Professional Documents
Culture Documents
LNG Terminal
LNG Terminal
PUBLIC VERSION
Prepared by:
LNG Development Company, LLC (d/b/a Oregon LNG)
and
Oregon Pipeline Company, LLC
January 2008
Oregon LNG Terminal
Draft Resource Report 13 – Engineering and Design Material
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
Table 13.1.3.1 LNG Sources and Compositions.........................................................................17
Table 13.1.14.1 LNG Unloading and Transfer System Equipment ............................................25
Table 13.1.14.2 LNG Storage Equipment...................................................................................25
Table 13.1.14.3 Vapor Handling System Equipment .................................................................25
Table 13.1.14.4 Vaporization and Sendout System Equipment..................................................26
Table 13.1.14.5 Auxiliary Heating System Equipment ..............................................................26
Table 13.1.18.2 Hazard Detector Layout Plans ..........................................................................33
Table 13.3.1.3 Cut and Fill Quantities ........................................................................................43
Table 13.4.2.1 Site Elevations ....................................................................................................52
Table 13.4.2.6 Site Tidal Elevations ...........................................................................................53
Table 13.4.5.7 Anticipated Flood Elevations..............................................................................57
Table 13.5.1.11 Wind Limits .....................................................................................................69
Table 13.5.1.12 Marine Drawings..............................................................................................69
Table 13.6.1 LNG Storage Tanks, General Information.............................................................87
Table 13.6.21 LNG Storage Tank Drawings...............................................................................99
Table 13.8.2.1 List of Process Equipment Data Sheets ............................................................108
Table 13.8.2.2 Equipment Vendor Data ...................................................................................108
Table 13.11.1 Motor Details .....................................................................................................127
Table 13.11.3.3 Transformer List .............................................................................................129
Table 13.13.1.2 LNG Spill Containment Basin S-606 .............................................................133
Table 13.13.2 Thermal Radiation Exclusion Zone Radii..........................................................135
Table 13.13.3 Flammable Vapor Exclusion Zones...................................................................136
Table 13.14.2 Hazard Detection Equipment Data Sheets .........................................................138
Table 13.14.4.1 Hazard Detector Layout Plans ........................................................................139
Table 0 Building Hazard Detector Layout Plans.......................................................................140
Table 13.16.4.1 Dry Chemical Equipment Systems Location Plans.........................................150
Table 13.16.4.2 Dry Chemical Equipment Coverage Plans......................................................150
Table 13.16.4.3 Dry Chemical System P&IDs .........................................................................150
Table 13.17.3.2-1 Fire Water Equipment Location Drawings..................................................155
Table 13.17.3.2-2 Fire Water P&IDs ........................................................................................155
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LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
Table 13.17.3.3 Fire Water Coverage Plans .............................................................................156
Table 13.20.7 Pipe Insulation Tabular Summary......................................................................162
Table 13.20.8 Major Process Equipment Area Layout Drawings.............................................163
Table 13.22.2 List of Buildings with Dimensions ....................................................................168
Table 13.23.1.1Process Flow Diagrams....................................................................................170
Table 13.23.1.2 Process Simulation Cases ...............................................................................170
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
Figure 13.5.11.2 Equipment Isolation/Maintenance Venting .....................................................83
Figure 13.10.5.1 Emergency Shut Down System Zones...........................................................122
Figure 13.15.1-1 Emergency Classification Process.................................................................143
Figure 13.15.2-1 Emergency Organization ...............................................................................144
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Term Description
" inches
°F degree Fahrenheit
AAV Ambient Air Vaporizer
ACI American Concrete Institute
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API American Petroleum Institute
ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
bbl barrels
bgs Below ground surfaces
BMS Burner Management System
BOG boiloff gas
BPA Bonneville Power Administration
Bscfd / bscfd billion standard cubic feet per day
Btu British thermal unit
Btu/(ft2hr) British thermal unit per feet squared per hour
CCTV closed circuit television
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CHE Coast and Harbor Engineering
COTP Coast Guard Captain of the Port
CSZ Cascadia Subduction Zone
cy cubic yard
DB&B double block and bleed
DCS distributed control system
DOGAMI Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries
DSL Department of State Lands (Oregon)
EIA Energy Information Administration
EIS Environmental Impact Statement
EPC Engineering, Procurement and Construction
ERC emergency release coupling
ERP Emergency Response Plan
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Term Description
ESD emergency shutdown
ESD-1 Pier Emergency Shutdown
ESD-1-1 Activation of the unloading arm/vapor return arm ERCs
ESD-2 Total Terminal Emergency Shutdown
ESP East Bank Skipanon Peninsula
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FEED Front End Engineering Design
FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FIRM Flood Insurance Rate Map
FM Factory Mutual
fps feet per second
ft feet
GDR Geotechnical Data Report
gpm gallons per minute
h hour(s)
H&MB heat and material balance
HAZID Hazard Identification
HAZOP Hazard And Operability
HDMS Hazard Detection and Mitigation System
HHV higher heating value
HIPPS High Integrity Pipeline Protection System
HP high pressure
hp horsepower
HTF heat transfer fluid
IESNA Illuminating Engineering Society of North America
in inch
inches H2O inches of water
inches Hg inches of mercury
ISC International Ship to Shore Connections
ISO International Organization for Standardization
Kts knots
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Term Description
kV kilovolt
kVA kilovolt Ampere (one thousand Volt Amperes)
LFL lower flammability limit
LHV lower heating value
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
Terminal Oregon LNG Import Terminal
LP low pressure
LTD Level, Temperature, Density
m3 cubic meters
3
m /hour cubic meters per hour
MARSEC Maritime Security
mbar millibar
MCC Motor Control Center
MCR Main Control Room
MLLW mean lower low water
MMBtu/hr million British thermal units per hour
MMcf/day million cubic feet per day
MMscfd million standard cubic feet per day
mph miles per hour
MW megawatt
N/A not applicable
NAVD North American Vertical Datum
NDE / NDT Nondestructive Examination / Nondestructive Testing
NEC National Electrical Code
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NGA Natural Gas Act
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NTP Notice to Proceed
O&M Operations And Maintenance
OBE Operating Basis Earthquake
OCIMF Oil Companies International Marine Forum
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Term Description
OD Outside Diameter
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
P&ID piping and instrumentation diagram
PCMS Plant Control and Monitoring System
PCR Platform Control Room
PIANC Permanent International Association Navigation Congress
PLC Programmable Logic Controller
POTW Publicly-owned Treatment Works
PPB / ppb parts per billion
PPM / ppm parts per million
psf pounds per square foot
psig pounds per square inch gauge
RGS Rigid Galvanized Steel (conduit)
RR Resource Report
RTD resistance temperature detector
RTU remote terminal unit
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
scfh standard cubic foot (feet) per hour
scfm standard cubic foot (feet) per minute
SIGTTO Society of International Gas Tanker & Terminal Operators
SIS Safety Instrumented System
SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol,
UL Underwriters Laboratories
UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply
USCG United States Coast Guard
USDOT United States Department of Transportation
USGS US Geological Survey
V voltage
VOC volatile organic compound
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Resource Report 1 contains detailed maps and drawings that illustrate the location of the Terminal and
Pipeline system.
This Resource Report 13 contains the front-end engineering design that has been prepared for the
Terminal, which includes the marine facilities and the onshore facilities. The front-end engineering
design has been prepared in accordance with the requirements of 18 C.F.R. §380.12 and has been
presented in accordance with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Resource Report 13 Draft
Preferred Submittal Format Guidance dated April 12, 2006. Sections 1.0 through 24.0 of Resource
Report 13 summarize the front-end engineering design, and Appendices A through U contain specific
reports, engineering standards, drawings and specifications referenced in the Report.
The Terminal will be located on the shoreland areas of the ESP, which are zoned Water Dependent
Industrial Shorelands I-2. The marine facilities are proposed in areas zoned Aquatic Development A-1.
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Total land modification will be dependent upon final design configuration approved by FERC and other
state and federal authorities.
Note: “Heavy” LNG has been used for sizing LNG equipment. Not related to pipeline tariff compositional or
heating value limitations.
In its recent Annual Energy Outlook 2007, the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information
Administration (EIA) presented a set of energy market forecasts for the U.S. through 2030, as follows:
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• The yet-to-be-produced deposits of domestic gas are smaller and deeper than currently producing
fields, which will mean generally higher natural gas prices in the future (in both nominal and real
terms);
• Canadian gas exports to the U.S. (via pipeline) will continue to decline, because of dwindling
Canadian production and increased Canadian domestic demand; and
These market factors show a tightening of the overall supply-demand balance in the U.S.
Traditional domestic sources of natural gas supply in North America are declining. Natural gas is a
depletable resource, meaning that there is a fixed amount and what is used today will be unavailable
tomorrow. Since its first widespread commercial application in the early 1900s, natural gas resources
have been drawn down at an accelerating rate in both the U.S. and Canada. The EIA projects domestic
supplies to remain stable through 2014, then to continue declining through 2030.
Compounding the problem of decreasing domestic gas supply is the maturing of the domestic gas-
producing basins. The EIA identifies this trend in several ways. First, since a large proportion of the
onshore Lower-48 conventional natural gas resource base has already been discovered (and much of it
depleted), future discoveries of new conventional natural gas reservoirs are expected to be smaller,
deeper underground, further offshore, and/or in deeper water. These factors make these supplies more
expensive to develop and produce, per unit of gas produced. Also, as opportunities for conventional gas
development (large fields of natural gas contained in discrete pools so that large volumes of gas can be
extracted by a single well) become less attractive, the industry is expected to move more toward so-called
“unconventional” supplies (coalbed methane, tight-sands gas, and gas shales), but these supplies usually
have production costs that are higher than conventional supplies. In short, supplies are still available and
will continue to be so in the short term, but no longer at low cost.
The cost of natural gas supplies has therefore been increasing significantly in recent years, and the EIA
projects continued high natural gas prices throughout the forecast horizon. The EIA forecasts U.S.
wellhead gas prices generally in the range of approximately $6.00 per million cubic feet (Mcf) (in
constant 2005 dollars) through 2030 – higher than the recorded wellhead prices (in both real and nominal
terms) for most of the last 20 years.
Accompanying the problems of decreasing supply and higher costs is the steady increase in natural gas
demand in the U.S. and Canada, a demand that is likely to accelerate in the future. The primary driver of
demand growth is the electricity sector, which uses natural gas as fuel in power plants to generate
electricity. As environmental regulations increase the cost of emissions, power generation will turn more
to clean-burning and efficient natural-gas-fired plants and away from high-emission coal- or oil-fired
plants. To meet the nation’s growing demand for electricity, the power industry is turning to natural gas
as the fuel of choice. Currently the U.S. owns about 3 percent of the world’s natural gas reserves, but
consumes almost 30 percent of the world’s total natural gas. The EIA forecasts a 15.4 percent increase
(to 3.24 trillion cubic feet [Tcf]) in overall U.S. annual end-use natural gas consumption between 2007
and 2030, and a 10.3-percent increase (to 0.26 Tcf) in the Pacific region, defined as Washington, Oregon,
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Idaho, California, Alaska, and Hawaii. Therefore, new lower-cost natural gas supplies are needed to meet
the ever-increasing U.S. demand.
Historically, gas imports from Canada (via pipeline) have filled the gap between domestic gas production
and natural gas consumption in the U.S. In recent years, these Canadian supplies have comprised up to 18
percent of total U.S. end-use consumption, reaching a high of 3.5 Tcf per year. However, the EIA
forecasts that the Canadian gas market will face the same factors facing the U.S. market – increasing
domestic demand and maturation of the Canadian domestic conventional supply base (principally the
Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin). These factors will combine to reduce the amount of gas available
for export from Canada to the U.S.; the EIA forecasts that by 2030, these exports will have declined more
than 50 percent from their current level, to 1.56 Tcf.
These market conditions – increasing domestic demand, decreasing domestic supply, and decreasing
imports via pipeline from Canada – are ripe for the introduction of new LNG supplies to the U.S. market.
The EIA forecasts that by 2030, annually imported LNG supplies will have risen more than 500 percent
from their present level (from 0.83 to more than 4.5 Tcf per year) and will represent almost 19 percent of
total U.S. end-use gas consumption in that year. These new LNG supplies will help the U.S. market meet
the forecasted levels of demand, while keeping prices at reasonable levels consistent with this level of
demand. LNG projects within the U.S. will be key components in maintaining a robust U.S. gas market at
reasonable prices. In order to reach the level of LNG imports required by the EIA forecasts, many LNG
projects will be required in the U.S. Already, in the Gulf Coast and mid-Atlantic states, many LNG
projects are in operation or planned for the near future.
Abundant natural gas supplies are available in various parts of the world, including the Middle East,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, Russia, South America, and Eastern Europe. The cost of transporting gas
is high, and pipelines are preferable over short distances, but the most economical method of transporting
natural gas over very long distances (1,000 miles and more) is to first liquefy it (i.e., convert it to LNG)
and then ship it in specially designated tankers. This LNG trade has been active since the 1960s, is a
proven technology with a demonstrated record of safe operations, and has been implemented successfully
in the U.S. in Massachusetts, Louisiana, Georgia, and Maryland. The trade continues to grow steadily
because such countries as Japan and Korea are entirely dependent on LNG for their natural gas supplies,
and many additional projects like the Oregon LNG Terminal and Oregon Pipeline (with a projected
capacity of about 0.35 Tcf per year) will be required. Thus, the proposed Project is entirely consistent
with the fundamental long-term market trends identified in the EIA forecasts.
The Oregon LNG Import Terminal will be part of the solution for these market trends – increasing
demand, decreasing availability of lower-cost U.S. supplies, decreasing availability of Canadian imports
via pipeline, and overall rising prices. The Project will benefit consumers in two ways: it will provide
new, competitively-priced gas supplies that will serve the increasing demand, and it will help to maintain
prices at reasonable levels.
Natural gas consumption in the state of Oregon alone, which imports all of its natural gas, now accounts
for one fifth of all the energy consumed in the state; and Oregon is representative of the entire Pacific
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Northwest. Yet, in contrast to the many LNG projects in place or planned in the Gulf Coast and Mid-
Atlantic states, very few have been proposed in the Western states. In addition, the Pacific Northwest has
felt the recent changes in the North American natural gas market more acutely than most of the U.S.
Historically a region of low prices because of relatively short distances to prolific resource basins (the
Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin and the Rocky Mountain Gas Basin), the Pacific Northwest is now
faced with prospect of having among the highest natural gas prices in the world. While steady population
growth will continue to accelerate the demand for natural gas, the declining Canadian supplies and
exports will affect the Pacific Northwest particularly badly because the region has historically relied on
Canada for much of its supply.
Furthermore, lower-cost gas supplies that are currently available in the Rocky Mountain Gas Basin are
limited by pipeline takeaway capacity to the Pacific Northwest, as the cost of building new pipelines
through the Rocky Mountains is extremely high. In any case, when the Rockies Express pipeline is
completed and adds almost 2 Bscf/d of capacity from the Rocky Mountains to the Midwest, the price of
gas is expected to increase, and thus cheap supplies will no longer be available in the area. Prices are a
measure of economic scarcity, and the simple fact is that the Pacific Northwest has run out of cheap
supplies.
Indicators point to rapidly escalating natural gas prices in Oregon and throughout the Pacific Northwest.
Currently, the price at Sumas, Washington, which is a published pricing point in the region, is traded at a
discount compared with the price at Henry Hub in Louisiana, which is the most widely traded natural gas
market in the world. The basis to Henry (i.e., the difference in price between two points) is negative,
meaning that the price at Sumas is lower than the price at Henry. However, given the market changes that
are likely to occur, the historical basis will not be maintained. Pacific Northwest prices will escalate
rapidly with the decline in Canadian imports, while the Henry Hub price will be relatively stagnant as
numerous LNG projects are constructed in the Gulf Coast and Mid-Atlantic states. Within a decade from
now, the basis is expected to turn positive, meaning that the Sumas price will be higher than the Henry
Hub price. Therefore, if natural gas supply alternatives are not located and implemented, the Pacific
Northwest will increasingly suffer from depleted supplies and higher prices.
The proposed Oregon LNG Import Terminal will receive LNG from Pacific Rim sources and deliver the
regasified supplies to natural gas markets throughout the Pacific Northwest. The Project will provide
additional, competitively-priced gas to growing markets that are currently served by declining and
increasingly expensive North American gas supplies, thus helping to meet the demand while mitigating
price increases.
In Oregon specifically, LNG delivered by the Project will serve local markets and decrease natural gas
prices in that state. Oregon consumers will benefit from having a competitively priced supply alternative
that will apply downward pressure on price. A price decrease of $0.15 per million British thermal units
(MMBtu), which is a fairly conservative estimate, will save Oregon households and businesses an
estimated $50 million dollars per year, regardless of who actually contracts the gas.
Oregon LNG has examined the existing and potential natural gas flow volumes that can be provided by
the Oregon Pipeline. As described previously, the approximately 121 miles of 36-inch-OD natural gas
pipeline will to run from Warrenton, Oregon to the Molalla Gate Station, from where the natural gas will
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reach the local market through its interconnections with the Williams natural gas transmission system
(16-inch-OD and 20-inch-OD high-pressure transmission pipelines) and NW Natural’s 24-inch-OD
SMPE. Existing peak and theoretical additional flows have been calculated for takeaway capacity at the
Molalla Gate Station location. The new NW Natural Pipeline Lateral will allow for the Oregon Pipeline
to connect to the SMPE further north, near Banks, Oregon.
Based on Oregon LNG’s evaluation and calculations, the proposed 36-inch-OD Oregon Pipeline has
potential outlets that meet its 1.5-Bscf/d peak design capacity. This ultimate flow is made up of the
following components:
• Existing historical peak flows on the Williams natural gas transmission system;
• Improvements to the Williams natural gas transmission system at Oregon City and Washougal,
Oregon compressor stations to reach the peak capacity of these existing lines for a northern flow
direction;
• Existing historical peak flows on the NW Natural 24-inch-OD SMPE to the Mist Gas Storage
Facility from the Molalla Gate Station;
• Improvements to the injection rate at the Mist Gas Storage Facility to allow more flow;
• Supplying NW Natural distribution flows to the greater Portland, Oregon distribution system
using the 24-inch-OD SMPE and the existing connections to the distribution system at Aurora,
Sherwood, and Hillsboro; and
• Providing a crossover pipeline (the NW Natural Pipeline Lateral) from the 36-inch-OD Oregon
Pipeline to the NW Natural 24 inch-OD SMPE to allow injection to the Mist Gas Storage
Facility and also distribution load supply at Aurora, Sherwood, and Hillsboro simultaneously.
Existing peak flows on the Williams and NW Natural pipelines currently will allow for 533 million
standard cubic feet per day (MMscf/d). With modifications to the Williams natural gas transmission
system at Oregon City and Washougal, it is calculated that the total peak flow would become slightly
more than 1 Bscf/d. Adding improvements to the injection rate at the Mist Gas Storage Facility or using
the SMPE to supply gas to the distribution system to the greater Portland area will bring this maximum
potential peak flow to 1.2 Bscf/d. Installing the NW Natural Pipeline Lateral cross-connection between
the 36-inch-OD Oregon Pipeline and the NW Natural 24-inch-OD SMPE will allow this maximum
potential peak flow to reach 1.5 Bscf/d.
It will also be possible to transport natural gas provided by the proposed Project through pipelines to
other Western states, especially those in the Pacific Northwest. The region has enough year-round
demand to accept the entire Project delivery capacity (planned at up to 1.5 Bscf/d) by itself. The region
has fairly seasonal demand with winter load peaks due to space-heating requirements, but also has
sufficient industrial and commercial load to maintain a good base load. The proposed Project will help
moderate the continued increase in natural gas prices by bringing additional supplies to serve the Pacific
Northwest market.
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Two additional factors related to storage will facilitate the delivery of natural gas to the Oregon market
and to the Pacific Northwest in general. Storage is a vital consideration for LNG projects because
deliveries from LNG carriers are large and intermittent. Carriers typically make at least two deliveries a
week, bringing a very large volume of LNG each time. Storage is necessary to buffer the delivered
volumes so that they can be absorbed into the natural gas system. LNG facilities must have access to
storage, either at the Terminal site or accessible by pipeline. Typically, storage is the most expensive
component of an LNG terminal. The proposed Oregon LNG Terminal has been designed to have three
LNG storage tanks, each with a usable storage capacity of 160,000 m3.
If an existing underground storage facility can be used, it can greatly decrease the cost of an LNG
terminal. While underground storage facilities are scarce in the western U.S., in this case two storage
facilities are located not far from the proposed Terminal. One is the Mist Gas Storage Facility at nearby
Mist, Oregon, with a capacity of 16 billion cubic feet (Bcf), and the other is at Jackson Prairie,
Washington, with a capacity of 41 Bcf. The natural gas provided by the Project, via the Molalla Gate
Station, will be able to serve these facilities as well as the Williams natural gas transmission system and
the NW Natural pipeline system.
Unloading minimum pressure at carrier manifold..................... 100 meter head (approx. 65 psig)
Max allowable saturation pressure of carrier's cargo (equilibrium pressure) ....................2.5 psig
The maximum required vapor flow returned to the carrier is to be based on a normal boiloff rate from the
carrier. A design rate of 0.15 percent of the full contents per day at an industry standard of 95°F ambient
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for newer carriers, and a maximum boiloff rate of 0.25 percent of the full contents per day at the same
95°F ambient for older carriers is used in the design.
Foundation ............................................. Piled with concrete pile cap, with seismic isolators
Number of tanks.............................................................................................................................3
Boiloff rate (pure methane and full tank) ......................................0.05% per day at 95°F ambient
Design flow rate........................................... 1,000 million standard cubic feet per day (MMscfd)
Peak flow rate ........................................... 1,500 million standard cubic feet per day (MMscfd)
The natural gas pipeline will interconnect with other natural gas pipelines, including the interstate natural
gas transmission system of Williams Northwest Pipeline (Williams) at the Molalla Gate Station.
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13.1.8 Peak Shaving; Source of Feed Gas and Market for Product
Not applicable
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If de-inventorying of a given section of the Terminal is required, all large volumes of LNG can be
nitrogen-pressure transferred into a closed system and returned to the LNG storage tank(s) without
overloading the Terminal Vent/Drain System.
LNG will be unloaded from an LNG carrier at a rate of 14,000 m3/hour into LNG Storage Tanks
T-201A/B/C via a single 36-inch LNG unloading pipeline. The unloading pipeline will be maintained at
cryogenic conditions at times when there is no unloading operation at a given berth by circulating LNG
from the LNG storage tank(s) through an LNG circulation pipeline to the berths. Expansion loops are
provided in the circulation pipeline to provide for pipeline expansion and contraction.
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The LNG storage tanks (T-201A/B/C) are all identical, full-containment type tanks, with a primary inner
containment and a secondary outer containment. The tanks are designed and will be constructed so that
the self-supporting primary containment and the secondary containment will be capable of independently
containing the full volume of LNG. The primary containment will contain the LNG under normal
operating conditions. The secondary containment is designed to be capable of containing the LNG (110
percent capacity of the inner tank contents) and of controlling the vapor resulting from the highly
unlikely failure of the inner containment. Each insulated tank is designed to store a net volume of
160,000 m3 (1,006,000 barrels) of LNG at a design temperature of -270°F and a maximum internal
pressure of 4.3 psig.
• An insulated aluminum deck over the inner containment suspended from the roof.
The aluminum support deck is designed to be insulated on its top surface with fiberglass blanket
insulation material. The fiberglass blanket of Perlite® insulation is chosen to minimize the potential of
in-leakage into the inner containment. The outside diameter of the outer containment is approximately
292 feet at the base of each tank. The small amount of vapor pressure generated from boiloff of the LNG
is designed to be equalized through ports in the suspended deck with the boiloff gas contained by the
outer containment. The internal design pressure of the outer containment roof is 4.3 psig. The space
between the inner containment and the outer containment is insulated to allow the LNG to be stored at a
minimum design temperature of -270°F while maintaining the outer containment at near ambient
temperature. The insulation beneath the inner containment is cellular glass, load-bearing insulation that
will support the weight of the inner containment tank, associated structures (including the bottom fill
standpipe column), and the LNG. The space between the sidewalls of the inner and outer containments is
filled with expanded Perlite® insulation that will be compacted to reduce long-term settling of the
insulation. The outer containment is lined on the inside with carbon steel plates. This carbon steel liner
serves as a barrier to moisture migration from the atmosphere reaching the insulation inside the outer
concrete wall. This liner also provides a barrier to prevent vapor escaping from inside the tank in normal
operation.
There will be no penetrations through the inner containment or outer containment sidewall or bottom.
All piping into and out of the inner or outer containments enters from the top of the tank.
The inner containment is designed and will be constructed in accordance with the requirements of
American Petroleum Institute (API) Standard 620 Appendix Q. The tank system meets the requirements
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of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 59A (2001 edition will be used as the basis except where
the 2006 edition is more stringent) and 49 CFR Part 193.
Each tank is protected against over-pressure and under-pressure by the provision of pressure and vacuum
relief valves.
Instrumentation installed on the tank will monitor level, temperature and density for detection of
situations that could result in roll-over.
Section 13.1.4.2 of this Report summarizes the key parameters used in the design of the LNG storage
tanks.
Each of the LNG storage tanks will have two LP Pumps. Each LP Pump will be mounted inside its own
column and will be located inside the column near the bottom of the LNG storage tank. There will also
be one spare pump column installed in each of the LNG storage tanks for installation of another pump if
needed for future operation.
Each pump will be provided with an individual minimum flow recycle line and flow control to protect the
pump from insufficient cooling and bearing lubrication at low flow rates.
The pumps have remotely monitored pressure, flow, vibration and motor amperage signals.
The pumps will include features to isolate and safely maintain a single pump without requiring other
pumps to be removed from service. The LP Pumps will be removable for maintenance while maintaining
an operating level in the LNG storage tank.
To avoid the lifting of vacuum relief valves, the LNG storage tanks T-201A/B/C are first protected from
low pressure by injecting revaporized LNG into the boiloff gas (BOG) Header via the Gas Make-Up
Vaporizer E-206.
The LNG carrier’s tanks are protected from low pressure by returning BOG to the carrier via Vapor
Return Blowers C-205A/B through Vapor Return Arm L-102.
Excess vapor in the on-shore LNG storage tanks (indicated by rising LNG tank pressures) is either
returned to unloading carriers, consumed as fuel gas for the auxiliary heating system, or condensed in
BOG Condenser E-207 and sent out through the vaporization system.
During extended periods of zero sendout, or with loss of BOG Compressors C-204A/B/C and Vapor
Return Blowers C-205A/B during LNG carrier unloading with the LNG storage tank operating near the
vent pressure setpoint, excess vapor will be vented to the atmosphere through Flare Stack L-210.
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BOG Condenser E-207 has been sized to condense the BOG gas stream generated during carrier
offloading and normal sendout operations. The BOG Condenser is sized to handle the peak volume of
BOG, which occurs during times of minimum sendout rate during carrier offloading operations. The
operating pressure of the BOG Condenser is optimized for the vapor compression and LP Pump
requirements.
The atmospheric venting system, including Flare Stack L-210, is designed for use during the following
situations:
• Unexpected loss of vapor handling equipment or sendout during carrier unloading with the LNG
tanks operating near maximum normal operating pressure; and
• Any other scenario which could lead to tank pressure approaching design pressure.
The Terminal will be equipped with six HP Pumps. The HP Pumps are used to increase LNG pressure to
the natural gas sendout pressure.
Each HP Pump will be supplied from a common suction manifold fed by HP Pump Drum D-208 and will
discharge into a common manifold that supplies each HP Vaporizer with a separate inlet line. Valves
will be provided to safely isolate each pump from the system. Provisions have been made in the design
of suction and discharge manifolds for the addition of additional HP Pumps for possible future
expansion.
Each HP pump will be provided with an individual minimum flow recycle line and flow control to
protect the pump from insufficient cooling and bearing lubrication at low flow rates. The recycle flow
will be routed to the top of one or more LNG storage tanks through a continuously cooled connection to
the tank top fill lines.
The pumps will have remotely monitored pressure, flow, vibration and motor amperage signals.
The pumps will include features to isolate and safely maintain a single pump without requiring other
pumps to be removed from service.
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it is expected that these vaporizers will provide all of the required LNG vaporization heat duty; at other
times, the natural gas leaving the AAVs must be further heated in a supplementary heating system. For
this reason the AAVS are identified as the First Stage Ambient Air Vaporizers.
The First Stage AAVs Vaporizers will be of forced draft design with ambient air entering from the top
and flowing down over finned tubes containing a countercurrent (flow up) stream of LNG. Inlet and
outlet connections and headers have been sized for the design pressure drop, and are supplied with butt
weld connections for interconnection piping.
Service air is used to power tools and equipment that will be used in the maintenance of the Terminal.
Dry instrument air is used for the instrumentation and control system installed at the Terminal.
Instrument air takes priority over service air if there is any reduction in compressed air supply.
Nitrogen will be used to purge pipelines and equipment in preparation for maintenance and in preparation
for return to service.
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dedicated onsite 115kV/13.8kV step down transformers The 115kV feed line will have a transmission
capacity of 41.7MVA.
At the Terminal, the line will feed two, 100% capacity 115kV/13.8kV step down transformers.
The 115kV power will be stepped down to 13.8kV and then routed to the 13.8kV switchgear and all of
the 4160V and 480V switchgear and motor control centers.
One standby power generator set will be provided that will be capable of supplying enough power for
one LP pump, to maintain LNG circulation throughout the Terminal for maintenance cooling, Terminal
emergency lighting, including security lighting, security monitoring and warning systems, emergency
communications systems, control systems, one instrument air compressor, and other necessary auxiliary
systems.
No storage of potable water will be provided on the Terminal Site. Potable water will be supplied
directly from the city main at local pressure.
Service water will be drawn from the top of Fire Water Tank T-601 through a standpipe in the tank.
Service water flow will be pumped throughout a distribution system by two service water pumps in
parallel. The service water main pressure will be maintained at a nominal pressure of 90 psig by a
hydrostatic tank.
Storm water falling in curbed process areas and LNG spill containment troughs will drain to the LNG
Spill Containment Basin S-606. In addition, operation of the AAVs will reduce the air temperature
below its dewpoint, which will generate condensate in the air flow and ice formation on the AAV heat
transfer surfaces. This condensate and the associated ice melt will also flow into the LNG Spill
Containment Basin S-606. Water collecting in this Basin will be pumped through an oily water separator
and then drained to a bioswale area on site. Storm water that falls on vegetated areas elsewhere on the
site will drain to the local waterways or dissipate into the soil.
The following siting requirements from 49 CFR Part 193 and NFPA 59A (2001) are applicable to
systems and equipment.
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• Three 160,000 m3 (net) full containment LNG storage tanks. 49 CFR Parts 193.2057 and 2059
require the establishment of thermal and flammable vapor exclusion zones for LNG storage
tanks. NFPA 59A Section 2.2.3.2 specifies four thermal exclusion zones based on the design
spill and the impounding area. NFPA 59A Sections 2.2.3.3 and 2.2.3.4 specify a flammable
vapor exclusion zone for the design spill, which is determined in accordance with Section 2.2.3.5
of NFPA 59A;
• A pier composed of one LNG carrier berth and a marine cargo transfer system consisting of three
16-inch LNG unloading arms, a single 16-inch vapor return arm, and a single 36-inch LNG
transfer pipeline. 49 CFR Parts 193.2001, 2057 and 2059 require thermal and flammable vapor
exclusion zones for the transfer system. NFPA 59A does not address LNG transfer systems; and
• LNG process equipment, including six in-tank LP LNG pumps (two per tank); six HP pumps;
and 150 first stage ambient air vaporizers. 49 CFR Parts 193.2057 and 2059 require thermal and
flammable vapor exclusion zones. NFPA 59A Section 2.2.3.2 specifies the thermal exclusion
zone and Sections 2.2.3.3 and 2.2.3.4 specify the flammable vapor exclusion zone based on a
design spill.
49 CFR Part 193.2181 specifies that the impoundment system serving a single LNG storage tank must
have a volumetric capacity of 110 percent of the LNG tank’s maximum liquid capacity. The LNG
Storage Tanks are each of full containment design consisting of a primary inner containment and a
secondary outer containment meeting this requirement.
The Terminal design includes one insulated concrete LNG Spill Containment Basin (S-606) as illustrated
on plot plan 07902-DG-000-001 included in Appendix U.1. The flow of LNG spills into this
containment basin is illustrated on the LNG Spill Containment Plot Plan 07902-DG-600-001 that is
included in Appendix Q.2.
LNG spilled from the process area would also flow into the S-606 basin. The required spill volume for
sizing the sump is conservatively based on a ten minute flow from a guillotine failure of the LNG Storage
Tank In-tank LP Pump discharge header operating at full rated capacity. Because the flow rate from
these pumps is less than the 14,000 cubic meters per hour for carrier unloading, this spill volume is
bounded by the spill volume of the 36-inch LNG transfer line, as described above.
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by the Gas Research Institute. The calculation and resulting thermal radiation exclusion zones for the
Terminal are detailed in Appendix Q.1 of this Resource Report.
The DEGADIS Dense Gas Dispersion Model was used to compute dispersion distances based on stability
Class F, a wind speed of 4.5 miles per hour (mph), 50 percent relative humidity and the average regional
temperature of 51°F and an initial basin wall temperature of 51.5°F. The calculation and resulting
flammable vapor exclusion zones for the Terminal are detailed in Appendix Q.1 of this Resource Report.
The Terminal will have a dedicated stand-alone system for fire, heat, combustible gas, smoke or
combustion product and low temperature LNG spill monitoring.
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Fire and gas detection and protection of offices and other buildings will be networked via fire panels
located in individual buildings to a master fire and gas detection panel located in the Main Control Room
(MCR). They will provide common alarms and status information to the Hazard Detection and
Mitigation System (HDMS).
An independent Safety Instrumented System (SIS) will be installed to allow the safe, sequential
shutdown and isolation of rotating equipment, vaporization equipment, pier operations and LNG storage
facilities when an Emergency Shutdown (ESD) is initiated. Emergency shutdown push buttons will be
installed at various points throughout the Terminal, and will encompass carrier unloading systems,
natural gas sendout systems and specific equipment.
The Terminal ESD system includes shutdown and control devices designed to put the Terminal in a safe
state. The ESD system will be used for major incidents and will result in either total shutdown of the
Terminal, shutdown of carrier unloading, shutdown of the sendout system and/or individual pieces of
equipment depending on the type of incident. The following levels of ESD will be configured for the
Terminal.
• ESD-1: Shutdown of unloading operations and isolation of the berth and unloading platform;
• ESD-1-1: A subset of ESD-1 which activates the ERC on each of the LNG unloading arms and
the vapor return arm; and
• ESD-2: Shutdown of LNG/NG sendout operations, including ESD-1. This action isolates the
Terminal from the natural gas sendout pipeline and from any carrier which may be berthed.
Cause & Effect Diagram (07902-DG-660-460, included in Appendix U.4) illustrates the input and output
relationship of all ESD initiators and actions.
The preliminary design basis for the fire water system assumes a total continuous fire water demand of
3,000 gpm, which is calculated as the sum of the 1,000 gpm supply required for hand held hose streams
per NFPA 59A (2001 edition) Section 9.4.2 and the maximum single incident postulated. The maximum
credible single incident postulated for the Terminal is assumed to require two 1,000 gpm monitors
operating simultaneously on the unloading platform. This is a typical value that will be confirmed during
final design of the fire water system. The fire fighting system is designed to maintain pressure
continuously to ensure 100 psig will be maintained at the monitors under all flow conditions. The
primary source of water for the fire water system is from the Fire Water tank, T-601, which is supplied
by the City of Warrenton municipal water system. However, backup fire water will be provided from
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Deluge Fire Pumps that will be installed at the edge of the Skipanon River, in accordance with applicable
permits. The Deluge Fire Pumps will also be used at any time that the LNG storage tank deluge system
is in operation. The design of the fire water system will consist of the following components:
• Fire Water Tank, T-601, with a fire water storage capacity of 360,000 gallons, based on a two
hour sustained flow rate, as required by NFPA 59A (2001 edition) Section 9.4.2;
• Electric and Diesel Fire Pumps, P-602 and P-603, respectively. The Fire Pumps will be located
onshore and will draw water from the Fire Water Tank. Each pump is designed to supply the
entire 3,000 gpm fire water demand (100 percent redundancy) at an outlet pressure that will meet
the design requirement of 100 psig system pressure at the inlet valves for the monitors on the
unloading platform. One pump is driven by an electric motor and the other pump is driven by a
diesel engine. This ensures the fire water system will be capable of providing the design basis
flow and pressure in the event of an electrical power failure;
• Jockey Pumps, P-604A/B. Two 100 percent redundant 250 gpm Jockey Pumps will be provided
and will be used to maintain system pressure in the fire water system; and
• Deluge Fire Pumps. These pumps will draw water from the Skipanon River and will be capable
of supplying water directly to the LNG storage tank deluge demand. In addition, these fire
pumps can provide river water to the fire water distribution system to provide emergency makeup
for the fire water system. The pumps are driven by diesel internal combustion engines.
The fire water system equipment sizing calculation 07902-CA-600-401 is included in Appendix P.2.
Dry chemical systems will be installed at the Terminal as they are effective against hydrocarbon pool and
three-dimensional fires (e.g., jet fires), particularly those involving pressurized natural gas or LNG spills,
provided re-ignition potential is low. The dry chemical agent specified is potassium bicarbonate
(“Purple-K®”) as this has been found to be most effective of the dry chemical agents. In addition, dry
chemical systems may be used in conjunction with the LNG Spill Containment Basin’s high expansion
foam system. Therefore, the dry chemical agent must be compatible with the high expansion foam agent.
The dry chemical systems will consist of total flooding systems, local application (fixed nozzle and/or
hose line systems) and/or portable extinguishers (both handheld and wheeled). System selection depends
on the type of hazard, the location of the hazard, the size of the hazard, existence of nearby ignition
sources, ability to access the hazard and the potential consequences of the fire on the public, Terminal
personnel and equipment. The dry chemical systems are located in strategic locations to facilitate
effective fire extinguishment. These systems are designed in accordance with NFPA 17 for engineered
systems and NFPA 10 for portable extinguishers and will be UL listed or FM approved.
A high expansion foam system, designed and installed in accordance with NFPA 11A, will be located at
the LNG Spill Containment Basin (S-606) to control ignited or un-ignited LNG spills.
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• The structure of the emergency response team, including roles, responsibilities and contact
details;
• Responses to emergency situations that occur within the LNG Import Terminal;
• Emergency evacuation adjacent to the LNG Import Terminal and along LNG carrier transit
routes;
• Documentation of consultations made with interested parties during the development of the ERP;
and
• Details of cost sharing plans that have been negotiated to reimburse capital costs, annual costs
and other expenses incurred by off-site emergency organizations in providing emergency
response services to the LNG Import Terminal.
In accordance with the above-mentioned FERC draft guidance document, the ERP will be prepared in
consultation with the U.S. Coastguard, state and local agencies, and Oregon LNG will request
Commission approval prior to the commencement of construction.
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displacement is provided by vaporizing a sidestream of the LP pump discharge and injecting it into the
BOG Header. This vaporization is performed using the E-206 Gas Makeup Vaporizer.
The marine facility unloading system is designed to berth and unload one carrier at a maximum rate of
14,000 m3/hour.
During carrier unloading, vapor in the LNG storage tanks will be displaced by the newly added LNG.
The displaced vapor is returned to the LNG carrier by vapor return blowers through a vapor return line
and a vapor return arm connected to the carrier in order to maintain the pressure in the carrier’s tanks.
Additional BOG will be generated due to the heat added by the carrier’s transfer pumps and the heat leak
into the tank and piping systems. Any BOG not returned to the carrier will be compressed by the BOG
compressors and condensed in the BOG Condenser, E-207.
Commissioning of equipment and systems will be in accordance with the commissioning procedures.
With respect to cryogenic systems, including LNG unloading pipeline, LNG storage tanks and LNG
sendout pipelines and equipment, commissioning must include a controlled cooldown process.
The first step of cooldown is to ensure all equipment and systems are sufficiently free of water (dry).
This will be achieved through the use of dry air, liquid nitrogen and nitrogen vaporization equipment.
Dry air (maximum -60°F dew point) will be injected into a common header to distribute dry air to all
parts of the Terminal. Commissioning personnel will cycle valves and vents so that all parts of the
cryogenic piping will receive a steady dry air flow. This dry air purge will continue until all parts of the
Terminal demonstrate hygrometer dew point readings of no more than -40°F. At this point, the Terminal
is considered dry.
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Once dryout has been completed, warm, vaporized liquid nitrogen will be injected into the connections
previously used to feed dry air into the piping system. The goal is to displace the dry air, oxygen rich
environment with an inert nitrogen environment, which will not support combustion of flammable gas.
Portable oxygen/flammable gas meters will be used to sample the environment inside the piping system.
Once it is assured that all points of the Terminal contain an environment with less than 5 percent oxygen,
the system will be considered to be purged and ready for cooldown.
Cooldown will commence with the LNG transfer pipeline and one LNG storage tank. Although the
Terminal is designed such that LNG tank cooldown can be achieved using liquid nitrogen, the preferred
method will be to use a shipment of LNG.
A temporary piping connection is provided at the LNG berth such that a small LNG flow can be routed
from one LNG unloading arm to the 6-inch LNG recirculation line. The Terminal will be lined out such
that the 6-inch recirculation line is open to the tank spray cool ring. The LNG spray first begins purging
the tank of nitrogen and then cooling the LNG tank. Cooldown of an LNG tank requires about 72 hours.
The tank contractor will oversee the cooldown process and direct control of the cooldown rate.
Initially the gas leaving the LNG tanks will be warm and nitrogen rich. As the outlet gas temperature
decreases it will be routed to the Vapor Return Blowers where it is directed to the unloading platform.
The gas is desuperheated upstream of the Platform Drum and routed through a temporary connection to
the L-101B LNG unloading arm. The cold gas then returns onshore through the 36-inch LNG transfer
line. Once on-shore, the gas further cools other large diameter LNG piping.
The Vapor Return Blowers will circulate cold vapor until all portions of the unloading line reach -200°F.
At this point, it is safe to introduce cold liquid to the system. Once the LNG Transfer System has been
inventoried and filling of the LNG tank has commenced, normal unloading may commence.
Once the carrier is unloaded, an LP Pump will start and will circulate LNG through the LNG unloading
pipeline and back to the LNG storage tank to maintain the system at cryogenic temperatures. Once the
carrier has departed, commissioning personnel will align the Terminal such that they may use the Vapor
Return Blowers to introduce cold vapor to all equipment and large diameter piping. Once the Terminal is
sufficiently cool, it will be aligned to provide a cooling flow of LNG from the LP Pumps to the balance
of the piping system. At this point, the Terminal is cold and ready for normal operation.
The timing of commissioning of equipment and systems at the Terminal is illustrated on the schedule
included in Appendix B.
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• 49 CFR Part 193 Subpart F – Operations, and NFPA 59A Chapter 14 – Operating, Maintenance
and Personnel Training. This will include policies for operating procedures, monitoring of
operations, emergency procedures, personnel safety, investigation of failures, communication
systems and operating records;
• 49 CFR Part 193 Subpart G – Maintenance, and NFPA 59A Chapter 14 – Operating,
Maintenance and Personnel Training. This will include policies for maintenance procedures, fire
protection, isolating and purging, repairs, control systems, inspection of LNG storage tanks,
corrosion control and maintenance records; and
• 49 CFR Part 193 Subpart J – Security, and NFPA 59A Annex C – Security. This will include
policies for security procedures, protective enclosures, security communications, security
monitoring and warning signs.
Recruitment of the O&M team will commence during the construction period and personnel involved in
the day-to-day operations and maintenance of the Terminal will receive the following training.
A technical reference manual will be developed for the Terminal and will cover the following topics:
• Introductory information;
• Design basis, process and instrumentation diagrams and other technical references;
• Process systems;
The basic training program will be based on the technical reference manual and will include:
• Basic orientation;
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• Terminal communications;
• Sendout pipeline;
• Operations procedures.
Training will be provided by the manufacturers of the major pieces of equipment that will be installed at
the Terminal and will be based on the O&M manuals.
• Training required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), including
Process Safety Management (including Management of Change) and other training specific for
the Terminal.
Environmental Training
Training will be provided in environmental management and mitigation to comply with the requirements
of the various permits that will be issued for the Project at the federal, state and local levels.
Hands-On Training
Hands-on training will be provided at all stages of the construction of the Project, including:
• Factory acceptance testing. This will include the review of equipment design parameters,
witness of factory tests, review of factory test results, final inspection of completed equipment
packages, and reports of any discrepancies or non-compliances;
• Construction. During this period, the O&M team will develop all of the software systems
including policies and procedures and management information systems;
• Mechanical completion. During this period, the O&M team will assist the Engineering,
Procurement and Construction (EPC) contractor in the preparation for mechanical completion,
which will include equipment and system clean-out, flushes and cooldown;
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• Start-up and commissioning. During this period, the O&M team will assist the EPC contractor in
reviewing the start-up and commissioning procedures and checklists, completing valve-out of
equipment and systems in accordance with commissioning procedures, preparing instrumentation
in accordance with commissioning procedures, and preparing electrical supplies and distribution
systems; and
• Performance testing. During this period, the O&M team will assist the EPC contractor in
demonstrating contractual performance guarantees for the Project.
Ongoing Training
During the commercial operation of the Terminal, the O&M team will receive on-going refresher training
at a frequency of no less than every two years in the O&M of the Terminal, safety, security and fire
protection. Individual training plans will be developed for each O&M team member, and training records
will be maintained for audit during the annual FERC and USCG inspections.
During commercial operations, it is expected that the Terminal will employ approximately 63 full-time
permanent personnel in administration, security, and O&M areas. The proposed organization chart for
the Terminal is included in Appendix A.1.
• Common process and auxiliary system piping headers that would have to carry the increased
volume have been sized accordingly;
• Double block and bleed (DB&B) isolation has been provided for the addition of additional HP
Pumps and vaporizers that will preclude the need to shutdown the Terminal to make tie-ins in the
future;
This future plan is dependent upon market demand and other commercial factors.
13.1.25 Drawings
13.1.25.1 Area Location Map
Resource Report 1 includes detailed maps that illustrate the location of the Terminal.
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Please refer to Resource Report 1 for detailed maps, drawings and descriptions of the Project.
There are no existing structures on the site requiring demolition. During construction of the Terminal,
the site will be graded.
The northeastern portion of the ESP is predominately wetlands with an elevation 2 to 3 feet above the
mean high water elevation. The west side of the ESP, next to the Skipanon River, and the south side of
the ESP are at a higher elevation (about 6 to 10 feet higher than the northeastern portion). These areas
include small wetland areas, but are predominately sandy areas that are not wetlands. The Terminal
layout was developed to minimize impacts on wetlands by locating the process equipment in the higher
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elevation areas. Refer to Resource Report 10, Alternatives for a discussion of the approach used in laying
out the facility to minimize wetland impacts.
The marine facilities will consist of a pier composed of a trestle containing a roadway and elevated
piperack with associated spillway and an unloading platform that will include a single berth for LNG
carriers that will range in capacity from 70,000 m3 to 266,000 m3. No tug berthing is planned at the
Terminal.
The marine facilities will primarily be constructed using floating equipment including a pile driving
barge, crane barge and material barges. Structural steel and precast concrete beams for the marine
facilities will likely be transported to the site by barge, while cast-in-place concrete will likely be
provided from the landside using either ready mix truck delivery or an on-site batch plant.
• Driven steel cylinder piles for all foundations, installed using a steam or diesel hammer;
The structures associated with the on-shore portion of the Terminal include the main control room,
administrative building, buildings housing auxiliary equipment and utilities; the Compressor Building;
and various other structures (fire pump houses, security building, etc.). Site buildings will be new
construction, and will be constructed in accordance with code requirements commensurate with their
function. Where permitted, buildings will be constructed on concrete slabs and provided with metal
frames and metal siding.
The approach to site grading is to produce a balance of the cut and fill materials for the onshore facilities.
It is anticipated that the site grading can be accomplished with conventional earthmoving equipment,
such as scrapers, dozers, and excavators. Appendix T.5 contains details of site preparation
specifications.
As presented in Table 13.3.1.3, it is anticipated that about 9,300 cubic yards of imported fill will be
required for site grading.
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All organic materials will be stripped from the ground surface before excavation for structures and
placing site fill. Strippings will not be used as backfill or in engineered fills, but may be removed from
the site or stockpiled for reuse during landscaping.
Onsite materials (poorly graded sand) are suitable for use as structural fill. Site fill beneath structures
and pavement will be placed as structural fill, in maximum 8-inch-thick lifts and compacted to at least 95
percent relative compaction. Relative compaction is the ratio of the in-place density to the maximum dry
density as determined by ASTM D698. Fill placed in areas not under structures or pavement will be
compacted to 90 percent relative compaction.
The LNG Spill Containment Basin is anticipated to require roughly 9 feet of excavation for the
foundation subgrade (elevation 2.7 feet). Excavation can be performed using standard excavation
equipment.
Temporary dewatering will be performed during excavation as needed. The dewatering system will
consist of deep wells, or well points, designed to lower the water level a minimum of 2 feet below the
bottom of excavation. Surface water will be controlled and diverted away from excavations. If soil is
loosened by water standing in excavations, the soil will be removed and replaced with compacted
structural fill.
Temporary excavation slopes will comply with all state, local, and federal codes, ordinances, and
regulations. Recommendations regarding temporary excavation sloping, shoring, sheeting, or bracing are
highly dependent on the contractor’s selected excavation method and construction procedures. For this
reason, the construction contractor will be made responsible for the design of all temporary slopes and
trench support. This will permit the contractor to select a system particularly suited to planned
construction procedures.
Subsurface Conditions
In general, the site is underlain by layers of unconsolidated alluvial deposits of clay, silt, and sand, as
listed below. (Elevations given below are in NAVD 88 datum.)
• Layer 1 – 10 feet of silty SAND (SM) to poorly graded SAND with silt (SP-SM) to poorly
graded SAND (SP) is located at about elevation 10 to 0 feet. This zone has the potential to
liquefy during a seismic event;
• Layer 2 – 8 feet of SILT (ML) to fat CLAY (CH) to poorly graded SAND with silt (SP-SM) is
located at about elevation 0 to -8 feet. This zone is not likely to liquefy during a seismic event;
• Layer 3 – 28 feet of poorly graded SAND with silt (SP-SM) to silty SAND (SM) is located at
about elevation -8 to -36 feet. Some zones liquefy in this layer, but the liquefiable layers do not
appear to be horizontally continuous across the site;
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• Layer 4 – 28 feet of interbedded layers of poorly graded SAND with silt (SP-SM), silty SAND
(SM), and SILT (ML) is located at about elevation -36 to -64 feet. This zone has the potential to
liquefy during a seismic event;
• Layer 5 – 50 feet of interbedded layers of poorly graded SAND with silt (SP-SM) and silty
SAND (SM) is located at about elevation -64 to -114 feet. Some zones liquefy in this layer, but
the liquefiable layers do not appear to be horizontally continuous across the site; and
• Layer 6 – 150 feet of interbedded layers of silty SAND (SM), SILT (ML), and poorly graded
SAND with silt (SP-SM) is located at about elevation -114 to -264 feet. Portions of this layer
liquefy during a seismic event.
The above soil profile was modeled to consider pile capacity, static settlement, and soil liquefaction and
settlement during a seismic event.
Groundwater levels have varied from elevation 5 to 7 feet (NAVD 88) as measured in August 2007. For
design, the 100-year flood elevation is assumed to be 12.6 feet (NAVD 88). Structures are designed for
full hydrostatic uplift or include an underdrain system.
See Appendix J for the Geotechnical Report which includes the Geotechnical Data Report (GDR) as an
attachment. The GDR presents the results from subsurface exploration, laboratory testing, and
geophysical surveys.
Ground Improvement
Ground improvement and deep foundations are recommended to stiffen the ground to be more resistant to
soil liquefaction, and to reduce potential settlement of the improved soil. Two ground improvement
options are being considered. Ground improvement option 1 would mitigate liquefaction for Layers 1, 3,
and 4 under the LNG Storage Tanks and mitigate liquefaction of only Layer 1 for other facilities. For the
LNG Storage Tanks, the site response analysis assumed improving the site soil materials (Layers 1, 3,
and 4) to a depth of about 80 feet (elevation -70 feet). Soil properties were based on ground
improvement consisting of cement deep soil mixing (CDSM). For the other facilities, ground
improvement would mitigate for only Layer 1 using stone columns.
CDSM is a soft soil stabilization method which mixes soft soil with cement slurry to produce soil-cement
with higher strength and lower compressibility than the native soil. The cement slurry is mechanically
blended using as auger with mixing paddles. A single auger or up to three augers can be used. A
computerized batch plant supplies the cement slurry and consists of a water tank, cement silo, mixers,
pumps and control room. Interlocking columns will be laid out in a grid type pattern. The drilling and
mixing operations has a low noise level and low vibrations, and does not generate dust.
Stone column (vibro-replacement) construction is a soil improvement technique where soft soil is
improved with columns of dense, crushed stone. For the wet, top feed method, jetting water is used to
remove soft material, stabilize the probe hole, and ensure that the stone backfill reaches the tip of the
vibrator. This method is the most cost-effective type of stone column construction, but generates spoil
that requires removal. For the dry, bottom feed method, a hopper and supply tube feed the stone backfill
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directly to the tip of the probe. This eliminates the generation of spoil. Stone columns are typically
constructed in a triangular pattern with equal spacing between columns.
Ground improvement option 2 would mitigate liquefaction for only Layer 1 for the LNG Storage tanks
and the other facilities.
13.3.1.4 Foundations
General
Based on geotechnical analyses, the LNG Storage Tanks, ancillary structures (including structural steel
buildings and pipe rack structures), and the LNG Spill Containment Basin will need to be supported on
deep foundations for vertical and lateral support. The deep foundations will extend to a depth required
for management of tolerable total static and seismic settlement. See Appendix J for the Geotechnical
Report, which discusses the site conditions, geotechnical analyses, preliminary foundation design and
construction recommendations.
Driven steel pipe piles are the recommended deep foundation type. Deep foundations are required to
provide uplift capacity for the LNG storage tanks and to transfer tank dead load uniformly to the
underlying soil. Layers of the underlying soil are compressible, even at depth, and settlement will occur.
It is anticipated that the piles will be driven closed-ended. The compressive capacity will be developed
from a combination of skin friction and end bearing. The tensile capacity will be developed from skin
friction along the outside of the pile.
In order to limit total settlement, the piles will be 215 feet long. Total settlement is estimated to be about
8 inches. This settlement is anticipated to occur relatively uniform across the foundation base and is
anticipated to occur during hydrostatic testing of the tank.
In order to limit total static and seismic settlement to less than 3 inches, the piles will be approximately
290 feet long. Total settlement is estimated to be approximately 3 inches. This settlement is anticipated
to occur relatively uniformly across the foundation base and is anticipated to occur during hydrostatic
testing of the tank. The estimated differential settlement of the tank on piles is no more than 2 inches
between the center and either edge of slab (2 inches in 146 feet, or 1:292).
Ancillary Structures
Ancillary structures at the Project site that are in Seismic Category I (includes structural steel buildings,
pipe rack structures, and other miscellaneous ancillary structures) will be supported by steel pipe piles. A
concrete mat foundation or an integral slab and gradebeam system will be constructed on the piles in
order to provide a structural floor and a means of connecting the building or structure superstructure.
For lightly-loaded ancillary structures (such as small buildings or other small appurtenance equipment)
that are in Seismic Category II or III, the structures will be supported on ground-supported shallow
foundations. Unsuitable upper layer soils will be excavated and replaced with compacted structural fill.
Concrete mat foundations, spread footings, and integral slabs with gradebeams will be used to support
the building shell and equipment.
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Construction of ancillary structures will be staged to avoid interference with construction of the LNG
Storage Tanks.
The LNG Spill Containment Basin will be constructed of reinforced concrete and supported by steel pipe
piles. The basin structure will consist of a thick concrete mat foundation with concrete walls designed to
contain an LNG spill, prevent inundation of the basin by a tsunami, and prevent flotation during a flood
event.
13.3.1.5 Roads
A preliminary pavement design for Portland Cement Concrete (PCC) and asphalt concrete (AC)
pavement sections was completed on the basis of the following assumptions:
• Climate is region 1.
For AC pavement, the typical section would consist of an AC thickness of 3 inches and an aggregate base
layer of 5 inches. For PCC pavement, the typical section would consist of a PCC thickness of 5 inches
and an aggregate base of 4 inches. Both sections would include a geotextile between the subgrade and
the aggregate base layer to provide separation and to prevent migration of fines. AC pavement is
recommended with a present worth of 50 percent of PCC pavement. PCC pavement is also not
recommended because sea water exposure is corrosive to PCC and potential damage to the PCC due to
wetting and drying cycles associated with tide and storm water surface fluctuations. In low lying areas,
such as around the LNG storage tanks, aggregate surfacing course is an option to AC pavement.
• Equipment and buildings have been located to provide adequate access for normal operation and
maintenance activities;
• In accordance with the requirements of Section 3.1 and 3.2 of NFPA 59A (2001 edition), process
equipment will be located (i) outdoors for ease of operation, to facilitate manual fire fighting and
to facilitate dispersal of accidentally released liquids and gases, and (ii) indoors, in enclosing
structures that comply with the requirements of Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 of NFPA 59A (2001
edition);
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• In accordance with the requirements of Section 3.2.2 of NFPA 59A (2001 edition), valves will be
installed so that pumps and compressors can be isolated for maintenance; and
• LNG vaporizers will be installed to comply with the requirements of Section 5.3 of NFPA 59A
(2001 edition).
In addition, the barrier wall is designed with consideration of scouring that may occur due to a tsunami.
Peak scouring to one foot of depth was estimated based on numerical modeling; given uncertainty in the
modeling, 2-foot scour depth was used for design. The base of the barrier wall footing will be at an
elevation that is at least one foot below the 2-foot scour depth.
By designing the barrier wall to withstand the forces due to a tsunami and to not be undermined by
scouring, the LNG storage tank area inside the wall will not become inundated by a tsunami. Refer to the
Coastal and Hydraulic Modeling Study included in Appendix I.2 for additional description of the
modeling performed to estimate forces on the barrier wall and to estimate scouring caused by a tsunami.
Stormwater that collects within the barrier will be removed by pumps and treated prior to disposal at the
on-site bioswales as illustrated on drawing 07902-PF-970-371 included in Appendix U.2.
The LNG process area, which is at a nominal elevation of 16 feet (NAVD88), is bounded on the
northeast side by an existing berm. To prevent scouring of the existing barrier by a tsunami, the barrier
wall will be protected using rock. Predicted peak water velocity during a tsunami is 7 feet per second.
This velocity will be used to determine rock size and arrangement.
13.3.2 Drawings
13.3.2.1 Site Plans
General Arrangement Plot Plan 07902-DG-000-001 included in Appendix U.1 illustrates the location of
the Terminal relative to neighboring properties as well as the following information:
• Identification and general arrangement of the equipment, systems, structures and buildings that
will comprise the Terminal;
• Location of roads;
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Additional sheets for the plot plan are also provided at a scale of 1:1200 (1-inch to 100 feet on 11-inch by
17-inch format) to show detail that is necessary to demonstrate the safe spacing of all equipment and
buildings as required by NFPA 59A (2001 edition) are included in Appendix U.1.
Drawing 07902-DG-000-003 included in Appendix U.1 illustrates the overall layout of site access and
emergency routing.
Although this section describes the basis for the design of the Terminal, the following reference
documents are also appropriate to this design basis.
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The following table illustrates the major equipment that would be operating and which equipment would
be in standby when operating at the design sendout rate of 1,000 MMscfd.
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Number
Equipment Equipment Number
in Notes
Number Description Operating
Standby
Varies depending on ambient
conditions. 15 trains of 10 units per
First Stage Ambient Air
E-302A through Q Varies Varies train are provided; nominally this is
Vaporizers
sufficient for 1.5 bscfd with 10 trains
operating and 5 in defrost
E-304A/B/C Second Stage Vaporizers 2 1 Under expected worst case
conditions, the HTF system will
B-401A/B/C Fired Heaters 2 1
operate with 2 of 3 loops in service
P-402A/B/C HTF Pumps 2 1 at 1.0 bscfd.
D-403 HTF Surge Drum 1 0 No moving parts
Two meters in operation with one
L-306 Sendout Meter Station 2 1
spare
Operating only during loss of offsite
G-502 Emergency Diesel Generator 0 1
power.
T-601 Fire Water Tank 1 0 No moving parts
Operating only during fire
Electric and Diesel Fire
P-602 & P-603 0 2 emergency event. 1 is needed for
Pumps
full requirement; 1 spare is provided
P-604A/B Jockey Pumps 1 1
Operating only during fire
P-605 Deluge Fire Pumps 0 4 emergency event. 3 are needed for
full requirement; 1 spare is provided
S-606 LNG Spill Containment Basin 1 0 No moving parts
One pump needed for code-
required water removal. Additional
LNG Spill Containment Sump pumps may be needed depending
P-607A/B/C/D/E 1 4
Pumps on accumulation of AAV
condensate/ice melt in the basin
due to ambient conditions
C-941A/B/C Air Compressors 2 1
L-942A/B Air Drier 1 1
D-943 Instrument Air Receiver 1 0 No moving parts
T-961 Liquid Nitrogen Storage Tank 1 0 No moving parts
E-962A/B Nitrogen Vaporizers 1 1
Unloading Platform Nitrogen
D-963 1 0 No moving parts
Receiver
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(MLLW). Oregon LNG expects that construction of the berth and turning basin will require dredging to a
depth of 45 to 50 feet, which will provide adequate under keel clearance at all tide stages.
The maximum expected channel current is 5 knots based on limited measured data from NOAA.
13.4.3 Emissions
Air emissions result from the operation of the Diesel Fire Water Pump P-603, Deluge Fire Pumps P-605,
Flare Stack L-210, Fired Heaters B-401A/B/C, and Emergency Diesel Generator G-502. Emissions from
these sources are summarized in Resource Report 9, Air and Noise Quality.
13.4.4 Seismic
A site-specific seismic hazard evaluation for the Terminal has been completed. The approach has been
developed to meet the requirements presented in the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 59A
(2001 edition) for LNG facilities, and the requirements of the FERC for seismic evaluation of LNG
terminals (18 CFR §380.12(o)). In addition, the site-specific hazard evaluation was conducted to meet
the requirements of the draft seismic design guidelines promulgated in January 2007.
The overall seismicity of the region is considered to be relatively high. The principal tectonic feature of
the Pacific Northwest is the active Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ), where the Juan de Fuca plate
subducts beneath the North American Plate along the Cascadia margin. This subduction zone begins off
the coast of Oregon and dips downward beneath western Oregon. Two primary seismic source
mechanisms are associated with the subduction zone: (1) an interface source mechanism and (2) an
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intraslab source mechanism. In addition, there is the potential for earthquakes from shallow crustal
sources resulting from built-up tectonic stresses within the North American Plate.
Evidence indicates that interface earthquakes occur at intervals of 200 to 1,500 years, with an average
return period of 500 to 600 years (Goldfinger, 2003). The last large earthquake occurred approximately
300 years ago, in the year 1700, and was estimated to be a magnitude of approximately 9.0 (Satake et al.,
1996).
The events associated with the interslab source are estimated to range from Mw 6 to 7.5, based on
historical occurrences (Geomatrix, 1995). Three earthquakes in recent history have been attributed to the
intraslab source: the 1949, 1965, and 2001 earthquakes in the Puget Sound Region, with Mw of 7.1, 6.5,
and 6.8, respectively. No large intraplate earthquakes (Mw greater than 5.0) have occurred in Oregon,
however, for this study, the intraslab source was considered an active seismic source, consistent with the
USGS (2002).
The site-specific seismic hazard evaluation was performed in order to develop a Seismic Category I site-
specific design response spectra for the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and the Operating Basis
Earthquake (OBE). The OBE is represented by the site-specific 475-year return period earthquake (as
the lesser of the 475-year return period and two-thirds the maximum considered earthquake (MCE) and
not less than 80 percent of the 475-year return period). The SSE is represented by the 2,475-year return
period earthquake (as the lesser of the 4,975-year return period; and two times the OBE and not less than
the site specific 80 percent 2,475-year return period). Separate horizontal and vertical component design
spectra for SSE and OBE earthquake events at 5 percent damping were developed. Three site-specific
design response spectra were developed for the site: LNG Storage Tanks with ground improvement to
mitigate for liquefaction in the upper 80 feet, LNG Storage Tanks and LNG Process Area with no ground
improvement, and Marine facilities. See Appendix I.1 for the Site-Specific Seismic Hazard Report which
includes a discussion of the hazards for ground surface rupture, seismic shaking (ground motions),
liquefaction potential, seismic subsidence, seismic slope stability, and tsunami.
Analysis indicates that layers 1, 3, and 4 liquefy at the Project site. Liquefaction is generally considered
to occur primarily above a depth of 100 feet. However, deep soil profiles may undergo loss of strength
and potential settlement at depth due to the generation of excess pore pressure at depth. Additional
laboratory tests are being conducted to better estimate the magnitude of seismic induced settlement.
Potential tsunami water elevations caused by a seismic event were modeled by Coast and Harbor
Engineering (CHE). Appendix I.2 is a technical memorandum prepared by CHE to summarize the results
of their evaluation. The seismic event used in the modeling was based on a study by the Oregon
Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI) (Priest et al., 2002), which examined tsunami
events that would be caused by the CSZ offshore from Coos Bay, Oregon. Several tsunami events were
developed based on different assumptions regarding the magnitude of the fault dislocation offshore. The
dislocation event used in the modeling was termed “Scenario 1-A Asperity” and consisted of dislocation
along the entire CSZ from a magnitude 9.1 earthquake. This event is predicted to cause a vertical
displacement of 19.7 feet between the uplift on the fault line and the shoreline. DOGAMI termed the
tsunami generated by this event to be an “extreme” tsunami.
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The elevation of the tsunami wave produced by the Scenario 1-A Asperity at the dislocation point was
used as a starting point to model the tsunami wave elevations as it traveled into the mouth of the
Columbia and upstream to the Terminal site. A 2-dimensional numerical model, MORPHO, which was
developed by CHE under a federal grant from the US Civilian Research and Development Foundation,
was used. The 1-A Asperity event has an estimated return period of 1,300 years. Events with longer
return periods have not been theorized at this time. The joint probability of the tide elevation was used to
arrive at a combined probability of 4,975 years, consistent with the return period for an SSE. Predicted
tide levels from NOAA’s Youngs Bay station over a 19-year period were used to determine the tide
elevation that, when combined with the 1,300 year return period for the tsunami, gives an overall return
period of 4,975 years. This tide elevation is 6.17 feet (NAVD 88).
Results of the modeling predict a peak tsunami wave elevation of approximately 14.2 feet (NAVD 88) at
the Terminal site, which is 8 feet above the tide elevation of 6.17 feet. The tsunami is predicted to
increase water elevations at the site for a period of 25 minutes.
In assessing the site area that could be inundated by the tsunami, the potential subsidence of the site was
also considered. A study done by Y. J. Yang of the potential subsidence that would occur due to the 1-A
Asperity event was used to estimate the amount of subsidence that may occur at the Terminal site. Using
data from the study, the estimated amount of subsidence at the Terminal site is 4.3 feet. The subsidence
would occur during the SSE at the same time the tsunami is formed offshore above the CSZ. Therefore,
when the tsunami arrives at the Terminal site, the ground elevation would be 4.3 feet below current
elevations. The combination of subsidence and peak tsunami elevation would result in inundation of
areas that are currently at an elevation of 18.5 feet or lower.
The design temperature used for thermal exclusion zone calculations was 37°F. This value was
determined by reviewing climate data from 2001-2005 and was determined to occur less than 5% of the
time.
The design temperature used for heat and mass balance calculations for heat leak into cryogenic piping
and equipment was 95°F. The design temperature used for basin walls for vapor dispersion calculations
was 51.5°F.
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The design wind speed used for thermal radiation exclusion zone calculations ranged from 0 to 16 mph.
These values were determined by reviewing climate data from 2001-2005. The wind speed assumed in
the vapor dispersion calculations was 4.5 mph per 49 CFR Part 193.2059.
The design wind speed used in heat and mass balance calculations for heat leak into cryogenic piping and
equipment was 10 mph.
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Flood elevations do not include contribution from tsunamis, storm surge, or waves caused by high winds.
Tsunamis are discussed in section 13.4.4. For the Terminal site, 100-year wind speeds with a northerly
component are not fast enough to cause a measurable surge. Potential high wave events caused by high
winds were modeled using a two-dimensional spectral model SWAN (Holthuijsen et al., 2004). The
results of the SWAN modeling for the 100-year wind event show that maximum breaking wave heights
of 2.2 feet or less would occur at the 100-year flood elevation of 12.3 feet. The actual momentary
increase in water elevation due to the breaking waves would be 1.2 feet. Wave forces were estimated and
determined to be insignificant. These results are described further in Appendix I.2.
During the period between February 1, 1953 and December 31, 2006, the average annual total snow was
about 4.1 inches as recorded at the Astoria Airport. The maximum snowfall of 10.8 inches in a single
day occurred on January 13, 1972. Maximum accumulated snow depth of 18 inches occurred on January
30, 1969.
13.4.6 Shipping
13.4.6.1 LNG carrier capacity range (expected) ............... 70,000 m3 to 266,000 m3
13.4.7 Mooring
13.4.7.1 Number of berths .......................................................................................... 1
13.4.7.2 Turning basin ............................................................................................ Yes
13.4.7.3 Number of platforms .................................................................................... 1
13.4.7.4 Trestle ........................................................................................................Yes
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13.4.9 Unloading
13.4.9.1 Unloading arms and size per berth, liquid................................. 3 x 16-inch
13.4.9.2 Unloading arms and size per berth, vapor................................. 1 x 16-inch
13.4.9.3 Unloading maximum rate .................................................... 14,000 m3/hour
13.4.9.4 Unloading min pressure at carrier manifold .......... 100 m head (~ 65 psig)
13.4.9.5 Design pressure, arms and piping.................................................... 275 psig
13.4.9.6 Design vapor return pressure at carrier manifold ........................ 1.45 psig
13.4.9.7 Maximum vapor return temperature at carrier manifold................-180°F
13.4.11 Pretreatment
Not applicable
13.4.13 Liquefaction
Not applicable
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13.4.15 Storage
13.4.15.1 Type of tank..................................... Full Containment, Above Ground
13.4.15.2 Foundation............ Piled with concrete pile cap, with seismic isolators
13.4.15.3 Secondary containment .......................... Concrete Outer Containment
13.4.15.4 Number of tanks...................................................................................... 3
13.4.15.5 Gross capacity per tank.....approximately 170,000 m3 (1,090,000 bbl)
13.4.15.6 Working capacity per tank .........................160,000 m3 (1,006,000 bbl)
13.4.15.7 Design pressure ............................................................................ 4.3 psig
13.4.15.8 Design vacuum .......................................... Not less than 2.0 inches w.c.
13.4.15.9 Normal Operating pressure ................................. 0.5 – 3.7 psig (range)
13.4.15.10 Design LNG specific gravity ............................................................. 0.48
13.4.15.11 Boiloff rate (pure methane & full tank) .......... 0.05% per day at 95°F
13.4.16 LP Pumps
13.4.16.1 Type of pump - In-tank, column-mounted, submerged motor, centrifugal
13.4.16.2 Number of pumps ................................................................... 2 per tank
13.4.16.3 Rated flow .................................................................................4,600 gpm
13.4.16.4 Differential head ............................................................................ 300 ft
13.4.16.5 Maximum LNG specific gravity ...................................................... 0.46
13.4.17 HP Pumps
13.4.17.1 Type of pump(s) ....... Vessel-mounted, submerged motor, centrifugal
13.4.17.2 Number of pumps operating and spare ......... 4 operating and 2 spare
13.4.17.3 Rated flow .................................................................................2,300 gpm
13.4.17.4 Differential head ....................................................................... 8,250 feet
13.4.17.5 Maximum LNG specific gravity ....................................................... 0.46
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13.4.25 Stack
13.4.25.1 Vent type .......................................................................................... Flare
13.4.25.2 Maximum flow conditions
Flow rate ..................................................................................... 1.7 MMscfd, 80,000 lb/hr
Temperature .................................................................................................................Ambient
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13.4.27 Electrical
13.4.27.1 Main power utility supplier .................. PacifiCorp Power (Tentative)
13.4.27.2 Utility supply voltage ................................................................... 115kV
13.4.27.3 Utility supply capacity ............................................................ 41.7 MVA
13.4.27.4 Main power generated onsite............................................................. No
13.4.27.5 Main power generators..................................................................... N/A
13.4.27.6 Emergency power supply .......................................... On-site generated
13.4.27.7 Emergency power generators ................................. 1 Diesel Generator
13.4.27.8 Emergency power voltage .......................................................... 4.16 kV
13.4.27.9 Emergency power capacity ...................................................... 2.0 mVA
13.4.27.10 UPS services, voltage, size and capacity....................................... 120 V
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13.4.32 Nitrogen
13.4.32.1 Source.............................................................. Cryogenic storage dewar
13.4.32.2 Liquid nitrogen storage capacity............................................. 8,300 gal
13.4.32.3 Flow rate .................................... 350 scfm design (29 scfm continuous)
13.4.32.4 Pressure....................................................................................... 110 psig
Since the Skipanon River water is brackish water, the water may need to be treated by reverse osmosis.
The water will be pumped from the river into the inner LNG tank through one of the manholes in the
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outer containment tank roof. The target water flow rate will be 1600 gpm, or a lesser rate if limited by
the capacity of the reverse osmosis units. Approximately 28 million gallons of water will be required to
test each tank. Accordingly, the time to fill the tank will be at least 12 days of pumping at the maximum
allowed rate.
Once the tank hydrotest is complete, the test water will be pumped out of the tank, tested, treated (if
necessary) and discharged to the river in a location and manner in accordance with applicable permits
and regulations.
Following hydrotesting, the inner tank inside wall, floor and internal structures will be rinsed with fresh
water. Typical rinse water flow rate is about 3-5 gpm. The rinse water will be pumped out of the tank
and discharged to the river in a location and manner in accordance with applicable permits and
regulations. The quantity of rinse water to be discharged is approximately 7,200 to 12,000 gallons for
each tank. Detailed procedures for rinse and final drying of the tanks will be prepared and implemented.
Further details of the LNG storage tank hydrotest procedure are included in Section 13.6.18.5 of this
Resource Report 13.
A separate Facility Security Plan, describing site security provisions and features, is being prepared for
the USCG pursuant to USCG regulations, 33 CFR Part 105.
Security measures included in the Facility Security Plan and within the design of the Terminal to control
access at all Maritime Security (MARSEC) levels include perimeter fencing, lighting, security personnel
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and cameras, monitored and controlled access points into the Terminal, restrictions and prohibitions
applied at the access points, identification systems, and screening procedures.
The site will be surrounded with a security fence with limited access openings. The fence will extend to
the pier to ensure only authorized Terminal personnel can access the Terminal. A Closed Circuit
Television (CCTV) system will be installed at the Terminal and will monitor the pier, the perimeter fence
line, active access points, the waters along the Terminal and the interior of the Terminal.
Drawing 07902-DG-000-S101 included in Appendix K.1 illustrates the geometry and alignment of the
proposed turning basin. A turning basin depth of 45 ft (MLLW) is proposed. The proposed depth was
estimated taking into account the static draught of the largest carrier expected to call at the Terminal,
squat, trim, vertical carrier motion due to wave action, fresh water adjustment, underkeel clearance, and
tolerance for dredging and sounding accuracy. For security, economical, and practical reasons, LNG
carriers must be able to navigate to and from the Terminal at all tide conditions. As such, no tidal
allowance has been considered in defining the required minimum channel depth.
To support the Terminal marine operations, appropriate navigational aids will be installed at the turning
basin and dock. In addition, navigation lights will be installed on land and on structures, such as the end
of the pier.
Real time navigation studies were performed by the Columbia River Bar Pilots at the Pacific Maritime
Institute’s simulator facilities in Seattle, Washington. A total of 40 simulations were performed that
included all phases of vessel operation between the Columbia River Bar and the Terminal berth.
Elements specifically addressed include the following:
• Transit of navigational channels from the Entrance Channel to the Tansy Point Turn;
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• Departing, including both bow upstream and bow downstream conditions; and
Details of the simulations and results are presented in Resource Report 11 – Reliability and Safety,
Section 11.4.6.
The results of the simulations showed that the proposed approach channel, turning area, and berthing
area are adequate to safely allow the transit, turning, and berthing/de-berthing of the LNG carriers under
operational conditions. The results showed a total travel time from the Columbia River Channel to the
Terminal berth to be approximately 120 minutes, including docking.
13.5.1.2 LNG carrier size and transfer design rates and pressure
The Terminal is designed to receive LNG carriers ranging in size from 70,000 m3 to 266,000 m3. The
maximum transfer rate is 14,000 m3/hour. The operating pressure at the unloading arm flange is 65 psig.
The main components of the marine facility will include the following:
• A pier extending from the shore line to the unloading platform; the pier will support an elevated
pipeway and spill containment system and provide a roadway to the unloading platform area;
• Mechanical systems.
To support the Terminal marine operations, a turning basin will be constructed by expanding existing
channels by dredging.
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Design temperatures range from -270°F to +120°F for the piping and process equipment in the unloading
system at the Terminal.
Draining (blowdown) of the LNG unloading arms after LNG transfer is accomplished by applying
nitrogen pressure at the apex of each arm. LNG on the carrier-side of the apex is drained back into one
or more of the carrier's LNG tanks. LNG on the side of the Terminal is forced through drain valves
(HV-112A/B/C) at the low point on each LNG arm. Once the LNG is forced out of each arm, the drain
valve closes automatically.
Once the draining is complete, the arm is left under nitrogen pressure.
The elevated pipeway will extend from the unloading platform to the shore line. An elevated concrete
spillway will be installed adjacent to and below the piping. The piping and spillway will be supported by
a steel support structure.
The maximum unloading rate is 14,000 m3/hour. Piping will be provided in the design to allow
circulation of LNG through the unloading system during periods when no carrier is unloading, to
maintain the unloading lines at cryogenic temperatures, thus avoiding thermal cycling of the unloading
lines.
• Fixed dry chemical system, covering the curbed area under the unloading and vapor return arms
using a fixed monitor plus hose lines;
• A fire water system, including two 1,000 gpm remote operated, elevated monitors; hydrant and
hose reel; and International Ship to Shore Connections (ISCs); and
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A description of the proposed security arrangements that address the principal concerns for Terminal
security, plans for security and the parties who would be instrumental in the development of security
plans during the design phase of the Project are provided in Section 13.19 of this Resource Report.
The PCR and/or unloading platform will be attended any time an LNG carrier has an unloading arm
connected, including the vapor arm. Control from the PCR will be limited to LNG unloading operations
and safety/ESD responses. The PCR has an operator console containing remote interfaces for the DCS,
SIS, HDMS and hard-wired ESD switches and annunciators, all of which are further described in Section
13.9 of this Resource Report.
The PCR will have a workstation to control and monitor the Marine Instrument Systems and LNG
Unloading Arm and Vapor Return Arm controls. Arm controls will include mobile units that can
function at the arms.
The operator console in the PCR will contain hard-wired ESD switches and annunciators for critical
alarms and fire and gas semi-graphic panels necessary for unloading operations.
A laser-type berthing monitoring system will be provided to measure the ship’s distance off the berth,
berthing velocity and angle of approach during final maneuvering and berthing. The measurements will
be conveyed to the pilot, master and berth operator by means of portable hand-held units and a display
board installed on the pier.
The mooring hooks will be fitted with load monitoring cells to measure the load in the mooring lines and
provide a warning when loads approach critical levels.
Information pertaining to preliminary selection of dockside equipment including: fenders, mooring and
vessel approach monitoring, mooring hooks, hydraulic crane and gangway is included in Appendix K.2
to this Resource Report 13.
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A safe means of access by a gangway is to be provided from the unloading platform to the LNG carrier.
A hydraulic-operated, pedestal-supported type gangway, with telescoping and slewing motion capability
will be provided. The gangway landing footprint will be small and position adjustable to ensure a stable
location on the limited carrier deck space that will be available. The Guide to Marine Terminal Fire
Protection and Emergency Evacuation (Oil Companies International Marine Forum, OCIMF//Society of
International Gas Tanker & Terminal Operators, SIGTTO) will be used as a reference for the design of
the gangway. Design of the gangway will give consideration to both emergency evacuation of the carrier
and firefighting or other emergency access to/from the carrier.
13.5.1.12 Drawings
The following drawings for the marine facilities associated with the Terminal are included in Appendix
K.1.
13.5.2 Unloading
The following describes the basis for the design for unloading an LNG carrier and the anticipated
operating conditions for such operation, and the design features of the equipment including operating
conditions and special design conditions.
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The unloading arms will be fitted with two isolating valves and an emergency release coupling (ERC)
that is installed between the two isolating valves. This ERC system protects the unloading arms and
carrier manifold when the unloading arm operating envelope is exceeded, and minimizes the spill of
LNG in case of an emergency uncoupling of the unloading arms from the carrier.
A data sheet for the unloading arms (07902-DS-100-101) is included in Appendix M.3 and vendor
information (07902-VP-100-101) is included in Appendix M.4.
A low flow to the vapor arm will also close the supply to the vapor return desuperheater spray.
A high level in Platform Drum D-103 will also close the supply to the vapor return desuperheater spray
and close the vapor return pressure control valve, PV-103.
A data sheet for the Platform Drum (07902-DS-100-103) is included in Appendix M.3.
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The vents from LNG arm cooldown are directed to Platform Drum D-103 and then onshore to the BOG
Header. It is possible that some LNG may carryover during the arm cooldown and therefore the liquid
will be captured within Platform Drum D-103. The LNG arms drain into the LNG transfer line using a
bypass around the LNG Unloading Arm isolation valves (HV-111A/B/C around HV-101A/B/C). HV-
111 A/B/C valves automatically close upon completion of arm draining.
Once the Unloading Arms have been connected and the spool piece purged of air, the Unloading Arms L-
101A/B/C will be aligned for cooldown. The design of Unloading Arms will allow rapid cooldown with
the cooldown vapor being directed into Platform Drum D-103 to facilitate cooldown.
Once the Unloading Arms are fully cooled down, and the Terminal Operator confirms he is ready for
unloading, the Cargo Officer may start the carrier's LNG cargo pumps at his discretion.
The Terminal Operators will determine which LNG storage tank(s) the LNG will be loaded into based on
current volumes in storage. Each LNG storage tank will be capable of being loaded from the top or
bottom. The decision to top or bottom fill a tank is a function of the composition of the LNG in the LNG
tank(s) and the composition to be unloaded, to avoid the potential for tank rollovers which could occur in
situations where heavy LNG is placed below lighter LNG in a storage tank.
The unloading rate will be highest during the initial period as the level in the carrier’s tanks is highest.
As the carrier unloads the unloading rate will decrease. As each carrier tank approaches minimum tank
levels, the cargo pumps will be shut down.
Once all of the carrier's cargo pumps are shut down, the LNG Unloading Arms are drained and purged.
The LNG on the carrier-side of the apex of the arm returns to an LNG tank on the carrier. The LNG on
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the shore-side of the apex of the arm is bypassed around the closed unloading arm valve into the LNG
Transfer header.
13.5.4 Liquefaction
Not applicable
13.5.5 Fractionation
Not applicable
At the start-up of the Vapor Return Blowers (C-205A/B) it is possible that BOG from the LNG tanks will
need to be desuperheated. In this case a small stream of LNG is sprayed into the vapor stream just
upstream of the BOG Drum (D-203). This is the same process that is used to cool the returning vapor
upon the initiation of the process as the returning vapor will be warmer than allowable for the LNG
carrier. In each event, the returning vapor will be desuperheated to -180° or colder.
A data sheet for the Vapor Return Blowers (07902-DS-200-205) is included in Appendix M.3 of this
Resource Report and typical manufacturer information (07902-VP-200-205) is included in Appendix
M.4.
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LNG carrier must be at least 5.0 psig, often requiring the use of the carrier’s blowers, to assure that the
Terminal can take the vapor in all operating scenarios.
ESD-1 or ESD-2, loss of the Vapor Return Blowers, or high liquid level in Platform Drum D-103 will
cause the vapor return to the LNG carrier to cease.
The Vapor Return Blowers will shut down with activation of an ESD-2, high liquid level in the BOG
Drum (D-203) or low suction pressure.
A data sheet for the BOG Compressors (07902-DS-200-204) is included in Appendix M.3 of this Report
and typical manufacturer data (07902-VP-200-204) is included in Appendix M.4.
The BOG Compressors will shut down with activation of an ESD-2, high liquid level in the BOG Drum
(D-203), low LNG tank pressure, high compressor discharge temperature or pressure or low compressor
suction pressure.
A data sheet for the BOG Condenser (07902-DS-200-208) is included in Appendix M.3 of this Report,
and typical manufacturer data (07902-VP-200-208) is included in Appendix M.4.
• The Terminal design includes a Closed Vent / Drain System which captures all discharges from
thermal reliefs, drains and vents for LNG process equipment and piping. The only way the gas is
released to atmosphere is through the Flare Stack (L-210), or from pressure relief valves on the
LNG storage tanks, the HP vaporizers, and the fuel gas drum; and
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• The high tank design pressure and inclusion of redundant BOG compressors reduces the need to
vent gas.
During detailed design, the EPC contractor will evaluate the expected operating and sendout scenarios,
and determine whether the Terminal is likely to operate for long periods of time at low or no sendout. In
that case, if economics dictate, high pressure BOG compression will be included in the design at that
time. To allow for this possible future installation, the BOG system includes provisions for connection to
a pipeline compressor, as illustrated on P&ID 07902-PI-200-109 included in Appendix U.4.
When unloading an LNG carrier there will be excess BOG to handle. In this situation the Vapor Return
Blower(s) will direct BOG to the LNG carrier. The LNG carrier’s Cargo Officer will control the vapor
return rate. The excess BOG flowing from the on-shore LNG storage tanks will be directed through the
BOG Compressors to the BOG Condenser (E-207). At lower than design unloading rates and/or lower
than maximum carrier saturated pressure the above scenario may change to where there will be no BOG
condensed or even inadequate fuel gas available for vaporization. In this case, fuel gas will be
supplemented from letdown sendout gas.
The Terminal is designed such that no venting of BOG will occur during normal operation. As such, the
Terminal rarely operates near the maximum operating pressures of the LNG tanks. However, there are
basically two scenarios that could lead to venting BOG. The first scenario involves extended periods of
operation at sendout rates lower than the minimum sendout rate. In this scenario, the LNG tank pressures
will begin rising. Rather than allowing the LNG tank pressure safety valves to open, a discretionary
venting system is used. Based on rising tank pressure, excess BOG will be directed to the atmosphere
first via a discretionary vent installed on each LNG storage tank; then eventually via the Flare Stack, L-
210. Venting rate will be equal to the BOG generation rate resulting from heat leak into the Terminal.
The second scenario occurs during LNG transfer of LNG at or near maximum saturated condition and at
or near maximum unloading rates (14,000 m3/hour). In this scenario the LNG tanks are operating near
maximum operating pressure. Any loss of vapor handling or LNG sendout could result in the LNG tanks
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approaching maximum allowable operating pressure. Such an event would very quickly result in the
reduction or cessation of LNG transfer, thus should venting occur it will be very short lived. Once the
cause of the upset is rectified the BOG handling system will be re-started, venting will stop and LNG
transfer can be increased or re-started.
• First Stage Vaporization is performed using forced draft Ambient Air Vaporizers. These
vaporizers obtain the bulk of the heat needed for vaporization from ambient air; and
• Second Stage Vaporization is used at times when the heat available from the ambient air is not
sufficient to produce sendout gas at the design sendout temperature. This could occur when
ambient temperatures are low or when heat transfer to the AAVs is hampered by accumulation of
ice. When in service, the Second Stage Vaporizers heat up a sidestream of natural gas above the
sendout temperature, after which the sidestream is blended with the remaining natural gas to
achieve the design sendout temperature.
The following describes the basis of the design for both of these systems along with the anticipated
operating conditions, the design features of the equipment and special design conditions for each.
13.5.7.1 Low Pressure LNG Pumps, Minimum Flow, Low Pressure LNG Recycle Systems
from High Pressure Pump Suction
The allowable operating pressure of the full containment design LNG tanks (T-201A/B/C) allows a
minimization of the operating pressures of the BOG Condenser (E-207) compared to many Terminals.
Thus, the operating head of the LP Pumps will vary with liquid level in the LNG tank and LNG tank
vapor pressure.
Each of the in-tank LP Pumps can provide LNG circulation of the LNG transfer piping, supply LNG to
the BOG desuperheater upstream of the BOG Drum (D-203), supply LNG to the Gas Make-Up Vaporizer
(E-206), and supply LNG to the Sendout System. Each LP Pump has a recycle system sized for a
minimum of 35 percent of its design flow to ensure that with loss of downstream flow the pump can run
indefinitely on recycle without causing damage to the LP Pump. The recycle flow is directed to the top
fill line of the respective LNG tank.
A data sheet for the LP Pumps (07902-DS-200-202) is included in Appendix M.3 of this Report and
typical manufacturer data (07902-VP-200-202) is included in Appendix M.4.
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The LP Pumps will shutdown with activation of an ESD-2, high LP Pump vibration or high or low LP
Pump amperage.
13.5.7.4 High Pressure LNG Pumps, Pump Vessel Vent System, Minimum Flow Recycle
The HP Pumps (P-301A through F) draw supply from the HP Pump Drum (D-208). The HP Pump Drum
will be supplied by the discharge from the BOG Condenser (E-207) and, at higher sendout rates, a bypass
of the BOG Condenser will take LNG directly from the LP Pumps or the LNG Transfer circulation
system.
The HP Pumps are dedicated to supplying the First Stage Ambient Air Vaporizers (E-302). Each HP
Pump has a recycle system sized for a minimum of 35 percent of the design flow to ensure that with loss
of downstream flow the pump can run indefinitely on recycle without damage to the HP Pump. The
recycle flow is directed to the top fill lines of the LNG tanks thus minimizing upstream supply upsets
when recycle operation takes place.
The HP pumps share a common recycle header. The following provisions have been made in the design
to protect the recycle header from the HP pump discharge pressure and operating conditions:
Prior to entering the recycle header, the recycle discharge flow from each HP pump is reduced in
pressure via an anti-cavitation valve sized for about 40% of design flow.
The recycle header is continuously recirculated with LNG from HP pump suction manifold to ensure the
header is kept cold at all times when one or more HP pumps is operating.
All interfacing lines of lower pressure class will be protected with a check valve.
As vessel-mounted pumps, each pump is tied into the top of the HP Pump Drum with a continuously
rising pump vessel vent line to ensure a flooded pump vessel in all operating modes including continuous
cooling during the idle mode.
A data sheet for the HP Pumps (07902-DS-300-301) is included in Appendix M.3 of this Report and
typical manufacturer data (07902-VP-300-301) is included in Appendix M.4.
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The HP Pumps will shut down with activation of an ESD-2, low HP Pump Drum level or pressure, high
HP Pump vibration, high or low HP Pump amperage, high sendout gas pressure or low sendout gas
temperature.
As ambient air flows down through the AAVs, the air can cool to its dewpoint and a portion of the water
vapor in the ambient air will condense. This condensate is either carried out of the AAV with the air
flow or deposits on the finned tube outer surfaces. Condensate that collects on the surfaces can freeze,
leading to a buildup of a frost/ice layer on the tubes, impeding heat transfer. This layer increases with
thickness in time, leading to reduced heat transfer. The rate of accumulation varies based on ambient
conditions (temperature, relative humidity, wind, solar radiation, precipitation, etc.) and LNG parameters
(such as flow, inlet temperature, pressure, composition). As a result, over time either the exiting natural
gas temperature will drop, or the amount of gas that can be heated to the desired temperature will drop, or
both.
The AAVs are arranged in 15 trains with ten units per train, for a total of 150 units available for use. The
discharge temperature of each train is indicated in the control room, and the discharges of all 15 trains
are combined and mixed in a common discharge. The temperature of the mixed AAV discharge is
continuously monitored and indicated to the plant operations staff, who can take action if the temperature
drops below the design basis limit of 40°F as follows:
Individual trains may be taken out of service and defrosted. At the same time, one or more idle
(defrosted) trains may be placed in service. This will increase the mixed discharge temperature since the
gas exiting the new train will be relatively warm compared to the train that was taken out of service.
If bringing idle AAV trains on line is not sufficient to achieve the desired sendout temperature, plant
operators can send a portion of the mixed discharge through the Second Stage Vaporizers as described
below. This sidestream of gas will be heated to a temperature above the sendout temperature and then
mixed with the balance of the flow as needed to achieve the desired sendout temperature.
AAVs can be defrosted by stopping the LNG inlet flow while keeping the fans on. At the Oregon LNG
Import Terminal site, ambient temperatures are generally above freezing, so this method will defrost the
AAVs at most times of the year. However, when ambient temperatures are too low to allow defrosting,
there is relatively little water vapor in the ambient air. Accordingly, the rate of condensation and ice
buildup on the tube surfaces will be greatly reduced under these conditions. This means that the units
will operate for longer periods before needing to be taken out of service for defrosting. Prolonging the
run cycle allows operators to wait to take units out of service for defrosting for times when the
temperature is warmer (i.e., daylight or the end of a cold period of weather).
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The units will continue to transfer heat from air to LNG even with an ice buildup, due to the large
temperature difference driving force for heat transfer and the large heat transfer area. Accordingly,
although the heat transfer is impeded with ice buildup, significant heat duty can still be achieved even
under iced conditions.
As more experience is gained with use of AAVs for LNG vaporization, it is expected that equipment
vendors will develop methods for in-place defrosting the units. This may include mechanical ice removal
methods, spraying of warm fluids, or provision of heated air flow through iced units. Oregon LNG will
review operating experience and current technology trends as experience is gained with this equipment
elsewhere and may add features to the final design to aid in defrosting these units.
To account for the lower performance of AAVs due to icing and the difficulty for defrosting the units at
certain times, the following provisions are made for the Oregon Terminal:
The number of AAVs units planned for Oregon LNG (150) was selected based on the peak sendout of
1.5 bscfd, with 33% of the installed units out of service for defrosting. This means that each of the 100
operating units can produce an average of 15 MMscfd. Typically each unit can vaporizer much higher
flows for a short period and at least this amount for a longer period. This large number of vaporizer units
allows operators to plan vaporization campaigns taking into account the drop-off in performance of
individual units with time and the need to take units out of service for defrosting.
Designing for the peak sendout case of 1.5 bscfd provides margin to ensure that the design sendout of 1.0
bscfd can be achieved under a wider range of ambient conditions.
A data sheet for the First Stage Ambient Air Vaporizers (07902-DS-300-302) is included in Appendix
M.3 and typical manufacturer data (07902-VP-300-302) is included in Appendix M.4.
The AAVs will shut down with activation of an ESD-2 or low low outlet temperature.
The Second Stage Vaporization System design is based on the following considerations:
• Per vendor information, the AAVs will operate with an approach temperature of 30°F. As the
site rarely experiences temperatures below about 30°F, it is assumed that the lowest expected
AAV discharge gas temperature will be 0°F throughout the year; and
• The desired sendout temperature is 40°F; to reach this temperature, the 0°F AAV outlet gas must
be increased by 40°F. Increasing the temperature of the peak sendout flow of 1.0 bscfd by this
amount will require approximately 90 mmBtu/hr (for heavy LNG composition). For the peak
sendout case (1.5 bscfd), 135 mmBtu/hr will be required.
Accordingly, the design duty for the Second Stage Vaporization is at least 90 mmBtu/hr. For Oregon,
additional margin is added to allow the system to provide 120 mmBtu/hr on a design basis (i.e., with an
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N+1 sparing philosophy), with a peak duty of 180 mmBtu/hr with all spare equipment operating. This is
accomplished by providing a three-loop system where each loop has a 60 mmBtu/hr duty. Each loop
consists of the following components:
• E-304 Second Stage Vaporizer. This is a horizontal shell and tube heat exchanger which heats
gas flowing through the tube side using a heat transfer fluid (HTF) flowing on the shell side;
• B-401 Fired Heater. This heater burns fuel gas to heat HTF flowing through tubes. Fuel gas to
these Fired Heaters is produced by the fuel gas system as described below; and
• P-402 HTF Pump. This is a centrifugal pump used to move the HTF between the Fired Heater
and the Second Stage Vaporizer shell.
The loops are connected via a common header and are equipped with an HTF Surge Drum (D-403) to
account for volume changes which will occur as the HTF operating temperatures change.
The system is designed to heat a portion of the AAV outlet gas to a temperature above the desired
sendout temperature, and then to blend that heated portion back to the main flow to achieve the desired
sendout temperature. Under peak conditions, about 30% of the AAV outlet flow (at 0°F) would be
heated to 180°F in the Second Stage Vaporizer system and then blended back with the remaining flow to
achieve an average of 40°F.
The HTF flow rate through the heat exchanger shell and fired heater in each loop is kept constant. The
control system for the Second Stage Vaporizer system will regulate the natural gas flow rate into the heat
exchanger tubes as needed to maintain the outlet natural gas temperature after blending at the set point
value. A falling outlet natural gas temperature will result in an increase in the fraction of the sendout gas
that is routed through the Second Stage Vaporizers. This will increase the heat transfer in these heat
exchangers and reduce the HTF temperature exiting the heat exchanger shell side.
This cooled HTF will flow into the Fired Heater. Fuel gas flow to the Fired Heater will be controlled
such that the firing is sufficient to heat the exiting HTF temperature to the HTF setpoint temperature of
nominally 200°F. The HTF flow rate is selected such that when providing 60 mmBtu/hr of heating duty,
a single system loop will return HTF from the Second Stage Vaporizer shell to the Fired Heater at 120°F.
Data sheets for the Second Stage Vaporizers (07902-DS-300-304) and Fired Heaters (07902-DS-400-
401) are included in Appendix M.3 of this Report and typical manufacturer data (07902-VP-300-304 and
07902-VP-400-401) is included in Appendix M.4.
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stream from the LP Pumps. The LP Pump discharge is circulated through and around the BOG
Condenser (E-207), through the HP Pump Drum (D-208) and into the suction header that feeds the HP
Pumps. Piping is provided to allow LNG to cool the HP Pump suction header, and to then flow into and
cool the HP Pump discharge header. After traversing this discharge header, the LNG flows into the HP
pump recycle header back to one or more of the LNG storage tanks, via the tank top fill line. In addition,
piping is provided to allow LNG flow through the First Stage Vaporizer inlet header and into the HP
pump discharge header, for maintenance cooling of this large bore line. To provide for these flow paths,
operators will follow startup procedures which will require them to open several normally car seal closed
manual valves.
The design of the HP Pump recycle header permits extended recycle operation of one or more of the HP
Pumps without flow through the vaporizers. To begin vaporization using the AAVs, the fans will be
started in one of the AAV trains, and Operators will then halt maintenance cooling in the discharge
header by car seal closing manual valves per procedure. Once all the zero sendout valving has been re-
car sealed closed, an HP Pump will be started in recycle only. When operation of that pump has
stabilized, the discharge valve on the HP Pump will be throttled opened, which will pressurize the HP
pump discharge header and allow flow to begin to the first vaporizer. LNG will be gradually increased to
the AAV train while gas outlet temperatures are monitored. If additional sendout is required, the process
will be repeated until adequate pumps and vaporizers have been started and lined out.
To initiate use of the Second Stage Vaporization system, warm HTF flow will be initiated through the
shell side of a Second Stage Vaporizer until procedurally controlled operating temperatures are
established. At that time, a portion of the AAV outlet gas flow will be routed through the tube side of
that heat exchanger and the outlet gas temperature monitored. The gas flow will be increased as needed
to achieve the setpoint sendout temperature.
An upset in the sendout system, such as a momentary loss of the sendout line outside of the Terminal
property boundary, will not immediately result in the shutdown of all HP Pumps. Without Operations
staff intervention, the HP Pumps will automatically be shut down in a controlled sequence over time;
however, the design of the recycle system can permit the HP Pumps to remain on line as long as needed
until the cause of the shutdown has been located and corrected. This will minimize the start/stop cycles
on the HP Pumps, which will increase mean time between failures and facilitate a more rapid re-
establishment of sendout.
If the sendout system is to be shutdown for a longer duration, Terminal staff will determine whether or
not to shift to zero sendout mode. The choice will be a function of the estimated time before sendout is
to be re-established.
The preferred source of fuel gas for the fired heaters is BOG from the LNG process system. This gas is
collected in the BOG header, and can be compressed to the required fuel gas pressure in BOG
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Compressor C-204A/B/C and warmed to the required temperature in Fuel Gas Heaters E-213A/B.
Warmed fuel gas flows to Fuel Gas Drum D-214 prior to entering the heater fuel gas manifold.
When the amount of BOG generated at the Terminal is insufficient to meet the fuel gas demand, the next
option for providing fuel gas to the fired heaters is to use the Terminal sendout gas. When used as fuel
gas, the sendout gas must first be reduced in pressure and heated to compensate for the resulting gas
temperature drop. The pressure reduction is performed by one of the two pressure control valves PV-
213A/B, which reduces the sendout pressure to the nominal fuel gas system pressure. The reduced
pressure sendout flow is heated in one of the two Fuel Gas Heaters E-213A/B, after which it flows into
the Fuel Gas Drum D-214.
A data sheet for the Flare Stack (07902-DS-200-210) is included in Appendix M.3.
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Following this bulk draining step, any small residual volume of LNG is gravity drained to a low point
collection (the D-103 Platform Drum on the Unloading Platform, and the D-211 Low Point Drain Drum
onshore). These small LNG volumes are then permitted to vaporize through ambient heat leak into the
respective vessel. The vapors formed are routed eventually to the BOG Header.
This method minimizes problems experienced in some LNG facilities where components are de-
inventoried directly to the LNG storage tanks. In these other applications, trace heavy hydrocarbons in
the drain lines can collect over time in horizontal pipe runs. They can later jell and plug the lines when
contacted by cold LNG during a later draining operation. At the Terminal, any heavy hydrocarbons that
do not vaporize will accumulate in the D-211 Low Point Drain Drum (the lowest point in the process
plant), where they can be removed when desired via a manual drain.
Under this design any potential draining of liquids is directed to the Low Point Drain Drum (D-211) that
collects and vaporizes these liquids. The resulting gas is directed into the BOG Header. Specific sources
of liquid include:
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• The BOG Drum (D-203) which gravity drains to the Low Point Drain Drum under control from
the MCR;
• If the BOG Condenser (E-207), the HP Pump Drum (D-208) or any HP Pump (P-301A through
P-301F) need to be drained for maintenance, the liquid is first pressure transferred using nitrogen
into other LNG systems, then the limited residual liquid is manually gravity drained into the Low
Point Drain Drum; and
• Any liquid remaining between the first isolation valve and the inlet flow control valve of the First
Stage Ambient Air Vaporizers (E-302A through E-302Q) is automatically gravity drained into
the Low Point Drain Drum.
Because all vents, drains and BOG are directed into the BOG Header, which is connected to the vapor
space of the LNG storage tanks (T-201A/B/C), there is no need to vent the system pressure until the
vapor pressures in the LNG storage tanks approach the set point of PIC-290, which directs gas to the
Flare Stack, L-210. During prolonged periods without LNG sendout it is conceivable that venting could
take place as the pressure in the LNG storage tanks rise from the system boiloff. It is also conceivable
that short-term venting could occur with the loss of the BOG Compressors (C-204A/B/C) and/or the
Vapor Return Blowers (C-205A/B) during LNG carrier transfer operations if the LNG storage tanks are
operating near PIC-290’s set point.
The following figure illustrates this philosophy by using HP Pump P-301A as an example.
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Procedurally, VLV 1 would be closed first followed by closing VLV 2. VLV 3 would then be opened
immediately to allow any LNG vapor or gas to be recovered into the Closed Vent/Drain System. Once
the system is fully de-pressured, VLV3 is closed and VLV 4 is opened establishing a safe, “double block
and bleed” isolation (VLV 1, VLV 2 and VLV 4, respectively).
The meter station is protected from over-pressure and unacceptably low operating temperatures through a
two-out-of-three voting logic High Integrity Pipeline Protection System (HIPPS). Activation of the
HIPPS will isolate the meter station from the LNG vaporization system.
Mechanical completion will be achieved only when installation of equipment and systems has been
completed and cleaned out, quality control records have been completed, and all operating and
maintenance manuals have been provided. Oregon LNG will verify that mechanical completion has been
achieved and will review commissioning procedures that will be prepared by the construction contractor.
Oregon LNG will provide the construction contractor with a signed certificate acknowledging that
mechanical completion of the applicable equipment and system has been achieved and that
commissioning may commence.
The commissioning procedures will include pre-commissioning activities, which will include:
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• Confirmation of the operation of all protective devices including emergency shut-down valves;
• Confirmation of operation of all hazard detection and hazard control equipment; and
• Line out of the equipment and system valves including all relief devices to the vent system.
All pre-commissioning activities will be completed before the equipment and systems are commissioned.
13.5.15.4 Commissioning
With respect to cryogenic systems including the LNG unloading pipeline, LNG storage tanks, and LNG
sendout pipelines and equipment, commissioning must include a controlled cooldown process.
The first step of cooldown is to ensure all equipment and systems are sufficiently free of water (dry).
This will be achieved through the use of dry air, liquid nitrogen and nitrogen vaporization equipment.
Dry air will be injected into a common header connection to distribute dry air to all parts of the Terminal.
Commissioning personnel will cycle valves so that all parts of the Terminal receive a steady dry air flow.
This dry air purge will continue until all parts of the Terminal demonstrate hygrometer dew point
readings of -40°F or lower. At this point, the Terminal is considered dry.
Once dryout has been completed, gaseous nitrogen will be injected into the connections previously used
to feed dry air into the piping system. The goal is to displace the dry, oxygen-rich air environment with
an inert nitrogen environment that will not support combustion of flammable gas. Portable
oxygen/flammable gas meters will be used to sample the environment inside the piping system. Once it
is ensured that all points of the Terminal contain an environment with less than 5 percent oxygen, the
system will be considered to be purged and ready for cooldown.
Cooldown will commence with the LNG unloading pipeline and one LNG storage tank. The preferred
and intended method for initial Terminal cooldown is to use LNG, although the Terminal is also designed
such that cooldown can be achieved using liquid nitrogen.
To use LNG for the cooldown, a temporary piping connection is provided at the LNG unloading platform
such that a small LNG flow can be routed from the L-101B LNG unloading arm to the 6-inch LNG
circulation line. The Terminal isolation valves will be aligned such that the 6-inch recirculation line is
open to spray cool ring in one of the LNG storage tanks. The LNG spray first begins purging the LNG
storage tank of nitrogen and then cooling the LNG storage tank. Cool-down of an LNG storage tank
requires about 72 hours. The LNG storage tank contractor will oversee the cool-down process and direct
control of the cool-down rate.
Initially, the gas leaving the LNG storage tanks will be warm and nitrogen rich. As the outlet gas
temperature decreases it will be routed to the Vapor Return Blowers where it is directed to the LNG
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unloading platform. The vapor is desuperheated upstream of the Platform Drum and routed through a
temporary connection to an LNG unloading arm. The cold vapor then returns onshore through the LNG
unloading pipeline. Once on-shore, the vapor cools other large diameter LNG piping.
The Vapor Return Blowers will circulate cold vapor until all portions of the unloading line reach -200°F.
At this point, it is safe to introduce cold liquid to the system. Once the LNG Transfer System has been
inventoried and filling of the LNG storage tank has commenced, normal unloading can then commence.
Once the LNG carrier is unloaded, an LP pump will start and will circulate LNG through the LNG
unloading pipeline and back to the LNG storage tank to maintain the system at cryogenic temperatures.
Once the LNG carrier has departed, commissioning personnel will align the Terminal such that they may
use the vapor return blowers to introduce cold vapor to all equipment and large diameter piping. Once
the Terminal is sufficiently cool, the Terminal will be aligned to provide a cooling flow of LNG from the
LP pumps to the balance of the piping system. At this point, the Terminal is cold and ready for normal
operation.
Appendix L.1 contains details of the LNG Storage Tank and Foundation specification 07902-TS-200-108
that has been used in the preparation of the LNG storage tank design.
13.6.1 General
Appendix R.1 includes a report entitled LNG Storage Tank Alternatives (07902-TS-000-106) that
describes the alternative LNG storage tank design concepts that were considered for the Oregon LNG
Project.
The design concept selected for the LNG Storage Tanks (T-201A/B/C) is a full containment tank, with a
primary inner containment and a secondary outer containment. The tanks are designed and will be
constructed so that the self-supporting primary containment and the secondary containment will be
capable of independently containing the LNG. The primary containment will contain the LNG under
normal operating conditions. The secondary containment is designed to be capable of containing the
LNG (110 percent capacity of the inner tank contents) and of controlling the vapor resulting from the
highly unlikely failure of the inner containment. Each insulated tank is designed to store a net volume of
160,000 m3 (1,006,000 barrels) of LNG at a design temperature of -270°F and a maximum internal
pressure of 4.3 psig.
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• An insulated aluminum deck over the inner containment suspended from the roof.
The aluminum support deck is designed to be insulated on its top surface with fiberglass blanket
insulation material. The fiberglass blanket is chosen to minimize the potential of in-leakage of Perlite®
insulation into the inner containment. The outside diameter of the outer containment is approximately
292 feet at its base. The vapor pressure from the LNG is designed to be equalized through ports in the
suspended deck and will be contained by the outer containment. The internal design pressure of the outer
containment will be 4.3 psig. The space between the inner containment and the outer containment will
be insulated to allow the LNG to be stored at a minimum temperature of -270°F while maintaining the
outer containment at near ambient temperature. The insulation beneath the inner containment will be
cellular glass, load-bearing insulation that will support the weight of the inner containment, tank internal
structures (including the bottom fill standpipe column), and the LNG. The space between the sidewalls
of the inner and outer containments will be filled with expanded Perlite® insulation that will be
compacted to reduce long term settling of the insulation. The outer containment will be lined on the
inside with carbon steel plates. This carbon steel liner will serve as a barrier to moisture migration from
the atmosphere reaching the insulation inside the outer concrete wall. This liner also provides a barrier
to prevent vapor escaping from inside the tank in normal operation.
There will be no penetrations through the inner containment or outer containment sidewall or bottom.
All piping into and out of the inner and outer containments will enter from the top of the tank.
The inner containment is designed and will be constructed in accordance with the requirements of API
Standard 620 Appendix Q. The tank system meets the requirements of NFPA 59A (2001 edition is used
as the basis except where the 2006 edition is more stringent) and 49 CFR Part 193. Refer to Drawing
07902-DG-200-201 included in Appendix L.2 for typical general arrangement details.
Additional typical tank data is provided in LNG storage tank data sheet 07902-TS-200-201 that is
included in Appendix M.3.
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The outer tank roof is composed of a butt-welded compression ring and welded steel plates. A deck is
suspended from the outer roof with hangers. The deck holds the roof insulation above the inner tank.
The outer tank roof and vapor space above the suspended deck will essentially be at ambient temperature.
A typical cryogenic roof penetration is illustrated on Drawing 07902-DG-200-205 in Appendix L.2.
• The specified wind design speed of 150 mph with Exposure C and an Importance Factor, I, equal
1.0 per ASCE 7-05 and as specified in 49 CFR Part 193, Section 2067;
• Seismic loads in accordance with NFPA 59A and the site specific seismic reports included in
Appendix I.1;
• Roof live load (to be determined during detailed design) applied to the entire projected area of
the roof and combined with the specified external pressure and the platform global live load; and
• Platform live load combined with a crane handling live load (both to be determined during
detailed design) and external pressure load. Roof live load is not combined with platform live
load.
The suspended deck will be composed of B209-5083-0 aluminum or equivalent. The suspended deck
hangers will be Type 304 stainless steel.
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the stored LNG will be contained by the outer tank. The inner tank, therefore, will not be subjected to
differential gas pressure and will be stressed only by liquid head, insulation loads, earthquake loads and
the effects of thermal gradients. Circumferential stiffeners will be located on the inside of the inner tank
shell to resist external insulation pressure.
The tank liquid levels will provide a net capacity in the cold condition of at least 160,000 m3 (1,006,000
barrels). Tank liquid levels will be as follows:
• Product temperatures and resulting thermal gradients due to cooldown and subsequent filling and
emptying operations;
• Internal pressure due to liquid head to the Design Maximum Liquid Level;
• Seismic loads in accordance with NFPA 59A and the site specific seismic reports included in
Appendix I.1; and
The inner tank will be composed of nine percent nickel steel A553 Type 1.
The inner bottom will be composed of a lap-welded bottom in the tank interior. Details of a typical inner
containment are illustrated on Drawing 07902-DG-200-201 included in Appendix L.2.
Horizontal and vertical accelerations are considered for both OBE and SSE seismic events.
Appropriate damping factors will consider soil structure interaction effects. The seismic loading on the
base insulation is also considered.
As per the preliminary calculation, sloshing heights for OBE and SSE are 5.6’ and 13.0’ respectively.
The inner tank will accommodate those sloshing heights to prevent over fill accordingly.
The complete seismic information is available in the seismic hazard report included in Appendix I.1.
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Details of a typical bottom corner insulation system are illustrated on Drawing 07902-DG-200-217
included in Appendix L.2.
An important consideration for the installation of the Perlite® in the annular space is the Perlite®
vibration after filling. Vibration will be used to settle the Perlite® to eliminate potential voids or pockets
in the Perlite® volume and maximize the insulating value of the system. A reservoir of Perlite® will be
placed at the top of the annular space to compensate for future, long-term settlement of the Perlite®.
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The suspended deck will be composed of aluminum plate with a series of stiffeners. Hanger bars will
attach to the deck stiffeners and roof framing to suspend the deck above the inner tank. The suspended
deck and hangers are designed for product temperatures. The deck hangers will be composed of stainless
steel.
An independent third servo-instrument for high-high level alarm only with trips will be provided in each
tank. The trip switches from this third instrument, along with the other two automatic gauges, will be
wired to the Safety Instrumented System (SIS) that is described in Section 13.10 of this Report.
This typical instrumentation is further described in technical specification 07902-TS-200-203 and 07902-
TS-200-204 provided in Appendix L.3.
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Each 12-inch x 16-inch valve will have a capacity of approximately 220,000 lb/hr with respect to the
design pressure of the tank. The required relieving rate is dependent on a number of factors, but sizing
will be based on the NFPA 59A Section 7.8.5.3 (2006 edition) requirement that: “The minimum pressure
relieving capacity in pounds per hour (kilograms per hour) shall not be less than 3 percent of full tank
contents in 24 hours.” This corresponds to about 230,000 lb/hour. Therefore a minimum of two on-line
valves will be required to meet this requirement. Two on-line valves have been included within the front
end engineering design. NFPA 59A 7.8.4.B (2006 edition) requires: “Pressure and vacuum relief valves
shall be installed on the LNG container to allow each relief valve to be isolated individually while
maintaining the required relieving capacity.” Therefore, an additional spare valve is provided for each
tank to allow one valve to be taken out of service while maintaining two valves in service to provide the
required relieving capability. Accordingly, a total of three pressure relief valves are provided for each
LNG tank. Each valve is provided with an inlet isolation valve.
NFPA 59A Section 7.8.2 (2006 edition) requires: “Relief valves shall communicate directly with the
atmosphere.” Accordingly, each valve discharge is independently routed to atmosphere. Each relief
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valve discharges to atmosphere at a safe location via its 16" vertical tailpipe. A safe location is
considered to be a minimum of 10 feet from platforms and walkways and 15 feet above local grade (tank
roof). The concrete tank roof has inherent passive fire protection, and the pipework and structures are
passively fire protected.
To protect against the ingress of foreign matter, each tailpipe will be provided with a rain flapper to
protect against rain ingress and a small-bore piped low point drain will be provided. To protect against
snow and ice, each tailpipe will be provided with appropriate winterization. A monorail crane will be
positioned for relief valve service.
These valves are illustrated the tank P&IDs 07902-PI-200-107-01 through 03 in Appendix U.4. A typical
arrangement of the relief valves and nozzles is illustrated on drawings 07902-DG-200-210 included in
Appendix L.2. Typical relief valves are positioned as illustrated on drawing 07902-DG-200-257
included in Appendix L.2.
Each 12" valve will have a capacity of about 210,000 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh) of air with
respect to the design vacuum of the tank. The required relieving rate is dependent on a number of
factors, but the front end engineering design basis is 640,000 scfh of air. Therefore, a minimum of four
on-line valves will be required to meet this requirement. Four on-line valves have been included in the
front end engineering design. NFPA 59A Section 7.8.4.B (2006 edition) requires: “Pressure and vacuum
relief valves shall be installed on the LNG container to allow each relief valve to be isolated individually
while maintaining required relieving capacity.” Therefore, an additional spare valve is provided for each
tank to allow one valve to be taken out of service while maintaining three valves in service to provide the
required relieving capability. Accordingly, a total of five vacuum relief valves are provided for each
tank. Each valve is provided with a dedicated tank-side isolation valve. Valve inlets draw independently
from the atmosphere.
To protect against the ingress of foreign matter, the inlet will be provided with coarse screen; and to
protect against rain and snow ingress, a protective cowl will be provided. To protect against ice, the
valves may be provided with winterization. A monorail crane will be positioned for relief valve service.
These valves are illustrated the tank P&IDs 07902-PI-200-107-01 through 03 in Appendix U.4. A typical
arrangement of the relief valves and nozzles is illustrated on drawings 07902-DG-200-211 included in
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Appendix L.2. Typical relief valves are positioned as illustrated on drawing 07902-DG-200-257
included in Appendix L.2.
13.6.10.2 Cranes/Hoists
The pump handling system will consist of a hydraulic jib crane or a monorail-type hoist. Explosion proof
electric motors or pneumatic drives and components will be provided to meet hazardous rating
requirements. For further details on typical cranes and hoists, refer to drawing 07902-DG-200-224
included in Appendix L.2.
Typical roof connection details are illustrated on Drawings 07902-DG-200-205 and typical internal pipe
work details are illustrated on Drawings 07902-DG-200-202, 07902-DG-200-208, 07902-DG-200-209,
07902-DG-200-210, 07902-DG-200-211, 07902-DG-200-226 and 07902-DG-200-227. These drawings
are included in Appendix L.2.
All piping systems are designed in accordance with ASME B31.3 and NFPA 59A.
The pipes running down the vertical side of the tank wall will be supported from the top of the tank
structure and guided by supports along the vertical run in at least two elevations along the vertical wall.
The supports in the vertical section are attached directly to the tank wall; therefore no structure from
grade for these supports is required.
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The interconnecting rack will contain a pipe support strategically located to account for the
expansion/contraction of the pipework in the vertical leg and any estimated pipe movement due to
seismic-induced tank motion or settlement of the supporting structure.
A stairway with intermediate landings attached to the outer tank will be provided to access the roof
platform for the LP Pumps and instrumentation. A staircase with galvanized steel handrails will be
provided to provide access from the LP Pump platform to the tank roof.
An emergency escape ladder will also be provided opposite the main roof platform and will be accessible
via a roof walkway equipped with handrails. The emergency escape ladder will be of the caged ladder
type with side stepping platforms. It will be attached to and supported by the outer concrete tank.
Typical arrangements of the stairways and ladder are illustrated on drawings 07902-DG-200-238 and
07902-DG-200-240, included in Appendix L.2.
Typical LNG tank access details are illustrated on drawing 07902-DG-200-239 included in Appendix
L.2.
A reinforced concrete bund beneath the tank top platform will be provided to ensure that discharge is
controlled and directed to two spillage down-pipes. These down pipes direct the spill to the base of the
tank, where the spill is discharged into a reinforced concrete channel and directed away from the tank
into a spill containment trough. Drawing 07902-DG-200-235 in Appendix L.2 illustrates plan and
elevation views of a typical tank top platform spill containment and down-pipe arrangement.
The tank top protection will extend to the edge of the roof dome. Any structural carbon steel on the roof
will be protected from potential spills.
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13.6.13 Anchorage
The concrete outer tank wall and base connection is monolithic and does not require anchors.
Since the seismic isolators will reduce the forces to the inner tank, anchor straps will not be necessary for
the inner tank.
13.6.14 Painting
Carbon steel stairs, platforms and pipe supports will be galvanized. Stainless steel, aluminum and
galvanized surfaces will not be painted.
A dual aircraft warning light will be provided at the highest point on each LNG tank if required in
accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) directives. Outdoor convenience receptacles
will be provided at the tank, with a minimum of two at the top platform.
The electrical system is designed in accordance with the National Electrical Code (NEC). Drawing
07902-DG-200-229 provides a typical lightening protection for a full containment tank.
13.6.17 Welding
LNG tank welding procedure qualifications and welder qualifications will be in accordance with ASME
Section IX C13. The guidelines of API 620 Appendix Q will be followed for the quantity of tests. Test
plates will be welded on a test stand.
The shell plate to annular plate joint will be smoothly finished to avoid undercuts and overlaps, provided
that any undercut will be within the tolerances allowed by API 620.
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Alloy verification will be performed in accordance with specifications. Technical specification 07902-
TS-200-202, included in Appendix L.5 summarizes typical requirements.
13.6.18.2 Radiography
The radiographic techniques and acceptance criteria will be in accordance with API 620. The extent of
radiography will be in accordance with API 620 and NFPA 59A Section 4.2.1 (2001 edition). The
radiographic test may be substituted with the ultrasonic test in accordance with API 620 Appendix U.
The inner containers will be made of nine percent nickel. Hydrotest water will be taken from the
Skipanon River and will be filtered to prevent the ingress of coarse materials. The test water will be
sampled and tested for compliance with API 620, Section Q.8.3 requirements for test water quality prior
to use. In addition to the API620 requirements, the test water will meet the following requirements.
• The chemical oxygen demand of the test water (CODMn): below approx. 15ppm.
Since Skipanon River water is brackish water, the water will be treated in reverse osmosis units so that
the quality of test water will satisfy the above requirements. The water will be pumped from the river into
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the inner LNG tank through one of the manholes in the outer containment tank roof. The water flow rate
will be 1,600 gpm realistically although it will be subject to be changed by capacity of the reverse
osmosis units. Approximately 28 million gallons of water will be required to test each tank. Accordingly,
the time to fill the tank will be at least 12 days of pumping at the maximum allowed rate. The water
residence time in the tank will be sufficient to meet the testing time required per API 620 (including a
one-hour hold time) and will otherwise be limited to prevent any possible corrosion. Sediment control
devices will be used during discharge of the test water to minimize turbidity and maintain compliance
with the federal and state water quality standards so there will be no adverse effects on the quality of the
Skipanon River.
Each tank will be equipped with a settlement monitoring system to measure and record inner and outer
tank movements during hydrotest. The settlement monitoring system consists of survey/reference points
equally spaced around the tank and will be capable of measuring differential settlement between inner
and outer tanks. During hydrotest, settlements, rotation and base slab tilting will be monitored at
approximately each 16.4-foot increment of water fill height. Measurements will also be recorded when
the tank is emptied.
The LNG storage tank construction schedule will be developed such that water used to hydrotest the first
storage tank may be reused to test subsequent tanks. After each tank hydrotest, the test water will be
pumped out of the tank, tested, treated (if necessary) and discharged to the river in a location and manner
in accordance with applicable permits and regulations.
Following hydrotesting, the inner tank inside wall, floor and internal structures will be rinsed with fresh
water. Typical rinse water flow rate is about 3-5 gpm. The rinse water will be pumped out of the tank
and discharged to the river in a location and manner in accordance with applicable permits and
regulations. The quantity of rinse water to be discharged is approximately 7200-12000 gallons for each
tank. Detailed procedures for rinse and final drying of the tanks will be prepared and implemented.
A minimum of 16 survey/reference points will be equally spaced around the outer edge of the base slab.
In addition, settlement of the inner tank will be monitored at the same reference points used for the base
slab/outer tank. Measurement will be made from the inner tank annular plate. Also a reference point
will be established on the outer tank wall to measure differential settlement between inner and outer
tanks. Differential settlement and tilting of the base slab will be monitored and recorded.
During hydrotest, settlements, rotation and base slab tilting will be monitored at approximately each
16.4-foot increment of water fill height. Measurements will also be recorded when the tank is emptied.
During construction, the settlement of the base slab and inner tank will be monitored on a weekly basis.
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13.6.21 Drawings
The following LNG storage tank general arrangement and construction drawings are included in
Appendix L.2.
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13.7 Utilities
13.7.1 Instrument Air
The Instrument Air System will supply dry compressed air to pneumatic valves and cabinet purges in the
Terminal.
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Air consumption for pneumatic valves is based on typical consumption rates for control valves (1 scfm),
on/off valves (0.08 scfm), an estimated number of valves in the Terminal, and an assumed ratio of control
valves to on/off valves. The system is designed with 100 percent margin on pneumatic valve air
consumption to account for high short term usage of valves.
Total instrument air consumption will be verified during the detailed engineering phase of the Project.
Three 50 percent motor-driven air compressor packages (C-941A/B/C) will be installed. Each 50 percent
compressor will provide oil-free air at a design rate of 310 scfm (for a total design flow rate of 620 scfm)
and a pressure of 150 psig. Each package consists of a compressor with an electric motor driver, a
knockout drum, an inlet filter, an inter-cooler, if required and an after cooler and control instrumentation
systems. When the system air pressure falls below a predetermined setpoint pressure, the standby
compressor will automatically start.
Two 100 percent Air Dryer Packages (L-942A/B), each with a capacity of 620 scfm, will be installed.
Air from the plant air compressors will supply each dryer package. The dryer will supply the design
instrument air and service air demands at a dew point of -40ºF or lower. The dryers will be of the heat-
less type and will be equipped with inlet and outlet filters. Air provided to the dryers will be oil free.
The maximum allowable pressure drop through the dryer package is 15 psig at the design air supply rate.
An Instrument Air Receiver (D-943) with a volume of 880 ft³ will be provided at the outlet of the dryers.
The vessel is sized so that instrument air can be supplied to the critical users during a system
malfunction. The instrument air volume is sufficient for five minutes when the minimum normal
operating pressure falls from 105 psig to 80 psig. Upon indication of low air pressure in the instrument
air system, flow to the service air system is halted.
P&IDs 07902-PI-940-341 through 07902-PI-940-343 included in Appendix U.4 illustrate the Instrument
Air System.
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Since utility stations are not in continuous use, it is assumed that not more than one 2-inch pneumatic
grinder and one pneumatic impact wrench is in operation at one time. The service air system flow rate is
designed to provide 235 scfm to service these tools.
Total service air consumption will be verified during the detailed engineering phase of the Project.
Service air will be available at utility stations located throughout the Terminal. The actual quantity and
location of utility stations will be determined during the detailed engineering phase.
The Service Air System is illustrated on P&IDs 07902-PI-940-344 and 07902-PI-940-345 included in
Appendix U.4.
13.7.3 Nitrogen
Nitrogen will be used within the Terminal during normal operations and for preparing equipment for
maintenance or return to service after maintenance. Nitrogen will be used to prevent concentrations of
natural gas vapors and oxygen reaching the lower flammability limit.
Nitrogen will be provided for purging of the unloading and vapor return arms before, during and after
unloading.
Prior to unloading, nitrogen is used to purge the unloading arms to remove air pockets between the
carrier and unloading arms. This ensures the natural gas concentration in the arms is below the lower
flammability limit. During unloading, nitrogen is used to purge the swivel joints in the unloading and
vapor return arms. At the completion of unloading, a nitrogen purge is also used to force liquid LNG
into both the LNG carrier and the unloading header.
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Nitrogen is also required on an intermittent basis to purge the unloading arms of LNG and natural gas
after carrier unloading.
The Platform Drum receives LNG liquid drained from the unloading arms at the end of the carrier
unloading. The liquid is transferred to the LNG storage tanks via the unloading line using nitrogen
pressure. This is an intermittent operation and required only after carrier unloading.
LP Pumps (P-202AA/AB/BA/BB/CA/CB)
Nitrogen will be used to maintain a positive nitrogen seal and/or continuous purge in the junction boxes
of the low pressure pumps. Nitrogen is also required for purging the columns when the in-tank LP
Pumps need to be removed for maintenance.
HP Pumps (P-301A/B/C/D/E/F)
Similar to the LP Pumps, nitrogen will be used to maintain a positive nitrogen seal and/or provide a
continuous purge to the electrical and instrumentation junction boxes of the HP Pumps. Nitrogen is also
used to purge the HP pump housings when these pumps need to be disassembled for maintenance.
Nitrogen will be provided to continuously sweep the vent header and stack to prevent air entry.
Utility Stations
Nitrogen will be available at utility stations located throughout the Terminal. Although the actual
quantity and location of utility stations will be determined during the detailed engineering phase,
provision has been made within the front end engineering design based on nitrogen requirements for
purging piping and equipment.
Nitrogen will be supplied to maintain backpressure in this expansion drum during HTF system
temperature swings.
Other Uses
Components that contain LNG or natural gas have nitrogen connections to allow for purging these
components for maintenance or for return to service following maintenance. These components are
supplied with nitrogen from local utility stations via hoses. Other minor uses of nitrogen include
warming of LNG in liquid samplers, laboratory use, etc.
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• 1 x 100 percent dedicated small ambient air vaporizer to maintain pressure in the tank;
• 2 x 100 percent vaporizers (1 operating, 1 back-up) for supply of gaseous nitrogen to meet the
nitrogen demand; and
• Piping network distributed throughout the Terminal to provide nitrogen to equipment and utility
services.
The nitrogen tank and vaporizers will be a skid-mounted, prefabricated vendor package. The equipment
selected will be based on the storage and vaporization requirements of the Terminal. The vendor will
supply the necessary rupture disks, pressure relief devices, instrumentation and valving. The nitrogen
storage tank will be a vertical pressure vessel. The vessel will be vacuum jacket insulated and will be
supplied with liquid nitrogen from a truck. Pressure will be maintained in the tank via a small ambient
air vaporizer loop. The pressure is monitored at the tank outlet. When the outlet pressure decreases
below the set point of the controller, a control valve will open which will allow liquid nitrogen into the
ambient air vaporizer. The vaporized nitrogen will flow into the tank vapor space, which increases the
pressure until the required control pressure is reached. If the pressure increases above the required
control pressure, a control valve will open and excess nitrogen will be vented into the atmosphere.
The vendor package will also include 2 x 100 percent capacity vaporizers (1 operating, 1 standby) which
will vaporize sufficient nitrogen flow to supply gaseous nitrogen to the distribution network on demand.
The spare vaporizer allows one vaporizer to be shutdown for maintenance. A pressure regulator on the
distribution header controls the nitrogen supply pressure.
Temperature indicators at the vaporizer outlet will be used to ensure that cryogenic nitrogen is not
present in the system. Additional safety systems are included in the design to prevent the potential
hazard of cold nitrogen flowing into the distribution network or through the vent to atmosphere.
Nitrogen system P&IDs 07902-PI-960-361 and 07902-PI-960-362 are included in Appendix U.4.
A summary of the Potable Water System design parameters is also illustrated on Terminal Water Balance
07902-PF-900-300 that is included in Appendix U.2.
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approximately 1.25 miles from the Project site, averages 90 psig (the elevation difference between this
location and the site is minimal). The City of Warrenton guarantees the supply pressure will be greater
than the state minimum of 20psig.
The Potable Water System is illustrated on P&ID 07902-PI-920-321, which is included in Appendix U.4.
A summary of the Service Water System design parameters is also illustrated on the Terminal Water
Balance 07902-PF-900-300 that is included in Appendix U.2.
• Storage capacity located above the standpipe elevation in the Fire Water Tank T-601;
• 2 x 100 percent, Service Water Pumps (P-926A/B) operating at 160 feet total dynamic head and
60 gpm; and
• 1 x 100 percent, 300 gallon (working volume) Service Water Hydrostatic Tank (T-927) operating
at 90 psig. The tank will maintain service water distribution piping pressure between operational
cycles of the service water pumps.
The Service Water System is illustrated on P&ID 07902-PI-930-331, which is included in Appendix U.4.
• Storm water from curbed process areas and LNG containment troughs, all of which drain to the
LNG Spill Containment Basin, S-606;
• Condensate and ice melt resulting from operation of the First Stage Ambient Air Vaporizers,
which also drain to the LNG Spill Containment Basin, S-606;
• Storm water from the LNG Spill Containment Basin, S-606 itself;
• Storm water from sumps inside the barrier surrounding the LNG tanks; and
• Storm water from other areas of the Terminal which do not drain directly to the LNG Spill
Containment Basin, S-606.
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In addition to storm water, up to 1,000 gpm of condensate may result from condensation of ambient
water vapor on the outside of the ambient air vaporizer tubing, which is further described in the report
entitled Estimated Condensation Rate for Ambient Air Vaporization (07902-CA-300-302) that is
included in Appendix C.3 . This condensate will also flow to the LNG spill containment basin.
The storm water treatment system is a 1.7 acre area with 28 bioswales, each 130 feet long and 20 feet
wide. Discharge from the storm water treatment system flows into the existing wetlands located on the
northeast portion of the site. The discharge will be distributed across a wide section of the wetlands to
prevent channelization.
The Storm Water & Condensate System Utility Flow Diagram 07902-PF-970-371 included in Appendix
U.2 includes details of the design flow rates, pressures, and temperatures of the system.
This LNG spill containment basin collects all storm water falling directly into the containment system, as
well as any storm water collected into plant areas that drain directly into it. These plant areas include all
LNG spill containment troughs under LNG-conveying pipe racks (including racks extending from the
unloading platform to the shore line, which also drain to this basin), curbed LNG process areas such as
the HP pump area and First Stage Ambient Air Vaporizers area (which drain by troughs to this basin),
and the top of the LNG storage tanks (which also drain to this basin via drain pipes from the tank tops
which feed into troughs). In addition to storm water, this basin also receives condensate and ice melt
resulting from operation of the AAVs. Except for these areas, the site is graded such that no other rain
water will fall into this basin. The basin volume is sized to contain a 10 minute spill of LNG from an
unloading line, with margin, which is more than adequate to contain the expected rain fall.
These sump pumps pump water out of the S-606 basin into Storm Water Oily Waste System L-970. The
NFPA code requires that these sump pumps must remove 25 percent of the rainfall from a 10-year, one-
hour storm, which for Oregon LNG is 0.9 inches per hour. Each of the five pumps is sized to remove
100% of the NFPA 59A required storm water removal flow. Multiple pumps are provided to ensure that
this water removal rate can be achieved simultaneously with the design basis condensate generation rate
from AAV operation. Capacities of these sump pumps are illustrated in 07902-PF-970-371 included in
Appendix U.2.
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This is a 1 x 100 percent system sized to handle storm water at 4,000 gpm. The discharged water from
this system flows to the Bioswales.
The tank area is surrounded by a barrier, which is provided with two sumps to collect storm water. Each
sump has a two 100% sump pumps which pump collected storm water over the barrier and into the L-970
Oily Waste System. The capacity of the pumps and design information for the sump pumps is illustrated
on Utility Flow Diagram 07902-PF-970-371 in Appendix U.2.
The Storm Water System is illustrated on P&IDs 07902-PI-970-371 and 07902-PI-970-372, which are
included in Appendix U.4.
13.7.7 Wastewater
The Wastewater System consists of the following streams:
• Sanitary waste.
The sanitary waste capacity is considered to be equal to the potable water demand, which is illustrated on
Utility Flow Diagram 07902-PF-920-321 included in Appendix U.2. Sanitary wastes will be transferred
to the City of Warrenton municipal water treatment system using a sanitary lift station.
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Vendor information for the LNG Storage Tanks T-201A/B/C are included in Appendix L of this Report.
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13.9 Instrumentation
The following describes the basic instrumentation and control system philosophy for the Terminal. The
systems described are generic and final equipment designs and selection will be made during the detailed
engineering and EPC phases.
A Plant Control and Monitoring System (PCMS) provides control of the Terminal. The PCMS consists
of field instrumentation and a number of microprocessor based sub-systems located in control centers
throughout the Terminal. Primary operator interfaces are located in the Main Control Room (MCR) and
at the Platform Control Room (PCR). The PCMS provides the Terminal personnel with user-friendly
information displays, monitoring, processing and automatic and manual control of the processes.
The subsystems making up the PCMS include the Distributed Control System (DCS), Safety
Instrumented System (SIS), Hazard Detection and Mitigation System (HDMS), Analyzer System, Gas
Metering System, LNG Tank Gauging System, Vibration Monitoring System and Marine Instrumentation
System.
The DCS includes a Supervisory Station that will be located in the MCR and will access (Read Only)
process monitoring and alarm data. The Supervisory Station will be used to generate various operational
and management reports.
Shared process and operation information is passed on a fiber-optic network connecting all the areas.
The Administration Building (A-804) illustrated on Plot Plan 07902-DG-000-001 included in Appendix
U.1 will also be connected to the data highway for information access and to facilitate Emergency
Response as described in the Emergency Response Plan discussed in Section 13.15 of this Report. The
DCS will communicate with each instrument sub-system via Modbus RTU protocol, using Ethernet or
serial connections, or hardwired connections allowing direct control through distributed I/O racks.
The Terminal will be controlled primarily from the Main Control Room (MCR), which will be the
primary operator interface and monitoring center for the Terminal. The MCR will be equipped with push
buttons that activate the Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system described in Section 13.10 of this Report.
Operations personnel in the MCR will monitor critical alarms and process variables and will be able to
manually shutdown the unloading operation and other processes if required during an emergency.
The Platform Control Room will be the control center for unloading operations and will be attended
during LNG unloading operations. The PCR will be equipped with push buttons that activate the ESD
system.
Local Control Station (LCS) shelters will be located in the vicinity of packaged equipment and will
contain instrument cabinets and packaged equipment cabinets. Final positioning of LCS locations will be
determined during the detailed design phase and will be based on Terminal layout, number of instrument
I/Os and packaged equipment.
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Field instruments will be connected via remote distributed I/O panels located in weatherproof enclosures
or via marshalling racks in equipment rooms.
All control system equipment is designed to be of proven design and operational reliability with an
installed base of at least 5 years of operation.
The Control System Block Diagram 07902-DG-700-001 included in Appendix U.11 depicts major
information and control sub-systems and inter-relations. The final system architecture that will be
defined during the detailed design phase will include a flexible integrated design based on functionality,
while at all times ensuring safe, reliable and economic operation of the Terminal as well as ease of
maintenance and troubleshooting.
The MCR will be the primary operator interface and monitoring center for the Terminal. Shared process
and operation information is passed on a fiber-optic network connecting all areas.
Video based operator screens for major control systems such as DCS, HDMS and SIS will be in operator
workstation consoles located in the MCR. The operator console will consist of double-tier CRT monitors
designed for operation. These interfaces will take into account Human Factors Engineering.
In addition to the monitoring screens, the operator console contains hard-wired Emergency Shutdown
(ESD) switches and annunciators for critical alarms, and fire and gas semi-graphic panels.
Other auxiliary systems are also located in the MCR, such as the closed circuit television (CCTV) system
for site security monitoring.
The engineering workstation is located in the MCR. This workstation will interface directly with the
DCS control hardware to store historical data used to perform analysis and generate reports. This
workstation will also interface with the historian. The workstation provides the capability to capture the
sequence and times of significant events. The monitoring function will time and date stamp the events to
an accuracy defined by the Terminal Operator, as well as the duration over which this data will be
maintained and the minimum number of digital signals to archive.
The PCR will be attended during LNG carrier unloading operations. Control from the PCR will be
limited to LNG carrier unloading operations and safety/ESD responses.
The PCR will have an operator console containing remote interfaces for the DCS, SIS, HDMS and hard-
wired ESD switches and annunciators. However, this operator console will only provide monitoring
capabilities.
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The PCR will also have a workstation to control and monitor the Marine Monitoring System and LNG
Unloading Arm and Vapor Return Arm controls. Arm controls will also include local units that can
function in the vicinity of the arms.
Monitoring capability will be provided via video display units located in the MCR and the PCR. The
screens for the operator video display units will be based on the Terminal P&IDs. A logical hierarchy of
the displays will be developed to allow easy navigation throughout the system.
The operator video display units will provide alarm configuration management. The alarm system allows
the Terminal Operator to view all alarms with time stamping and trending screens, as well as historical
trends.
Access to the DCS will be configured to allow different levels of access control to maintain security,
ensuring that only properly trained and authorized personnel can operate the various parts of the
Terminal or access system tuning and software parameters.
The control system will include the capability to capture the sequence and times of significant events.
The DCS will contain the software and hardware required to perform the following functions:
• Automatic/manual remote start sequence and operation. Alarms and events will be available to
the Terminal Operator to identify failures;
• Data communication for integration with other Terminal systems to provide more coordination
between systems;
The DCS will communicate with other systems and vendor packages installed in the Terminal via
Modbus RTU protocol, using Ethernet or serial connections. Where only a few I/O are required to be
monitored, hardwired connections will be used.
The DCS hierarchy consists of operator control level, Terminal control level and field devices. The
operator control level consists of workstations, hardware push button control stations and peripherals.
The Terminal control level consists of DCS controllers, SIS, HDMS and package control systems
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The main components of the DCS consist of the Operator Workstations, the Engineer Workstation, I/O
and Controllers and the Communication Devices. The configuration of the components for the DCS
system will be determined during the detailed design phase, but, as a minimum, will include:
• Interface with BOG Compressor and Vapor Return Blower control systems;
• A historian package that will be a configurable, real time and historical data collection package
for trending, logging and reporting; and
In response to fire and gas leak alerts, operating personnel will have the ability to manually initiate
appropriate fire fighting and/or shutdown actions via hard-wired switches provided on the MCR and the
PCR control consoles.
The Hazard Detection and Mitigation System will have interfaces with the following PCMS sub-systems:
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The Hazard Detection System and equipment is further described in Section 13.14 of this Report.
A microprocessor based networked inventory management system will be used to consolidate all level,
temperature and density measurements associated with the LNG storage tanks. The system will interface
with the DCS via non-redundant Ethernet or serial link.
Automatic vibration shutdown devices will be installed on large, critical rotating machinery. The
following guidelines will be used:
• All critical pumps and rotary or centrifugal gas or air compressors between 100 hp and 1000 hp,
and all non-critical pumps over 500 hp, will be equipped with bearing failure detection
equipment (vibration detection). For anti-friction bearings, a bearing housing mounted velocity,
acceleration or acoustic device will be installed. Velocity style sensors will be used. For
hydrodynamic bearings, Bentley-Nevada non-contacting probes will be installed in an X-Y
configuration;
• All critical pumps and rotary or centrifugal gas or air compressors, 1000 hp and larger will be
equipped with two thrust proximity probes sensing the shaft end or shaft shoulder (not a collar),
two radial proximity probes inboard and two radial proximity probes outboard;
• Equipment 1000 hp and larger will be equipped with vibration trip functions on axial probes;
• Equipment over 5000 hp will be equipped with vibration trip functions on axial and radial
probes;
• Equipment over 12,000 rpm will be equipped with trip function on radial probes;
• All critical pumps and centrifugal gas or air compressors from 500 hp to less than 1000 hp and
all non-critical pumps, will be equipped with one RTD in the lube oil return; and
• All critical pumps and centrifugal gas or air compressors over 1000 hp and larger, will be
equipped with RTDs in the bearings.
Common alarms will be provided on the DCS. Trip signals will be hard-wired to the machine
safeguarding system and alarmed on the DCS.
Machinery suppliers will generally supply the vibration and temperature probes and related electronic
cabinetry.
The vibration monitoring system supplier will provide the centralized monitors, servers and related
software. This console will be located in the MCR or remotely at the individual pieces of equipment.
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13.9.2.7 Burner Management System and Hot Water Heater Control System
Fired Heaters B-401A/B/C will include a Burner Management System (BMS) to ensure safe operation
and control.
The BMS will be a redundant microprocessor based, high-integrity PLC system. Communications from
the BMS to the DCS will be provided through serial link using Ethernet or Modbus RTU.
During unloading operation the carrier personnel will communicate with Terminal operations personnel
via radio. In case of an emergency and/or abnormal operation, the carrier personnel can activate the ESD
push button in the carrier operation room, which is further described in Section 13.10 of this Report.
This signal will be transferred through one or more of the following means:
An activation of the carrier’s cargo system ESD generates a shutdown of the unloading operations (ESD-
1).
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also be monitored on DCS via hard-wired, Ethernet or industry standard serial-linked interface such as
Modbus RTU.
Vendor package programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and other systems will provide, as a minimum, a
status and common alarm to the DCS. This information will be presented to the Terminal Operators in
the operator displays. The graphic representation in the DCS will mimic the representation in the local
panel.
When “intelligent” transmitters are used, a feature that allows connection to the digital communication
system will be available in the I/O rack marshalling panels.
All trips will require online testing capabilities through a switch or through the DCS. All field devices
that are trip inputs to the control systems will have bypass capabilities for maintenance. This will be
provided by either hardwired key-lock bypass switches or software configured screens that inhibit the
input during testing. This feature will be password protected. When any device is in bypass, a status
alarm will be displayed on the alarm panel.
Critical safety systems will have their own separate field mounted input equipment. The physical
detection of the measurement may be shared with another loop, but the electronic processing will be
segregated. For example, one orifice plate may be shared by two transmitters, which also serves to
minimize pipe penetrations and therefore reduce the potential for leaks.
For critical applications, voting systems will be used when dictated based on safety considerations, i.e.,
using two out of two or two out of three transmitters. The selection of voting systems will be based on
the need for increased additional availability and the desire to minimize false readings. The voting logic
will be defined during detailed design and will be based on a failure modes and effects analysis.
Control valve actuators will be a pneumatic design. Hydraulic actuators will be used where fast stroking
is required.
Potential-free contact type process switches will be used for fire detection tubing systems and enclosures
in hazardous areas.
Rotary switches will be used for local trip switches. The trip switch enclosure color will be red. Push
button switches will be used for local trip reset functions.
Thermocouples will be fabricated using ISA premium accuracy, calibrated, thermocouple lead wire of
appropriate alloy. Thermocouple Type K will be used for general service and Type T for LNG service.
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RTDs will be considered in lieu of thermocouples for narrow spans or for higher accuracy. Three-wire,
100-ohm platinum RTDs will be used.
Vibration in Terminal stationary rotating mechanical equipment will be monitored and alarmed where
equipment is critical to the uninterrupted operation of the Terminal.
From the Operator Workstation, the Terminal Operator will be able to verify the conditions of devices
connected on the redundant path and to switch to a redundant device if desired. When appropriate (e.g.,
when a problem occurs with device or communication path), the DCS will automatically switch
“bumplessly” to a redundant device or communication path.
Continuous communications diagnostics will alarm a failure and switch to the redundant communications
path automatically. Any communication errors will be logged at any console in the system.
Communication system status/performance will be made available to any console in the system.
Nodes on the control network will be synchronized across the entire network to within plus or minus one
millisecond via the DCS-based clock. All computers will be time synchronized.
Each sub-system will have the capability to communicate with the DCS system via Modbus RTU
protocol, using Ethernet or serial connections. Where only a few I/O are required to be monitored,
hardwired connections may be used.
Network interfaces to external networks such as the Terminal computer network will be provided with
adequate security such as a “firewall” to protect from misuse, viruses and intruders.
In addition, redundant 24V DC systems will be provided for all equipment as required. This system will
include dual battery chargers and 100% rated dual batteries, arranged so that a failure or removal from
service of any one component will not interrupt service.
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All system and I/O modules will be capable of operating at a minimum of +/-10% available voltage and
+/-5% available frequency.
Separate 24V DC redundant field interrogation voltage and final actuating element power supplies will
also be provided.
Power supplies will be dual as a minimum, each capable of supplying complete system power.
Each power supply will be rated for expected duty including an additional 15% for installation of spare
capacity. The system will accept power from two different power sources.
Power supplies will be replaceable on-line without disrupting the process and without impacting the main
processor. The system will alarm if one of the power supplies in a redundant set fails.
• Safety Instrumented System and supporting system cabinets (30 minutes UPS);
• DCS for process control and monitoring purposes including supporting system cabinets (30
minutes UPS);
• Fire protection safeguarding and monitoring equipment, including supporting system cabinets (2
hours battery backup);
• Packaged equipment control cabinet electronic and PLCs including I/Os (30 minutes UPS battery
backup).
The analyzer systems will interface with the DCS via Ethernet or serial links or hardwired signals.
Analyzers will be required for metering and gas composition for natural gas sendout.
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The metering systems will be supplied complete as a pre-engineered package including the flow
measurement skids, associated instrumentation, analyzers and flow computers.
Communications between the metering system and DCS will be by redundant Ethernet or serial links.
13.9.7 Drawings
13.9.7.1 Control System Block Diagram
Control system block diagram 07902-DG-700-001 is included in Appendix U.11. As detailed design
advances, this diagram will be updated accordingly to reflect final plant configuration.
Primary operator access to the SIS will be provided at the Main Control Room (MCR) A-802 and at the
Platform Control Room (PCR) A-801.
The SIS will be an independent, high integrity system. The system will continuously monitor the
Terminal and alert the Terminal Operator of any hazardous condition. The SIS will provide both
programmable and solid state safeguarding systems that satisfy critical process applications. The SIS
will also be fault-tolerant and designed to eliminate single point failures.
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) requirements will be determined per SIL determination guidelines (ISA
S84.01) during the detailed design phase. The trip philosophy that will be incorporated within the SIS
will be to de-energize to trip (fail-safe) for process machine trips. However, energize to trip systems may
be considered for certain applications such as de-pressuring, fire and gas trips and rotating machinery
trips. The trip philosophy will be finalized during the EPC phase through a Safety Integrity Level
analysis.
SIS equipment will be configured for fail-safe action in the event of power loss or loss of instrument air.
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On-line and off-line diagnostics will be provided to assist in system maintenance and troubleshooting.
Diagnostics will be provided for every major system component.
All SIS I/O will be hardwired from the field devices to the MCR SIS cabinet or remote I/O panel.
All SIS alarms and shutdown conditions will be alarmed in the SIS/HDMS workstation.
Monitoring capability for this system will be provided via video display units and/or mimic panel
displays located in the MCR and the PCR. In response to hazard conditions, the Terminal Operator will
have the ability to manually initiate appropriate shutdown actions via hard-wired switches provided on
the MCR and the PCR control consoles.
SIS initiators are typically field sensors such as transmitters and switches. Smart transmitters will be
used as trip initiators whenever feasible.
I/O signals will provide an alarm for a bad quality signal, whether that input is single or multiple for
voting purposes. The bad quality alarm signal will be displayed in the DCS. These signals will be
transmitted to the DCS by soft-link.
A deviation alarm will be generated for all signals used for voting purposes. This alarm will be
generated whenever the magnitude of the difference between the minimum and maximum signals is
greater than a preset value of 5% full span signal range. This alarm will not be generated if any of the
signals is of bad quality. Instead, a "bad signal quality" alarm will be generated.
• Field mounted addressable instruments and safety valves. Instruments will be accessible for
maintenance and readability;
• A Programmable Electronic System (PES), which will serve as the configurable system for the
SIS. The PES will be independent from the DCS and its reliability will not be affected by the
DCS link status;
• SIS main control panel located in MCR – A high integrity system, UL approved for safety
integrated monitoring service, will be required;
• Operator interface – video display screens and printers located in the MCR and the PCR; and
• Hard-wired switches located at the MCR and PCR and in process areas.
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Continuous communications diagnostics will be installed that will alarm a communications failure and
switch to the redundant communications path automatically. Any communication errors will be logged at
the SIS workstation. Communication system status/performance information will be available from the
SIS workstation.
The SIS communicates with the DCS via Modbus RTU protocol, using Ethernet, serial connections and
hardwired connections. When transmitting great amounts of non-critical data, serial communication
links are used instead of hardwired connections.
Instrument electrical power supply systems are designed to ensure an appropriate level of security for the
function the instrumentation serves.
In addition, redundant 24V DC systems will be provided for all equipment as required. This system will
include dual battery chargers and 100% rated dual batteries, arranged so that a failure or removal from
service of any one component will not interrupt service.
Any 24 VDC power supplies used in the SIS cabinets to power field I/O will be capable of accepting
120VAC +/- 10%, 60 Hz +/- 3%, single phase.
Power supplies will be dual and each will be capable of supplying complete system power.
Each power supply will be rated for expected duty including an additional 15% for installation of spare
capacity. The system will be supplied with power from two different power sources. Power supplies
will be replaceable on-line without disrupting the process and without impacting main processor
triplication. The system will be designed to alarm if one of the power supplies in a redundant set fails.
Critical instruments are those requiring extremely reliable power supplies. These instruments and
controls will remain in service during power failures for a sufficient amount of time to allow the
Terminal to be shutdown. Supplies will be DC with dual battery backup, dual un-interruptible power
supplies (UPS), and dedicated switchboards. The emergency generator (G-502) will provide extended
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power capability to backup the critical supplies. Power to the SIS and supporting system cabinets will be
backed up by a 30 minute UPS.
Each major part of the Terminal and process area will have an ESD circuit. Each ESD circuit will have
dedicated instruments that are independent and separate from instruments used for normal operations.
The LNG carriers have their own ESD system, which will be connected to the Terminal through a
ship/shore umbilical link. The carrier cargo officer will have the ability to initiate an ESD signal.
The ESD system will isolate the Terminal and trip operating equipment. Natural gas sendout into the
pipeline may also be stopped by an ESD valve located in the natural gas sendout pipeline near the
Terminal battery limit.
ESD circuits will be provided for major equipment such as vaporizers, BOG compressors and the LNG
storage tanks.
The Main Control Room will be equipped with push buttons that activate the Emergency Shutdown
(ESD) system. The PCR will also be equipped with manual push button capability to activate the ESD
system. In addition, ESD push buttons will be located in different process areas throughout the Terminal.
The Terminal Hazard Detection and Mitigation System (HDMS) will interface with the ESD system and
will initiate the ESD system upon receipt of specified signals.
Cause and Effect Diagram 07902-DG-660-460 included in Appendix U.4 illustrates the input and output
relationship of all ESD initiators and actions.
The following two levels of ESD will be configured for the Terminal.
• ESD-1: Shutdown of unloading operations and isolation of the pier. ESD-1-1 is a subset of ESD-
1 and activates the Emergency Release Couplings (ERCs) on each of the LNG unloading arms
and the vapor return arm. ESD-1 is referred to as interlock I-100 on the Terminal logic and
P&ID drawings included in Appendix U.4. ESD-1 is referred to as interlock I-101; and
• ESD-2: Shutdown of LNG/NG sendout operations, including ESD-1. This action isolates the
Terminal from the natural gas sendout pipeline and from any carrier which may be berthed at the
unloading platform. ESD-2 is referred to as interlock I-200 on the Terminal logic and P&ID
drawings included in Appendix U.4.
The demarcation of the various ESD zones is depicted in the following diagram.
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The following actions are performed on activation of ESD-1 for the pier:
• ESD valves on unloading arms and vapor return arm are closed;
• LNG unloading pumps on the carrier trip, and the carrier’s manifold valves are closed (through
the ship/shore umbilical signal); and
• ESD push buttons located in the Platform Control Room and the Main Control Room;
• ESD push buttons located near the LNG unloading and vapor return arms;
• Actuation of the first stage over-reach alarm (apex or slew angle) on any of the unloading or
vapor return arms;
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ESD-1 will completely shutdown LNG unloading operations and vapor return and isolate the process
lines to/from the Platform.
• Activation of the Emergency Release Couplings (ERC) on the unloading and vapor return arms;
and
• Activation of ESD-1.
• ESD push buttons located in the Platform Control Room and the Main Control Room;
• ESD push buttons located near the LNG unloading and vapor return arms; and
• Activation of 2nd stage overreach of apex or slew angle alarm on any of the unloading or vapor
return arms.
• The inlet and outlet valves to the LNG Storage Tanks close;
• HP Pumps trip;
• Valves close on LNG inlet and outlet to the BOG Condenser and the HP Pump Suction Drum
area;
ESD-2 action is initiated manually by activation of any single push button at the following locations:
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Each first stage vaporizer will require ESD valves at the LNG inlet and natural gas outlet for isolation of
the vaporizer.
ESD valves for pipes into and out of tanks will be located at the tank nozzle.
All ESD valves will be of fire-safe design provided with single action, fail-closed actuators and will be
activated by the SIS.
ESD valve trip circuits will be periodically tested to verify proper functioning of the ESD valves as
required to meet the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) established for that valve.
Details of the shutoff valves that will be used as ESD valves at the marine area of the Terminal are
included in Appendix S.1.
Open/close limit switches on the ESD valves will be provided for confirmation of trip action. ESD valve
limit switches will not be used for shutdown functions, but may be used for permissive activities. If the
command to the valve does not match with the position switch, an alarm will be generated and will be
displayed on the DCS.
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13.11 Electrical
13.11.1 Description of Electrical System
The following describes the Terminal’s electrical system. See single line diagrams 07902-DG-500-501
through 07902-DG-500-503 (included in Appendix O.2) for reference.
Four 4160V buses are supplied from the 13.8kV bus. The 4160V buses will consist of two groups of
double-ended buses with a bus tie breaker between the buses in each group. XB-511A and XB-511B will
make up the first bus group, and XB-511C and XB-511D will make up the second.
Each 4160V bus powers 2 480V buses. The 480V buses will consist of 480V switchgear XB-521A, XB-
521B, XB-521C and XB-521D, XB-521E, XB-521F, XB-521G and XB-521H, with bus tie breakers
between XB-521A-XB-521B and XB-521C-XB-521D and XB-521E-XB-521F and XB-521G-XB-521H.
A fifth 480V bus, XB-521J, is powered off 4160V bus XB-511A or XB-511B and provides power to the
pier.
During normal operation, the 13.8kV, 4160V and 480V bus feeders will be configured to provide
maximum redundancy and protection in the event of a loss of power supply to any bus.
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• One LP pump, to maintain LNG circulation throughout the LNG unloading pipeline for
maintenance cooling;
• Control systems;
The standby diesel powered generator (G-502) is connected to the 4160V bus and will be used when the
normal power supply has failed. As stated above, G-502 is sized to power non-process loads, i.e., non-
motor loads, plus one LP pump. Motor loads will drop out when the power is lost. Essential and
emergency loads will be powered from UPS systems, as illustrated on drawing 07902-DG-500-503
included in Appendix O.2. The G-502 will supply all remaining loads connected to the switchgear
breakers and molded case circuit breakers. The G-502 is also sized to power one in-tank LP Pump in the
event of an extended outage to maintain recirculation of the LNG unloading pipeline. Once the normal
power supply has been restored, G-502 will automatically synchronize with the utility source. Terminal
Operator action will be required to re-close the main feeder to the Terminal, after which the bus tie
breaker will automatically open (i.e., when both main feeder breakers are closed).
As illustrated on drawing 07902-DG-500-503, G-502 will also provide power to the 480V buses and to
the Unloading Platform. This eliminates the need for a separate stand-by generator on the pier.
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The 4160V switchgear will be built to ANSI/IEEE C37.20.7 arc-resistant type 2 design. Arc-resistant
design is also specified for the 4160V MCCs and the low-voltage switchgear.
The circuit protection scheme employs both electronic devices and standard fuses and circuit breakers.
Electronic relays will be GE Multilin style.
The following table provides design details for motors that will be used at the Terminal.
Cable trays installed on the pipe rack will be used and will be extended to the electrical loads whenever
practical. Cable trays will be aluminum, hot-dipped galvanized steel or reinforced fiberglass depending
on the suitability of each in proximity to salt-water. Cable trays will be separated for the following
systems:
• 4160V;
Critical circuits for the ESD and communications system will be run in dedicated rigid galvanized steel
(RGS) conduit with orange labels.
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RGS conduit will be used for all runs from the cable tray to equipment, except for metal-clad cable,
which can be run in channels. Flexible conduit will be used for all final runs to rotating or vibrating
equipment.
In general, electrical equipment will be located outside of classified areas where practical. Conduit seals
and associated fittings will be used in hazardous classified areas. In accordance with the requirements of
NFPA 496, control cabinets located in hazardous locations will be purged with dry instrument air and
alarms will be installed to warn of low purge air pressure. All panels and fixtures that cannot be located
out of a classified area will be NEMA 7X with appropriate thermal T-rating.
The lighting system will be connected to the emergency power bus to ensure lighting is available for
operations and security during loss of offsite power events.
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information packages to be obtained during final design. To allow for this usage, the Terminal nitrogen
system has been sized to allow for consumption of some nitrogen purge gas for this demand.
Similarly, the pass-through seal design for other pressure boundary instrumentation will also meet NFPA
59A (2001 edition) Section 7.6 requirements. The specific sealing arrangement will be determined based
on the vendor selected for each type of instrumentation. Drawings illustrating these seals will be
provided with vendor information packages to be obtained during final design.
There are two sources available at the Terminal for fuel gas for these fired heaters. Each is described
below.
Data sheet 07902-DS-200-213 is provided in Appendix M.3 for Fuel Gas Heaters E-213A/B.
13.12.2 Drawings
13.12.2.1 Plans Showing Piping and Equipment Layout
Fuel Gas System Piping and Instrument Diagram 07902-PI-200-112 included in Appendix U.4 illustrates
the fuel gas system arrangement.
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The following siting requirements from 49 CFR Part 193 and NFPA 59A (2001) are applicable to
systems and equipment.
• Three 160,000 m3 (net) full-containment LNG storage tanks – 49 CFR Parts 193.2057 and 2059
require the establishment of thermal and flammable vapor exclusion zones for LNG storage
tanks. NFPA 59A Section 2.2.3.2 specifies four thermal exclusion zones based on the design
spill and the LNG spill containment area. NFPA 59A Sections 2.2.3.3 and 2.2.3.4 specify a
flammable vapor exclusion zone for the design spill, which is determined in accordance with
Section 2.2.3.5 of NFPA 59A;
• A pier consisting of one LNG carrier berth and a marine cargo transfer system consisting of three
16-inch LNG unloading arms, a single 16-inch vapor return arm, and a single 36-inch LNG
transfer pipeline. 49 CFR Parts 193.2001, 2057 and 2059 require thermal and flammable vapor
exclusion zones for the transfer system. NFPA 59A does not address LNG transfer systems; and
• Six in-tank LP LNG pumps (two per tank); six HP pumps; 150 First Stage Ambient Air
Vaporizers; and three Second Stage Vaporizers. 49 CFR Parts 193.2057 and 2059 require
thermal and flammable vapor exclusion zones. NFPA 59A Section 2.2.3.2 specifies the thermal
exclusion zone and Sections 2.2.3.3 and 2.2.3.4 specify the flammable vapor exclusion zone
based on a design spill.
The LNG storage tanks (T-201A/B/C) that will be installed at the Terminal are full-containment type
tanks, with a primary inner containment and a secondary outer containment. The tanks are designed and
constructed so that the self-supporting primary containment and the secondary containment will be
capable of independently containing the LNG. The primary containment will contain the LNG under
normal operating conditions. The secondary containment will be capable of containing the LNG (110
percent capacity of inner tank) and of controlling the vapor resulting from product leakage from the inner
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containment. Each insulated tank is designed to store a net volume of 160,000 m3 (1,006,000 barrels) of
LNG at a temperature of -270°F and a maximum internal pressure of 4.3 psig.
• An insulated aluminum deck over the inner containment suspended from the roof.
The outside diameter of the outer containment is approximately 292 feet at its base. The vapor pressure
from the LNG is designed to be equalized through ports in the suspended deck and will be contained by
the outer containment. The internal design pressure of the outer containment will be 4.3 psig. The space
between the inner containment and the outer containment will be insulated to allow the LNG to be stored
at a minimum temperature of -270°F while maintaining the outer containment at near ambient
temperature. The insulation beneath the inner containment will be cellular glass, load-bearing insulation
that will support the weight of the inner containment, internal structures, and the LNG. The space
between the sidewalls of the inner and outer containments will be filled with expanded Perlite®
insulation that will be compacted to reduce long term settling of the insulation. As these tanks sit upon
isolators, no base heating will be provided for these tanks. The outer containment will be lined on the
inside with carbon steel plates. This carbon steel liner will serve as a barrier to moisture migration from
the atmosphere reaching the insulation inside the outer concrete wall. This liner also provides a barrier
to prevent vapor escaping from inside the tank in normal operation.
There are no penetrations through the inner containment or outer containment sidewall or bottom. All
piping into and out of the inner and outer containments will enter from the top of the tank.
The inner containment is designed and will be constructed in accordance with the requirements of API
Standard 620 Appendix Q. The tank system will meet the requirements of NFPA 59A and 49 CFR Part
193. Refer to Drawing 07902-DG-200-201 included in Appendix L.2 for general arrangement details and
also to Section 13.6 of this Resource Report for details of the LNG storage tank design.
Spill protection of the tank roof is designed to comply with the requirements of NFPA 59A. The
protection will extend to the edge of the roof dome. Any structural carbon steel on the roof will be
protected from potential spills. Spill protection for the LNG storage tank roof is illustrated on drawing
07902-DG-200-235 included in Appendix L.2.
The full containment design prevents water ingress into annular spaces and therefore there are no water
removal requirements for this tank design.
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This basin is designed to contain a spill of LNG resulting from a guillotine failure of the 36-inch LNG
unloading pipeline flowing for a period of ten minutes (see Line Numbers LNG-100-36-01SS-8CC and
LNG-200-36-01SS-8CC on the P&IDs in Appendix U.4). This is an unlikely occurrence, because the
LNG unloading line will be a fully welded design. The maximum LNG unloading rate is 14,000 cubic
meters per hour; therefore, the basin volume is designed to contain a ten-minute spill equal to 2,333 cubic
meters of LNG (equivalent to 82,400 cubic feet, or 616,400 gallons).
LNG spilled from the process area would also flow into this basin. The required spill volume for sizing
the sump is based on a ten-minute flow from a guillotine failure of the LNG Storage Tank In-tank LP
Pump discharge header (Line Numbers LNG-232-30-01SS-7.5CC and LNG-239-30-01SS-7.5CC on the
P&IDs in Appendix U.4) operating at full rated capacity. The full sendout capacity for the Terminal at
peak conditions is 1.5 bscfd. Assuming a typical expansion of 600-to-1 for vaporized LNG, 1.5 bscfd is
equivalent to about 2,950 m3/hour, which is substantially less than the unloading rate of 14,000 m3/hour.
Since the sump was sized based on a design basis 10 minute spill at the full unloading rate, it is much
larger than required for a guillotine break of the LP Pump Discharge Header.
The location of LNG Spill Containment Basin S-606 is illustrated on the Terminal plot plan 07902-DG-
000-001 included in Appendix U.1.
LNG spills would flow along insulated concrete troughs that will be located adjacent to and beneath
LNG transfer pipes leading to the LNG storage tanks, and adjacent to and beneath LNG piping between
the tanks and process area equipment. Troughs are designed and sized to minimize vapor formation
during LNG spills. Pipe-rack section drawings 07902-DG-000-002-01 and 07902-DG-000-002-02
included in Appendix U.6 illustrate the following information:
• Dimensions of pipe-racks;
• Locations and dimensions of LNG spill containment troughs and dimensions; and
The capacity of LNG Spill Containment Basin S-606 is summarized in the following table.
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The basin will be an insulated concrete design, which is further described in Section 13.21 of this
Resource Report 13. In accordance with the requirements of Section 2.2.2.8 of NFPA 59A (2001
edition), the insulation system used for the impounding surfaces will be, in the installed condition,
noncombustible and suitable for the intended service, considering the anticipated thermal and mechanical
stresses and loads.
Section drawings of the LNG Spill Containment Basin are illustrated on LNG Spill Containment Cross-
Section Drawing 07902-DG-600-002 included in Appendix U.7.
As required by Section 2.2.2.7 of NFPA 59A (2001 edition), the spill containment basin will include a
sub-basin to clear rain or other water from the impounding area. For the Oregon Terminal, water
generated by operation of the ambient air vaporizers (from condensation of ambient water vapor and ice
melt) will also flow initially into this sub-basin. In accordance with Section 5.2.2.10.2 of NFPA 59A
(2006 edition) the water removal system will have the capacity to remove water at a minimum of 25
percent of the rate from a storm of a 10-year frequency and 1-hour duration. As illustrated in document
07902-CA-900-301 that is included in Appendix C.6, this is equivalent to 0.9 inches per hour for the
area.
Per the requirement of Section 2.2.2.7 of NFPA 59A (2001 edition), sump pumps P-607A/B/C/D/E will
be installed to remove water from the spill containment basin. Utility Flow Diagram 07902-PF-370-371
included in Appendix U.2 illustrates the design and continuous volumetric flows of water removed from
the spill containment basin, which is routed to an oily water separator and then discharged to the
bioswale area of the Terminal site.
The sump pumps will be fitted with an automatic cutoff device that prevents their operation when
exposed to LNG temperatures.
The following summarizes the bounding assumptions used in thermal radiation modeling and the
isopleths that have been calculated.
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S-606 basin dimensions ................................................................. 110 feet long by 110 feet wide
Ambient Temperature (°F)..........................................................................................................37
Relative Humidity (%).............................................................................................................58.2
Wind speed (mph)....................................................................................................................0-16
Weather data used in thermal radiation and flammable vapor exclusion calculations for the Import
Terminal are from published data from the Astoria Clatsop County Airport, COOP ID 350328. The data
set used for these calculations included hourly-collected data from a period beginning December 31,
2000 and ending December 31, 2005.
In accordance with 49 CFR Part 193.2057, these calculations use values for wind speed, ambient
temperature and relative humidity that produce the maximum exclusion distances, except for those values
that occur less than five percent of the time based on recorded data for the area.
Based on this set of input data, the thermal radiation exclusion zone distances listed below were
calculated:
The DEGADIS Dense Gas Dispersion Model has been used to compute dispersion distances. The
calculation and resulting flammable vapor exclusion zones for the Terminal are detailed in Appendix Q.1
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of this Resource Report 13. The following summarizes the assumptions used in flammable vapor
exclusion modeling and the resulting distances.
Weather data from the Astoria Airport from 2001-2005 were used to calculate the above temperature. In
accordance with 49 CFR Part 193.2059, the average ambient temperature is used.
Based on this set of input data, the flammable vapor exclusion zone distances listed below were
calculated:
Note: All distances are presented as radii measured from the center point of the specified location.
Drawing 07902-DG-000-006 included in Appendix Q.2 of this Resource Report 13 depicts the flammable
vapor exclusion distances in relation to the property boundaries.
The HDMS will be an independent, stand-alone, high integrity system and will continuously monitor and
alert operating personnel to LNG spills, fires or flammable gas leaks. The HDMS will be based on a
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Proprietary Supervising Fire Alarm System in accordance with NFPA 72. This system will also be fault-
tolerant and self-supervising to alert operating personnel of fault conditions.
The main HDMS control panel and operator interface will be located in the MCR. A secondary control
panel will be provided in the PCR for control of systems on the pier. Local control panels will be
distributed around the Terminal to provide local detection, notification and system release functions.
The local control panels and the main control panel will be networked together on a dedicated system.
The HDMS will have a communication link to the DCS for the display of HDMS status and alarm signals
on the DCS.
• Field-mounted addressable fire and flammable gas detectors and other sensors. All instruments
will be accessible for operation and maintenance;
• Visual and audible alarms located in the field and the MCR to notify personnel of hazardous
conditions. Leak hazards and fire hazards will have distinct alarms;
• Local control panels for the initiating devices and notification devices. Automatic activation of
fire suppression systems and control of other equipment (e.g., automatic shut-off of ventilation
systems) are also accomplished from the local control panels. All circuits will be supervised to
detect integrity problems;
• A HDMS main control panel that will be located in the MCR. The main control panel will be
networked with the local panels over a high integrity communications system. The network
circuit will be supervised to detect integrity problems;
• Operator interface via video display screens and printers located in the MCR and the PCR;
• Mimic panels located in the MCR, PCR and other buildings as required; and
The HDMS will execute control logic for single detectors as well as for groups of detectors. For
example, a voting scheme may be applied where three detectors are installed in a particular area and
alarms from two out of the three detectors will initiate controlled actions. A deviation alarm will be
generated for all signals used for voting purposes. This alarm will be generated whenever the magnitude
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of the difference between the minimum and maximum signal signals is greater than a preset value of 10
percent full span signal range. This alarm will not be generated if any of the signals is of bad quality.
Monitoring capability is provided via graphic display screens and mimic panel displays located in the
MCR and the PCR. All HDMS alarms and shutdown conditions will be alarmed in the SIS/HDMS
workstation. Fire alarms and overview graphics illustrating the location of the detector will be repeated
on the DCS via communications links.
Fire and flammable gas detection and protection of offices and other buildings will be via networked fire
panels provided by the building supplier. These fire panels will be located in individual buildings and
networked to the main fire alarm control panel in the MCR. All hazard signals will alarm locally as well
as in the MCR and PCR. Local signals will be audible and visual (strobe lights) and will have distinctive
alarms and colors for fire and flammable gas (leak) hazards.
Operating personnel will be able to initiate appropriate fire fighting and/or shutdown actions via hard-
wired switches provided at the MCR and the PCR control consoles in response to fire and/or flammable
gas leaks.
Hazard trips that initiate automatic shutdown of equipment and systems and which will activate the ESD
system are described in Section 13.10 of this Resource Report 13. The input and output relationship of
all ESD initiators and actions is further illustrated in Cause and Effect Diagram 07902-DG-660-460
included in Appendix U.4.
The fire and flammable gas detection system is designed such that no single failure point would affect
system integrity. All circuits and devices will be supervised, and shorts to ground will not prevent alarm
or communication capability. Failure of any single active component supplied within the system will not
cause a multiple loss of field devices and during such a failure the system will remain on-line and will
continue to monitor for fire and flammable gas. Additionally, the system will accommodate a means for
alarming the fault.
On-line and off-line diagnostics will be provided to assist in system maintenance and troubleshooting.
Diagnostics will be provided for every major system component and peripheral.
Data sheets for the following hazard detection equipment are included in Appendix M.3.
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Document
Description
Number
07902-DS-600-612-01 Smoke Detector
07902-DS-600-612-02 Smoke Detector – High Sensitivity
07902-DS-600-613 Low Temperature Detector
07902-DS-600-614-01 Combustible Gas Detector
07902-DS-600-614-02 Combustible Gas Detector
07902-DS-600-614-03 Combustible Gas Detector – Duct Mounted
07902-DS-600-615-01 Flame Detector – Indoor
07902-DS-600-615-02 Flame Detector – Outdoor
07902-DS-600-616 High Temperature Detector
13.14.4 Drawings
13.14.4.1 Hazard Detector Layout Plans
The following hazard detector layout plans are included in Appendix U.8.
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• The structure of the emergency response team, including roles, responsibilities and contact
details;
• Responses to emergency situations that occur within the LNG Import Terminal;
• Emergency evacuation adjacent to the LNG Import Terminal and along LNG carrier transit
routes;
• Documentation of consultations made with interested parties during the development of the ERP;
and
• Details of cost sharing plans that have been negotiated to reimburse capital costs, annual costs
and other expenses incurred by off-site emergency organizations in providing emergency
response services to the LNG Import Terminal.
In accordance with the above-mentioned FERC draft guidance document, the ERP will be prepared in
consultation with the U.S. Coast Guard and state and local agencies. Oregon LNG will request
Commission approval of the ERP prior to the commencement of construction.
• Can the Terminal Operations Personnel prevent harm to personnel or property by taking
reasonable and prudent actions? This criterion determines whether the emergency is a
Controllable Emergency or Uncontrollable Emergency; and
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Controllable Emergency
This is an emergency in which the Terminal Operations Personnel can prevent harm to personnel or
equipment by taking reasonable and prudent actions such as valve manipulations, shutting down
equipment, or initiating the Emergency Shutdown System. Examples of Controllable Emergencies that
may occur at the Terminal include:
• LNG spills that are contained within the LNG spill containment system and do not result in fire;
• LNG spills that are contained within the LNG spill containment system and result in a fire within
the containment system;
• Collapse of buildings or systems and equipment that does not result in or does not have the
potential to result in the loss of containment of LNG or flammable gases;
• Vehicle accidents;
• Breaches of site security that do not result in or have the potential to result in substantial damage
to the Terminal.
Uncontrollable Emergency
This is an emergency in which the Terminal Operations Personnel cannot prevent harm to personnel or
equipment by taking reasonable and prudent actions such as valve manipulations, shutting down
equipment, or initiating the Emergency Shutdown System. An Uncontrollable Emergency involves
situations that have the potential to result in exposure of personnel or property to natural gas in a liquid,
cold vapor, or gaseous state or may result in fire or explosion. Examples of Uncontrollable Emergencies
that may occur at the Terminal include:
• LNG spills that are not contained by the LNG spill containment system and do not result in fire;
• LNG spills that are not contained by the LNG spill containment system and result in an
unconfined fire;
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• Building or equipment fires that contain or have the potential to contain flammable gases
• Severe weather conditions that cause wide-scale damage to equipment and systems that result in
or have the potential to result in a loss of containment of LNG or flammable gases.
In addition, a Security Breach that results in a high probability of substantial damage to the Terminal and
may create an Uncontrollable Emergency will be considered an Uncontrollable Emergency, even if no
damage has yet occurred. Examples of this situation include:
• Discovery of an explosive device in close proximity to an LNG tank or major LNG pipeline or
natural gas pipeline; and
• An act of sabotage that may result in structural failure of an LNG storage tank or rupture of an
LNG tank or major LNG pipeline or natural gas pipeline.
A Security Breach that results in a high probability of substantial damage to the Terminal is considered a
Terminal Site Emergency.
At the instruction of the Terminal Emergency Director, emergency help will be requested by the Public
Information Contact from off-site emergency organizations during a Terminal Site Emergency
The following diagram illustrates the decision-making process that Oregon LNG will use to classify site
emergencies and determine the appropriate response to the emergency.
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Certain Emergency Actions will require emergency response from outside organizations. Effective
Emergency Response Planning and response is, therefore, dependent on close, ongoing coordination
between Oregon LNG and those outside organizations.
To assure effective coordination is maintained, there will be periodic meetings, drills, and familiarization
tours conducted for these organizations at predetermined intervals. In addition, the outside organizations
will be encouraged to send new members to the Oregon LNG Import Terminal for familiarization tours.
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Oregon LNG will coordinate the development of its ERP with the U.S. Coast Guard and state and local
agencies. A significant aspect of this plan will be the organization and staffing of local police, fire, and
emergency response resources and personnel specific to the needs and action plans of the Import
Terminal. The ERP will describe the roles and responsibilities of the off-site emergency services.
• Operations Personnel;
• Maintenance Personnel;
• Security Personnel;
During normal working hours, the Terminal Management Personnel will initiate the Emergency
Response Plan. During off-normal working hours, Operations Personnel will initiate the Emergency
Response Plan.
When the Emergency Response Plan is put into effect, Terminal Personnel will assume designated
positions, each with specific duties as depicted in the following chart.
Terminal
Emergency Director
Security
Public Information Emergency Response Shift Assembly
Contact Team Leader Supervisor Leaders
Security
Emergency Response Force
Team
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The Terminal Emergency Director is in command of the Terminal Emergency Organization. If the
emergency occurs outside of normal business hours, the Shift Supervisor will assume the Terminal
Emergency Director position until relieved by the Terminal Manager.
The role of the Terminal Emergency Director involves interacting with both on-site groups (Terminal
employees dealing with the emergency) as well as off-site groups (media and off-site emergency
organizations). If the emergency continues for an extended period, then the Terminal Emergency
Director position may be filled in rotation by mo0re than one person. The Terminal Emergency Director
is normally based in the Emergency Control Center, which will be located in the Administration
Building.
The specific duties of the Terminal Emergency Director position will include the following tasks:
• Assessing each emergency and determining the appropriate Emergency Classification using
information provided by the Emergency Response Team Leader;
• Designating and directing the Terminal Public Information Contact or acting as the Terminal
Public Information Contact until another individual is designated for that position;
• Coordinating activities with off-site emergency organizations and, if acting as the Public
Information Contact requesting off-site assistance for emergency response;
• Determining which resources are required to respond to an emergency and directing the call-in of
additional Terminal employees;
• Directing on-site evacuation and providing recommendations for off-site evacuation as needed;
In the event of an emergency at the Terminal, it is critical that information released to public agencies,
the media, and ultimately the general public be accurate. During an emergency situation, the Terminal
employees may be contacted by the media or by members of the general public regarding the emergency.
In order to assure that accurate information is disseminated, only the Public Information Contact will be
authorized to provide information to the media, local agencies or the public. Terminal employees will
refer all persons with questions regarding the emergency to the Public Information Contact. Also, if
Terminal employees are questioned about statements or speculations that arise, they will also refer the
person to the Public Information Contact.
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The Public Information Contact will be designated as the information point of contact by the Terminal
Emergency Director and acts as the spokesperson for disseminating information to all media outlets and
state and local emergency organizations. The Public Information Contact reports to the Terminal
Emergency Director.
The specific duties of the Public Information Contact include the following tasks:
• Appointing and overseeing a liaison to communicate with local emergency organizations during
General Emergencies; and
• Designating a media area, preparing news releases, and disseminating information to the media
in accordance with established protocols.
The Emergency Response Team Leader will be the on-duty Shift Supervisor or Lead Operator. The
Emergency Response Team Leader will command the on-site Emergency Response Team and will report
to the Terminal Emergency Director. Generally, the Emergency Response Team Leader will direct the
Operations Team and off-site emergency organizations while they are performing emergency actions at
the Terminal.
The specific duties of the Emergency Response Team Leader include the following tasks:
• Assessing each emergency situation and assuming the role of Terminal Emergency Director until
relieved by the Terminal Manager;
• Identifying the actual and potential hazards affecting the Terminal, its personnel and/or areas
adjacent to the Terminal;
• Providing the Terminal Emergency Director with the current information about the emergency
situation.
The Emergency Response Team will report directly to the Emergency Response Team Leader. The
Emergency Response Team's responsibilities include the direct actions to bring the Terminal to a safe
status.
• Operations Personnel;
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• Maintenance Personnel;
• Selected contractor personnel as requested by the Emergency Response Team Leader; and
The specific duties of the Emergency Response Team include the following tasks:
• LNG and flammable gas release control. This role will primarily utilize Terminal Operations
and Maintenance Personnel, who will implement immediate actions required to terminate any
release and mitigate the consequences of the emergency incident.
• Emergency recovery and restoration. This role will primarily utilize Terminal Operations and
Maintenance Personnel, who will implement immediate actions required to bring the Terminal to
a safe condition and mitigate the consequences of the emergency incident.
• Fire fighting. This role will primarily utilize off-site fire fighting personnel. The Terminal
employees are also trained to fight fires.
• Re-entry into areas that were previously evacuated. Re-entry will be approved only by the
Terminal Emergency Director. Re-entry will primarily utilize Terminal Operations and
Maintenance Personnel, who will search for unaccounted personnel, rescue trapped or injured
personnel, perform maintenance or operations activities to terminate or mitigate the emergency,
determine safe areas and personnel exclusion areas, and determine the nature and magnitude of
the emergency.
• Medical Aid. This role will utilize Terminal employees, including the Safety and Health
Coordinator, and off-site rescue squads as needed. The Terminal employees will perform this
function until off-site rescue squad personnel arrive. As off-site rescue squad personnel arrive,
Medical Aid activities will be taken over by rescue squad personnel to free the Terminal
employees for Terminal recovery activities. The Medical Aid activities include transporting
injured persons to a safe location, administering first aid, determining if transport off-site is
needed, notifying hospital(s) of incoming injured, transporting injured personnel to appropriate
medical facilities, and maintaining accurate records of all first aid treatment.
The Security Shift Supervisor supervises the Security Force and reports directly to the Terminal
Emergency Director. The Security Shift Supervisor is responsible for assuring the Security Force carries
out its assigned duties.
Security Force
The specific duties of Security Force Personnel include the following tasks:
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• Ensuring that Terminal access roads are clear for use by emergency vehicles and essential
personnel;
• Coordinating and directing off-site emergency response teams to staging areas as directed by the
Emergency Response Team Leader;
• Identifying needs for additional security requirements (i.e., local law enforcement) and
communicating those needs to the Terminal Emergency Director.
Assembly Leaders
The Assembly Leaders perform an accountability function and direct personnel safely to assembly areas.
Assembly Leaders will assume their designated roles when a Terminal evacuation is ordered by the
Terminal Emergency Director.
Although the Assembly Leaders report to the Terminal Emergency Director, they will also communicate
directly with the Emergency Response Team Leader.
Dry chemical systems installed at the Terminal will consist of total flooding systems, local application
(fixed nozzle and/or hose line systems) and/or portable extinguishers (both handheld and wheeled).
System selection, as discussed in Section 13.16.2 below, depends on the type of hazard, the location of
the hazard, the size of the hazard, existence of nearby ignition sources, ability to access the hazard and
the potential consequences of the fire on the public, Terminal personnel and equipment. As illustrated in
Section 13.16.4, these systems are located at strategic locations to facilitate effective fire extinguishment.
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These systems are designed in accordance with NFPA 17 for engineered systems and NFPA 10 for
portable extinguishers and will be UL listed or FM approved.
Fixed dry chemical systems are provided on the unloading platform, the Compressor Building, HP Pump
Enclosure and the LNG storage tank pressure safety valve tail pipes.
• Enclosed areas that contain natural gas or LNG processing equipment should be protected with a
total flooding system due to the risk of a three-dimensional fire, including the tail pipes of LNG
storage tank relief valves. These systems will be automatically activated by the HDMS using
heat and/or flame detectors,
• Areas where LNG spills may collect should be provided with a local application system that is
either automatically or manually operated, or portable extinguishers. The choice selected
depends on the results of a hazards evaluation that considers the size of the hazard, ignition
sources available, time required for response and other factors, and
• Open areas where natural gas or LNG leaks, sprays, or ruptures may occur should be equipped
with a local application system or portable extinguishers. As these potential fires are likely to be
small and less likely to significantly affect the public, Terminal personnel or equipment, manual
systems (either hose lines or portable extinguishers) may be used. However, each area should be
individually examined in a hazards evaluation.
Systems will meet the requirements of NFPA 17 and be UL Listed or FM Approved. In accordance with
33 CFR §127.609, a dry chemical system is provided for the marine transfer areas (i.e., under the
unloading arms). This system is for local application with at least two discharge systems, one of which
must be a monitor. The second may be either a monitor or a hose line. System capacity is based on 45-
second discharges from each system either sequentially or simultaneously.
Manual systems consisting of either hose line units or portable extinguishers will be employed, provided:
• The fire size is such that personnel can approach the fire to effectively apply the dry chemical
agent; and
• The consequences of the fire to the public and the Terminal are found to be low, allowing time
for a manual response.
If an automatic system is determined to be appropriate for a local application, the dry chemical will be
applied by either nozzles or monitors. Sufficient detection equipment, such as heat and/or flame
detectors, will be provided for system activation.
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Portable dry chemical extinguishers will be available throughout areas where LNG or natural gas process
piping exists for fast response to small fires.
Dry chemical system sizing is described in the hazard detection and mitigation philosophy (07902-TS-
600-500) included in Appendix C.4 to this Resource Report.
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In addition, there will be an LNG storage tank deluge system to protect LNG storage tanks that are
exposed to the heat from a fire involving an adjacent LNG storage tank. The deluge system will be fed
from dedicated pumps taking suction from the Skipanon River.
The main fire water pumps will consist of two x 100 percent jockey pumps and two x 100 percent fire
pumps: one motor driven and the other diesel driven. The deluge system will use four x 33 percent fire
pumps that will all be diesel driven.
The Firewater System and Equipment Sizing Calculation 07902-CA-600-401 included in Appendix P.2
demonstrates that the design of fire water supply and distribution systems is based on the volume of
water required to combat and protect against the maximum credible fire event, thereby establishing the
“design basis fire water demand” for the Terminal, plus a hose stream allowance of 1000 gpm per NFPA
59A-2001/2006. Separate, unrelated simultaneous fires in two or more Terminal locations are not
considered to be credible and are not provided for in the design. The maximum credible fire event for
the fresh water system is estimated to require 2,000 gpm of water at a residual pressure of 100 psig, plus
1,000 gpm for hose streams for a total of 3,000 gpm. The design flow rates are illustrated on the Fire
Water System Utility Flow Diagram 07902-PF-600-401 that is included in Appendix U.2.
For the LNG storage tank deluge system demand, the maximum credible fire is a fire at one tank
generating heat that affects the adjacent LNG storage tanks. Coverage is provided for the surfaces of the
adjacent tanks that may be exposed to radiant heat fluxes in excess of 9,500 Btu/hour/ft2, which is based
on the concrete’s ability to withstand this heat flux. As demonstrated in the Firewater System and
Equipment Sizing Calculation 07902-CA-600-401 included in Appendix P.2 the deluge system requires a
flow of up to 18,400 gpm for the limiting case where the middle tank (T-201B) is burning and deluge
water is provided to the two adjacent tanks.
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The Fire Water Tank (T-601) will be a suction tank at grade in accordance with NFPA 22. The Fire
Water Tank will also serve as the supply tank for the service water system. Water for the service water
system will be drawn from the Fire Water Tank via a standpipe located at an elevation in the tank which
will ensure that the service water system cannot draw the tank level below the required fire water
volume. The working capacity of the tank is 360,000 gallons to handle the maximum credible fire event
for two hours. The make-up water will be from the city water supply.
Data sheet 07902-DS-600-601 for the Fire Water Tank is included in Appendix M.3.
The entire pump installation, including the fire pumps, jockey pumps, drivers, controllers, piping, valves,
fuel tanks, interconnecting wiring, etc., is in accordance with NFPA 20.
The fire water system will normally be pressurized to above 100 psig by operation of one of the two
100% capacity Jockey Pumps (P-604A/B). The Electric Fire Pump (P-602) and Diesel Fire Pump (P-
603) are arranged for automatic, sequential start upon a decrease in the fire water system pressure. Upon
a drop in system pressure, the first fire pump to operate will be the Electric Fire Pump. If this fire pump
fails to start, or if the header pressure continues to fall, the Diesel Fire Pump will automatically start.
Design flow for each pump is 3,000 gpm. The design flow for the jockey pumps is 250 gpm, which
enables fire water usage of up to 250 gpm flow without requiring start of the large fire water pumps.
The following data sheets are provided in Appendix M.3 for these components:
Deluge Fire Pumps P-605A/B/C/D will be installed in the Deluge Pump House (A-861) located on the
western boundary of the Terminal. The pumps will be vertically mounted centrifugal pumps and will
take suction from the Skipanon River. These pumps will supply fire water to the LNG Tank Deluge
System at a design flow of 4,500 gpm (and a maximum capacity of 6,750 gpm) per pump. All Seawater
Fire Pumps will be diesel-driven. These pumps are designed per NFPA 20. Starting controls are based
on LNG tank containment fire.
The Deluge Fire Pumps will take suction from the Skipanon River through intake screens that are
designed to prevent debris from damaging the pumps while minimizing potential for damage to marine
life. The intake screen design will limit the water velocity passing through the screens to 0.4 feet per
second or less under design flow conditions.
Data sheet 07902-DS-600-605 for the Deluge Fire Pumps is included in Appendix M.3.
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A looped, underground fire water distribution network will extend throughout all areas of the Terminal in
accordance with NFPA 24. The layout of the system will provide a supply to each area from a minimum
of two directions, except for the pier, which will be supplied by a single fire water line. Isolation gate
valves (Post Indicating Valves) will be used to isolate sections of piping in the event of failures and will
retain the ability to supply fire water to each designated area. The distribution system is sized to deliver
the design fire water demand to the hydraulically most remote location in the network at a minimum
residual (flowing) pressure of 100 psig. Aboveground piping will deliver fire water to the pier and
unloading platform area via a pipe rack.
Post Indicator Valves (PIVs) will be resilient type gate valves. Butterfly valves will not be used. These
valves will be locked open so as not to require electrical supervision. A PIV will be located at each
branch connection and downstream of each branch connection at a minimum per 33 CFR §127.607.
For the pier, the fire main system will provide at least two water streams to each part of the LNG transfer
piping and connections, one of which must be from a single length of hose (1-1/2-inch or greater hose of
length no greater than 100 feet) or from a fire monitor in accordance with 33 CFR §127.607. The hose
will be connected to the hydrant or standpipe and will be on a reel or hose rack. The nozzle will be a
USCG-approved combination solid stream and water spray nozzle.
Hydrants
Fire hydrants will be located throughout the Terminal area (process area, pier and unloading platform
areas) in accordance with NFPA 24 and the OCIMF guidelines. Hydrants will be spaced at not more than
150 feet in Terminal process areas and dock areas and not more than 300 feet along the trestle and
Terminal roads.
• 3-way fire hydrants (with one 3½-inch pumper connection and two 2½" hose connections); and
• 3-way monitor mounted fire hydrants with two 2½-inch hose connections.
Hydrants located along the pier and roadways will be 2-way type.
Hydrants located in the LNG unloading area, LNG tank storage area and LNG process area will be 2-way
or 3-way monitor mounted types.
Monitors
Fire water monitors will be located as needed to provide cooling, vapor dispersion and exposure
protection.
Berthing area monitors will be tower elevated brass monitors, will be remotely controlled with either
electrical or electro-hydraulic operation, and will be suitable for hazardous locations. Each monitor will
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be equipped with a fog/straight stream nozzle. Monitor remote controls will be located at least 50 feet
from anticipated fire locations.
The area near the LNG Spill Containment Basin will be equipped with one monitor as needed to cool the
pipe rack in the event of a fire in the basin. Monitors will be equipped with a combination fog/straight
stream brass nozzle.
The number of monitors is minimized since the use of monitors can inadvertently add significant
amounts of water to the LNG containment system increasing the evolution of vapor and/or fire intensity
(if ignited). A spill in the process area will drain away from the process area to the LNG containment
basin, minimizing exposure to process equipment. If a spill does ignite in the process area, activation of
the ESD will isolate the spill and, with the draining of the spill away from the area, the fire exposure in
the area will be mitigated. For this reason, hose reels are preferred to respond to any lingering fires and
will be strategically located for vapor cloud control in the event that the spill does not ignite.
Outside hose houses with fire hose carts, nozzles, hydrant wrenches, spanners and other necessary
equipment will be provided and located around the Terminal in accordance with NFPA 24. Hose houses
at hydrants will have hoses pre-connected to the hydrant.
Automatic (either wet pipe or dry pipe) sprinkler systems will be provided in non-process areas in
accordance with NFPA 13 and local building codes. Systems are hydraulically designed for the
occupancy classification of the application.
The Tank Water Deluge System will consist of 360° circumferential spray ring headers for the roof of
each tank, and circumferential spray ring headers for the tank side walls. For the middle tank (T-201B),
the side wall spray ring header will extend 360° around its circumference to provide protection in the
event of a fire in either of the adjacent tanks. For the end tanks (T-201A and T-201C), the side wall
spray ring headers extend 270° around each tank since the side of each tank away from the middle tank
does not need deluge flow.
These rings will distribute the water over the tank outer surface for cooling when there is a fire in an
adjacent tank. The application rate is 0.1 gpm/ft2 on the exposed tank surface areas to ensure complete
wetting of the surfaces. Only those surfaces that may be exposed to heat fluxes in excess of 9,500
Btu/hr/foot2 will be protected. The deluge system will be supplied by the Deluge Fire Pumps through
deluge valves and will operate normally dry from these valves to the tank distribution rings.
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system, but the peak flow demand for the foam systems will not be used to determine the fire main
system maximum demand, since the foam system will operate intermittently to maintain the foam
blanket.
The following P&IDs for the fire water systems are included in Appendix U.4.
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High expansion foam will be used to reduce the vaporization rate of spilled LNG, provide additional
vapor dispersion control (since vapors traveling through the foam warm sufficiently to better disperse in
the atmosphere), and reduce the heat release rate of a basin fire, if ignited, by reducing the vaporization
rate from the basin under fire conditions.
The system will consist of a foam concentrate storage tank, a proportioning device to mix the concentrate
with fire main water, and a foam generator powered by a water-driven reaction motor to distribute the
foam over the liquid surface of any spilled LNG in the basin. The foam concentrate has an expansion
ratio of at least 500:1. The system will be activated manually by Terminal Operators as required. The
foam generator is designed to withstand high temperatures and will be of a design proven for LNG
service. Foam fences will also be used to minimize the loss of foam as a result of wind.
The foam system provides for coverage of at least one foot blanket depth over the entire basin area within
30 seconds of system actuation, and coverage of at least five feet blanket depth within one minute of
activation. System capacity will be sufficient to maintain this foam blanket for a 24-hour period by
periodically adding more foam.
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System capacity to maintain a 5-foot depth of foam for 24 hours has been conservatively selected to
provide sufficient time to disperse the LNG vapors in a controlled and safe manner. This capacity also
provides a margin of safety to account for wind-driven or rain-driven foam depth loss.
Potassium bicarbonate dry chemical agents may be used as well as the foam system to control basin fires.
As a result, the dry chemical and foam agents used will be compatible.
High expansion foam system sizing is described in the hazard detection and mitigation philosophy
document (07902-TS-600-500) included in Appendix C.4 to this Resource Report.
13.18.4 Drawings
13.18.4.1 Foam System Component Location Plan
The location of the high expansion foam system for the S-606 LNG Spill Containment Basin and its area
of coverage is illustrated in drawing 07902-DG-620-454, which is included in Appendix U.9.
13.19 Security
The Terminal is designed and will be constructed and operated to provide the level of security and safety,
consistent with the requirements of its design and location.
A separate Facility Security Plan, describing site security provisions and features, is being prepared for
the USCG pursuant to USCG regulations, 33 CFR 105, and is being treated as Sensitive Security
Information according to the USCG regulations. This information will be made available upon request in
accordance with the USCG disclosure requirements for Sensitive Security Information.
Key elements of this Facility Security Plan are summarized below. For more detailed information, see
the Facility Security Plan.
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Security measures included in the Facility Security Plan and within the design of the Terminal to control
access at all Maritime Security (MARSEC) levels include:
• Perimeter security;
• Screening procedures.
A Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) system will be installed at the Terminal and will monitor the pier,
the fence line, active access points and the waters along the Terminal, and the interior of the Terminal.
Intrusion detection systems will be installed at the perimeter security fence and also in all buildings.
• Security measures for access control, including perimeter security, access points into the
Terminal, restriction and prohibitions applied at the access points, identification system,
acceptable forms of personnel identification, visitors’ log and passes, screening procedures for
personnel and vehicles, access control and screening procedures;
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• Location of the means of access and egress through the protective enclosure;
• Methods of maintaining security of gates that are used for access and egress and procedures that
will be used during emergency situations;
• Deter the unauthorized introduction of dangerous substances and devices including any device
intended to damage or destroy persons, vessels, facilities or ports;
• Secure dangerous substances and devices that are not authorized by the owner or operator to be
on the Terminal Site; and
13.19.3 Cameras
A Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitoring system will be installed at the Terminal to provide
remote surveillance capability.
The CCTV system will monitor the pier, the fence line, active access points, the waters along the
Terminal, and the interior of the Terminal.
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The system will include a mix of fixed and pan/tilt/zoom cameras to provide the coverage based on the
lighting requirements, the application, the required field of view and the camera location. The cameras
will be low-light or ultra-low-light depending on the lighting in each area. Monitors will be located in
the Control Room and the Security Building. The layout of the security cameras and areas of coverage
are illustrated in drawing 07902-DG-000-010, which is included in Appendix U.12 to this Resource
Report.
The fence line system will detect, alarm, and accurately identify the locations of any attempts of intrusion
through the security fence. The fence line perimeter will be partitioned into zones, and each zone will be
alarmed and logged at the security system console.
The intrusion detection system will also include sensors for early warning of approaching vehicles and
will be capable of controlling vehicle access gates. To minimize false alarms, surrounding weather
conditions will be appropriately considered when installing the system.
13.20 Piping
13.20.1 Piping Systems
Process-related piping systems at the Terminal are designed in accordance with the following design
fluid velocities at maximum design steady-state velocities:
The use of flanges in cryogenic piping will be minimized. Vessels and equipment will use welded
connections, except where entry or disassembly for inspections or maintenance after start-up is
anticipated or required, such as for heat exchangers or relief valves. In these cases, there will be a case-
by-case evaluation to confirm that flanges are required. Belleville® washers will be used for all flanged
connections in LNG or other cryogenic service.
Provisions will be made to allow for the de-inventorying of LNG Transfer Systems following start-up of
the Terminal. The bypass design will include a manual valve and check valve to the LNG storage tank
side of the valve. All piping will be sloped accordingly to allow de-inventorying. There will be similar
de-inventory systems at the fill line into each LNG storage tank.
Small diameter weld penetrations increase pipe thermal stresses during cooldown. Consequently, all
piping penetrations for vents, drains and instruments sensing lines will be evaluated during detailed
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engineering. If the thermal stresses for a given penetration cannot be diminished by pipe hangers or pipe
supports, the penetration will be a minimum of 2 inches. All efforts will be made to minimize the
number and size of penetrations. Wherever possible, penetrations for sensing lines for level, pressure
and differential pressure will be combined for both local and remote instrumentation.
LNG headers and dead headed piping are provided with a means for maintenance cooling. Piping that
serves in intermittent operation will also be provided with a means for maintenance cooling.
Piping details are further described in the Engineering Design Standard 07902-TS-000-001 that is
included in Appendix C.1.
Insulation thickness is based upon design parameters relevant to site conditions including ambient
temperature, relative humidity, wind velocity and maximum heat gain/loss. The insulation thickness is
calculated based upon internationally recognized standards. Low temperature insulation is designed for a
maximum heat gain of 8 Btu/hr/ft2 and to prevent surface condensation. All insulation will be finished
with a weatherproof outer metal jacket of stainless steel. All banding and other fasteners are stainless
steel.
Cold Insulation Specification 07902-TS-000-105 included in Appendix T.2 defines the requirements for
exterior insulation for piping and equipment that will be used at the Terminal. The specification scope
includes insulation for piping and equipment that contain the following fluids:
• LNG or BOG at cryogenic temperatures as low as -270ºF. For these fluids, the insulation is
designed to minimize heat leakage into the process fluid and to minimize condensation or
freezing of atmospheric moisture onto the insulation outside surface;
• Boiloff gas at temperatures as low as -150ºF. For this fluid, the insulation is designed to
minimize heat leakage into the process fluid and to minimize condensation or freezing of
atmospheric moisture onto the insulation outside surface; and
• Fluids in general with temperatures as low as 32ºF which operate below ambient temperatures.
For these fluids, the insulation is designed to minimize condensation or freezing of atmospheric
moisture onto the insulation outside surface.
This specification includes insulation for both indoor and outdoor applications.
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0.5 3 1 16 7 1.5
0.75 3.5 1 18 7 1.5
1 3.5 1 20 7.5 2
1.5 4 1 22 7.5 2
2 4 1 24 7.5 2
2.5 4 1 26 7.5 2
3 5 1.5 28 7.5 2
4 5 1.5 30 7.5 2
5 5.5 1.5 32 8 2
6 5.5 1.5 36 8 2
8 6 1.5 40 8 2
10 6.5 1.5 44 8 2
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Appendix J.1 includes the Geotechnical Report, which discusses the site conditions, geotechnical
analyses, and preliminary foundation design and construction recommendations. Appendix T.3 and
Appendix T.4 contain specifications for civil construction applicable to foundations.
The LNG storage tanks will have an outer wall of pre-stressed concrete and a structural slab base of
reinforced concrete. The slab will be supported with pile foundations. Deep foundations are required to
provide uplift capacity for the overturning load from the LNG storage tanks and to transfer tank dead
load uniformly to the underlying soil. Layers of the underlying soil are compressible, even at depth, and
settlement will occur. It is anticipated that the piles will be driven closed-ended. The compressive
capacity will be developed from a combination of skin friction and end bearing. The tensile capacity will
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be developed from skin friction along the outside of the pile. In order to limit total settlement to 8
inches, the piles may need to be 215 feet long. This settlement is anticipated to occur relatively uniform
across the foundation base and is anticipated to occur during hydrostatic testing of the tank. Actual
length and configuration of the vertical piles will be determined during detailed engineering design.
The LNG Spill Containment Basin (S-606) is described in Section 13.13.1.2 of this Report, and is
illustrated on the plot plan 07902-DG-000-001 that is included in Appendix U.1.
The sidewalls of the basin will consist of reinforced concrete in order to provide separation between the
LNG and the adjacent ground and groundwater. Thickness of the sidewalls will be determined during
detailed engineering design. The design will account for forces resulting from floods, tsunamis, high
groundwater levels, and LNG containment. The joint between each wall and the mat will be sealed using
a water stop component. To protect the structural concrete in the event of a spill, all interior surfaces
will be coated with a lightweight concrete that contains Perlite® aggregates. This type of mixture is
preferred for sumps used in cryogenic applications as it provides resistance to heat transfer thereby
slowing the rate of generation of vapor during LNG spills.
The LNG spill containment basin walls will be supported on steel pipe piles. The deep foundation system
will provide support to the structure static loads (gravity and buoyancy) and seismic loads (lateral loads
and loads due to unstable soils).Groundwater levels, as previously noted in the geotechnical report
(Appendix J.1) and flood levels are present above the anticipated bottom of the basin; hence the structure
is designed with hydrostatic conditions in mind. A concrete mat will be constructed at the bottom of the
basin designed to resist hydrostatic uplift pressures. The dead weight of the mat foundation and
sidewalls, plus tension resistance provided by the piles, will provide the required resistance to these
uplift pressures. The uplift resistance to buoyant forces will be provided by a combination of downdrag
forces along the deep foundation system in the upper depth of drag plus the skin friction below the zone
of drag. Length and configuration of the steel pipe piles as well as the overall mat thickness will be
determined during detailed engineering design. An internal pit will be provided to collect and remove
accumulated storm water. Structural design will be based on the Geotechnical Report contained in
Appendix J.1 and the International Building Code, ASCE 7 and ACI Manual, all referenced in Appendix
D.1 of this Resource Report 13.
Ancillary Structures
In addition to the above structures, pads and foundations will be provided for other structures and
equipment, including:
• Auxiliary heating area, second stage vaporizer area, and fuel gas area;
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Pad sizing will accommodate the particular piece of equipment and account for both design loading and
differential settlement criteria. Mat foundations will typically be pile supported as outlined in the
Geotechnical Report included in Appendix J.1. The foundations will also serve to dampen vibrations
from operating equipment.
Ancillary structures at the Project site include structural steel buildings, pipe rack structures, and other
miscellaneous ancillary structures. Ancillary structures that are settlement sensitive will be similarly
supported on a pile foundation system as the tank foundations, as noted above.
For non-settlement sensitive, lightly-loaded ancillary structures (such as small buildings or other small
appurtenance equipment), these structures may be supported on individual column footings bearing on a
minimum of one foot of structural fill placed and compacted consistent with the recommendations in the
geotechnical report. The foundations will be sized for the net allowable bearing pressure of 1,500 psf
when founded on a minimum 1-foot thick layer of structural fill.
13.21.2 Drawings
New construction will be in accordance with code requirements consistent with the function of each
building and structure. In general, buildings will be pile supported and constructed on concrete slabs.
Where required by code, buildings and structures that house LNG process equipment will be constructed
of open frames and non-load bearing walls.
The PCR is illustrated on plot plan 07902-DG-000-001 included in Appendix U.1 and the building layout
is illustrated on drawing 07902-DG-800-801 included in Appendix U.10.
The PCR will be attended during LNG carrier unloading operations and will contain all controls
necessary for controlling and monitoring unloading operations. The building will also contain panels for
monitoring the status of the ESD System. The PCR will also be connected to the DCS located in the
MCR for monitoring LNG Terminal operations
The PCR building will be constructed of ribbed surface precast metal panels. The top parapet of the
building will be constructed from smooth precast metal panels.
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The Main Control Room (MCR) is illustrated on plot plan 07902-DG-000-001 included in Appendix U.1
and the building layout is illustrated on drawing 07902-DG-800-802 included in Appendix U.10.
The MCR will be continuously attended and will be the center for all operational activities. The MCR
will contain the DCS, HDMS and associated instrumentation and control systems.
The MCR building will be constructed of ribbed surface precast metal panels with a roof parapet
constructed from smooth precast metal panels.
The Security Building is illustrated on plot plan 07902-DG-000-001 included in Appendix U.1 and the
building layout is illustrated on drawing 07902-DG-800-803 included in Appendix U.10.
The building will be permanently occupied by the site security team and will be the headquarters for site
security. The building will be located at the entrance to the site.
The building will include a training area where site visitors and contractors can receive safety training
before entering the site.
The building will include a security control center where all security monitoring devices will be located.
Direct communications with the Main Control Room and the Administration Building will be provided.
The building will be constructed of ribbed surface metal panels with aluminum window frames.
The building will include offices for the site management and administrative teams and will also include
facilities for training, storage space, and the technical library.
The building will be constructed of ribbed surface metal panels and will have aluminum metal frames
with insulating glazing.
The Maintenance Building / Warehouse location is illustrated on plot plan 07902-DG-000-001 included
in Appendix U.1 and the building layout is illustrated on drawings 07902-DG-800-805-01 and 07902-
DG-800-805-02 included in Appendix U.10.
The maintenance building includes space for general and clean area workshops and offices for the
engineering and maintenance teams. An overhead crane will be used for lifting heavy pieces of
equipment into and out off the building and for moving equipment around inside the building.
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The warehouse will be the central location for all consumable items and equipment spare parts. A waste
storage area will be located outside of the warehouse under a roof and will be used for the
characterization of all waste material generated on the site in preparation for correct disposal. A fire
barrier will separate the waste storage area from the warehouse.
The maintenance building and warehouse will be housed in a common building that will be constructed
of a combination of ribbed and smooth surface metal panels. Windows will be aluminum framed.
The Compressor Building is illustrated on plot plan 07902-DG-000-001 included in Appendix U.1 and
the building layout is illustrated on drawings 07902-DG-800-820-01 and 07902-DG-800-820-02 included
in Appendix U.10.
The building will house the BOG Compressors and Vapor Return Blowers. The building will be a two
story design with the BOG Compressors and Vapor Return Blowers located above the floor elevation.
The building will be constructed of lightweight non-flammable materials and will have non-load bearing
walls. The building will be open-sided at the grade elevation and equipped with a roof ridge vent for
ventilation to minimize the possibility of hazardous accumulation of flammable gases. The building floor
slab will be curbed to contain any oil leaks.
The building will be designed such that BOG Compressors and Vapor Return Blowers can be removed
without the need to remove roof or wall sections. A crane will be provided to allow the removal and
replacement of equipment for maintenance.
The building will also include an area where an HP Pump can be stored for maintenance purposes.
The HP Pump Structure is illustrated on plot plan 07902-DG-000-001 included in Appendix U.1 and the
building layout is illustrated on drawings 07902-DG-800-830 and 07902-DG-800-830-02 included in
Appendix U.10.
The HP Pump Structure supports the HP Pumps and associated electrical and mechanical equipment, and
a 15 ton bridge crane used for pump maintenance.
The structure will be open-faced on the sides up to the working deck, which is situated to allow personnel
to access the pump top flanges for maintenance. Above that elevation, the top portion of the structure
will be enclosed by walls and a roof to protect personnel and the crane from exposure to the weather.
The enclosure will be constructed of ribbed metal panels. The structure will be equipped with a handrail
around the perimeter of the upper operating floor level and a stairwell to provide access to the crane and
upper level platform.
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The Auxiliary Building is illustrated on plot plan 07902-DG-000-001 included in Appendix U.1 and the
building layout is illustrated on drawings 07902-DG-800-840-01 and 07902-DG-800-840-02 included in
Appendix U.10.
The building will house the fired heaters, the heat transfer fluid (HTF) pumps and the HTF surge drum.
The building will be constructed ribbed surface, non-load bearing metal panels and translucent panels.
The building’s parapet will be of smooth surface, non-load bearing metal panels. A roll-up door will be
provided to allow movement of equipment.
The Emergency Diesel Building location is illustrated on plot plan 07902-DG-000-001 included in
Appendix U.1 and the building layout is illustrated on drawing 07902-DG-800-850 included in Appendix
U.10.
The Diesel Generator Building will house Diesel Generator G-502 and associated equipment.
The building will be constructed of ribbed surface, non-load bearing metal panels with a roof parapet
constructed from smooth metal panels.
The Fire Pump House is illustrated on plot plan 07902-DG-000-001 included in Appendix U.1 and the
building layout is illustrated on drawing 07902-DG-800-860 included in Appendix U.10.
The building will contain the two electric fire water jockey pumps, the electric fire water pump and the
diesel operated fire water pump. The building will also house the two service water pumps.
Located adjacent to the fire water storage tank, the building will be constructed of ribbed surface, non-
load bearing metal panels with a roof parapet constructed from smooth metal panels.
The Deluge Fire Pump House is illustrated on plot plan 07902-DG-000-001 included in Appendix U.1
and the building layout is illustrated on drawing 07902-DG-800-861 included in Appendix U.10.
The building will contain the Deluge Fire Pumps and diesel fuel storage tanks. A bridge crane will also
be provided in the building to facilitate maintenance activities. In addition, pumps will be removed and
installed through hatches provided in the roof of the building.
The building will be constructed of ribbed surface, non-load bearing metal panels with a roof parapet
constructed from smooth metal panels.
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These building sizes are preliminary and will be reviewed and adjusted as required during detailed
design.
13.22.3 Drawings
13.22.3.1 Preliminary Building Plans and Elevations
Building plan and elevation drawings are included in Appendix U.10.
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H&MBs for each of the process simulation results are also included in Appendix U.3.
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