CONFLICT IN INDOCHINA

KEY FEATURES
 nature and role of nationalism
 nature and role of communism
 nature and consequences of US involvement
 strategies and tactics
 impact of the war on civilians
 reasons for communist victories

DECOLONISATION IN INDOCHINA

CONFLICT IN VIETNAM 1946-1954

OVERVIEW OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND CULTURE

 A strong oral tradition – storytelling through song known as ca-do an important way of espousing ideas
and messages.
 Village/agricultural lifestyle – economy reliant on agriculture.
 Peasant life was characterised by hardship with cycles of famine and monsoon.
 Thousands of years of foreign occupation and colonisation which exploited the country’s resources.
 For the Vietnamese, the Vietnam War as we know it was simply a continuation of their ongoing fight for
independence.

HO CHI MINH

 First emerged as an outspoken voice for Vietnamese independence while living in France during WWI.
 Inspired by the Bolshevik revolution, he helped found the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930 and
the League for the Independence of Vietnam, or Viet Minh, in 1941.
 After Viet Minh forces seize Hanoi, Ho becomes president of the Democratic State of Vietnam.
 Known affectionately as ‘Uncle Ho’, he would serve in that position for the next 25 years, becoming
symbol of Vietnam’s struggle for unification during a long and costly conflict.
 First and foremost sought independence and unification – the vehicle through which he would attain
this is communist ideology.

NATIONALISM

 Patriotic feelings, principles or efforts.

 An extreme form of patriotism marked by a feeling of superiority over other countries (e.g. Nazi
Germany).
 VIETNAM  Advocacy of political independence for a particular country.

SIGNIFICANT GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS

 Viet Minh
 Ho Chi Minh
o Weaves propaganda into facets of society subtly.
o Relates to the people.
o Models what he asks of the people.
 Vo Nguyen Giap
o Military commander
o Exceptionally effective and strategic
 o Responsible for military victories.

FUSION OF COMMUNSIM & NATIONALISM

 Communism was the vehicle through which nationalism would be secured.

 Although nationalism and communism shared similar anti-colonial and pro-independence outlook, not
all nationalists were communists.
 But the fusion of these ideas brought together strong organisation and wide popular support.
 DIFFERENCES  Nationalism can be grouped with a wide range of political ideals, not all were
committed to the Marxist regime.

EVENTS LEADING TO THE FIRST INDOCHINA WAR

 24hrs before Japan surrender, HCM declares August Revolution (methodical consolidation of power in
areas controlled by Viet Minh).
 Power was passed from Bao Dai to Viet Minh.
 Ho proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
 Pacific war ends  Japan leaves in 1945.
 French troops regroup and rearm.
 French colonialism clearly returned.
 Dialogue broke down between HCM and the French.
 HCM appeals to the people to wage resistance war December 1946.

FIRST INDOCHINA WAR 1946-1954

 People’s army no match for large concentration of French troops who used conventional military
tactics.
 Late 1947 the People’s army changed its tactics  Elephant and Tiger Strategy
 HCM’s strict rules of self-discipline
 Transforms into a Cold War conflict in the 50s with proclamation of People’s Republic of China which
moves Cold War to Asia.
 Containment and domino theory.
 US commits itself to support French against HCM’s communists.

THE NATURE OF VIETNAMESE VICTORY AGAINST THE FRENCH IN 1954

DIEN BIEN PHU

 French targeted DBP to stop Vietnamese access to Laos (supply base and safe haven).
 Airstrip in the valley but unstable  needed to redevelop to launch attacks on People’s Army.
 January airstrip operational.
 April 1954 – 15000 French troops at DBP
 Problems  arrived by parachute (no secrecy, locals knew), base’s lifeline was the airstrip and valley
surrounded by limestone cliffs.
 Giap mobilised 80000 regular troops and built roads to DBP using bicycles – 3 month trek.
 Plan to place artillery on peaks above the valley.
 Disassembles artillery piece by piece and carried to the top where it was reassembled.
 French were unaware.
 12 March 1954 – Giap sent blunt message to Vietnamese residing near “Evacuate the valley”.
 56 day siege.
 Artillery pounded French fortifications.
 Dug a circle of trenches around the base.
 50% of air drops captured by Giap’s troops.
  “Don’t let the French sleep.”
 Launched final attack on 1st May – horrific hand to hand confrontations.
 6 May – white flags down.
 1st Indochina War ended.

SIGNIFICANCE OF DIEN BIEN PHU

 HCM and Giap raised to celebrity status.

 Indochina to be viewed through a Cold War lens.
 Humiliation of France on a global stage.
 Greatly strengthened the bargaining position of the Viet Minh at the Geneva Conference due to the next
day.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IN 1954

THE GENEVA PEACE AGREEMENT: 1954

 HCM expected to achieve his dream of an independent, unified Vietnam.

 Pressure was placed on Viet Minh to accept a divided Vietnam.
 Laos independent under royalist government.
 Cambodia independent under royalist government.
 Vietnam divided at 17th parallel.
 300 day period of legal migration allowed.
 Elections to take place in July 1956 to determine unified Vietnam.

SIGNIFICANCE OF GENEVA

 Peace that satisfied no one.

 Division of Vietnam
 Creation of two dictatorial regimes.
 Interlude between two wars.

CONFLICT IN VIETNAM

POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

NORTH
OVERVIEW  Population 14 million
 Ho Chi Minh was a well-known and
charismatic leader
 Government was well organised
 Army was large and well equipped
 Between 10 000- 15 000 Viet Minh
supporters committed to unification under
Ho had stayed in the South to work for the
cause
POLITICAL  President: Ho Chi Minh
 PM: Pham Van Dong
 Military commander: Giap
 Leader of Lao Dong: Le Duan
 1951: ICP & VM combine = Lao Dong 
wider support base for the party.
o All aspects of life controlled by Lao
Dong & in return there was
widespread loyalty from
SOUTH
 Population 11 million
 Ngo Dinh Diem as national leader never
had wide support
 Government was poorly organised and
was without experienced civil servants
 Army was weak and poorly organised
 Economy had been damaged during the
war with the French
 1955 – Diem proclaimed Republic of
Vietnam.
 Diem – Catholic, anti-communist, anti-
French, backed by USA.
 Colonel Lansdale (USA,CIA) aimed to
discredit HCM and create support for
Diem.
 July 1956 – Operation Exodus –
propaganda program to persuade
 population.
o Communist concepts interwoven
into sociocultural and historical
traditions.
o Nationalistic slogans and
propaganda: freedom, victory,
prosperity, and loyalty.
o Lao Dong all lived on low salaries
and by 1975 they had >1million
members.
SOCIAL  Criminal codes introduced.
 Francophiles targeted and jailed, put in
forced labour camps and some executed.
 National cohesion – embraced all aspects
of life under ‘uncle Ho’.
Vietnamese Catholics to return south.
 Diem had no nationwide identity and little
support – 95% Buddhist, Taoist,
Confuscist.
 Diem had no police, no gov, no army.
 Potential enemies to Diem – Cao Dai, Hoa
Hao.
 US invested millions to make RVN into a
fortress of anti-communism.
 Diem was inexperienced politically and
militarily – relied on nepotism.
o Brother Nhu – Military + Civil
Intelligence
o Brother Can – Warlord +
Entrepreneur
o Brother Thuc – Catholic
Archbishop
o Brother Luyen – Diplomat +
Ambassador
o Madam Nhu – First Lady
 Fundamental ideological clash between
democratic US and totalitarian Diem’s
regime.
 1954 Can Lao created – anti-communist
version of the Lao Dong.
o Unsuccessful as it did not
represent the people, members
were generally friends of Diem –
loyalty.
 1956 promised elections (Geneva
Accords) were not held in order to keep
Diem in power.
 1961 Diem won another rigged election.
 1963 Buddhist Crisis
 US cultural influence.
 1959 Agroville Program
o Was a Can Lao attempt to control
the countryside.
o Supposedly to protect rural
communities from Ho’s soldiers.
o Lands confiscated by government
landlords.
o Collapsed in 1961 due to
resistance and VC penetration.
 Replaced by the Strategic Hamlet program.
o Protect the rural villages from the
VC.
o Provide weapons to farmers to
resist VC.
o Establish secure hamlets to
support Diem regime.
 Strategic hamlet program failed because:
o VC avoided heavily fortified
hamlets.
o Rural folk resented the relocation.
o Didn’t eliminate or reduce VC
activity.

ECONOMIC  All resources nationalised by the state:
human, material, natural.
 Prices fixed; unemployment eliminated via
nationwide labour redevelopment
program.
 1955-1957 Agricultural Reform Tribunal –
to take land from landlords and distribute
to landless peasants.
o Seen as disloyal but there were
many false accusations, and many
were killed by 1957.
o HCM realised the destruction being
caused and that ‘errors had been
committed’.
 The tribunal created some peasant
discontent but DRV has achieved self-
sufficiency by 1957.
 1958 Cooperativisation – based on the
principle that all villagers should share the
work and responsibility.
o By 1960 – 80% of all DRV living
under this policy.
 Industrial reconstruction – desperately
needed, they relied heavily on aid from the
Soviet Union and China.
MILITARY  Senior officers – Commissars worked with
military staff to ensure all activities
conformed with political objectives.
 People’s army remained in South –
initiated attacks between 1957-60.
 1960 – National Liberation Front (a.k.a
Viet Cong) was proclaimed.
 NLF embraced every aspect of Viet society
to further its national appeal.
 NLF had no formal headquarters, wore no
uniform.
 Based on liberation and ongoing struggle.
o Rural farmers began identifying
with VC nationalism.
 National Assembly Law 10/59 –
Government allowed to arrest anyone
whose actions were deemed dangerous
national security.
 Law for the Protection of Morality –
outlawed gambling, contraception,
divorce, polygamy, prostitution etc.
 These laws were exacerbated in 1963 by
events in Saigon with the Buddhists – they
were ordered to lower their flags to
ensure that the national flags were given
precedence.
o Diem accused Buddhists of having
communist links.
o Chaos erupted – violence and riots
and self-immolation.
o Madam Nhu “not concerned about
Buddhist BBQ’s.”
 US aid saw major building programs,
communication, public works,
transportation, education, hospitality
services – creating thousands of local jobs.
 Poverty still remained.
 1959 Agroville Program meant to boost
economic development however failed.
 Thousands of Ho’s peoples army remained
in the south and were told to remain until
fair elections were held.
 Nov 1960 – the Vietnamese National Army
attempted to overthrow Diem – failed due
to US intervention.
 ARVN expanded to over 500,000 – US aid
+ advisors.
 When elections were not held, HCM
reactivated armed propaganda teams –
soldiers of the people’s army that has
remained in the South formed the nucleus
  The objective was to overthrow Diem and of Lao Dong resistance in the South.
oust the USA.
NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF US POLICY TOWARDS INDOCHINA

INVOLVEMENT
Harry Truman (1945-  CONTAINMENT
53) o Viewed Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh not as nationalists but as part of a
worldwide communist campaign of aggression.
o Ho was seen as nothing more than a communist puppet doing the bidding
of his Soviet and Chinese masters.
o Tensions present at Geneva Conference were largely a result of Cold War
pressures.
o The decision to back South Vietnam and later escalate US military
intervention was all part of the US policy of containment which had been
in place since 1947.
o The Truman Doctrine established the theory of containment – that
communist was to be confined to a small area (North Vietnam) in order to
prevent world revolution.
 During the First Indochina War, though America did not send troops, they heavily
funded the French – by the end of the war were covering 80% of French war
costs.
Dwight D. Eisenhower  DOMINO THEORY
(1953-61) o Eisenhower’s administration saw the Indochina conflict as having an even
greater significance.
o The US believed that the South had to be protected from expansionary
communism.
o The domino theory proclaimed that if South Vietnam fell to communists,
this would lead in quick succession to the fall of other South East Asian
states including Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Malaya and Indonesia.
“You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will
happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly”.
 At the Geneva Conference, the Americans refused to compromise with Vietminh
and Chinese delegates.
 By the end of 1954 there were 600 US advisors in South Vietnam.
 In early 1955, the US granted an aid package of $322million to South Vietnam.
 By the early 1960’s, South Vietnam’s economy was entirely reliant upon American
aid and investment.
 The US gave its full support to Ngo Dinh Diem  backed him when he rigged the
referendum in 1955, ousted Emperor Bao Dai and inaugurated the Republic of
Vietnam.
o Supported Diem in 1956 when he cancelled plans to hold nationwide
elections.
o As Diem strengthened his hold on power, there was no US questioning of
his methods.
 By 1960, there were 900 US advisors in South Vietnam.
John F. Kennedy (1961-  IDEALISM
63) o There was a strong and genuine idealistic element in US policy towards
Vietnam.
o JFK viewed South Vietnam as a responsibility of the US to protect from
communist revolution – thus justified fighting in Vietnam as a noble act.
“Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the Free World in South East Asia”
“Vietnam represents a proving ground of democracy”
“This is our offspring, we cannot abandon it, we cannot ignore its needs.”
 SELF-INTEREST
o Losing South Vietnam would mean the loss of massive economic
investment in the country.

Lyndon B. Johnson
(1963-69)
THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR
o If South Vietnam fell to the Communist, the US resources given to South
Vietnam would fall into the Communist’s hands.
 By the end of 1963, the number of US personnel in SV had risen to 16700.
 American involvement in South Vietnam went beyond the purely military and
economic.
o WHAM (Winning Hearts and Minds)  aim of developing a social
infrastructure for the South – health services, education and subsidised
rice.
 Strategic Hamlets had the backing of US funding.
o Failed due to a multitude of factors – built with unpaid peasant labour,
separation from ancestral grounds, fortified structure (like prisons), ARVN
imposing strict rules  collapsed by 1964.
 JFK and Diem assassinated in 1963.
 PRESTIGE
o Aim of maintaining America’s prestigious military reputation.
o ‘The Pentagon Papers’
o The Johnson Administration deliberately escalated the conflict in Vietnam,
often against the advice of its own intelligence authorities.

US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS VIETNAM FROM 1964

LBJ’S CHOICE

 Johnson shared the general view of most US political leaders at the time that communism around the
world was being directed by Moscow.
 Throughout 1964, Johnson continued to be advised that there was a very real possibility that South
Vietnam could fall to the communists – continued fear of Domino Theory.
 If South Vietnam fell to the communists, LBJ’s chances of re-election would be nil – this ruled out
withdrawing from Vietnam.
 LBJ was equally as unlikely to be re-elected if he sent thousands of American troops into a foreign
country to fight a war that seemed to be unrelated to them.
 Johnson was fortunate that in 1964 his Republican opponents nominated their presidential candidate
one of the scariest people they could find – Barry Goldwater.
 In November 1964, Johnson won the election by a landslide.

BUILD-UP TO THE TONKIN INCIDENT

 Johnson needed a reason to escalate US involvement in Vietnam without losing the support of the
American public.
 His advisors were divided:
o HAWKS  advocated a hard line in Vietnam – damaging bomb raids and a greatly increased
American military presence.
o DOVES  expressed major doubts about the US role in South Vietnam and who advocated a
process of disengagement.
 Throughout 1964-65, the hawks increasingly caught the ear of the president – not surprising
considering Johnson’s personal opinions on Vietnam.
ESCALATION OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT

Little US action taken

In February 1964, the
US commenced raids
in NV - attack
economic targets and
limit NV assistance to
VC.
in response to NVA LBJ wins November
and VC attacke in the election by a
South - sustained landslide.
bombing but LBJ
preoccupied with
election campaign.

March 1964 - Johnson launches

Pentagon developed Operation Flaming
PASSING OF THE
detailed bombing Dart in January 1965.
TONKIN
plans - NV military
RESOLUTION
sites, sanctuaries in
Cambodia and Laos.

March - LBJ drafting a February 1965 -

congressional Operation Rolling
THE TONKIN Thunder begins.
resolution that would
INCIDENT
give him absolute
power in Vietnam.

March 1965 - first US

June 1964 - Honolulu combat troops arrive
US forces carried out to defend Da Nang air
Conference increased
SOG and DESOTO base.
US advisor numbers
patrols against NV.
to 23000.

THE TONKIN INCIDENT AND THE TONKIN RESOLUTION

 Late July 1964 – the USS Maddox was involved in DESOTO patrols off the coast of North Vietnam.
 Was clearly a provocative act on the part of the Maddox – NV vessels attacked the Maddox and the crew
of the Maddox claimed they sank a North Vietnamese patrol boat and damaged two others before
leaving the area.
 Two days later the Maddox and the USS C Turner Joy returned to the area – during a violent
thunderstorm.
 Claims were made by US authorities (later found to be false) that the US vessels had been attacked
again.
o This could have been the result of confusion caused by the storm or a deliberate lie by the US to
give it an excuse to retaliate.
 Johnson acted quickly – stating that the US would not allow its vessels to be attacked with impunity.
 Within days, congress passed the Tonkin Resolution – unanimously in the House of Reps – and it was of
crucial importance.
o Gave Johnson the power to take “all necessary measures” to prevent any further aggression.
o LBJ had been given a ‘green light’ to do in Vietnam whatever he believed was needed to be done.
o He could take these actions without having to pass them through congress.

THE NATURE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN SECOND INDOCHINA
CONFLICT

 NATURE = air war, ground war, psychological and media war.

 North  overall aim to reunify Vietnam
 South  overall aim to resist infiltration by N and preserve SV independence
  STRATEGY = Broad overall plan/ vision for campaign
 TACTIC= Specific methods used to achieve strategic goals

NORTH VIETNAM AND THE NLF

NVA

 Highly trained and disciplined- cadres maintained discipline and had respect of the troops, shared
dangers and hardships
 Organized into divisions e.g. transport, engineers, artillery
 Infiltrate SV via HCM trail from NV Cambodia and Laos
 Approx. 200 000
 Worked w NLF

NLF/VC

 Only in SV
 50 000
 20% female
 3 forces
 Regulars
 Provincials
 Part timers
 Support from Soviets and Chinese  older guns replaced by modern weapons. By 1970 NVA had tanks
and other heavy weapons

Strategy

 Attrition (long, bloody, costly) & had been successful against French. Willing to suffer terrible losses
without losing resolve.
 Mental toughness & conviction to fight against foreign invasion. Idea of Dau tranh> struggle.
Combination of armed struggle + political struggle.
 Use variety of methods
 Wait for US to tire/ turn public opinion

Giap’s 3 phase war:

 Form guerrilla bands  train, est. bases & infiltrate/ create links with South Viet peasants
 Guerrilla bands become active & challenge ARVN (ambush & assassination)
 NVA begins open/conventional warfare.

Tactics

 Flexibility & concealment

 Used night to conceal activities
 Avoided major confrontation – initiate conflict only when there was a means of escaping attack
 Fight close to enemy so airstrikes also kill ARVN/US troops

Ambush & Snipers

 Element of surprise
 Hit & run / Overwhelm enemy fast/ get close and get enemy to get caught in friendly fire
 Used with mines & booby traps
Shoot & Scoot

 Short & regular attacks on permanent bases to draw out patrols or keep enemy on alert.

Booby Traps

 Never allow feeling of safety  psych. Effect

 Nonexplosive e.g. Punji stakes, Tripwire triggered projectiles
 Explosive e.g. mines, tripwire grenades

Concealment

 Tunnels
 Concealment and guerrilla tactics were successful in engaging the enemy on their own terms and
conserving their resources/ harassing the enemy and having a psychological effect.

USA & ARVN

USA

 Mainly conscripts
 Soldiers average age 19
 Little military training/ trained for trad. European war
 Lacked respect for officers
 Officers – 6 month tour- little time to bond with troops and gain combat experience
 Soldiers- 12 month tour – little time to bond with units and gain combat experience
 Costly- 80% US soldiers in support roles
 Body count becomes NB & evidence of playing up numbers
 Little understanding of Vietnamese people/ ignorant of culture and complex political situation/ didn’t
understand those they were defending  mistreatment/killing of some villagers/ Couldn’t separate VC
from villagers – who is the enemy?
 Not trusted by locals
 as public support for the war fell away the troops suffered from declining morale
 increased drug use and killing of officers by soldiers who wanted to avoid battle

ARVN

 Suffered huge losses

 Poor pay rates so corruption was rife/ common to steal wages from dead bodies
 Poor leadership- dominated by wealthy upper class men/ promotions based on political considerations
 Poorly motivated. Huge desertion rates  20% /yr.

Strategy

 Attrition by overwhelming enemy with resources and firepower e.g. bombing raids/ thought they could
force NLF and NVA to accept defeat – reach’ crossover’ point where US killed VC and NVA faster than
they could be replaced
 Overwhelming advantages in terms of troop numbers, weaponry and facilities and support of the
world's most powerful economy

Tactics

 Isolate (attempt to stop or reduce infiltration of men and equipment from North into South), Attrition,
(wearing down of enemy) ,Pacification (trying to improve living standards and quality of life of South
V), Destabilise (use air power against the Nth)
  US authorities used the body count- a tally of VC/NVA dead to show the US was winning- later used
civilian deaths in the count to make it look better
 Use of technology e.g. B52 bombers, chemical defoliants
 Reach ‘crossover point’ > us killed VC & NVA faster than they could be replaced
 ‘Hearts & Minds’ Program > aid local population & win support
 $$$ into ‘pacification programs’  increasing village security thru police protection;
o Education, health, hygiene, agricultural Initiatives
 Contradiction?/ Key to defeat? ( hearts and minds already belonged to Vietnam/ suspicion of Saigon
govt. controlled by US
 Westmoreland thought it would take 2 yrs. – Pressure from congress for quick results
 US forces had total control over the air & array of anti-personnel bombs including Napalm, phosphorus,
and cluster bombs, & chemical defoliants including agent orange. >25% of SV affected by these toxic
chemicals

US Ground Troops

 Search & destroy >kill as many as possible with minimum risk to own force
 Largest search and destroy mission> Operation Cedar Falls. Captured and killed large amounts of VC
but created many refugees> severely disrupted lives of civilians.
 Use mobile units, M48 tanks, M113 personnel carriers, helicopter & direct fire fight
o VC blended back into villages/ NVA retreated Cambodia/Laos
o VC/NVA concealment in Tunnels/ underground bases made enemy hard to find
 Ground Troops – Search and destroy missions in areas where VC had support, some villages had to be
completely destroyed, and the inhabitants relocated “It became necessary to destroy the town to save
it”
 -US forces were not allowed to follow retreating North Viet into Cambodia so they could not inflict as
much damage as they hoped.
 -could request air strikes in combat situations, napalm drops in particular could engulf entire VC and
NVA formations, burning soldiers alive and causing terrible injury

Helicopter

 Most NB tactical weapon

 ‘Huey’ – transport and evacuation
 Highly mobile in jungle conditions  huge #’s in position quickly & withdrawn fast if necessary- extract
wounded, observation posts  essential for search and destroy strategies that were meant to locate
and destroy enemy units
 But US & ARVN rarely spent much time in the countryside & when they left VC/ NVA returned SO they
never held territory for long
 Very successful in moving troops, ammunition, supplies and evacuating casualties.
 Dealt with lack of roads and airstrips in jungle conditions
 Was noisy, so difficult to conceal from enemy

Fire support bases/ enclave strategy

 Conventional war tactics and large scale troop movements to attack the enemy would be useless
 Westmoreland planned to use troops in 3 phases
o Build infrastructure and a logistical network (achieved)
o Seek out enemy and inflict heavy casualties (hard to find the enemy)
o Push the northern forces back using ARVN to deal with the remainder
  ARVN effectiveness can be questioned. Poor calibre of training and fighting/ poor leadership (Diem’s
Govt legacy) - Battle of Ap Bac ARVN refused to counterattack Viet Cong, others argue they were
strong, hard fighters.
 Self-contained military base set up in countryside
 Supplied by air
 Defended by barbed wire & infantry
 Base for patrols
 But in areas with strong VC/NVA; east targets for attack e.g. shoot & scoot

Army/Navy combined forces

 Used on coast & Mekong Delta

Air Bombing

 Rolling Thunder
 Aim to attack North
 Cut off supplies along Ho Chi Minh Trail
o 3 yrs. / 800 tonnes of bombs, rockets & missiles
o Limited success… Peasants carried on ( little infrastructure to destroy) BUT ALIENATED THEM
FROM THE REGIME IN SAIGON
 Huge cost
o Could not hold on to areas that they had taken… communists reoccupied villages that were
supposedly pacified  winning battles did not equate to winning the support of the people
especially when victories were on behalf of a corrupt govt.
o Bombed Hanoi > internat. Criticism & lost 318 planes due to North Viet surface to air missiles
(supplied by Soviets)
o Bombing of NV and HCM trail to stop supplies from reaching the south and maintaining the
war effort
o By 1967 NVA anti-aircraft guns had brought down 700 US planes
o Bombing – most effective component was the B52’s flying from Philippines & Guam – too high
to be attacked from the ground- most effective against entrenched enemy troops and bases.
o Bombing of North Vietnam was designed to force them to call off the VC- it didn’t.
o The North was a poor country with little infrastructure to bomb so again it had little effect.
o It was hoped that it would force the North to negotiate or retreat (Johnson & Nixon increased
bombing as punishment for attacks from the North, and decreased bombing when they wanted
to negotiate).
o Evidence suggested that the bombing just made the North more determined.

Chemicals

 Operation Ranch Hand – defoliate jungle e.g. Agent Orange – 86 million litres over 20% of South Viet.

Strategic Hamlet Program

 Aimed to prevent Viet Cong gaining shelter and support

 Some success in isolating VC but it also isolated the locals who were strongly attached to the land and
most peasants in the villages supported the VC activities.

Hearts and minds program

 Continuing strategic hamlet program; organizing rural govt. supporters; building roads and
infrastructure; promoting local democracy; encouraging VC desertions.
  Limited success- 1972 US argued that 70-80% of population. In the south was secure.
 But US troops didn’t stay in the one place for long and there was little trust and mutual suspicion.

IMPACT OF THE 1968 TET OFFENSIVE

PRIOR TO TET

 Westmoreland sought attrition through conventional warfare.

 Operation Rolling Thunder was in progress for 3 years was not denting North Vietnam’s will.
 The worse bombing got, the greater seemed to the morale and determination of the Vietnamese.
 On the home front, anti-war protests were on the increase, though at this stage majority of Americans
still supported the president and the war.
 Divisions were appearing amongst the administration and military – hawks, McNamara resigns.
 Official admin line was that the war was being won – “daily evidence of body counts show, the
Americans were winning.” (The 5 o’clock follies).

LEAD UP TO TET – BATTLE OF KHE SANH

 In September 1967 captured Viet Cong intelligence showed that the NVA were moving large numbers of
troops and supplies to the area around Khe Sanh.
 Westmoreland believed this was the beginning of a major communist offensive.
 Believed NVA were attempting another Dien Bien Phu.
 He moved 6000 troops into the area and carpet bombed the areas surrounding.
 In January 1968 the NVA attacked the American base.
 This was to be a major battle lasting 3 months.
 The cost for the NVA was devastating 10000 deaths vs. 500 Americans.
 The NVA pulled out on April 17 and Americans abandoned the Khe Sanh base in June.
 Impact-distracted the US from Tet.

TET – OVERVIEW

 30 January 7 major cities attacked.

 31 January one hundred separate attacks made across all South Vietnam.
 US stunned that Viet Cong could launch such a large scale attack – intelligence networks had failed
them.
 A select group blasted their way into American embassy compound – US public could watch the fighting
inside the walls of their embassy on TV.
 Also saw an incident later in the day where South Vietnamese police chief walked up to captured VC in
street and shot him in the head.
 VC failed to gain major military victory or trigger popular uprising that would overthrow South
Vietnamese government – huge communist losses.
 Crucial in changing public opinion.
 Showed clearly they were not winning, and brutality was not confined to communists.
 Morale of soldiers declined  fragging, drug addiction.
 Military loss for the North yet simultaneously a psychological victory.

IMPACT OF TET – SUMMARY

 Changed American war aims

o “To get out of Vietnam with the minimum loss of face’.
  Destroyed Johnson’s chances of being re-elected.
 Americans had their most decisive military victory.
 Altered the cold war consensus that had taken the US into Vietnam.
 Anti-war movements on the American home front became mainstream. term-67
o Kent State Massacre
 Convinced the Americans of communist determination and convince them to leave.
 VC/NVA forces lost almost 60000.
 Media deemed guilty of self-censorship.
 Photo of General Loan circulated - made the American home front question who they were fighting
against/for.
 Lost the support of the general public in America.
 Decline in the morale of the US.
o Fragging, drug addiction, alcohol abuse - “Don’t be the last G.I. to die in Nam.”
 Enhances the North’s tenacity and drive - know victory has been secured, just a matter of time.
 Five o’clock follies.
 Change in policy - Americanisation to Vietnamisation.

IMPACT OF THE WAR ON CIVILIANS IN VIETNAM

SOCIAL IMPACTS

 2 million Vietnamese deaths

 Traditional family structures undermined by the strategic hamlet building program
 Social dislocation – movement of refugees. 1 mil boat people. 1/3 of SV villages abandoned or destroyed
during the war.
 Southern cities had become heavily Americanised due to the presence of US troops since 1965
 Western fashion, music and goods dominated the southern society
 Prostitution and drug addiction had become common and remained in the South
 American soldiers often had children with local Vietnamese women – these children were unwanted
and sometimes put into refugee camps – the ‘Bui Doi’ children
 Ongoing effects of chemical warfare: birth defects + stillborn children, Vietnamese veterans had cancer
from defoliants like Agent Orange containing extremely toxic substance dioxin. Operation Ranch Hand –
helicopters drenched countryside with 42 mil L of Agent Orange from 1962-1970
 American establishments of bars and brothels formed around air bases
 Vietnamese education system suffered as a result of under-funding

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

 The major cities of Hanoi and Haiphong severely damaged during the US bombing campaigns and
agriculture had been badly damaged
 Severe damage to the North’s infrastructure, like roads, bridges and factories
 Impact of American bombing in South Vietnam
 Landscape badly cratered from years of bombing
 Defoliation of jungle and forested areas
 Impacts of Agent Orange left ‘toxic hotspots’ throughout South Vietnam
 Rice irrigation was destroyed (20% of agricultural areas)
 Chemical contamination of crops, water, livestock
 Unexploded ordinances

ECONOMIC IMPACTS

 American foreign aid to Vietnam stopped after Communist victory in 1975

  Southern economy had been completely dependent on the input of both US aid and American presence
to stimulate spending
 Complete ban on trade and foreign aid with Vietnam
 Vietnam continued to receive aid from the Soviet Union and China
 Culture of corruption in the Southern economy and government; due to pouring of American money
into the economy, financial mismanagement
 Thirty years of war had destroyed economic progress in North Vietnam
 Poor industrial base in both north and south Vietnam
 Little spending on infrastructure or development
 50% Unemployment in Saigon as a result of the American departure
 Famine: Vietnam produced 1.6 million tons of food less than it needed to feed the population at a
subsistence level.
 Unskilled workers had been fighting a lifetime of war – skills shortage in Vietnam
 The war destroyed 60% of Vietnam’s rubber plantations
 Food production crippled by the bomb damage to irrigation systems and defoliation of farming regions

POLITICAL IMPACTS

 Establishment of a united Vietnam that operated under a communist rule

 Problems with incorporating the capitalist, southern half of the country into the established but
extremely poor socialist economy of the north
 The government was run by revolutionaries: no experience in running a country other than a wartime
economy
 North Vietnamese under 30 had known only war
 Political re-education camps for southern ‘traitors’: 3 month program to indoctrinate Communist
ideology.

THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ANTI-WAR MOVEMENTS IN THE USA AND AUSTRALIA

REASONS FOR THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT

FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE – NOT WINNING THE WAR

 Throughout 1967, despite rising casualties, the administration view that the enemy was being beaten
was generally accepted  and then came the 1968 Tet Offensive.
 After Tet, anti-war protests intensified in both scale and violence, and the general perception changed
to believe that the US was not winning the war.
 Created distrust in the Government – had been fed lies that the US was definitely going to win but Tet
revealed that this was not accurate.

MEDIA

 TV
o Television revolutionised the way war was presented to the home front – went from newsreels
shown before movies at the cinemas to constant broadcasting, and by the 60’s these broadcasts
were in colour.
o The first TV network to work in Vietnam was CBS in 1963.
o TV journalists brought immediacy to their stories.
o TV cameramen accompanied troops in the field.
o TV networks often featured an individual soldiers experiences – adding human interest.
o August 1965 – Reporter Morley Safer reported on the destruction of Cam Ne, showing US GI’s
setting fire to the village – sparked major controversy and Johnson had him investigated for
communist links.
 o This signified the military’s loss of control of the war – no censorship meant that the public had
more access to the reality of war than ever before.
o After Tet, the daily broadcasts of war statistics and body counts were known as the “5 o’clock
follies”.
 TET
o There was no way that journalists could underplay the Tet Offensive.
o After Tet, the media became more critical of the US and more willing to investigate events such
as:
 The My Lai massacre of March 1968.
 Photograph of 8-yr-old Phan Thi Kim Phuc following a napalm attack on her village.
 US invasion of Cambodia in May 1970.
o Johnson encountered problems with the media, but Nixon completely lost them, referring to
them as a “small unelected elite” and ordered the FBI to tap journalists’ telephones.

SOCIAL INEQUALITY

 Johnson lost the support of civil rights activists such as Martin Luther King Jr due to the growing feeling
that the Vietnam War was not treating all Americans equally.
 African-American frustrations were seen in race riots which had become a feature of mid-60’s America,
occurring in Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston and Newark.
 The perception grew that there was a disproportionate number of African-American boys being sent to
Vietnam and White Americans had a much better chance of avoiding being sent to fight.
 Middle class families also had the means to enable their sons to gain college deferments and avoid
having to go to war.
 Many veterans recalled that as the war wore on there was a distinct social bias in the composition of
American units fighting in Vietnam.
 There seemed to be a preponderance of working-class men from the less affluent parts of the country
fighting.

THE SPIRIT OF THE 60’S

 Much of the early anti-war protests were led by baby-boomer students on the campuses of America’s
universities.
 Anti-war protest became part of a wider generational battle that saw the youth in conflict with their
parents’ generation.
 The anti-war feeling of the 1960’s was accompanied by the growing radicalism of the civil rights
movement which had its more violent offshoot with the Black Panther movement.
 The 1960’s also saw the beginnings of the Women’s Movement and the Gay Rights Movement.
 It can be argued that the growth of the anti-war movement can be attributed to the zeitgeist of the
1960’s.

CHRONOLOGY OF ANTI-WAR

DATES INFORMATION
AUGUST  Early opposition included Hiroshima Day protests.
1964  Some clergymen, pacifists and women’s groups opposed the war on moral grounds.
 These were small scale protests that were unimportant to the administration.
EASTER  Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) protested in Washington – a small, peaceful
1965 and idealistic movement.
 By the end of 1966 membership had grown to 30000.
1965-66  Student opposition on the campuses was growing – ‘sit ins’, burning of draft cards,
‘teach-ins’.
  Many potential draftees fled to Canada and Sweden.
 By 1973, over 13500 men had been arrested for draft resistance.
 In November Norman Morrison (a Quaker) self-immolated outside the Pentagon in
protest to the war.
1967  Politicians begin to question Johnson’s right to engage in war.
 October – major protest occurred with the March on the Pentagon in Washington.
 Vietnam Veterans Against the War established.
1968  Anti-war candidates such as Eugene McCarthy seeking presidential nomination.
 Assassination of Robert Kennedy.
 Democrat Convention held in Chicago.
1969  October – 50000 people took part in a moratorium march in Washington – other
marches in Detroit, Miami and New York.
 November – 250000 people march in Washington.
1970  Following Nixon’s invasion of Cambodia, major demonstrations occurred on campuses
across the country.
 Kent State Massacre  four students killed by the national guard.
 This sparked mass demonstrations across the country including a 100000 people
march in Washington.
 Counter demonstrations in support of soldiers in Vietnam also occurred at this time,
e.g. a 100000 strong march in New York.
1971-72  The scale of anti-war protests dropped significantly as the policy of Vietnamisation
was employed.
 This was because more troops were coming home, and casualty figures were dropping
significantly.
IMPACT OF THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT

 The fallout from Tet was the key factor affecting the US’ performance in the Vietnam war  it led to
Johnson’s easing of the bombing campaign and led Nixon to campaign “peace with honour”.
 Nixon despised anti-war protesters, yet he still persisted with Vietnamisation.
 Nixon pursued hard line policies in Vietnam, but this did not stop him winning the 1972 election by a
landslide.
 It could be argued that the militant anti-war protests of 1968 actually prolonged the war.
 The anti-war movement definitely would’ve heartened the North Vietnamese  knowing that many
Americans were calling for the end of the war they knew eventually they would have to retreat.
 The strength of the anti-war movement also weakened the morale of the US troops in the field.
o Soldiers risking their lives in Vietnam while their peers are peacefully protesting their
involvement  psychologically damaging.
o Unfriendly reception of veterans in the US when they returned.
o Increased fragging and drug/alcohol abuse.
 1969  President Nixon employs the policy of Vietnamisation.

ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT IN AUSTRALIA

 Early opposition was limited as the Australian population shared Prime Minister Menzies’ concerns
about the downward thrust of communism.
 Australia needed to back its American ally.
 In May 1965, a mother’s group called ‘Save Our Sons’ was formed that opposed conscripts being sent to
Vietnam.
 The Youth Campaign Against Conscription was formed in 1965.
 There were conscientious objectors who refused to do military service for religious reasons, such as
Jehovah’s Witnesses, or for moral reasons such as teacher Bill White.
 o The arrest of Bill White called Australia’s involvement in the war into question throughout the
population.
 By 1967-68, opposition was growing for similar reasons as in the US.
o Became more radical and more violent.
o However, the violent nature of anti-war protest usually hindered the effectiveness of the
movement.
 By 1970, the Australian anti-war movement was emulating the Moratorium Movement that had
developed in the US a year earlier.
 By late 1971/early 1972, most Australian troops had been brought home, the last troops returning in
December 1972.
 Australia’s anti-war protests were closely linked with conscription that had been reintroduced in 1964.
o The “birthday lottery” method of deciding who would be sent to Vietnam became labelled as the
“lottery of death”.
o Conscription ended by the Whitlam government in December 1972.
 It is unlikely that the anti-war movement played a substantial role in the withdrawal of Australian
troops.
o Once Nixon had introduced ‘Vietnamisation’ it was inconceivable that any Australian
government would maintain a military presence in Vietnam.
 Veterans were often vilified due to the anti-war movement, with no formal welcome home until 1987.
 The anti-war movement created widespread unpopularity for the Liberal Party, with the ALP forming a
government for the first time in 23years with Whitlam’s election in 1972.

THE REASONS FOR AND THE NATURE OF THE US WITHDRAWAL

OVERVIEW

 ARVN proved inefficient in Cambodia incursions 1970-71.

 1972 Easter Offensive cemented this  NV tanks steamrolled South causing ARVN forces to retreat in
total disorder: 10 provincial cities besieged.
 US continued relentless bombing and North forces were overextended and under supplied.
 1969-72 Hanoi and Washington conducted secret negotiations to end conflict.
 By June 1972 a basic plan had been accepted but South refused.
 Nixon reassured South by ordering 1972 bombing raids – 18-30 December 24/7 every day except xmas.
 US failed to bomb North into submission and more anxious to end conflict.
 Settlement in Paris Jan 1973 was agreed.
 US troops left Vietnam 29th March 1973.

NIXON’S DILEMMA

 Nixon promised ‘peace with honour’.

 Post Tet – could no longer talk about victory, but rather ‘an honourable peace’.
 Had to bring the American troops home but had to convince South President Thieu he was not being
deserted.
 Wanted Hanoi to negotiate seriously in the Paris Peace Talks but had to prove that America was not
weakening.
 However, while needing to put pressure on North, had to be sure not to enflame anti-war feeling at
home.
 Wanted to be re-elected and not be a one term president.

PEACE WITH HONOUR? HOW?

 VIETNAMISATION
 o ARVN could be built up to fight on its own and South would survive as an independent state.
o US forces could be withdrawn but aid to the South maintained to make ARVN a viable,
independent fighting force.
 MADMAN THEORY
o North should be told that Nixon is a mad anti-communist with his finger on the nuclear button
to put pressure on Hanoi.
 NEGOTIATIONS WITH SU + CHINA
o SU and China became rivals.
o Nixon believed he could play one off against the other and put pressure on North to compromise
in peace talks.
 BOMBING CAMBODIA
o In early 1969, NVA launched a new offensive against South.
o Nixon responded by trying to sever links between NVA forces and their supply routes 
Operation Menu.

EFFECTIVENESS

 Nixon getting nowhere throughout 1970.

 NVA launched another offensive in Feb.
 May US and ARVN invaded Cambodia to root out communist bases – was a failure.
o No bases found and communist forces that were there retreated deeper into Cambodia.
 The invasion enflamed anti-war protests.
 On top of this – major problem of declining morale within US and ARVN forces.
 Mutiny was feared – 1971 there was 500 known attempts of fragging.
 Rationale behind Vietnamisation was ARVN could defend their country without US  to test this Feb
1971 5000 ARVN sent into Laos to attack NVA supplies.
o Unmitigated disaster, within 2 weeks half ARVN force dead.

DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

 Paris Peace Talks dragged on.

 May 1971 Nixon offered deal to North:
o Withdrawal of US forces.
o US Prisoners of War to be released.
o Ceasefire
o End to more North troops moving south.
o Thieu to remain in power.
o Laos and Cambodia left alone.
o BUT no specific mention of US bombing so North did not take up the offer.

END OF 1971

 3 years as president had achieved little.

 ARVN seemed as unreliable as ever.
 Hanoi still refusing to compromise on letting Thieu remain in power.
 The Russians and Chinese were failing to pressure Hanoi to make concessions.
 Nixon was sinking in the polls.
 Popular unrest at home remained high.

1972 – EASTER OFFENSIVE

 In 1972 Nixon believed totally that failure in Vietnam would mean his electoral defeat.
  Had to get Americans out, guarantee survival Thieu all by November.
 On 30th March North launched Easter Offensive – 3 pronged attack against the South.
 Gained quick success with NVA/VC gaining control of Central Highlands, some Northern provinces and
areas just north of Saigon.
 31st March Nixon responded by bombing selected targets, “these bastards have never been bombed like
they are going to be bombed this time.”
 Americans dropping 3000 tonnes of bombs a day.
 Northern offensive ended in July but US bombed until October.

PARIS PEACE TALKS

 On 9th October US bombing came to end  2 key negotiators in Paris Peace Talks (Henry Kissinger and
Le Duc Tho) seemed to have reached an agreement.
o US withdrawal within 60 days.
o Return of US POWs
o Right of South to decide its own future.
o A promise of a new DRV/US relationship.
o US promise to help with reconstruction.
 President Thieu annoyed that he had not been part of negotiations.
 He ordered ARVN to attack NVA.
 North saw this as American bad faith.
 At home Nixon advised to hold off signing a weak agreement as this might harm election (Nixon wins in
a landslide).
 In Paris, Kissinger handed LE Duc Tho long list of amendments.
 Le Duc Tho walked out of talks and went home.
 Nixon sent North an ultimatum to resume talks or face major consequences – Hanoi did not reply.
 Launch of Linebacker II.

OPERATION LINEBACKER II

 Lasted for 11 days.

 Horrific extent had US newspapers describing the government’s actions as barbaric.
 Dropped 40000 tonnes of bombs over heaviest populated areas of North.
 Destruction massive nut fatalities low due to effective mass evacuation.
 Operation was largely futile.

TALKS RESUMED

 Le Duc Tho resumed talks.

 Nixon informed Thieu that Americans intended signing the agreement with or without him.
 Thieu had no choice but to sign.
 On 15 January Americans ended all action against the North.
 On January 27th, 1973 peace treaty to end Vietnam War was signed.

THE REASONS FOR THE COMMUNIST VICTORY IN VIETNAM

GENERAL REASONS

 Communist guerrilla warfare tactics.

 The relevance of Ho Chi Minh’s ‘elephant and tiger’ analogy.
 VC ability to blend in with local population.
  VC support within the peasant population of the South.
 Fear of the VC amongst the peasant.
 The strength of nationalism of the VC/NVA/Vietnamese people.
 The strength of morale amongst the Communist forces.
 Aid provided by the Soviet Union and China to the Communist forces.
 The impact of the Ho Chi Minh trail and the US inability to destroy it.
 The patience of the Vietnamese in achieving their goals.
 The failure of conventional tactics by the Americans.
 Lack of support for the Americans amongst large sections of the population.
 The indiscriminate nature of American bombing/use of defoliants/failure of US social policy which
alienated the peasant population,
 The cultural insensitivity of the Americans.
 The steady decline in the morale of US troops.
 The growth of the anti-war movement and its impact on policy.
 The impact of the Tet Offensive.
 The significance of the change of US war aims with Nixon.
 The determination of the US Congress to limit presidential powers.
 The corruption, nepotism and inefficiency of the Southern regime.
 The failure of the ARVN to take on the burden of fighting.

Power and
Determination of
Tet Offensive - Was
the North - HCM
a political and
was able to harness
psychological
nationalism against
defeat for the US.
massive odds.
Destroyed Johnson
Supplies sent
and changed the
through the HCM
media coverage of
trail. Tet basically
the war. Changed
Problems in the destroyed the VC,
the aims of US from Power of the Anti-
South - inability of so the NVA
victory to minimum War Movement -
the US war effort to facilitated the
loss of face. No democratic
sustain a credible eventual victory of
the North. government could
and sustainable
sustain the war
regime. Diem seen
with no popular
as a US puppet. In
support. Forced the
stark contrast to the
policy of
stable leadership of
Vietnamisation.
the North.

Nature of the
Military Factors -
Conflict - the US
VC/NVA used more
was unable to
appropriate tactics
Why was the US understand the
than the ARVN/US.
nationalist nature
Guerrilla warfare defeated in the of the conflict. The
combined with war? US percieved the
nationalism proved
conflict as an
to be highly
extension of the
effective.
Cold War.

SPREAD OF CONFLICT TO CAMBOIA AND LAOS

IMPACT OF CONFLICT ON CIVILIANS IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS

CAMBODIA

CAUSES OF SPREAD OF WAR INTO CAMBODIA

 1964-66 North and VC established sanctuaries inside Cambodia in order to infiltrate men and material
across south border.
 Sihanouk agreed in return for promise that Cambodia would not be invaded.
  Nixon interpreted this as direct support for Hanoi.

SPREAD OF WAR

 March 1969 Nixon launched Operation Menu – secret bombing of Cambodia to destroy Viet Cong
without congressional approval.
 March 1970 CIA sponsored a coup led by Lon Nol (Cambodia chief of staff).
 Sparked a Cambodian civil war that lasted five years (Khmer Rouge led by Saloth Sar (Pol Pot) was a
radical group of nationalists who eventually seized power in 1975).
 Cambodia’s neutrality violated 1st May 1970 when 12000 US troops attacked Cambodia.

AIMS AND RESULTS

 To display ARVN’s self sufficiency as an effective combat force (Vietnamisation).

 To destroy southern terminus of HCM trail.
 To eliminate communist sanctuaries.
 Largely ineffective overall.
 Sihanouk had deposed and Cambodia became a new battleground in a war that its people did not want.

LAOS

GENERAL IMPACTS

 25% of population became refugees.

 Guerrilla fighters – included children.
 Political instability – civil war.
 Cratered landscape – 2million tonnes of bombs.
 Exploitation of ethnic minorities (Hmong).
 New political administration under the Pathet Lao 1975.
 Secret War of the US.

BACKGROUND TO LAOS

 Laos never centre power like Vietnam.

 Since 14th century, Lao people no clear identity as a nation or political independence.
 18th and 19th centuries lost territory to Thailand and suffered raids from China.
 Became French protectorate in 1893.
 French put down occasional Lao rebellion.
 French rule in Laos far less brutal than Vietnam.
 ‘Benign indifference’ best characterises nature of French rule in Laos.

LAOS: 1ST INDOCINA CONFLICT TO GENEVA

 Following surrender of Japan in 1945, a Lao Issara (Free Lao) was declared.
 French willing to negotiate and following their reoccupation of the country in April 1946, put Lao king
as head of state.
 Pro-communist Pathet Lao allied themselves with Vietminh in struggle against the French.
 Fought the French in north-western Vietnam and eastern Laos.
 Gained independence from French in October 1953.
 1954 Geneva Accords allowed for coalition between Royal Lao government of Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma and Communist Pathet Lao under Prince Souphanouvong – Monarchy stayed in place.
 1954 Pathet Lao controlled two Lao provinces in north and north west of the country.
LAOS: FROM GENEVA TO 2ND INDOCHINA CONFLICT

 Laotian independence was fully affirmed at Geneva but new Royal Lao Government (RLG) was already
under pressure from growing communist movement, the Pathet Lao.
 1955 Eisenhower administration established the Programs Evaluation Office (PEO) to help support the
RLG as it struggled against the Pathet Lao.
o Since Laotian neutrality was affirmed at Geneva in 1954, much of this activity was conducted in
secret.
 PEO supplied RLG with weapons and training.
 1957 the Accords provided for armed forces of the Pathet Lao being absorbed into the Royal Lao army –
disagreements between the two developed.
 Soon DRV established Group 100 to help organise and support the Pathet Lao.
 US began to build a team to support the RLG.
 By late 1950’s, foreign intervention and local tensions in Laos had increased dramatically.
 Pathet Lao made gains in 1958 elections and coalition collapsed.
 May 1959 Prince Souphanouvong arrested and Pathet Lao forces retreated to their Northern
strongholds – political instability.
 August 1960 – military coup – did not last and Souvanna Phouma found himself as Prime Minister
again.
 Following years  intermittent conflict between royalist and Pathet Lao forces.
 Now becoming an international issue.

BECOMING AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE…

 Soviet Union and North Vietnam providing Pathet Lao with arms and supplies.
 US backing the royal forces  seen as potential ‘falling domino’.
 New York Times gave 3 times as much space to stories about Laos as Vietnam.
 Violent outbreaks between Lao factions – Americans believed a communist takeover could be a reality.
 CIA officer Bill Lair persuaded Hmong chieftain Vang Pao to begin guerrilla campaign against
communists in return for cash and arms.
 1960 – US provides $5mil, 1962 – 11mil, end of 1960s – 500mil.
 700 CIA personnel in Laos.
 International conference called in attempt to neutralise Laos.
 July 1962 new Geneva Accords signed by US, SU, China, North and South Vietnam calling for the
neutralisation of Laos  would never prove to be effective.
 1964 flare up in fighting inside Laos.
 France, Soviet Union, India and Cambodia reconvened the 1962 Geneva Conference.
 US not keen to participate as it feared neutralisation of Vietnam might become possible issue.

LAOS IN THE 2ND INDOCHINA CONFLICT

 The decade following the 1954 also failed to being resolution or peace to the divisions evident in Laos
 conflict became worse.
 Although international community made renewed agreement to keep Laos neutral in 1962, almost all
parties ignored their promises.
 By 1964 the DRV stepped up its support for the Pathet Lao and through the CIA US began its secret war
in support of RLG.
 Laos in state of civil war for remainder of the entire conflict.

US ACTIONS IN LAOS DURING 2ND INDOCHINA WAR

 Eastern regions of Laos integral to North Vietnamese conduct of war – used HCM trail to supply VC
forces and later to bring its own troops and supplies south.
  US incessant bombing of HCM trail and Pathet Lao areas involved dropping of two million bombs
between 1964-73, 25% of population became refugees.
 Actions close to Laotian border e.g. assault on Hill 937 in the A Shau valley – Hamburger Hill – one mile
from Laotian border.
 Barrel Roll bombing operation  attempt to support non-communist forces in Laos and disrupt HCM
trail 14 December 1964 – 29 March 1973.

LAOS AND VIETNAMISATION

 To achieve Vietnamisation Nixon followed LBJ strategy of bombing HCM trail other strategic targets
inside Laos.
 Maintained a Hmong army of over 30 000 members who fought against Pathet Lao using US arms and
training.
 Approved ARVN invasion in 1971 in what became an important test for Vietnamisation – no US ground
forces were used.
 The new operation, Lam Son 719, began Feb when 17000 soldiers from ARVNs better trained units
moved across border in attempt to disrupt major transport of men and supplies moving HCM trail.
 Campaign failed to permanently deprive DRV of its supply lines or bases throughout the areas targeted.
 ARVN began withdrawal on 3 March – lost half its tanks, 2/3 of its Armoured Personnel Carriers and
half their troops – US lost 100 helicopters and 544 damaged.
 ARVN performed well in some battles but clear that still reliant on US air support in most severe
confrontations.
 Some observers worried about long term ability of ARVN to provide adequate protection for South if US
military assistance completely cut off.

THE REASONS FOR THE COMMUNIST VICTORIES IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS

CAMBODIA

THE KHMER ROUGE

 A radical, jingoistic, xenophobic group of dissident Khmers whose origins date from early 50’s.
 The Communist Party of Kampuchea, of which the Khmer Rouge were a part, grew out of anti-French
resistance movements.
 Party fell under the influence of Saloth Sar and his group of young racial purists.
 His clique was known as ‘the centre’ and aligned with China and North Vietnam.

HOW DID THEY COME TO POWER?

 Sihanouk’s downfall and Lon Nol’s seizure of power prompted the Khmer Rouge to retaliate.
 Civil war ensued.
 Sihanouk announced he had formed a United Front of Kampuchea with Khmer Rouge – tremendous
propaganda for Khmer Rouge.
 Period of complex violence between:
o Cambodian nationalists vs. North Vietnamese.
o US/ARVN vs. VC/NVA
o Khmer Rouge vs Lon Nol regime.
 Lon Nol’s regime finally collapsed in April 1975.
 Khmer Rouge took over the capital, Phnom Penh.

LAOS

GENERAL REASONS
  Withdrawal of US support in 1973 (Paris Peace Accords).
 Communist victories in Vietnam and Cambodia encouraged the Pathet Lao to make a final push.
 Failure of the Geneva Accords (1954 & 1960s)
 Failure of Vietnamisation.
 Support from North Vietnam and China.
 Spread of the war into Laos fuelled the revolution.

COMMUNIST VICTORY IN LAOS

 When the Paris Peace Accords were signed in January 1973, the anti-communist position in Laos
severely weakened.
 All major US support evaporated while the DRV and China continued to work closely with the Pathet
Lao.
 RLG forces and Vang Pao’s CIA backed secret army seriously undermined.
 NVA had 100 000 troops along South border with Laos and Cambodia, ready for eventual attack.
 RLG made one last attempt to create coalition government with Pathet Lao but fell apart.
 Fall of Phnom Penh 1975 stimulated the Pathet Lao to make a move for sole power  last major push
for RLG positions.
 Captured strategic locations and by August controlled Vientiane.
 November - King and Souvanna Phouma resigned.
 2 Dec 1975, Lao forced RLG to surrender – Lao People’s Democratic Republic established.
 Marked the end of anti-communist resistance.
 By 1975, 3 communist movements came to power in Indochina.

DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA UNDER POL POT AND THE KHMER ROUGE – AIMS AND IMPACT OF
THE REGIME, FOREIGN POLICY

PENULTIMATE AIM: To create a new Khmer society – Kampuchea and Year Zero declared.

AIMS OF NEW KAMPUCHEA

 Racial Purity
 Cultural Purity
 Communal living
 Achieving through radical agrarian Marxism (RAM).

RADICAL AGRARIAN MARXISM

 Aimed at converting Cambodia into a nation of uneducated, rural peasants.

 All Cambodians must serve Angkar, and in turn, Angkar would provide people with guidance and
direction towards a new state of prosperity.

RACIAL PURITY

 Preservation of Khmer racial purity.

 No tolerance towards Vietnamese and Chinese inhabitants of Cambodia.
 Ancient minorities such as Muslim Cham people and Montagnards targeted.
 These groups forced to flee and those who couldn’t were killed.
 Established Cambodia as a racially closed country.
 Created deep chasms in society.

CULTURAL PURITY

 Removing foreign influences and return to a purer Khmer past.

  All modern technology confiscated and destroyed.
 Phnom Penh evacuation.
 Intellectuals targeted – only 50 of 725 professors and assistant professors remained alive at the end of
the regime.
 Influenced by Mao Zedong’s cultural revolution.
 Separation from international community – allowed KR to implement their aims without intervention.
 Angkar established as an unquestioned form of guidance for the new Khmer people – replaced
traditional religions and became state-wide idol.

COMMUNAL LIVING

 Established a communal way of life with everyone working towards greater Kampuchea.
 Extreme controls were placed over civilians such as constant surveillance.
 Eradicated all familial loyalty and redirected it to Angkar.
 Intentional separation of families to different farming zones removed family tied and strengthened
individual connection to Angkar.
 Civilians no longer paid wages for their work – was for the benefit of the state not the individual.
 Individual and family privacy became extinct.
 All activities made public such as eating, sleeping and getting married.
 Black peasant garb worn by all Cambodian civilians was a physical symbol of the removal of personal
identity.

STATS

 A quarter of the population killed – 1.7million