Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Corporation Law and Foreign Investments Act by Atty. Anselmo S. Rodiel IV
Corporation Law and Foreign Investments Act by Atty. Anselmo S. Rodiel IV
Corporation Law and Foreign Investments Act by Atty. Anselmo S. Rodiel IV
Rodiel IV
Corpo and FIA
Nationality of corporations
1. Place of Incorporation test; Entity test
1. It provides that the nationality of the corporation is determined by the
country where it was incorporated.
2. This is the general rule.
2. Control test; Aggregate test
1. It provides that the nationality of the corporation is determined by the
nationality of its stockholders.
2. This is the exception, which applies:
1. In times of war, as regards the public enemy
2. For investment purposes, as defined in FIA of 1991. This means the
business is strictly reserved to Filipinos. (nationalized or partly
nationalized industry)
3. The control test is complied with by determining the legal ownership over
EACH class of shares, regardless if voting or non-voting. (Gamboa v
Teves, 2012)
1. Hence, the 60-40 ownership requirement must apply separately to
each class of shares, i.e., at least 60% of the non-voting stocks must
be owned by Filipinos, and at least 60% of the voting stocks must also
be owned by Filipinos.
2. This uniform application of the nationality requirement insures that
the "controlling interest" in public utilities always lies in the hands of
Filipino citizens.
3. Leonen disagreed with the ruling in Roy III v Herbosa, 2016.
1. In the case, the Court upheld the validity of SEC-MC No. 8, which
provides that “the required percentage of Filipino ownership shall
be applied to BOTH: 1) the total number of voting shares, and 2)
the total number of ALL shares, whether voting or non-voting.”
2. The criticism, however, is that SEC-MC No. 8 permits the
corporation to have Filipino citizens owning less than 60% of the
non-voting shares, as long as at least 60% of the total shares are
owned by Filipinos.
3. Grandfather rule; Beneficial Ownership test
1. The grandfather rule applies only when the Control Test is first
complied with. (Narra Nickel Mining v Redmont Consolidated Mines,
2015)
1. If the corporation’s Filipino equity falls below the threshold 60%
requirement, the corporation is immediately considered foreign-
owned. There is no need to resort to the grandfather rule.
2. On the other hand, a corporation that complies with the 60%
requirement can still be considered foreign-owned if there is a doubt
as to who has the beneficial ownership and control of the corporation.
3. In that instance, there is a need to further inquire into the ownership
of the corporate shareholders in both the investing and investee
3.
corporation.
2. Hence, the grandfather rule applies when there is DOUBT as to the
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL of the capital of the
corporation.
3. “Doubt” refers to various indicia that the “beneficial ownership and
control” of the corporation do not in fact reside in Filipino shareholders
but in foreign stakeholders.
1. The following are indicators of doubt:
1. Foreign investors provide practically all the funds;
2. Foreign investors undertake to provide practically all the
technological support for the joint venture;
3. Foreign investors, while being minority stockholders, manage the
company and prepare all economic viability studies.
4. “Beneficial owner” means any person who, directly or indirectly, through
any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise, has
or shares voting power and/or investment returns or power. (Roy III v
Herbosa, 2016)
5. COMMENT: If the facts do NOT show any “doubt,” just apply the control
test for nationalized/partly-nationalized industries.
6. NOTE: Memorize the negative list to determine which corporations
required 60% Philippine citizenship.
4. Corporate juridical personality
1. Doctrine of separate juridical personality
1. Meaning
1. A corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its
stockholders.
2. Hence, it is not affected by the personal rights, obligations, and
transactions of the stockholders. (Sulo ng Bayan v Araneta, 1976)
3. The interest of the stockholders to the corporate assets, if any, is
indirect/inchoate/expectant/contingent/remote/conjectural/
consequential/collateral.
2. A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the personality of the owner of the
enterprise.
1. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship
as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single
individual and requires its proprietor or owner to secure licenses
and permits, register its business name, and pay taxes to the
national government. The law does not vest a separate legal
personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or
defend an action in court. Thus, Stanley Fine, being a sole
proprietorship, does not have a personality separate and distinct
from its owner, Elena Briones. Elena, being the proprietress of
Stanley Fine, can be considered as a real party-in-interest and has
standing to file this petition for review. Stanley Fine Furniture vs.
Gallano, 743 SCRA 306, G.R. No. 190486 November 26, 2014,
Leonen
3. It is basic that a corporation has a personality separate and
distinct from that of its individual stockholders. Thus, a
stockholder does not automatically assume the liabilities of the
corporation of which he is a stockholder.
1. In fact, even the ownership by a single stockholder of all or nearly
all the capital stock of a corporation is not, in and of itself, a
ground for disregarding a corporation’s separate personality.
AEV’s status as ATSC’s stockholder is, in and of itself, insufficient
to make AEV liable for ATSC’s obligations. Moreover, the SPA does
not contain any stipulation which makes AEV assume ATSC’s
obligations. It is true that Section 6.8 of the SPA stipulates that
the rights and obligations arising from Annex SL-V are not
terminated. But all that Section 6.8 does is recognize that the
obligations under Annex SL-V subsist despite the termination of
the January 8, 1996 Agreement. At no point does the text of
Section 6.8 support the position that AEV steps into the shoes of
the obligor under Annex SL-V and assumes its obligations. Aboitiz
Equity Ventures, Inc. vs. Chiongbian, 729 SCRA 580, G.R. No.
197530 July 9, 2014, Leonen
4. A consequence of a corporation’s separate personality is that
consent by a corporation through its representatives is not
consent of the representative, personally.
1. Its obligations, incurred through official acts of its representatives,
are its own. A stockholder, director, or representative does not
become a party to a contract just because a corporation executed
a contract through that stockholder, director or representative.
Hence, a corporation’s representatives are generally not bound by
the terms of the contract executed by the corporation. They are
not personally liable for obligations and liabilities incurred on or in
behalf of the corporation. Lanuza, Jr. vs. BF Corporation, 737
SCRA 275, G.R. No. 174938 October 1, 2014, Leonen
2. Respondent Riza A. Moises may not be held personally liable for
the illegal termination of petitioner’s employment. As we explained
in Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Rebesencio, 746 SCRA 140 (2015): A
corporation has a personality separate and distinct from those of
the persons composing it. Thus, as a rule, corporate directors and
officers are not liable for the illegal termination of a corporation’s
employees. It is only when they acted in bad faith or with malice
that they become solidarily liable with the corporation. In Ever
Electrical Manufacturing, Inc. (EEMI) v. Samahang Manggagawa
ng Ever Electrical, this court clarified that “[b]ad faith does not
connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it
means breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or
ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.” Petitioner has not
produced proof to show that respondent Riza A. Moises acted in
bad faith or with malice as regards the termination of his
employment. Thus, she did not incur any personal liability. Rivera
vs. Genesis Transport Service, Inc., 764 SCRA 653, G.R. No.
215568 August 3, 2015, Leonen
3. Although these pieces of evidence show that respondent signed
the Trust Receipt Agreements, they do not show that he signed
them in his personal capacity. On the bottom right corner of the
agreements are two (2) lines: one for the "NAME OF
CORPORATION," and the other for "AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE." In
all agreements, "Camden Inds." was handwritten as the name of
the corporation, while respondent's signature appeared as the
authorized signature. Clearly, respondent affixed his signature
only as Camden's representative. Moreover, there was no
guaranty clause or a similar clause on the page that he signed
that would have made him personally liable in case of default of
the company. In Tupaz IV v. Court of Appeals: “A corporation,
being a juridical entity, may act only through its directors, officers,
and employees. Debts incurred by these individuals, acting as
such corporate agents, are not theirs but the direct liability of the
corporation they represent. As an exception, directors or officers
are personally liable for the corporation's debts only if they so
contractually agree or stipulate.” (Citations omitted) Without any
evidence that respondent personally bound himself to the debts
of the company he represented, this Court cannot hold him civilly
liable under the Trust Receipt Agreements. BDO Unibank, Inc. vs.
Ochoa, G.R. No. 237553, July 10, 2019, Leonen
5. Liability for tort and crimes
1. Being an entity with a separate juridical personality, a corporation
can be held liable for torts committed by its officers under express
direction from the stockholders or directors, acting as a body.
(PNB v. CA, 1978)
2. The corporation itself cannot be arrested and imprisoned; thus, it
cannot be penalized for a crime punishable by imprisonment. The
criminal action is limited to corporate agents guilty of the act
amounting to crime. (Time Inc. v Reyes, 1971)
3. Corporate officers and/or agents may be held individually liable
3.
for a crime committed under the Intellectual Property Code:
Petitioners, being corporate officers and/or directors, through
whose act, default or omission the corporation commits a crime,
may themselves be individually held answerable for the crime.
Mere membership in the Board or being President per se does
not mean knowledge, approval, and participation in the act
alleged as criminal. There must be a showing of active
participation, not simply a constructive one. ABS-CBN
Corporation vs. Gozon, 753 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 195956 March
11, 2015, Leonen
4. To be held criminally liable for the acts of a corporation, there
must be a showing that its officers, directors, and shareholders
actively participated in or had the power to prevent the
wrongful act.
1. Petitioner failed to allege the specific acts of respondents
Velarde-Albert and Resnick that could be interpreted as
participation in the alleged violations. There was also no
showing, based on the complaints, that they were deemed
responsible for Price Richardson's violations. As found by
State Prosecutor Reyes in his March 13, 2002 Resolution:
[T]here is no sufficient evidence to substantiate SEC's
allegation that individual respondents, Connie Albert and
Gordon Resnick, acted as broker, salesman or associated
person without prior registration with the Commission. The
evidence at hand merely proves that the above-named
respondents were not licensed to act as broker, salesman or
associated person. No further proof, however, was presented
showing that said respondents have indeed acted as such in
trading securities. Although complainant SEC presented
several confirmation of trade receipts and documents
intended to establish respondents Albert and Resnick illegal
activities, the said documents, standing alone as heretofore
stated, could not warrant the indictment of the two
respondents for the offense charged.”(SEC v Price
Richardson, 2017, Leonen)
5. However, a corporation may be charged and prosecuted for a
crime if the imposable penalty is a fine. (Ching v. Secretary of
Justice, ̧ 2006)
1. NOTE: Sec. 170 of the RCC provides that for violations of the
Code, if it is committed by a corporation, the same may, after
notice and hearing, be dissolved in appropriate proceedings
before the Commission.
6. Recovery of damages
1. General Rule:
1. A corporation, being an artificial person, has no feelings,
emotions nor senses; therefore, it cannot experience physical
suffering and mental anguish, which are bases for moral
damages under Art. 2217 of Civil Code. [Manila Electric Co. v.
Nordec Philippines, 861 SCRA 515 (2018), Leonen].
2. Exceptions:
1. Exception to this rule is when the corporation has a
reputation that is debased, resulting in its humiliation in
the business realm.
1. In such a case, it is imperative for the claimant to present
proof to justify the award. It is essential to prove the
existence of the factual basis of the damage and its
causal relation to petitioner’s acts. In the present case,
the records are bereft of any evidence that the name or
reputation of T.E.A.M. Electronics Corporation/Technology
Electronics Assembly and Management Pacific
Corporation] has been debased as a result of petitioner’s
acts. Besides, the trial court simply awarded moral
damages in the dispositive portion of its decision without
stating the basis thereof. Manila Electric Co. v. Nordec
Philippines, 861 SCRA 515 (2018), Leonen].
2. Art. 2219 of the NCC expressly authorizes the recovery of
moral damages in cases of libel, slander, or any other form of
defamation. It does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a
natural or juridical person. (Filipinas Broadcasting Network v
Ago Medical and Educational Center, 2005)
2. Doctrine of piercing the corporate veil
1. Meaning
1. It is the legal fiction that a corporation is an entity with a juridical
personality separate and distinct from its members or
stockholders may be disregarded and the corporation will be
considered as a mere association of persons, such that liability
will attach directly to the officers and the stockholders. (2006 Bar
exams)
2. Grounds for application of doctrine
1. Fraud cases - These are cases when the corporate identity is
used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or
defend crime. (PWFC)
2. Alter ego cases - These are cases when the corporate entity is a
mere alter ego, business conduit or instrumentality of a person or
another corporation. Here, the corporate entity does not act on its
own, but acts through another person or corporation.
3. Equity cases - These are cases when piercing the corporate veil is
necessary to achieve justice or equity.
3. Test in determining applicability
1. Three-pronged test for alter ego cases: (Complete domination;
Fraud; Proximate cause of injury)
1. Control, not merely majority or complete stock control, but
Complete domination, as to the finances, policy, and
business practice, with respect to the transaction attacked, so
that the corporate entity as to this transaction had, at the
time, no separate mind, will, or existence of its own;
2. Such control must have been used by the defendant to
commit Fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a
statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust
act in contravention of plaintiff’s legal right; and
3. The aforesaid control and breach of duty must have
Proximately caused the injury, harm or unjust loss
complained of. (PNB v Hydro Resources Contractors, 2013)
2. “Control”; “Complete domination”
1. The plaintiff must show “complete domination as to the
finances, policy, and business practices.”
1. Ownership by one corporation of all or a complete
majority of stocks of another corporation and their
existence of interlocking directors merely serve as indicia
of control, but by themselves and without more, these
circumstances are insufficient to establish the alter ego
relationship or connection between the two corporations.
(Zambrano v Philippine Carpet, 2017)
2. Further, mere showing of interlocking directors does not
shoe complete domination.
3. Due process and Piercing the Corporate Veil
1. General Rule:
1. In a case, the Court held that the piercing cannot apply to
one who is not a party to the case. It would offend due
process rights if what petitioner ultimately seeks in its
allegation is to hold a corporation responsible for the
respondent’s liability. (Pioneer Insurance v Morning Star
Travel, 2015)
2. Exception: (Fraud cases; To evade committed and
perpetuate fraud)
1. However, if it is shown by clear and convincing proof that
the separate and distinct personality of the corporation
was purposely employed to evade a legitimate and
binding commitment and perpetuate a fraud or like
1.
2019)
4. Not intra-corporate if the demand is only for civil indemnity
1. There were no allegations assailing the petitioners’ rights or
obligations on the basis of the association’s rules and bylaws, or
regarding the petitioners’ relationships with the association. What
were alleged were only demands for civil indemnity and damages.
Hence, the controversy being not corporate in nature, and which
merely involves a simple civil action, the case does not involve an
intra-corporate dispute. (Gulfo v Ancheta, 2012)
5. Not intra-corporate where the issue arose from vendor-vendee
relationship
1. The relationship of private respondent when he sold his shares of
stock to his son was one of vendor and vendee, and nothing else. The
question raised in the complaints is whether or not there was indeed a
sale in the absence of cause or consideration. The proper forum for
such a dispute is the regular courts. No special corporate skill is
necessary to resolve the issue of the validity of the transfer of shares
from one stockholder to another of the same corporation. The
determination whether a contract is simulated or not is an issue that
could be resolved by applying pertinent provisions of the Civil Code,
particularly those relative to obligations and contracts. (Intestate
Estate of Ty v CA, 2001)
6. Illustrations of intra-corporate dispute
1. Dispute as to the proper association dues in a condominium
corporation AND extrajudicial sale
1. The case before the RTC involved an intra-corporate dispute – the
Moreno spouses were asking for an accounting of the
association dues and were questioning the manner the
petitioner calculated the dues assessed against them. These
issues are alien to the first case that was initiated by Salvacion – a
third party to the petitioner-Moreno relationship – to stop the
extrajudicial sale on the basis of the lack of the requirements for a
valid foreclosure sale. Although the extrajudicial sale of the
Moreno properties to the petitioner has been fully effected and
the Salvacion petition has been dismissed with finality, the
completion of the sale does not bar the Moreno spouses from
questioning the amount of the unpaid dues that gave rise to the
foreclosure and to the subsequent sale of their properties. The
propriety and legality of the sale of the condominium unit and the
parking spaces questioned by Salvacion are different from the
propriety and legality of the unpaid assessment dues that the
Moreno spouses are questioning in the present case.
2. The facts of this case are similar to the facts in Wack Wack
2.
Condominium Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., where
we held that the dispute as to the validity of the assessments is
purely an intra-corporate matter between Wack Wack
Condominium Corporation and its stockholder, Bayot, and is, thus,
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). We ruled in that case that since the
extrajudicial sale was authorized by Wack Wack Condominium
Corporation’s by-laws and was the result of the nonpayment of
the assessments, the legality of the foreclosure was necessarily
an issue within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the SEC. We
added that:
3. Just because the property has already been sold
extrajudicially does not mean that the questioned
assessments have now become legal and valid or that they
have become immaterial. In fact, the validity of the
foreclosure depends on the legality of the assessments and
the issue must be determined by the SEC if only to insure that the
private respondent was not deprived of her property without
having been heard. If there were no valid assessments, then there
was no lien on the property, and if there was no lien, what was
there to foreclose? Thus, SEC Case No. 2675 has not become
moot and academic and the SEC retains its jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case despite the extrajudicial sale. (Chateau De
Baie v Sps. Moreno, 2011)
2. Dispute as to management of corporate property AND forcible
entry
1. While the case purports to be one for forcible entry filed by
Mariam against BIRI's employees and contractors in their
individual capacities, the true nature of the controversy is an
intra-corporate dispute between BIRI and its shareholder,
Mariam, regarding the management of, and access to, the
corporate property subject of the MOA. We therefore find that
the MCTC never acquired jurisdiction over the ejectment case
filed by Mariam.
2. In sum, what appears on record as the true nature of the
controversy is that of a shareholder seeking relief from the court
to contest the management's decision to:
1. post guards to secure the premises of the corporate property;
2. padlock the premises; and
3. deny her access to the same on May 28, 2007 due to her
alleged default on the provisions of the MOA. (Tumangan v
Kairuz, 2018)
3. Termination of corporate officers, i.e., President of the
3.
corporation
1. This is an intra-corporate dispute. Hence, the proper body is the
RTC and not the NLRC.
2. A corporate officer's dismissal is always a corporate act, or an
intracorporate controversy which arises between a stockholder
and a corporation, and the nature is not altered by the reason or
wisdom with which the Board of Directors may have in taking such
action. The issue of the alleged termination involving a corporate
officer, not a mere employee, is not a simple labor problem but a
matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and
management and is a corporate controversy in contemplation of
the Corporation Code. (Wesleyan University v Maglaya, 2017)
3. Under Section 25 of the Corporation Code, the President of a
corporation is considered a corporate officer. The dismissal of a
corporate officer is considered an intra-corporate dispute, not a
labor dispute.
1. Thus, in Tabang v. National Labor Relations Commission, 266
SCRA 462 (1997): A corporate officer’s dismissal is always a
corporate act, or an intra-corporate controversy, and the
nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom with which the
Board of Directors may have in taking such action.
2. Also, an intra-corporate controversy is one which arises
between a stockholder and the corporation. There is no
distinction, qualification, nor any exemption whatsoever. The
provision is broad and covers all kinds of controversies
between stockholders and corporations. Malcaba vs.
ProHealth Pharma Philippines, Inc., 864 SCRA 518, G.R.
No. 209085 June 6, 2018
4. The by-laws may even be silent, since the RCC states that a
President is a corporate officer.
4. Inspection of corporate books/records
1. Even though Belo Medical Group filed a case for interpleader, i.e.,
who owns the stocks in the name of Jose Santos, the controversy
was actually an intra-corporate dispute.
2. Applying the relationship test, this Court notes that both Belo and
Santos are named shareholders in Belo Medical Group's Articles
of Incorporation and General Information Sheet for 2007. The
conflict is clearly intra-corporate as it involves two (2)
shareholders although the ownership of stocks of one
stockholder is questioned. Unless Santos is adjudged as a
stranger to the corporation because he holds his shares only in
trust for Belo, then both he and Belo, based on official records,
are stockholders of the corporation. Belo Medical Group argues
that the case should not have been characterized as intra-
corporate because it is not between two shareholders as only
Santos or Belo can be the rightful stockholder of the 25 shares of
stock. This may be true. But this finding can only be made after
trial where ownership of the shares of stock is decided. (Precisely,
it must be heard in an intra-corporate case)
3. The trial court cannot classify the case based on potentialities.
The two defendants in that case are both stockholders on record.
They continue to be stockholders until a decision is rendered on
the true ownership of the 25 shares of stock in Santos' name. If
Santos' subscription is declared fictitious and he still insists on
inspecting corporate books and exercising rights incidental to
being a stockholder, then, and only then, shall the case cease to
be intra-corporate.
4. Applying the nature of the controversy test, this is still an intra--
corporate dispute.
5. The Complaint for interpleader seeks a determination of the
true owner of the shares of stock registered in Santos' name.
Ultimately, however, the goal is to stop Santos from
inspecting corporate books. This goal is so apparent that, even
if Santos is declared the true owner of the shares of stock upon
completion of the interpleader case, Belo Medical Group still
seeks his disqualification from inspecting the corporate books
based on bad faith. Therefore, the controversy shifts from a mere
question of ownership over movable property to the exercise of a
registered stockholder's proprietary right to inspect corporate
books. (Belo Medical Group v Jose Santos and Vicky Belo, 2017,
Leonen)
5. Refund of price paid for stock ownership
1. This case is an intra-corporate dispute, over which the Regional
Trial Court has jurisdiction. It involves a dispute between the
corporation, SBGCCI, and its shareholders, Villareal and Filart.
2. Villareal and Filart's right to a refund of the value of their
shares was based on SBGCCI and UIGDC's alleged failure to
abide by their representations in their prospectus. Specifically,
Villareal and Filart alleged in their letter-complaint that the world-
class golf course that was promised to them when they purchased
shares did not materialize. This is an intra-corporate matter that is
under the designated Regional Trial Court's jurisdiction. It involves
the determination of a shareholder's rights under the Corporation
Code or other intra-corporate rules when the corporation or
association fails to fulfill its obligations.
3. However, even though the Complaint filed before the
3.
Securities and Exchange Commission contains allegations
that are intra-corporate in nature, it does not necessarily oust
the Securities and Exchange Commission of its regulatory and
administrative jurisdiction to determine and act if there were
administrative violations committed.
4. In relation to securities, the Securities and Exchange
Commission's regulatory power pertains to the approval and
rejection, and suspension or revocation, of applications for
registration of securities79 for, among others, violations of the law,
fraud, and misrepresentations.
5. To ensure compliance with the law and the rules, the Securities
and Exchange Commission is also given the power to impose fines
and penalties.
6. Thus, when Villareal and Filart alleged in their letter-complaint
that SBGCCI and UIGDC committed misrepresentations in the sale
of their shares, nothing prevented the Securities and Exchange
Commission from taking cognizance of it to determine if SBGCCI
and UIGDC committed administrative violations and were liable
under the Securities Regulation Code. The Securities and
Exchange Commission may investigate activities of corporations
under its jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the law.
7. However, the Securities and Exchange Commission's
regulatory power does not include the authority to order the
refund of the purchase price of Villareal's and Filart's shares
in the golf club. The issue of refund is intra-corporate or civil
in nature. Similar to issues such as the existence or inexistence of
appraisal rights, pre-emptive rights, and the right to inspect books
and corporate records, the issue of refund is an intra-corporate
dispute that requires the court to determine and adjudicate the
parties' rights based on law or contract. Injuries, rights, and
obligations involved in intra-corporate disputes are specific to the
parties involved. They do not affect the Securities and Exchange
Commission or the public directly. (SEC v Subic Bay Golf, 2015,
Leonen)
6. QUESTION:
1. B was the Executive Vice President/Chief Executive Officer of
NSIT Incorporated. After several years of service, B was placed in
preventive suspension due to some questionable transactions.
She was then prevented from reassuming her position. B filed a
complaint before the Labor Arbiter contending that she was
illegally dismissed. NSIT Inc., on the other hand, prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the LA as the
case involves an intra-corporate dispute. What are the tests to
determine whether a case is an intra-corporate controversy? Is
the matter of B’s dismissal an intra- corporate dispute?
1. Yes. To determine whether a case is an intra-corporate
controversy, a two-tiered test must be employed: (a) the
relationship test, and (b) the nature of the controversy test.
Under the relationship test, a dispute is considered an intra-
corporate controversy when, among others, it is one between
the corporation and its stockholders, partners, members, or
officers. Moreover, under the nature of the controversy test,
the disagreement must not only be rooted in the existence of
an intra-corporate relationship but must as well pertain to the
enforcement of the parties' correlative rights and obligations
under the [Revised] Corporation Code and the internal and
intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation.
2. Incidents and issues that are adjuncts of a dismissed officer’s
corporate office make a controversy an intra-corporate
controversy (Norma D. Cacho and North Star International
Travel, Inc. v. Virginia D. Balagtas, G.R. No. 202974, February
7, 2018; Belo Medical Group, Inc. v. Santos, G.R. No. 185894,
August 30, 2017, Leonen Case). A corporate officer's
dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate
controversy which arises between a stockholder and a
corporation, and the nature is not altered by the reason or
wisdom with which the Board of Directors may have in taking
such action. The issue of the alleged termination involving a
corporate officer, not a mere employee, is not a simple labor
problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate
affairs and management and is a corporate controversy in
contemplation of the [Revised] Corporation Code (Wesleyan
University-Philippines v. Maglaya, Sr., G.R. No. 212774,
January 23, 2017).
2. BMG received a request from AB for inspection of corporate
records. AB claims that he was a registered shareholder and co-
owner of CB’s shares. The request for corporate records arose
when AB was not notified of the annual meetings and AB’s
concern over the corporate operations arose from the alleged
death of a client in BMG premises. CB wrote BMG to object to the
inspection by AB of corporate records claiming that AB held the
shares in his name merely in trust for CB. Based on BMG’s Articles
of Incorporation and General information Sheet, both AB and CB
are shareholders of BMG. BMG filed a complaint for interpleader in
RTC to compel AB and CB to interplead and litigate their
conflicting claims of ownership which ultimately seeks to
determine the true owner of the shares of stock and also to
prevent AB from inspecting the corporate books or records based
on bad faith. Is the dispute between AB and CB who claim to be
the real owners of the same shares of stock an intra-corporate
dispute?
1. Yes. Applying the relationship test, both AB and CD are named
shareholders in BMG's Articles of Incorporation and General
Information Sheet. The conflict is clearly intra-corporate as it
involves two (2) shareholders although the ownership of
stocks of one stockholder is questioned. Unless AB is
adjudged as a stranger to the corporation because he holds
his shares only in trust for CD, then both AB and CD, based on
official records, are stockholders of the corporation. Applying
the nature of the controversy test, this is still an intra-
corporate dispute. The Complaint for interpleader seeks a
determination of the true owner of the shares of stock
registered in AB's name. Even if AB is declared the true owner
of the shares of stock upon completion of the interpleader
case, BMG still seeks his disqualification from inspecting the
corporate books based on bad faith. Therefore, the
controversy shifts from a mere question of ownership over
movable property to the exercise of a registered stockholder's
proprietary right to inspect corporate books (Belo Medical
Group, Inc. v. Santos, G.R. No. 185894, August 30, 2017,
Leonen Case).
3. PH Corporation was owned by PCS Corporation which is subject
of a standing sequestration order issued by the PCGG. OD, a
stockholder of PH Corporation, requested for a copy of all the
minutes of the meetings of the board of directors and executive
committee of PH Corporation. Despite several follow- ups made
by OD, nothing happened. Hence, OD filed a complaint for
inspection of books with the RTC. The officers of PH Corporations
prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of
the RTC as special commercial court since PH Corporation is
under sequestration and thus any issue must be resolved by the
PCGG. The RTC however denied the prayer for dismissal.
1. Was the RTC correct?
2. Assuming that the RTC issued an order, directing PH
Corporation to furnish OD a copy of the minutes of the
meetings as requested, may PH Corporation refuse to comply
with the order on the ground that the decision has been
appealed?
1. Yes. Cases involving intra-corporate disputes are within
1.
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts. The mere fact that a corporation's shares of
stocks are owned by a sequestered corporation does not,
by itself, automatically categorize the matter as one
involving sequestered assets, or matters incidental to or
related to transactions involving sequestered corporations
and/or their assets (San Jose v. Ozamiz, G.R. No. 190590,
July 12, 2017).
2. No. In intra-corporate controversies, all orders of the trial
court are immediately executory as provided for by
Section 4 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing
Intra-Corporate Controversies, as amended. It is not for
the parties to decide whether they should or should not
comply with a court order. There was no injunction to stop
the implementation of the trial court’s orders (Oca v.
Custodio, G.R. No. 199825, July 26, 2017, Leonen Case).
PH Corporation cannot refuse to comply with the order of
the RTC in absence of any injunction pertaining thereto.
4. Stockholders Kiko and Kikay ask for the refund of the shares they
bought from A Corporation on the ground that said Corporation
failed to deliver the promised amenities to be built on the
premises. The Corporation Finance Department (CFD) conducted
an ocular inspection of the project and found out that they failed
to comply substantially with their commitment to complete the
project and ordered the refund of Kiko and Kikay’s share. The SEC
affirmed the CFD’s decision stating that the latter conducted such
inspection to determine if A Corporation violated SEC’s rules and
regulations. The Court of Appeals found that the case involved an
intra corporate controversy, thus must be within the jurisdiction of
the RTC. Did the SEC act in excess of its jurisdiction when it
ordered the refund of the shares?
1. No. This case is an intra-corporate dispute, over which the
RTC has jurisdiction. It involves a dispute between the
corporation, A Corporation, and its stockholders, Kiko and
Kikay. This also involves corporate rights and obligations. It
involves the determination of a stockholder's rights under the
Revised Corporation Code or other intra-corporate rules when
the corporation or association fails to fulfill its obligations.
However, even though the complaint filed before SEC contains
allegations that are intra-corporate in nature, it does not
necessarily oust the SEC of its regulatory and administrative
jurisdiction to determine and act if there were administrative
violations committed. The SEC may investigate activities of
corporations under its jurisdiction to ensure compliance with
the law. However, its regulatory power does not include the
authority to order the refund of the purchase price of Kiko’s
and Kikay’s shares in A Corporation (Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Subic Bay Golf and Country Club, Inc., G.R. No.
179047, March 11, 2015, Leonen Case).
7. In intra-corporate controversies, all orders of the trial court are
immediately executory.
1. Section 4. Executory nature of decisions and orders. All decisions and
orders issued under these Rules shall immediately be executory
except the awards for moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees, if any. No appeal or petition taken therefrom shall stay
the enforcement or implementation of the decision or order, unless
restrained by an appellate court.
2. Interlocutory orders shall not be subject to appeal. Questioning the
trial court orders does not stay its enforcement or implementation.
There is no showing that the trial court orders were restrained by the
appellate court.
3. Hence, petitioners could not refuse to comply with the trial court
orders just because they opined that they were invalid. It is not for the
parties to decide whether they should or should not comply with a
court order. Petitioners did not obtain any injunction to stop the
implementation of the trial court orders nor was there an injunction to
prevent the trial court from hearing and ruling on the contempt case.
Petitioners’ stubborn refusal cannot be excused just because they
were convinced of its invalidity. Their resort to the processes of
questioning the orders does not show that they are in good faith. Oca
vs. Custodio, 832 SCRA 615, G.R. No. 199825 July 26, 2017,
Leonen
7. Trust fund doctrine
1. Definition
1. Under the Trust Fund Doctrine, the capital stock, property, and other
assets of a corporation are regarded as equity in trust for the
payment of corporate creditors, who are preferred over the
stockholders in the distribution of capital assets. (Yamamoto v Nishino
Leather Industries, 2008)
2. In case of violation of the trust fund doctrine, the corporate creditors
are allowed to maintain an action against the subscriber for any
unpaid subscriptions.
3. The creditors thereby step into the shoes of the corporation in
satisfaction of the debt
2. When is the trust fund doctrine violated (CDAFP)
1. Condones or releases the payment of the unpaid subscription. The
1.
corporation has no legal capacity to do the same.
2. Dividends were declared without unrestricted retained earnings
3. Acquires its own shares without unrestricted retained earnings
(fractional shares, compromise of unpaid subscription in delinquency
sale, and appraisal right.)
4. Transfer of property in Fraud of creditors
5. When properties are disposed or undue Preference is given to some
creditors even if the corporation is insolvent.
3. When is the trust fund doctrine NOT violated (AROWD)
1. Amendment of the AOI to reduce the authorized capital stock,
2. Redeemable shares, regardless of the existence of URE,
3. Order of the SEC-arbiter to acquire the shares of a close corporation
in case of deadlocks, regardless of existence of URE,
4. Withdrawal of stockholders in close corporations, regardless of
existence of URE; and
5. Dissolution and eventual liquidation of the corporation.
4. QUESTION:
1. Could any stockholder, at his pleasure, pull-out the machines and
equipment, which he used to pay for his shares in a corporation?
1. No. The property of a corporation is not the property of its
stockholders or members. Under the Trust Fund Doctrine, the
capital stock, property, and other assets of a corporation are
regarded as equity in trust for the payment of corporate creditors,
which are preferred over the stockholders in the distribution of
corporate assets. The distribution of corporate assets and
property cannot be made to depend on the whims and caprices of
the stockholders, officers, or directors of the corporation unless
the indispensable conditions and procedures for the protection of
corporate creditors are followed. (Yamamoto vs. Nishino Leather
Industries, G.R. No. 150283, April 16, 2008)
2. A, B, and C are shareholders of XYZ Company. A has an unpaid
subscription of P100,000. B’s shares are fully paid up, while C owns
only nominal but fully paid-up shares and is a director and officer. XYZ
Company became insolvent, and it is established that the insolvency
resulted from fraudulent practices within the company. If you were the
counsel for a creditor of XYZ Company, will you advice legal action
directly against A, B, and C?
1. My advice would be different for each of the three shareholders.
2. I would advise the creditor to file a claim against A for the latter’s
unpaid subscription in the amount of P100,000 before the
insolvency court under the Trust Fund Doctrine (Halley v.
Printwell, G.R. No. 157549, May 30, 2011). My action cannot be
direct against A as it is still a clam against the corporation except
that it is in the form of seeking to compel the corporation to
collect unpaid subscriptions for purposes of liquidating its assets.
3. I would advise the creditor to file an action for damages against C
in his personal capacity as director and officer because the
corporation’s insolvency was the result of fraudulent practices
within the company. Under Section 30 of the Revised Corporation
Code, directors are liable jointly and severally for damages
sustained by the corporation, stockholders, or other persons
resulting from gross negligence or bad faith in directing the
affairs of the corporation.
4. However, my client does not have any cause of action against B
because B has already fully paid for his subscription. Since the
stockholder is not an officer, his liability as stockholder is only up
to the extent of his subscription which has been paid. This is also
called the limited liability feature of the corporate vehicle
(Pioneer Insurance Surety Corp. v. Morning Star Travel & Tours,
Inc., G.R. No. 198436, July 8, 2015, Leonen Case)
5. How Corporate Powers are Exercised
1. How exercised
1. By the shareholders
1. The powers are exercised by voting in a regular or special
meeting duly called for the purpose.
2. As a rule, the vote necessary to approve a particular
corporate act shall be deemed to refer only to stocks with
voting rights. (Sec. 6)
1. Examples of these are:
1. Election of directors/trustees
2. Declaration of stock dividends
3. Delegation of power to adopt/amend by-laws
4. Revocation of such power delegated
5. Management contracts
6. Fixing the consideration of no-par value shares
7. Fixing the compensation of directors
3. The exceptions are:
1. (AAC-BC-MID)
2. By the board of directors
1. The powers of the board of directors are exercised by a
majority vote of the quorum in a directors’ meeting.
2. NOTE: The approval of the board is not needed for adoption/
amendment of by-laws.
3. By the officers
1. Binding effects of the acts of officers
1. The general rule is that, in the absence of authority from
1.
the board of directors, no person, not even the officers,
can validly bind a corporation. (DBP v Sta. Ines Melale
Forest, 2017, Leonen)
2. Doctrine of apparent authority (Knowing permits officers
+ apparent authority + estopped + anyone relied in good
faith)
1. If a corporation knowingly permits one of its officers, or
any other agent, to act within the scope of an “apparent
authority,” it holds him out to the public as possessing
the power to do those acts. Hence, the corporation will be
estopped from denying the agent’s authority against
anyone who relied therein in good faith. (Lapulapu
Foundation v CA, 2004)
1. It can be gleaned that apparent authority is
determined by the acts of the principal and not by the
acts of the agent. However, the principal’s liability is
limited to THIRD PERSONS IN GOOD FAITH who are
reasonably led to believe that the agent was
authorized to act for the principal due to the
principal’s conduct. (Calubad v Ricarcen
Development, 2017, Leonen)
2. QUESTION:
1. T Construction planned to develop a housing project,
to finance this, T Construction, B Corporation, and
Planters Bank agreed to raise funds through the
issuance of bonds worth P400 million called the
Margarita Bonds. B Construction, as guarantor, would
pay investors the value of the bond at maturity plus
8.5% interest per year. Banco Filipino purchased the
Margarita Bonds and asked for additional interest
other than the 8.5% per annum based on the letters
written by T Construction Senior Vice President
Escalona. When the Margarita Bonds matured, the
funds in the asset pool were insufficient to pay the
bond holders. Banco Filipino, however, sent T
Construction a demand letter dated January 31, 2001,
alleging that it was entitled to a 15.5% interest on its
investment and that as of July 1, 2001, it was entitled
to a 7% percent remaining unpaid interest of P
18,104,431.33. T Construction refused to pay the
demanded interest. Banco Filipino alleged that it was
induced into buying the Margarita Bonds after T
Construction, through its senior vice president's
letters, committed to pay 15.5% interest on a P50
million bond that Banco Filipino held for a client and
16.5% interest on a P50 million bond it held for
another client. It also alleged that T Construction paid
the additional interest twice during the Margarita
Bonds' holding period. Is T Construction liable to
Banco Filipino to pay the demanded interest?
1. Yes. Escalona had apparent authority to transact
on behalf of T Construction. The rule is of course
settled that although an officer or agent acts
without, or in excess of, his actual authority if he
acts within the scope of an apparent authority
with which the corporation has clothed him by
holding him out or permitting him to appear as
having such authority, the corporation is bound
thereby in favor of a person who deals with him in
good faith in reliance on such apparent authority,
as where an officer is allowed to exercise a
particular authority with respect to the business,
or a particular branch of its continuously and
publicly, for a considerable time. Here, Banco
Filipino relied on Escalona's apparent authority to
promise interest payments over and above the
guaranteed 8.5%, considering that Escalona was
T Construction's then senior vice president. His
apparent authority was further demonstrated by T
Construction paying Banco Filipino what Escalona
promised during the Margarita Bonds' term (Terp
Construction Corporation v. Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 221771,
September 18, 2019, Leonen Case).
2. Ms. Mateo, the President of Stanley Corporation
(Stanley), obtained a loan before the Lestine
Financing (Lestine) and secured by a real estate
mortgage of Stanley’s property. Ms. Mateo presented
a board resolution empowering her to borrow money
from Lestine and to use Stanley’s property to secure
the loan. However, Stanley failed to pay its loan.
Lestine initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.
Only then Stanley learned about the transactions of
Ms. Mateo. She was immediately removed as
president. Stanley filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Real Estate Mortgage contending that it never gave
Ms. Mateo the authority to obtain the loan and it
should not be liable for such. Is Stanley correct?
1. No. When a corporation intentionally or
negligently clothes its agent with apparent
authority to act in its behalf, it is estopped from
denying its agent's apparent authority as to
innocent third parties who dealt with this agent in
good faith (Calubad v. Ricarcen Development
Corp, G.R. No. 202364, August 30, 2017, Leonen
Case). Stanley cannot deny the authority it vested
upon Ms. Mateo to obtain the loan and use of its
property to secure such loan. This is evident on
the board resolution to such effect, absent any
proof negating the validity of the resolution.
Exceptions
Deny pre- Sale or Other Power to Power to Management
emptive right Disposition acquire own declare contracts;
of All or shares dividends; when 2/3
substantially without URE Can retain stockholders
all of surplus of the
corporate profits in managed
assets excess of corporation
100% of the is needed
paid-in
capital stock
Denied by If the same is Redeemable Corporate Stockholders
AOI/ necessary in shares expansion represent the
amendment the usual and projects same interest
regular course approved by in both the
of business the board managing and
managed
corporation +
Stockholders
owns MORE
THAN 1/3 of
the
outstanding
capital stock
entitled to
vote in the
MANAGING
corporation
Comply with Appropriated Withdrawal of Prohibited to Majority of
law requiring for the stockholders declare board in the
stock conduct of in close dividends by a managing
offerings/ the remaining corporation Loan corporation +
entitled to
vote in the
MANAGING
corporation
Comply with Appropriated Withdrawal of Prohibited to Majority of
law requiring for the stockholders declare board in the
stock conduct of in close dividends by a managing
offerings/ the remaining corporation Loan corporation +
minimum business agreement + also majority
stock without the of the board
ownership of consent of the in the
the public creditor + the managed
consent is not corporation
acquired
Shares issued Order of SEC- Retention is
in good faith + Arbiter in case necessary
2/3 of deadlock in under special
stockholders close circumstance
+ exchange of corporation s (special
property OR reserve for
payment of possible
PREVIOUSLY contingencies
contracted )
debt
Stockholders and members
1. Fundamental rights of a stockholder
1. Participation in management;
2. Voting rights;
3. Right to remove directors;
4. Proprietary rights (dividends, appraisal, stock certificate, liquidation);
5. Right to inspect books;
6. Right to be furnished of most recent financial statements;
7. Right to recover stocks unlawfully sold for delinquent payment;
8. Right to file individual/representative/derivative suits
2. Participation in management
1. Proxy (Sec. 57)
2. Voting trust (Sec. 58)
3. Cases when stockholders' action is required
1. With preferred and non-voting shares
1. At least 2/3 vote is needed:
1. (AC-BC-MID)
2. At least majority vote is needed:
1. Adoption and amendment of bylaws; and
2. Dissolution of the corporation, in case of voluntary dissolution
where no creditors are affected.
2. Without preferred and non-voting shares
1. At least 2/3 vote is needed:
1. Deny Pre-emptive right, when it is issued in good faith, in
exchange for property for corporate purposes or for
payment of previously incurred debt
2. Stock dividends
3. Delegate to the board the power to amend, repeal, and
adopt new bylaws
4. Management contract, when 1) a stockholder represents
interest of both the corporations and he owns, controls, or
represents more than 1/3 of the outstanding capital stock
entitled to vote of the managing corporation, or 2) the
majority of the directors or trustees in the managing
corporation are also majority of the directors or trustees in
the managed corporation.
5. Remove Directors or trustees
6. Ratifying Dealings with directors/trustees that are voidable
7. Ratifying acts of Disloyalty of the director
8. Approval of Plan of distribution of assets in nonstock
corporation
9. A corporation is not deemed as “Close” when at least 2/3 of
its voting stock is owned by another corporation which is not
a close corporation.
10. For Religious societies, it can be incorporated if at least 2/3
of its members have given their written consent and/or
affirmative vote
2. At least majority vote is needed:
1. Management contract (General rule)
2. Revoke the delegation to the board of the power to amend,
repeal, and adopt new bylaws
3. Fix Issued value of no-par value shares.
4. In choosing the presiding officer in Meetings called by
stockholders, as ordered by the SEC.
5. Granting Compensation other than per diems to the directors
3. By cumulative voting
1. Cumulative voting applies to election of directors and trustees
4. Manner of voting
1. Person - in all meetings
2. Proxy - in all meetings
3. Remote or in absentia - when authorized by the by-laws OR majority
of the board; or in case of election of directors/trustees in
corporations vested with public interest.
3. Proprietary rights
1. Right to dividends
1. Done.
2. Appraisal right (Sec. 80-85)
1. When available
2. Manner of exercise of right
1. Done.
3. Right to inspect (Sec. 73-74)
1. Right to Inspection
1. Specifically, stockholders cannot be prevented from gaining
access to the (a) records of all business transactions of the
corporation; and (b) minutes of any meeting of stockholders or
the board of directors, including their various committees and
subcommittees. (Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining
Corp. v Lim, 2016, Leonen)
2. The Corporation Code has granted to all stockholders the right to
inspect the corporate books and records, and in so doing has not
required any specific amount of interest for the exercise of the
right to inspect. Ubi lex non distinguit nee nos distinguere
debemos. When the law has made no distinction, we ought not to
recognize any distinction. (Terelay Investment v Yulo, 2015)
3. Hence, an action for injunction filed by a corporation generally
does not lie to prevent the enforcement by a stockholder of his or
her right to inspection. The stockholder has the right to inspect
the records of the corporation. Such right is subject to certain
limitations, but these limitations are expressly provided as
defenses in actions filed under Section 73. Thus, this Court has
held that a corporation's objections to the right to inspect must be
raised as a defense. If a stockholder demands the inspection of
corporate books, the corporation could refuse to heed to such
demand. When the stockholder subsequently files an action to
enforce the right to inspection, corporations may raise their
objections thereto through an affirmative defense in an ordinary
civil action for specific performance or damages, or though a
comment in a petition for mandamus. (Philippine Associated
Smelting and Refining Corp. v Lim, 2016, Leonen)
1. COMMENT: It cannot be raised through an action for
injunction because it is a pre-emptive action unjustly intended
to restrain the rights of the stockholder. Instead, the
corporation may refuse to heed the demand of the
stockholder, and then raise the objections in the Answer once
a civil case is filed by the stockholder.
4. The corporation or defendant or respondent still carries the
burden of proving a) the stockholder Improperly used the
information before, b) he was NOT in good faith or not for a
legitimate purpose, or c) he represented the interests of the
4.
held by and in the name of the trustee or receiver who can lawfully
proceed with liquidation even if the corporation no longer exists,
because he has title to the assets.
3. The trustee in liquidation is accountable under the terms of the
trust agreement. The receiver and management committee
members are deemed officers of the court and must therefore be
accountable to the court by provision of law.
4. Both are not subject to the 3-year period because the
corporation is substituted in either case by the trustee or the
receiver who may sue or be sued even after the expiration of the
3-year period. However, in the case of trusteeship, the trustee
must have been designated within the 3-year period.
4. Liquidation after 3 years
1. The termination of the life of a corporate entity does not by itself
cause the extinction or diminution of the rights and liabilities of
such entity.
1. If the 3-year extended life has expired without a trustee or
receiver having been expressly designated by the corporation,
within that period, the board of directors or trustees may be
permitted to so continue as "trustees" by legal implication.
2. Such designation as “trustees” is for the purpose of completing
the corporate liquidation [Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v.
CA, G.R. No. 145855 (2004)].
3. Further, the creditors of the corporation who were not paid within
the 3-year period may follow the property of the corporation that
may have passed to its stockholders.
2. Right of the corporation to appeal a judgment is not extinguished
by the expiration of the 3-year period.
1. Corporations whose certificate of registration was revoked by the
SEC may still maintain actions in court for the protection of its
rights which includes the right to appeal [Paramount Insurance
Corp. v. A.C. Ordonez Corp., G.R. No. 175109, August 6, 2008].
Other corporations
1. Close corporations
1. Characteristics of a close corporation
1. Family Corporation versus Close Corporation
1. The articles of incorporation of Motorich Sales Corporation does
not contain any provision stating that (1) the number of
stockholders shall not exceed 20, or (2) a preemption of shares is
restricted in favor of any stockholder or of the corporation, or (3)
listing its stocks in any stock exchange or making a public offering
of such stocks is prohibited. From its articles, it is clear that
Respondent Motorich is not a close corporation. Motorich does
not become one either, just because Spouses Reynaldo and
Nenita Gruenberg owned 99.866% of its subscribed capital stock.
The "[m]ere ownership by a single stockholder or by another
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation
is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate
corporate personalities." So, too, a narrow distribution of
ownership does not, by itself, make a close corporation. (San Juan
Structural and Steel Fabricators, CA, 1998)
2. Validity of restrictions on transfer of shares
1. Option Restriction - this restriction provides that the disposition of
shares will be invalid unless the shares are offered first to the
corporation or to the stockholders. This is valid because this is the
one contemplated by law.
2. Consent Restriction - this restriction provides that no disposition of
shares will be made without the consent of the directors. This
restriction is not valid. The law states “restrictions shall not be more
onerous than granting the existing stockholders or the corporation the
option to purchase the shares.”
3. Issuance or transfer of stock in breach of qualifying conditions
1. Requisites to make the stockholder personally liable
1. As can be read in that provision, several requisites must be
present for its applicability, i.e. a) the stockholders must actively
engage in the management or operation of the business, b) the
obligation must be corporate torts, and c) the corporation has
not obtained a reasonably adequate liability insurance. None of
these were alleged in the case of Spouses Cruz. Neither did the
RTC or the CA explain the factual circumstances for this Court to
discuss the personally liability of respondents to their creditors
because of "corporate torts.” We thus apply the general doctrine
of separate juridical personality, which provides that a corporation
has a legal personality separate and distinct from that of people
comprising it. (Bustos v Millians Shoe, 2017)
4. When board meeting is unnecessary or improperly held
1. Written consent
2. Knowledge + no prompt objection in writing by director
3. Knowledge + no prompt objection in writing by stockholder
4. Accustomed to take informal actions + express or implied
acquiescence of directors
5. Preemptive right
6. Amendment of articles of incorporation
7. Deadlocks
2. Non-stock corporations
1. Definition
2. Purposes
3. Treatment of profits
4. Plan and distribution of assets upon dissolution
1. Conversion to Stock Corporation; and vice versa
1. From nonstock to stock corporation
1. A nonstock corporation cannot be converted into a stock
corporation by mere amendment of the Articles of
Incorporation. The amendment would be inconsistent with the
nature of a nonstock corporation, because the same will have
the effect of distributing the assets as liquidating dividends to
its members so that the latter can become its shareholders. A
nonstock corporation is defined as a corporation where “no
part of its income is distributable dividends to its members,
trustees, or officers.” (Sec. 86)
2. From stock to nonstock corporation
1. A stock corporation can be converted into a nonstock
corporation by mere amendment of the Articles of
Incorporation. Thereafter, the stockholders lose their
proprietary interest in the business of the corporation and
their contribution to its capital will then be treated as
donations to achieve the corporation’s benevolent purposes.
2. Homeowners’ association
1. Qualification of a Member. - A homeowner as defined under this
Act shall be qualified to be a member of an association: Provided,
however, That a lessee, usufructuary, or legal occupant shall have
the right of a homeowner as set forth under this Act upon
procurement of a written consent or authorization from the owner
of the lot or housing unit. (Sec. 6, Magna Carta for Homeowners
and Homeowners’ Associations) The Court held that if
membership in the association is a condition for the sale, the
buyer is bound to honor the same. As elucidated by the Court:
“Neither are we convinced by PADCOM’s contention that the
automatic membership clause is a violation of its freedom of
association. It could have avoided such membership by not buying
the land from TDC. Nobody forced it to buy the land when it
bought the building with the annotation of the condition or lien on
the Certificate of Title thereof and accepted the Deed. PADCOM
voluntarily agreed to be bound by and respect the condition, and
thus to join the Association. (Padcom Conominium Corp. v Ortigas
Center Association, 2002)
3. Condominium Corporation
1. Title to the common areas, including the land, or the appurtenant
1.
interests in such areas, may be held by a corporation specially
formed for the purpose (hereinafter known as the "condominium
corporation") in which the holders of separate interest shall
automatically be members or shareholders, to the exclusion of
others, in proportion to the appurtenant interest of their
respective units in the common areas. (Sec. 2, Condominium Act)
There is no provision in PD 957 that states that an owner-
developer cannot be a member of the corporation. Thus, whether
one becomes an owner of a condominium unit by virtue of sale or
donation is of no moment. He automatically becomes a member of
the condominium corporation. (Lim v Moldex Land, 2017, Leonen)
2. Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or
store or other space therein, shall include the transfer or
conveyance of the undivided interests in the common areas or, in
a proper case, the membership or shareholdings in the
condominium corporation: Provided, however, That where the
common areas in the condominium project are owned by the
owners of separate units as co-owners thereof, no condominium
unit therein shall be conveyed or transferred to persons other than
Filipino citizens, or corporations at least sixty percent of the
capital stock of which belong to Filipino citizens, except in cases
of hereditary succession. Where the common areas in a
condominium project are held by a corporation, no transfer or
conveyance of a unit shall be valid if the concomitant transfer of
the appurtenant membership or stockholding in the corporation
will cause the alien interest in such corporation to exceed the
limits imposed by existing laws. (Sec. 5, Condominium Act)
3. Educational corporations
4. Religious corporations
1. Corporation sole; nationality
2. Religious societies
5. One person corporations
1. Excepted corporations
2. Capital stock requirement
3. Articles of incorporation and by-laws
4. Corporate name
5. Corporate structure and officers
6. Nominee
7. Minutes and records
8. Liability
9. Conversion of corporation to one person corporation and vice versa
6. Foreign corporations
1. Bases of authority of foreign corporations
1. Consent
2. Doctrine of "doing business"
2. Necessity of a license to do business
1. Requisites for issuance of a license
2. Resident agent
3. Amendment of license
3. Personality to sue
4. Suability of foreign corporations
5. Instances when unlicensed foreign corporations may be allowed to
sue (isolated transactions)
6. Grounds for revocation of license
1. Which foreign corporations are allowed to sue?
1. Any foreign corporation NOT doing business in the Philippines
may maintain an action in our courts upon any cause of action,
provided that the subject matter and the defendant are within the
jurisdiction of the court.
2. It is not the absence of the prescribed license but "doing
business" in the Philippines without such license which prohibits
the foreign corporation from access to our courts. In other words,
although a foreign corporation is without license to transact
business in the Philippines, it does not follow that It has no
capacity to bring an action. Such license is not necessary if it is
not engaged in business in the Philippines. (Columbia Pictures v
CA, 1996)
2. Tests of Doing Business
1. Continuity Test - any other act or acts that imply a continuity of
commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that
extent the performance of acts or works, or
2. Substance Test - the exercise of some of the functions normally
incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain
or of the purpose and object of the business organization.
(Agilent Technologies v Integrated Silicon, 2004; Section 3(d),
FIA)
3. Maintaining office in the Philippines; Doing Business
1. By its own admission, Saudia, while a foreign corporation, has a
Philippine office. Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 7042, otherwise
known as the Foreign Investments Act of 1991, provides the
following: The phrase “doing business” shall include . . . opening
offices, whether called “liaison” offices or branches; . . . and any
other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or
arrangements and contemplate to that extent the performance of
acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally
incident to, and in progressive prosecution of commercial gain or
of the purpose and object of the business organization. A plain
application of Section 3(d) of the Foreign Investments Act leads to
no other conclusion than that Saudia is a foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines. As such, Saudia may be sued in
the Philippines and is subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine
tribunals. Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) vs. Rebesencio, 746
SCRA 140, G.R. No. 198587 January 14, 2015, Leonen
4. Offline Carrier that sells tickets in the Philippines; Doing Business
1. While Section 3(d) above states that "appointing a representative
or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts
business in its own name and for its own account" is not
considered as "doing business," the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 7042 clarifies that "doing
business" includes "appointing representatives or distributors,
operating under full control of the foreign corporation,
domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the
country for a period or periods totaling one hundred eighty (180)
days or more[.]”
2. An offline carrier is "any foreign air carrier not certificated by the
[Civil Aeronautics] Board, but who maintains office or who has
designated or appointed agents or employees in the Philippines,
who sells or offers for sale any air transportation in behalf of said
foreign air carrier and/or others, or negotiate for, or holds itself
out by solicitation, advertisement, or otherwise sells, provides,
furnishes, contracts, or arranges for such transportation."
3. Petitioner is undoubtedly "doing business" or "engaged in trade or
business" in the Philippines. (Air Canada v CIR, 2016, Leonen)
4. NOTE: Even if the ticket sales agent act under its own name and
under its own account, the offline carrier is still deemed doing
business in the Philippines, because the ticket sales agent acts
under the full control of the offline carrier.
5. Foreign Companies entering into Reinsurance contracts abroad;
Not Doing Business
1. The reinsurance treaties between the petitioners and Worldwide
Surety and Insurance were made through an international
insurance broker, and not through any entity or means remotely
connected with the Philippines. Moreover, there is authority to the
effect that a reinsurance company is not doing business in a
certain state merely because the property or lives which are
insured by the original insurer company are located in that state.
The reason for this is that a contract of reinsurance is generally a
separate and distinct arrangement from the original contract of
insurance, whose contracted risk is insured in the reinsurance
agreement. Hence, the original insured has generally no interest in
the contract of reinsurance. (Avon Insurance PLC v CA, 1997)
1. NOTE: In short, it is not doing business in the Philippines
because 1) the contract was entered into abroad, and 2)
reinsurance contracts are separate and distinct from the
original insurance contracts.
6. Instances when a foreign corporation may sue in the Philippines,
whether or not it is licensed to do business: (RINAE)
1. Reputation, name and goodwill
2. Isolated business transaction. This means a transaction or series
of transactions set apart from the common business of the foreign
corporation in the sense that there is no intention to engage in a
progressive pursuit of the purpose and object of the corporation.
(Eriks Pte., Ltd v CA, 1997)
3. Not arising from business transactions e.g. crime/tort that
occurred in the Philippines
4. Agreed that the Philippines is the venue of the action; and
5. Estoppel or unjust Enrichment (solutio indebiti) from questioning
the capacity of the foreign corporation, because it already
benefited from the contract.
1. Trademark infringement
1. The foreign corporation can sue despite the lack of
license. Suits to protect corporate reputation, name, or
goodwill are allowed.
2. Estoppel or unjust enrichment
1. A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines
without license may sue in Philippine courts a Filipino
citizen that had contracted with and benefited from it.
(Agilent Singapore v Integrated Silicons 2004) A party is
estopped from challenging the personality of a foreign
corporation, after having acknowledged the same by
entering into a contract with it. The principle is applied to
prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporation,
then later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the
statutes, chiefly in cases where such person have
received benefits of the contract. (Global Business v
SurecompSofware, 2010)
3. Not arising from business transactions (crime/quasi-delict)
1. Further, the crime of unfair competition punishable the
Intellectual Property Code is a public crime. It is
essentially an act against the State and it is the State
which stands as the injured party. Hence, the
complainant’s capacity to sue becomes immaterial. (Sasot
v People, 2005)
7. Subrogee’s capacity to sue
1. Rights inherited by the subrogee pertain only to the obligations,
not to the capacity.
2. Incapacity of the insured will not affect the capacity of the insurer
exercising the right of subrogation because capacity is PERSONAL
to its holder. It is conferred by law, and not by the parties.
(Lorenzo Shipping v Chubb & Sons, 2004)
1. For legal basis, in merger or consolidation, the surviving/
consolidated corporation shall assume the rights, privileges,
immunities, and franchises of the constituent corporations. It
does not include “capacity” or “incapacity.” (Sec. 79)
8. Subsequent acquisition of license; Cure
1. It must be noted though that the lack of capacity to sue by a
foreign corporation at the time of the execution of contract is
CURED by its subsequent registration here. (Home Insurance v
Eastern Shipping Lines, 1983)
Foreign Investments Act (For nationality and for “doing business” in the
Philippines)
1. Policy of the law
2. Definition of terms
1. Foreign investment
2. "Doing business" in the Philippines
3. Export enterprise
4. Domestic market enterprise
3. Registration of investments of non-Philippine nationals
4. Foreign investments in export enterprises
5. Foreign investments in domestic market enterprises
6. Foreign Investment Negative List
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________
LIST A: FOREIGN OWNERSHIP IS LIMITED BY MANDATE OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND SPECIFIC LAWS.
4. Cooperatives
5. Organization and operation of private detective, watchmen or security guards
agencies
6. Small-scale mining
7. Utilization of marine resources in archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone as well as small-scale utilization of natural resources
in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons
SEC. 4. Coverage.
1. No lease contract shall be for a period exceeding fifty (50) years, renewable
once for a period of not more than twenty- five (25) years;
2. The leased area shall be used solely for the purpose of the investment upon
the mutual agreement of the parties;
3. The leased premises shall comprise such area as may reasonably be required
for the purpose of the investment subject however to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law and the Local Government Code.
The leasehold right acquired under long-term lease contracts entered into
pursuant to this Act may be sold, transferred, or assigned: Provided, That when
the buyer, transferee, or assignee is a foreigner or a foreign-owned enterprise, the
conditions and limitations in respect to the use of the leased property as provided
for under this Act shall continue to apply.
SEC. 5. Limitations. –
1. Foreign individuals, corporations, associations, or partnerships not otherwise
investing in the Philippines as defined herein shall continue to be covered by
Presidential Decree No. 471 and other existing laws in lease of lands to
foreigners.
2. Withdrawal of the approved investment in the Philippines within the period
2.
of the lease agreement entered into under this Act, or use for the purpose
other than that authorized, shall warrant the ipso facto termination of the
lease agreement without prejudice to the right of the lessor to be
compensated for the damages he may have suffered thereby.
3. Any lease agreement under this Act which is renewable at the option of the
lessee subject to the same terms and conditions of the original contract shall
be interpreted to mean as renewable upon the mutual agreement of the
parties.
4. In addition to the conditions for the renewal of a lease agreement after the
period of fifty (50) years as provided herein, the foreign lease shall show that
it has made social and economic contributions to the country.
5. In the case of tourism projects, lease of private lands by foreign investors
qualified herein shall be limited to projects with an investment of not less than
five million (5M) US dollars, seventy percent (70%) of which shall be infused in
said project within three years from the signing of the lease contract.
SEC. 6. Termination of Lease Contract. – The Secretary of Trade and Industry shall
terminate any lease contract entered into under the provisions of this Act, if the
investment project is not initiated within three (3) years from the signing of the
lease contract. (Because there is withdrawal of approved investment)
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________
RA 7916, as amended - Special Economic Zone Act (Relevant when connected
to Investors’ Lease Act)
SEC. 30. Leases of Lands and Buildings. – Lands and buildings in each ECOZONE
may be leased to foreign investors for a period not exceeding fifty (50) years
renewable once for a period of not more than twenty-five (25) years, as provided
for under Republic Act No. 7652, otherwise known as the Investors’ Lease Act. The
leasehold right acquired under long-term contracts may be sold, transferred or
assigned, subject to the conditions set forth under Republic Act No. 7652.