN THE INSTANT CASE.

III. SETTLED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE CLEARLY PERMITS THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI TO QUESTION THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH.[11]

The petition lacks merit.

On the substantive issue of whether the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has jurisdiction over her case

for falsification of a private document, Navaja argues that not one of the three (3) essential

elements[12] of such crime was shown to have been committed in Jagna, Bohol. She insists

that there is no showing in the Information, or even in the complaint-affidavit and the annexes

thereto that the crime of falsification of a private document was committed or consummated

in Jagna, Bohol. In particular, the allegation in the complaint-affidavit that the subject receipt

was issued by Garden Cafe in Jagna, Bohol, cannot determine the venue because the place of

issuance of the receipt is not an element of the said crime. It was also impossible for her to

have committed the crime in Jagna, Bohol, because the alleged request for reimbursement

under the Weekly Travel Expense Report for September 29 to October 4, 2003, was prepared

and submitted on October 6, 2003 in Cebu City, while the subject receipt was issued on

October 2, 2003 by Garden Cafe in Jagna, Bohol. She further insists that at the time of the

issuance of the subject receipt on October 2, 2003, the element of damage was absent, hence,

there is no crime of falsification of private document to speak of. She explains that any

damage that private respondent could have suffered would only occur when it pays the

request for reimbursement in the Travel Expense Report submitted on October 6, 2003, but not

before that date, much less at time of the issuance of the said receipt.
Navaja's arguments are misplaced.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.[13] This principle was explained

by the Court in Foz, Jr. v. People,[14] thus:

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the

offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within

the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory

where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed

therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an

offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a

court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.

And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the

evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the

court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.[15]

In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has

jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or

municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential

ingredients occurred.

Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently states:

Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be

understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential

ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular

place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is

necessary for its identification.

In Union Bank of the Philippines v. People,[16] the Court said that both provisions categorically

place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the offense

was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the

venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information

states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place

within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place where the document is

actually falsified, to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a third person, regardless

whether or not the falsified document is put to the improper or illegal use for which it was

intended.[17]

Contrary to Navaja's argument that the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has no jurisdiction over the

case because not one of the essential elements of falsification of private document was

committed within its jurisdiction, the allegations in the Information and the complaint-affidavit

make out a prima facie case that such crime was committed in Jagna, Bohol. In particular,

the Information clearly alleged that she committed such crime thereat, to wit:

That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality of Jagna, province of Bohol,

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,

with intent to prejudice a juridical person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously falsify a commercial receipt No. 6729 of Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making an

alteration or intercalation in the said receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS

(P810.00) to ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P1,810.00) and thereafter accused

used the said receipt to claim reimbursement with DKT Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty.

Edgar Borje and accused as a result of which received the amount of P1,810.00 to her own

benefit; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during

trial. xxx[18]
Likewise, the Complaint-Affidavit dated February 18, 2004 alleged that the she committed the

said crime in Jagna, Bohol, viz:

“4. Among the expenses she reimbursed from DKT is the amount of Php1,810.00 she

supposedly incurred at Garden's Cafe, Jagna branch. Photocopy of the receipt dated 02

October 2003 she sent to the DKT office in Metro Manila is hereto attached as Annex “C”.

5. However, upon recent field investigation of Navaja's expenses in Bohol, it was found that

the actual amount she incurred at Garden's (sic) Cafe is only Php810.00 Photocopy of the

duplicate original official receipt (pink copy) certified true and correct by the cashier of

Garden's Cafe, Jagna is hereto attached as Annex “D”.

6. Evidently, Navaja falsified the receipt in Bohol upon receiving it with the intent of causing

damage to DKT.”[19]

Guided by the settled rule that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of

the complaint or information and not by the result of proof [20], the Court holds that Navaja's

case for falsification of private document falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the MCTC of

Jagna, Bohol.

Meanwhile, Navaja's defense that it was impossible for her to have committed the crime in

Jagna, Bohol, cannot be sustained at this point where the prosecution has yet to present

evidence to prove the material allegations of the charge against her, which include the place

where the subject receipt was falsified. However, given that the defense of lack of jurisdiction

due to improper venue may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, the Court stresses that if

the evidence adduced during the trial would show that the crime was indeed committed

outside its territorial jurisdiction, the MCTC should dismiss the case based on such ground.

On Navaja's claim that there is no crime of falsification of private document to speak of

because at the time of the issuance of the subject receipt on October 2, 2003, the element of

damage was absent, the Court sustains the RTC ruling that such damage need not be present,

as Article 172 (2)[21] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that mere intent to cause

such damage is sufficient.[22]

Navaja further contends that the CA's reliance on the findings of the Regional State

Prosecutor as to the sworn statement of a certain Cheryl Labarro [23] for purposes of

determining venue was misplaced, as her sworn statement pertains to an incident in Miravilla

Resort in Tagbilaran City, which was entirely separate and distinct from the facts material to

the case. She adds that the CA's reliance on the said statement in upholding the venue of the

case clearly runs afoul with the provisions of Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

[24]
She submits that nowhere in the Rules of Court is it allowed that the actions of the

accused on a different occasion maybe used to confer venue in another case, since venue

must be determined solely and exclusively on the facts obtaining in the instant case and

cannot be inferred or presumed from other collateral allegations.

The Court finds no merit in Navaja's foregoing contentions which boil down to the factual

issue of whether the crime of falsification of private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol

or in Cebu City.

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari "shall

raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth." In Pagsibigan v. People, et al.,

[25]
the Court held:

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law.

Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what

the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the

truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of

reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The issue to be resolved must be limited to

determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a review of the

evidence, the question posed is one of fact.

Whether the crime of falsification of private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol or in

Cebu City, is a question of fact. Indeed, in the exercise of its power of review, the Court is not

a trier of facts and, subject to certain exceptions, it does not normally undertake the re-

examination of the evidence presented by the parties during trial. [26] In certain exceptional

cases, however, the Court may be urged to probe and resolve factual issues, viz:

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are

contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;

(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are

based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs,

are not disputed by the respondent;

(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and

contradicted by the evidence on record; or

(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,

which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. [27]

Navaja failed to show that any of these circumstances is present.

It also bears emphasis that the factual findings of the appellate court generally are

conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court,

absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they

are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. [28] In this case, the CA,

the RTC and the MCTC all agree that the issue of improper venue was already resolved by the

Regional State Prosecutor when he held that “there are sufficient evidences (sic) indicating

that the falsification took place in Jagna.”[29] The Court perceives no compelling reason to

disturb such factual finding.

Anent Navaja's claim that the MCTC simply made reference to the findings of the Regional

State Prosecutor without specifying the factual and legal bases of its resolution, the Court

finds that the RTC had squarely addressed such issue as follows:

This court notes that in that particular resolution, reference was made to the sworn statement

of Ms. Cherly Lavaro who narrated that after she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja, the latter

borrowed her pen and in her presence wrote something on the said receipt. The Regional

State Prosecutor then concluded that Ms. Lavaro's statement “describes an apparent scheme
or pattern of altering receipts right after issuance. The borrowing of the cashier's pen and the

use thereof must have been intended to create an impression that the receipt was prepared by

the cashier herself.”

In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit of another witness, which

categorically states that Ms. Navaja was in Jagna when the questioned receipt was issued.

If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that her request for

reimbursement was made in Cebu City not in Jagna, Bohol, would likewise give no showing or

indication that the falsification was done in Cebu City. In other words, the said contention

would necessarily result in a “neither here no there” situation. [30]

On Navaja's argument that the CA's reliance on Labarro's[31] aforesaid statement in upholding

the venue of the case violates Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, [32] the Court holds

that such evidentiary rule has no bearing in determining the place where the crime was

committed for purposes of filing a criminal information which merely requires the existence of

probable cause. In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr.,[33] the Court expounded on the concept of

probable cause in this wise:

Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts

as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that

respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor

does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.

Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure

a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of

constitutes the offense charged.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not,

a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely

not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the

average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules

of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is

determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a

crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held

for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a

conviction.[34]

Also, Navaja insists that the rule on venue should have been construed liberally in favor her

favor as the accused, and strictly against private respondent, given its purpose of preventing

harassment and inconvenience by compelling the accused to appear in a different court from

that of the province where the crime was committed. Yet, private respondent willfully chose

to prosecute separately the other cases for falsification of private document against her in

different jurisdictions, namely, Cebu City, Bacolod City, Iloilo City and Tagbilaran, Bohol, to

harass and drain her financial resources, when all these criminal cases, involving minimal

amounts of actual damages,[35] should have been filed in one (1) criminal jurisdiction to avoid

multiplicity of actions.

The Court overrules Navaja's assertions, and upholds the RTC's sound ruling thereon:

The petitioner's insistence that all the criminal complaints filed against her should be filed in

one jurisdiction would be a blatant violation of the law on jurisdiction as one cannot file a

criminal case other than where the offense was allegedly committed.

In short, if it so happens that several offenses are alleged to have been committed in different

venues, then it is just unfortunate that whatever complaints have to be filed, will have to filed

in those different venues. To do otherwise would be procedurally fatal. [36]

To stress, in criminal proceedings, improper venue is lack of jurisdiction because venue in

criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.[37] Unlike in a civil case where venue

may be waived, this could not be done in a criminal case because it is an element of

jurisdiction. Thus, one cannot be held to answer for any crime committed by him except in the

jurisdiction where it was committed. Be that as it may, Section 5 (4), Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution provides that the Court has the power to order a change of venue or place of trial

to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, where there are serious and weighty reasons

present, which would prevent the court of original jurisdiction from conducting a fair and

impartial trial, the Court has been mandated to order a change of venue so as to prevent a

miscarriage of justice.[38] That private respondent filed several criminal cases for falsification

in different jurisdictions, which unduly forced Navaja to spend scarce resources to defend

herself in faraway places can hardly be considered as compelling reason which would prevent

the MCTC from conducting a fair and impartial trial.

Besides, it is erroneous for Navaja to argue that the separate filing of the falsification cases

she allegedly committed in different jurisdictions would result in multiplicity of actions. Such

separate filing of cases is only consistent with the principles that there are as many acts of

falsification as there are documents falsified[39] and that the venue of such cases is where the

document was actually falsified[40].

The Court now resolves the second and third procedural issues.

On the second issue, Navaja states that she did not commit a grave procedural error in filing a

petition for certiorari from the denial of her motion to quash. She posits that venue is an

element of the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of a criminal proceeding, and

that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be interposed at any stage of the

proceeding. Thus, even if a party fails to file a motion to quash, the accused may still question
the jurisdiction of the court later on, and such objection may be raised or considered motu

propio by the court at any stage of the proceeding or on appeal.

On the third issue, Navaja asserts that the Supreme Court has allowed the filing of a petition

for certiorari to question the denial of a motion to quash in cases where grave abuse of

discretion was patently committed, or when the lower court acted without or in excess of its

jurisdiction. She claims that not only did the lower court commit grave abuse of discretion in

denying the motion to quash, but there is likewise the issue of improper venue that need to be

settled with finality and dispatch. In support of her assertion, she cites a ruling [41] that when

the court has no jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the complaint, the court should dismiss

the case, instead of ordering its transfer.

Apropos to the second and third procedural issues is Querijero v. Palmes-Limitar[42] where

the Court reiterated the fundamental principle that an order denying a motion to quash is

interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition

for certiorari, thus:

In Zamoranos v. People, this Court emphasized that “a special civil action for certiorari is

not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The

established rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is

not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an

unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.”

On a number of occasions, however, Court had sanctioned a writ of certiorari as an

appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order in the following circumstances:

(1) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of

discretion;

(2) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not
afford adequate and expeditious relief;

(3) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice;

(4) to promote public welfare and public policy; and

(5) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with

dispatch in the consideration thereof.[43]

As can be gleaned from the Court's discussion on the substantive issue of the case, Navaja

failed to prove that any of the said special circumstances obtains in this case, let alone the

grave abuse of discretion she imputed against the MCTC. Hence, the CA did not err in

affirming the RTC ruling that the MCTC correctly denied her motion to quash.

Finally, the remaining factual issues raised by the parties need not be discussed further, as

they are properly resolved in due course of the proceedings in the instant case before the

MCTC and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner

authorized by law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 28,

2007 and the Resolution dated May 7, 2008 in CA G.R. SP No. 02353 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

July 8, 2015
 NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs / Mesdames:

Please take notice that on June 22, 2015 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by

the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office

on July 8, 2015 at 2:18 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.)

WILFREDO V. LAPITAN

Division Clerk of Court

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla, with Associate Justices Pampio A.

Abarintos and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring; rollo, pp. 43-49.

[2]
Id. at 51-52. Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla, with Associate

Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Amy C. Lazarro-Javier, concurring.

[3]
Id. at 80-82.

[4]
Id. at 96.
[5]
Id. at 98-105.

[6]
Id. at 76.

[7]
Id. at 77-78.

[8]
Id. at 106-124.

[9]
Id. at 53-55.

[10]
Id. at 53-54.

[11]
Id. at 26-27.

[12]
(1) The offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in Paragraph 7,

enumerated in Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) The falsification was committed in any

private document; and (3) The falsification caused damage to a third party or at least was

committed with intent to cause such damage.

[13]
Foz, Jr., et al. v. People, 618 Phil 120 (2009).

[14]
Supra.

[15]
Id. at 129, citing Macasaet v. People, 492 Phil. 355, 370 (2005); and Uy v. People, G.R. No.

119000, July 28 , 1997, 276 SCRA 367.

[16]
G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012, 667 SCRA 113, 123.

[17]
U.S. v. Baretto, 36 Phil 204, 207 (1917); Lopez v. Paras, 124 Phil. 1211, 1216 (1966).

[18]
Rollo, p. 96. (Emphasis added)

[19]
Id. at 81. (Emphasis added)

[20]
People v. Galano, G.R. No. L-42925, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 193; People v. Delfin, G.R.

Nos. L-15230 and L-15979-81, July 31, 1961, 25 SCRA 911, 920.

[21]
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents . — The penalty

of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than

P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage,

shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next

preceding article.

[22]
Rollo, p. 54.

[23]
Also spelled as Cherrel B. Labarro, or Cherly Lavaro; id. at 126.

[24]
Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence – Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at

one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at

another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan,
system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.

[25]
606 Phil 233 (2009).

[26]
Claravall v. Lim, 669 Phil. 570 (2011). Citations omitted.

[27]
Federal Builders, Inc. v. Foundation Specialists, Inc., G.R. No. 194507 and G.R. No. 194621,

September 8, 2014; Andrada v. Pilhino Sales Corporation, G.R. No. 156448, February 23, 2011,

644 SCRA 1, 10.

[28]
Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014.

[29]
Rollo, pp. 46-47, 53, and 77.

[30]
Id. at 74.

[31]
Also referred to as Cherrel B. Labarro, or Cherly Lavaro; id, at 126.

[32]
Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence – Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at

one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at

another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan,

system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.

[33]
G.R. No. 172829, July 18, 2012, 677 SCRA 113, 121.

[34]
Id., citing Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc., 582 Phil. 505, 519-520 (2008). (Emphasis

added)
[35]
P3,600.00, P2,000.00, P2,000.00 and P1,000.00, respectively.

[36]
Rollo, p. 74.

[37]
Yoingco v. Hon. Gonzaga, 470 Phil. (2004).

[38]
Ala v. Judge Peras, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2283 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3478-RTJ), November

16, 2011, 660 SCRA 193, 219.

[39]
Abalos v. People, 437 Phil. 693, 700 (2002).

[40]
U.S. v. Baretto, supra; Lopez v. Paras, supra.

[41]
RCBC v. Hon. Isnani, etc., et al., 312 Phil. 194, 199 (1995).

[42]
G.R. No. 166467, September 17, 2012, 680 SCRA 671, 675-676.

[43]
Id.

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815 Phil. 183

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 186329. August 02, 2017 ]

 DR. FRISCO M. MALABANAN, PETITIONER, V. SANDIGANBAYAN,

RESPONDENT.

[G.R. Nos. 186584-86, August 2, 2017]

ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID, PETITIONER, V. THE HON.

SANDIGANBAYAN - 1st DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, HON.

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 198598, August 2, 2017]

ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

These three consolidated petitions stem from a common set of facts. Abusama M. Alid (Alid)

was the Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Agriculture (DA), Regional Field

Office No. XII, Cotabato City.[1] Frisco M. Malabanan (Malabanan), on the other hand, was the

Program Director of the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani Rice Program (GMA Rice Program) of the

DA, Field Operations Office, Diliman, Quezon City.[2]

On 27 July 2004, Alid obtained a cash advance of P10,496 to defray his expenses for official

travel. He was supposed to attend the turnover ceremony of the outgoing and the incoming

Secretaries of the DA and to follow up, on 28 to 31 July 2004, funds intended for the GMA Rice

Program. The turnover ceremony did not push through, however, and Alid's trip was deferred. [3]
On 22 August 2004, Alid took Philippine Airlines (PAL) Flight PR 188 from Cotabato City to

Manila under PAL Ticket No. 07905019614316 (PAL Ticket). [4] He attended the turnover

ceremony at the DA Central Office in Quezon City on 23 August 2004. [5] The following day, or

on 24 August 2004, he took a flight from Manila to Cotabato City per another ticket issued in

exchange for the PAL Ticket.[6]

On 1 September 2004, Alid instructed his secretary to prepare the necessary papers to

liquidate the cash advance.

In his Post Travel Report, he declared that his official travel transpired on 28 to 31 July 2004. [7]

He likewise attached an altered PAL Ticket in support of his Post Travel Report. The date "22

AUG 2004" was changed to read "28 JULY 2004", and the flight route "Cotabato-Manila-

Cotabato" appearing on the PAL Ticket was altered to read "Davao-Manila-Cotabato." [8]

He further attached an undated Certificate of Appearance signed by Malabanan as Director of

the GMA Rice Program.[9] The document stated that Alid had appeared at the DA Central

Office in Quezon City from 28 to 31 July 2004 for the turnover ceremony and to follow up the

status of the funds intended for the GMA Rice Program.[10]

During post-audit, discrepancies in the supporting documents were found and investigated.

Thereafter, the Office of the Special Prosecutor charged Alid and Malabanan before the

Sandiganbayan with falsification of public documents.[11]

In SB-07-CRM-0072, Alid was indicted for falsifying his Post Travel Report, as follows:

That [on] or about July 2004, and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Cotabato City,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,

ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID, a high ranking public officer holding the position of Assistant

Regional Director with salary grade 27 of the Department of Agriculture, Regional Field Office

No. XII, Cotabato City, taking advantage of his official position, with abuse of confidence, and

committing the offense in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified his Post Travel Report prepared on September 1,
2004, which is an official document, by making it appear therein that on July 28, 2004, he

proceeded to Davao to take a flight bound for Manila and that he was in Manila up to July 30,

2004 to attend to the turn-over ceremony of incoming and outgoing DA Secretaries and to

follow up the funds intended for the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani (GMA) Rice Program projects

and that on July 31, 2004, he took a taxi from his hotel to the airport and boarded a flight back

to Cotabato City, which document he submitted to support his Liquidation Voucher for Ten

Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Six Pesos (P10,496.00) which he cash advanced [sic] for

traveling expenses to Manila for the period July 28-31, 2004, when in truth and in fact, as the

accused well knew, he did not take the aforesaid official trip to Manila for the said period of

July 28 to 30, 2004 and that the turn-over ceremony between the incoming and outgoing DA

Secretaries was postponed and moved to August 2004, nor did the accused follow up the

funds for GMA projects in the said month, thus accused made [an] untruthful statement in a

narration of facts, the truth of which he was legally bound to disclose.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]

In SB-07-CRM-0073, the Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor charged Alid with falsifying the PAL

Ticket. The Information stated:

That on or about July 2004, and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Cotabato City,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,

ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID, a high ranking public officer holding the position of Assistant

Regional Director with salary grade 27 of the Department of Agriculture, Regional Field Office

No. XII, Cotabato City, taking advantage of his official position and committing the offense in

relation to his office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to

be falsified the Philippine Airline (PAL) plane ticket No. 07905019614316[,] a genuine

document which he attached and submitted as supporting document to his liquidation voucher

for the purpose of liquidating his cash advance of Ten Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Six

(P10,496.00) Pesos as traveling expenses for the period July 28-31, 2004 thereby rendering the
said plane ticket a public/official document, which falsification was committed in the following

manner to wit: that in the upper right corner of the said plane ticket indicating the date and

place of issue, accused inserted the figure/number 8 after the figure/number 2 and erased the

original word Aug (August) and superimposed the [word] July to make it appear that the plane

ticket was purchased/issued on July 28, 2004, when the original date of purchase/issue was

August 2, 2004; that in the portion of the ticket indicating the flight route, accused also erased

the original word "Cotabato" and superimposed therein the word "Davao" and under the

column "Date" of flight, accused erased the original figure 22 and superimposed the figure

"28" and also erased the word "Aug." and superimposed the word "Jul" to make it appear that

the flight took place on July 28 originating from Davao, thus accused made alterations and

intercalations in a genuine document which changed its original meaning and perverting the

truth to make it appear that he made an official trip to Manila, originating from Davao on July

28, 2004 using a plane ticket issued/purchased on July 28, 2004 to conform with the entries in

his liquidation voucher when accused knew [full] well that he did not make such official trip on

said date and route as indicated in the aforesaid falsified PAL plane ticket.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[13]

In SB-07-CRM-0074, Alid and Malabanan were charged with falsifying the Certificate of

Appearance that the former attached as a supporting document for the Post Travel Report.

The Information reads:

That on or about July 2004, and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ABUSAMA

MANGUDADATU ALID, a high ranking public officer holding the position of Assistant Regional

Director with salary grade 27 of the Department of Agriculture (DA), Regional Field Office No.

XII, Cotabato City, conspiring and conniving with accused FRISCO MERCADO [MALABANAN],

Chief Science Research Specialist of the Philippine Rice Research Institute (Philrice) and

Program Director of the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani (GMA) [Rice] Program of the Department
of Agriculture, Field Operations Service, Diliman, Quezon City, holding a salary grade of 26,

taking advantage of their official positions, with abuse of confidence and committing the

offense in relation to their respective offices, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified an undated Certificate of Appearance issued in the

name of ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID noted by accused FRISCO M. MALABANAN which is

an official/public document and which the former submitted as one of the supporting

document[s] to his liquidation voucher of his cash advance of Ten Thousand Four Hundred

Ninety Six (P10,496.00) Pesos as traveling expenses for the period of July 28-31, 2004 by

making it appear in the said Certificate of Appearance that accused Abusama Mangudadatu

Alid appeared in the Office of the DA Central Office, Diliman, Quezon City for the period of July

28-31, 2004 to attend to the turn-over ceremony of incoming and outgoing DA Secretaries and

to follow-up the funds intended for the GMA Projects Implementation; when in truth and in

fact, as both accused well knew, accused Abusama Mangudadatu Alid did not travel to Manila

on said date as the turn-over ceremony of the incoming and outgoing DA Secretaries was

postponed and moved to August 2004 nor did accused Alid follow up with accused Malabanan

on the said period the funds intended for the GMA projects, thus accused made an untruthful

statement in a narration of facts, the truth of which they are legally bound to disclose.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[14]

Upon arraignment, both Alid and Malabanan entered pleas of "not guilty." [15]

While the cases were pending before the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution filed a Motion to

Suspend Accused Pendente Lite, praying for their preventive suspension pending trial.[16]

In a Minute Resolution dated 29 October 2008, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and

ordered the suspension pendente lite of Alid and Malabanan for 90 days.[17]

Both of the accused sought reconsideration, but the Sandiganbayan denied their motions in a

Minute Resolution dated 30 January 2009.[18]

Malabanan then filed before this Court a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari and

Prohibition[19] praying that the order of preventive suspension be set aside, and that a writ of
prohibition be issued against the Sandiganbayan to forestall the threatened implementation of

the Minute Resolutions.[20] This petition was docketed as G.R. No. 186329.

Alid filed a separate Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition [21] before us, likewise

praying that the order of preventive suspension be set aside, and that a writ of prohibition be

issued against the Sandiganbayan's implementation of the Minute Resolution dated 29

October 2008.[22] He further prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order pending

the resolution of the principal case.[23] This petition was docketed as G.R. Nos. 186584-86.

In the meantime, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with the criminal cases and eventually

rendered a Decision convicting Alid of falsification of a private document for altering the PAL

Ticket.[24] The Sandiganbayan, however, acquitted both of the accused of the other charges.

The dispositive portion of its ruling reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows

1. In SB-07-CRM-0072 - ACQUITTING accused ABUSAMA M. ALID for insufficiency of

evidence, with costs de oficio;

2. In SB-07-CRM-0073 - finding accused ABUSAMA M. ALID GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of a private document under paragraph

2 of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and, with the application of the

Indeterminate Sentence Law and without any mitigating or aggravating

circumstance, hereby sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ONE (1)

YEAR and ONE (1) DAY to THREE (3) YEARS, SIX MONTHS and TWENTY-ONE (21)

DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum and maximum, respectively, and to pay a

fine of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) with costs against the accused; and

3. In SB-07-CRM-0074 - ACQUITTING accused ABUSAMA M. ALID and FRISCO M.

MALABANAN for insufficiency of evidence, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.[25]

Alid moved for the reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's decision convicting him of the

crime of falsification of a private document under paragraph 2 of Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code.[26] The prosecution likewise moved for a partial reconsideration insofar as the

acquittals were concerned.[27] However, the Sandiganbayan denied both motions.[28]

Alid thereafter filed the present Rule 45 Petition for Review [29] before this Court, praying for

the reversal of the Decision and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan insofar as SB-07-CRM-

0073 is concerned. This petition was docketed as G.R. No. 198598.

THE COURT'S RULING

We dismiss the petitions in G.R. Nos. 186329 and 186584-86 for being moot and academic.

However, we grant the petition in GR. No. 198598 and rule that the Sandiganbayan committed

a reversible error in convicting Alid of the crime of falsification of a private document under

Article 172, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

The petitions questioning the order of preventive suspension

are moot and academic.

A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, it ceases to

present a justiciable controversy, such that a declaration thereon would no longer be of

practical value.[30] As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such a case or dismiss it on the

ground of mootness.[31]

In G.R. Nos. 186329 and 186584-86, Alid and Malabanan pray that the Sandiganbayan's order

imposing preventive suspension be set aside and its implementation restrained. It appears

from the records, however, that the order of preventive suspension had already been

implemented by the DA on 17 March 2009,[32] and that Alid had already retired from

government service on 30 June 2009.[33] Clearly, therefore, by virtue of supervening events,

there is no longer any justiciable controversy with regard to this matter, and any

pronouncement that we may make upon it will no longer be of practical value. Thus, we rule

that the Rule 45 petitions in GR. Nos. 186329 and 186584-86 should be dismissed for

mootness.
 II

The Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Alid of the crime of

falsification of a private document under paragraph 2 of

Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.

In G.R. No. 198598, the Sandiganbayan convicted Alid of falsification of a private document for

altering the PAL Ticket. We disagree with that conviction for two reasons.

First, a conviction for falsification of a private document under paragraph 2 of Article 172

violates the right of Alid to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him

given that his Information charged him only with falsification of documents committed by a

public officer under Article 171. Second, for falsifying a commercial document, the penal

provision allegedly violated by Alid was paragraph 1, and not paragraph 2, of Article 1 72.

Right to Be Informed of the Nature

and the Cause of Accusation

At the outset, we note that the appeal of Alid is grounded on two points: (1) that he was not

the one who altered the plane ticket; and (2) that he had no intent to cause damage. He has

not raised the defense that his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation

against him has been violated. However, an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole matter

for the review of any question, including those questions not raised by the parties. [34] In this

case, a review is necessary because the conviction was made in violation of the accused's

constitutional rights.

One of the fundamental rights of an accused person is the right to be "informed of the nature

and cause of the accusation against him."[35] This means that the accused may not be

convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the Information. [36] Even if the

prosecution successfully proves the elements of a crime, the accused may not be convicted

thereof, unless that crime is alleged or necessarily included in the Information filed against

the latter.[37]
Pursuant to this constitutional right, Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,

commands:

Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is

variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and

the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused

shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the

offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

Therefore, the accused can only be convicted of an offense when it is both charged and

proved. If it is not charged, although proved, or if it is proved, although not charged, the

accused cannot be convicted thereof.[38] In other words, variance between the allegation

contained in the Information and the conviction resulting from trial cannot justify a conviction

for either the offense charged or the offense proved unless either is included in the other.

As to when an offense includes or is included in another, Section 5 of Rule 120 provides:

Section 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged

necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of

the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense

charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the

former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.

Here, it cannot be overlooked that there is a variance between the felony as charged in the

Information and as found in the judgment of conviction. Applying the rules, the conviction of

Alid for falsification of a private document under paragraph 2, Article 172 is valid only if the

elements of that felony constituted the elements of his indictment for falsification by a public

officer under Article 171.

Article 171 - the basis of the indictment of Alid - punishes public officers for falsifying a

document by making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its

meaning. The elements of falsification under this provision are as follows: [39]

1. The offender is a public officer, employee, or a notary public.

2. The offender takes advantage of his or her official position.

3. The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts of falsification

under Article 171.[40]

Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code contains three punishable acts. It reads:

Art. 172. Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents. — The penalty

of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000

pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next

preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of

commercial document; and

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage,

shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next

preceding article.

Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the

damage of another or who, with the intent to cause such dan1age, shall use any of the false

documents embraced in the next preceding article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of

this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.

Paragraph 2 of Article 172 was the basis of Alid's conviction. Its elements are as follows:

1. The offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in Article

171(7).
 2. The falsification was committed on a private document.

3. The falsification caused damage or was committed with intent to cause damage to

a third party.[41]

Comparing the two provisions and the elements of falsification respectively enumerated

therein, it is readily apparent that the two felonies are different. Falsification under paragraph

2 of Article 172 goes beyond the elements of falsification enumerated under Article 171. The

former requires additional independent evidence of damage or intention to cause the same to

a third person.[42] Simply put, in Article 171, damage is not an element of the crime; but in

paragraph 2 of Article 172, or falsification of a private document, damage is an element

necessary for conviction.

Therefore, not all the elements of the crime punished by paragraph 2, Article 172 are included

under Article 171. Specifically, the former offense requires the element of damage, which is

not a requisite in the latter. Indeed, the Information charging Alid of a felony did not inform

him that his alleged falsification caused damage or was committed with intent to cause

damage to a third party.

Since Alid was not specifically informed of the complete nature and cause of the accusation

against him, he cannot be convicted of falsification of a private document under paragraph 2

of Article 1 72. To convict him therefor, as the Sandiganbayan did, violates the very

proscription found in the Constitution and our Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this ground

alone, we find that the court a quo erred in its decision.

Falsification under Articles 171 and

172 of the Revised Penal Code

Notwithstanding the erroneous conviction meted out by the Sandiganbayan, this Court

proceeds to peruse the nature of the crime established in the records of this case. In People

v. Castillo,[43] we emphasized a basic rule in criminal jurisprudence: that the defendant in a

criminal case may be found guilty of any offense necessarily included in the allegation stated

in the information and fully established by the evidence.

Guillergan v. People[44] declares that the falsification of documents committed by public

officers who take advantage of their official position under Article 171 necessarily includes

the falsification of commercial documents by private persons punished by paragraph 1 of

Article 172. To reiterate, the elements of Article 171 are as follows:

1. The offender is a public officer, employee, or a notary public.

2. The offender takes advantage of his or her official position.

3. The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts of falsification

under Article 171.

In turn, paragraph 1 of Article 172 contains these requisites:

1. That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not

take advantage of his or her official position.

2. The falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.

3. The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts of falsification

under Article 171.

Analyzing these felonies, we find that neither of them include damage or intent to cause

damage as an element of the crime; and that Article 171 encompasses all the elements

required in a conviction for falsification under paragraph 1 of Article 172. Thus, in Daan v.

Sandiganbayan,[45] we allowed the accused facing Informations for falsification of public

documents under Article 171 to plead guilty to falsification under Article 172. We specifically

stated that "in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to

the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that

petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and

payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte.”[46]

Here, if the records show sufficient allegations that would convict Alid of paragraph 1 of

Article 172, the Sandiganbayan is bound to sentence him to that lesser offense. But, as

mentioned, it overlooked this provision and jumped to convicting him of falsification under
paragraph 2 of Article 172. As discussed, the latter felony is not covered by his indictment

under Article 171.

This Court finds that the prosecution has sufficiently alleged all the elements of paragraph 1

of Article 172. As regards the first element, Alid was a public officer who did not take

advantage of his official position.

Offenders are considered to have taken advantage of their official position in falsifying a

document if (1) they had the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation

of the document; or (2) they had official custody of the falsified document. [47] Here, the

accused definitely did not have the duty to make, prepare, or intervene in the preparation of

the PAL Ticket. Neither was it in his official custody. Therefore, when he falsified the PAL

Ticket, he did not take advantage of his official position as Assistant Regional Director of the

DA.

Anent the second element, the Sandiganbayan concluded that because the PAL Ticket was a

private document, Alid should not have been charged with falsifying a public document.

However, the PAL Ticket fell under the category of commercial documents, which paragraph 1

of Article 172 protects from falsification.

Commercial documents or papers are those used by merchants or business persons to

promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions. Examples include receipts, order slips, and

invoices.[48] In Seaoil Petroleum Corporation v. Autocorp Group,[49] we considered a sales

invoice a commercial document and explained:

The Vehicle Sales Invoice [Autocorp sold to Seaoil one unit Robex 200 LC Excavator paid for

by checks issued by one Romeo Valera] is the best evidence of the transaction. A sales

invoice is a commercial document. Commercial documents or papers are those used by

merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions. Business

forms, e.g., order slip, delivery charge invoice and the like, are commonly recognized in
ordinary commercial transactions as valid between the parties and, at the very least, they

serve as an acknowledgment that a business transaction has in fact transpired.

In this case, since the PAL Ticket functioned as a sales invoice that memorialized the

consummation of the commercial transaction between the air carrier and the passenger, the

Sandiganbayan should have considered the fact that Alid had altered a commercial document.

Finally, the accused did not dispute that he had altered a genuine document. The date "22

AUG 2004" was changed to read "28 JULY 2004"; and the flight route "Cotabato-Manila-

Cotabato" appearing on the PAL Ticket was altered to read "Davao-Manila-

Cotabato."[50] Hence, the third element of the felony punished by paragraph 1 of Article 172 is

apparent in this case.

Criminal Liability of the Accused

Criminal intent or mens rea must be shown in felonies committed by means of dolo, such as

falsification.[51] Such intent is a mental state, the 2 existence of which is shown by the overt

acts of a person.[52] Thus, the acts of Alid must have displayed, with moral certainty, his

intention to pervert the truth before we adjudge him criminally liable. In cases of falsification,

we have interpreted that the criminal intent to pervert the truth is lacking in cases showing

that (1) the accused did not benefit from the falsification; and (2) no damage was caused

either to the government or to a third person.

In Amora, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[53] the accused construction contractor was absolved even

if he had admittedly falsified time books and payrolls. The Court appreciated the fact that he

did not benefit from the transaction and was merely forced to adjust the supporting papers in

order to collect the piece of work he had actually constructed. On that occasion, we explained

at length the nuanced appreciation of criminal intent in falsification of documents, viz.:

Although the project was truly a contract for a piece of work, nevertheless he used the daily

wage method and not the contract vouchers. This was not his idea but by the municipal mayor

and treasurer to prepare a payroll and list of laborers and their period of work and to pay them
the minimum wage so that the total payment would equal the total contract price. This is the

so-called bayanihan system practiced by former Mayor Bertumen and Engineer Bertumen of

the 2nd engineering district. In the payrolls only some 20 names of the 200 laborers were

listed as not all of them could be accommodated. Those not listed received their wages from

those listed. As all of the utilized laborers were duly paid, not one complained. Neither did the

municipality complain. x x x.

xxxx.

From the foregoing coupled with the fact that the town of Guindulman suffered no damage and

even gained on the project (the cost of the boulders actually delivered was P18,285.00 but

Murillo was paid only P13,455.00) plus the additional fact that the alleged complaining witness

mentioned in the informations suffered no damage whatsoever and were in fact awarded no

indemnity, it is obvious that the falsifications made by the petitioners were done in good faith;

there was no criminal intent. x x x. In other words, although the accused altered a public

document or made a misstatement or erroneous assertion therein, he would not be guilty of

falsification as long as he acted in good faith and no one was prejudiced by the alteration or

error. (Emphasis supplied)[54]

In Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals ,[55] the heirs of the

deceased falsified the signature of the latter in a Notice of Appeal. The Court rejected the

imputation of falsification because the forgery produced no effect:

In the instant case, given the heirs' admissions contained in several pleadings that Avelino

and Pedro are already deceased and their submission to the jurisdiction of the Regional

Adjudicator as the successors-in-interest of the decedents, the effect would be the same if the

heirs did not sign the decedents' names but their own names on the appeal. [56]

This Court is well aware that falsification of documents under paragraph 1 of Article 172, like

Article 171, does not require the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person as an

element of conviction. But, as early as People v. Pacana,[57] we have said:

Considering that even though in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by

public officials or by private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain

or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private

documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the solemnly proclaimed, it must,

nevertheless, be borne in mind that the change in the public document must be such as to

affect the integrity of the same or to change the effects which it would otherwise produce; for

unless that happens, there could not exist the essential element of the intention to commit

the crime which is required by article 1 [now Article 3] of the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied)

[58]

Here we find that, similar to Amora, Jr. and Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,

there is no moral certainty that Alid benefitted from the transaction, with the government or

any third person sustaining damage from his alteration of the document.

The peculiar situation of this case reveals that Alid falsified the PAL Ticket just to be

consistent with the deferred date of the turnover ceremony for the outgoing and the incoming

Secretaries of the DA Central Office in Quezon City. Notably, he had no control as to the

rescheduling of the event he had to attend. Neither did the prosecution show that he had

incurred any additional benefit when he altered the document. Moreover, after he submitted

the PAL Ticket that he had used to support his liquidation for a cash advance of P10,496, the

public funds kept by the DA remained intact: no apparent illegal disbursement was made; or

any additional expense incurred.

Considering, therefore, the obvious intent of Alid in altering the PAL Ticket - to remedy his

liquidation of cash advance with the correct date of his rescheduled travel - we find no malice

on his part when he falsified the document. For this reason, and seeing the overall

circumstances in the case at bar, we cannot justly convict Alid of falsification of a commercial

document under paragraph 1 of Article I 72.

WHEREFORE, the Rule 65 petitions in GR. Nos. 186329 and 186584-86 are

hereby DISMISSED for being moot and academic. The Rule 45 Petition for Review in G.R. No.

198598 is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan

are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is hereby

rendered ACQUITTING petitioner Abusama M. Alid in SB-07-CRM-0073.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo (G.R. No. 198598), p. 33; Sandiganbayan Decision dated 23 June 2011, penned by

Associate Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada and concurred in by Associate Justices Efren N. de la

Cruz and Rafael R. Lagos.

[2]
Id. at 40.

[3]
Id.

[4]
Id. at 214; Certification dated 24 September 2004.

[5]
Id. at 40; Sandiganbayan Decision dated 23 June 2011.

[6]
Id.

[7]
Id. at 40-41.

[8]
Id. at 126-127; Information in SB-07-CRM-0073 dated 24 October 2007.

[9]
Id. at 41.

[10]
Id. at 129-130; Information in SB-07-CRM-0074 dated 24 October 2007.

[11]
Id. at 41-42.

[12]
Id. at 123-124; Information in SB-07-CRM-0072 dated 24 October 2007.

[13]
Id. at 126-127; Information in SB-07-CRM-0073 dated 24 October 2007.

[14]
Id. at 129-130; Information in SB-07-CRM-0074 dated 24 October 2007.

[15]
Id. at 33; Sandiganbayan Decision dated 23 June 2011.

[16]
Rollo (G.R. No. 186329), pp. 17-22; Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite dated 28

April 2008.
[17]
Rollo (G.R. No. 186329), pp. 52-54; rollo (G.R. No. 186584-86), pp. 19-21; Minute

Resolution of the Sandiganbayan First Division dated 29 October 2008, approved by then

Presiding Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (now a member of this Court), and Associate Justices

Rodolfo A. Ponferrada and Alexander G. Gesmundo.

[18]
Rollo (G.R. No. 186329), pp. 55-57; rollo (G.R. No. 186584-86), pp. 27-29; Minute

Resolution of the Sandiganbayan First Division dated 30 January 2009, approved by Associate

Justices Norberto Y. Geraldez, Rodolfo A. Ponferrada and Alexander G. Gesmundo.

[19]
Rollo (G.R. No. 186329), pp. 3-12; Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition dated 25 February

2009.

[20]
Id. at 11.

[21]
Rollo (G.R. No. 186584-86), pp. 3-18; Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition dated 8 March

2009.

[22]
Id. at 15.

[23]
Id. at 16.

[24]
Rollo (G.R. No. 198598), pp. 30-54; Sandiganbayan Decision dated 23 June 2011.

[25]
Id. at 52-53.

[26]
Id. at 60-73; Motion for Reconsideration (of the June 23, 2011 Decision) dated 26 June

2011.

[27]
Id. at 74-82; Partial Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 July 2011.

[28]
Id. at 55-59; Resolution dated 6 September 2011.

[29]
Id. at 9-26; Petition for Review dated 28 October 2011.

[30]
Gunsi, Sr. v. Commissioners of the COMELEC, 599 Phil. 223 (2009).

[31]
Id.

[32]
Rollo (G.R. No. 186584-86), p. 162; Manifestation dated 15 June 2009, citing an Order

issued by DA Secretary Arthur C. Yap dated 17 March 2009.

[33]
Id. at 114; Comment (on the Petition dated 25 February 2009 and the Petition dated 8

March 2009) dated 28 August 2009.

[34]
People v. Yam-id, 368 Phil. 131, 137 (1999)

[35]
CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 14 (2).

[36]
People v. Manalili, 355 Phil. 652, 684 (1998).

[37]
Laurel v. Abrogar, 518 Phil. 409, 431 (2006).

[38]
Pecho v. Sandiganbayan, 308 Phil. 120 (1993), citing Esquerra v. People, 108 Phil. 1078,

1084-85 (1960).

[39]
Garong v. People, G.R. No. 172539, 16 November 2016.

[40]
ARTICLE 171. Falsification by Public Officer, Employee or Notary or Ecclesiastic

Minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be

imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official

position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did

not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than

those in fact made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;

7. Issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document

when no such original exists, or induding in such copy a statement contrary to, or different

from, that of the genuine original; or

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry,

or official book.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of

the offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this article, with respect to any
record or document of such character that its falsification may affect the civil status of

persons. (Emphasis supplied)

[41]
Manansala v. People, G.R. No. 215424, 9 December 2015.

[42]
Tan, Jr. v. Matsuura, 701 Phil. 236 (2013).

[43]
People v. Castillo, C.A. No. 227, 76 Phil. 72 (1946).

[44]
656 Phil. 527 (2011 ).

[45]
573 Phil. 368 (2008).

[46]
Id. at 382.

[47]
Adaza v. Sandiganbayan, 502 Phil. 702 (2005).

[48]
David v. People, 767 Phil. 290 (2015); Lagon v. Hooven Comalco Industries, Inc., 402 Phil.

404 (2001); People v. Benito, 57 Phil. 587 (1932).

[49]
Seaoil Petroleum Corporation v. Autocorp Group, 590 Phil. 410,419 (2008).

[50]
Sandiganbayan Records, vol. I, p. 10.

[51]
Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman, 430 Phil. 101 (2002); REVISED PENAL CODE,

Article 3.

[52]
Lastrilla v. Granda, 516 Phil. 667 (2006).

[53]
200 Phil. 777 (1982).

[54]
Id. at 781-783.

[55]
632 Phil. 191 (2010).

[56]
Id. at 214.

[57]
47 Phil. 48 (1924).

[58]
Id. at 56.

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SECOND DIVISION
SPOUSES REVELO VILLAMAR G.R. No. 178652
and CORAZON PENULIAR-
VILLAMAR, Present:
Petitioners,

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

PERALTA,
- versus - ABAD,
PEREZ,* and
MENDOZA, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondent. December 8, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

This is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court. The petition challenges the 27 June 2007 Decision [2] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29524. The Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification the 11 August 2005 Decision [3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Judicial Region 1, Branch 40, Dagupan City, in Criminal Case No. 2005-0172-
[4]
D, affirming the 8 February 2005 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Judicial Region 1, Branch 1, Dagupan City, in Criminal Case No.
42907.

On 20 April 1967, Elena Manantan (Elena) sold a parcel of land to her nine
children: Cornelia Penuliar (Cornelia), Simplicio Penuliar (Simplicio), Modesta
Flores (Modesta), Eulalia Penuliar (Eulalia), Hermogenes Penuliar (Hermogenes),
Lucia Penuliar (Lucia), Pedro Penuliar (Pedro), Felipe Penuliar (Felipe), and Jose
Penuliar (Jose). On 6 June 1983, Cornelia Eulalia, Hermogenes, Lucia, Pedro, and
Jose sold their share to Simplicio. Modesta and Felipe did not sell their share.

On 7 September 1989, Simplicio sold his total share to his daughter,

petitioner Corazon Penuliar-Villamar (Corazon). Corazon is married to petitioner
Revelo Villamar (Revelo). Corazon and Revelo possessed and registered with the
Office of the Provincial Assessor of Lingayen, Pangasinan, a signed and notarized
deed of sale dated 23 November 1989. Notary Public Quirico Bachar notarized the
deed. In the deed, it was made to appear that all of Elena’s children, including
Modesta and Felipe, sold the property to the spouses. The signatures of Modesta,
Hermogenes, and Lucia were forged. Corazon and Revelo alleged that “employees
of the Assessor’s Office” committed the falsification.

In 1999, Modesta discovered the 23 November 1989 deed of sale. In an

information[5] dated 7 September 2000, Second Assistant City Prosecutor Regulus
V. Reyes charged Corazon and Revelo with falsification of public document.

In its 8 February 2005 Decision, the MTCC found Corazon and Revelo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of public document. The MTCC
sentenced the spouses to an indeterminate penalty of four months and one
day arresto mayor as minimum to three years, six months and 20 days prision
correccional as maximum, and to pay Modesta P20,000 moral damages. The
MTCC held that:
There is no question that the signature of the private complainant in the
Deed of Sale, dated November 23, 1989 was falsified. In fact, even the accused
admitted that indeed private complainant Modesta Penuliar Flores was not one of
the vendors in the said document. But the accused maintain that they could not be
held guilty of the crime charged because they were not the ones who falsified the
document as it was prepared by somebody in the Office of the Provincial Assessor
of Lingayen, Pangasinan without their knowledge. The accused insisted that
when they went to the said office to register the Deed of Sale marked Exhibit 2,
they were asked to leave it, and when they returned to get their document, they
were given another document particularly Exhibit A which is the reason why they
were charged with falsification because it appears in the said document that
private complainant Modesta Penuliar Flores was one of the signatories when, in
fact, she was not. In other words, the accused maintain that they could not be held
liable for falsification of public document because criminal intent was
lacking. But if the accused acted in good faith, why did they not immediately
inform the private complainant about the matter. Moreover, they should not have
 received the falsified document from the Assessor’s Office knowing that it was
not the document that was given to their office for registration. The actuation and
the behavior of the accused negate their claim of innocence. It is very unusual
that they entrusted such very important document to somebody whose name they
don’t even know. Furthermore, why did the accused waited [sic] for the advice of
the Brgy. Captain of their place to settle their problem with the private
complainant. Their silence work [sic] against them as it goes against the principle
that the first impulse of an innocent was [sic] when accused of wrongdoing is to
express his innocence at the first opportune time. Besides, other than the self-
serving testimonies of the accused, no other evidence was presented by them to
substantiate their pretense of innocence. They should have presented the person
from the Assessor’s Office who gave them Exhibit A to corroborate their claim if
indeed they have no hand in its falsification. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction
that the person who stood to benefit by the falsification of a public document and
was in possession of it is presumed to be the material author of the
falsification. Hence, the defense of good faith of the accused is not acceptable as
it is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

All told, the prosecution has succeeded in rebutting the presumption of

innocence accorded the accused who, on their part, have dismally failed to
substantiate their pretense of innocence.[6]

Corazon and Revelo appealed to the RTC. In its 11 August 2005 Decision,
the RTC found Corazon and Revelo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification
of public document. The RTC held that:

After a careful review of the decision appealed from, the Court finds no
reversible error committed by the court a-quo as the same is duly supported by
evidence.

The prosecutor’s evidence has duly proved that the signature of the private
complainant in the Deed of Sale dated November 23, 1989 was falsified. Even
the accused admitted that indeed private complainant Modesta Penuliar Flores
was not one of the vendors in the said document.

The accused, while admitting that private complainant Modesta Penuliar

Flores was not one of the vendors in the said document, they maintained that they
could not be held guilty of the crime charged because they were not the ones who
falsified the document as it was prepared by somebody in the Office of the
Provincial Assessor of Lingayen, Pangasinan without their knowledge, and put up
the defense of good faith.

As correctly held by the Court a-quo, the actuation and behavior of the
accused in not immediately informing the complainant about the inclusion of her
 name in the subject Deed of Sale as one of the vendors therein negate their claim
of innocence.

The Court is in consonance with the ruling of the court a-quo that the
person who stood to benefit by the falsification of a public document and was in
possession of it is presumed to be the material author of the falsification.

As held by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Manansala (105
Phil. 1253), it is an established rule that when a person has in his possession a
falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is
justified that such person is the forger.[7]

Corazon and Revelo appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its 27 June 2007
Decision, the Court of Appeals found Corazon and Revelo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of falsification of public document. The Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the MTCC’s and RTC’s decisions by adding one day to
the maximum penalty. The Court of Appeals held that:

Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

“Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified

documents. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 shall be imposed upon:

“1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications
enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or
letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; and

xxx xxx x x x”

On the other hand, Article 171 of the same Code provides:

“Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or

ecclesiastical minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who,
taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing
any of the following acts:

“1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;

xxx xxx x x x”

From the foregoing, the elements of the crime of falsification under

paragraph 1 of Article 172 are: (i) that the offender is a private individual; (ii) that
he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171; and (iii) that
the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial
document. All these elements are present in the instant case.

It is not disputed that Modesta’s signature in the questioned Deed of Sale

was forged. Indeed, petitioner-spouses admitted that Modesta and Felipe never
participated in the sale of the property subject of the Deed of Sale in their
favor. They argue, however, that they were not the authors of the falsification,
claiming that the employees of the Assessor’s Office of Lingayen, Pangasinan
were the ones who falsified the document. They maintain that the deed of sale
they submitted to the Assessor’s Office did not include Modesta as one of the
vendors but when they returned to said Office after one month, the employees
therein gave them the questioned document which included Modesta as one of the
vendors. We are not convinced.

That petitioners were the authors and/or masterminds of the falsification is

presumed from the fact that they actually benefited from it. In Maliwat vs. Court
of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of satisfactory
explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the
forger and therefore guilty of falsification. “If a person had in his possession a
falsified document and he made use of it, taking advantage of it and profiting
thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the
falsification.”

In the instant case, petitioners failed miserably to rebut the above

presumption. Clearly, they were the ones who benefited from the falsified
document, the same having been executed in their favor. To emphasize, they
were the ones who caused the registration of the deed of sale and were the ones
who received the falsified document from the Assessor’s Office. Their bare-faced
assertion that the employees of the Assessor’s Office committed the falsification
is flimsy and unsupported by evidence.

In the first place, a comparison of the September 7, 1989 Deed of Sale

allegedly submitted by petitioners to the Assessor’s Office and the falsified
November 23, 1989 Deed of Sale returned to them by the said Office reveals that
the two documents are totally different from each other, both in the print or font
of the contents and the location of the names of the signatories. We cannot,
therefore, see how the employees could have inserted the names of Modesta and
Felipe in the questioned document, much less falsified their signatures, without
anyone noticing it. What is taxing to the mind is: Why would the employees
include the names of Modesta and Felipe and falsify their signatures, and what
could they gain therefrom?[8]

Hence, the present petition. Corazon and Revelo raise as issue that:
 The facts of the case x x x is [sic] that petitioners were innocent of the existence
of the falsified document on the ground that what was submitted to the Office of
the Assessos [sic], Lingayen, Pangasinan to be the basis of the petitioners’
ownership was a genuine document which truly did not include the share of the
private complainant, now the private respondent. What was in the mind of the
perpetrators employees of the Assessor’s Office whom petitioners sought
assistance for the transfer of the document in their favor was beyond their control
as they were never informed beforehand of the execution of the questioned
document.[9]

The petition is unmeritorious.

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on
certiorari “shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth.” In Pagsibigan v. People,[10] the Court held that:

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover
only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law
exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A
question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts.

There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved

without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The issue to be
resolved must be limited to determining what the law is on a certain set of
facts. Once the issue invites a review of the evidence, the question posed is one
of fact.[11]

Whether Corazon and Revelo “were innocent of the existence of the falsified
document” is a question of fact. It is not reviewable.

The factual findings of the lower courts are binding on the Court. The
exceptions to this rule are (1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the
findings are grounded on speculation; (3) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual findings are conflicting; (6) when
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are
contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals
overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; (8) when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed
by the respondent; and (9) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are premised
on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
[12]
Corazon and Revelo did not show that any of these circumstances is present.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the
27 June 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29524.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate
Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
 Chief Justice

*
Designated additional member per Raffle dated 6 December 2010.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 7-17.
[2]
Id. at 108-121. Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan-Castillo, with Associate Justices
Marina L. Buzon and Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring.
[3]
Id. at 57-59. Penned by Judge Emma M. Torio.
[4]
Id. at 40-46. Penned by Judge George M. Mejia.
[5]
Id. at 38-39.
[6]
Id. at 44-46.
[7]
Id. at 58.
[8]
Id. at 115-117.
[9]
Id. at 13-14.
[10]
G.R. No. 163868, 4 June 2009, 588 SCRA 249.
[11]
Id. at 256.
[12]
Id. at 257.