Observations on the use of Anti-Tank (ATk)

weapons and Artillery (Arty) in the Ukrainian War

OSINT analysis by Tim

Nammo Symposium 2023

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Anti-tank (ATk) weapons in
the Ukrainian War
 Content
● Means available to UKR at the
start of the war
● Non-exhaustive list of antitank-
weapons delivered by Allies
● Succesfully countering the invasion
● Observations in 2nd year: The
changing role of the Russian
Armour
● Lessons Leraned / Lessons
Identified

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Means available to UKR at the start of the war

● 950 Launchers / 7000 Msl ● Vehicle mounted systems

○ STUGNA-P / RK-3 Corsar ○ Barrier: 150 Launchers / 900 Msl
○ FGM-148 Javelin: 150 Launchers/ 1000-2000
Missiles

● Tank launched missiles / 1600 Msl ● Shorter range:

○ 9K112 Kobra (AT-8 Songster) ○ 1000 Fagot/Metis Launchers / 5000 Msl
○ KORSAR ○ 2000 NLAWs

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Non-exhaustive list of antitank-weapons delivered by
Allies
● Shoulder Launched anti-tank weapons: Have not (yet) been delivered:
○ Next Generation Light Anti-tank Weapon (NLAW)
○ Carl Gustav (M3/M4) • SPIKE family (SR, LR, ER, NLOS)
○ LAW M72
○ RGW 90 family • Akeron MP/MMP
○ C90
○ AT-4
○ RPG-7
○ Panzerfaust 3-IT
○ ……
● ATGMs
○ FGM-148 Javelin
○ Milan
○ TOW

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Succesfully countering the invasion

● To put everything in the right perspective:

○ Coverage of the fighting often focused on the role of anti-tank

missiles in stopping the RUS advance.

○ But it was "massed fires" from artillery units that enabled Ukraine
to turn back Russia's tanks.

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Succesfully countering the invasion
● Using the capabilities of the available weapons
○ ATGM: maximum stand-off
○ Remote control / signature reduction

● Succesful use of the ambush tactic

○ Lead and last – more advanced weapons
○ other vehicles - less advanced Atk means or with Arty

● Combine different shoulder-launched ATk means

○ Scarcity of means
○ Weakenesses / strenghts

● The drone as observer

○ TA
○ SA

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Succesfully countering the invasion

Training:
• No time – simple to use systems
• Maint -> Lack of training ->
impact on operational availibility
of the scarce means

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The shift of the war to a positional nature
● Extensive use of Long Range ATGMs
○ Reconnaissance by UAS
○ Stationary Armored Vehicles
○ Bunkers
○ Often combined with snipers and or indirect fire means (to kill off the Infantry)

● Use of ATk means in built-up areas

○ ATGMs for HVT
○ Heavy reliance on (very) short range ATk-means
○ Attack the weak spots (firing from raised firing positions)
○ Attack in mass

● Use during night

○ Very limited use at night of shoulder Launched ATk–weapons
○ Considerable use of ATGMs (night vision capability

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Observations in 2nd year: The changing role of the
Russian Armour
● Rarely used for attempts at breakthrough in 2 nd
year.

● Supplement Arty capabilities through indirect

engagements

● Highly accurate fire support assets (stand off +

optics)

● Raiding (mostly during night)

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Observations in 2nd year: The changing role of the
Russian Armour
● Russians have made several changes:
○ Anti-thermal material
○ modification to the engine deck
○ fighting at dusk and dawn -> make use of thermal crossover effect

● -> lower kill probability but tactical constraints

● Urban Environment
○ Effectivity of the above mentioned measures is reduced in urban environment -> distance
○ suppression of urban structures
○ rapid breaching of buildings to avoid entering through choke points and known avenues of
advance
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Lessons / Conclusions
● ATGMs ><SR ATk means
○ Balance between training time >< stand-off
○ Simplicity and reliability = success
● In MOUT,
○ Engagements appear to happen very often on close distances
○ close engagement range >< western approach of guaranteeing Pers safety
● Distribution of ATk means to the lowest tactical level
● Trg
○ Simplicity
○ Do not neglect Maintenance (batteries -> UKR has struggled in the beginning of the war with this)
● Combine different ATk weapon systems
○ Cover weaknesses of one by strenghts of another
● The importance of UAS for ATk teams
● Russia learns from its mistakes
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Artillery in the Ukrainian
War
OSINT analysis by Tim
2014 - Lessons From the First Phase in the Donbas

● RUS UAV systems – TA – engagement within 15 Min (mostly MLRS)

● Conventional Arty:
○ High Intensity 300/400 rounds/barrel/day

● Concept of Use
○ RUS: suppress targets in support of advancing troops
○ UKR: counterbattery (limited)

● 80-85% of UKR casualties due to Arty

● RUS dispersion of Arty systems -> attach artillery systems directly to lower-
level formations

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Russian Arty Organization – Evolution during the War

Artillery Artillery Brigades

Tactical
Groups • Sp of Axes
• Counterbattery

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Ammunition consumption and production

● 2022:
○ 20.000 – 50.0000 rounds/day
● 2023:
● first quarter of 2023
○ 12,000 - 38,000 rounds/day
○ 152-mm -> 120 mm Mortar.
○ Increase in # Duds -> Improper storage
2022: 12 Mio rounds used
2023: (if trends remain similar): 7 Mio rounds
● Current ammo production:
○ 2.5 Mio rounds/year
○ Will increase + purchase on Int market
(PRK)
● 2022:
○ May through August 2022: 6.000
rounds/day
○ Sep-Oct: 5.000 Rounds/day
○ Nov: 3.000 rounds/day
● According to AFU CHOD:
○ Minimum 356.400 rounds/month (12.000
rounds/day) needed
● Production deficit
○ Some unusual suppliers of Soviet Ammo
for UKR: PAK, IRN
○ West: ramping up production capacity
but….
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Some observations

● 50.000 rounds /day

● Additional artillery systems -> Russian
○ Burden on Logistic and supply chain
○ Effect on barrels of Arty system ->
captures
resupply problem <> hugh stocks ● Provision of western Systems not without
○ Impact of UKR countermeasures problems:
-> unsustainable ● Training
● Ammo supply
● Spare Parts
● RUS Arty forces were poorly trained
● 155 mm systems becoming standard
calibre for UAF
● Quantity lacks quality if it’s all alone ● Precision can overcome mass but…
○ only true to a certain point
○ Giving up terrain to let precision guided
munition make their impact
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Learn by making mistakes
● Prior to summer 2022 -> No problem for RUS to stockpile Ammo near its Arty
positions
● Summer 2022:
UKR HIMARS Attacking
prepositionned RUS reaction:
Conventional Arty RUS Ammo expirimentation
Precision fires stockpiles

● Immediate value and weight of salvo

○ Immediate value:
■ Precise timing on delivery of fires
■ Planning as a series of decision points
○ Weight of Salvo:
■ Greatest weight within a defined period to maximise effect
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Learn by making mistakes

● Gun positions:
○ From dug-in Posn -> Concealment in woodblock and movement to Posn (salvo)

● Indirect fire
○ Against UKR defensive positions
○ Saturate area (UKR offensive)
○ Retreat and saturate

● Precision fires
○ Krasnopol laser-guided 152-mm rounds - Orlan-30
○ Counterbattery fire: from saturation to use of Loitering munitions

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Learn by making mistakes
● Improvement of Russian kill Chain - Strelets
○ Orlan 10’s (Obs of UKR Posn from different directions)
○ 3-5 Min to have effect on target
○ Improvement of Kill Chain flexibility ><
equipment/leadership/training

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 Experience from

Availability of
Ammo
Sustained spare barrels,
consumption
high Reduce as well as
is far higher
utilisation artillery repair and
than
rates over performance overhaul
previously
months services must
expected
be assured

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Lessons to Learn - General

● Quantity lacks quality if it’s all alone

○ Adequate training / equipment / leadership

● Precision can overcome mass

○ only true to a certain point
○ Giving up terrain to let precision guided munition make their impact

● Whatever stockpiles you think you need against a peer competitor ->
triple them
○ Hence Increase critical mass and reactivity of your defence Industry.
○ Caveat: How will you assure S3 of these ammunitions
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Lessons to learn - Operationally
● Dispersion
● quickly get into and out of action to survive on the battlefield.
-> Self-propelled systems are the choice solution .If employed properly, towed artillery
can still play a role on the modern battlefield

● Rocket systems and tube artillery are complementary. The west has caught up with
Russia on use of Rocket systems.

● Accurate engagements out to extended ranges, in conjunction with advanced

surveillance and targeting systems will be the future direction of tube artillery systems.
Inevitably, there will be a need to use guided projectiles, and the challenge
comes in making these affordable to acquire in credible numbers.

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 The rate of artillery ammunition usage in Ukraine should be a real lesson to
European militaries and force them to seriously consider if their ammunition war
stock numbers are truly adequate for combat operations.

The same logic applies to more expensive, but more capable, guided rounds that
are already only available in small numbers

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Tim DE ZITTER

OF-3

Anti-tank systems lifecycle manager

BEL MoD

Tim.dezitter@mil.be

OSINT: https://www.linkedin.com/in/tim-de-zitter/

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