1

Right of Accession with Respect to Movable Property

Articles 466 to 475

CASES
1. AGUSTINGV. IAC
2. BINALAY V. MANALO
3. GRANDE V. CA

1. G.R. Nos. L-66075-76 July 5, 1990

EULOGIO AGUSTIN, HEIRS OF BALDOMERO LANGCAY, ARTURO BALISI & JUAN

LANGCAY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARIA MELAD, TIMOTEO MELAD, PABLO
BINAYUG & GERONIMA UBINA, respondents.

Antonio N. Laggui for petitioners.

Pedro R. Perez, Jr. for private respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east in the
province of Cagayan. According to the unrebutted testimony of Romeo Rigor, Geodetic
Engineer of the Bureau of Lands, in 1919 the lands east of the river were covered by the
Tuguegarao Cadastre. In 1925, Original Certificate of Title No. 5472 was issued for land east of
the Cagayan River owned by defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin (Exh. 2-Agustin).

As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the
western bank. The shifting of the river and the siltation continued until 1968.
 2

In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these
occupying lands covered by the Solana Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents, namely,
Pablo Binayug, who has been in possession of Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881, 7882,
7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, and Maria Melad, who owns Lot 3351 (Exh. 3-Binayug; Exh.
B-Melad). Pablo Binayug began his possession in 1947. An area of eight (8) hectares was planted
to tobacco and corn while 12 hectares were overgrown with talahib (Exh. C-1 Binayug.)
Binayug's Homestead Application No. W-79055 over this land was approved in 1959 (Exh.
B-Binayug). Binayug's possession was recognized in the decision in Civil Case No. 101 (Exh.
F-Binayug). On the other hand, as a result of Civil Case No. 343-T, Macario Melad, the
predecessor-in-interest of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad, was issued Original Certificate of
Title No. P-5026 for Lot 3351 of Cad. 293 on June 1, 1956.

Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern
bank among which was defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin's Lot 8457 (Exh. E-Melad),
depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by Pablo Binayug on the western
bank.

However, in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its 1919
bed, and, in the process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad, and the spouses
Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on the eastern, or
Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate those lots they had to cross the river.

In April, 1969, while the private respondents and their tenants were planting corn on their lots
located on the eastern side of the Cagayan River, the petitioners, accompanied by the mayor and
some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and drove away the
private respondents from the premises.

On April 21, 1970, private respondents Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad filed a complaint (Civil
Case No. 343-T) to recover Lot No. 3351 with an area of 5 hectares and its 6.6-hectare accretion.
On April 24, 1970, private respondent Pablo Binayug filed a separate complaint (Civil Case No.
344-T) to recover his lots and their accretions.

On June 16, 1975, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby made:

 3

In Civil Case No. 343-T, commanding Eulogio Agustin, Gregorio Tuliao, Jacinto Buquel and
Octavio Bancud, or anybody acting as their representative[s] or agents to vacate Lot No. 3351 of
Solana Cadastre together with its accretion consisting of portions of Lots 9463, 9462 and 9461 of
Tuguegarao Cadastre and for these defendants to restore ownership in favor of Maria Melad
and Timoteo Melad who are the only interested heirs of Macario Melad.

In Civil Case No. 344-T, commanding defendants Justo Adduru, Andres Pastor, Teofilo Tagacay,
Vicente Camilan, Nicanor Mora, Baldomero Cagurangan, Domingo Quilang, Cesar Cabalza,
Elias Macababbad, Titong Macababbad, Arturo Balisi, Jose Allabun, Eulogio Agustin, Banong
Aquino, Junior Cambri and Juan Langoay, or any of their agents or representatives to vacate the
Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, together with
its accretion and to restore possession to plaintiffs Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina. Without
pronouncement as to damages which were not properly proven and to costs.

SO ORDERED. (As amended by the order dated August 15, 1975.) (pp. 24-25, Rollo.)

Only defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin appealed in Civil Case No. 343-T, while in Civil
Case No. 344-T, only defendants-petitioners Eulogio Agustin, Baldomero Cagurangan
(substituted by his heir), Arturo Balisi and Juan Langcay appealed. But upon motion of
plaintiffs-private respondents, the trial court ordered the execution pending appeal of the
judgment in Civil Case No. 344-T against Cagurangan, Balisi and Langcay on the ground that
their appeal was dilatory as they had not presented evidence at the trial (Order dated August
15, 1975).

On November 29, 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision affirming in toto
the judgment of the trial court, with costs against the defendants-appellants.

In their petition for review of that decision, the petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals
erred:

1. in declaring that the land in question had become part of private respondents' estate as a
result of accretion;

2. in declaring that the accretion to private respondents' estate which used to pertain to
petitioners' estate cannot preclude the private respondents from being the owners thereof; and
 4

3. in declaring that the ownership of private respondents over the accretion is not affected by
the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed

The petition is unmeritorious and must be denied.

The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the private
respondents who did not lose the ownership of such accretions even after they were separated
from the principal lots by the sudden change of course of the river, is a finding of fact which is
conclusive on this Court. That finding is supported by Art. 457 of the New Civil Code which
provides:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. (366)

Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the
deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the
water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river
(Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514).

All these requisites of accretion are present in this case for, as the trial court found:

. . . Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919 to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. Within
this period, the alluvium (sic) deposited on the other side has become greater in area than the
original lands of the plaintiffs in both cases. Still the addition in every year is imperceptible in
nature, one could not discern it but can be measured after the lapse of a certain time. The
testimonial evidence in these cases that said Cagayan River moved eastward year by year is
overwhelming as against the denial of defendant Eulogio Agustin alone. Cesar Caronan, one
time mayor of Solana, Cagayan, said so. Arturo Taguian said so. Timoteo Melad said so.
Francisco Ubina said so. Geodetic Engineer Rigor impliedly said so when he testified that when
Solana Cadastre was executed in 1950 it overlapped portions of Tuguegarao Cadastre executed
in 1919. This could not have happened if that part of Tuguegarao Cadastre was not eroded by
the overflow of the Cagayan River. These testimonies cannot be destroyed by the denials of
Vicente Cauilan, Marcelo Agustin and Eulogio Agustin alone . . . . (p. 27, Rollo.)
 5

The appellate court confirmed that the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan River had
been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was gradual and
imperceptible. Only when Lot No. 3351, with an original area of 5 hectares described in the free
patent that was issued to Macario Melad in June 1956, was resurveyed in 1968 did it become
known that 6.6 hectares had been added to it. Lot No. 3351, covered by a homestead patent
issued in June, 1950 to Pablo Binayug, grew from its original area of 18 hectares, by an
additional 50 hectares through alluvium as the Cagayan River gradually moved to the east.
These accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made
(Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806). The reason for this
principle is because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage due
to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances
and various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as may prejudice the
owners thereof should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion (Cortes vs. City of
Manila, 10 Phil. 567).

The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the sudden
and abrupt change of the course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old
1919 bed, and separated or transferred said accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the
river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation.

Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a
known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the
segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same
within two years.

Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or
part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of
land is separated from the estate by the current. (Emphasis supplied).

In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a strong
typhoon in 1968 caused a portion of the lands of the private respondents to be "separated from
the estate by the current." The private respondents have retained the ownership of the portion
that was transferred by avulsion to the other side of the river.
 6

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 7

2. G.R. No. 92161 March 18, 1991

SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO GANNABAN, NICANOR MACUTAY, DOMINGO

ROSALES, GREGORIO ARGONZA, EUSTAQUIO BAUA, FLORENTINO ROSALES,
TEODORO MABBORANG, PATRICIO MABBORANG and FULGENCIO MORA,
petitioners
vs.
GUILLERMO MANALO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Josefin De Alban Law Office for Petitioners.

FELICIANO, J.:

The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini, Isabela having an
estimated area of twenty (20) hectares. The western portion of this land bordering on the
Cagayan River has an elevation lower than that of the eastern portion which borders on the
national road. Through the years, the western portion would periodically go under the waters
of the Cagayan River as those waters swelled with the coming of the rains. The submerged
portion, however, would re-appear during the dry season from January to August. It would
remain under water for the rest of the year, that is, from September to December during the
rainy season.

The ownership of the landholding eventually moved from one person to another. On 9 May
1959, respondent Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad,
daughter of Judge Juan Taccad. The land sold was described in the Deed of Absolute Sale1 as
follows:

. . . a parcel of agricultural land in Balug, Tumauini, Isabela, containing an area of 8.6500

hectares, more or less; bounded on the North by Francisco Forto on the East by National Road;
on South by Julian Tumolva and on the West by Cagayan River; declared for taxation under Tax
Declaration No. 12681 in the name of Faustina Taccad, and assessed at P 750.00. . . .

Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba who
had earlier acquired the same from Judge Juan Taccad. The second purchase brought the total
 8

acquisition of respondent Manalo to 10.45 hectares. The second piece of property was more
particularly described as follows:

. . . a piece of agricultural land consisting of tobacco land, and containing an area of 18,000
square meters, more or less, bounded on the North by Balug Creek; on the South, by Faustina
Taccad (now Guillermo R. Manalo); on the East, by a Provincial Road; and on the West, by
Cagayan River assessed at P 440.00, as tax Declaration No. 3152. . . .2

During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21 October 1969, the two
(2) parcels of land belonging to respondent Manalo were surveyed and consolidated into one
lot, designated as Lot No. 307, Pls-964. Lot 307 which contains 4.6489 hectares includes: (a) the
whole of the 1.80 hectares acquired from Gregorio Taguba; and (b) 2.8489 hectares out of the 8.65
hectares purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the survey was conducted on a rainy month, a
portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad then under water was left unsurveyed and was
not included in Lot 307.

The Sketch Plan3 submitted during the trial of this case and which was identified by respondent
Manalo shows that the Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to
form two (2) branches—the western and the eastern branches—and then unites at the other end,
further north, to form a narrow strip of land. The eastern branch of the river cuts through the
land of respondent Manalo and is inundated with water only during the rainy season. The bed
of the eastern branch is the submerged or the unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to
respondent Manalo. For about eight (8) months of the year when the level of water at the point
where the Cagayan River forks is at its ordinary depth, river water does not flow into the
eastern branch. While this condition persists, the eastern bed is dry and is susceptible to
cultivation.

Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of the Cagayan River when the
cadastral survey was conducted, the elongated strip of land formed by the western and the
eastern branches of the Cagayan River looked very much like an island. This strip of land was
surveyed on 12 December 1969.4

It was found to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares and was designated as Lot 821 and Lot 822.
The area of Lot 822 is 10.8122 hectares while Lot 821 has an area of 11.9087 hectares. Lot 821 is
 9

located directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated from the latter only by the eastern branch of
the Cagayan River during the rainy season and, during the dry season, by the exposed, dry
river bed, being a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad. Respondent Manalo claims
that Lot 821 also belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to
which it is adjacent.

Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other hand, insist that they own Lot 821.
They occupy the outer edges of Lot 821 along the river banks, i.e., the fertile portions on which
they plant tobacco and other agricultural products. They also cultivate the western strip of the
unsurveyed portion during summer.5 This situation compelled respondent Manalo to file a case
for forcible entry against petitioners on 20 May 1969. The case was dismissed by the Municipal
Court of Tumauini, Isabela for failure of both parties to appear. On 15 December 1972,
respondent Manalo again filed a case for forcible entry against petitioners. The latter case was
similarly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela.

On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaints6 before the then Court of First Instance
of Isabela, Branch 3 for quieting of title, possession and damages against petitioners. He alleged
ownership of the two (2) parcels of land he bought separately from Faustina Taccad and
Gregorio Taguba for which reason he prayed that judgment be entered ordering petitioners to
vacate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion. Respondent Manalo likewise prayed that
judgment be entered declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during
the survey.

Petitioners filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint. The case was
then set for trial for failure of the parties to reach an amicable agreement or to enter into a
stipulation of facts.7 On 10 November 1982, the trial court rendered a decision with the
following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the Court renders judgment against the
defendants and in favor of the plaintiff and orders:

1. That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is declared the lawful owner of the land in question, Lot
No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph
2-b of the Complaint;
 10

2. That the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the land in question, Lot No.
821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of
the Complaint;

3. That the defendants are being restrained from entering the premises of the land in question,
Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in
paragraph 2-b of the Complaint; and

4. That there is no pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the decision of the trial
court. They filed a motion for reconsideration, without success.

While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of an island surrounded by the two (2) branches of
the Cagayan River, the Court of Appeals found otherwise. The Court of Appeals concurred with
the finding of the trial court that Lot 821 cannot be considered separate and distinct from Lot
307 since the eastern branch of the Cagayan River substantially dries up for the most part of the
year such that when this happens, Lot 821 becomes physically (i.e., by land) connected with the
dried up bed owned by respondent Manalo. Both courts below in effect rejected the assertion of
petitioners that the depression on the earth's surface which separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is,
during part of the year, the bed of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.

It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great respect, and
that they carry even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.9 This is in recognition
of the peculiar advantage on the part of the trial court of being able to observe first-hand the
deportment of the witnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the Court of
Appeals is the final arbiter of questions of fact.10 But whether a conclusion drawn from such
findings of facts is correct, is a question of law cognizable by this Court.11

In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts below apparently collides with their
findings that periodically at the onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows through
the eastern bed of the Cagayan River. The trial court held:
 11

The Court believes that the land in controversy is of the nature and character of alluvion
(Accretion), for it appears that during the dry season, the body of water separating the same
land in controversy (Lot No. 821, Pls-964) and the two (2) parcels of land which the plaintiff
purchased from Gregorio Taguba and Justina Taccad Cayaba becomes a marshy land and is only
six (6) inches deep and twelve (12) meters in width at its widest in the northern tip (Exhs. "W",
"W-l", "W-2", "W-3" and "W-4"), It has been held by our Supreme Court that "the owner of the
riparian land which receives the gradual deposits of alluvion, does not have to make an express
act of possession. The law does not require it, and the deposit created by the current of the water
becomes manifest" (Roxas vs. Tuazon, 6 Phil. 408).12

The Court of Appeals adhered substantially to the conclusion reached by the trial court, thus:

As found by the trial court, the disputed property is not an island in the strict sense of the word
since the eastern portion of the said property claimed by appellants to be part of the Cagayan
River dries up during summer. Admittedly, it is the action of the heavy rains which comes
during rainy season especially from September to November which increases the water level of
the Cagayan river. As the river becomes swollen due to heavy rains, the lower portion of the
said strip of land located at its southernmost point would be inundated with water. This is
where the water of the Cagayan river gains its entry. Consequently, if the water level is high the
whole strip of land would be under water.

In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, it was held that —

According to the foregoing definition of the words "ordinary" and "extra-ordinary," the highest
depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season is the ordinary one, and the highest
depth they attain during the extra-ordinary one (sic); inasmuch as the former is the one which is
regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year, while the
latter is uncommon, transcends the general rule, order and measure, and goes beyond that
which is the ordinary depth. If according to the definition given by Article 74 of the Law of
Waters quoted above, the natural bed or basin of the lakes is the ground covered by their waters
when at their highest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay is the ground
covered by its waters when at their highest depth during the dry season, that is up to the
northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question.
 12

We find the foregoing ruling to be analogous to the case at bar. The highest ordinary level of the
waters of the Cagayan River is that attained during the dry season which is confined only on
the west side of Lot [821] and Lot [822]. This is the natural Cagayan river itself. The small
residual of water between Lot [821] and 307 is part of the small stream already in existence
when the whole of the late Judge Juan Taccad's property was still susceptible to cultivation and
uneroded.13

The Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that Government of the Philippine Islands
vs. Colegio de San Jose 14 is applicable to the present case. That case involved Laguna de Bay; since
Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court applied the legal provisions governing the ownership and
use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to determine the character and ownership of the
disputed property. Specifically, the Court applied the definition of the natural bed or basin of
lakes found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. Upon the other hand, what is
involved in the instant case is the eastern bed of the Cagayan River.

We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law
applicable to the case at bar:

Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the
highest floods. (Emphasis supplied)

We note that Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground
covered by its waters during the highest floods. The highest floods in the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River occur with the annual coming of the rains as the river waters in their onward
course cover the entire depressed portion. Though the eastern bed substantially dries up for the
most part of the year (i.e., from January to August), we cannot ignore the periodical swelling of
the waters ( i.e., from September to December) causing the eastern bed to be covered with
flowing river waters.

The conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon evidence of
record.1âwphi1 Firstly, respondent Manalo admitted in open court that the entire area he
bought from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot 307.15 If the 1.80 hectares purchased from
Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot 307, then the Cagayan River referred to as the western
boundary in the Deed of Sale transferring the land from Gregorio Taguba to respondent Manalo
 13

as well as the Deed of Sale signed by Faustina Taccad, must refer to the dried up bed (during the
dry months) or the eastern branch of the river (during the rainy months). In the Sketch Plan
attached to the records of the case, Lot 307 is separated from the western branch of the Cagayan
River by a large tract of land which includes not only Lot 821 but also what this Court
characterizes as the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.

Secondly, the pictures identified by respondent Manalo during his direct examination depict the
depressed portion as a river bed. The pictures, marked as Exhibits "W" to "W-4", were taken in
July 1973 or at a time when the eastern bed becomes visible.16 Thus, Exhibit "W-2" which
according to respondent Manalo was taken facing the east and Exhibit "W-3" which was taken
facing the west both show that the visible, dried up portion has a markedly lower elevation than
Lot 307 and Lot 821. It has dike-like slopes on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821
that are vertical upward and very prominent. This topographic feature is compatible with the
fact that a huge volume of water passes through the eastern bed regularly during the rainy
season. In addition, petitioner Ponciano Gannaban testified that one had to go down what he
called a "cliff" from the surveyed portion of the land of respondent Manalo to the depressed
portion. The cliff, as related by petitioner Gannaban, has a height of eight (8) meters.17

The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel on the
surface of the earth. However, Exhibit "E"18 for the prosecution which was the Declaration of
Real Property standing in the name of Faustina Taccad indicates that the eastern bed already
existed even before the sale to respondent Manalo. The words "old bed" enclosed in
parentheses—perhaps written to make legitimate the claim of private ownership over the
submerged portion—is an implied admission of the existence of the river bed. In the Declaration
of Real Property made by respondent Manalo, the depressed portion assumed the name Rio
Muerte de Cagayan. Indeed, the steep dike-like slopes on either side of the eastern bed could
have been formed only after a prolonged period of time.

Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire private
ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the deeds of
absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors
could not have validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion. Article 420 of the
Civil Code states:
 14

The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)

Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, "rivers" is a composite term which
includes: (1) the running waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks.19 Manresa, in commenting upon
Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 from which Article 420 of the Philippine Civil
Code was taken, stressed the public ownership of river beds:

La naturaleza especial de los rios, en punto a su disfrute general, hace que sea necesario
considerar en su relacion de dominio algo mas que sus aguas corrientes. En efecto en todo rio es
preciso distinguir 1. esta agua corriente; 2. el alveo o cauce, y 3. las riberas. Ahora bien: son estas dos
ultimas cosas siempre de dominio publico, como las aguas?

Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte que al decir el Codigo civil que
los rios son de dominio publico, parece que debe ir implicito el dominio publico de aquellos tres elementos
que integran el rio. Por otra parte, en cuanto a los alveos o cauces tenemos la declaracion del art.
407, num 1, donde dice: son de dominion publico . . . los rios y sus cauces naturales; declaracion que
concuerda con lo que dispone el art. 34 de la ley de [Aguas], segun el cual, son de dominion publico:
1. los alveos o cauces de los arroyos que no se hallen comprendidos en el art. 33, y 2. los alveos o
cauces naturales de los rios en la extension que cubran sus aguas en las mayores crecidas
ordinarias.20 (Emphasis supplied)

The claim of ownership of respondent Manalo over the submerged portion is bereft of basis
even if it were alleged and proved that the Cagayan River first began to encroach on his
property after the purchase from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad. Article 462 of the Civil
Code would then apply divesting, by operation of law, respondent Manalo of private ownership
over the new river bed. The intrusion of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River into his
landholding obviously prejudiced respondent Manalo but this is a common occurrence since
estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive
force of the waters. That loss is compensated by, inter alia, the right of accretion acknowledged
 15

by Article 457 of the Civil Code.21 It so happened that instead of increasing the size of Lot 307,
the eastern branch of the Cagayan River had carved a channel on it.

We turn next to the issue of accretion. After examining the records of the case, the Court
considers that there was no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the
bed of the eastern branch of the river. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article
457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the deposition of
soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the action of the waters
of the river (or sea); and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
rivers (or the sea coast).22 The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by respondent Manalo
border on the eastern branch of the Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by this eastern branch
which respondent Manalo may claim must be deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the
claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite
Lot 307 across the river.

Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale transferring
ownership of the land to respondent Manalo is the western branch, the decision of the Court of
Appeals and of the trial court are bare of factual findings to the effect that the land purchased by
respondent Manalo received alluvium from the action of the aver in a slow and gradual manner.
On the contrary, the decision of the lower court made mention of several floods that caused the
land to reappear making it susceptible to cultivation. A sudden and forceful action like that of
flooding is hardly the alluvial process contemplated under Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the
slow and hardly perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian
owner.

Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares. Lot 821 is the northern
portion of the strip of land having a total area of 22.72 hectares. We find it difficult to suppose
that such a sizable area as Lot 821 resulted from slow accretion to another lot of almost equal
size. The total landholding purchased by respondent Manalo is 10.45 hectares (8.65 hectares
from Faustina Taccad and 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba in 1959 and 1964, respectively), in
fact even smaller than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion. The cadastral survey
showing that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in 1969. If respondent
Manalo's contention were accepted, it would mean that in a span of only ten (10) years, he had
more than doubled his landholding by what the Court of Appeals and the trial court considered
 16

as accretion. As already noted, there are steep vertical dike-like slopes separating the depressed
portion or river bed and Lot 821 and Lot 307. This topography of the land, among other things,
precludes a reasonable conclusion that Lot 821 is an increment to the depressed portion by
reason of the slow and constant action of the waters of either the western or the eastern
branches of the Cagayan River.

We turn finally to the issue of ownership of Lot 821. Respondent Manalo's claim over Lot 821
rests on accretion coupled with alleged prior possession. He alleged that the parcels of land he
bought separately from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad were formerly owned by Judge
Juan Taccad who was in possession thereof through his (Judge Taccad's) tenants. When
ownership was transferred to him, respondent Manalo took over the cultivation of the property
and had it declared for taxation purposes in his name. When petitioners forcibly entered into his
property, he twice instituted the appropriate action before the Municipal Trial Court of
Tumauini, Isabela. Against respondent Manalo's allegation of prior possession, petitioners
presented tax declarations standing in their respective names. They claimed lawful, peaceful
and adverse possession of Lot 821 since 1955.

If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically to Lot 307 and the
depressed portion or the eastern river bed. The testimony of Dominga Malana who was a tenant
for Justina Taccad did not indicate that she was also cultivating Lot 821. In fact, the complaints
for forcible entry lodged before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela pertained only to
Lot 307 and the depressed portion or river bed and not to Lot 821. In the same manner, the tax
declarations presented by petitioners conflict with those of respondent Manalo. Under Article
477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must at least have equitable
title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. The evidence of
record on this point is less than satisfactory and the Court feels compelled to refrain from
determining the ownership and possession of Lot 821, adjudging neither petitioners nor
respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 04892 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Manalo is hereby declared the owner of Lot 307. The regularly
submerged portion or the eastern bed of the Cagayan River is hereby DECLARED to be
property of public dominion. The ownership of Lot 821 shall be determined in an appropriate
action that may be instituted by the interested parties inter se. No pronouncement as to costs.
 17

SO ORDERED.
 18

3. G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG,
respondents.

Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.

Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from
the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First
Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents
Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land
allegedly occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.

The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of
land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay
(formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia
Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land
appears registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934).
Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of
registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same
boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on
the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that
by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site,
and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added
to the registered area (Exh. C-1).

On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of
Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by
accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their
 19

predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until

September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership.
Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as
attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim
ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed
possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging
the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the
premises and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as
damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:

It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual
deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are
inclined to believe that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the
surveyors found out that the northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them was the
Cagayan River, and not the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion
has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and
the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a
little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the
declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect
that the land in question was formed by accretion since 1933 do not only contradict the
testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the incontestable fact
that the accretion with an area of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it
was only declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No.
257 (Exh. "2") when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence to defendants'
assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh.
"2" says that "tax under this declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants
declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner
of the land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership
of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in
question being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion
 20

belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming
arguendo, that the accretion has been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no
moment, because the law does not require any act of possession on the part of the owner of the
riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408;
Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the
reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the law
does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).

This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have
been in possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by prescription.
Assuming that they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the action was
commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the land for ten (10) years;
hence, they could not have acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138,
New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered
property, the same may be considered as registered property, within the meaning of Section 46
of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession by
another person.

Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14,
1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:

That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which
started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. By
law, therefore, unless some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the
riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of
the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that they have acquired ownership
through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this case. The Court a quo, has
resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in
question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered,
the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states
that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began
 21

only in the month of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription
before the present action was instituted.

As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An
accretion to registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to
the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the
protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such
protection does not extend beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To hold
otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the
technical description of the land given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the
identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative
manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the erosion of
the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas
Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to all the
rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is concerned.
What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on
accession: and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition area by another
person through prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa,
et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.

We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the
length of time that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he
occupied the land in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs.
The area under occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the
land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by
another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality wherein it is located was changed from
Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of
properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal president of Tumauini for
three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on the south, and that since 1940 or
1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants. Vicente C.
Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the defendants' possession started
sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare.
 22

We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than
that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated
that the defendants occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's
attention to the fact that the land was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the
owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an action until 1958, because it was only then that they
were able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they
never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro
Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he
tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but
because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is
conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part thus
included, containing an area of some 458 square meters.1äwphï1.ñët

The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession — from 1933 to
1958 — is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they
and not the plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional
circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were deprived thereof
in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps to recover the same. The excuse they gave for
not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their
property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too
flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of the surveyor's fees had nothing to do
with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have
it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs by
accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the defendants. We
are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really in possession since
1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their
rights only when they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had
already supervened in favor of the defendants.

It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.

The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial
property in question through prescription.
 23

There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of
the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered
owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes
automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title
thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it
does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land
does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one
thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership
over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code.
Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the
Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms
and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by
occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the
operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The
fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property (which
was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the
Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered
property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by
registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.

The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive
prescription? This is a question which requires determination of facts: physical possession and
dates or duration of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found
that respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly,
continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958.
This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an
examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be
reviewed by us.

The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions
of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the
 24

old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence,
the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by
acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.

The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.