Evidence

In the district of Muzaffarpur lived a Jaiswal family

They didn’t know what the fate has decided for them.
1. Lady taking money from husband
2. Lady keeping money in iron safe on first floor of house 2 accused accheyal ram surat.
3. Husband was not home that night and Damyanti devi and child were alone
4. There accused who were servants of Jaiswal were sleeping at the ground floor of the
house
5. The cook of the house, Batahu, was sleeping in the veranda of the house
6. The next morning Achayalal woke Batahu, the witness, and informed him that door of the
house was open
7. When they went upstairs, Damyanti devi, was found dead in her room, and the safe was
iron safe was open and empty.
8. Jaiswal was called and filled an FIR. The appellants were arrested the next day after the
commission of the offence on the report made by Jaiswal that he suspected that the murder
of his wife had been committed by his four employees and the two appellants.
9. As a result of investigation the 6 accused persons were put up for trial for office under 396
IPC ie dacoity.

The investigating officer visited the house of the 2 appellant haricharan and jogia. He found
blood stains on the lane of haricharan’s house and later found a shirt bearing blood stains on
it.
And at jogia’s house a gamcha with blood stains on it was found. But when jogia’s house was
searched on 26th March 1960 this gamcha was not found it was found the next day on 27 th
March, 1960.
They also collected haricharan’s hands nails which had traces of blood.
These were sent for Chemical Analyser. The blood found on the pieces of earth sent to the
Chemical Analyser could not be determined, but the stains of blood on the shirt of the
appellant Haricharan were found to have traces of human blood. Haricharan's nails blood
stains were too small for serological test. Jogia’s gamcha reported to have human blood
stains on it.

The charge against the two appellants has been proved by the prosecution by the
confessions made by the three accused persons (Ram Surat Choudhary, Ram Bachan and
Achheylal Choudhury) and certain other discoveries, such as blood-stained clothes with both
of them and stains of blood in the house of the appellant Haricharan.

Procedural history
Trial court sentenced life imprisonment for all six accused. There was no direct evidence to
show how, when, and by whom the offence was committed. Besides the confessions, the
evidence on which the prosecution relies is circumstantial and it is on this evidence that the
case has been tried in the courts below.

This was challenged in the High court.

Held - In regard to Joginder Singh, however, the High Court was not inclined to agree with
the conclusion of the trial Judge and gave the benefit of doubt to him.
In regard to the two appellants, however, the High Court took the view that the ends of
justice required that the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on them should be
enhanced to that of death.

Thus it was challenged in the Supreme Court that the High Court has erred in law in treating
the confession made by the co-accused Ram Surat Choudhury as substantive evidence
against them. This course adopted by the High Court in dealing with the case of the
appellants on the basis of the confession made by the co-accused person is, it is urged,
inconsistent with the consensus of judicial opinion in regard to the true scope and effect of
section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Issue

Whether the confession of co-accused has evidentiary value of being substantive evidence?

RULE

Now the question with us in hand is that, what role can, a-confession made by a co- accused
person can play in a criminal trial,

This question has to be determined in the light of the provisions of s. 30 of the Act.

(Ask any body to read it out loud)

Section 30 deals specifically with confessions made by one accused person that implicate
themselves as well as other co-accused. It states that when multiple persons are tried jointly
for the same offense, and a confession made by one person affects themselves and some
other persons, the court may consider such confession not only against the person making it
but also against the other implicated persons.

S.30 - Section 30 deals specifically with confessions made by one accused person that
implicate themselves as well as other co-accused. It states that when multiple persons are
tried jointly for the same offense, and a confession made by one person affects themselves
and some other persons, the court may consider such confession not only against the person
making it but also against the other implicated persons.
It serves to establish the truth by acknowledging that a confession implicating oneself and
others may suggest the truthfulness of the confession, as it is unlikely that a person would
falsely implicate themselves in a crime voluntarily.

While Section 30 allows for the consideration of confessions made by co-accused persons, it
does not fall under the strict definition of "evidence" as provided in Section 3.

But what is s.3

JUHI ANALYSIS

On a plain reading of it we can understand that Confessions are not included in the
categories of oral or documentary evidence outlined in Section 3.
Hence Section 30 provides a mechanism for treating confessions as evidence, albeit not
strictly fitting within the technical definition of evidence provided by the Indian Evidence
Act. While confessions may not be considered evidence in the traditional sense, Section 30
allows them to be treated as such for the purpose of trial.
However, it is important to note that the court retains discretion in determining the weight
and relevance of the confession based on the circumstances of the case. This discretion
allows the court to assess the reliability and credibility of the confession before considering
it as evidence.

Kajol Analysis
EVIDENCE IN A NON-TECHNICAL WAY
The court observed that even then section 30 provides that a confession may be taken into
consideration not only against its maker, but also against a co-accused. Thus, though such a
confession may not be evidence as strictly defined by section 3 of the Evidence Act, it is an
element which may be taken into consideration by the criminal court and be described as
evidence in a non-technical way. The court further observed that section 30 merely enables
the court to take the confession into account. It is, not obligatory on the court to take the
confession into account.
CONFESSION TO BE CONSIDERED AS TO RECEIVE ASSURANCE
If the prosecution relies upon the confession of one accused against another the correct
procedure is that first court has to take into account the other pieces of evidence against the
accused and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the court believes that the
evidence can lead to framing of charges against the accused, then the court can use the
confession to assure itself of the conclusion it has arrived on through other evidences.
In Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the court observed that confession by co-
accused are generic in nature because it is not evidence under section 3. The court, thus,
should not start with the confession statement, and must begin with other evidence
adduced by the prosecution. Court need to form its opinion through quality and effect of
other evidences. Only after forming this opinion, they can look at confession to receive
assurance that they have arrived at right conclusion.

PRECEDENTS –

This was also held in Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty that a
confession can only be used to "lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused".

In In re. Peryaswami Noopan Reilly J. observed that the provision of s. 30 goes not further
than this : "where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support
his conviction, then the kind of confession described in s. 30 may be thrown into the scale as
an additional reason for believing that evidence."
In Bhuboni Sahu v. King

Sir John Beaumont who spoke for the Board observed that a confession of a co accused is
obviously evidence of a very week type.

It is not evidence under section 3

The court referred to section 3, of the Evidence Act and observed that confession of a co-
accused is not evidence within the meaning of section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is neither oral
statement which the court permits or requires to be made before it as per section 3(1) of
the Evidence Act nor does it fall in the category of evidence referred to in section 3(2) of the
Evidence Act which covers all documents produced for the inspection of the court. Neither
required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by
cross-examination.

Saumya
On comparison with accomplice’s statement

The Court, further, considered the value of evidence given by an accomplice under section
133 – that they shall be competent witness and conviction of accused on those evidence is
not illegal. Section 133 needs to be read together with illustration (b) to section 114, which
leads that rule of prudence shall be applied by court for evidence of accomplice – that courts
should materially corroborate that evidence before acting upon it. Thus, it was held that the
statement given by accomplice is an evidence under section 3 and it acts as substantive
evidence. Although, it might require material corroboration. Confession of a co-accused is
different, because, here, the courts cannot begin with examination of these statements.
They can consider it only when other evidences are considered and found to be satisfactory.
High court erred when they relied upon Ram Prakash’s case – through which they
interpreted that confession of co-accused can be considered on simply corroboration of
material facts, just like the evidence of accomplice. However, this is not what Ram Prakash
intended to do, and the other evidences in that case too were very strong evidences.

Were other evidences satisfactory?

Now, the court went on to decide whether, in the present case, the other evidences were
satisfactory, proving the case of prosecution – the blood stains on clothes and gamcha were
held to be entirely insufficient to charge the appellants. The High Court erred because they
treated this evidence to corroborate the confessional statement, and they first considered
the confessions. Thus, the High Court was not right in their judgement. It is true that
confession of Ram Surat was made voluntarily and was true regarding him, thus it is likely it
might be true regarding the appellants too. However, in criminal cases, a case must be
decided beyond any reasonable doubt and here there is likelihood, thus a ‘true legal
approach’ must be adopted and suspicion must not take place of proof.

Conclusion

-- Overturned the decisions of the lower courts, which had convicted and sentenced
the appellants based on their confessions and other circumstantial evidence.
— Court held that the evidence presented by the prosecution, particularly the discovery of
blood stains, was insufficient to prove the charges against the appellants beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Court reiterated the principle that a confession made by a co-accused cannot be treated as
substantive evidence against another accused, but can only be used to lend assurance to
other evidence.
Hence ,
* The orders of conviction and sentence passed against the two appellants were set aside.
* The accused, Haricharan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam, were ordered to be acquitted.