1972 Clark Valenciennes 1540-1570

INFORMATION TO USERS
This dissertation was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document.
While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this
document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of
the original submitted.
The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand

markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.
1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document
photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the
missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with
adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and
duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black

mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the
copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred
image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being
photographed the photographer followed a definite method in
"sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the
upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from
left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary,
sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and
continuing on until complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest

value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be
made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the
dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at
additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog
number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.
University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
A Xerox Education Company
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
72-28,024
CLARK, Geoffrey Whitham, 1939-
AN URBAN STUDY DURING THE REVOLT OF THE
NETHERLANDS: VALENCIENNES 1540-1570.
Columbia University, Ph.D., 1972
History, modem
University Microfilms, A XEROX Com pany , Ann Arbor, Michigan
(^Copyright 1972
Geoffrey Whitham Clark
AN URBAN STUDY
DURING THE REVOLT 0? THE NETHERLANDS:.
VALENCIENNES 1540-1570
Geoffrey Whithare Clark
Submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for
The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Faculty of Political Science
Columbia University
1972
PLEASE NOTE:
Some pages may have
indistinct print.
Filmed as received.
University icrofilms, A Xerox Education Company
i
ABSTRACT
Aft URBAN STUDY DURING TH5 REVOLT OP THE NETHERLANDS
VALENCIENNES 1«&0-1570
Geoffrey Whitham Clark
The dissertation, is an attempt to treat systematically
the rebellion of the city of Valenciennes during the early
stages of the revolt of the Netherlands from Spanish rule.
The study was designed to ascertain to what extent the well-
known rebellion of Valenciennes was directly influenced by
what Henri Pirenne saw as a wave of industrial capitalism
in the Southern Netherlands cities of the 16th century, and
to what extent it was caused by other factors like the in
quisition.
Concentrating on social groupings and the tensions a-
rising from group interests, the first half of the work
investigates the city's economic, political, and religious
institutions. The extent of trade and the nature of guild
organizations were reconstructed albeit from skimpy
municipal regulations lacking in statistics. Statistical
information was available for a study of patterns of
municipal bondholding, patterns of municipal officeholding,
and some 20 years of criminal cases. The investigation of
political institutions included a functional analysis of
judicial, financial, and charity organizations which in
dicated what social groups they favored. The study of
religious institutions mapped the relationships between
the parish churches, the local abbeys, and the dioceses. A
ii
correlation of religious affiliation with social groups was
made in an attempt to see if socio-economic and political
tensions were reflected in religious preference.
The second half of the study investigates the behavior of
different social groups to the extent that they can be gleaned
ftom memoires, correspondence, and the accounts of government
spies. Outlining the chain of action and reaction that brought
the inquisition to Valenciennes, this part of the study indicates
how the actions of the central administration in Brussels
became the focus of economic and political discontent in Val
enciennes. The targets of the activities of Calvinist crowds
at preaching sessions and during the iconoclastic movement in
1$66 are described,.the promoters of these activities are iden
tified, and the complex motivations underlying the various
participating groups are indicated. During the siege of
Valenciennes, the roles of officials in authority and the roles
of the forces of order inside the city are described.
The results of the study indicate that industrialization
in Valenciennes was limited by restrictive guild and municipal
regulations. Nevertheless, relative to other cities there was
a considerable development in industry, especially in light
wool textiles! there were social tensions existing because of
the large number of urban.and urban-rural workers in these cloth
industries, but the workers' behavior was neither unified nor
consistent because they were split up into different herarchical
groupings with dissimilar working conditions and expectations.
The study cautiously indicates that social tensions and religious
iii
preference among different sections of the ruling oligarchies
were due to such factors as accessibility to municipal office,
accessibility to ecclesiastical positions, and ability to gain
rewards from the tax system. However, the single most clearly
demonstrable cause of the city's rebellion led by the merchant
faction of the ruling oligarchy was the oppressive nature of
the inquisition established in the city in the years im
mediately before the rebellion. Particularly irritating to
all social groups in the city were the secondary aspects of the
inquisition, i.e. the troop occupations, the tax levies for
the upkeep of garrisons, and the abrogation-of chartered
rights safeguarding the persons and property of Valenciennes'
citizens and inhabitants.
1 .
T A B L S OF C. 0 N T E N T S
abbreviations . ....v.......... ','..2
INTRODUCTION ..... ............... .. ............... 4
CHAPTER 1 1 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY..,....... ....... 15
1. Valenciennes as a center of trade....,..,..........15
2. Basi c socio-economic structure : the guiles..........19
3. The Valenciennes textile industries................ 29
4. Conclusions. 45
CHAPTER II; GOVERNMENT ANDSOCIETY.......,,.......... ,,..50
1. Citizenship and occupational groups................ 51
2. The Valenciennes government and social groups...... 59
3. Institutions of charity. ....... ?5
4. The criminal system and control of the lower
population....................... 88
5- The tax system and the rentiers......... 104
6 , Relations with central authority.... .120
7. Conclusions ...... 127
CHAPTER Ills RELIGION ANDSOCIETY............ 3-31
1. The Catholic church............. .131
2. Aspects of "worker-artisan social life............. 143
3. Aspects of elite social life and culture ......154
4. The Calvinist church. ........ .170
5* Conclusions..... ...... ........ ...............191
CHAPTER IV; THE INQUISITION AS A FOCUS OF ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL TENSIONS..... ......... ,.,........ 19?
T-* Piaccards and the inquisition under Charles Y......19S
2. General economic trends at mid-century........ 206
3. The policies of Philip II and his administrators...212
4. Jurisdictional challenge from the archbishop of 0 am-
brai and the reestablishment of the royal inquisi
tion, 1559-1561............ 218
5. Political and economic tensions caused by the in
quisition...................... 226
6 . Political and economic tensions caused by the en
forcement of the inquisition by royal troops,.....24?
7. Conclusions. ...................... .260
CHAPTER V* THE BREAKDOWN OF AUTHORITY IN THE YEARS
1559-1563....................... ............. 266
1 . Opposition of the upper: nobility...... 266
2. The "naubrulez*' incident; opposition of urban
magistrates and militia. .... .2?4
3. The noble Confederates and the general breakdown
of authority in 1566 ,.... .288
4. The <rrands uresch.es at Valenciennes in 1566...... ,.392
5. The image breaking .... 3-99
6 . Conclusions............................. 328
CHAPTER Vis THE SIEGE 0? VALENCIENNES ............ ; 336
1. From the icoroclnr.m to the outbreak of hostilities,
August to December 1 5 6 6 .... 336
2. Organization inside Valenciennes during the siege..364
3. The reduction of V a l e n c i e n n e s . .321
A. Summatr. on and aftermath of the siege ............. .A01
CONCLUSION............. ........ ......... ............413
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 425
APPENDICES,.. , ...................... .446
ABBREVIATIONS
ACV Archives corrnnunales de Valenciennes.

ADN Archives departmentales du Nord.
A5SC •Annales. Economies, Societes, Civilisations.
AGR Archives generales du Royaune.
AH5S Annales d'Histoire, economic)ue et sociale.
AN Archive du Nord.
ANFM3 Archives historiaues et litteraires du Nord
de la France et du nidi de la Belgique.
ARBMC Academie royale de Belgioue. Memoires couronss.
ASHP3 Annales de la Societe d'Histoire du Protestantisme
beige,
BCHDN Bulletin de la Commission historicue da Departe-
ment du Nord.
BCKSW ' Bulletin de la Commission de l'Histoire des
Eglises wallonnes.
BCRH Bulletin de la Commission royale dîstoire.
BLARB Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres. Acaderaie
royale de Belgique.
BS3PC Bulletin de la Socrete d*Studes de la Province
de Cambrai.
BSHP3 Bulletin de la Societe du Protestantisme beige,
BSHPF Bulletin de la Societe ce l’Histoire du
Protestantisme frentals.
CAHV Cercle archeologique et historique de Valenciennes.
CCSB Cahiers de la Societe calviniste de Belgique.
HTRV Histoire des Troubles religieux de Valenciennes.
N3V Manuscrits de la Bibliotheque de Valenciennes.
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3.
KHSAV Kemoires historigues de la Socie~te d’Agriculture,
Sciences, et Arts de l'Arrondissement de Valen
ciennes.
MSHDP Meinoires de la Societe d*Histoire da Droit des
Pays flair.ands. picards et wallons.
RASAY Revue agricole de la Societe* d'Agriculture,
Sciences, et Arts de Valenciennes.
R3PH Revue beige de Philologie et d'Histoire.
RH Revue historique.
RN Revue du Nord.
TG Ti.idschrift voor Geschiedenis.
VSV«G Viertel.iahrschrift fur social und wirtschafts-
geschicte.
I
INTRODUCTION
Social and economic historians of the Revolt of the

Netherlands have stressed the urban character of the con
flict and have been tempted to view it as the earliest
middle class revolution. This focus on the cities of the
Netherlands is understandable given the fact that the l6th •
century Netherlands was one of the two most urbanized areas
of Europe and that cities like Valenciennes, Ghent, Antwerp,
and many others were the major battlegrounds of the revolt.
In the 20th century H. Pirenne has presented the most
concise thesis about the Revolt of the Netherlands. Pirenne
found a wave of industrial capitalism in the l6 th century
which he saw directly influencing the revolt. He sav; the
Calvinist movement following in the path of an expansion
of the textile industries in the southern Netherlands pro
vinces. For Pirenne the rural Flemish patting out systems
established by entrepreneur capitalists created an indus
trial proletariat in those areas where the iconociasm of
1566 began, i.e. in the Pays de I'Alleu.and in the rural
area around the river Lys, Pirenne also saw the develop
ment of capitalism in certain "merchant cities", notably
Valenciennes, Lille, Tournai, Antwerp, and the northern
Netherlands ports. In these cities there were social trans
formations as a result of the spread of capitalism which
"prepared the terrain" for Calvinist propaganda. For
Pirenne both the capitalists and the proletarians favored
Calvinism and made these industrialized and trading centers
the backbone of Calvinism during the first years of the
revolt.'1'
Pirenne‘s seminal thesis led to the work of E. Coornaert
who studied the rural industrial area of Hondschoote in
west Flanders. His work has shown that Pirenne was right in
assuming that the spread of industrialization had a role in
creating the violence and iconoclasra in the rural areas.
Coornaert found the working conditions among the peasants,
migrant workers, and floating population in the area of
Hondschoote to have promoted discontent and endemic violence,
Merchant-entrepreneurs exploited the rural populations and
kept them on the verge of starvation with subsistence wages;
they were forced many times to steal and pillage in order to
survive. Coornaert goes on to speculate that the "violently
revolutionary" attitude of the Hondschoote proletarians in
the summer of 1566 was also to be found in certain urban
milieus like Valenciennes which were also the scene of
iconoclasm. 2
The notion that the Revolt of the Netherlands was a
result cf industrialization was taken to its ultimate
^H. Pirenne, Kistoire de Belgioue (Brussels, 1907), Vol. Ill,

pp. 237-2^, 276-277* ^19-^20, and 4-53-^61; and H. Pirenne,
"Une crise inaustrielle au XVI6 siecle; la draperie urbaine
et la nouvelle draperie en Flandre," in Histoire fconomioue
de 1*Occident medieval (Paris, 1951)* pp. 624-6^1. .
2
E. Coornaert, Un centre Industrie! d*autrefois; la draperie-
sayetterie d*Hondschoote: XIVe-XVIIle si^cles (Paris, 193 o),
pp. 358-453; and E. Coornaert, "Draperies rurales, draperies
urbaines. L*evolution de 1’Industrie flamande au Moyen Age
et au XVIe- siecle," R3PH, Vol. XXVII (1950), pp. 59-96.
6 - -
6.
conclusion by the Marxist historian E. Kutner. In a general

history of the revolt in the year 1$66, Kutner presents the
thesis that the revolt was actually a progressive bourgeois
revolution. Like Pirenne he saw the capitalism established
in the southern industrialized areas as having prepared the
■ ground for the revolt. He indicated that it was mainly a
rise in the prices of grain in the winter of 1565-1566 which
•. precipitated the looting and pillaging during the icono-
clasm of the summer of 1566. According to his interpre
tation, the proletarian weavers of the southern Netherlands
industrial belt were driven to pillaging in order to live.
Without studying any locality in depth, Kutner touched
upon the main rural areas and cities where the iconoclasm
occurred. In the vanguard of the Calvinist movement he saw
the "weaver city" of Valenciennes; he wrote that it was a
second Geneva or a theocratic republic led by its ministers
and the middle class. The Calvinists there created a revolu
tionary proletarian army called the "tout nuds" or naked .
ones because of their rags; for Kutner the proletarians were
the mainstay of the city*s defenses against royal Catholic
troops in the winter of 1566 -1 5 67 . Although he implied
that the middle class was in command', Kutner nevertheless
stressed the role of the famished and jobless workers who
were forced to sack monasteries near Valenciennes in order
to .survive; he wrote that these early proletarians did their
duty well and supplied an inspiration to later generations
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7
7.
because of their courageous defense of the city. Kutner

suggests, finally, that the reason why the prince of Orange
did not lead a revolt in 1566 was that he feared the revolu
tionary powers of the people.^
In contrast to these social and economic interpreta
tions, there are the more political theses of such his
torians as J. Motley and P. Geyl. In his classic, narrative
the liberal 19th century historian J. Motley stated that
"all the so-called revolutions of Holland, England, and
America are the links of one chain." For him the Netherlands
revolt was an organized protest carried out by the nobility
and the burgers of the towns in an effort to protect their
chartered rights and privileges from the accumulation of
power in the hands of the Hapsburgs, Charles V and Philip II,
and from the oppressive inquisition. He saw the crushing
of the rebellion at the city of Ghent in 15^0 as inaugura
ting an intolerable period of degradation for the Nether
lands which ended in revolt. Motley believed that the
iconoclasm of 1566 was a popular explosion of revenge against
the symbols of the Catholic church in whose name the oppres
sive inquisition of Fhilip II was carried out. As a result,
he stressed that the iconoclasts were generally guiltless
of any looting and pillaging during their breaking of
images. He cites the testimony of a Catholic eyewitness
to the Valenciennes iconoclasm that there was no stealing
1E. Ku-* ler, Het Honger.iaar (Amsterdam, 19^9), pp. 37^-381.
in the city; upon this example and those of a few other
localities Motley generalized for the rest of the Nether
lands and concluded that the iconoclasm, although violent,
did not result in thefts. Overall Motley saw the revolt
as progressive in the religious and political sense, i.e.
Protestantism and x-erpublican liberty were established and
set a precedent for the English and American revolutions.^
In the 20th century P. Geyl wrote a more sophisticated
account of the Revolt of the Netherlands but cane to the
same basic conclusions as did Motley, namely that it was
the oppressive inquisition and the centralizing tendencies
of the Kapsburgs that were the main causes of revolt. Geyl
like Motley ;
saw: the defense of noble and urban rights as
a key factor in the genesis of the revolt and does not place
much weight on the social and economic interpretation of
p
Pirenne. Thus, both Motley and Geyl saw the cities as
important factors in the revolt more because of their char
tered privileges than because they were industrial centers.
In spite of the interest vrtiich historians have taken
in the industrial and urban nature of the Revolt of the
Netherlands, there have been no systematic studies of the
behavior of the Netherlands towns during the genesis of
the revolt. The present state of our knowledge is limited
^J. Motley, The Rise of the Dutch Republic (New York, I8 8 3 ),

pp. iv-vi and 59-6?.
2
P. Geyl, The Revolt of the Nether.lands 1 1555-1^09 (London,
19^5).
to the study of rural Hondschoote and to a few studies of
the textile, industries in the southern Netherlands towns
which give no attention to the revolt.^ 3ecause it has teen
used by Pirenne, Coornaert, and Kutner as the prime example
of urban revolt during the.genesis of the Revolt.of the
Netherlands, Valenciennes becomes important in the crisis
years of 1566 -1 5 6 7 . The. city in those years v:as a hotbed
of anti-government action aind the only town in the Nether
lands in that early stage of the revolt to offer active
well-organized resistance to the royal armies in a Ions
and drawn out siege. The episodes of the tovm's iconoclasm
and siege have also been utilized to substantiate the
theses of Pirenne and Kutner. As a result, it is time that
a comprehensive study of Valenciennes' institutions and
behavior during the revolt be undertaken.
The following topics seem vital to a systematic treat
ment of Valenciennes' urban revolt in the l6th century.and
will be covered in this dissertation! First, what is needed
is an investigation of the city's institutions in order to
see what social groups they favored and which they did not
and what tensions existed because of the- clash of group in
terests. The institutions to be studied fall into three
main headings— economic, political, and religious.
^"Principal!?/' F. Kaugis, ''La saieterie a Amiens: 1480-1589,"

VgWG.Voi. V (1907),^po. 1-114; H. Pirenne, ed., Recue11 de
documents relatifs a 1'histoire de 1*Industrie drr~ci£re er.
Fiar.dre (Brussels, 1906-1924); and F!. 7.aihaeck, "His^îre de
la sayetterie a Lille,” Nemoires de la Societe d*Etudes
de Cambrai, Vols. XVI and XVII (1910;.
The economic investigation of institutions will in
clude such factors as geographic situation* proximity to
markets and transportation networks, the existence of trading
companies, and the types and quantity of mercantile pro
ducts. The guild institutions and the organization of labor
also need to be studied in order to determine the existence
of various levels of working artisans, their relationships
with employers, and what possible tensions existed between
them. The investigation of the political institutions will
include a functional analysis of the town's judicial, fi
nancial, law enforcement and charity organizations with re
spect to what social sroups they favored. Patterns of re
cruitment to office will be correlated with wealth and
social status, and an attempt will be made to determine if
there were tensions existing among the town's elites because
of oligarchic control of political office. The financial
and political relationships with the central government will
be indicated to show what groups inside -the town found the
urban-royal ties beneficial and which found them detrimen
tal. The study of religious institutions, finally, will
set forth the functions of the parish churches, the local
abbeys, and the dioceses for Valenciennes' social groups;
similarly the social life and culture of the city will be
investigated to see if they reflected the tensions which
existed on the political and economic levels. There will be
a correlation of religious affiliation with social groups
in order to see if institutional tensions were reflected in
religious preference.
a
n.
Secondly* what is needed is an investigation of the
behavior of the different interest groups within the context
of the changes that influenced Valenciennes in the mid-l6 th
century. This behavioral section will focus on the chain
of action and reaction that brought the inquisition into
Valenciennes, and it will show how the inquisition became
the focus of economic and political discontent. It will
indicate the behavior of the urban groups during the criti
cal years of 1566-156 7 : The targets of the activities of
the Calvinist crowds at preaching sessions and during the
iconoclastic movement will be described, the promoters of
these activities will be identified, and the motivations
underlying the various participating groups will be defined.
During the critical fall and winter of 1566-1567 the roles
of officials in authority and the roles of the forces of
order both inside and outside Valenciennes will be investi
gated as to their efficiency and effectiveness. Finally,
the consequences of Valenciennes* actions and their his
torical significance have to be considered in the light
of past historiography on the Revolt of the Netherlands,
V.’hat kind of sources do we have for the study of
Valenciennes? There are the contemporary memoirs, but
these are very dangerous sources given the intense religious
and political hatreds existent in the latter part of the
16 th century and the beginning of the 17th century when they
were written. For example, the Catholic memoirs of eye

witnesses are of uneven quality, and none exists that has
12.
not been edited by Catholics of the 17th century. The

memoir of two Valenciennes tax collectors which has come
down to us ascribed to P. Le3oucq^ is little more than a'
diatribe against the canaille who made up the Calvinist
ranks and who pillaged and stole their way through the
monasteries near Valenciennes.. A more moderate eyewitness
report is that of Kenri D'Outreman, whose memoirs were edited
p
by his son, a Jesuit father. D'Outreman is Motley's source
for the lack of stealing in Valenciennes, while the pseudo-"
LeBouca is evidently the source for the pillage and sack
described by Kutner. Other more general memoirs of the era
like those of Pontus Payen and Pasauier de la Barre mention
the troubles at Valenciennes but only in passing remarks.
Given the general unreliability of the memoirs, the
historian has to go to the archives to find original corres
pondence and government documents which better describe
Valenciennes at mid-century and which give a less biased
account of the Calvinist movement. For the institutional
study of the city the archives give us a wealth of charters
and additional municipal regulations detailing the city's
economic and political privileges and franchises throughout
the centuries. These include the charters of the guilds
^P. leBoucq, Histoire des troubles advsnues a Valenciennes

a cause des heresies, 15e?-1679 (Brussels, 1864), ed. by
A.F.L. De Roubaulx de Scumoy.
^K. d'Cultreman, Histoire de la ville et c omte de Valenci
ennes (Douai, 1 6 3 9 ).
and the political charters establishing the rights and
privilege's of the citizens and the town. We also have many
of the amendments of these economic and political charters
in the 15th and l6th centuries. There are citizenship lists
and lists of the magistrates. for the- whole l6th century,
and there are the ordinances covering charity and some in
dication of the monies spent in crucial years-of famine and
unemployment. Criminal registers indicating crimes are in .
existence for a good segment of the 16 th century as are
complete records of the owners of municipal rentes. There
are also reports describing the state of religious obser
vance in the parish churches, and documents which describe
the relations of the local abbots and bishops to the Catholic
church in Valenciennes. For the behavioral investigation
there are spy reports and interrogations of heretics de
tailing the•organization and personnel of the Calvinist
consistory and the activities of the Calvinist church in
the 1 5 6 0 *s.^ Also, much of the correspondence between the
central government and the town magistrates has already
been published for the period 1562 -156 7 .
On the other hand, there are some crucial lacunae in
our sources which are mostly of a statistical nature. We
^These sources are to found principally in the Archives con-

munales and in the Bibliothôue municioale at Valenciennes,
in the Archives depart ernentales du I-’ord at Lille, and in the
Archives fer.^rales du Rovaune at Brussels.
2
C. Paillard, ed. Histoire des troubles relirdeux de Valen
ciennes, (Brussels-The Hague, 137^-1376); and C. Paillard,
ec., "Fapiers d'etat et documents iriedits pour servir eL 1 'his-
toire de Valenciennes pendant les an.nees 1566 et 1567 ," I-IHSaV,
Yols. V-VI (1878-1379).
14
Ik.
possess no records of merchant families which might indicate

the procedures of trade or the quantities of products traded.
All internal records of the guilds along with the production
records of the textile industries also are lost. There are
no tax records on the cloths as these were farmed out and
kept by private individuals, and similarly, there is little
concrete statistical evidence to indicate the size cf the
work force or the wages paid to workers. These gaps are
indeed deplorable as they are important for a study of a
city in revolt and cannot help but to limit the extent of
our conclusions. Nevertheless, if we cannot make a complete
statistical study, we still possess sufficient documentary
and epistolary evidence for a systematic description and
analysis of the city's institutions and the behavior of its
social groups during the 1560’s and the first year of the
Revolt of the Netherlands.
15.
CHAPTER ONE* ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
1. Valenciennes as a center of trade

In the l6th century. Valenciennes was a walled- and
moated city of 12,000 plus population situated in the border
province of Hainaut in the southern Netherlands.1 The city •
was positioned on the Scheldt river where it met a tribu
tary called the Rhonelle; this was the point of departure
for navigation on the lower Scheldt. Valenciennes was the
entrepot for trade from northern France to the Netherlands
cities of Tournai, Ghent, and Antwerp all of which were con
nected with Valenciennes by the Scheldt, the largest in
ternal river system in the Netherlands. As early as the
9th century Valenciennes was a trading center, and from
the 12th to the 14-th centuries Valenciennes belonged to the
Hanse of the Seventeen Towns, a commercial group specializ
ing- in the exportation of drapery cloths to the Champagne
fairs.^
In the 15th and l6th centuries the most important pro
duct coming into the Valenciennes entrepot was wine from
The Belgian demographer M.A. Arnould estimates the Valen

ciennes population to be from 12,000 to 1 2 ,6 0 0 on the basis
of the tax levied on real and movable property by the duke
of Alva in 1567, Les denombrer.ents des foyers dans Is comote
de Hainaut XIVe-XVIe sidcles (Brussels, 1956), 0 0 . 304— 305;
and “Llmpot sur le capital en 3elgique au XVIe siecle," Le
Hainaut economic!ue, Vol. I (194-6), p. 4-2. C. Paillard, an
historian of Valenciennes, used the figure 30*000 which seems
exagerated, Notes et eclaircissements sur 1'histoire ger.erale
des Pav-3as et sur 1*histoire de Valenciennes au XYIe siecle
(Valenciennes, 1379). p. 24-”
^F. Vercaute£en, "Notes sur la survivance de la Hanse des XVII
villes du XVe au XVIIIe giecles", 33PH. Vol. XXVII (1950), pp.
1078-1109; H. D'Outrer-tan, Histoire de la ville et comote' de
Valentiennes (Douai, 1639), pp. 24-6-24-9 and 333.
16.
Prance. French wines of Soissons, Laon, Champagne, Ile-de-
France, and Burgundy came overland by wagon to Rouen where
they were transported across the frontier to Valenciennes
and Arras, from whence they went by water to their distribu
tion iri Flanders and Brabant. Two great markets of wine—
Valenciennes and Arras— on the border between France and
the Low Countries controlled the trade in wine not only on
the river tributaries linking up-with the lower Scheldt but
also in the surrounding areas of Hainaut, Artois, and Flan
ders. These markets were based originally on-the favorable
geographic position of the two cities, but later on privi
leges which established their monopoly of trade in the area.'*’
•If wine was the most important item in the trade with
France, wool and cloths were the most important items of
trade altogether. Valenciennes was an importer of raw and
combed wool not only for her own cloth industries but for
the industries of other cloth producing towns in the pro
vinces of Hainaut, Cambraisis, and Flanders. These towns
were not part of the Scheldt river system which connected
the area with the Netherlands' entrepot of Antwerp and ulti
mately with the wool producing countries. Valenciennes'
lainiers and grossiers, wholesalers in raw and combed wool,
traveled as far as England and Spain to select and buy
wool. They then sold their wool as far into Flanders
^J. Craevbeckx, Un grand commerce d'importation: les vins

de France aux ancier.s Pays-Bas; XIII^-XVI^ siecle (Paris,
1953). so. 21-26; and H. Lancelin, Histoire de Valenciennes
depuis ses origines (Valenciennes, 1933)* PP» 10-11.
// .
17*
as the save center of Hondschoote.^
These merchants were the intermediaries between the
regional producers and the merchants of great commercial
centers. They had factors at Antwerp and Rouen during the
first half of the 16th century when trade quickened on the
Scheldt. Both indigenous merchants from Valenciennes'
merchant guilds and foreign merchants traveled between
Valenciennes and great merchant houses in England, Germany,
and France, besides those of Antwerp and the cities of the
Netherlands. They promoted the overland trade routes to
France and Italy for woolen cloths from Flanders; these
routes went by way of Valenciennes, Dijon, and-Lyon or
2
by way of Valenciennes,.Arras, and Amiens to Paris. A good
many of Valenciennes’ lainiers were originally foreigners who
were attracted to the cloth center and regional market by
the profits to be made. Many young men from the families •
of the Valenciennes merchants wisite d:.r foreign cities
to study as apprentices in merchant houses in order to learn
O
the trade and to establish contacts.^
Valenciennes was also a regional market and an entrepot
for Hainaut, Cambresis, and eastern Flanders for all sorts
of merchandise. Merchants came from Bouchain and Cambrai on
^B. Coornaert, U.n centre industriel d*autrefois; la draperie-

sayetterie d*Hondschoote; Xiy'-XVIIIe si£cies (Paris. 1930),
pp. 192 and 241-242. Valenciennes, Ghent, and St. Omer were
the main suppliers of Hondschoote*s wool.
2
Coornaert, Un centre industriel, pp. 248-249.
3HTRV, Vol. II, p. 487 note.
0
18.
the non-navigable stretches further up the Scheldt and from

the small towns of Le Cateau Cambresis, Bavay, Le Quesnoy,
Solesmes, Landrecies, Maubeuge, and a host of villages in
Hainaut and the Cambresis. During the market days merchants,
villagers, and peasants bought and sold a multitude of pro
ducts including farm animals, manufactured tools, wagon parts,
cloths, and vegetables. The major products traveling to the
cities on the Scheldt for the regional market were wine,
herrings, and cereals. Farms in the area could not produce
enough cereals for local consumption in the cities, and wheat
had to be shipped from Antwerp. Herrings were used as a
substitute for meat when it became scarce and too costly to
purchase. The Valenciennes area had some vineyards but they
could not supply the needs of the peasant population which
drank considerable quantities of wine.1
There were a number of different markets during the
16th century at Valenciennes. The regional market was held
every Saturday on the market place before the bell tower and
the municipal buildings. This weekly market was highly regu
lated; it was opened and closed at specific times, merchants
were required to have certification to sell, and they were
assigned to designated spots. The portable wooden stalls
holding merchandise were of a set size, and taxes were col
lected on many items. On the 16th of each month, however*
1C. Cappliez, Histoire des metiers de Valenciennes (Valen

ciennes, 1893), p d . 39-42; and £. Bouton, "Les vignobles de
Valenciennes, *' MKSAV, Vol. II (1868), pp. 197 -2 0 5 '.
there was a free market which was unregulated and untaxed.
Once a year there was the fair held from the 8th to the 20th
of September following the yearly festival of the procession
of Notre-Dame du Saint— Cordon. This fair was visited by
foreign merchants, regional merchants, and small buyers
from the Hainaut area. During this fair and on many saints
days there were unofficial neighborhood.markets selling
local wares and vegetables which were situated around the
parish churches.'*'
In sum Valenciennes was a commercial center of con
siderable importance on the main trade route between the
Low Countries and France. Her position on the upper Scheldt
made her a regional market for Hainaut, east Flanders, and
the Cambresis. Her merchant community had ties with mer
chants in Germany, France, and England.
2. Basic socio-economic structures: the guilds

The basic socio-economic institutions of Valenciennes
In the 16th century were the guilds. By the late 15th and
2
early 16th centuries Valenciennes had 92 guilds. For the
^C. Caopliez, Histoire des metiers de Valenciennes, pp. 39“

**2 . —
^The basic secondary source which can be utilised for the

metiers of Valenciennes in the l6th century is C. Caopliez,
Histoire des metiers de Valenciennes (Valenciennes, 1893)•
See also J. Leoreux, "I'totes sur les corns des metiers de la
ville de Valenciennes" HASAY. Vol. VIl/(l856), pp. 200-203.
For the charters of the majority of guilds which were es
tablished before 1 ^0 3 , see the compilation of charters in
K3V. ms. nos. 700-703 and 7^-7. Unfortunately, there are no
records of the guilds themselves which would indicate the
internal workings of the organizations.
majority of trades, the charters came in the 12th and 13 th
centuries, but many important guilds were established in the
early 15th century-. For example, the sayeteurs, or saye
weavers, Were established in l406, and the mulkiniers, or
linen weavers, were established in 1413. There were only a
few guilds established in the 16 th century, namely those of
the hautelisseurs, or fine cloth weavers, and the painters
and artists.
There were 29 guilds in the textile industry of Valen
ciennes spanning every stage in production from the mer
chants who bought the wools, to the combers and weavers, and
the dyers and merchants of cloth.’ The 29 guilds covered many
kinds of cloth, i.e. the heavy v/ool draperies, the fine sayes
and hautelisse, and the linen muslins and laces. Most of
these textiles were of the fine luxury variety, Valenciennes
having a reputation for worksmanship in fine light cloths.
Thirteen guilds were in the clothing industries, in
cluding shoemakers, shoe repairers, bootmakers, the makers
of cloth boots or a type of sock, hosiers, couturiers,
hatters, furriers, glovers, and purse-makers. There were
separate guilds for parmentiers— or those workers who did
the laborious job of putting a luster on certain cloths.
The vieswariers, or sellers of old clothes or repaired
clothes, were also constituted into a guild.
There were 10 guilds which traded or produced food and.
drink. They were the wine merchants, grain merchants,
bakers, brewers, innkeepers, millers, measurers of grain,
21 .
porters, butchers, fishmongers, and fruitsellers. The metal
industries in Valenciennes had 10 guilds, including tool
makers, comb makers, locksmiths, tinsmiths, goldsmiths, and
cutlers, besides armorers and firearms makers.
There were JO other guilds of a diverse nature— anything
from makers of rope and pins, to tanners, barbers, and coopers-.
The most important group among these were probably those mer
chant guilds of general merchants and oil merchants, and
the guilds of the building trades— the masons, the carpen
ters, joiners, etc.
Each guild had a charter granted by either the prince
or a municipal body, the Halle Basse, which consisted of
the city magistrates sitting as civil judges. The charters
were partly political documents which noted the allegiance
which the corporations had to the sovereign. Mostly they
were economic and social documents, laying down principles
which would guide the masters and officers of the guild in
the areas of quality control and organization. These char
ters left the day to day enforcement of the regulations to
urban officials and the leadership of the guilds. Yet the
Halle Basse served as an ultimate tribunal to judge disputes
arising within the guild .or arising between the guild and
an outside body, and it had the authority to issue ordinances
regulating the guilds whenever it deemed it necessary. "*■
^For the relationship between the Halle Basse and the guiles
see Cappliez, Histoire des mexiers de Valenciennes, pp. 12-13
and 37-39; and G. Espinas, 1/Organization corporative des
metiers de la dranerie a Valenciennes (Paris-Louvain, 1932),
pp. 1-4.
The primary function of the guilds in Valenciennes v;as
the control of quality in products. Quality regulation was-
enforced both from within the guild by its officers and mas
ters and externally through market regulations laid down by
the magistrates. The guilds* officers made visitations to
the workshops of masters to see that correct procedures in
the production of merchandise were being observed. Buying •
and selling at the markets was regulated by the municipality
for all the wares of the city; these included all sorts of
merchandise from wine and wool to items associated with the
regional market like beasts of burden and vegetables. Fines
were handed out by the Halle Basse for the slightest in
fraction of selling outside the market, even for peddlers
of home-grown vegetables.*^
A second function of the guilds was, of course, promoting’
social stability. This was achieved by the hierarchy within
the laboring forces. The relative degrees of privilege at
each level provided layers of workers who were interested in
bettering their working conditions by moving upwards in the
hierarchy.
It is hard to arrive at generalization about working’
conditions as the regulations governing such objects, as the
hours of work, apprenticeship, and holidays were different
for each guild. The magistrates provided some leadership
and prevented abuses such as night work by candlelight in •
For examples of cases of persons caught abrogating market

regulations, see M3V, ms. no.,702, f'f. ^7-^?vo and 80.
23.
the l6 th century. They laid down a law that no one could

work after three p.m. on Saturday so that workers could go
to Saturday vespers. Sundays were mandatory holidays as were
several saints days during the year. On these religious
holidays the markets and quais were closed and anyone found
working was fined. 1 To what, extent these regulations were
enforced is unknown, because the records of the civil cases
of the magistrates are missing.
There was also a seasonal oscillation in the number
of hours worked due to the length of the day and the amount
of light available to see to work. For example, many arti
sans worked nine hours in the winter and twelve in the sum
mer. The workers were summoned to work by special bells
in the city's watch-tower called the cloche des ouvriers
which sounded the time for lunch and tolled the end of the
work day. These hours were for workers employed by the
city and for a good number of trades, including the weavers,
which was perhaps the largest group of workers in Valenciennes.
In other trades the work day was indicated by the tolling of
the parish church bells, or by the bells of certain monas
teries as set forth in the contracts between the masters
2
and their journeymen.
There were two ways to become a journeyman in many of
Valenciennes* guilds. The first was through an apprentice-
1M3V, ms. no. 7^7, ff. 3 and 6; and Cappliez, Histoire des
metiers de Valenciennes, p. 196.
2A. Dinaux, "Le beffroy de Valenciennes," ANFM3, Vol. IV
(184-2), pp. 250-269.
2Ur,
ship which usually lasted for two years. This was the
normal way to become a journeyman for the majority of the
guilds in the city. Apprentices usually had to be at least
12 years of age, and some charters stipulated that the ap
prentices had to have proof of baptism and of legitimate

marriage. For most trades there was a tax on entry to ap
prenticeship, but this tax was usually half for the sons of
masters. Regulations set the-number of apprentices that a
master could have at a low level, generally only one or two;
many guilds stipulated that to become a master, an indivi
dual had to serve as an apprentice. In many guilds appren
ticeship seems to have been a privileged status reserved
for masters' sons being groomed for mastership.
The second way to become a journeyman in several
guilds was by serving as a valet. The valet was a newcomer
to the guild like the apprentice, and he too made a contract
with the master which bound him to work at reduced wages in
order to- learn the trade. The difference between the appren
tice and the valet was that there was no entry fee to become
a valet, and although a valet might reach journeyman status,
he probably went no further; in those guilds which had valets
the regulations for entry to mastership only mentioned ap
prenticeship as a prerequisite for mastership and did not
mention the status of valet at all.^ Also, whereas there
were regulations restricting the number of apprentices,
^"See, for example, the saye weavers' regulations of 1^2, 1^58,

and-lWj-9, I-I3Y, ms. no. 7^7, 3-5; and see the hautelisseurs'
regulation of 1565» MBV, ms. no. 703. fo. l8lvo.
25.
there seems to have been no regulation restricting the

number of valets a master could employ. Thus, valet status
seems to have been inferior to apprenticeship status; in
fact the valets seem to have been the lowest level of workers
in the city. Valets were for the most part ouvriers de dehors
or peasant workers living in the suburbs or nearby villages
who labored inside the city. 1
The journeyman, even though few became masters in the
16th century, was in a relatively privileged position. He
was a skilled worker in his industry or craft and had al
ready, served two to five years as an apprentice or valet
to become a "free" worker. He could leave to go to another
town carrying with him a certification of his skill. Jour
neymen many times had contracts with the masters with whom
they worked to assure a certain length of time to perfect
specific knowledge of the work; after the expiration of the
contract the journeyman could change masters. Many trades
required that the journeymen pay a droit d'entree, or entry
fee, when moving to Valenciennes, and in other trades it was
customary for the journeyman to pay a sum of money, called
the bienvenu, to the drinking fund of the other journeymen
in-the guild.
Upward mobility in the various trades differed greatly.-
Some traders tended to be controlled by groups of families
in a hereditary manner; trades such as skilled metalworkers
or merchant guilds retained their exclusivity by requiring
*un the regulations governing apprentices and valets, see Cap-

pliez, Histoire des metiers de Valenciennes, pp. 18-22; and Es-
pinas, L*organization corporative des mgtie'rs. pp. 6 -1 2 .
26.
considerable charges for entry-and to- mastership. Even in

the lesser skilled trades there-were clauses in the charters
which favored the established masters and their families;
many times the son of a master only had to pay half the
1
entry fee to mastership.
Entry requirements for mastership included an entry fee
and usually the gift of a banquet for the rest of the mas
ters, although the latter was a custom which was considered
an abuse by the Halle 3asse. Once one achieved the status
of master the privileges were numerous. In- the trades
and industrial guilds the masters were allowed to open up
a workshop and employ apprentices and valets; they were also
allowed to put up a stall for selling wares in the market
place— this process was called lever le feniestre du mestier
in Valenciennes. Other privileges were the right to parti
cipate in the social activities of the guild and to help to
elect its officers. Masters also had exclusive rights to
buy supplies before journeymen cr foreign merchants in some
industries; this enabled them to monopolize the best raw
materials available.
Very little is known about the internal organization
of the guilds; the method of election of guild officers and
how decisions were made is not specified in the charters or
supplementary regulations. Each metier had eswards or
stewards who marched in front of the assembled guildsmen
during parades. In some cases the stewards, who were
Êspinas, L'organization corporative des metiers, p. 21.
1/
27.
evidently designated by the masters of the guild, were .

confirmed in office by the magistrates. Among their func
tions were visitations to the workshops and stores to assure
the the regulations of the guild were being upheld. They
also arbitrated certain petty disputes arising within the
guildswhich were not serious enough for the consideration
of the Halle Basse. They acted as treasurers of the guilds
by collecting dues and keeping the accounts of the metier.
Also they assisted the temporarily sick masters with the
help of prudhommes who gave money collected from the mas
ters.^ The stewards presided at the banquets held by the
masters usually during the day of the patron saint of the
guild.
In Valenciennes there was no political function for the
guilds as there were in cities like Ghent where the guilds
had obtained political powers. In Valenciennes there was
no mention of any political privileges appertaining to the
guilds in either their charters or the subsequent regulations
governing their organization. As we shall see, the politi
cal institutions of Valenciennes were controlled by a handful
of families who excluded the guilds from the central organs
of authority and decision making. The guildsmen*s partici
pation in politics was limited to a little used- council
•^The guild charities seem only to have helped masters in

need. " Cappliez, Histoire des metiers de Valenciennes, pp. •
63 -6 5 ; and*G. Espinas, '"Group economioue, groupe religieus;
les tisserands-de Valenciennes au XIV sieele," AKES. Vol. II
(1930), p. 5?.
which was only called at the request of the oligarchic
families, and their participation in the urban militias.
Thus,, the guild master and much less his journeymen had
virtually no control over the central political institutions
of the city. 1
•This oligarchic control of the political institutions
by a few families had not gone unchallenged: By the 14-th
century the textile industries had reached a high degree of
development in Valenciennes. At that time the mass of the
cloth v/eavers had no guilds of their own and were excluded
from the predominant merchant guilds. In the 14th century
"weaver revolts occurred in many cities, and Valenciennes
was no exception. However, in Valenciennes the revolt
came within the context of another conflict between the
fccunt of Hainaut and the Valenciennes oligarchs with the
’weavers taking the side of the count. Whereas in cities
like Ghent the weaver revolts of the 13 th and 14-th centuries
resulted in a. share of the political power for the weaver
and other artisan guilds, in Valenciennes the weavers relied
on the patronage of the count and achieved no political
power for themselves. The artisans were allowed to have
guild organizations, but these remained, as did all the
guilds of Valenciennes, without political power. The ulti
mate authority' to regulate industry, to issue ordinances
concerning the markets, and to decidewho was to be accepted
^See chapter two, pp. 59 -7 5 •
29.
into a guild and how, was all retained by the magistrates.
.3. The Valenciennes textile industries

Valenciennes was part of a textile-producing group of
cities in the southern Netherlands and northern Fraaice, i.e.
Ghent, Bruges, St. Omer, Lille, Arras, Cambrai, Douai, Valen
ciennes, Tournai, Amiens, and Courtrai. There were also
certain unwalled rural cloth producing areas including
Hondschoote, Armentieres, Estaires, and the area around the
Lys river in Flanders. Besides northern and central Italy
it was in this region that most of Europe's textiles were
produced in the l6 th century.
The establishment of the woolen drapery industry dates
back to the 11th century in such cities as Ghent, fores,
Lille, and Valenciennes. These draps were wool cloths of
diverse varieties including longs draps renforces, grand
draps renforc^s, draps a six rosettes, draps de corde,
draps petits. etc. By the l^th century the drapery industry
also included many minor cloths such as saves, tiretaines,
and couvertures.2 These cloths included the very expensive
heavy cloths used for draperies and bedspreads and the very
cheap save cloth which was then made of the wool residue
left after fulling.^
^L..Cellier, Une commune flamande; recherches sur les insti

tutions politroues de la ville de Valenciennes (Valenciennes,
• 1873)» PP. 57-59; and H. Pirenne, Les villes et les institu
tions urbainss (Paris, 1939), Vol. I, pp.- 83 -8 9 .
^Saye textile production, so important in the 16 th century,
existed in Valenciennes since 1308. G. Espinas, Documents
relatifs £ la draperie de Valenciennes au lloyen Age (Lille-,
1931), P. 1^.
^G. pe Pocrck, La draperie medievale en Flandre et en Artois:
tecjinique et terninologie (Bruges, 1951), pp. 283-292.
30.
The first charter of a guild at Valenciennes was granted

to the drapers in 1067 "by Count Bauduin I, giving them privi
leges of control, over the textile industries by the estab
lishment of a halle, or a centrally controlled clearing
house for cloths. When in 1114 the town received its charter
establishing it as a municipal entity with political and
jurisdictional rights, the city government continued to regu
late the textile industry through the halle which became
known as the Halle Basse or hall of lower or civil justice.
As we have seen , the Halle Basse controlled all the guilds
of Valenciennes by the issuance of charters and ordinances.
The draper guild continued to exist after 1114, but part of
its functions had been taken by the government of the city.
The most important result of the political strength
of the guilds in the Flemish cities of Ghent and Ypres
seems to have been their industrial decline; there the guilds
stubbornly persisted in efforts to protect their privileges
when other cities were innovating. The politically powerful
guilds of Ghent and Ypres prevented change and retained
their drapery industry far longer than was warranted by the
demand.• Yet where the guilds were politically weak, i.e. in
Valenciennes, and probably in Lille and Tournai, there was
a shift to other textiles when they saw the decline of the
drapery.
The decline of the drapery industry in the Netherlands
seems to have been a result of England's entry into the
industry in the mid-l4th century. .The dual developments of
expansion of the English trade in expensive cloths sold at
the Antwerp market.and the decline' in raw wool imports from
England to Flemish towns resulted in a crisis in Flanders.
The Flemish towns could not compete with the English, mainly
because of the strength of Flemish guild structures which
prevented the utilization'of rural labor. The guild-dominated
towns of Ghent and Ypres fought the rural expansion in Flan
ders as a threat to their economic status and went so far
as to combat rural industry by force.^
Nevertheless, rural industries did succeed in the Nether
lands, notably in Armentieres, Hondschoote, Berghes, and the
area around the Lys river. They produced a so-called nou-
velle drapperie and saye cloths which were cheaper than the
2
old drapery cloth. Coincident with the development of the
rural textile areas, was the development of saye industries
in Valenciennes, lille, Tournai, Douai, and Orchies. In
Valenciennes attempts to introduce rural industries had
failed, and the city became a ville close, i.e. it prevented
putting out systems in the countryside. The old drapery
industry in Valenciennes had followed the general decline
since the'late l^th century, but it did not disappear and
existed alongside the industry of the predominant saye cloths.
dent in the Shift of Commerce from Bruges to Antwerp m the

late 15th Century," R3PH, Vol. XLIV, pp. 1137-1159; and
Coornaert, "Draperies rurales, draperies urbaines," pp. 59-
o.<
2
Pirenne, Une crise industrielle,” pp. 633 -6 3 6 , considers
these rural industries to be ■'capitalistic" and utilizing
"proletarian" labor.
32.
The save industries took over where the drapery industry

left off in Valenciennes. The cheaper save cloth had been
a minor cloth of the drapery industry which had been sold
for local consumption. In the l6 th century it became the
predominant cloth when demands for heavy drapery slackened
because of English and Italian competition and when demand
increased for a cheap light cloth supplied in quantity; de
mand grew for the Netherlands' saves and nouvelle draperie.
English worsteds, and the petit draps of France. While the
rural centers like Kondschoote were probably in the first
rank as cheap saye producers, cities like Valenciennes,
Arras, and Douai formed a second rank where saye and other
fine cloth had a better reputation and brought a higher price
on the market. The cities which tried to continue producing
drapery cloths and did not want to acknowledge the change
to light, cheap cloths suffered severe declines. 1
There was a variety of quality textiles produced
at Valenciennes. The city produced high quality saves,
quality heavy drapery, linens, and lace. The linen industry
was probably second only to the saves in production at
Valenciennes during the 1550's and 1560's. The linen was
grown from reeds along the valley of the Scheldt to the
south of Valenciennes. The industry had its origins in the
13 th century, but expanded in the 15 th century when a demand
arose for fine muslins among nobility and merchants. The
^.unro,"Bruges and the Abortive Staple in English Cloth,"

pp. ll4o-11^4; and Coornaert, "Draperies rurales et draperies
urbaines," pp. 80-8?.
33.
guild of linen weavers or malkiniers was established in
14-13 and v/as regulated and encouraged by the municipal govern
ment. From the 15th century the linen of Valenciennes had
been known for quality, although Cambrai’s linen was con
sidered better in the 17th century.^ There was also a fine
lace industry at Valenciennes which began in the14-th cen
tury. It was called bisette andwas popular in late 16th •
century France where it was worn at the court of Henry III.
The lace workers were called passementiers and their guild
was established in 1 5 9 2 .2
The most important textilesin l6 th century Valenciennes
were saves as they were produced in the greatestquantities.
Saves were used for underwear, blouses, linings, hose,
stockings, curtains, bodices, and religious vestments. The
saye guild was established in Valenciennes in 14-06 and some
time later in the 15th century a warehouse for Valenciennes
saves was opened in Bruges. Although the lack of statistical
evidence does not allow one to determine prices paid weavers
for their cloths, or even yearly production figures, these
charters and subsequent ordinances in the years 14-42, 1458,
1468, 1480, 1489, 1499, 1534-, 154-3. 154-7, 155^, 1560 , 1574, .
and 1612 allow one to describe the industry in some depth
and permit an understanding of the basic relationships
Â. Kalotet, "I5industrie> et commerce des toiles fines £

Valenciennes dans les temps modernes," RN, Vol. IV (1910^, •
pp. 281-320; A. LeGlay, "Letter £ un membre de la soeiete
d*emulation de Cambrai sur le mot mulkinier," ANFMB, Vol. I
(192Q), pp. 151-153i and Caiypliez, Histoire des metiers de
Valenciennes, pp. 210-212.
2S. Membre, "Un texxe ancien relaxif k la dentelle de Valen
ciennes," CAHV, Vol. I (I8 3 0 ), pp. 57-60.
2 I
f
3^.
among the various groups of the industry.^

Since the saye industry grew out of the drapery indus
try, there was considerable overlapping with the guilds of
the latter industry. There were no separate guilds specifi
cally for saye spinners, saye combers, or saye dyers— only
for save weavers or sayeteurs was there a separate guild.
The rest of the guilds in the production process served
both the drapery and the saye industries. This adaptation
of the preparation and finishing trades in the saye indus
try was facilitated by the fact that the stages in the pro
duction of saye generally correspond to those in the produc
tion of drapery.
The production of saye started when the raw, greasy
wool supplied by the wool merchants•was washed with soap
on the quais beside the canals jutting off from the river
in the city. When it was dry, it was combed to eliminate
other impurities and to straighten it into long, fine fila
ments. Then it was given out to spinners who made threads
in their homes inside and outside the city. These threads
were sold on Wednesdays and Saturdays on the marche-aux-
filets or thread market sometimes by wool wholesalers,
sometimes by recorrpeurs or middlemen, and at other times
by the combers. The spun threads were sold exclusively to
^-We have to rely mainly on a 17 th century copy of saye or

dinances, MVB, ms. no. 7^7 of the Bibliotheque de' Valenciennes.
Some ordinances we possess in original, MVB, ms. nos. ?00-
703 while there are some helpful 18 th century inventories
ss-vs ordinances, MVB, ms. no. 7^1, pp. ^09-^12.
master saye weavers before the market was opened up for
foreign merchants. 3uyers came from as far away as western
Flanders to purchase spun threads at the Valenciennes thread
market. After the weaving process the weaver masters took
their cloths to the Halle-aux-drans where they were checked
for quality and the town's seal was affixed to the cloths.
The master saveteurs or save merchants who bought the cloths
at the Halle then had the cloths fulled, washed, and dyed
before shipping them down the Scheldt or overland to France
to international markets,^
The saye industry fell under many of the restrictions
which had existed in the drapery industry. These restric
tions prevented the expansion of putting out systems into
the countryside as regulations prohibited the.weaving of
wool cloths outside the walls of Valenciennes. An ordi
nance of 1^99 followed this tradition of the drapery indus
try in Valenciennes by stating that only saves made inside
the city were allowed to be stamped with the seal of the
Halle-aux-draos, while cloths brought into the city were
subject to confiscation. For an example of how this
•^These stages of production left out the greasing of the

warp and weft, carding of the weft (instead of combing),
heavy fulling, and shearing— all part of the processes in
the production of drapery cloths. The simpler and less ex
pensive save process utilized dry, tightly spun threads of
a smaller diameter, thus making the cloths much thinner and
lighter. De Poerck, La cranerie, pp. 283-292; and Coor-
naert, Un centre industriel d'autrefois, pp. 222-223.
o
' K3V, ms. no. 7^7, ordinance for 1^99* fo. Only one ex
ception was made to this rule; the cloths of the town of
LeQuesnoy, 15 kilometers to the southwest were accepted in
Valenciennes as a result of ancient privileges and agreements
between the two towns.
36 .
ordinance was enforced, we have a case in 157 ^ of several
wool merchants who were prosecuted for importing inferior .
sayes from rural Flemish areas and mixing them with Valen
ciennes' saves to the detriment of the latter. These impor
tations abrogated
les anchiennes chartes et briefs de la
Halle Basse,âue aultres bansêt ordon-
nances, ait ete interdit et defendu a
tous’bourgeois, manans et merchands de
cette vilie, s'entremeslans, de pooir d'a-
chapter et revendre saye et aultres pieces,
achepter ou faire achepter par autruy aul-
cunes pieces de sayes, satins ou aultres
parties de sayeterie faictes au dehors de
ceste ville pour les mesler, ne revendre
avecq lesdits ouvrages faits et ouvres^ en
icelle, sur les paines et loi y apposees.-*-
Similar restrictions on rural industries by other walled
cities are well known. Lille, for example, prohibited
the manufacture of saves in the countryside in 153 ^, and
she prohibited imports from other cities in 1 5 6 8 .
If the peasants of the countryside around Valenciennes
were not allowed to weave wool in their homes, they could
nonetheless spin it. Spinning was a preparatory stage
where there was a blockage in production if there was not
an ample supply of cheap labor; the spinning process took
many hours of tedious work by many hands in order to pro
duce enough threads for the weaving stage. In order to
ensure large quantities of spun threads at cheap prices
*M3Vt ms. no. 7 2 9 » ordinance for 157^.

2
K. Vanbaeck, Histoire de la sayetterie a Lille (Lille, 1910),
p. 2 0 .
37.
for the benefit of the master weavers, the spinning of wool

in peasant homes had been allowed at an early stage in the
Valenciennes' wool industry. As there was no guild for
spinners, there was a wide degree of freedom at this stage
in the production process. Spinning was usually done at
home by the wives and daughters of peasants or urban arti
sans. They obtained the wool from lainiers, and other mid- ,
dlemen who paid the women for their labor piecemeal. For
many peasant families and artisans, the money made by spin
ning was an important supplement to regular incomes which
were often on the subsistence level. The quality of the
spun threads was regulated when the middlemen came to sell
them to the weaver masters on the Harche-aux-filets. This
market specified the quality of the threads and confiscated
shoddy ones; there were also regulations punishing monopo
lizing of threads, and black-marketing.'1’
The prohibitions on weaving outside the walls did not
prevent peasants from coming into the city to work as
weavers under the supervision of master saveteurs. This
utilized cheap peasant labor and also ensured quality pro
ducts made under the supervision of skilled masters. Peas
ants living as far away as Conde and LeQuesnoy came into
the .city on Monday morning and left on Saturday afternoon
after a week’s sojourn inside the city. Peasants who lived
■SwBV, ms. no. 7*1-71 ordinances for 15 ^3 » 15 ^7 » and 1 5 6 8 ; ms.

no. 703, ordinances for 15^7, ff. 179-179vo. A similar situa
tion existed at Lille where spinning in the countryside, was
considered absolutely necessary to the cloth industries.
Vanhaeck, Histoire de la savetterie a Lille, p. 20.
38.
closer to Valenciennes in the villages of the banlieu or

in the suburbs of Valenciennes daily walked to work inside
the city.'*'
Peasants or new workers arriving in the city had to
start work at the lowest level in the hierarchy of weaver-
artisans, that of the valet or compagnon; this status meant
that the new arrival had to work under contract to a master
for two' years at reduced wages just to learn the trade. A
valet was different from an apprentice in that there was
seldom any mobility upward for the valet except to journey
man status, while the apprentice was a privileged status
leading to mastership. The period of learning by the valet
existed in the old drapery industry also and has been called
"pre-apprenticeship’' by historians of the drapery industry
2
like Sspinas.
In order to move up to the next level of journeyman
or franca ouvrier, the valet had to complete his pre-appren
ticeship and pay an entry fee for admission into the jour
neyman ranks. Journeymen could also be workers who had
served their pre-apprenticeship in other cities belonging
to the old Hanse of the Seventeen Towns; at times during
the 15 th to the 18th centuries these towns accepted jour
neymen trained in the cloth industries of other member
towns and only required a droit d*entree or entry fee. At
~*~HTRV, Vol. Ill, Berghes to the regent, 6 August 15^3»

390-392.
2
I’
.'BV, ms. no. 1}±1, fo. 4; and Espinas, L’organis ation cor
porative des metiers, po. 6 -1 2 .
39.
Valenciennes, a man having served his pre-apprenticeship
in one of these privileged towns could work as a journeyman
for an entry fee of 30 sols; his appelation, franco ouvrier,
was defined as "one having learned his trade of saye weaver
for a term of two years in a privileged town."^- These
journeymen were allowed to work alone in their own rooms
under the supervision of the masters from whom they received
2
looms and threads. These migrant skilled workers did not
have sufficient capital for independent work, and only a
few could hope to obtain master status. All journeymen
were dependent on their masters for looms and wool, and most
journeymen probably obtained advances of salary in order to
pay their droit d*entree. Thus the journeyman was depen
dent on the master in an economic and legal way besides
being in an inferior position due to the hierarchy of the
guild system. Often there were contracts between masters
and journeymen specifying the minimum period of tine which
the journeymen promised to give the master in repayment of
fees and tools loaned. Nevertheless, Valenciennes journey
men weavers were in a better position than the mass of
weavers from the unprivileged cloth producing areas like
Hondschoote, Neuve-3glise, Armentieres, and the Lys area
^Vercautere-*, "Notes sur la survivance de la Hanse," pp.

1078-1079. The acceptance of Hanse journeymen by the member
cities seems to have been relative to the availability of
labor and the conditions of the industry, as for example in
Arras in the early years of the century the city would not
accept Hanse journeymen without another period of pre-appren
ticeshio, Naue-is, "La sayetterie a Amiens; 1480-1534,"
VSvvQ.Vol. V (1907), p. 14.
^MBV, ms. no. 74-7, ordinances for 1442 and 1468, fo. 3*
4o.
because the latter were not admitted to journeyman status

even if they were trained because they did not come from a
privileged town. Even so the vast majority of journeymen
at Valenciennes were relegated to a permanently inferior
position relative to the masters. Journeymen had no deci
sion-making power within the sayeteur guild as that was
reserved for the masters. Journeymen were only the adjuncts
of the masters— a skilled and tested labor force which
traveled back and forth between the privileged towns of
Flanders, Brabant, Hainaut, Artois, and France.'1’
In terms of numbers the valet week-workers and the resi
dent journeymen weavers were undoubtedly more numerous than
the masters at the top of the weaver hierarchy. The mas
ters reportedly numbered some 1600 to 1?00 at the height of
prosperity of the saye industry before the wars of religion
p
at mid-century. A contemporary chronicler, Henri D'Outreman,
reports that there were 5.000 looms in Valenciennes around
1 5 2 0 .3 if We are to believe these fragments of information
See Cappliez, Histoire des metiers de Valenciennes, p. 24.

On sayeteur journeymen see principally 13V, ms. no. 74?, or
dinances for 1442, i486, and 1499.
2
There exists an ordinance of the magistrates for 1610 which
cites the number of master sayeteurs before the decline after
the religious troubles as between 1600 and 1700. In 1610
there were only 150. This reduction coincided with a de
crease of perhaps as much as half of the population after
the religious troubles when there was a large exodus of
workers and merchants to England and to the north to escape
the occupation forces. ?<i. Deschamps de Fas, "Znquete indus-
trielle sur I'etat de la manufacture des draps dans les Fays-
Bas au commencement du XVIIe siecle," Memoires de l'Academie
d'Arras, Vol. XXXV, (1 86 3 }, p. 1 6 3 . In Hondschoote where the
work force was directed by"merchant-entrepreneurs" there were
only 400 masters in the r.id-l6 th century. Coornaert, Un centre
ir.dustriel d‘autrefois, p. 1 2 6 .
3.
-1. d'Cultreman, Histoire, p. 383*
41 .
it appears that the weavers were the most numerous occupa
tional group in the city.
The requirements for entry into master status were not
especially exclusive in themselves, hut they must have been
impossible or an unnecessary burden for most journeymen. One
became a master by serving an apprenticeship, by paying a
droit d*entree, and by obtaining citizenship status.'*' Ap
prenticeship was generally reserved for the sons of the
masters or for particularly good weaver journeymen; like the
pre-apprenticeship of the journeymen it lasted two years,
but sometimes more if the apprentice was young. The droit
d* entree was not very high, only four livres and ten sols,
whereas the typical wage in the Low Countries a little
after mid-century was somewhere around two livres per cloth,
or some 60 livres per year for an average journeyman.
Nevertheless, the entry fee was still almost a month's salary
3
taken out of subsistence wages. It was also necessary to
have a certain amount of capital to make mastership worth
while; the master needed a workshop where he and journeymen
^For citizenship see the next chapter, pp. 51-59*

2
For apprenticeship see M3V, ms. no. 747, fo. 3 for ordi
nance of: 1442; fo. 4 for ordinances of 1480,and 1487; and ms.
no. 703 for an ordinance of 1 5 6 1 .
-'The droit d*entree of four livres ten sols did notseem to
have gone up since the 15th century when it was first set.
See r.'SV, ms. no. 747, fo. 2. There are no specific figures
of wages in Valenciennes in the l6th century; Coornaert, Un'
centre indastriel d'autrefois, pp. 403-409, cites from 40'
livres to 72 livres per year for weavers in the LowCoun
tries and France around mid-century.
42.
could work, he needed money to "buy his own loom and the
looms cf any journeymen he would hire, and he needed capital
for the wool threads that were needed to make cloths.^" For
most journeymen, these costs of mastership were prohibitive,
and so it was usually the sons of masters who became new
2
masters. Thus, in the saye industry at Valenciennes, ap
prenticeship seems to have been an exclusive status for
the recruitment of masters, and most of the apprentices were
probably sons of masters.
For those who made it mastership accorded numerous
rights and privileges which allowed the master a decided ad
vantage over the lower ranks in the weaver hierarchy. The
principal advantages were those of working for oneself and
of being allowed to have a workshop or ouvroir where week-
workers and journeymen labored under one's supervision. The
master obtained profits from his monopoly offthe tools of
production from the renting of looms to journeymen and
valets and, if the journeymen lived with him, from, rents for
room and board. All of these fees were probably taken from
the worker*s pay.
‘ Another important right of the masters was their vir
tual monopoly of the spun threads in the first hour of the
^■The ordinances of Valenciennes are not enlightening on the

number of valets and journeymen in masters’ workshops, but at
Lille they were not allowed to employ more than six looms at
one time in 15^5» Vanhaecke, Histoire de la sayetterie §
Lille, p. 91.
2
Sons of masters were favored in another way; the droit d'en
tree for masters' sons was only half that of non-masters* sons.
KBV, ms. no. ?4?, fo. 2. In some cities like Amiens there
were no entry fees at all for masters’ sons, Maugis, "La
saieterie a Amiens,” p. 5*
43 .
market to take-to their workshops before any free journey
man, or any foreign merchant could buy threads.^ They thus
obtained the best threads with which to supply their jour
neymen in order to obtain quality cloths. Finally, and most
importantly, the master sayeteurs had the added advantage
which was held by the person at the end of the production
line, i.e. he marketed the cloths produced in his workshop •
at the Halle-aux-drat>s to saye merchants and thus could ob
tain the price which the market could bear, making himself
further profits.
Perhaps the most striking aspect about the master saye
teurs was the diversity within the group as to wealth and
power. On the whole most of the master saye weavers were
only of moderate wealth and compared unfavorably with the
masters of many of the more skilled trades such as fulling
and dying. At the bottom of the master ranks were some
masters known as "poor but honest" who were only slightly
better off than journeymen, perhaps only having enough
capital to work alone; in times of industrial decline
caused by gluts, or shortages, etc., these poorest of mas
ter sayeteurs often went into debt and lived on the border
of poverty.
On the other hand, at the top level of the master
^The ordinances, however, prevented any monopolizing of

threads; the masters were required to take only the amount •
necessary for their needs and the needs of their journeymen.
M3Y, ms, no. 747* fo. 7, ordinances for 1543 and 1547. Simi
lar regulations existed at Amiens where only masters could
buy threads. Pâugis, "La saieterie a Amiens," p. 5.
savetears were men who were alternatively referred to as
marchands de saye. The merchants of save cloths had no guild
of their own» and they seem to have been unregulated in
Valenciennes, some being masters and owning workshops and
some being only merchants who specialized in buying and
selling the cloths of masters. A man like Pierre de la Rue
was listed in the records of the times variously as a master
saveteur and a marchand de save. He owned considerable
property in and about Valenciennes and probably had a work
shop producing his own cloths besides buying and selling
the cloths of poorer masters. Such men reaped the profits
of the industry as the sellers of the finished product on
foreign markets; they acted as the bankers of the industry,
financing the other masters with loans and subsidizing dyers
and fullers who would finish the cloths for them.'*'
The ordinances of the magistrates governing the saye
industry seem to favor the merchants rather than the master
weavers. The Halle 3asse required that all masters bring
their cloths to the Halle-aux-draos and that all cloths
were to have the mark of the master. If merchants found
any defects or abrogations of the regulations governing
Âll the l6th century Valenciennes documents which .list names

and occupations pose a similar problem. Most always the
documents list a person's name and his occupation, for exam
ple, Jehan Dubois, sayeteur, but not his rank in the trade,
i.e. whether he was a master, journeyman, valet, or appren
tice. Moreover, because merchants of saye did not have their
own guild, they were also called sayeteurs. Thus, occupational
categories in themselves were not an indication of wealth or
status. Out of hundreds of sayeteurs, one can identify by
cross-reference many very poor ones and several very wealthy
ones.
size and weights of the cloths, then they would he seized,
smd the master who sold them would be identified and fined
by the municipal authority. Seized cloths were to be cut
into three pieces and sold locally, the proceeds going to
the master to "content" him for the loss of his cloths.^"
Ordinances like these insured discipline in the industry
as to quality and standards of cloths and assured the mer- .
chants high prices on international markets because of the
good reputation of Valenciennes textiles.
4. Conclusions
As far as can be ascertained from the skimpy source
material, Valenciennes was a considerable trading center.
It was linked with Antwerp by the Scheldt river system and
was on the overland trade route from the Netherlands to
Burgundy and northern France. Valenciennes was the principal
trading city in the province of Hainaut, and her regional
market for such commodities as wholesale wool reached as
far as west Flanders. Her merchant community was more
powerful and wealthy than that of solely industrial areas
like Hondschoote; the merchants of Valenciennes and such
towns as Arras and Tournai dealt in products traveling be
tween the international markets in the Netherlands and
^For ordinances regulating v:eights and measures of cloths,

see especially M3V, ms. no. 7^7, ordinance for 14-89, and ms.
no. 701, fo. 83 v o , ordinance for 1554-. For the ordinances .
requiring the mark of the saveteur in the corner o.f the
cloth, see KI3V, ms. no. 703, fo. 63vo, ordinance for 15^3.
On the fines and confiscations, see MBV, ms. no. 74-7. ordi
nance- for 1 5 3 5 » and ms. no. 7 0 3 , ordinance for 15 &5 *
U6.
France besides dealing in the products of local industries.

Valenciennes had belonged to the old Hanse of Seventeen
Towns and was still considered a privileged textile city in
the 16th century. Her textile guilds attracted skilled ar
tisans from other old Hanse towns because they were accepted
into the -journeyman work force without being required to go
through another training period. Quality and social organi
zation in the guilds was tightly regulated by the municipal
government, and the guildsmen had virtually no political
authority or power. Valenciennes had a reputation for fine
high quality textiles especially linen, lace, and saves;
in the first half of the l6th century■, the city was one of
the Netherlands' major saye producing centers specializing
in high quality cloths. The social organization of Valen
ciennes favored the master weavers and merchants even though
journeymen at Valenciennes were in a more advantageous posi
tion than journeymen in unprivileged areas. A basic privi
lege of the Valenciennes' guildsmen was their monopoly of
production which prevented rural industries in the country
side around the city; however, the textile industries util
ized peasant laborers who cane to work inside the city during
the week.
The dissimilar social and economic institutions in
Hondschoote, Valenciennes, and Ghent indicate to a large
extent why some textile areas rose and why some textile are'as
declined in the l6th century. In the ares of the unwalled
Hondschoote, there was no resistance to the putting out
•system of raerchant-entrepreneurs, and the saye industries
experienced a period of violent expansion in the 15 th and
the first half of the 16th centuries. In the Flemish cities
of Ghent and Ypres the politically strong guilds blocked
both the putting out systems and the switch to saye produc
tion, only accepting the latter when it was too late. There
the political power of the guilds of the drapery industry
had seen the development of rural industries and saye clo h
as threatening to their privileges and they successfully
blocked innovation. By doing so, however, these cities
suffered a decline relative to the saye producing centers.
In Valenciennes and in cities like Lille, Douai, Tournai,
and Orchies, the monopoly of production inside the walls was
retained by the guildsmen but within the context of a switch
from drapery to saye cloth; the drapery guilds at Valen
ciennes evidently did not have the power to stop the develop
ment of saye industries. Moreover, at Valenciennes the pro
duction of sayes had existed since the l^th century, and the
preparatory and finishing trades of the drapery industry
accomodated the expansion of the saye industry in the 15 th
and early 16th centuries.
The social and economic institutions in Valenciennes
seem to have been more stable in comparison with other in
dustrial areas like Hondschoote and Ghent. In the unwalled
rural complexes like Hondschoote, the guilds were controlled
by a few merchants and the industrial masters; the laboring
migrants or peasant workers in the' putting out system had
little or no protection from local government cfficials and
were undifferentiated by many levels of privilege. At Honds
ciioote unemployed migrants were attracted to the area and
went from door to door asking for work or alms. In the
relatively uncontrolled textile industries of Hondschoote,
piece work on subsistence wages created conditions where the
workers toiled through the night and were chronically in
debted to the merchant-entrepreneurs. In rural Flanders
many of the exploited saye workers rioted under the leader
ship of defrocked priests and Anabaptists. These riots seem
to have come as a result of the miserable working conditions
On the other hand, in the case of Ghent which was a
walled city like Valenciennes, the industrial guilds pos
sessed political power as their doyens had a voice in the
magistracy. There the mass of industrial guildsmen were
accustomed to opposing taxes, opposing rural industries,
and jealously protecting their interests. They were accus
tomed to political activity against other interest groups,
and their behavior exhibited a distinct tendency toward
conservative revolt in the protection of their rights and
privileges.
Valenciennes belonged to a third type of social struc
ture, i.e. one where the guilds had important economic
^"Coornaert, Un centre industriel d*autrefois, pp, 4-03-4-19.

^Pirenne, "Une crise industrielle," pp. 624— 64-1.
and social privileges but no political pov/er. Unlike the
stark rich-poor relationships existent at Hondschoote, Valen
ciennes guild institutions assured economic privileges for
upper and middle artisans which tended to promote social
stability; furthermore, the walls of Valenciennes prevented
the city from being floode'd with alms-seekers or migrant
unemployed workers. On the other hand, the guildsmen at
Valenciennes had no tradition of successfully exerting poli
tical rights; the ultimate control of the guilds by the magis
trates seems to have assured the success of the city's
economy in the 15th and early 16th centuries. As we shall
see, these differences in social organization go a long way
to explain the different behavior of the various industrial
areas during the period of conflict with the crown and church
in the 1560’s.
50.
CHAPTER TWO: GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY
The most important documents for the study of Valen

ciennes ' government and society are the charters granted to
the city hy the sovereign prince of Hainaut. These charters
date hack to 1067 when the -count of Hainaut founded the first
merchant corporation at the juncture of the Rhonelie and the.
Scheldt rivers. By a charter of lll^f the count established
the city as a political entity with rights of criminal juris
diction. By the l6th century other charters had been added,
and in totc; they were called the coutumes of Valenciennes.
In the l6th century these coutumes contained the rights
and privileges of Valenciennes. They were jealously guarded
from the encroachments of other political entities, i.e. the
prince, the provincial estates, and other cities. They had
been obtained ana protected over centuries by cajoling,
bribing, bargaining, and sometimes by making war on rival
political bodies. The rights they contained were considered
immemorial, being legalized by charter and sanctified by
time.
This chapter will use documentation from the coutumes
and from the political institutions they sanctioned to in
vestigate the government and society of Valenciennes in the
16th century. The rights of citizens and of the municipal
corporation wall be defined, and the authority and preroga- .
tives of the magistrates will be delineated. The functions
of the tax system, the municipal councils, the systems of
charity, and law enforcement will be explored to see what
51.
social groups ‘benefited or suffered under the political
system. The extent of social control preventing or pro
moting group conflict will be determined. Finally, the
chapter will reveal the degree and the nature of the ten
sion between the city and the central government of the
prince.
1. Citizenship and occupational groups

The term bourgeois was synonymous with citizenship in
16th century Valenciennes. The bourgeois were enfranchised
citizens who belonged to the city's corporate body and en
joyed its privileges; the term referred to a restricted
legal title or status, and not to a "class" distinction.
In the l6th century this status was just as important as it
had been in the later Middle Ages, if not more so. It was
necessary for upward mobility by persons desiring either
economic or political power. In the 16th century the status
can be defined by (1) the privileges and rights appertaining
to citizenship, (2) the procedures for entry to citizenship,
and (3) the social makeup of the citizenry as exhibited by
their occupations, wealth, and positions in the political
institutions.
The advantages of bourgeois status included both eco
nomic and political rights. The most important economic
right was found in the charters of many guilds; they speci
fied that one had to be a bourgeois in order to attain mas- ■
ter rank. For the masters this stipulation assured greater
security by preventing the proliferation of masters through
the erection of a harrier to a journeyman's upward mobility.'
The economic advantages for merchants in Valenciennes
v;ere many and varied. Citizens of Valenciennes were exempt
from the tax on wine imposed by the King, making the city a
particularly attractive place for the operations of wine
merchants. Citizens were also exempt from tolls collected
on stretches of the Sctel&t; river below Valenciennes. A
Valenciennes citizen could not be prosecuted for debts if
he was not obligated in his private name, and a bourgeois *
property could not be confiscated for debt or any other
reason. This privilege of exemption from confiscation was
similar to another general privilege of the city. A foreign
merchant coming to live in Valenciennes permanently could
spend his money in any way whatsoever without threat of con
fiscation by outside authorities. Finally, the property
of the bourgeois was exempt from the right of mortmain.
These privileges acted as incentives for merchants to gain
citizenship in Valenciennes either by immigration or by
establishing a permanent residence in the city while living
2
elsewhere. The economic rights thus favored the masters,
the merchants, and the propertied groups in general.
The political rights were the most jealously guarded
privileges of the Valenciennes citizen. One very ancient
^C. Cappliez, Histoire des metiers de Valenciennes, pp. 31"

32, and 108-113. See also MBV, ms. no. 7^7, Livre des
metiers, passim.
^L. Cellier, Une commune fiamande? recherches sur les insti-
tutions oolitiaues de la ville de Valenciennes (Valenciennes,
1873), pp. 69-70.
with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53.
right was that of carrying arms in all the lands of the
prince. This privilege had originally been obtained for the
protection of merchants travelling on the frontier where
there was a constant threat from vagabond and brigand bands.
In the 16 th century the right to carry arms in all the lands
of the prince was usually reserved for the nobility or armies
commissioned by the prince. Before it was done away with by
Alva in 1568, any abrogation of this right, such as the
seizure of the arms of a citizen, was protested hotly by the
city no matter how minor the citizen in question.^
Another privilege of the bourgeois of a similar type
was their exemption from torture. In a society which con
tinually utilized torture as a means of interrogation, not
to mention as a means of punishment, this was a meaningful
right. The mannants and forains of the city were often taken
to a torture chamber in the cellars of the city jail in
order to be subjected to a variety of painful devices which
2
forced confessions out of the innocent and the guilty alike.
Perhaps the most extraordinary privilege of the city
was that of asylum £>r criminals. Any person having committed
a crime elsewhere could seek and find asylum in Valenciennes,
no matter what the crime. Even though a man might be sought
by a neighboring town, a provincial lieutenant or even by
"^The right to carry arms was denied to all the rest of the
non-noble citizens of Hainaut. Cellier, Une commune fla-
mand. pp. 38, 52, and 70.
^Cellier, Une commune flamande, pp. 69-70, and T. Louis,
De la sorcellerie ex de la jus~ice criminelle & Valenciennes;
XVIe et XVIIe siebles (Valenciennes, 1861), pp. 92-99»
' 54.
the sovereign himself » he was immune from punishment if he
were inside the walls of Valenciennes."
The most important political privileges were those
which assured the protection of the citizens* lives and
property. The charter of 1114 had given the city rights of
criminal jurisdiction. The citizens were created at the same
time in order to provide an armed group to enforce law and
order. Only the bourgeois were regularly allowed to carry
arms inside the jurisdictional limits of Valenciennes. All
bourgeois were obligated to help a fellow citizen if he was
being attacked no matter where it happened,— in the streets,
in another city, or in the countryside. Wounding of a bour
geois by a mannant or forain seldom occurred in Valenciennes,
probably because the penalties were so severe. Murder of a
bourgeois by a non-citizen, whatever, his station, was a crime
calling for death. In the Middle Ages when Valenciennes was
a regional power unto itself, the city utilized a right called
the droit d*abatti which punished murder of a bourgeois with
total destruction of the murderer’s property by the assembled
bourgeois en masse. Even the ^chateaux of noblemen were razed
2
by this law in the late Middle Ages. As we shall see, by
the 16 th century these rights had been institutionalized in
a citizen militia which enforced order inside the city. By
belonging to the militia, the rank and file bourgeois obtained
a ..limited participation, in political life.
■LCellier, Une commune flamande, p. 205.

^Cellier, Une commune flamande, pp. 51-64, 71-73? and H.
Pirenne, Les Villes et les institutions uroaines (Paris,
1939), PP. 83-89.
55.
The procedures governing entry to bourgeois status were
the following? An immigrant, or forain, had to stay in Valen
ciennes for a year and a day in order to obtain mannant or
inhabitant status, and achieving this status made one eligi
ble for citizenship. For a mannant, then to become a bour
geois, he had to pay a fee of several sols, obtain two citi
zens as sponsors, and swear an oath before the city magis
trates, to uphold the c o u t u m e s After this the magistrates
finalized entry to citizenship by writing the citizen's name
in their registers of bourgeois.
While these procedures for entry to bourgeois status
do not appear on the surface to be very restrictive, the resi
dence requirement merely assured that- the entrant could sup
port himself for a year inside the city and offered no re
sistance to entrance. Although the fee was perhaps onerous
for the lower echelons of the work force, namelyr the ap
prentices and the peasant -week-workers, it would have seemed
to be in the capabilities of artisans of moderate earning
pov/er. In spite of these easy requirements, we know that
there must have been effective restrictions to becoming a
citizen as most of the 12,000 population were of mannant
status. It seems that the documents which clearly describe
the procedure for entrance to citizenship are hiding cer
tain subtleties of the process which prevent us from ex
plaining why there were relatively few citizens compared to
the mass of mannants and forains.
^Cellier, Une commune flamande, pp. 69-70.
56.
The restrictions were probably of a social nature. The

urban bourgeois as a group were known to be jealous of their
privileges and rights, and protective of their fraternity.
Most bourgeois were hereditary citizens whose families had
settled in Valenciennes decades and even centuries before.
In the l6th century, seigneurs and nobles listed their status
as a bourgeois of Valenciennes before their other titles. As
Henri d 'Cultreman, the l6th century historian of Valenciennes
relates,
ceux d'entre eux qui avoient ete anoblis
cherissoient tant le titre de bourgeois qu'ils
ne l'oublioient jamais et aimoient bien d'estre
qualifies honnorables plustot que nobles, Simon
de Marlis, Jean Gouchet, Jacques Partit, Jean
Bougier, Jean son Fils, Jean de Valentiennes,
Jean de Quaroube, et beaucoup d'autres semblables
furent chevaliers, qui neantmoins en tous leurs
contrats et actes t>ublics s'appelerent toujours
bourgeois de Valentiennes.1
Perhaps the aspirant to citizenship who did not possess any
of the social attributes of the existing body of bourgeois,
i.e. wealth, seigneuries, titles of nobility, established
family name, or at least a mastership in the guilds, found it
hard to be socially accepted. In order to obtain the necessary
bourgeois sponsors, the aspirant probably had to spend consid
erably more time than a year establishing his position both
economically and socially in the city. Moreover, the sponsors
had to have a degree of prestige and power within the bourgeois
community in order to convince the magistrates to accept the
oaths and pledges of the aspirant? the magistrates had final
^H. d' Cultreman, Histoire de la ville et comte de Valentiennes

(Douai, 1 6 3 9 ), pp. 333-33^*
3 /
57.
authority over who should he admitted to citizenship. Un

doubtedly, many mannants 'who could pass the residency and
monetary requirements never became citizens because of un
written social requirements.
As lists of hereditary bourgeois never seem to have been
made, the social makeup of.the citizenry cannot be determined
with exactitude. The only records we possess are of entrants
to bourgeois status from mannant status; these registers kept
by the Kagistrat give the names and occupations of entrants,
and thus provide us with a useful sample of the citizenry.^
However, one must remember that the entrants were the newest
citizens, and therefore the least prestigious among them.
Out of a total of 569 entrants to citizenship in the period
15^6-1566, we find that there were 204 from the relatively
unskilled trades, 195 from the skilled artisan trades, 53 from
the ranks of small proprietors, 53 merchants, 36 clerks and
royal officials, and 10 knights and seigneurs.
The above figures seen to indicate that new citizens were
mostly low-paid worker-arxisans from the lesser skilled trades
or middle layer artisans from the skilled trades. For example,
of the relatively lesser skilled trades we have 60 entrants
listed as sayeteurs or saye weavers, 28 listed as linen
weavers, 23 listed as fullers, 15 were cord makers, and 14 were
drapery weavers. These occupations are ones which are usually
associated with poverty and low status. How could they enter
bourgeois status? Obviously, the records are again deceiving
1
KBV, Registres des bourgeois et choses communes, ms. nos,
692-705.
us. The 20^ men from the lesser skilled trades were actually
only a small percentage of the city's work force which must
have numbered several thousand; this couple of hundred who
entered bourgeois status probably represent the few lucky
ones who became^master weavers- master fullers- etc., and
were actually well off relative to the rest of the workers
in their trade. Moreover, as there was no separate guild for
merchants of saye cloth, some of those listed as saye weavers
were probably saye merchants. On the other hand, a few
unskilled occupations required that all their members be
bourgeois; the stevedors or norteurs de sacq were-required, to
be citizens in order to provide the city with reliable dock
workers. In spite of such special cases, the majority of
entrants from the artisan trades were probably of high guild
status.
Among the small proprietors we find 16 bakers, 11 sellers
of general merchandise, and 11 hotel and innkeepers. Among the
merchants were 22 wool merchants, 18 Wholesale merchants, 5
livestock merchants, h linen merchants, one drapery merchant ;•
and several merchants of other products. Adding these to the
already established merchant families, one assumes that the
trading community numbered from between a hundred and two
hundred strong.
In sum, the title of bourgeois was a highly prized status
in the l6th century and carried with it many important priv
ileges. It meant admission to guilds, all sorts of exemptions
of material importance to merchants and property owners, and
it carried with it important political rights- such as the
right to carry arms. The political rights assured a bourgeois
that he had at least a participation in the political life
through the citizen militia, but they did not assure him a
seat in the municipal government. As we shall see, the bourgeois
were an elite within which smaller ruling oligarchies monop
olized authority and power. Although the entrance require
ments to citizenship were not particularly onerous, most of
the inhabitants of Valenciennes were excluded because of un
written social requirements. The bourgeois seem to have
consisted of guild masters, proprietors and merchants—
that is, the propertied groups of Valenciennes.
2." The Valenciennes government and social groups

By the l6 th century the political institutions of
Valenciennes consisted of the Magistrat, the Conseil Par-
ticulier and the Grand Conseil. These bodies had different,
but overlapping functions* and each represented a different
layer of the elite bourgeois citizens. This section will
discuss the functions of these institutions, determine
the methods of recruitment to them, and investigate the
social backgrounds of their personnel.
The Hagistrat was the official political authority
inside Valenciennes because it was appointed by the sovereign's
officer. It was established by the prince in 111^ when
Valenciennes was given its rights of criminal jurisdiction.
The Magistrat*s personnel acted as judges in high, middle,
ar.d low justice, i.e.: jurisdiction in “all matters and .
actions of a criminal, civil, real, personal, and mixed
nature." These wide-ranging judicial prerogatives were
operative throughout the city and in the cheflieu, or a
portion of the surrounding countryside. Administratively,
the Magistrat published the edicts of the central government
and oversaw the management of the rentes, or municipal
bonds which were floated to obtain revenues for the prince's
treasury. The Magistrat also acted as the protector of the
city's privileges against other jurisdictions; including
that of the princej that is, they jealously protected the
rights of the bourgeois and acted as the city's jurists and
ambassadors to make sure those rights were not abrogated.
The Magistrat consisted of a prevot and twelve ^chevlns
who were appointed by the sovereign's officer each year on
the 15th of May. In the case of extraordinary circumstances
such as famines and wars, the renewal was put off into the
summer months in order to assure continuity of action in
the city's interests. The renewal ceremony took place in
the conventual room of the abbey of St. Jean in front of
the prince's deputy, the abbots of St. Jean and Hasnon, and
the outgoing magistrates. The magistrates could serve one
term and were not reeligible for office until the passage
of two years. The basic requirement for office was citizen
ship, but there were unwritten social requirements which
^For the rights and privileges of the Magistrat in the 16th

century, see the coutumes .of 153 ^ and 1540 in C.- Faider,
Coutumes du nays et connote de Hainaut in the series Recueil
des anciennes coutumes de la Belgiaue, Vol. LI. 0 0 . 466 and
Wf.
61 .
determined which families obtained office. The exact
method of how persons were chosen for appointment is un
known, but the decisions probably took place in a caucus
of the prince's representative, the local abbots, and the
heads of families who had served on the Magistrat in the
. 1
past.
The year 156? represented a violent break in Valen
ciennes history since many of her. privileges were destroyed
after the religious troubles. Although the Magistrat was
discontinued in the years 1567 -1571 , the body continued to
exist in the remaining years of the century; this contrasts
with the experience of the other political bodies of the
city which were not allowed to meet after 15 &7 . The per
sonnel of the Magistrat was generally the same before and
after 1 5 6 7 , and so we can analyze the lists of the Magis-
2
trat*s personnel for the century as a whole.
These lists indicate that the central administration
selected echevins from a select few families, namely the
echevinale families, who were considered to be loyal and
reliable to the prince. When analyzing the lists of the
Magistrat's personnel, it is necessary to think in terms of
families and not individuals. Seigneurs and men of wealth
put a high value on family inheritances of wealth and power,
^Cellier, Une commune flamande, pp. 81-91; d*Cultreman, His-

toire, p. 353; and A. Dubois, Fssai sur I'histoire nunici-
•pale de la ville de Valenciennes (Valenciennes. 15^1),-pp.1-9.
^For the lists of the "Kagistrats de la ville de Valenciennes"
see I'.BV, ms no. 739 which gives personnel from 1302 to 1697.
62.
while family members worked together in order to succeed.

Given the nature of the patterns of property and politics
in the society, the family was the basic political unit of
the oligarchs who controlled the Magistrat.
Taking, the lists from 1500 to 1600 inclusive and sub
tracting the missing years, we have a total of 1222 posi
tions which were filled. Filling the 1222 positions were
304 families, indicating at first glance that the oligarchy
had a wide base among the top level bourgeois of Valen
ciennes. This figure is misleading, however, since 80 per
cent of the families only controlled 42 per cent of the posi
tions, while a more privileged minority of 20 per cent of
families controlled 58 per cent of the positions. Also,
if one looks at the number of times the majority of families
served, it is clear that their names only appeared once,
twice, or at the most up to five times, while the minority
of oligarchic families served anywhere from 6 to 49 times.
Thus, while there was participation by a great number of
bourgeois families in the Magistrat, only one-fifth of
them retained power over a long period of time by con
tinually reappearing in office.^
Who were the families who repeatedly served as echevins
throughout the century and what do we know about them? For-
Ân example of the way in which families controlled the Magis

trat is the office-holding of the Rasoir family; Nicolas
Rasoir served in 1500, 1503» 15°6» and 1509? his eldest son,
Nicolas le josne, served in 1504, 150 7 , 1514, 1517, 1532, 153^»
and 1539; his youngest son, Jean, served in 1502, 1505, 1508,
1511, and 1518. Their officeholcing illustrates the prevalent
custom among the elite family members of serving every three
years.
63.
tunately, in the 19th century a descendent of a noble
family called de Sars compiled genealogies of the well-
kiown Valenciennes families stretching back in some cases
to the 12th century. These genealogies were a compilation
of family records, epitaphs, memoires,. and the like.'*' Al
though there are well-known errors in the family trees,
they nevertheless are most useful in obtaining general in
formation about a family's longevity, titles, offices, and
marriage, alliances.
Taking the families who served the most times as
£chevins throughout the l6th century, we find that they
were all of a very similar kind,— that is, they were all
ancient families who had obtained seigneuries or patents
of nobility, and who had served in capacities as royal
or imperial officers or as members of the ecclesiastical
hierarchy.
The Rasoir, for example, who served ks times had owned
seigneuries since the 13th century; in the 16 th century
they were -seigneurs of Vanonville, Watignies, and Ploson,
while the elder family line carried the title gentilhomme.
They had intermarried with regional nobility including the
Lalaing and Quarouble. They had served as captains of-
bandes d'ordonnances. and the family had representatives
in religious orders reaching the level of abbot. Moreover,
-*-M3V, ms nos. 809-318.
in "the 16 th century the Rasoirs served 1? times as prevot
of Valenciennes and 11 times as lieutenant prevot.^
The Ifi'Poivres who served 30 times were a crusading
family from Chalon in the 12th and 13 th centuries who claimed
to have gone to the Holy Land with Saint Louis. They had a
family "branch in the nobility of Venice on the level of
iftarquis, and one of their number had been a bishop of Cam-
bray in the 13th century. They also had many members in
religious orders in the 16 th century, including an abbess.
In Valenciennes the Le'Poivres had been prevots from the
l*4th century, while in the l6th century they served as
prevot 8 times and as lieutenant 11 times. They were
seigneurs of Chaufontan, Orandes, Poussel', Rozel, and
Ronbies. One of the more notable l6th century members of
the family was ThieryLe Poivre who served as ambassador to
the Emperor Maximilian, had had a hand in the treaty of
Arras in 1*4-82, and later became prevot of Valenciennes
in 1503 and 1505* This family intermarried only with
nobility and seierneurs from outside Valenciennes, including
2
the deQuarouble, de Meghem, and de Bouvignies.
A final example were the d 'Oultremans who served 22
times on the Magistrat in the 16th century and held the post
^ A
of prevot two times and lieutenancies five times. They were
an old family from Ghent who came to Valenciennes in the
^M3V, ms no., 81 7 , pp.-56^70.

2MBV. ms no. 816, pp. 621-6*44,
65.
13th century. They showed their fidelity to both the prince

and the city in the office of pensionaries and by their
mediating role in the continual troubles between Valenciennes
and the central authority. In the 16th century they held
the seigneuries of de Honbrocq, de St. Anthoine, de Karliere,
and the small seigneury of Quivelon enOstrevant. This
family had members who were councillers at the Grand Council
of Malines and the Council of Namur; another member was
grand bailli of d'Escoraix. D'Oultremans were in the re
ligious orders of the Benedictines of Stamand, .the Grises
Soeurs, and one was an abbot of St. Jean.'*'
The same pattern of social standing, officeholding, and
intermarriage existed for the rest of the top 22 echevinale
families who held most of the positions in the Magistrat.
Some were not as illustrious and as ancient as the Rascirs,
the LePoivres, and the D ’Oultremans, but they were all es
tablished families of Valenciennes who had acquired seig-
neuries and invested their money in property and rentes.^
Only one in the first 22 families, the Gruel, were active
in the working economy of the city as merchants— all the
rest lived off incomes from their lands, from the annuities
of rentes, and from royal offices. Many of them were law
yers or doctors of law, or counsellors to the king. In
~MP.V, ms. no. 8l6, pp. ^57-^64.

"For the ownership of rentes, see section five of this
chapter.
66.
sum, these echevinale families were all ancient, either

noble or seigneurial, and had intermarried with nobility
outside the city. They generally had connections with the
prince as counselors or jurists, and many had relations in
the hierarchy of the Catholic church.
The top positions in the Magistrat, i.e. the offices of
•prevot and lieutenant-prevot, were often held by individuals
who were new to the city and who had never served in any
lower municipal office. An example of this type of man
was Andrien de 3ouzenton,•seigneur de Querenaing, who served
six times as a prevot but never as an echevim He was a petty
noble who held lands and a chateau between Valenciennes and
Mons. The Brussels government found in him a reliable ex
ecutive to carry out royal placcards on heresy and to enforce
the edicts of the duke of Alva. He was made a bourgeois in
1558 at the begining of the Counter-Reformation in Valenciennes
and first became prevot in 1559 — one of the first years op
pressive measures were taken in the city. He served again in
1 5 6 5 . and then after the crisis of 1566-1567 in 157^* 1575*
and 1576. The De Bouzentons were seigneurs from the 15th

century, and by the 16 th they held the seigneuries of
d'Imprechier, de Lompret, and de Naste besides that of
Querenaing. They were prevots of Chimay, knights of the
Holy Sepulcre, and gentilhommes. They intermarried with
families only from outside the town and by the latter half
of the 16th century they were allying with the de Lannoys,

1
a powerful noble family. Other cooperative Catholics
~KBV, ms no. 810, pp, ^1^-it-17.
6?.
and creatures of the central government were Andrien de

Villers, escuyer, and Jean de Ghoegnies, seigneur d'Erquesnes,
who both served as prevot after the crisis of 1 5 6 6 -1 5 6 7 *
The insertion of these few outsiders into the key posi
tions of prevot and 1ieutenant-prevot coincided with the period
of religious troubles in the 1560 s and the 1570s. As we shall
see, the central government took an increased interest in
1
whom it appointed to offices in these decades; a few eche
vinale families, notably the De la Fontaines dit Wicart and
the Gruels, never appeared in the Magistrat after 15^7.
On the whole, however, the lists of officeholders indicate
that the echevinale families who had served on the Magistrat
in the begining of the century were still serving at the end.
Families like the Rasoirs, the LePoivres, the d 'Culiremans,
the Desmaisieres, and the de la Croix, etc., survived the re
ligious troubles and were still considered loyal to the prince.
In contrast to the Magistrat, the ancient Grand Conseil

of Valenciennes had no power at all in the 16th century. It
consisted of the assembly of all the bourgeois arid was a huge
and unruly body of men including such dissimilar social groups
as the relatively humble masters, the rich merchants, and the
more distinguished resident seigneurs of the echevinale fam
ilies. It was only assembled by the call of the Magistrat
and could only deliberate on questions set before it..Thus,
it had little power to initiate anything. In the l6th century
it was only called a few times in order to convince the
^Cellier, Une commune flamande, p. 99»
68. .
bourgeois to unite for a common defence, or to comply with
regulations put forward by the Magistrat. The Grand Conseil
had been created in the Middle Ages to give representation to
the bourgeois and had at times held considerable power, but
by the mid-l6th century it had become a little used and
1
• functionless assembly.
The other municipal council, the Conseil Particulier was

very powerful. The Conseil Particulier had been established
in 14-97 by the sovereign as a response to merchant-bourgeois
complaints that the Magistrat had become controlled by an
oligarchy unresponsive to the needs of the city. Its estab
lishment represented a reform of government institutions
designed to allow wealthy merchants and other notable bourgeois
tradesmen to gain a measure of municipal control from the
families who controlled the Magistrat. It enabled the merchant
community to review many of the magistrates’ decisions con
cerning the guilds, financial outlays, and other matters of
administration. The charter of the Conseil Particulier did not
give the body any authority or* jurisdictional rights similar
to those of the Magistrat, but it did grant the merchants and
notable bourgeois the right to meet with the Magistrat on a
regular bi-weekly basis so that the magistrates actions could
.2
be reviewed.
Cellier, Une commune flamande, pp. 115-122; and d 'Cultreman,

Histoire, p. 357.
2
Cellier, Une commune flamande, pp. 114-115.
By the loth century the Conseil Particulier had ac
quired considerable power in Valenciennes despite its lack
of authority. Theoretically, the members of the council were
appointed by the prince's officer with the approval of the
Grand Conseil but in practice they were not. First, the
prince was more interested in controlling the institution
upholding authority, i.e., the Magistrat, than the institu
tion representing the citizens, i.e.. the Conseil Particulier
and the Grand Conseil. Undoubtedly, the prince would have
controlled both if he had had the power to do so, but he
had not. It was precisely because of the prince's control
over the Magistrat and the resulting monooply of offices by
the echevinale families that led to the merchant-bourgeois
opposition which had to be pacified in the reform of 1^97.
Once the prince had conceded .the. establishment of the
Conseil Particulier, he did not try to control who sat there
except in principle. Secondly, the prince had no desire ever
to call the Grand Conseil to approve the Conseil Particulier's
personnel as the mass of the bourgeois citizens might take
the opportunity to remonstrate or force other concessions.
Since the beginning of the l6th century, therefore, the
Conseil Particulier was left alone to develop independently
as it presented no threat to royal or municipal authority.3,
^There was never an attempt to control the Conseil Particu

lier until after the crisis of 1566-1567 when it ceased to
exist in practice: only the personnel of the Magistrat was
manipulated by the central government. See HTRV, Vol. II,
Deliberation of the Conseil d'Stat. 3 June 15 62 , pp. 306 -3 0 9 .
70.
In fact, it came to function as a useful supplement to the
Magistrat. a sort of administrative cabinet, filled.with the
executive offices of the municipal government.
The names and occupations of the members who filled
the offices of the Conseil Particulier in the mid-l6th
century indicate that they were almost all from the merchant
community. Members of the Conseil consisted of the notables
of the guilds, the constables of the bourgeois militia, the
superintendants of charity, the public works directors, and
the municipal treasurers.'*' The active citizens in trade and
industry were also the active executives of the government.
They held power in the Conseil Particulier because there
were no restrictions on how many years a particular super-
intendant or treasuerer could serve and individual merchants'
2
held these offices for years, even decades. They seem to
have held these posts; as :a-result, of •••their wealth and in
fluence in the guilds over the rank and file masters, their
knowledge of industry and trade, and their willingness to
work on such tasks as road and fortification repairs and
There never were any lists kept of who served in these

executive and administrative positions in the Conseil Par=
ticulier. However, the offices, names, and occupations can
be found mentioned in the various deliberations of the coun
cil. See HTRV, Vols. I-IV, and MHSAV. Vols. V-VI.
2
For example, the save merchant Vincent Resteau seems to
have been treasurer from 1553 until 156 7 . ACV, Series CC,
connotes des mas sards, years 1553-155^ and 1555-15 6 7 . Another
example is the wine merchant Michel Herlin, who evidently
led militia companies from 15^0 until 15&7. A. Dinaux,
“Entree joyeuse de l’Empereur Charles-Quint en sa ville de
Valenciennes avec les fils du Roi de France, Francois ler du
non1 15^0, AftPM3t Vol. IV, pp. 3^9-366; and C. Paillard,
Notes et eclairclssements (Valenciennes, 1879), PP« 116-120.
71.
charity collections. The merchants were more suited for

such offices than the faineant echevinale families who con
trolled the Magistrat.
Who were the merchant families controlling the Conseil
Particulier? One was perhaps the most influential and
wealthy merchant family in Valenciennes, namely, that of
Michel Herlin. He was a descendant of Jean Herlin, a wine
merchant of Arras. Michel had immigrated to Valenciennes
in the early part of the century to carry on the wine trade—
thus providing the family with representatives in both the
border cities which controlled the wine trade with France.
In Valenciennes the Herlins had no illustrious heritage.
They did buy several small seigneuriesnotably those of
Jenlain, Beaussart and de Toureete, but thesg made up only
a small portion of his incredibly large landholdings. Michel
Herlin was by far the richest citizen of Valenciennes, the
echevinale families notwithstanding.^" His town house on the
Marche aux Poissons contained furniture which was worth a
small fortune in itself and housed an extended group of guests,
religious refugees, and servants.2 The extent of his landed
properties straddled .the whole of Hainaut: In the northern
part'he owned farms and lands near Ath. In the south and
^He reportedly earned 15»000 florins a year in the wine trade.

H. Pirenne, Histoire de Belgioue, Vol. Ill, p. ^?6 .
^"La vendue des biens meubles du dit feu Michiel Herlin" came
to 1,612 livres tournois. ADN. Series 3, ms no. 12701, fo Svo.
His houseguests included the widow Quentin, a "crassier" and
his wife, and "unq Flameng". See Cnarles Rahlenbeck, "Les
Chanteries de Valenciennes," MSKDP (1 8 8 7 ), Vol. Ill, pp. 1 6 7 ,
1 6 8 , and 179.
72.
west he owned land* farms and buildings in the small towns .

and villages of Conde, Antoing. Maubray, Souleville, Oizies,
Vielconde, Maing, Curgies, St. Saulve, Hornain* Houvy*
Noyelles, Brueil, Prasne, Vendegies, Sebourg, and Anzin. He
also owned houses and farmes in the suburbs of Valenciennes
1
outside the Mans gate.
Herlin served on the Conseil Particulier at various times
as Commissioner of the General Aumosne, and he also served as .
a captain of bourgeois militia forces from 1 $6 $-1 $6 7 . The
latter position of captain of the bourgeois militia forces
made him the most powerful man in Valenciennes during the period
of religious struggle as we shall see. In spite of this
wealth and power, he was excluded from the Magistrat except
for one term in the year l$6l-l$62. His exclusion is prob
ably due to the fact that he was not of an old and distin
guished family who had intermarried with nobles or served the
prince in various capacities.
Another active family which sat in the Conseil Particulier
but which was systematically excluded from the Rlagistrat was
that of the LeBoucqs. Although the LeBoucqs had been resident
in Valenciennes since the first half of the 13th century, they
were not an old seigneurial family. Noel LeBoucq, his son
Olivier, and Neel's brother Tassin, a?.says merchant, all owned
I ;
These properties were all confiscated by the crown after the
siege of 1566 -1567 . ADN, Series B, ms no 127C0, ff. 1, 8vo,
9, 12 vo, 3§vo, °.nd 39; no. 12701 , ff. 1-9; no. 12706 , fo. 3;
no 1 26 2 3 , ff. 53,53vo» and 5 6 ? no 1279 ^, all folios for the
'seigneury-_ of Jenlain? nos. 127^4-127^6 are three whole volumes
listing only the property of Herlin.
73.
considerable wealth. Noel LeBoucq, the most illustrious
member of the family in the 16 th century, held the position
of commissioner of artillery and munitions on the Conseil
Particulier. He was also an active literary figure who directed
the major dramatic festivals of Valenciennes in the 15^0s.
Other members of merchant families who sat in the Con
seil Particulier were the following* A commissioner of works
or maitre des oeuvres was Pierre de la Rue, a save merchant
and brewer who owned considerable properties in the village
2
of Leuze and in the chatellanies of Quesnoy and Bouchain.
The cloth merchant Jehan Mahieu was a constable of bourgeois
militiamen who owned properties in the villages of Popilmont,
3
Meuregnies and Koulbaix, besides houses in Valenciennes itself.
The saye merchant Pierre Conrart was another commissioner of
works who held the seigneury. of de Mollay and farmlands in
the village of Horgies-sur-Sscaut. Among the militia leaders
5 6
were the innkeeoers Allard Bar, Jacques Joffroy, and the mer-
7 8
chants Nicolas Bassee, Aymery Bertrand, Jeahn de Lattre le
9 10 11 12
Josne, Jacques Gellee, Georges LeBlond, and Simon Logier.
^■For the LeBoucqs' lands in the area of Quesnoy and Sebourg

see ADN, Series B,ms no. 12623, fo. ^9vo, and no 12665, fo.39.
2ADN, Series B, msno. 12700, fo 28vo; 12701, fo. 12vo; and
no. 12665, ff. 36-39.
3ADN. Series 3, ms no. 12700, ff. 4vo, 5vo, and 3 8 ; no 12701,
fo 9vo; and 126 6 5 , ff. 35 and 35vo.
ÂDN, Series B, msno. 12700, ff. 12 and 25vo.
5ADN, Series 3, ms no. 12665 , fo. ^2vo.
6ADN, Series B, ms no. 12701, fo. lOvo.
?ADN, Series B, ms no. 12706,fo§ 2; and 12623, fo. 5^.
ÂDN, Series 3, ms no. 12706, fo. 8.
9ADN. Series B, ms no. 12701, fo. 10.
IQa DN, Series B, ms no. 12701, fo. 11.
3-3-ADN. Series B, ms no. 12700, few 35vo.
12ADN, Series B, ms no. 12701, fo 2-Gw.
7b.
»
Vincent Resteau was a saye merchant of the Mons branch

of the Resteau family of Valenciennes. He migrated to Val
enciennes in 1550 and became a bourgeois in 1551* He served
as a massard or municipal treasurer on the eonseil Particulier
for several years including those of 1565# 15 ^6 , and 15&7.
Resteau was perhaps one of the most prestigious merchants of
Valenciennes as he was from a relatively old family which had
served in the Magistrat and intermarried with several of the
echevinale families. Vincent himself never served in the
Magistrat probably because he was involved in trade. His
property was considerable, consisting of both lands and rentes:
he owned buildings and land in the towns and villages of.Ath,
Hanegnies, Ollegnies, Yzieres, and Sebourg.1 Resteau also
2
owned rentes giving annuities of 137 livres per annum.
In sum, the members of the Magistrat were chosen by
the prince's officer from among the established echevinale'•
families who constituted a ruling aristocracy of the city.
These families obtained their wealth from offices, benefices,
seigneuries. ana, as we shall see, from rentes. They were
trained jurists and many had served as councellors on the
provincial courts or as royal officials. A good percentage
of the upper' positions in the Magistrat, the offices of prevot
and lieutenant-•prevot, went to especially trustworthy
servants of the prince. The echevinale families had*jurisdiction
in criminal and civil cases, and authority as the enforcers,
of lav/ and order. On another level of government there was
iADN, Series B, ms no. 12700- ff. 2vo, 3vo, 6vo, l6vo, 1?» 20,
23vo, 32vo-33vo, and 53; 12706, fo 15vo; 12623, fo. 59.
2ACV. ms no. C I lb6, ff. 48, 87vof llOvo and 130; ADN, Series
B, ms no. 12981, ff. lOvo, 12vo, 14, 19vo, 20vc, and 22,
the Conseil Particulier filled with some of the richest and
most powerful citizens of Valenciennes coming from newer
merchant backgrounds. Their positions in the council were
based on their wealth, their trading connections and their
clientele among the rank and file bourgeois merchants and
masters of the city. They held the executive positions of
municipal government in the militia, charity organizations,
and public works. Their newness and merchant backgrounds
made their appointment to office in the Magistrat, to pos
itions on the provincial councils, or to ecclesiastical
benefices all but impossible. The central government
evidently recognized them as socially inferior, suspect,
and unreliable compared to the echevinale families and the
nobility. Nevertheless, these merchants possessed real power
especially in their positions as militia leaders.
3. Institutions of charity
The charity instituitons, along with the system of law
enforcement to be considered in the next section of this
chapter, made Valenciennes secure from both the indigenous,
unprivileged worker-artisans, and from the foreign floating
population. These institutions show that Valenciennes was
a closed society which was highly controlled by and for its
elites. The institutions of charity systematically excluded
undesirable elements from the city by restricting welfare to
indigenous nannairts or to the able-bodied labor needed in
the work force. This section will investigate the charity
system to see which groups it accepted and which it excluded.
The principle charitable institutions of Valenciennes
in the mid-l6th century were controlled by the municipal
government and supported with money contributed voluntarily
by the bourgeois. Traditionally, charitable institutions had
been overseen by the Catholic Church, but in 1530 there was
a reform which put Valenciennes* charities under lay super
vision. This reform was part of a general trend toward
laicization and centralization of charity throughout western
Europe in the second quarter of the 16th century.3*
The charter of 15302 gave authority over all charities
to a commission of six lay superintendents who were appointed
by the Magistrat. They met twice a week in the Hall St.
Georges, a municipal building, in order to regulate the
O
charity system called the General Aumosne. The superin
tendents had authority to amend the lists of those receiving
charity, to set the time and place for the distribution of
alms, to appoint the lay "masters" who oversaw charity on
the parish level, and to audit the accounts of the Aumosne.
For the historiography of this general trend, see P. Bonen-

fant, "Les origines et le caractere de la reforme de la
bienfaisance publique aux Pays-Bas sous le regne de Charles-
Quint in Hooitaux et bienfaisance publique dans les anciens
Pays-Bas. Les origines a la fin du XVIIIe si^cle (Brussels,
1965), pp. 118-14-9.
We possess the ordinances of the General Ausmone in Valen
ciennes but not any of its registers or accounts. The
ordinances of^l$30 and 15^0 have been printed in S. LeBouca,
Histoire ecclesiastiaue de la villa et comts de Yalentienne
(Valenciennes, 1844), pp. 261-265.
■^Paragraphs 7-10 of the 1530 charter indicate the sjrstemSs
personnel and organization. LeBouca, Histoire ecclesiatiaue,
p. 262.
with permission o f the copyright o w n e r Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1f
77.
There v/ere four masters in each parish in charge of

receiving alms from the churches on Sundays and Saints' days.
Locked trunks v/ere kept in the parish churches so that
parishioners, could drop in contributions; the box was opened
by the masters on Sundays and saints' days after the services
and the money was counted. The masters could distribute
money to the poor in their parish who were carried on the
rolls of the superintendents. Any money left over went to
the superintendents to be distributed in other parishes
or to other small charitable organizations as the need
arose. The accounts of the masters were audited every three
months by the superintendents and every year by the Magistrat.^
The charters of 1530 and 15^0 set forth comprehensive
measures to eradicate begging. The introduction to the
charter of the General Aumosne in 1530 stated that idleness
was the mother of all evil? it was thought that idleness
led to begging and sinful ways. It was observed that many
of the young jobless men of forain parents grew up to be
thieves while young unmarried women v/ere corrupted. The
idle who received alms spent their money in taverns where
they gambled at bowls and dice. Idleness, the charter's
introduction continued, was a scandal which had to be eradi
cated by excluding from Valenciennes all jobless and vaga-
O
bond persons,
■^Paragraphs 8-10, TLeBoucq, Histoire ecclesiastique, p. 262.

2 -•
Introduction, LeBouca, Histoire ecclesiastique, p. 26l.
The 1530 charter excluded certain categories of people
from receiving charity. The poor of forain status could not
receive alms; this excluded journeymen who had not stayed
in Valenciennes for a year, peasant week-workers, and rural
vagabonds.^" The charter stated that begging was no..longer
permitted in Valenciennes; and all beggers who were not of
mannant: or bourgeois status had to■leave the city. If a
mannant or bourgeois was caught begging he would be put to
work or punished arbitrarily by the Magistrat. • Thus, this
law banned all idle and vagabond persons inside the walls
2
of Valenciennes. In order to control the floating popula
tion and to exclude the non-working elements, a series of
restrictive regulations were included in the charter. Para
graph 17 of the charter specified that landlords renting
rooms to the idle and vagabond would be fined 60 sols; in
15^0 this fine was raised to 6 livres tournois. All poor
receiving aid had to be registered in the lists of the
General Ausmosne, and in order to be registered one had to
3
have at least mannant status and be deserving of aid.
Begging was not only banned public/y!y in the streets, mar
ket places, and churches, but also in private homes. There
was also a prohibition on any Valenciennes mannant or
■^Paragraph 2 of the 1530 charter, LeBoucq, Histoire ecclesi

astic;ue. p. 26 l.
Paragraph 5 of the 1530 charter, LeBoucq, Histoire ecclesir-
astioue. p. 26 l.
■^Paragraph 16 of the 1530 charter. LeBoucq, Histoire ecclesi-
astioue. p. 2 6 2 .
79.
bourgeois begging in any other city.1 The only exceptions

to the prohibition on begging were the mendicant religious
2
orders and travelers on organized religious pilgrimages.
All the receivers of alms of the General Aumosne had
to wear a band on their sleeves to indicate they were re
ceivers of charity. All who wore this mark were prohibited
from visiting cabarets or taverns either inside or outside
the city. Only those who received charity because they were
temporarily out of work did not have to wear the mark of
a welfare recipient. The wearing of these marks was manda-
3
tory sincere payments were' made to those that removed them.
Young orphans would be cared for under the General
Aumosne until they could be put to work as apprentices in
a trade; a few of them would be sent to a "poor school" es
tablished in 1530. All poor children had either to learn
a trade or to go to school with no exceptions. The sick
and the elderly mannants and bourgeois who could no longer
support themselves were to be given alms in the form of
bread, clothing, and/or money. Those with contagious dis
eases were to receive alms before Mass on Sunday and then
■^Paragraph 2 of the 1530 charter. LeBoucq, Histoire ecclesi

astique. p. 26l.
Paragraph 1 of the 1530 charter. LeBoucq, Histoire ecclesi-
astioue, p. 261.
-^Paragraphs 6 and 15 of the 153° charter, and paragraphs 4
and 6 of the 15^0 ordinance. LeBoucq, Histoire ecclesias
tic ue. pp. 262 and 2 6 5 .
^Paragraph 3 of the 1530 charter. LeBoucq, Histoire ecclesi-
astioue, p. 26l.
80.
to return home before crowds appeared,'1' For the adult popu

lation who were capable of work, there was only anaLlowance
if they had been working and had temporarily fallen on "bad
times."
What happened during prolonged work stoppages is set
forth in the registers of the massards. Supplementary pay
ments from the municipal budget enabled the able-bodied to
"earn their living". The unemployed were paid for working
on public projects under the direction of the commissioners
of works or maitres des oeuvres. The hottiers. as the re
cipients of these subsidies were called, worked on fortifi
cations, on roads, or public buildings. Since the financial
registers of the massards are only existant for a few years
in the l6 th century, we do not have enough examples in order
to compare the circumstances under which these measures were*
taken on a year by year basis. Nevertheless, the extant
accounts of 1553-155^» 1565-1566, and 1566-1567 supply us
with examples:
During the year 1553-155^ there was a subsistence crisis
which saw the price of wheat go up on the Valenciennes
market some 3°0 per cent. This short term price rise coin
cided with disruptions of trade caused by the presence of
the warring armies of Charles V and Henry II in the area.
There was a program that year to employ on public works poor
persons unable to earn money for their subsistence; that
year, 1553 -155 ^* 6 ,1 5 0 livres were spent for the employment
■^Paragraph 7 of the charter of 1530, LeBoucq, Histoire ecclesi

astic ue . p. 262.
81.
of mannants.^ A worse crisis developed in the winter of 1565“

1566 when grain shipments from the Baltic were cut off be
cause of the war between Denmark and Sweden. The entry in the
massard registers clearly shows the magistrates' fear of riot
by the poor mannants nearing famine conditions 1
Audicts Nicolas Rasoir et Jehan Mahieu,
commissioneurs ausdicts ouvraiges de la
ville* pour deniers par euelx employez
esquels ouvraiges extraordinaires mis sus
pour le solaigement des pauvres mannants
de ceste ville ad fin de leur donner moyen de
gaigner leur vie heu regard a la grand
sterilit£ et chierte du temps, craindent
tumult et sedition, suivant i'ordonnances
des consaulx particuliers tenus le XVIII
de seotembre, VIII d'octobre et XI de
febrier XVCLXV. 2
This system evidently worked well, as Valenciennes
successfully escaped the endemic riots which occurred in
both larger cities like Antwerp and Paris,and in the rural
areas like Hondschoote. The reason for this is found in the
city's policy of excluding the idle vagabond elements from
the city. Only the indigenous working poor were subsidized
by the city in times of crisis, and only the indigenous
deserving poor received alms from the General Aumosne. Thus,
the floating population and the forain week-worker were elimin
ated ifthey were not employed, and the city was savedfrom
the levels of the population most dangerous to the propertied
groups. This system contrasted with that of Hondschoote where
the floating population was supplied with cheap looms to en
courage the unemployed to stay and work in the rural industries,
ÂCV, connotes des massards. 155^-1555. fo. 82.

2 ACV, connotes des massards. 1565 -1566 , fo. 103vo.
3Coornaert, Un centre industriel d'autrefois, pp. ^25-^26.
Also, at Valenciennes the levels of privilege among the worker-
artisans tended to promote retention of trained journeymen
rather than masses of indigent and unprivileged weavers as
at Hondschoote. The system of welfare was more regulated and
selective at Valenciennes, and as a result the population was
probably less dangerous to property than in either the large
cities or in rural areas like Hondschoote.
How did this highly controlled lay directed charity
system compare with the decentralized system which preceded
it? Why had this reform taken place? What had been wrong
with the system overseen by the church?
The introduction to the reform of 1539 described a
,:great disorder" in the charities of the city. The alms
collected by the parish curates had been badly distributed, so
that some money went to the undeserving poor while some
deserving poor got none at all. Begging by the poor had
reached the point where the magistrates considered it both dan
gerous and a scandal. Increased numbers of idle and vagabond
individuals had come from other cities, and frcm the villages
of the countryside in order to beg'.in the city or to receive
aims from the parishes. The floating population had come with
out .training -or skills and had been forced to beg or steal
for a living. In the churches the beggers had stood in frorit
of the alms boxes and prevented bourgeois from contributing to
the parish charity by imploring alms directly and by exhibiting
their infirmities to elicit sympathy. Many poor families had
sent out their children to beg to obtain a supplement to
83.
regular income, for children were known as artful and deceit

ful collectors of alms. Certain streets -in the city had been
filled, with forain poor who collected money from the city in
alms, thus preventing the deserving poor, i.e. the infirm, the
old, the poor orphans, and the temporarily out of work among
the indigenous inhabitants, from receiving their share.
Thus, it was precisely because there were chaotic conditions
which had threatened to engulf the city with idle vagabonds
seeking alms that the reform of 1530 had been instituted. The
idle vagabonds had been a threat to the property and morals
of the citizens and inhabitants, and the magistrates had acted
to prevent entry of the floating population which could not
be absorbed in the work force.
Although the unemployed were not allowed into the city
and begging was banned after the reforms of 1530 , there were
still tensions in the welfare system, especially among the
groups who were ruthlessly and effectively excluded from re
ceiving charity. After the reforms there were many mannants
of Valenciennes who needed money as a supplement to low wages
or because of some personal disaster which prevented them from
working, but they could not beg and could not collect aid from
the General Aumosne. Also, week-workers of the countryside
who were temporarily out of work were not cared for by the
public works system because they did not hold mannant status.
This forced them to steal, or move on to another city or per

haps to a rural industrial area.
■^LeBoucq, Histoire eccliesiastique, p. 26l.
8k .
These social tensions are reflected in cases recorded in
the Valenciennes criminal registers. For example, in 1550 one.
Maximilian Rudan was banished for three years for swearing at
the charity masters in the parish of St. Nicolas.x A case of
more direct action was that of Arnoul Alkertzoone, a locksmith
of Schoonhoue in Holland, who was birched and banished for
breaking into an alms trunk in the church of St. Gery after
2
vespers. Or there are the cases in 1557 of the forains
Jehan du Bois and Jan Sangne,. fine cloth weavers, who applied
for charity but were judged able-bodied by the superintendants
and told to "go and work without taking alms from other poor
people unable to earn a living”. They were shortly after
birched and banished for stealing carrots from gardens in the
3
suburbs.
Another important tension in the Valenciennes welfare
system after 1530 was the exclusion of heretical persons from
the General Aumosne. All the poor on the lists of the General
Aumosne had to go to their parish church each Sunday and hear
both Mass and vespers; for each period of non-attendance at
mass and vespers, the welfare recipiants would have a diminution
in the amount alloted them. The priest and curate exerted
some influence over who was to collect alms and who was not.
The priests were required to keep attendance lists of the
welfare receivers at mass. The pervasiveness of the Catholic
presence in the system is illustrated by the fact that the
alms were collected in the parish church, and that the eharity
1M3V, ms no. 700, fo. 157vo.
2M3V, ms no. 702, fo. 1 5 .
3MBV, ms no. 702, fo. 10.
85.
was organized on the parish level, From the start of the new
system in 1530 it was the job of the parish priest to justify
and present the new system in their sermons, and during con
fessions.^ These restrictions in the General Aumosne assured
the Catholic ecclesiastical hierarchy a good deal of partici
pation in the lay directed charity organization.
What other kinds of charity organizations were there?

What became of the sick and the elderly?
The curable sick persons of bourgeois and mannant status
were cared for by the Hotel Dieu which was founded in 1^30.
Before that time there was no hospital which took care of the
mannants without charge. The nurses were called the sisters of
Chevale d'or, and were a local quasi-religious group patterned
after a similar organization in St. Omer. Pledged to chastity,
poverty, and care of the sick, the sisters were usually members
of the echevinale families but some came from the local petite
noblesse. In the 15 th and l6th centuries among the women sup
eriors were the names of the De la Haye and Rasoir families.
The Hotel Dieu was directed by the abbot of St. Jean and the
prevot of the Magistrat Who appointed two lay notables to over
see the administration of the hospital.
The possessions of the Hotel Dieu were large. They in
cluded lands, farms , and buildings in over fifty different
villages in the Valenciennes area rendering several thousand
2
livres per year. Its bond holdings gave the hospital
1 “
LeBoucq, Histoire ecclesiastique, p. 265.

2
LeBoucq, Histoire ecclesiastique, p. 223-22^.
.
86
116? livres per year, the second highest total paid put in
annuities by the assenes and the municipal rentes.^ The
echevinale and the merchant families were generous patrons
of the institution; the donations of these families were in
money, lands, and fixtures liKe beds. The names of donors
recorded on the 51 bedsteads of the main dormitory included
the duchess of Bavaria, the seigneur de Quarouble, the
Le Poivres, Jappins, Greberts, Clauwets, Godins, de Renins,
2
and Resteaus. The municipality provided the hospital with
additional funding that was needed in times of crisis;during
the war years in the 155°'s, the Hotel Dieu accomodated many
plague ridden patients, and there were subsidies given to
the hospital by the Magistrat. In the plague year of 155^
-a
the Magistrat gave 600 livres tournois to the institution.
Patients included both mannants and bourgeois of Valen
ciennes, but not poor forains. The Hotel Dieu seems to have
been restrictive in its treatment of patients in a number of
ways* Incurable diseases were not admitted, i.e.. leppers,
paralytics, and the insane.^ In the 16 th century heretics
^•ACV. Series CC« I lh6 , ff. 1, Ivc, 8 , and 9vo. ADN. Series
B, ff. 6 9vo, l8vo, 20, 22vo, 2^vo, and 28.
2
LeBoucq, Histoire ecclesiastique, pp. 220-223.
^The plague continued into 1555 with the ravages of war and
destruction in the countryside; over a dozen sisters re^*
portedly died while caring for the afflicted, LeBoucq,
Histoire ecclesiastique, p. 226,
Ône of the hinds of patients not admitted was the pregnant'
woman. The sisters had complained of the unmarried state of
many pregnant women in the 15 th century when the maternity
service -was terminated, but it was reinstated in the l6 th
87.
were prevented from entering; the sisters followed the direc
tions of Charles V and Philip II that no one was to he ad
mitted unless they were known to he good Catholics.^-
Several minor charitable institutions in Valenciennes
were affected by the reform of 1530 and were still run hy
religious orders and their Catholic patrons. These insti
tutions were the Hostellerie du Chasteau de Saint-Jehan. the ■'
Maison des Ladres, and the Hopital St. Bartholsmy. These
private foundations had been founded in the Middle Ages to
serve the sick and the poor, but by the 16 th century they
had become the reserves of the echevinale families and
nobility in the area. They were exclusive hospitals and re
tirement homes where the elderly parents of echevinale fami
lies could retire along with the trusted servants of the
nobility. They served also as livings for the daughters
of the echevinale families and of the petty nobility. They
are significant only as examples of the decay of old reli
gious charities and as illustrations of the vested interests
2
of the upper classes m Valenciennes.
In sum, the reform of 1530 gave the direction of the
system of charity on the parish level to laymen. The principle
century as a result of the last reforms. The service was

abolished for a second time in 1627 as a result of complaints
of the sisters that women in labor were infectious and there
fore dangerous to other patients. LeBoucq, Histoire ecclesi-
astioue, pp. 223-224.
■^The patient had to carry a letter of good standing from the
parish curate. LeBoucq, Histoire ecclesiasticue, pp. 218-219.
^LeBouca, Histoire ecclesiastique. pp„ 179-184, 189-196, 201-
2 0 2 , and 2 0 6 .
88.
charity of the city, the General Aumosne.. was centralized and
controlled by the Magistrat and a standing committee in the
i
e
Conseil Particulier. This system effectively restricted
charity to indigenous workers and deserving poor; it banned
the unemployed and foreign populations from the city making
it more safe for property owners and the privileged. The
social control obtained by the restrictive measures more
than counterbalanced the isolated cases of discontent by the
individuals prevented from obtaining aid. Religious ortho
doxy was necessary to obtain alms and to be admitted to the
Hotel Dieu. but apart from the resulting indirect control
by the parish curates the ecclesiastics no longer had con
trol .of the main system of charity.
4. The criminal system and control of the lower population

The criminal system clearly illustrates that Valen
ciennes was effectively controlled by the upper levels of
society. The echevinale families in the Magistrat and the
merchant-led bourgeois militias worked together to assure
security for the lives and property of theprivileged groups
of Valenciennes. This section will show that incomparison
to unwalled places like Honds~!oote the walled and moated
city of Valenciennes was a relatively secure place.
The chief function of the Magistrat was to oversee the
enforcement of law and order. All the inhabitants of the
city and the cheflieu of Valenciennes were subject to the
jurisdiction of the Magistrat in criminal matters. The
echevins sat as judges over bourgeois, mannants, and forains.
.The mannants and forains were not equal to citizens as they
were subject to torture and were automatically in an inferio
position when involved in a crime against a bourgeois. The man
nant could not belong to the armed bourgeois militias which
enforced order. He was looked upon as irresponsible or at
least unreliable as a result of his largely propertyless
position. Nevertheless, the mannant and the forain lived
under the protection of the justice of the Magistrat en
forced by the bourgeois inside the walls,— a protection
which was a considerable privilege in the chaotic border
area of Hainaut.3’
Able to inflict all sorts of corporeal punishments in
cluding death, the Magistrat *s competence in criminal mat
ters was not restricted by the coutumes. Generally speaking
there were no set punishments for different crimes; the
magistrates could arbitrarily mete out punishments according
to the time and place of the crime, and according to the
status or social position of the guity party. The charter
of 111 ^ was not a penal code, and there were never any or
dinances systematically setting forth what were and were
not crimes. There was no body of law which the magistrates
could consult other than recorded precedent and customs
found in the yearly registers of judgments handed down by
their predecessors. Paragraph 65 of the charter of U n
allowed the judges to interpret vague or doubtful crimes
^Cellier, Une commune flamande, p. 9 6 .
90 .
as they arosa according to the circumstances of time and
place. ^ The exception was where there were specific rights
appertaining to the bourgeois? such as their rights of
exemptions from torture or property confiscation.
Although the Magistrat could try nobles, it could not
try officers of the prince. Officers of the prince were
theoretically the administrative branch of government in
charge of law enforcement, as this function had always been
a prerogative of the sovereign. All rights not specifically
given to the Isagistrat in the coutumes and charters were re
served for the prince's officer, the prevot-le-compte. The
prevot-le-compte;was entitled to judge cases in the prevote
of Valenciennes, one of the jurisdictional divisions of
Kainaut, and to prosecute but not judge cases in the juris
dictional area of Valenciennes held by the Magistrat. As
the prosecutor of justice within the city, the prevot-le-
compte brought criminal cases before the Magistrat to be
judged. At least that was the theoretical and structural
delineation of roles between the Magistrat and the prevot-le-
compte. In reality the city traditionally controlled the
office of public prosecutor: The prevot-le-compte was cus
tomarily an absentee noble who showed up on ceremonial occas
ions or during crises but for the rest of the time was con
tent to allow a substitute, a lieutenant prevot-le-compte.
to fulfill his duties in Valenciennes. This lieutenant was
^Cellier, Une commune flgaande, pp. 51-52? and H. Pirenne,

Les villes et les institution urbaines, pp. 83 -8 9 .
91.
normally appointed from the ranks of the echevinale fami

lies who thus had a near total control over the administra
tion of justice.*-
For the day to day peacekeeping within the city, there
were a few dozen' sergeants at arms who acted as arresting
officers in the streets. They were paid piecemeal for speci
fic jobs done by the municipal treasury, i.e. for making
arrests, inflicting corporal punishment on prisoners, or
keeping the peace during festivals. Yet, this small force
of full time officers was unable to prevent potential riots
or to withstand the attacks of maurauding soldiers.
The major job of keeping the peace fell on the citizens
themselves, organized as a militia. In French speaking
provinces they were usually called milice. At Valenciennes
they were organized under connetables on the parish level;
the constables, usually merchant notables, utilized many of
the guild officials as officers. Each of the constables
directed a militia force consisting of a number of cinquan-
teniers in charge of five dizainiers who were each in charge
of ten armed bourgeois. The number of cinauanteniers under
under each constable depended on the number of bourgeois
living in the particular parish. The total number of bour
geois militiamen fluctuated according to the number of
*Cellier, Une commune flamande. pp. 153"l60.

^See ACV, Series CC, I, l^t-6 , ff. ?0, S3vo, and 109 for gaiges
divers for the sergeants bastonniers. The sergeants perform
ing corporeal punishments were known as sergeants a vierges
and received a yearly pension from the Magistrat of 21 livres
8 sols, 7 deniers. fo. 105vc.
92.
able-bodied citizens in the city and must have been at least

6 0 0 -7 0 0 in the mid-l6 th century.^-
At Valenciennes in the 16th century the bourgeois mili

tia protected the city from the vagabonds and brigands of
the countryside and from the ravaging bands of soldiers
during the incessant wars. They were organized into patrols
called guets or ruages which took turns guarding the walls
and gates, and patrolling the streets. They enforced the
curfews and set up chains across the streets at night to
prevent robberies. The annals of the time show these bour
geois forces to have been reliable, efficient and prudent
all at the same time; they could be counted on to defend
their property, their families, and their privileges as
citizens when mustered and armed. As we shall see, these
armed bourgeois were the backbone of the city's defenses
and whoever had their allegiance controlled Valenciennes.
• There were also several medieval serments or elite
brotherhoods specializing in particular weapons, but by the
16 th century they were ineffectual as enforcers of law and
order. These societies spent most of their time at banquets

or at parades resplendent in their colorful uniforms, flags,
and pennants. Recruitment was restricted to the more wealthy
bourgeois families; interviews with the criminal clerk and
^During the cdsis of 1566-1567 between 600 and 700 able-

bodied bourgeois were enlisted in bourgeois foot and cavalry
companies. AGR, Conseil des troubles, ms. no. 10^, fo. 72.
£H. Caffiaux, "Essai sur 1'organization militaire de la
ville de Valenciennes, 1067-1789" KHSAV, Vol. 5. PP« 5-8.
93
recommendations from one's curate were necessary as pre

requisites for joining. By the 16th' century there were only
three serments, the arbaletriers, the archers, and the can-
noneers. Each was small in numbers and dwindling? by 1620
there were only 24 arbaletriers and a few archers. They
were only significant as upper class social clubs, as hon
orary societies, and as corps de parade.3-
That the system of law and order overseen by the Magis
trat and the bourgeois militias favored the wealthy upper
levels of society is obvious from an investigation of the
criminal registers. When one looks at the occupations of
For an example of their ceremonial functions, see ACV,

Series CC, I, 146, fo. 83* and also Caffiaux,"Essai sur
1 'organization militaire", pp. 2 3 -3 3 .
2 KBV, ms. nos. 700-703. These criminal registers of the

Magistrat are complete with the exception of one year be-
tween 1546-1566, and they give the following information
more or less systematically? name of individual, occupa
tion, place of origin, crime, and punishment. The cases
are listed in three different sections in the register;
the separation was based on the importance of the crime
and on the severity of punishments meted out. The first
section called loix .iugees consisted of crimes only
punished by fines. The section banissements consisted of
crimes requiring some sort of corporal punishment and
banishment. Finally, under choses communes and extraor-
dinaireswere crimes punished by death. For lists of
crimes in these categories, see Appendix One finds
that of all the 1096 crimes in the period 1546-1566 a mar
jority of 782 fit into the fines category, 234 into the more
serious classification of banishment and corporal punish
ment and 80 resulted in capital punishment. Unfortunately,
there are no studies giving comparative figures for other
cities or rural areas in the southern Netherlands, and
it is hard to tell whether Valenciennes' crime rate was
normal or not.
criminals in Valenciennes one finds that most of them fit
into the occupations of the lower levels of society and were
forains who came to Valenciennes to work. Poor weavers,
fullers, and combers customarily found in the floating popu
lations, in the peasant villages as week-workers, or in
migrant journeymen groups committed the majority of serious
crimes, i.e. those against property. Of a total of 31^
serious crimes in the period 15 ^6 -15 66 , 12 ^ were committed
by save weavers, 3^ "by combers of wool, 23 by linen weavers,
22 by unskilled laborers, 17 by fine cloth weavers, 13 by
gardeners, and 10 by fullers. These figures compare to

only 20 serious crimes for all categories of merchants,
while the largest group of skilled artisans, the carpenters,
had only 10 serious crimes. The registers also indicate
that the unskilled cloth workers who committed the .majority
of crimes against property came from the neighboring French-
speaking provinces of Artois, theCambraisis, and the Tour-
naisis, and from many of the villages of rural Hainaut.
These worker-artisans were often driven to crimes out of
starvation and want of jobs, and thus were caught digging
up carrots from gardens and stealing from other poor people
in order to survive. The subsistence pay they received
for weaving and combing wool, coupled with the long hours
and cramped living conditions undoubtedly promoted frustra
tions resulting in the endemic violence among them— especially
in the cabarets and streets.
Of the crimes considered minor and punished by fines
about 51 per cent or 399 out of 782 were violent, i.e..
wounding and battery by one individual against another.
This represented the largest single category of crime and
indicates that violence was fairly common in the city. Since
the penalty was only a fine, violence does not seem to have
been considered a very serious crime. The rule of thumb
in these cases seemed to be that the person who wounded the
other was fined, no matter what the circumstances preceding
this fact. Sometimes both participants in the fight were
fined if they wounded each other. Most of the woundings
were with knives or fSsts since there were very few cases of
firearms. The fines for wounding and battery were anywhere
from 30 sols to 65 sols.
Inside the walls of Valenciennes the number of serious
crimes was kept low. Only 31^ serious crimes for a city of
1 2 ,0 0 0 population in the 20 .year'period 15^6-1566 seems low in
deed. This low crime rate was e f f e c t e d by a system of

exclusion from Valenciennes society of the social groups
recognized to be dangerous to bourgeois lives and property,
i.e., the unemployed migrants who were not needed in the
work force. As we have seen the charity regulations had
made no provision for the non-indigenous poor whether they
were deserving or not. For Valenciennes there could be no
question of supporting non-contributing members of society
from other localities if the city was to survive. The forces
of law and order saw to it that vagrants were excluded from
the city; the bourgeois guards screened persons at the gates
96.
and the citizen patrols guarding the walls and moats pre
vented infiltration of the city by the unemployed vagabonds
who roamed the countryside.
The most serious crimes, i.e. robberies, burglaries,
and thefts took place in critical years of famine and war*
when there was an increase of floating populations in the
countryside. 15^6 had 15 cases, 1553 had 11 cases, 155 ^
had 11 cases, and 1557 had 1*4- cases. The forain or mannant
journeymen and week-workers did not steal in the wealthy
sections of the city but rather outside the walls in the
suburbs or in nearby villages. Inside the city itself, it
was hard to commit robberies, and burglaries given the pro
tective solidarity of the citizens who wo uld immediately come
to each other's aid. During the night the curfew, the
chaining of the streets, and the bourgeois guets prevented
burglaries. Robberies inside Valenciennes' walls invariably
occurred in the public places, for the most part in the mar
kets and halles. Usually they were cases of purse-snatching
from women shopping in the halles during market days or
holidays.'1' Burglaries were most frequent in the houses of
poor laborers or poor peasants in the rural villages like
Vaucelles or Stain, or in the suburbs of Valenciennes because
these were less guarded than those inside the city walls,
^For examples of stealing purr-es from women on the markets,

see I'.BV, ms. no. 700 , fo. 1 9 ; ms. no. 70 1 , ff. U-2 and 1 5 6 .
The festival days were times of opportunity for robbers and
extra citizen patrols were stationed along the streets
during them; see K3V, ms. no. 700, fo. 90 for three cases
of robbery during the festivals of the year 15 ^8 , including
a man who had "mettre main & bourse, aux sacqueailx de plusi-
eurs gens" while in the crpwced streets.
97.
and there were many more potential burglars among the floating
population in the countryside.^" Another activity of these
poor vagrants was stealing from gardens in the suburbs as a
last resort for many who would have starved otherwise. For
example, Jehan DuBois, a fine cloth weaver from Tournai,
and Jan Sangue, a laborer from Ghoy near Arras, were con
victed of having taken radishes and carrots from gardens
2
outside the gates and of being idle vagrants.
Unemployed migrants or wiseulx et vagabonds were ex
plicitly recognized by the Magistrat as a threat to society.
If those migrants seeking work were caught begging, they
were considered "annoying delinquents", "disturbers of soc
iety", and "living as opportunists to the detriment and
3
damage of society". They were tolerated if they came to
work, but as soon as they started to beg or steal then they
became criminals and the charge of vagrant was brought
against them along with the other charges of robbery, beg
ging, etc. Of 92 cases of robbery, burglary, and theft,
there were ^0 cases where wiseaulx et vagabond was also
•^For examples of burglaries in the villages and suburbs, see

MBV, ms. no. 700. ff. 18vo. and 56vo; ms. no. 701, ff. 112-
112vo; ms. no. 702, ff. 9. H . 12, and 83.
O
MBV. ms. no. 700, ff. 130vo and 1 3 1 . Nicknames or aliases
of criminals and of the floating population were common in
the criminal registers, i.e.. Vye Rompu, Cabaret, Gros Pierre,
Vita, Le Bastard, Le. Monde, Bieraret, Malaoiet, l-lenoin, I-'.ous-
son, Clers Yeulx. Polree, Mainbour, Canin, Pugno, Le Roi,
Petit Typueux, Cinca Oefs, Raton, Broullon, and Sacquaterre.
These names give us hints of the kind of violent and tenuous
existence of the floating population.
3MBV. ms. no. 700, ff. l6 ^vo-l6 6 ; ms. no. 701, ff. 68 and 7 1 .
98.
mentioned. • Vagrancy was also mentioned if the individual

was accused of a moral crime such as swearing:, or lubricity.
Vagabondage was usually enough to incriminate as there were
numerous cases of vagabondage mentioned along with suspicion
of robbery or theft. For example, Philot de la Ruyelle and
Japin le Main, both idle and vagabond forains, were found
to have several pieces of gold. This was enough to have them
birched and banished.^"
The system of punishments and penalties functioned
well given the aims and needs of the society and the limi
tations of the criminal system. The most frequently used
punishments for serious crimes was birching and banishment.
The convicted robber or vagabond was taken around the city
and birched at the main street corners while standing in an
open c a rt. Then the individual was taken to the gates where
he or she was banned from the city usually for a three year
period, but sometimes forever, Banishment was not a lenient
penalty; banishment tore a person away from.the milieu in
which he had lived, worked and socialized all his life if
were an indigenous inhabitant. The banished person had to
take all his possessions with him on his back and became
part of the floating population living with other criminals
and jobless in the countryside without the security of the
city walls. He was torn away from his family and forced
into a life of isolation and abandonment without friends or
means of support. If he returned before the end of the
^ri3V. ms. no. 7 0 0 , fo. 19 vc..
99.
specified period of "banishment, he was put into the stocks

for 2b hours, birched, and banished forever. 1
If a man who was banished forever had the temerity to
return, he was judged incorrigible and hung on the market
place. Thirty-one of the 80 capital crimes in the 20 year
period were forincorrigible robbers, burglars, and thieves
who were almost invariably banished unemployed vagabonds
2
who had returned to the city. The rest of the capital
crimes were the kind of outrages that are punished in any
society, i.e. rape, kidnapping, and murder. It is interest
ing that among these latter crimes which did not involve
property were the majority of cases involving the 20 mer
chants who were convicted during the period 154-6-1566; thus,
the poor would almost exclusively commit crimes against
property, but they had no monopoly of the crimes of murder
and other outrages.
For the relatively few crimes involving morality, de
pravation of family, or decency such as incest, adultery,
abandonment of children, lubricity, or prostitution,-^ the
^H. Caffiaux, Le oanissement (Valenciennes, 1891).

p
In the 19th century the Catholic historian Emile Carlier_
erroneously thought that Valenciennes was overrun with crimi
nals during the Reformation period because of the city's^
privilege of granting asylum to persons fleeing prosecution
for crimes elsewhere; E. Carlier, Valenciennes et le roi d’Es-
•oagne. pp. 7 -9 . This was untrue. Persons admitted under the
■orivilege still had to have means of support in either money
or a job, and many migrant criminals were excluded in this
way. The system favored the wealthy because if a poor man
who found asylum lost his job and became unemployed and forced
to beg or commit another crime,the I.'.agistrat brought up the
old charges from the other city to prove the man was incorri-
ble whereupon he was hung. See for example, K5V, ms.no. 703,
fo. 172.
-Ît is hard to judge why there we re so few cases of prostitu-
100 .
individual was taken to the market place where he or she .
was exhibited in the stocks; another punishment was carrying
a tonneau or a sort of yoke around the city with a sign at
tached proclaiming the crime. After the punishment of
stocks or tonneau. the individual was birched and banished.
For certain crimes like swearing, there was mutilation— the
blasphemer had his or her tongue pierced with a hot iron.
There was a special punishment reserved for those who
wounded or threatened authority. Although cases involving
such crimes were few, they were treated with especial care
by the Tfegistrat. The custom of punishing people for disre
spect for authority dated back to the 12th century in Valen
ciennes when it was punished by a mark of a hot iron on the
forehead. In the 16th century there were several different
punishments for this crime depending upon the seriousness
of the circumstances. The most common punishment was forcing
the culprit to appear before the magistrates on his knees
with bare feet and head carrying a candle as a sign of peni
tence ; he then went to his parish church to deposit the
candle and to pray mercy of God before receiving the regular
punishments of birching and banishment.'1' If the individual
swore against some authority he would have his tongue pierced
2
before birching and banishment. The seriousness of the
tion. Perhaps the magistrates did not consider it a serious

crime and refrained from punishing prostitutes. The criminal
registers and the chronicles of the time are net enlightening
on this subject.
hx3V, ms. no. 7 0 0 , ff. 125-125vo, 1^9vo-150, and 15^-15^fvo.
2 I.1BV, ms. no. 701, fo. 15&vo.
101 .
crime can be seen by. the fact that two young unmarried men
who had shown incorrigible disrespect to their parents were
executed. 1 The few cases of wounding of the bourgeois mili
tiamen or the sergeants at arms do not indicate any conscious
desire of the poor to retaliate against the forces of law-
2
enforcement; the cases show that the poor generally ac
cepted their lot and avoided the sergeants in terror of the
harsh punishments meted out.
The above punishments were necessarily harsh given the
aims of the system of criminality. All the above punishments
seemed to function in a similar manner. They were designed
to discourage others from crime by exhibition of the punish
ment, and to rid the society of a nuisance. The townspeople
were summoned to witness birchings by the soundof a tam
bourine and a herald who announced the crime andpunishment
at the streetcorners, and they were called by a special bell
to witness executions on the market place. The stocks and
tonneau specifically utilized the opprobrium of the populace;
they were designed to elicit harrassment of the helpless
criminal, i.e.. verbal and physical ridicule heaped on by
grownups and children alike. These exemplary punishments'
seemed to have worked satisfactorily as long as the popula
tion concurred with the legistrat that the person had com-
3
mitted what they considered to be a crime.
1I-:3V, ms. no. 700, ff. 6lvo-62 and 98-9Svo.
ZPBV, ms. no. 7 0 0 , ff. l49vo-150 and 15 ^-15 ^-vo.

Ît was only when they did not, as in the time of religious
troubles, that the system of exemplary punishment did not work.
If banishment was the first step in the process of
ridding society of its dangerous elements, death had to be
used as the next step if the criminal kept coming back, or if
it was found that he was not going to reform. Death was the
final solution to incorrigible criminals in a time when there
were no facilities for permanent detention and rehabilita
tion. There was a jail in Valenciennes called the bourreau
or burianne, but it was not suitable for prolonged sentences.
It consisted of several subterranean cells in a street be
hind the City Hall. In the l6 th century it was notorious
for its Unsanitary conditions, and the place was referred
to as "the cesspool" or putier. Prisoners were chained in
cellers which filled up with sewage and water from the streets
and the building above. The jail could not hold more than
a few prisoners at any one time, and it was recognized that
all persons held there were liable to contract diseases and
die. The policy of the Magistrat was only to hold criminals
prisoner while awaiting their judgment and never to keep
.them in the jail for a long period of time. 1
In contrast to this picture of Valenciennes as a well-
regulated walled society in the interests of the propertied
groups, E. Cocrnaert has described a state of near anarchy
in Hondschoote. Coornaert did not utilize criminal registers
^There was also an adjoining torture chamber called the

lieu extraordinaire. For the jail at Valenciennes, see
H. Caffiaux, Le Bourreau de Valencinnes (Valenciennes, 1891);
Cellier, Une commune flsmande, pp. 18^-187; and T. Louise,
De la sorcellerie et de la justice criminelle a Valenciennes
aux XVIU et au XVIIe sieoles (Valenciennes, 1861), pp. 119-121.
/o3>
1 °3 .
but he uses descriptive accounts to ascertain that there were

bands of brigands among the rural cloth workers in the area.
For example in 1556 combers pillaged at will among persons
going to market, in 1558 groups of save weavers forced the
wealthy to give up their purses, and during the iconoclasm
of 1566 houses were sacked.^ Hondschoote was unwalled and
made up of a rural conglomeration of villages where peasants
and migrant workers were exploited in putting out systems;
there was no security from jobless vagabonds who were at-
2
tracted to the area by the necessity of finding jobs.
Valenciennes, on the other hand, was a fortress society
which systematically excluded from its walls the property-
less floating population which could not be successfully
utilized in the work force. Valenciennes was a town where
the Valenciennes bourgeois minority, in contrast to the
elites in the Hondschoote area, successfully consolidated
its power and control over the lower populations. There
were relatively few cases of crimes against property and
never any sacking of houses within the walls of Valenciennes.
There were similarities, however, between Hondschoote and
the rural area outside the walls of Valenciennes. The vil
lages where Valenciennes* peasant week-workers resided were
the scene of most of the thefts, robberies, and burglaries
“Ss. Coornaert, Un centre industriel d*autrefois, p. *{-28.

Ê. Coornaert, Un centre industriel d*autrefois, pp. *Hl-*H'*i-e
10k.
prosecuted by the Magistrat. There the poor were allowed

to steal from the poor, and the vagrant jobless preyed upon
the merchants traveling on the high roads. The criminal
system successfully controlled the lower population inside
the walls, but it probably increased, the anarchy in the
countryside by its system of banishments which undoubtedly
forced many jobless into a cycle of never-ending thievery
in order to survive.
5. The tax system and the rentiers

The municipal bond and tax system caused tensions which
accentuated the social divisions between those who ran the
Magistrat and the Conseil Particulier. This section will
show how the financial system of Valenciennes operated,
and what social groups it favored. It will also indicate
the discontent of those who paid for the system.
The finances of Valenciennes were inextricably inter
mixed with the tax structure of ihe central government.
The basis of the tax of the central government in the Kiddle
Ages and at the beginning of the reign of Charles V was the
medieval aide. Its total amount was fixed prior to its col
lection by the prince as contracted through a meeting of
the estates of the realm. Ideally this sum was apportioned
according to the wealth of the estates of the participating
provinces but in reality it was the peasantry who paid the
most. In most areas the apportionment of the aide was based
on the counting of hearths in the countryside, in towns, in
villages, and in cities. Some cities, the so-called bonnes
/<?> • •
105.
villes, had gained a working relaiionship with their prince

which exempted them from the collection of the aide by the
system of hearth counts. Such was the position-of Valenciennes.
The special relationship between the prince and Valen
ciennes had started in 13^5 when the city succeeded in ob
taining it by delaying apportionment of the aide. From that
time Valenciennes gave monies to the prince separately from
the estates of Kainaut and did so at a rate lower than had
been traditionally her portion. The city based her aide .
on a certain percentage of the total aide agreed upon the
estates of Hainaut. The estates continually assigned a
sixth of the sum apportioned .to the county of Hainaut to
Valenciennes, a sum the city could afford as it was well-
known she was the richest city -in the province;: Yet, Valen
ciennes traditionally only paid one-half of this sum or a
12th part.'1' The principle function of the estates of
Hainaut was to respond to the monetary requests of the
sovereign and to issue remonstrances in return; from the
14th century, Valenciennes did this independently and thus
destroyed the principle relationship between the city and
2
her provincial estates.
Ârnould, Denombrement, pp. 68 and 100-101.

2Arnould, Denombrement, pp. 101 and 209. From 1305 the
texts of the Hainaut Ccmptes indicate this separate posi-
tionr.with the phrase "sans la ville de Valenciennes";
Arnould describes the relationship between Valenciennes
and her estates as "desolidarisee" after this date.
f V -
.
106
Although the estates of Hainaut never recognized this

special relationship between Valenciennes and the prince,
it continued to exist in the 16th century. Sometimes the
prince would obtain needed funds even sooner by settling
with Valenciennes before agreeing with the estates; in 1558
the government of Philip II settled with the city several
days before it came to agreement with the provincial estates.^
The sovereign continued this special relationship be
cause it expedited the sending of cash to the central govern
ment. Traditionally the cities and estates of the Lew Coun
tries had utilized the strategem of stalling and delaying
their portion of the aide, and in this way they received re
ductions because the chronically hard pressed princes needed
ready cash to pay for troops— war being the occasion for the
aide in^most cases. What Valenciennes government did, how
ever, was to raise a reduced amount of money quickly by the
sale of municipal bonds, called rentes or assenes in Valen-
ciennes. The monies from this sale of municipal bonds were
then given to the prince, who, in return gave letters of
authorization to the city for the issuance of the assenes,
and for the collection of taxes to pay for the annuities on
them. In other words the reduced aide money was raised
quickly through a bond sale and given to ihe prince in return
■Ârnould, Denombrement, pp. 620-621.

2
For the accounts of the municipal rentes, see ADM, Chambre-
des comptes, Series B, ms. nos. 12881-130-44; and ACV, Series
CC, I, 1^-6. For copies of the letters of the prince author
izing the system, see MBV, ms. no. 7^1.
for authorization of taxes. Thus, while the city went-
through the laborous and time consuming process of collecting
taxes, the king could carry on with the money raised by the
bond sale. This was the system which had been in existence
since the 14th century; the first issue of municipal rentes
to raise money for an aide had been floated in 1321 by Guil
laume, Count of Hainaut,'5' and the system was continued and
expanded by the Burgundians and by their 16th century suc
cessors, Charles V and Philip II.' The only difference was
that in the 16 th century much larger sums were called for
in the aides as a result of the incessant demands of the
imperial and Spanish war machine.
In order to understand the vested interests created by
the bond system, it is necessary to comprehend what the as-

2
senes or rentes were and how much they paid. There were two
kinds of bonds: the rentesviageres, or life bond% and the
rentes heritieres. or hereditary bonds. The rentes viageres
paid a set annuity until the lives of two persons had run
their course; that is, the acquirer of the bond was assured
of the benefit of annuities during the lives of two indivi
duals of his choice. Usually the buyer would pick some
healthy members of the family who were old enough to sur
vive (having gone through the critical years of childhood),
^MBV, ms. no. 741, p. 122.

2
„The accounts of the assenes record the names of persons
holding bonds, theiype of bond, the year of issue, and the
amount of annuity payment. ADN, Chambre des Comptes, Series
B, ms* nos. 12881-13044.
/o ?
108.
but young enough to keep the annuities coining in for years

to cone, perhaps his sons or daughters, himself, his wife,
or his sister. The rente viagere would usually pay for
perhaps half a century. As the bonds sold for approximately,
ten times the amount of the annuity, the original capital
would be paid up after 10 years and the holder could then
enjoy some ^0 years of payments resulting in ^00 per cent
profit. When.money was tight in certain years, the cost
of the bond decreased so that the rente sold at 8 or 9 times
the annuity instead of 10 and thus increased the profits
available, Although they never ceased to pay annuities on
the lives designated by the first holder, these bonds could
be easily transferred and were sometimes in hands of another
holder when they ran out. The holdings of the rentes can
be traced annually by the accounts of the city which indicated
to whom the annuity was paid each year.
The second type of rente was the rente her-itiera which
worked the same way as the rente viag^re except that it was
held in perpetuity. It was not based on the lives of desig
nated people, but paid an annuity for its legal holder for
all time to come. It could either be bequeathed to one's
heirs or sold to another family. These rentes heritieres
naturally sold at a higher price relative to the annuity
than the rentes viageres because of their higher value.
They sold at anywhere from 15 to 20 times the annuity, or
at a lower price when investment capital was particularly
scarce.
109.
Valenciennes had utilised both these life bonds and the

hereditary bonds since the l^th century.^ Until the 16th
century* however, when the incessant warfare of the Kapsburg
Valois wars increased the needs for funds, the bond issues
were few and far between. The repetition and frequency of
the aides increased toward the middle of the 16 th century,
culminating in the aide novennale, which continued on a
yearly basis from 1556 to 1562 and then was renewed from
1562 -1568 . Cities had to carry on virtual propaganda
campaigns in order to raise the money in rentes during the
1 5 5 0 's and l$6oTs when there was a drying up of investment
capital; there arose a competition betwreen various bond issues

floated by cities and other authorities.^ In Valenciennes
^The rente method cf collection of the aide was also used

on the county level from the l^th century on; the system was
overseen by the Receveur de Kainaut. On the county level
the rente heritieredid not make its appearance until the 16 th
century financial crises, but in Valenciennes the rente heri-
tiere had been used since 1321. See IvI.A. Arnould, Les rentes
d’etat en Hainaut au XVIe et au XVIIe siecle (extract Annales
du cercle areheologique de Soignies, Vol. VIII, 2, pp. 16^-
182; and M3V, ms. 110.7^1 , fo. 122.
2
The government of Charles V had attempted to centralize the
system of taxation in the 1 5 3 0 's by substituting direct taxes
for the old aide, but he failed because of the opposition of
the bonnes villes in the States—General. Nevertheless, he was
mranted an extraordinary levy of 10 per cent onreal property,
itself•-an innovation; 1 Philip in' 1556 and 1553 tried* to ob
tain a direct tax of one per cent on all property, but the
States-General would only settle for an aide running on a
yearly basis, i.e., the so-called aide novennale. A perman
ent direct tax was not established until the time of Alva.
See Arnould, L'impqt sur le capital en Belgique au XVIe
siecle (lions, 19 ^-6 ), pp. 2 3 -2 5 .
^During the last stages cf the Hapsburg-Valois wars in 1553-
1555 there was a shortage cf investment capital in the ravaged
county of Hainaut; cities complained of the tactics of the
receveur de Hainaut in the sale of his county, level rentes—
No
.
110
there were bond issues by the municipality for the years
1552i 155^. 1556, and -T559.* f

^ e tightness of money .is
indicated by the price of the hereditary rentes which reached
a low of 1 6 , 1 ^, and even 12 times their annuity.'1'
Now, where did the money come from to pay the yearly
annuities on the municipal rentes? The letters of the princes
authorizing the Hagistrat to float rentes. also authorized
the collection of taxes to pay for the rentes* annuities.-
These were indirect taxes, i.e., taxes on wine, beer, wheat,
and cloths sold in the city. 2 Although each initial aide to
the king was a set sum for one year only the annuities on
hereditary and life bonds continued on the accounts of the
city year after year. With each successive aide, the burden
of annuity payments rose and so did the tax burden on Valen
ciennes. In the late 15 th century sales taxes already ex
isted on wheat, cloths,,salt, herrings, wool, and wine.
As the frequency of the aides increased in the 1550's, the
municipality had to find new revenues to pay for the in
creased load of annuities. The prince authorized the addi
tion of certain commodities to the lists of taxable items,
specifically his advertising by billets on the doors of

churches and on the gates of cities. Arnould, Les rentes
d*etat en Hainaut, p. 9. The financial crisis also led the
government to decree all local lotteries void in favor of
a centralized government lottery. Bigwood, Une loterie
patriotique au XVIe siecle (3russels, 1 9 0 7 ), pp. 6-10.
Hi3V, ms. no. 7hl, pp. 185-193. After 1559 there was not
another rente issue until 159 5 * while there had been issues
in 18 different years for the beginning part of the century
up until 1559 *
o
The first mention of the "maltote au vin" to pay for the an
nuities on rentes came in 133^. MBV, ms. no. 7^1* p. 123.
*i€
. .
111
namely sayes, and dyes in 15 50 . and a tax on new bourgeois
in 155ô1 The expedient of increasing the tax on wine was
also used. The wine tax rose from 18 deniers on each lot of
wine in 1555 to 20 per cent of the price of each lot of wine'
in 156^. The Magistrat was reliant on the prince to renew
the letters authorizing the sales taxes each time they ran
out and the prince was reliant on the Magistrat as the
curator of the rentes.
The accounts of the treasurers or massards of Valen
ciennes contain records of the bond sales, the annuities and
receipts in tax monies.^ These accounts show that nearly
all of the tax monies collected in Valenciennes went tc pay
for rente annuities. Moreover, they show that nearly all cf
tax monies collected from the indirect taxes authorized by the
•p:nncg: went to pay for annuities. ^ Therecords of the mas-
sards are not enlightening as to themethods ofcollection,
or even the total revenues raised. The records only show
revenues from the sale of tax farms or the price paid by
private individuals who bought the right to collect taxes
for the municipal government. In effect the government did
not even directly oversee the administration of tax collection,
^M3V, ms. no. ?4l, p. 2 1 5 .

2 MBV. ms. no. 7^1t pp. 217-218.
ÂCV, Series CC, the com-ptes des massards are extant for the
years 1538-1539, 155^-1555, and 1565 -1 5 6 6 .
^55»°76 livres tournois out of a total budget of 6 7 ,3 2 3
livres went to pay rente annuities in 1565-1566. ACV, Series
CC, com-ptes des massards, 1565 -1566 .
ta -
112 .
"but sold this right at auction.'' for a sum considerably
lower than the amount of tax revenues collected. The dif
ference went to the buyer of the farm to pay for his col
lection organization and to provide him with a profit. The
records indicate that consortiums of tax collectors bought
the rights to a particular item which was to be taxed; these
men undoubtedly hired personnel who worked as contractors
in the markets, halles and cabarets of the city. Of the
various tax farms sold the most expensive were those on the
major tax items of beer, wine, save cloth, and wheat, in
that order. The records show the taxes on beer and wine to
PRIC5S 0? TAX FARMS ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS IN LIVR3S TOURNOIS1

1533-1539 155^-1555 1565-1566
Beer 35,552 60,740 35,038
Wine 19,311 2^,557 32,577
Sayes 1 2 ,1 2 5 9,530 9,169
Wheat 3.927 4,797 780 •
be the most irarjortant sources of revenue among these top

farms, accounting from !?8 per cent to 87 per cent of the
total in any one year.
ACV, Series CC, comntes des massards, 1538-1539* 1554-1555*

and 1565-1566, These prices fluctuated according to the ex
pected returns, and they were adjusted every six months. The
figures apply to the sales of offices running for six month
periods on each farmed tax. Some suppositions of the dif
ferences in price can be made; First, more beer was drunk
in 1554-1555 than wine because the war in those years cut
the wine trade routes with France. The price of the wine
farm steadily increased because this was the item increasingly
taxed with higher ratos in order to find revenues for the new
rente sales. The decline in the price of the farm on sayes
probably results from a decline in the cloth industry in the
early 1550‘s. Last, the low price of the wheat farm for 1565 -
1566 was a result of the subsistence crisis during the winter
of that year.
113.
Now we can ask the following questionsi Which social

group benefited from the tax-rente system by virtue-of re
ceiving the annuities? What social groups had to carry the
burden of the system by paying the municipal taxes? And
finally what were the political consequences of the system?
To provide information in answer to these questions we
have the rente registers for Valenciennes for the 16th cen
tury. In them we can see who owned the bonds and obtained
profits from them.'*' Each register of accounts reports the
annuity paid to the holders of bonds on the aides, for each
particular year. The registers contain over 1550 separate
rente holdings indicating a large number of rentiers. There
were not that many, however, as most renlaers held several
issues and collected more'than one annuity per year. There
was some transfer of rente holdings from year to year, but
the majority of the Valenciennes' bonds seemed to have been
HOLDERS 0? RENTES WITH ANNUITIES OF stable in the invest
OVER 300 LIVRES PER YEAR FOR THE
YEAR 1565-15o62__________________ ments of the Ichevinale
Grebert 1325
Hotel Dieu 1167 families, certain chari
De la Fontaine dit Wicart 871
Eglise de Beaumont 844 table institutions, and
Maison des povres orphelins 760
Quaroble 665 a few select religious
Godin 636
Le Mesureur 600 houses.
Vivien 578
Resteau
D'Oultreman 566 ~*~ADN, Series 3, ms. nos.
Le Poivre 495 12881-13044; and ACV,
Escolle St. Jehan 425 Series CC, ms. no. I,
De Bouzenton 420 146.
Desmaisieres 399 p
General Aurnosne 339 ACV, Series C, ms. no.
Despretz 36°, I, 146; and ADK, Seres
Abbaye de Fontenelles 34 6 B, ms. no. 12931.
Rasoir 340
Losrier 315
114.
Taking the echevinale families first, we see that the

seven top. families which served the most times in the fllagis-
trat during the l6th century all received over 300 livres
per annum in annuities. The Greberts who. served as echevins
23 times received 1325 livres per annum, the De la Fontaine
dit Wicarts served 22 times and received 8?1 livres, and the
Le Keseureurs who served 24 times received 600 livres. Such
families not only received their political authority as
bureaucratic jurists in the Magistrat from the prince, but
they were also the recipients in a financial system depen
dent on letters of authorization from the crown for the col
lection of taxes. The echevinale families, therefore, had an
added reason why they should remain loyal to their prince.
The faineant echevinale families probably bought rentes
as a source of income because they were less inclined to
enter trade and industry; they were ancient and proud families
who had intermarried with the nobility for generations and ac
quired their disdain for investment in trade. They obtained
revenues as the councillors on provincial courts, as officers
of the prince, and as owners of seigneuries and rentes.
The four charitable institutions which served the community
of Valenciennes held considerable numbers of bonds. The Hotel
Dieu, serving the sick, received the most money in annuities
with 1167 livres, the Maison des oauvres orohelins received
760 livres, the Escolle de Saint Jehan received 425 livres. and
the Generate Ausmosne received 3 8 9 . These institutions were

provided for by the wealthy merchants, the echevinale families,
and other lesser bourgeois. This was only natural, as these
115.
institutions supported the health and welfare of the indige

nous citizens and inhabitants of Valenciennes. In an era when
government did not conceive of its duties a!s much more than
making war, keeping internal lav; and order, and making money,
it was up to the citizens of localities to support the bodies
working for health, education, and charity.
With a few exceptions the religious institutions of
trhe area did not own many rentes. First, the three great
Flemish abbeys, some 10 to 20 kilometers to the west of Valen
ciennes, St. Amand, Marchiennes, and Vicogne were not holders
of Valenciennes rentes. These were three of the richest
abbeys of the area, but in lands rather than in rentes.
Secondly, the parish churches, the two abbots of Valenciennes,
and most of the religious orders were not holders of bonds,
or they were holders of relatively' insignificant amounts— the
revenue they received was under 100 livres per year. Only
two religious institutions received over 300 livres in rente
annuities per year, namely the Fglise de Beaumont and the
Abbeye de Fontenelles which received 844 livres and 3^6
livres respectively. These institutions received large
sums probably because they served the wealthy citizens of
Valenciennes. It was to these abbeys for unmarried women
that the echevinale families and regional nobility sent many
of their female relatives.
While the Echevinale families, the charitable institu
tions, and the religious houses all received annuities from
rentes, there was a noticeable lack of listings among the
principal merchants of the city. Because of the enormous sums
.
116
raised from the confiscation of property belonging to these
merchants in 1566 -1567 , we know they were very rich.'1' Yet,
these merchants in Valenciennes had only small or insignifi
cant rente holdings. Michel Herlin received only 20 livres
in rentes, and the only other time he. purchased rentes was
as a gift, for the General Aumosne and not for his own profit.3
■The LeEoucqs, so influential in the cultural life and as
military leaders, but not accepted in the Magistrat because
of their merchant occupations, received only a total of 40
4
livres per annum in rente annuities. The DeLattre, a mer
chant family who appeared in theMagistrat lists 9 times,
received 55 livres;-* the Caignoncies who were another well-
known merchant family in Valenciennes and who served.on the
Magistrat 10 times received ?0 livres;** the De Flecquieres
who did not serve on the Magistrat at all but who were
wealthy merchants received only 143 livres.? One exception
■’■ABN, Series 3, ms. nos. 3617, 3624, 7017. 12623, 12665-12669,

12696 -1 2707 , 12744-12746, 12794, and 12799.
2ACV, Series CC, ms. no. I, 146, fo. 115.

ÂCV, Series CC, ms. no. I, 146, ff.28-28vo. These were life
rentes bought on lives of his 8-year-old son, Jehan and on the
daughter of Vincent Resteau, the saye merchant.
4
Noel LeBoucq, the municipal commissioner of artillery and
literateur received 25 livres. ADN. Series B, ms. 12981, fo.
2 5 . Tassin LeBoucq, the saye merchant, received 15 livres per
annum, ACV, Series CC, ms. no. I, 146, fo. 1?1.
ÂCY, Series CC, ms. no. I, 146, fo. 223vo; ADN, Series B, ms.
no. 12981, fo. 21,
**ACY. Series CC, ms. no. I, 146, fo. 70vo; ADN, Series B,
ms. no. 12981, ff. 21vo, 22vo.
1ACV, Series CC, ms. no. I, 146, fo. 28vo; ADN, Series B,
ms. 12981, ff. 7 , 10.
,'V /
117.
was the. massard Vincent Resteau who traded in saye cloths.

He was one of the two administrators of.the rentes, and he
personally received 141 livres, while his family received
575 livres altogether.1
Why did the merchants put their money into trade, in
dustry, and landholdings instead of into rentes? Certainly
there was no bar to their buying rentes for the central govern
ment and the municipality encouraged anyone to buy them when
money was tight in the 1550's and 1560's. The wealthy and
active merchants were evidently more inclined to invest in
enterprises which would give them a better return on their
money. The annuities in the rentes were lucrative, but they
were fixed and thus subject to devaluation. Investments in
trade were more risky but brought higher profits, and they
9
could oe increased to keep up with the inflationary economy."
The merchants, moreover, may have boycotted the rentes
because they found the taxes which paid for the annuities in
jurious to their businesses. The taxes on shipments of wool
and finished saye cloths which passed through the halles of
Valenciennes probably cut into the profits of merchants and
perhaps forced them to sell products at a higher price. The
taxes on some products resulted in remonstrances of the mas
ters and the merchants; for example, the new tax on the dye
1?or Vincent Resteau, see ACV, Series CC, ms. no. I, 146, ff..
48, llOvo, and 130. For the rest of his family, see ff. 87vo,
and ADN. Series B, ms. no. 12981, ff, lOvo, 12vo, 14, I9vo, '
and 20vo.
2Unfortunately» we do not have the accounts from businesses
of the trading families.
m
118.
weddes in 1551 was scored by the merchant community in a

letter to the central government in 1560.1 Wine merchants
like Michel Herlin could have been especially adverse to in
vestment in rentes because of the taxes on wine shipments
passing through the halles of Valenciennes. We have evidence
to suggest that wine merchants v/ere in fact trying to avoid
paying the wine tax. In 155^ an edict of the Brussels govern
ment specified the routes and procedures which shipments of
wine from Burgundy had to take so that the tax farmers could
collect their monies; the edict complained that these taxes
2
were being avoided. Perhaps the opposition to taxes among
the merchants and bourgeois made them view the profits ob
tained from rentes with disfavor; perhaps they refused to
take profits which were detrimental to their primary interests
of trade and industry.
The indirect taxes were also injurious to the cabare-
. teurs and middle men who sold wine and beer. The Valenciennes
cabareteurs remonstrated to the emperor against the tax in
15^1 claiming that it was injurious to their business. Arti
sans and workingmen v/ere boycotting taverns inside the city
in favor cf ones in the villages of Anzin, Marly, and St.
Saulye which were not obligated to collect the tax.^
^MBV, ms, no. 7^1, p. 2*l4»

2 •
ACV, Series AA, ms. no. 98, ff. 22-22vo.

V, ms. no. 7*M, p. 2*j4.
in
119.
The artisan-worker population of the city were forced

to pay these taxes. Other beverages could not he utilized
because of their unavailability or health hazards, while
the Magistrat prosecuted people with fines if they were
caught going outside the walls of the city to drink in
cabarets where the beer and wine taxes were not collected.
• In some years there would be over 10 arrests for this prac
tice, as in 1 5 ^ 7 » 1552» 1559 » and 156 0 , and in other years
none at all. The occupations of these tax evaders were from
the lower income groups, i.e.* saye weavers, fullers, cur-
fiers, linen weavers, and wagoners.-*- It is well-known that
indirect taxes on necessities are inequitable as they fall
on the genei-al population and prove most onerous to the poor;
from the indications of .the occupations of tax evaders, it
seems this was also the case at Valenciennes.
In sum, as a source of irritation and tension within
Valenciennes the tax system must have been quite near the
top. It tended to divide the community along lines a.lready
established by the political structures. The merchant com
munity and the rank and file artisan-workers owned few
rentes but they had to pay for the annuities. The merchants
complained when their products were subject to increased
taxation during the 1550*s. The artisan-workers, perhaps
less conscious of the structure of the system, tried to
avoid the effects of the beer and wine taxes on their pocket-
books and risked fines to drink outside the city.• Meanwhile,
'^See KEY, ms. no. 700, fo. $6; and ms. no. ?02, fo. 117°
fl*.
.
120
the echevinale families and a few religious institutions re
ceived the rewards of the system along with the central
government. One can go so far as to say that the financial
administration of Valenciennes shows the town magistrates to
.be a sort of corporation of rentiers monopolising the tax
system for the profit of the echevinale families.
6. Relations with central authority
The political and economic differences between the

echevinale families and the merchant-bourgeois did not nor
mally become manifest. In fact when it came to protecting
the city's particularism from the encroachments of central
authority, both groups united to defend the privileges and
rights of Valenciennes. After all, the echevinale families
had just as much to lose as the merchants if these privi
leges were lost; without Valenciennes immunities and govern
ment prerogatives the echevinale families would have no
monopoly of jurisdiction and authority. Therefore, the
echevinale families had customarily acted as professional
representatives of the city's interests in disputes with
the Brussels government.
In the Middle Ages the Magistral of Valenciennes had
been a powerful body vis a vis the nobility and the prince.
Its jurisdictional competence established by the charter of
10.^ allowed it to judge nobility living in or visiting
Valenciennes. In fact, article 13 of the charter of 111^
stated that the echevinale justice would apply to the count
.
121
of Hainaut himself if he broke -the peace.3' It was upon this
charter that claims to jurisdictional independence were made
in succeeding; centuries. These jurisdictional claims did
not remain mere theories during the Middle Ages as there were
cases of crimes against bourgeois of Valenciennes by seigneurs
and officers of the prince whovere fined by the Magistrat.
In the l^th century, for example, an officer of the count
of Hainaut was fined because he had confiscated money of a
bourgeois,at Wasmes. Among other numerous examples was the
prosecution of an official because he had taxed a bargeois
o
at a bridge near Fresnes. In 1393 the Dame de Werchin was
also fined for allowing a murder of a bourgeois on her land.^
In the 15 th century the counts of Hainaut became strong
enough to challenge the jurisdictional autonomy of Valen
ciennes, Philip the Good in 1^4? banned the Magistrat *s
ability to try his officials when they acted in an official
l<.
capacity. This removed Valenciennes’ jurisdiction over the
provot-le-comcte.the governor of Valenciennes, and the grand
bailli of Hainaut. This restriction of Valenciennes' juris
diction set a precedent which would be carried much further
by Philip's successors. The jurisdictional competence of
1
See the text of the charter-de la oaix of 111^ in Faider,
Coutumes du -cays et comte de Hainaut, Vol. III.
2M. Bauchand, La .justice criminelle da Magistrat de Valen
ciennes au Koy'en Age (Paris, lyO^-), ?. .
^Bauchar.d, La justice criminelle, pp. 31-32. It is not true,
however, that the Magistrat always succeeded in punishing
seigneurs.
h y.
Bauchand, La .justice criminelle, p. 3^«
j —
J
!> _
.
122
Valenciennes was again curtailed in 1505 when Maximilian of

Austria created the Grand Council of the Netherlands. This
was a high judicial body similar to the -parlements of France
to which appeals could- be made against regional jurisdictions,1
In 1552 Charies V in order to remedy "the irregularities
and abuses resulting from the diversity of couturaes in the
Netherlands", ordered all- municipalities to assemble copies of
their charters and to submit them to his cousellors for re
view. The response of many cities to this request threatening
their privileges and immunities was to temporize as long as
possible. This was an old tactic used when new or increased
taxes were requested, and it served well in this case too—
up to a point. After a suitable time had elapsed, the Valen
ciennes Magistral asked for clarification of the request,
and upon receiving that clarification from the grand bailli
of Hainaut, the magistrates simply ignored the request al
together. The government was still waiting for copies of
2
the Valenciennes coutumes nine years later in 1531* How
ever, the grand bailli and the central government finally
forced the Magistral *s hand by a combination of cajoling and
threats, and a comprehensive coutume was sent to Brussels in
153 ^ • Tbe 153^ coutume upheld.all the particularistic privi
leges of Valenciennes and was generally a faithful rendering
of the charters on which it was based. It did not contain
•^Cellier, line commune flamande, p. 97*

Cellier, Une commune flamande, pp. 6 5 -66.
123.
extravagent claims of autonomy for the city, probably because

it knew that the emperor would not allow them, but it did
uphold all the privileges and rights appertaining to the
city and its bourgeois.
In spite of its moderate tone, the 153^ coutume helped
to exacerbate the relations between Valenciennes and her
prince. The crisis came over the conflicting jurisdictional
claims of the Magistrat and the royal officer, the prevot-
le-compte. Up until 1531 there had been little trouble be
tween the prevot-le-compte and Valenciennes because of the
customary absenteeism of the royal official which allowed
the Magistrat to nominate the lieutenant who served in his
place. But in 1531 Charles V appointed the count of Boussu,
as prevot-le-compte,' and Boussu refused the city the right to
choose his lieutenant. The Magistrat complained to Charles V
that this was a break with custom, but the emperor upheld
the right of his officer. While the coutume of 153^ had
correctly defined the role of the prevot-le-compte as one
of bringing cases or prosecutions before the Magistrat, the
right of arrest of the forains. mannants, or bourgeois of
Valenciennes had been reserved by the Magistrat for itself
just as it had been since the city’s jurisdiction was estab
lished in 111^.^ The prevot-le-compte or his lieutenant,
in order to arrest anyone inside the walls of Valenciennes,
needed a warrant from the prevot of the Magistrat,— a proce
dure which had not been troublesome when the Magistrat had
•Ârticle 25 of the 153- coutume in Faider, Coutumes du pays

et compte de Hainaut, Vol. Ill, p. 42#.
IZUr,
appointed the acting prosecutor. But since 3oussu had

chimed that right for himself, the Magistrat in retaliation
enforced its own right of requiring warrants to be obtained
before arrests could be made. This was a situation which
Charles V's government found intolerable and which they de
cided to rectify by decree.
In 15^0 Charles' government had a new coutume drawn up,
not by the magistrates, or in cooperation with them, but by
jurists in the central government's Conseil Prive in Brus
sels. This was a radical departure in the jurisdictional
relationships between the city and the central government
as they had existed for centuries. Charters and coutumes
had always been mutual contracts to which both parties had
agreed and which recognized the right of consent by the city.
The closest precedent for Charles' action was the charter of
1302 restricting the magistrates to one year in office, but
that had come after years of warfare between the city and
the count. Charles' coutume of 15^-0 stated that the coutume
of 153 ^ contained certain clauses which were contrary to
the emperor's "superiority and highness".1 The coutume went
on to say
. . . lesdits President, chiefs et gens de
notre prive Conseil, avons, de nostre cer-
taine science, auctorite et plaine puissance
. declaire, ordonne, statue et decrete,
declairons, ordonnons, statuons et d£cretons
par ces presentes que c* ore Savant on gar-
dera, observera et entreienara pour coutumes
^See Faider, Coutumes du -Days et compte ce Hainaut, Vol. II,

pp. vii and k6E~.
*
125.
et usaiges en nostredite ville do Valenciennes,

banlieu, eschevinaige et chieflieu d'icelle,
les points et articles qui s'ensuivent.l
The coutume specified that the imperial officer could hence
forth make arrests of bourgeois, mannants, and forains without
the necessity of approval from the Magistrat.2 This right
of arrest of forains by the central government severely re
stricted the city’s privilege of asylum, as fugitives from
other jurisdictions could thenceforth be arrested by the
•prevot-le-comote. In reality the jurisdictional conflict
did not result in a radical change in favor of the central
official, as the 1540 coutume did not eradicate the right of
the Magistrat to try the persons arrested; cooperation be
tween the •prevot-le-conrpte and the Magi strat was still
necessary in order to sentence a criminal.
The central government explicitly inserted into the
coutume of 1540 the prince's right of lese-majesty. This
notion from Roman lawr was confounded with the sovereign’s
basic right to punish heresy and treason; it had been a
vague notion under the Romansr a.nd the Holy Roman Empire,
and it continued to be ill-defined under Charles V. In the
minds of the jurists of the central government, it was a
higher law than the particularistic coutumes of Valenciennes;
it allowed the sovereign to render null and void all estab
lished procedures in cases of heresy or treason. The charter
^See Faider, Coutumes du pays et connote de Hainaut, Vol. Ill,

p. 466.
Faider, Coutumes du •pays et comnte de Hainaut, Vol. Ill,
p, 46?, articles 5 andTT See Bauchond, La justice criminelle,
p. 5?* for commentary.
126.
of 15^0 stated
Que le prevost, jurez et eschevins de notre

ville de Valenciennes, auront sous notre
main, a- la conjure et semonce de noz of-
ficiers la cognoissance et judicature de
toutes matieres et actions criminelles,
civiles, reeles, personnelles et mixtes,
excepte cas de leze-Majeste divine et
humaine en tous leurs membres, et de noz
officiers et ceux de nos successeurs.l
This was the first time the sovereign's right of lese-majesty
had been mentioned in any of the charters or coutumes of
Valenciennes.
The decade of the 15^0's saw further attempts by the
central government to reduce the jurisdictional privileges
of the city. In 1 5 ^ the prevot-le-compte tried to exercise
the same kind of rights inside the citythat he had in the
prevote of Valenciennes outside the walls of Valenciennes.
Faced with the problem of making arrests without the full
cooperation of the Magistrat, the royal officer proposed
to take charge of the sergeants bastonniers and oversee the
constables in charge of the bourgeois militia. This action
was averted when the Magi strat threatened to put the royal
officer in irons in the burianne.^ In 15^6 a dispute arose
over the positions to be taken by the prev6t-le-compte and
the town officials in the yearly procession of the Sainte
Cordon; Brussels ruled in favor of their officer, and
Faider, Coutumes du pays et compte de Haiaut. Vol. Ill,

coutume of 15^0. It v/as_thrcugh the prince's right of lese-
majesty divine that the oppressive commissioners and garri
son would be introduced into Valenciennes in the early 1 5 6 0 's,
as we shall see.
2
Cellier, Une commune flamar.de, p. loO. Bauchond, La justice
criminelle, pp. 57-5&«
12?.
thenceforth the prevot-le-comote marched, in public parades

between his lieutenant and the nrevot of the Magistrat.
Previously, the municipal prevot had taken the position of
honor in the middle.1
In sum, Valenciennes had an illustrious history which
exhibited a vigorous defense of its particularistic privi
leges. It had taken pride in the exacting way it had pro
tected itself through war,, strategems, •and cajolery. To a
city which continually harked back to the legality of its
contractual agreements, and which protected its particu
larism with the belief that the oldness of its charters was
goodness, the actions of Charles' government in the 15^0's
must have seemed oppressive and a radical change from the
traditional relationship with the prince. Nevertheless,
the situal3on calmed down somewhat in the 1550*s when the
Brussels government was preoccupied with the Hapsburg-ASLois
wars, and had no interest in exacerbating relations with a
border city in a war area. . Further t3sts of strength be
tween the Brussels government and the city did not come until
the period of religious trouble.
7. Conclusions
In 16th century Valenciennes the political insiitutbns
protected the interests of the elites of urban society.
There was a hierarchical structure of political status juxta
posed with the hierarchy in the guilds. For each higher level
^Cellier, Une commune flamande, p. l60. Bauchond, La. justice

criminelle, pp. 57-58*
of status there were increasing advantages both of a poli
tical and economic nature.
At the top ofthe hierarchy were the favorites of the
prince; the echevinale families held a monopoly of authority
in the Magistrat and they obtained the profits of the bond
system. The merchants formed a second layer which had much
de' facto power in the Conseil Particulier; they obtained
wealth from trade and industry and power from control of
the ~bo ur geois militia. The echevinale families and the
merchants were only part of a larger elite, the mass of
bourgeois citizens. The majority of citizens were guild
masters, shopkeepers and lesser proprietors. Since the
Grand Conseil was almost never called the bourgeois had
little political participation except in their roles as
armed militiamen.
At the bottom of the political hierarchy were the mass
of non-citizens which made up the majority of the population.
Hannants were resident journeymen and laborers who, if nothing
else, enjoyed the security of the walls. The forains were
the lowest level of exploited workers: they were either resi
dents who had lived in the city less than one year or week-
worker peasants from the rural areas who sold their labor at
subsistence wages to the master and merchant elite. The non
citizens, both mannant and forain, had no political authority
or' power as they were unrepresented and unarmed. Moreover,
they not only supported the industrial elite with their labor,
but also paid for the prince's wars and the echevinale fami
lies' annuity incomes through the bond system supported by
indirect taxes.
These clashes of group interest caused tensions. We
have seen the merchants and the masters complaining of the
increased tax loads on their products, and we have seen at
tempts by the lower worker-artisan populations to avoid
paying beer and wine taxes-. We have seen some of- the most
wealthy men of the city excluded from office in the Magis- •
trat because of their merchant backgrounds; similarly,
mannants were excluded from bourgeois status because of their
lack of basic social requirements. The tensions between the
echevinale families and the merchant-bourgeois had resulted
in the charter of 1^97 which established the Conseil Particu-
lier as a body allowing for some control over the upper elite.
For the most part, the echevinale families and the mer-
chant-bourgeois cooperated to secure Valenciennes from the
threat of social disorder by the unprivileged. The systems
of charity and law enforcement favored the elites, the
propertied, and the employed. The charity and the law en
forcement systems combined to exclude behind the walls the
dangerous jobless vagrants which infested the rural areas.
The tightly controlled enforcement system did not allow the
lower artisan-workers to express social discontent; the
echevinale families and the merchants diffused the potentially
riotous periods of unemployment and subsistence crisis by
supplying work on public projects, and by an oppressive
system of punishment and social exclusion. A high degree
of social control was achieved by this management
130
.
130
of the elites which contrasts markedly with the social
anarchy in unwalled industrial areas like Hondschoote.
In normal times the Echevinale families cooperated with
the merchant-bourgeois in' protecting the city's age-old
particularistic jurisdictions and immunities from the en
croachment by the prince. The. Echevinale families had diffi
cult roles to play because they had to take heed of essen
tially conflicting interest groups. In order to prote.ct
their monopoly of authority they had to cooperate with the
prince' who appointed them to office, but in order to retain
effective control inside Valenciennes they had to cooperate
with the merchants who upheld their positions with the power
of the militia forces. As jurists they were particularly
suited to act as mediators and crisis managers of the dis
putes between the prince and the particularism of the city.
As we shall see, the echevinale families and the:-merchant-
bourgeois would continue to act to protect Valenciennes'
political integrity untilihe height of the religious
troubles. At that time, however, the Echevinale families
would no longer be able to reconcile their conflicting
interests and would opt to join with the prince.
»V f
131.
CHAPTER THREE: RELIGION AND SOCIETY
In order to understand the Calvinist movement and its
correlation with social groups in Valenciennes, it is neces
sary to investigate the city's religious, social, and cul
tural institutions. The day to day workings of the Catholic
Church, the social life of the worker-artisans, and the
culture of the elites can he probed to discover the func
tions of religion within the city. The need is to ascer
tain what social groups the religious institutions served,
how effectively they functioned in the 16th century, and
what tensions existed because of them. This chapter will
try to indicate that institutional abuses and inefficiency
and the clash of group interests were some of the reasons
which led to the active participation of members of the
me rchant-bo urge ois community in the Calvinist movement.
1. The Catholic Church
What was the state of the Catholic Church in Valenci
ennes in the mid-l6th century? How did it function on the
parish level and what was its organizational structure?
We know of the religious life on the parish level from
an investigation of the subject made by the diocese of Arras
in 1555* The chapter of Arras under the auxiliary bishop
Richardot held a council on February 13, 1555 at which they
cited the poor state of religious observance in the diocese
of Arras and called for a report on its causes on the parish
level. The investigation was not to be left to local curates
132.
who were '6ften simple", but was to be done by a group of

ecclesiastics from the offices of the bishop, including
several theological doctors. Their completed report stated
that of all the cities and towns in the diocese, Valenciennes
was the most seriously infected with disrespect for the
church.^
The report of 1555 found that the sacraments of the
Eucharist and confession were not observed- by many in Valen
ciennes. The host was not held in reverence when it was
carried around the city in processions, and it was evidently
not held in reverence at Mass as attendance was low, irregu
lar, and many did not come at all. There were continual
irreverences during the Eucharist that produced a carnival
like atmosphere, the congregation many times crowding around
the priest instead of remaining in their seats and coming
up in an orderly manner to take their turns as participants.
Much of the blame was put on the untrained and undisciplined
curates; the decretals of the Council of Trent called for
solemnity and simple dignity in performing the sacrament.
There was a need for standardized times when the Eucharist
was to be given, instead of too few or too many celebrations.
Another complication was a local myth existant since the
Middle Ages that one had only to see the host to be preserved
from all evil. This resulted in the flock leaving after the
elevation of the host and in only a partial celebration of
the Lord's Supper.
^See P. Beuzart, ed., "La Reforme dans le diocese a'Arras en

1555 d'apres un document inedit," 3SKPH, Vol. LXXVII (1927)*
pp. 468-^76.
133.
Aversion to confession was well documented in the
report t
Item, beaucoup de gens ne font cas ny es-

time du sacrement depenitence, et sy d'aven-
ture par simulation ils vont a la confesse,
ilz viennent la veille et jour de Pasques
avecq grand irreverence.
Even pregnant women or
les femmes enchaintes eminentes partues ne

font plus de debvoir d'aller a la confesse
et recepvoir le sacrament de I'autel comme
du passe.
The unpopularity of confession resulted from the abuses of
the ©.crament by untrained stand-in priests who many times
were indiscreet, charged for their services, or recommended
the wrong kind of penitence.
According to the report, another sacrament which was
being ignored in Valenciennes was that of marriage. There
were few cases of unmarried persons among the Echevinale
or wealthy Calvinist families, and so the mass of cohabiting
unmarried persons must have been among the. lower levels of
society, the week-workers, mannants, and forains. Perhaps
they were too poor to support a family or to pay the marriage
fees; many who lived on subsistence incomes probably did not
want to be burdened by wives and children.
In Valenciennes we have a number of specific examples
of disrespect toward ecclesiastics, toward the sacraments,
and even a few cases of disruption of church services. The
^Beuzart, "La Reforme", p. ^7^.
2Beuzart, "La Reforme", p. ^75*
criminal registers indicate that in 1549 one Sstienne de
Lannoy, a fine cloth weaver, swore at his parish curates and
proferred "villainous sentiments" against the Holy Mother
Church*1 In 1564 one Jehan Hiette, a tanner, was convicted
of having blasphemed against the Miass, the saints, and the
p
ordinances of the church.- Then there were cases involving
non-attendance at Mass or at confession which were sometimes
prosecuted by the Magistrat. For example, in 1564 the wife
of Tliery Le Josne was convicted of the crime of never going
to church, while Charles Couveur, a save weaver, and his
wife were convicted of not going to confession.^ Finally,
there was the case of Eustace, a save weaver, who was birched
and banished for heckling the curate during a high.' liass in
St. Nicolas parish.^
In actuality this kind of confusion and disrepair on
the parish level had been going on. perhaps for centuries.
It resulted from institutionalized abuses and the fragmented
hierarchy of the Catholic Church: Valenciennes had seven
parishes, four of which were on the left bank of the river
that divided the city and three on the right bank. The
parishes on the left bank were in the gift of the local
1MBV, ms. no. 700 , ff. 124-124vo.
2 mbv, ms. no. 703, fo. 1 3 0 .
3 mbv, ms. no. 703, fo. 133.
^MBV, ms. no. 703, fo. 1 6 6 .

^MBV, 'ms. no. 703. fo. l6vc.
135.
abbot of Hasnon while those on the right- bank were in the

gift of the rival abbot of St. Jean. These local abbots
acted independently of their bishops of Arras and Cambrai
whose dioceses included the left and right banks respectively.
In the Catholic Church it was not unusual for the regular
•clergy of local abbeys to have in their gift the benefices
of the secular clergy in the parishes. In Valenciennes the
abbots of Hasnon and St. Jean obtained this right from
charters dating back to the Middle Ages.^
The oldest, the largest, and the most prestigious
parish church of Valenciennes, that of Notre-Dame-La-rGrande
built in 1086, was left by a charter of Count Baulduin of
Hainaut to the abbot of Hasnon with all property and privi
leges appertaining in the 11th century. The privileges of
Notre-Dame-La-Grande included the right to collect charges
for baptism made in the churches of all the other parishes
and the right to appoint the curates of the parish churches
of St. Vaast and St. Jacques in Valenciennes and the church
in the suburb of Anzin, two kilometers to the northwest of
Valenciennes. Thus, in all, there were four parish curates
in the gift of the abbot of Hasnon in and around Valenciennes.
On the other side of the river, the magnificent chapel
of the 3enedictine abbey of St. Jean was the principal
parish church. The abbot of St. Jean had obtained the gift
^De Moreau, Histoire de l'Bglise en Belgique (Brussels, 1952),

Vol. V, p. 57.
2 ^
Simon LeBoucq, Histc.i re ecclesiastinue de la ville et comt?te
de Valentienne (Val-enciennes, 1844), pp. 21-22.
136.
of the parish in the 12 th century by a charter granted by

thie bishop of Cambrai. Although the abbot of St. Jean did
not seem to have a specific right granted by charter to ap
point the curates of the other parishes on the right bank*
he nevertheless did so. Moreover, he had collation of cer
tain independent chapels, notably those of St. Elizabeth,
St. Martin, St. Augustine, St. Marie, and that of All Saints. 1
The parish curates appointed by the abbots were more
often than not absentees. Some of the absentees were uni
versity students who used part of their fees for expenses;
some were relatives, friends or allies of the abbots who were
untrained as priests. The places of these absentees were
taken by vice-curates who formed a second layer of appointees;
they came from the religious houses of mendicant friars es
tablished in Valenciennes. The abbot of St. Jean appointed
Dominicans to his parishes while the abbot of Hasnon desig-
2
nated rival.Franciscans and Carmelite friars as vice-curatest
These regular clergy made poor substitute curates as
they were often untrained in the administration of the sacra
ments and in the duties of the office of priest. No one on
the diocesan level examined either the curates or the vice
curates before their admission to their benefices and visi
tations hardly ever occurred before the late 1560’s. Drunken
ness v gambling, and licentiousness were common among the
êBouca, Histoire ecclesiastiaue, pp. 31 -3 7 .

^LeBoucq, Histoire ecclesiastique, pp. 83-3^ and 9^.
137.
curates of Valenciennes before the enforcement of the de

cretals of the Council of Trent. Acceptance of dinner in
vitations and living with women were considered endemic
problems at the time. Sermons were many times incomprehen
sible or irrelevant to the needs of the community. When
the decretals of Trent were beginning to be enforced in
Valenciennes during the late 1560*s and early 1570's one
of the first policies was to suggest reading matter and
titles of books useful in sermons. Attempts were made to
do away with the irre.verant atmosphere inside the church.
Curates were instructed to ban animals and to prevent people
from walking around or through the church, or laughing,
shouting, or quarreling during ceremonies.^
Who were the abbots and what was the extent of their
power in Valenciennes? The abbey of Hasnon was situated on
the Scarpe River, some 12 kilometers to the west-north-west
of the city. It was the richest and most prestigious abbey
in Hainaut, being the chief representative of the clergy
in the provincial estates. Its domain lands included rural
sections of Hainaut and the Tournaisis, i.e. the villages
of Millonfosses, Bousignies, and the seigneurie of Aulbalde.
Its wealth was not as great as the Flemish abbey of Marchi-
ennes, some eight kilometers across the border and up the
river, but it was greater than the wealth of the abbeys.of
Vicogne and St. Amand, some 10 kilometers down the river.
In the l6th century the abbey was held by regional nobility
^Beuzart, "La Refcrme," p. ^75s HTP.V, Vol. II, Resolution of

the Conseil d'5tat. 3 January 15^2, pp. 310-313? and De Moreau,
Histoire de I'Sglise en Belgique, vol. V, pp. 58-59.
.
138
and various Echevinale families, including Jacques de
Lattre in:the 15^0's.^
The abbey of St. Jean housed the Benedictine order and
was situated inside the walls of Valenciennes. Less wealthy
than Hasnon, the abbey of St. Jean had to rely on its indus
tries and properties within the walls of the city for its
revenues. These properties included a brewery run by the
brothers and several chapels which were rented to the guilds.
The abbey owned rentes bringing in annuities totaling 50
livres per year. They obtained other revenues by charging
admission fees for the viewing of hundreds of sacred relics
they owned; these included mementos of St. Peter, St. Julien,
St. Rufus, and a highly prized finger joint of St. John the
Baptist. The abbot's appointment had been a matter of dis
pute throughout the centuries and the 16 th century was no
exception. In 152^ Guillaume Bracquewas elected as abbot
of St. Jean by the pope. Thereafter, the papacy had been
forced to give the power of election to the benefice to
Charles V. Upon the death of Bracque, Charles elected Nico
las de la Croix. Both the Bracques and the De la Croix
were Echevinale families of Valenciennes.^
The abbots of Hasnon and of St. Jean held several im
portant economic and political privileges in the city. In
the 13 th century they had received the right to be present
Jules Dewez, Histoire de l'abbaye de St. Pierre d'Hasnon *

(Lille, 1890), pp. 207-208 and 215-219.
2 **
LeBcucq, Histoire ecclesiasticue. pp. 31-35*
. 139.
at the renewal of the Magistrat. This yearly ceremony took

place in the conventual room of the abbey of St. Jean where
the magistrate appointees were required to swear their oaths
of office on the abbey's relics. Both abbots also had the
right to be in attendance during the audit of the municipal
accounts at which the abbots had a voice after the prince's
officer. These rights continued well into the 17th century.3'
The most important political privilege of the abbot
of St. Jean was that of jurisdiction in a neighborhood of
the city called the tasnerie; this was the only separate juris-
diction allowed in Valenciennes besides that of the Magis-
trat. The tasnerie was a seigne/ury • which had been given to
the abbey by a wealthy patron in 1 2 3 9 ? at that time the
tasnerie had been located in the village of the Espais,
but by the 16 th century it was included within the walls of
the city. The tasnerie retained jurisdiction in middle and
lower justice, that is in civil cases within its area at the
north end of Valenciennes. It had a mayeur and seven echevins
of its own, all chosen by the abbot, of St. Jean. The abbot
of St. Jean also had many privileges inside the city which
traditionally belonged to the clergy. He was allowed a per
manent seat -on the commission in charge of the Hotel Dieu
even after the 1530 reforms in charity, and he held the
droit d'escollatrie which prevented anyone from establishing
a school without his permission, and enabled him to collect
^LeBoucq, Histoire ecclesiastique, pp. 27 and ^0-4-1.
^.
1 0
payments from each pupil taught in Valenciennes* schools.1

The rival abbot of Hasnon held exclusive privileges of
his own. He held the only right of taxation in the city be
sides that of the municipality. He was granted a charter in
the Middle Ages to collect a tax called le gambage on drinks
in all the cabarets, taverns, and public houses in his parishes '
on the left bank. How much was collected from this tax, or
how systematically it was collected is unknown, but if it
was still collected in the 16th century, it must, have con
flicted with the city's beer and wine taxes. The abbot also
had exclusive rights of foraging in stretches of the land
around the city? these rights had belonged to the church of
2
Notre-Dame-La-Grande since the 11th century.
The abbots of St. Jean and Hasnon had a great deal of
influence among the religious orders in Valenciennes because
of their rights of patronage in the parishes, in the schools,
and in such institutions as the Hotel Dieu. Y/henever an
order or an ecclesiastic wanted to establish and build a
religious house or chapel in Valenciennes, they had to obtain
the abbot's permission. The male and female Carmelites and
Franciscans had their houses on the left bank in the terri
tory of Hasnon while the male and female Dominicans lived on
the right bank in the bailiwick of St. Jean. Most of these
mendicant orders were in bad financial straits at mid-century
êBoucq, Histoire1ecclesiastique, pp. ^0-^1.

^LeBoucq, Histoire ecclesiastique. p. 27.
141 .
and had to rely on the perquisites of parish offices or
charitable institutions in order to survive. Although they
were permitted to beg after the charity reforms of 1530 » rev
enues from this source were evidently insufficient for the
orders* needs. In 1552, fbr example, the male Dominicans
who lived in the old abbey of St, Pol were forced to sell
some of their relics, while in 1560 they had to obtain a
loan from the municipal treasury of 250 livres tournois.
The female Dominicans, however, had considerable incomes
from rentes which were given by Echevinale families who had
their daughters in the order; the female Dominicans also
possessed many relics in their Eglise de Beaumont from which
they obtained revenues.1
The local bishops of Arras and Cambrai had little con
trol over religious life in Valenciennes. Since the abbots
had the gifts of the parishes, and since the abbots were
elected by first the pope and then by the sovereign prince,
the bishops had little patronage in the city. Also, Valen
ciennes was on the jurisdictional dividing line of the
dioceses of Arras and Cambrai; this made the city an area over
which the rival bishops contested. This fragmentation of
the Catholic hierarchy produced advantages for the munici
pality. The Magistrat had been able to resist the juris
dictional claims of the bishops' ecclesiastical courts by
playing off one bishop against the other. Moreover, until
êBoucq, Histoire ecclesiastic!ue. pp. 10-12, 19-27, 83 -87 ,

and 89-93.
142.
the reorganization-of the Netherlands* bishoprics in 1559,

the bishops of.Arras and Cambrai were frequently absentees?
for example, the bishop of Arras during the 1550*s was An
toine Pernanot, the chief counsellor of the regent in Brus
sels and he never sat in his diocese in any of the years he
held it.1 -
In sum, the fragmented hierarchy of the Catholic Church
and the lack of conscientious interest by both bishops and
abbots led to confusion and disruption on the parish level.
Before the Tridentine reforms, the Valenciennes religious
institutions were dominated by a pair of rival abbots. In
side the city they held important political privileges and
jurisdictions which were second only to those of the Magistrat.
They divided the city's parishes between them and controlled
the city's schools besides having influence in the Hfrtel Dieu.
Their chartered privileges and their system of patronage
enabled the abbots to assimilate other religious orders into
their spheres of influence and to dispense with benefices
without any diocesan control. To a large extent, the Catholic
Church at Valenciennes functioned to provide livings for
members of the nobility and the Echevinale families who
filled the positions in the abbeys and religious orders.
The merchants, the bourgeois and the inhabitants of
Valenciennes were excluded from any control of the city's
religious institutions, and they had no way of correcting
abuses and corruption in the parishes. The system functioned
1De Moreau, Histoire de I'Sglise en Belgique, pp. 57 and 420;

and HTRV, Vol. II, pp. 371-390.
3A3.
so inefficiently that laymen boycotted the masses and held

the sacraments in low esteem. Undoubtedly many laymen viewed
the mendicant orders with disfavor in a merchant dominated
society which normally banned the idle.from its walls. The
control of the religious system by the prince and the eche
vinale families corresponded to their control in the poli
tical and tax systems and was undoubtedly another cause for
tensions between the echevinale families and the merchant-
bourgeois. The lack of direction, the ill-defined hierarchi
cal structure, and the ignorant and ill-trained clergy had
existed at Valenciennes for centuries, but it was to come
under increasing attack in the 16 th century during the re
form movement. As we shall see, the Calvinists provided
a moral justification for both reform of the parish churches
and for participation of the merchant-bourgeois in the reli
gious institutions of the city.
2. Aspects of worker-artisan social life

Much of the day to day entertainment of the poorer seg
ments of society came from pastimes which allowed them to
be enjoyed with a minimum of investment after a long day's
work, on Sunday, or on one of the Saints'; days. A principle
entertainment of the lower levels of the population was the
tavern and the cabaret, where they went to drink, to game,
or, as was the case sometimes, to argue and to fight. Each
parish had its taverns and beer halls where inhabitants would
come to entertain themselves with games of dice or bowls. In
the l6th century cabarets like the Lion d'Or in the rue
144.
Tourr^sienne and the Rouge Coeur in the countryside near

Anzin were popular meeting places for workers and artisans
from the cloth industries. These cabarets served as the
living rooms for apprentices, week-workers, and journeymen,
whose abodes were either too small, too crowded, or too
squalid to enjoy.^ The price of the tax farm on beer and
wine indicates that the consumption of these drinks must
have been considerable at Valenciennes. The accounts for
the year 1565-1566 show the price of the farm for beer to
have been 35*038 livres tournois and the price for that of
2
wine to have been 3 2 ,5 7 7 livres tournois.
The cabarets and the streets of the city were the scene
of most of the brawls of the forain week-workers, of journey
men, and of visiting soldiers. The criminal registers do
not always give the location of the crimes of violence but
when they do they indicate that they were in the streets or
in taverns. The violence was almost always among the
lower groups of society and most of the time among members
of a similar occupational groups, i.e. saveteurs would wound
sayeteurs, fullers fullers, etc. A sample of the hundreds
of entries for simple violence would be the following*
"Guillaume le Conte, comber of save cloth, fined for wounding
“Emile Carlier, Les cabarets de Valenciennes et la cave au

vin des messeigneurs de la ville au XVII^ sidole (Valenciennes,
1880). po. 5-71 and A. Van Genneo. Le Eolklore d~e la Flandre
et du Hainaut francais (Paris, 1935), Vol. I, p. 13s •
ÂCV, Series CC, Massard comotes for 1565 -1566 , ff. 21 and 23.
%3V, ms. nos. 700-703, in the sections on fines for wounding
underloix jugees.
1 *5 .
Guillaume Joly, also comber of saye cloth'*1 or "Daniel de la

Vale, saye weaver fined for wounding 3on le Butaine, also
saye weaver."2
A few cases of prostitution were prosecuted among the
lower population in both the cabarets and in private houses.
In 15*9 one Isabelet Beghin was prosecuted for "having suborned
and been the curator of many young girls both married and
unmarried and having taken them to various taverns, cabarets,
and houses where they lived dishonest and scandalous lives,"3
Similarly, the widow Poullalier sustained in her house
*
"young girls leading lascivious and dissolute lives".
There were also cases among the poorer population which indi
cate that a few parents supplemented their incomes by pro
curing for their daughters. A poor locksmith and his wife
.were prosecuted for promoting their daughter's lubricity in
their home,”* while the widow Sebille de le Court prompted
her unmarried daughter to keep company with several men.^
Yearly religious festivals and saints* :days provided
a framework for the entertainment of the worker-artisans.
The most celebrated festival took place annually on the
first nine days of September and was called the holiday of
H>
1KBV, ms. no. 701, 66vo.

O
•
2m b y , ms. no. 701, fo. 67 vo.

3m b v , ms. no. 700 , fo. 126 vo
*
MBV, ms. no. 700, fo. 157vo
%BV, ms. no. 700 , fo. l*7vo
6m b v , ms. no. 701, fo. 112.
146.
the Saint Cordon. It celebrated a legendary visitation by

the Virgin Mary who saved the city from plague in 1008.
On the 8th of September there, was a solemn procession in which
each guild .carried pennants honoring their patron saints,
and in which the religious orders carried their relics. Lay
men would follow, the route of the procession in attitudes
of penitence with bare feet. For the rest of the days of
the festival of Sainte Cordon, there would be merrymaking,
dancing, and drinking; in the daytime large crowds from
neighboring villages and towns would be allowed into the city
to buy from the Valenciennes markets.^-
Such legends based on deliverance from plague or from
war were common in the ^rea of the Scheldt river and in the
north of France. At Tournai there was a similar festival
in mid-September called the kermesse which celebrated a
2 A
miracle of the year 1090. Similar fetes were held in Lille,
Cambrai, and Douai, besides in the smaller towns in the
area. These festivals were carried on partly because of
the belief in the patron's powers of protection, and partly
because they had become institutionalized in a yearly festi
val accompanied by market days.
The period of authorized exuberance and indulgence
before Lent was also celebrated in the area. In Valenciennes
Â. Julien, Histoire et culte de Notre-Dame du Sainte-Cordon.

•patror.ne de la ville de '.hlenciennes (Valenciennes. 1836);
LI. Bauchond, Menoire de la •procession de la ville de Valen
ciennes comoose oar Sire S. LeBouca en 1653 (Valenciennes.
1908); and S. LeBoucq. Histoire ecclesiasticue, pp. 7-9.
2 N
Gerard Moreau, Histoire du Protestantisms a Tournai jusau'^
la veille de la Revolution des Pays-Bas (Paris. 1962). 0 . 168.
fH ;
W.
this spring MarSi'S'ras was traditionally celebrated by
•carrying a mock giant around the city; this paucha. pancha-
broutte, or malbouck. as it was called, was portrayed in a
state of drunkenness. The brawls brought on by heavy drinking
at such festivals were so bad that one traditional festival
falling on a saint's day was abandonned altogether in the
15 ^0 's. 1
The saints' days had an important role in the lives of

the worker-artisans in the guilds. Each guild had a patron
saint and the guildsmen would cease work on the day dedicated
to their patron. The -guilds had traditionally acquired
patron sants because of the belief that the saint had been
in a similar condition to the tradesmen and that the saint's
salvation held out: hope for the worker's future consolation.
It was thought that prayer would be rewarded with under
standing and favor. The guildsmen would worship together
in the chapel of their patron saint in the local parish
churches of Valenciennes. Notre-Dame-La-Grande, Saint-Mico-
✓
las, and Notre-Dame de la Chausee had oratories or chapels
branching off from the choirs or lateral clefs which were
dedicated to saints and rented to the guilds.
These chapels provided a sanctuary where the guildsmen
solemnized their marriages, baptisms, and funerals; many
times the business of the guilds was done in the chapel,
i.e., chapels were used as meeting halls, auditing rooms, .
places where the regulations of the trade were read, where
^Van Gennep, Le folklore. Vol. I. pp. 140-141.
148.
dues were collected, and where new members were admitted'.

If the guild was a particularly rich one, there might be a
stained glass window donated by the masters or perhaps painted
icons and sculptures, or even a gold or silver urn, or a
precious relic.^ • •
We know that guildsmen and religious orders found •
their mutual ties to be advantageous. The weavers in the
drapery industry, for example, organized as a religious
brotherhood before becoming a regulated guild. In the pro
cession of the Saint Cordon in the year 1337» the weavers
were allowed to carry relics rented from the Cluny order.
The order also granted a charter to the weavers constituting
them a brotherhood with a patron sa5nt and allowed them to
rent one of their chapels. Thus, the weavers were allowed
to organize themselves, to gain protection, and to attain
a sanctity by acquiring relics, a chapel, and ecclesiastical
sanction, while the order of Cluny received rent on their
2
relics and on one of their chapels.
We see similar patterns occurring in the few l6th cen
tury guild charters we possess. ~Although l6th century
charters seem to be authorized by the Magistrat. the religious
connections were similar. For example, in 1502 a contract
between the parish church of St. Nicolas and the bakers’
^Simon LeBoucq, Histoire ecclesiastique. p. 39; and C. Cap-

pliez, Histoire des Metiers de Valenciennes, pp. 56-57•
2
George Espinas, "Groupe econom'ique, groupe religieuxj les
iisserands de Valenciennes au XIV si&cle" Annales d’histoire
economicue et sociale (Paris, 1930), Vol. II, pp. 48-63.
1^9 •
guild specified that the "bakers could utilize some of the
chapels in the church for meetings and storing the guild's
.possessions in return for contributions of money for the up
keep and decoration of the church. In 1588 the painters and
' sculptors obtained a chapel and guild under the patronage
of Saint Luc; the guild was charged a fee for the upkeep of
the chapel where they celebrated holy services and invoked
their patron to help them.to prosper. We also know that
many trades which went through a period of economic boom in
the l6th century had patron saints; the saye weavers prayed
to Saint Bernardin and the linen weavers to Sainte Veronique.■*"
It is hard to assess the popularity of the patron saints
among the artisan-workers in the 16 th century when economic
conditions promoted hardship for the unprotected worker and
when reform movements brought the cults and their images
under criticism. One cannot ignore the possibility that
the unprotected lower level workers hated these cults be
cause they sanctified and justified the exclusive guilds.
Given the ineffectualness of the parish churches and charity
system to succor the forain worker's needs, it is probable
that at least'the lowest levels of the workers were ready
to adhere to any opposing religion which would offer them
a better vision of the future. On the other hand, it seems
that a large segment of society, perhaps the upper level
artisans inside the walls, were ready to accept the tradi-.
^Cappliez, Histoire des metiers de Valenciennes, pp. 5^-57»

and P. Foucart, Les Peintures de Martin d e V o s a Valenciennes
(Paris, 1893), P> 10.
150.
tional institutional structure of the guilds and their connec

tion with the patron saints.
It would be an error to think that the cults of saints
or of the Virgin vanished during the Reformation period. .
The cults were too imbedded into the fabric of life to be
done away with. The saints* days covered the whole calendar
year and were important to the population not only because
they provided days of rest and celebration but also for the
cure of disease. Saints were thought to control diseases,
or at least to be able to cure disease; for example, St.
Piacre was thought to cure dysentary, St. Ghislain was be
lieved to be able to cure a sick child, and the Virgin was
thought to be able to cure almost anything. One could pray
before an image of the saint at home or in the streets at
one of the many shrines; one could go to the chapel of the
saint attached to a parish church or one could visit a holy
relic of the saint at a nearby abbey. Pilgrimages to cure
diseases seem to have more popular in the 17th century, but
they took place in the l6th also. In an era when the causes
of disease were unknown, and when contagion seemingly ar
bitrarily struck its victims down, the cults of the saints
allowed one to find solace in the knowlege that prayer and
worship would bring an alleviation of affliction.^"
Êdmond Kembre, "Les epidemics et les pestes a! Valenciennes

jusqu'au XVIIIe silcle" Cercle archeologioue et historicue
de Valenciennes (Valenciennes, 1936), Vol. II, pp. 35—3^s
and Van Gennep, Le Folklore, Vol. I, pp. 302-330 and 511-523.
151.
The legends of the Saint Cordon and the cults of the

saints in the guilds were all accepted by the Magistrat and
the ecclesiastical authorities, but there was a level of
popular superstition which was punished by the Magistrat as
a crime. Invariably an individual who believed in unacceptable
superstitions was punished as a sorcerer or a practitioner of
magic arts. These unacceptable superstitions took various
forms, including exorcisms of demons from individuals pos
sessed by the devil and the curing of disease with home
remedies.
The belief in exorcism came from a belief in the devil.
It was thought by many in the 16th century that one could
be either possessed by the devil or be his disciples.; the
former were called demoniacs and the latter sorcerers. It.
was thought among many reformers that it was an honor to the
Redeemer to do battle with the devil and his army of demons
when they appeared in an individual; through a process of
prayers, laying on of hands, pronouncement of aspersions and
the invocation of purity by the waving of a cross, it was
thought that the demons were exorcised and driven away. The
exorcisers were protected by their knowledge that they were
already predestined to heaven and that their souls could not
be captured as long as they were armed with their faith in
the Savior Jesus. The popularity of exorcism was heightened
by the fact that it was successful in temporarily curing thTe
symptoms of what we would consider a mental disease.
.
152
In 1561 there wasa well-known case of demoniac posses
sion of a peasant in the ■village of Horning, some ten kilo
meters to the west of Valenciennes, A group of Calvinists at
Valenciennes decided to have a try at ridding the poor peasant
of his demons. The peasant, probably an epileptic, seemed
to be cooperative enough and responded satisfactorily to the
first attempt at exorcism. But after a relapse it was de
cided that another session was needed. News of the second
exorcism spread rapidly among the rural peasant workers and
large crowds appeared in the neighborhood of Horning to ob
serve the proceedings; local landowners, fearing a pillage by
these strangers, organized under the local authorities to
drive them out of the area. The poor peasant was prosecuted
for sorcery and the Calvinist deacon Pauveau was identified
as one of the exorcisers— an identification which would later
lead to his capture asa heretic.
Before the crisis of 1566-1567 there were several cases
2
of sorcery prosecuted by the Magistrat in Valenciennes. For
^■For C. Paillard’s commentary on witchcraft in the Valenciennes

area, see HTRV. Vol. I, pp. 165-1?^.
2The best documented belief in the forces of evil is the sys
tematic persecution of people who were thought to be sorcerers,
sorceresses, or disciples of the devil. The rise and fall of .
prosecution of witches seems to have corresponded to the rise
and. fall of judicial torture in Surope as has been pointed
out by H.R. Trevor-Roper, "The European Witch-craze of the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" in Religion, the Refor
mation.and Social Change, and Other Essays (London, 1967),
pp. 90-192. But in Valenciennes we are able to distinguish
two periods of persecution of so-called witches, i.e. in the
16th century before 1558 when the Catholic repression of
heretics began and in the period after 1559 up through the
mid-17th century. In the first period vitches were merely
banished from the city, but in the second period they were
burned alive. In Valenciennes the period of oppression of
example, in 15^8 one Jehenne Mepla, a widow and a forain
from Holland was banished for causing illnesses by trying to
cure people with magic arts.^ Similarly one Margherite de
la Deriere was accused of sorcery in 15&3 because she had
caused illnesses by use of magic arts.*' These cases reflect
a belief on the part of the population that their ills could
be solved through magic— veiy similar in function to the mira-
cle cures of the saints. 3
In sum, the worker-artisan levels of Valenciennes society
were excluded from creative endeavors by the length and dif
ficulty of their workday. The frustrations of boredom and
poverty undpubtedly drove them to the activities of the
cabaret; drinking, gaming, violence, and prostitution were
probably the result of a desire to forget their lack of
security and their bleak expectations. There seemed to be
little opportunity to express the frustrations of their
condition against the forces of order and privilege, and the .
endemic violence of the tavern and the street was committed
by the poor against the poor and not against the privileged
and wealthy. The sabbath, the saints' days, and the reli
gious festivals were the formal framework in which leisure
heretics was also a period of stepped up persecution •

pf' w it .ch e‘s See T. Louise, De la sorcellerie et dela
justice criminalle a Valenciennes (XVI^ et XVII** si^clesT
(Valenciennes, 1861).
“SlBV, ms. no. 700, fo. 92vo.
V, ms. no. 7 0 3 , fo. 87.
^For other cases of sorceresses banished and not tortured, see
MBV, ms. no. 700, fo. 55"vo, ms. no. 702, fo. 82, ms. no. 703?
ff* 13i 55. 86, and 196. The first execution by burning alive
was in 1559* See MBV, ms. no. 702, fo. 60.
154.
could be enjoyed. There seems to have been a good deal of

credulity as to the power of the saints and of magical
remedies; the group consciousness of the worker-artisans and
the rural peasants was obscured by belief in superstitions
and in cults which offered them another kind of satisfaction
for their social needs. One can say that the lower levels
of the population were ready and willing to accept any reme
dy for their social ills, even of the most fantastic kind.
As subsequent events show, they were ready to accept here
tical doctrines if allowed to do so by the bourgeois'
guildsmen, the militias, and the elites who regularly kept
them in their place and regulated their religions life.
3. Aspects of elite social life and culture

It is well known that the social life of the upper
levels of urban society was conspicuous for its wealth and
the richness of its culture. Valenciennes was no exception,
and in the period of her economic well-being during the first
half of the century, her culture could compete with any city
in the Low Countries except the very large or very old such
as Antwerp, Brussels, Ghent, and Bruges.
This culture had its base in the wealth of the princi
pal citizens of Valenciennes; merchant families like the
Herlins and the Le3oucqs and echevinale families like the
LaFontaines dit Wicart were among the richest families of
the city, and it was they who were the cultural leaders.
Coinciding with the ideal of the humanists which laid stress
on man's diverse roles in civic affairs, men like Michel
*ss
155.
Herlin and Noel LeBoucq were the financers, the directors, and
the players in a range of activities which encompassed poli
tics, arms, and charity and also literature and art. For
example, Michel Herlin was not only a magistrate, a militia
leader, and a charity commissioner, but also a director and
an actor in dramatic festivals. Noel LeBoucq was not only
an artillery commissioner but also a designer of stage set-,
tings, an artist, and a student of literature. These men
served their city out of a sense of duty and conviction as
their culture vras not only a means of personal glorification
but a means of patriotic expression, first for the urban
entity and secondly for their sovereign.
Charles V's .ioveuse entree into Valenciennes in 15^0
is a good example of the relationship between art and poli
tics on the urban level of society. It took place during a
period of strain between Charles V and many of the cities
of the Netherlands, Charles had been pressed for funds
during the war with France in 1539 and had drawn up a new
system of taxation which centralized the collection and
eradicated many pockets of privilege; the resulting furor
among the cities was highlighted by the revolt of Ghent, and
it was to put down this revolt that Charles was traveling
through Valenciennes. A treaty had been concluded with
Francis I the year before which allowed Charles to travel
from Spain to the Netherlands through France, and the
Valois king had honored his rival with an escort led by his
two young sons, the dauphin and the duke of Orleans. As
the first imperial city across the border it was the task
156.
of Valenciennes to greet and to entertain the sovereign and

his guests. The entry of the sovereign into a city was an
opportunity for the expression of civic pride and a display
of wealth and power. The manner of salutation and the sym
bols in the pageantry reflect the desire of the bourgeois
to remind the sovereign of their military strength and of
1
their particularistic privileges and rights.
On 21 January 15^0 at about three o'clock in the after
noon the gates of Valenciennes opened and a troop of ^00
mounted bourgeois rode out to meet the emperor's cortege
which was approaching from the southeast. The bourgeois
were dressed in white satin and damask with borders and
bonnets of black velvet; their hats were decorated with
white plumes while many wore gold chains around their necks.
The militia captain Michel Herlin led the troop on a horse
draped and harnessed with white satin with fringes of black
silk; his two pages carried a standard of white taffeta
with gold embroidery. Herlin himself was wearing a habit
of cloth of gold. This incredibly wealthy man who greeted
the emperor that afternoon in 15^0 was the same Herlin who
in 15 6 6-1567 would be accused of rebellion and heresy and
would be beheaded on the market place for leading the resis
tance to the royal troops of Charles' son Philip II.
A few minutes later a larger troop of bourgeois cavalry
sallied forth dressed similarly in black and white and led
Â. Dinaux, "Fntree joyeuse de l'Smpereur Charles-Quint en

sa ville de Valenciennes avec les fils du Roi de France,
Francois Ier du nom.3^.5 ^ 0 ”» ANFM3, Vol. IV, pp. 3^9-366; and
D'Outreman, Histoire, pp. 19^-195*
157.
by Jean du Jonquoy, another influential bourgeois, who was

wearing: white satin worked with gold braid; his four or five,
hundred companions carried white batons as a show of peace
and amity, A last troop of cavalry approached the procession
made up of a hundred black robed "gladiators" carrying
broadswords on their shoulders. The carefully orchestrated
show of force continued: Next cane the archers, the cross
bowmen, and the bombardiers who marched out of the gates
bedecked in their arras, insignia, and pennants. As the
serments fell in behind the emperor's procession for the
march back to Valenciennes, the guns emplaced in fortified
positions around the city commenced firing salvos.
Upon entering Valenciennes' Cambrai gates with trumpets
of the imperial guard blaring, and after the traditional
pardon given to convicted criminals asking for mercy, the
emperor and his retinue met the prevot and the echevins who
were dressed in their judicial robes. The magistrates were
surrounded by sergeants bastonniers dressed in imperial
colors and preceded by a herald, who was called the franguevie
in allusion to the freedoms or rights of Valenciennes. There
followed a rhetorical speech of welcome by the prevot Pierre
Lelievre who*spoke of the pleasure of the people of Valen
ciennes in seeing their sovereign in good health and in the
company of such illustrious and powerful princes.
The emperor’s party then moved past a series of arches,
of triumph, public theaters, and fountains which had been
erected for the occasion; they had been executed on the
designs of Noel LeBoucq, who as superintendent of artillery
would roll out his cannons against the royal troops in 1 5 6 6 .
A theater garnished with tapestries emblazoned with the anas,
of the dauphin, the emperor, and the duke of Orleans, con
tained on its stage three young girls representing faith,
hope, and charity. Faith carried the key to the city in a
gold basin, hope held a medal imprinted with the arms of
William of Bavaria, who had given Valenciennes its greatest,
privileges, and charity carried the arms of Valenciennes.
After a greeting from the assembled clergy in the avenue
of Cambresienne, the emperor was. hoisted into a portable
dias covered with white damasque and gold embroidery. He
was carried by members of the echevinale families, including
Jacques LePoivre, Gilles de Quarouble, Jehan LePoivre, and
Lehar Baudouin; all were dressed in rich damasque and carried
gold chains with the emperor's emblem around their necks.
Traversing the city from one side to the other, the emperor
was carried through the narrow streets of Valenciennes lined
by guildsmen drawn up in double ranks holding lighted torches
and colored lanterns.
Passing under arches decorated with paintings of the
nativity and with golden imperial eagles surrounded with
angels, the cortege arrived at the market place in front of
the city hall with its gothic arcades containing statues of
the old counts of Hainaut who had granted the privileges of
Valenciennes. Around the square under the gabled houses
.with sculptured facades stood a huge crowd assembled to wit
ness the spectacle of the emperor's entry; the bourgeois
159.
companies discharged their arcquebuses into the air, the

bells of the churches pealed, and then musicians began to
play. Following the custom in many Flemish cities at the
time, a huge bonfire called a feu de .joie was lit in the
center of the square.
The next day started with a high Mass in Notre-Dame-la-
Grande celebrated by Georges d'Sgmont the bishop of Utrecht.
Then the illustrious visitors went back to the market place
to be entertained by the local dramatic society, the chamber
of rhetoric of Valenciennes, which presented plays and farces
for the amusement of the court. This was followed by a second
feu de .ioie, a banquet at the Salle-le-c pmte with sovereign
princes, nobility and principal citizens in attendance, and
finally a ball which lasted into the night.
This .ioyeuse entree was not only a colorful spectacle
to honor the sovereign, but also a traditional way of ob
taining honor for the city. In the minds of the men at the
time it wasimportant that the sovereign stop at Valenciennes
rather than at Mons, Lille, Cambrai, or any of the other
imperial cities just across the frontier; it publicized the
power and the wealth of the city and hence its importance as
a market and industrial center. If the prince could be wooed
with lavish compliments in the arches, costumes, and plays,
then it washoped he would favor Valenciennes by respecting
her privileges and rights. Joveuses entrees were occasions
on which the sovereign could be reminded cf these privileges
by a display°£statues and arms of past sovereigns who had
.
160
given charters to the city. The magistrates customarily
used the' occasion to have the sovereign swear to uphold the
coutumes in a formal ceremony in the abbey of St. Jean; this
was done in 15^0 and in 15^9 when Charles visited the city
with his son Philip. For the echevinale families and the
merchant--bo urge 0 is the .joyeuse entree was an elaborate
ritual of compliments and a display of force that was designed
to remind the sovereign of the city’s military power and
particularistic privileges.
The most important cultural institutions of Valenciennes'

upper society were the dramatic associations. As early as
the 1^-th century a chevalric order called the Ordene de
Frankevie sponsored competitions on the stage; each of the
cities of the era had such societies— Bruges had her "For
resters” and Tournai her “Thirty-one icings".^ In the 15th
and early l6 th centuries the tradition of communal drama
reached its maturity in the Netherlands. Dramatic festivals
were held during entrees of sovereigns, on religious holi
days, and during weeks of special competitions between dif
ferent cities. Rivalries between cities became common as
the societies tried to outdo each other in the magnificence
of their entertainment, in the skill and wit with which they
wrote and performed comedies, and in the splendor of their
costumes. While Ghent had two and larger cities like Antwerp
^Caffiaux, La bourgeoisie valenciennois, pp. viii-ix.
,
161
four competing societies, provincial cities like Tournai and
Valenciennes had one dramatic society. Intercity competi
tions were held, and prizes were given by host cities to the
best dramatic companies who composed and performed plays
on a specific theme.^
The themes and content of the presentations were con
temporary and expressed a point of view based on the in
terests of the urban milieu. For example, the border city
of Arras was threatened in 1531 by the incessant Hapsburg-
Valois wars, and she invited participation in a dramatic
competition to answer the question "Y/hy is the hoped for
2
peace so late in coming?" The societies presented many of
the themes which appeared in the writings of Erasmus, i.e.
criticism of war's barbarity, the need for wisdom in govern
ment, the virtues of a Christian life, and the iniquities
and corruption of the church. Many societies, Valenciennes
included, took up the study of Greco-Roman literature and
thus contributed to the humanistic enrichment of Christian
society. The dramatic societies made criticisms with the
humor of the farce on the one hand and the piety of Christian
passion plays on the other.
In the late 15th century during the numerous city re
volts against the inheritors of Charles the Bold, the
H. Liebnecht, Les chambres de rhetorique (Brussels, 1948);

C. Thelu, "Liste des chambres des rhetorique" Bulletin du .
Comite de France, Vol. I- p. 424; and 0. -Leroy, "Chambres
dramatiques ou litteraires dites rhetoriques" ANFMB. Vol. IV,
pp. 101 -1 2 6 .
2
Leroy, "Chambres dramatiques", pp. 104-105.
162.
dramatic societies were considered a threat by the central

government and ordinances were decreed to regulate them. As
a result they became known as chambres de rhetoricue or
rederyke kamer.i and had to have constitutions. They had a
hierarchy of "princes", "captains", and "deacons" as adminis
trative officers and "fiscals" as treasurers. Uniforms
were issued for the different companies and authorization
was needed to organize competitive dramatic festivals; the
urban magistrates and government officials had more control
over the content of the plays and of the themes of the
competitions.^
In spite of these attempts at control the dramatic
societies still exhibited a great deal of independence in
the first half of the l6th century. A dramatic festival at
Ghent in 1539 criticized the avarice of the clergy and
parodied them in lines such as these from the piece of the
rhetorician Josse Lanbrechtsi
Apres avoir fait danser tous mes sols,
Je n'en vois pas de plus sots, a mon sens, g
Que ces tetes dures comme pierre, avec une tonsure.
Criticism of this sort against the clergy undoubtedly came
from many Catholic reformers in the dramatic societies be-
3
sides the adherents of Luther.
^Liebnecht, Les chambres de rhetoriaue, pp. 26-31 and 48-50.

^Liebnecht, Les chambres de rhetoriaue, p. 10?.
■^for examples of Protestant activity in chambres de rhetoriaue
see L. van der Sssen, "Les progres du Lutherar.isme et du
Calvinisme dans le monde commercial d'Anvers" Viertel.iar-
schrift fur Social-und-V.'irtschaftsgeschichte, Vol. DLXII,
no. 1-2, 1914.
.
163
The organizer of dramatic festivals at Valenciennes in
the 16th century was Noel LeBoucq, the Valenciennes commis
sioner of artillery.^ Noel Le3oucq*s niece Marie was married
to Michel Herlin and was reputed to be "the most opinionated
and seditious Huguenot in the Low Countries," and his son
Rolland was a saye merchant who was executed as a heretic
and rebel in 1 5 6 7 .^ In spite of these heretical connections
Noel was in the ©.rly part of the century an earnest Catholic
who founded the order of the Chapelet de Kotre-Dame de la
Sauch, a quasi-religious fraternity founded in honor of
the Holy Virgin and to commemorate the return of Charles
k
from Spain.
% . Brassart, "Fetes populaires au XVIe sitcle dans les

villes du Nord de la France et particulierement it Valen
ciennes, d'apres les manuscrits de Simon Le Boucq" Souvenirs
de la Flandre-Wallonne. Vol. XI, p. 42.
^Pontus Payen, Memoires. Vol. I, p. 278.
Â.L.E. Verheyden, Le Conseil des troubles: liste des con-
damnees 1567-1573. Academie royale de Belgique; Commission
royale d'histoire, Vol. 6 9 , Brussels, 1961 , entry no. 6 6 0 7 .
‘hi. Brassart, "L'ordre du Chapelet de Notre-Dame de le Sauch;
f£te ponulaire organisee a Valenciennes par Noel I« Boucq,
8 juillet 1520", Souvenirs de la Flandre-Wallonne, /ol. XIII,
pp. 153-170. It is ironic that the founder of this order
honoring the Virgin would 46 years later at the age of 77
die in battle while defending Valenciennes which all the
Netherlands believed to be a Calvinist stronghold. It
should also be noted that even in provincial towns like
Valenciennes, great pride was taken in the fact that the
sovereign resided within the Netherlands instead of else
where; this underlines the differences between Charles V,
a man who at least viewed the plays of Valenciennes when
he was in the area, and a man like Philip II who deigned
never to return to the Netherlands after his departure in
1559 and who, as we shall see, did all he could to eradicate
the rich dramatic culture of the 'Netherlands which he evi
dently did not understand.
Each member of the order wore around their necks a
rosary of red beads with a gold swan, the emblem of Valen
ciennes, hanging from it. We only know of one activity of
the order besides its dramatic endeavors— the members prayed
together before the image of the Virgin in a tabernacle
imbedded in the wall of the rue Sauch which had under it an
embossed swan.'*' It was as head of this organization that
Noel LeBoucq directed plays and made the designs for the
arcs of triumph, the tableaux with inscriptions and the
^ O
statues for the .joyeuse entree of 154-0.
In the 16 th century the dramatic societies in the
southern cities were most active during the lull in the
Hapsburg-Valois wars in the' late 154-0' s, a period which
coincided with a renewal of trade and economic well-being.
While the intercity dramatic competitions in the area of
Valenciennes were smaller than those of Antwerp, they were
still considerable. Valenciennes, Lille, and Tournai were
the principal cities where festivals took place, but drama
tic societies from smaller towns were invited to the com
petition in the host cities. Each city named a "prince"
whose mission was to establish the theme on which the
competition would be based, send out invitations, and or
ganize the provisions and decorations for the entertainments.
At Valenciennes.the prince was nominated by the magistrates.
^'Brassart, "L'ordre du Chapelet", pp. 163 -1 6 5 .

^Brassart, "Fetes populaire", pp. 4-2-4-3.
165.
In 15^7 Lille held a competition at which there were

150 “Cavaliers” of Valenciennes dressed in violet saves bor
dered in black and led by Jacques Sanglier, a notable bour
geois. Tournai also had a competition in 15^7, to which
the echevin Quentin Coret led the Valenciennes contingent.
The relationship of these -“cavaliers" with the order of the
. Chapalet is not clear, and to add to the confusion the
players of Valenciennes are also referred to as a- comoagnie
des .ioueurs en chambre, who would parade around Valenciennes
preceded by a herald and blaring trumpets before the start
of a dramatic presentation; this parade was part of the
ceremony of the festival and served to announce the mystery
plays or farces to the populace.1
Valenciennes was not to be outdone by her neighboring
cities in 15^-7. She produced a passion play that was famous
for its length, complexity, and its spectacular sets. The
passion play was announced by a herald on the street corners
and in public places six months ahead of time and was to
coincide with the opening of a market in the city. It was
to start on the Monday after the Pentecost and to last for
25 days— that is a new act would be shown each day for 25
days. The play was to be presented in the court and gardens

of the h$tel of the duke of Arschot. one of the largest of
noble residences in Valenciennes, which would allow the
showing to take place before several thousand viewers.
1Brassart, "F^tes populaire", pp. ^7-^3.

M. Renault, Representation'd'unmyst^re de la passion a Val
enciennes au XYIe sigcle (15^-7) (Valenciennes, 1890), pp. 2-9.
The men who organized the passion play were among the
most notable bourgeois and merchants of the city, and they
set up a corporation with intricate rules and regulations
to make sure that the play paid for itself. 1 Highly.
controlled corporate structures.'ensu'fed efficient manage
ment even in the city's cultural institutions. These regu
lations specified that there would be 13 superintendents
who would be in charge of production. If anyone in the com
pany challenged the directions of the producers he would be
punished with an arbitrary fine. The regulations specified
that the superintendents had to be gens de bien or men of
wealth, and the names on the list came from both £chevinale
and merchant families. There were also 38 other members
of the corporation who had no power of administration but
who shared in the profits of the venture by their initial
investments. Thus the production arrangements reflected a
commercial spirit and a possible desire to draw crowds to
the regional markets in the city. The directors and the
cast of over 150 characters also came from the principal
bourgeois families of Valenciennes. For example, Jean Rasoir
played Jesus Christ, Colie LeFebre played Pontus Pilate,
Jehan Godin'played Joseph, Jean de Lattre played Simon the
Lepper, Pierre de la Fontaine dit YJicart played St. John
the Baptist, and Michel Herlin played the Bmperor Octavian.^
1The text of the regulations are^set forth in J. Mangeart,

Catalogue descriptive et raisonne des manuscrits de la
Biblioth£que de Valenciennes (Paris, 1866), p. 69 !.
^See appendix B.
■^G.A.Jc Hecart, Rechercnes historicues, bibliographiques,
16?.
The play told the story of Christ from the Annunciation

until the resurrection and followed the tradition of the
apocrypha by inclusion of unauthorized episodes, speeches,
and opinions not found in biblical texts. The settings in
cluded heaven, hell, Nazareth, the temple in Jerusalem, and
the palace of the Emper.or Octavian. Many sets were fitted
with devices which emitted fire, smoke, and even streams of
blood, all of which reportedly captivated the audiences.
Expenditures on salaries and settings were 4,179 livres
while receipts were 4,680 livres, giving a surplus of 501
livres. We know that the prices of admission were 6 deniers
and 12 deniers.^- If one figures on an average of 8 deniers
per entrant, that gives a total of 8?,773 entrants which,
figured on a basis of 25 days, gives an average audience
per showing of 3#5H» .Of course, this does not mean, there
were 87,773 different people; as the play was 25 days in
length, the same people would come every day to see the in
stallments. Tfefthese figures indicate that the play was im
mensely popular.
Imbedded in the basic biblical framework were historical,
mystical, and literary themes which reflected the attitudes
of the urban bourgeois toward religion and society. E. Konig-
son, a literary historian who has studied the text in depth,
goes so far as to call the play religious propaganda. He
critiques et litteraires sur le theatre ce Valenciennes

(Paris. 1316). pp. 30-43; and Henault, Representation d'une
mystere, pp. 23-24.
H'iangeart, Catalogue descriptive et raisonne, p. 691.
168
finds anticlerical themes and a dramatization of urban

secular life in a religious metaphor. The play profaned
the paraphernalia of the established church with passages in
directly criticizing veneration of the saints and relics.
It called for a return to the monotheism of the early church
by explicitly stating that "one Being only ought to be hum
bly venerated.” Other passages laid a stress on God's
vengeance as a punisher of evil and on God’s charity only
going to those who deserved it. The play consistently
portrays evil emanating from the devil; the devil's cohorts
were portrayed as naked serpents and dogs which sallied
forth from hell to steal and pillage among mortals. 1 These
themes reflected the values of the secular charity and judi
cial systems; they justified the harsh policy of exclusion
of the "undeserving" from the General Aumosne. and they sug
gest to us why the judges continually referred to criminals
as being possessed by "bad spirits" which drove them to
crime.
The Magistrat and the bishop of Cambrai worked out a
compromise to their conflicting claims to review the text of
the play. The Magistrat allowed a committee of 12 ecclesi
astics appointed by the bishop to read the text but not to
change it; this evidently satisfied both sides that their
Ê. Konigson, Representation d'une mystere de la passion a

Valenciennes en 15^7 (Paris, 1969), pp. 15-22 and 11^;
Henault, Representation d'ur. mystere, pp. h6ând 56; see
also H. Giese, La passion de Jesus-Christ .iouee a Valenciennes
l'an 15^-7 (G-reifswala, 1905)? and H. Schreiner, Kouvelles
etudes sur la premiere passion de Valenciennes (Greifswald,
169.
jurisdictional rights were upheld. The text was not changed

by either the Magistrat or the ecclesiastics, although the
latter stipulated that nothing could be added after their
review.^" According to Henri d’Oultreman, a member of a con
temporary echevinale family, the mystery plays and farces
of the rhetorical society were known to contain anticleri
cal ideas which "opened the door to the sacrileges of Luther
2
and Calvin." The danger of these ideas were not fully
recognized by the Catholic hierarchy in the 15^0's and the
systematic censure and eradication of the chambers of rhetoric
did not occur until the late 1550 's and early 1 5 6 0 's.
In sum, the .ioyeuse entree and the chambers of rhetoric
reflect bourgeois pride, concerns, and values. The .ioyeuse
entree was used to impress the sovereign with Valenciennes'
military strength and to implant on the sovereign's mind
that Valenciennes had ancient privileges and rights which
the city intended to protect. On the other hand, the cham
bers of rhetoric reflected bourgeois spiritual and social
values. The plays and farces were anticlerical but not anti-
religious as religion was the explanation and the justifica
tion of existence; religion sanctified the urban institu
tions from the guilds to the charity and judicial systems.
The mystery play of 15^7 expressed rather harsh and simple
morality which indicated that the bourgeois were ready to
■^Henault, Representation d'une mystere, p. 10.

^H. D’Outreman, Histoire, p. 395*
\I1'
170.
reform their religious institutions, but only through a

religious movement which would protect their privileges and
property. The mass of the propertyless journeymen and mannants
most likely found the plays and farces of the elite fascina
ting and exciting; the fact that the culture of the elite
was popular with the inhabitants indicates the predominance
of bourgeois values in Valenciennes.
4-. The Calvinist church

How did the Calvinist church begin in Valenciennes?
Y/hat were the activities of the Calvinists at mid-century?
What was the organizational structure of the Calvinist church
and how did it function? What groups benefited from the es
tablishment of Calvinism in Valenciennes?
The first Calvinist minister came to Valenciennes in
1$^. Unknown persons from both Valenciennes and Tournai
went to Strasbourg in the winter of 15^3-15^ in order to
relate their fears of the Anabaptists to Valerin Poullain,
an adherent of the ideas of both Bucer and Calvin. They
took with them examples of the writings of the "libertines"
as. they called the Anabaptists.'1' Poullain wrote to Calvin •
of their request for a minister capable of combatting the
doctrines of an Anabaptist by the name of Antoine Pocquet;
^The historian of the Anabaptists of the Netherlands finds

few Anabaptists in the French-speaking provinces with the
exception of the area around Armentieres, A.L.S, Verheyden,.
Anabaptism in Flanders, 1530-1650 (New York, 1961), pp. 15-
This is corroborated by the historian of Protestantism
in the Valenciennes and Tournai area, G. Moreau, "La reforme
dans le Hainaut et le Tournaisis", BSHPB, Vol. VIII (19^9)»
pp. ^09 -^2 1 .
the Valenciennes and Tournai representatives also wanted a
minister aole to organize reformed churches in both Tournai
and Valenciennes. Upon receiving no reply by May of 1544,
the representatives traveled to Geneva to meet with Calvin
personally. During the spring of 1544 Calvin wrote a pam
phlet against Pocquet and the Anabaptists in general called
•Contre la secte -phantastiq ue et furieuse de's libertins
(Geneva, 1544), copies of which were sent to Valenciennes
and Tournai through Bucer at Strasbourg. The delegates re
quested that Calvin send Martin Bucer to Tournai and Valen
ciennes, but Calvin instead designated Pierre Brully whom
he charged to preach against the Anabaptists and to organize
reformed churches in Valenciennes, Tournai, and other French-
speaking towns in the southern Netherlands. 1
From his arrival in the summer of 1544 until November of
1544 when he was arrested by the government as a heretic,
Brully preached principally in Tournai and Valenciennes, but
also in Lille, Arras, and Douai. He traveled in disguise
and had to preach at night to escape capture by imperial of
ficers. In the houses of merchant and artisan families of
Tournai and Valenciennes he arranged to have a series of
disputations with the Anabaptist Pocquet. At the same time
Brully set up clandestine organizations which were to lay
the groundwork for the stronger Calvinist communities in the
area in the 1 5 5 0 *s and 1 5 6 0 ’s.
1 G. Moreau, Kistoire du Protestantisme a Tournai (Paris, 1962),

pt>. 91-93? and C. Paillard, "Prose's de Pierre Brully", AF.BMC.
Vol. XXVIII (1878), pp. 13-14,
2 C. Paillard, "Proces de Pierre Brully", pp. 8-40.
In the cities we know little of the Calvinist congrega
tions encouraged by Pierre Brully in the first 10 years of
their existence because 1hey were small and clandestine. There
were only brief intervals when these communities had the bene
fit of a visit from a trained minister like Valerin Poullain
and Guy De Bres. These ministers preached or administered
the sacraments to secret conventicles of six to a dozen
persons; most of the time Calvin's adherents had to read
their Bible alone or have one of their number read to them.
For their day to day doctrinal guidance they had to rely on
contraband books of Calvin, Beza, and Bucer smuggled in
from Germany, Switzerland, and France. Careful to leave no
incriminating evidence of their existence, the different
.urban churches had code names, as did the ministers: The
Valenciennes church was known as the "Eagle", Lille the "Rose
Tournai the "Palm", Antwerp the "Capernum", Brussels the
"Sun", Audenarde the "Fleur de Lis", and so o n . 1
During the late forties and early fifties Calvin, Beza,
Bucer, and Poullain took an interest in the development of
the reformed church in the French-speaking southern Nether
lands. Geneva was kept informed of the activities of the
urban congregations by letters from Poullain and by visitors
who went to study in Switzerland. Among the latter were the
sons of the Valenciennes wine merchant Michel Herlin who
attended the Geneva Academy. Other Calvinist converts who
traveled to Switzerland for study included Guy De Bres of
^F. Le Cornu, Origine des eglises reformees wallonnes de

Pays-Bas (Utrecht, n .d.),pp. ¥-9 , 37-38, and 140*
ro
173.
Mons, and Jean Crespin, a lawyer from Arras who was impli
cated as a supporter of Brully in 15^5.^ The second trained
Calvinist minister to preach in the circle of French-speaking
cities on a systematic basis was Guy De Bres, who later be- .
came known as the "Belgian Reformer" because of his many
doctrinal and political works. De Bres was minister at
Lille from 1552 to 155-5 and at Tournai from 1559 to 1562; he
. traveled under the code name "Jerome" to preach in Tournai,
2
Valenciennes, Arras, Douai, and Mons.
The formative years of tentative organizations and
undercover activities came to an end in the period 1555-1553
when the Calvinist movement went through a considerable
development. According to the historian F. LeCornu Calvinism
spread from its strongholds in Antwerp and the French-speaking
cities into Flanders and then through the northern provinces.
The organizational model planted in Tournai, Valenciennes,
and Lille by Brully, Poullain» and De Bres spread to other
parts of the Low Countries.^
Stimulating this spread of Calvinism was an increase
in the dissemination of Calvinist publications printed in
Germany, France, and England. In 1559 Jean Petit, the son
of a hat merchant from Tournai, established himself at
■^F. LeCornu, Origine des eglises reformees wallonnes des

Pays-Bas. pp. 18-20.
2
E. Braekman, Guy de Bres (Brussels, 1950), pp. 80-81.
•'F. LeCornu, Origins des Eglises reformees wallonnes des
Pays-Bas, pp. 37-35.
1*7 .
?.
1 4
Frankfort where he bought prohibited books; and he sold
them to Netherlands merchants. At Antwerp merchants like
Jean Le Grin distributed religious literature to Flemish
speaking areas to the west and north, while the merchant
Nicolas du Bar at Valenciennes, Francois Laot at St. Omer,
and Jacques Vromon at Armentieres were the distributors in
the French-speaking provinces. Among the more popular and
important publications besides the vernacular Bibles and
doctrinal pamphlets were the psalters like the Geneva edition
of Marot's psalms (15^2), the chants of martyrs by Beza
(15^5)» and Beaulier's songs, called La Chrestienne Res-
.iouissance (15 ^6 ). Martyrologies appeared like that of
Crespin*s Livre des Martyrs (155*0 and became part of a triad
of books for the Calvinist household including the vernacu
lar Bible and the psalter.*'
The Calvinists in the Netherlands were encouraged by
the expansion of Calvinist influence in France. The late
1550's and the early 1560*s was a period when Geneva trained
ministers and the Calvinist propaganda won many French cities
and a segment of the French nobility over to the Huguenot
cause. These French Calvinist successes led to the Colloquy
^Nicolas du Bar of Valenciennes collaborated on a venture

to publish a supplication to the king in the early 1 5 6 0 's by
contracting to pay half of the expenses in order to reap half
of the profit. See C. Rahlenbeck, Notes sur les auteurs.
les im-orimeurs et les distributeurs des -pamphlets -politique
et religieux du XVIs si&cle (Liege, 18?0), pp. 4-13; in the
libraries of ministers like De Bres were works by Luther, .
Melanchthon, Zwingli, Bucer, Bullinger, Brentius, and Oeco-
lampade, and of course many books and pamphlets by Calvin and
Beza. All the above printed works were confiscated by inqui
sitorial officials from the library of^Guy De Bres in 1561.
G. Moreau, Histoire du Protestantisme a Tournai. pp. 164— 168.
175 .
of Poissy and culminated in the Edict of January 1562 which
authorized Huguenot services in certain cities. The news of
these victories crossed the border into the Netherlands and
urged a more active role upon the Calvinists of the Low
Countries.
The Calvinist ministers encouraged the spread of the
word of God among their congregations by a program of ver
nacular Bible readings and of vernacular chants. Chanting
symbolized the unity and the community spirit of the re
formed churches. Singing was one of the signs by which the •
Calvinists recognized and greeted each other; one group sang
the first line of the psalm and the other group took up the
second line. With the increase in numbers of Calvinist rank
and file in the late 1 5 5 0 's and early 1560 *s and with the in
creased persecutions of the government, the chants became
both an overt expression of religious affiliation and an act
of defiance— a non-violent defiance designed to exhibit to
the government the numbers of the faithful in the reformed
church,
There had been chanting and singing at Valenciennes
since the 15 *1-0 's, but because of the persecution it had not
been public, i.e. it occurred outside the walls of the city
in the countryside or in the surrounding forests. During
the Calvinist expansion of the 1560's Valenciennes was the
first Netherlands city where chanting became public. The
1 W. Marichal, “Le culte reforme", CCS3, Vol. XXVIII (1966).

pp. 1-1**-; and H. Eordier, Le chansonnier huguenot du XVI
siecle (Paris, 1870).
176.
chanting spread within the walls of Valenciennes on the night
of 27 September 1561 and into the city of Tournai on the
night of 21 September 1561. In Valenciennes a crowd of
several hundred, their faces covered so they could not be
identified, congregated in the streets just after dark and
sang psalms before the houses of the mendicant orders and
before the abbey of St. Jean. The chanting continued in
Valenciennes intermittently until the summer of 1562.1
We possess documents of the Brussels government which
enable us to see who the leaders of the Calvinist movement
were during the period of the chanting in the early 1560's.
After the crisis of 1566-1567 the government made a composite
report about Calvinist activities and organization from the
time of the chanting to 1567• This report was compiled from
the testimony of spies and from the confessions of heretics
taken after the crisis of 1566 -1 5 6 7 .
The government report shows the leaders of the Valen
ciennes Calvinist church to be all merchants or bourgeois.
The Dominican monks used to spy on the chanters reported
that the leaders of chants in the streets were Alexandre Du-,
pont, a merchant, and Rolland du Four, a master fine cloth
weaver. The confessions obtained after 1566 indicate the
men who belonged to the Calvinist church's governing body
•*-C. Rahlenbeck, "Les chanteries de Valenciennes", BCHEW,

Vol. Ill (1887), pp.121-159; and G. Koreau, Histoire de
Protestantisme, pp. 169 -1 7 1 .
"3esonge des commissaires du Roy a Valenciennes sur le
faict des troubles et rebellion", in La Repression si Valen
ciennes apres les troubles religieux de 15667ciamart, 1930)
pp. 105-140.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission
T) -
177.
or consistory in the early 1 5 6 0 ’s; the document shows these

men to be likewise all bourgeois of Valenciennes* with the
vast majority of them coming from the merchant and property
owning level. Among the principal merchants were the well-
known Michel Berlin, the saye merchant Rolland LeBoucq, the
wine merchant and malt re des oeuvres Jehan Mahieu, and the
saye merchant and municipal treasurer Vin'Ce-nt Resteau. The
few artisans on the consistory were all of the upper ranks
like the master weaver Etienne Gervais or the tanner Gery
LeJosne who made up the rest. Notably missing from leadership
roles were the main Catholic echevinale families of the town*
on the one hand, and the poor resident forains on the other.'*’
These consistory members had important functions which
made them the most powerful members of the Valenciennes
Calvinist church. The consistory had authority to pay the
itinerant ministers or to select and hire resident ministers;
in 1565 they hired Perigrih . de la Grange, a Geneva-trained
minister, and in 1566 they hired Guy De Bres himself at a
salary of 100 livres tournois per year. Since the ministers
were paid from the funds of the consistory they were to some
extent dependent on the merchant bourgeois. The elders of
the consistory enforced discipline among the congregation
by censoring morals and reading matter. The deacons had
many functions including those of educational instruction
and the collection and distribution of alms. .Last, the con
sistory provided for the protection of the congregation
^"Besonge", pp. 118-110; for a complete list see appendix c.
178 .
during preaching sessions. In short the consistory had
power to hire ministers and to establish policy in charity
and educational matters and to police morals and behavior..^
The role of the minister in the local Calvinist church
was to provide doctrinal guidance according to the inter
pretation of Calvin. His primary function was that of ex
plaining the Scriptures and correcting any “heretical"
doctrinal misconceptions among the congregation. Some
Geneva-trained ministers like Guy De Bres also proffered
political theories and acted as political .advisors to their
consistories? the degree of participation of the minister
seems to have depended on his individual training, his experi-
encg, and his capabilities. Generally speaking, however, the
minister was devoid of administrative functions in the local
reformed church.
The institutions which offered coordination to the urban
consistories were the provincial or national synods. The
synod was a congress of deputies from individual consis
tories assembled to discuss common problems and common needs
and to propose solutions which could be used to common advan
tage. Y/hatever solutions were arrived at in the discussions
at the synods were only enforcable at the will of the local
consistories as the synod had no authority or power to enforce
■*"C. Paillard, Les grands nresches Calvinistes de Valenciennes

(Paris, 1877), pp. 21-23; E. Breakman, Guy De Bres. p. 235;
and for general organization of Calvinist churches on the ;
local level, see R. Kingdom Geneva and the Coming of the
Wars of Religion in France, 1555-1563 (Geneva, 1956). pp. 47-50.
policy. Whether a local church followed the policies ar
rived at in the synods, depended on the consistory's needs.
The existence of the synod did not eradicate the independence
of the consistory in matters of administration and politics.'1'
Although there was a first national synod in the Nether
lands in 15 ^1 » we know little of its activities as its records
were lost. In 15^3 there were other national synods at Theux
and Franchircont whose records show that the Calvinists were
starting to form a coordinated policy vis a vis the persecu
tion of their members by the government; efforts were to be
made to win over the nobility and the magistrates of cities
as had taken place in France. Meanwhile, in the same year
a synod of the French speaking provinces was held at Tournai,
and it decided that the new adherents to the church won over
during the chanting of 1561-1562 whould be accommodated in
enlarged preaching sessions. This conscious policy of en
larging and making more public the Calvinist services was
a result of the expansion of the Calvinist movement in the
years 1559-1563. As increased numbers of artisans and
workers were won over to the reformed church, the Calvinist
2
preachers could no longer keep the sermons secret.
The result of the decision taken at Tournai in the spring
synod of 15^3 was the development of large open air preaching
■^Kingdon, Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of Religion,

pp. 47-50.
2 • ^
Moreau, "La Reforme dans le Hainaut et le Tournaisis”,
pp. 413-414.
■ _
180«
sessions or presches in the countryside. Country presches

were well known since the 1530's in areas of the Netherlands
but none of then had reached the size of the so-called
grands presches of 1563 in the area of Valenciennes and
Tournai. Preaching also took place around Douai, Orchies, and
Lille, besides in smaller towns in-; Artois and Flanders.
In the Valenciennes area the presches of 15&3 were given
by several local members of the Calvinist church who acted
as preachers. One of the most influential and the most
eloquent was Martin DuBuissons, a master sayeteur who em
ployed a few workers and sold their cloths— in other words
an upper level artisan. When the royal inquisition started
to persecute Calvinists in Valenciennes in the summer of
1563i DuBuissons fled to Antwerp where he joined the con
sistory and was active in 1566 under the name of M. DuLac.V
Another preacher at Valenciennes during 1563 was Mathieu de
Lannoy, a member of a French merchant family, who had
preached in the conventicles of merchants in both Valenciennes
and Tournai. A third preacher in Valenciennes was Paul Milet,
called the chevalier because of his noble stature and his
riding habits; he was a French ex-monk who had converted to
Calvinism during the Huguenot ascendency in 1560-1561 and
who had preached in both Rouen and Orleans before moving
to Valenciennes.
During 1563 the preaching around Valenciennes took place
at the Mont d'Anzin, the Mont d'Hauwy, the A.ubry woods, the
■^DuBuissons was banished in absentia in 1565• MBV, ms. no.

703, fo. 165*
SI
181.
.Cynge woods, and at the Fountain of St. Martin— all l6 th

century landmarks in the countryside around the city. Be
cause these presches were held outside the walls of Valen
ciennes, they included crowds of peasant-workers from the
surrounding villages and towns in Haiaut. As word of the
preaching sessions spread, the numbers grew from two to
three thousand in February, March, and April to 6,000 in
May, On 9 May at two presches an Mont Hauwy and the Mont
Anzin there were a reported 6,000 at each presche. Offi
cials reported that at Anzin "the whole hill was covered with
people" including a crowd of participants from Valenciennes
who freely admitted "we are going to the presche" as they
left the gates.'1'
The numbers of people at the 1566 presches in the coun
tryside around Valenciennes -were reportedly even larger and
the numbers were perhaps exagerated. At the first sermon on
Sunday 7 July 1566 government spies reported 3,000 to 4-,000
persons. On 9 July they reported some 4,000, on 11 July
some 3,000, but on Sunday 14 July the number reported grew
to an estimate of 16,000. On Wednesday 1? July 1566 the
number dropped again to 7,000 to 8,000, but on Sunday the
21 st it rose again to 1 0 ,0 0 0 to 1 2 ,000 , then dropping to
p
3,000 to 4,000 on Monday, etc.
Ôn the preaching of 15^3» see HTRV, Vol. Ill, La Thieulloye

to the regent, 4- May 1563, pp. 116-118; Berghes to the regent,
10 May 1563 , pp. 260-261; and La Thieulloye to the regent,'
11 May 1563, pp. 263-265.
2
See the depositions of Anthoine Jaco and his wife Catherine
and one Marie Lambert in "Deposition faite le 8 e du mois de
Juillet 1566 par devant Couronnel et de le Val" BCKEW, Series I,
Vol. Ill (188?), pp. 160-188.
182.
The individuals and groups attending the 1563 presches

cannot be determined with exactitude, but in 1566 the govern
ment employed spies to infiltrate the congregations of the
grands -presches at Valenciennes, and their reports give us
a clearer idea of the crowd's makeup.^- As in 1563 "the vast
majority of persons at the preaching sessions of 1566 were
reportedly peasant families from the surrounding villages
and suburbs of Valenciennes and resident workingmen and ar
tisans of the city. These persons could not be recognized
by the spies, nor were they important enough to be recognized,
but the spies indicated that they appeared in the thousands,
"as much from this city as from the towns and villages sur
rounding it."2
1
There are numerous complications with the records of spies
which bring both their reliability and their representative
ness into question. We can easily see that the spies, who
were an obscure nan and two women of Valenciennes, had to
rely on their ability to identify persons in the crowd.
Their reports listed many more names from the well-known
families or from persons whose occupations made them well-
known, like taverners or local merchants than from the
poorer Calvinists. At best the spy records afford us only
an indication of certain selected groups known to three in
dividuals, and at worst they are unrepresentative of the
kind of people who came to the presches. Some names were
perhaps even imaginary and were merly included to make the
reports more saleable to the government officials. In spite
of these problems, the spy records supply valuable informa
tion on many families who show up on other records of the
inquisition as those who offered resistance to the govern
ment during the crisis of 1566 -1567 . "Deposition", pp.
160-138. ■
"Deposition". P« 166; we also have the testimony of the

marquis de Berghes that the majority of the people at the
presches of 1563 were from the ranks of the peasantry and
the week-workers. See HTRV, Vol. Ill, Berghes to the
regent, 6 August 1563 , PP* 390-392.
r&?
183.
A total of 72k persons were identified by the spies
out of the thousands reported. Although this sample is un
representative of the majority, it. nevertheless allows us to
gain insights into the nature of the crowd.and to determine
its leaders. Out of the 72k there were ^0^ males and 296
females and 2k infants. Of the kOk males 73 were minors and
331 v/ere adults, while of the 296 females 99 were listed as
daughters and nieces and 197 as adult females. -Thus some

3 9 3 ». or over half of the ?2k, were infants or young people
who were listed as unmarried. The spies reported that heads

of families were accompanied by both their immediate rela
tives and the rest of their households, including in-laws,
cousins, nephews, nieces, and servants. For example, the
merchant draper Anthoine Becque went to the sermon of 1^ July
with-his wife and two nieces whereas the cobbler Jacques Noz
went to various presches with his wife, son, grandchildren,
his sister, and his wife's married sister. Another such
case is that of Jean le Josne, the owner of the tavern-hotel
called "L'Ours", who came with his wife and maid with "all
his infants". Among the families of the merchants and arti
sans the phrase "with all his infants" recurs again and
again in the reports. The open air presches of the Calvi
nists seem to have been religious ceremonies which families
attended with their children, their servants, and their
relatives. >•
Of the 331 adult males identified by name some 2?0 had
' occupations given. The 270 adult males belonged to 91
. 184.
TOP 24 OCCUPATIONS REPRESENTED BY ADULT trades from mer-.

MALES AT THE PRESCHES 0? 1566 *.. FROM/.'
THE REPORTS 0? GOVERNMENT SPIES chant s, thro ugh
weavers of saye cloth 21
servants • 21 the artisans* ranks
butchers 13
small shopkeepers 13 to the poorer
hotelkeepers and cabareteurs 12
merchants of saye cloth 9 workers represented
chiriers 9
merchants of drapery cloth 9 by combers of wool.
general merchants 7
merchants of wine 6 For the most part,
brewers and beer merchants 6
combers of wool 6 cloth weavers of
miscellaneous merchants' 5 .
cobblers 5 various sorts out
goldsmiths 5
dyers 5 numbered both the
weavers of miscellaneous cloths 5
cloth finishers 4 artisans and the
linen weavers 4
tanners 4 merchant community
weavers of drapery cloth 4
linen merchants 4 in the sample, but
this is only to be expected in a city with over a thousand
weaving masters alone. We have no indication whether these
weavers were masters or journeymen but they were probably
established for a considerable time in Valenciennes in order
to be recognized by the spies, and thus more likely to be
masters. Many of the saye weavers identified were wealthy
enough to carry arms or ride horses.
Among the more wealthy members of the Valenciennes com
munity at the presches were a few men from the echevinale
families, notably the son of Jacques Godin, the sont daughter,
and maid of Bertrand Despretz, Jehan Clauwet, the son of
Jehan de Lattre, an echevin and orevot of the city in 1566-
1567, and the mother of Bertrand Gruel, a longtime Echevin.
and a member of the Grebert family who arrived with Godin's
son. The impact Calvinism had made on the echevinale
185.
families is indicated by the presence of the wives of Rasse

de la Fontaine dit Wicart and the wife of Pierre de la Fon
taine dit Wicart, of the reknowned scholarly family. Al
though the Greberts, the de la Fontaine dit V/icarts, and the
Godins are at the top of the echevinale families and most
wealthy rentiers of the city, the spies did not indicate
wholesale participation of the Echevinale families. The
majority of the Echevinale families were missing, including
those who were more reliant on the will of the king, namely
the De la Croix, the Desmaisieres, the De le Hoves, the
LePoivres, and the d'Oultremans.
The merchant community, however, was comprehensively
represented: Among the families of wine merchants were Michel
Herlin the elder, Michel Herlin the younger, Jacques Gellee,
Jehan Turotte, who dealt in both wine and wool, Jehan Bruneau,
Daniel Coureau, and Jehan Martin. Among the saye merchants
were members of the LeBoucq family, Pierre de la Rue, Allard
Bar, who was also a innkeeper, Nicolas Bassee, also a whole
saler in wool, and. Antoine de le Becq. Among the drapery
merchants were Pierre Buyret, Mathieu Cardon, Guillaume de
la Deuze, the sons of Pierre Morda, and Pierre Caufourrier.
Among the wool merchants were Sandrin Clincquart, Collin
Macarce, Haquind Macaree, and Jehan Lescuyer. There was
also an assortment of other important merchants including
Jacques Lespinart, a linen merchant, Georges Linauart, a
grain merchant, and Pierre Bison, a merchant of soaps and
toilet accessories. Also attending many of the presches
were several officers of the city or members of their
<0°
186.
families: Jehan Mahieu and Andrieu Mernier, the two

maltres des oeuvres and the latter was also appointed master
carpenter for the city works, Jehan Hostelet and Jehanette
Warin, municipal officials in charge of the seals of the
city, while the families of treasurers of the city for the
year were represented in the persons of Vincent Pesteau
and the daughters of Nicolas Vivien. Many of the others who
were identified were upper level artisans, or petty shop
keepers and tavern owners. Among the most active at the
•presches were Jehan Allen, host of the Cigoing d*0r in the
rue Anges, Sandrin Pietre, host of L*Empereur outside the
Tournis;ienne gate, Marguerite Plichon and Jehan, butchers,
and Jehan Le Douille, a master mason. The innkeepers of the
taverns called La Marcq, Haubergon. St. Nicolas, and D*Or
leans were also present along with Jacques Joffroy of the
Lion D*or and Jehan Le Josne of L'Ours, two taverners of
especially activist tendencies.
Many of these men belonged to the Calvinist consistory
and led the urban congregations from the city to the country
side and back again. The activities of these men during the
sermons were those one would expect of the bourgeois citizen:
They came mounted and armed and spent much of their time on
the outskirts of the crowds on the lookout for royal offi
cials or troops which might try to capture or massacre the
congregation. Armed with arquebuses, pistols, and swords,
they would ride before and behind the women,, children, and
artisans as they trooped out of the city gates into the
m
187 .
countryside. Many times they would fire their arms into the
air upon regaining the walls of Valenciennes.- The presche
of 22 July 1566 was described as "like a camp" with mounted
bourgeois ringing the assembly and patrolling in the nearby
woods. The Calvinist heralds who went about the streets
announcing the services, asked all to go armed if they could
and were able. The merchants brought firearms, while the
artisans brought an occasional pistol or a halberd, and the
rural peasants and week-workers brought pitch forks and
scythes. The spy LeLievre said, "Most of those who brought
forks were peasants from the villages," while the horsemen
contained "many merchants".'*'
As the preaching continued during the summer of 1566
the participants became more organized and disciplined.
. The Valenciennes Calvinists, as opposed to the peasants at
tending, marched in ranks behind the women and infants.
Similarly on the night of 20th of August during the return
from a mass sermon
les arquebusiers et aultres vyans longs bas- .
tons alloient de rengs et par order comme
gendarmerie marchant, et les femmes et les
aultres non ayans bastons alloien devant. . .
^while the/ chevaulchers unde grande par-
tie voltisoient authour du bpis pour des-
covrir les embuscades. . . .
Conventicles and preaching sessions had the same format,
namely theiypical Calvinist service. As the congregation
■^''Deposition", p. 176.
2"Deposition", p. I8 5 .
188.
assembled they would be led in psalm-singing by one of the
deacons or elders. After the arrival of the crowd, an
elder would read in the vernacular a passage from the Scrip
tures, and then the minister would preach a sermon on the
biblical passages read. At no time during the 15^3 and
1566 presches was there any mention in the reports of spies
and officials of non-religious content of sermons. There
were no reported speeches against the sovereign prince or
the magistrates; on the .contrary, the preachers reportedly
exhorted their congregations to adhere to the orders of the
magistrates in all that appertained to their authority. The
in'arquis de Berghes reported that the sermons only reflected
desire for liberty of conscience in doctrinal matters which
the preachers said was not the realm of the magistrates.^
In all the police reports of the .Calvinist presches at Valen
ciennes not one ever reported a sermon on a subject other
than that of a biblical text. After the sermon there was
more psalm-singing and sometimes, if a trained minister
like Be Bres was present, there would be celebration of the
sacraments of baptism and marriage.
Another function of the presches was charity. During
the services, the deacons took up collections from the
wealthy bourgeois and artisans and passed alms out to the
poorer members of the flock. Sometimes these monies were
•kept and given out later during visits of deacons to the
homes of the poor, and sometimes alms were given out during
^HTRV, Vol. Ill, Berghes to the regent, 10 Kay 15^3, po. 260-
2617 ”
189.
the -presches themselves.1 These are the first indications

we have of the charitable function of the Calvinist church '
at Valenciennes. Alms were evidently part of the incentive
to the exploited and discontented peasant workers to come to
«•
the Calvinist -presches in the countryside as peasant families

were able to attend to receive material aid which was denied
them by the charity laws of Valenciennes,
In sum, Calvinism came early into the Valenciennes and
Tournai area which seems to have been the vanguard of the
movement in the Netherlands. Valenciennes was the first city
to have overt chanting in 15^1 and the countryside of Valen
ciennes and Tournai was the scene of large preaching sessions
in 15^3 and 156 6 . The popularity of the chanting and preach
ing with the lower populations probably came from both the
spiritual and material functions of the church. There is
no evidence to suggest that charges were taken for Calvinist
marriages or baptisms.; but there is evidence that charity
was made available to poor persons who were regularly ex
cluded from the municipal system of charity. ' . •
The positions in the consistory were filled by members
of the merchant community and the upper level artisans.
These men oversaw the practical as opposed to doctrinal ad
ministration of the Calvinist church. The' establishment
of the Calvinist church in Valenciennes enabled the merchants
and bourgeois to gain a measure of control ever religious
life that was denied to them under the Catholic institutions ;
1HTRV, Vol. II,^La Thieulloye to the regent* 11 May 15^3* PP»

263 -2 6 5 ? and ’‘Deposition”, pp. 175» 176, and I8 3 .
.
190
through that control they were able to bypass the abuses .
of the parish curates and to institute a new doctrinal and
moral discipline among their congregations. It also enabled
the merchant-bourgeois to combat Anabaptists, "libertines”,
and "radicals" who were feared because they were thought
to be a threat to property and authority; the disorganiza
tion and decay of the parish churches perhaps made the
Catholic church less functional on the lower level as a
bulwark against the Anabaptists, and Valenciennes had appealed
t
to Calvin himself to combat the sect. The advantages in

the Calvinist organizational structure must not be under- '
estimated, as without them it is doubtful that the Geneva-
trained ministers would have been allowed to lead the mer
chant-bourgeois in doctrinal matters.
For ministers like De Bres and La Grange and for serious
Calvinists, the institution of the reformed church in Valen
ciennes was, of course, an attack upon the Catholic church
and a return to the true faith by means of the doctrines of
sola scriotura and of justification by faith alone; this
enable them to preach against the Kass and what they con
sidered to be heretical veneration of saints and relics.
That the Calvinist ministers spent a lot of their time com
bating the Anabaptists through disputations and writings
is due to the fact that Anabaptisra was very strong in the
Netherlands, particularly in the rural areas in the province
of Flanders to the west of Valenciennes.^ Thus, Calvinism
.Braekrcan, "Guy de Bres et la prooagande Anabaptiste",

ASHP3. Vol. I (1952), pp. 1^-31? and C-. De Bres, La Racine.
source et fonderoent des anabaptistes ( Abel C.le m:e nee, 1 5 6 5 ).
191.
meant different things to different individuals and groups.
5. Conclusions
This chapter has completed our review of the economic,
political, and religious institutions of Valenciennes and
calls for presentation of a conclusion not only for the
latter insitutions "but for the others as well. Such conclu- .
sions are not inappropriate in this place because Valenciennes'
religious institutions reflected many of the group tensions
existing in the economic and political institutions of the
city. We have seen that almost all the institutions bene
fited some social groups more than others, and we have shown
many of the group tensions which existed because of the
unequal distribution of wealth, rights, and privileges. This
last chapter has indicated what social groups belonged to
the Catholic and Calvinist churches in mid-l6th century
Valenciennes, and we can now correlate religious preference
with social groups in order to indicate how group tensions
seemed to have prompted the polarization into conflicting
religious parties.
The echevinale families were quite distinct from the
merchant-bourgecis who made up the rest of the elite of
Valenciennes because they were, according to the values of
time, socially superior. They obtained positions in the
highest political offices and the religious benefices in
Valenciennes because they belonged to families who had in
the past loyally served the prince and had intermarried with
nobility. Their virtual monopoly of the positions in the
local abbeys.was an extension of their monopoly of the rentes
and of their recurring positions in the Magistrate It is,
therefore, no surprise that the: principal echevinale fami-'
lies were not to be found in the ranks of the Calvinists;
the echevinale families had benefited from the institutional
structures and had too much to lose and almost nothing to
gain by turning to heresy.
The rest of the elite of Valenciennes,, the merchant-
bourgeois, were not homogeneous but they had many things in
common nonetheless. The'merchants made large profits from
the cloth industries because of their positions at the end
of the industrial process, and they also owned considerable
landed property. The lower level bourgeois masters and small
proprietors owned their means of production but accumulated
less wealth than the merchants. The merchants, were excluded
from positions of authority in the Magistrat, but were able
to gain a measure of de facto power within the Conseil Par-
ticulier especially in their positions as militia captains.
The rank and file bourgeois were left with little political
participation at all except in their privileged capacity to
act as the bearers of arms and enforcers of law in the
streets. Eoth the merchants and the bourgeois were forced
to pay the indirect taxes on cloths. and on beer and wine
which went to support the wars of the prince and the profits
of the rentiers. The differences between the merchant-bour
geois and the echevinale families is illustrated by their
different roles in the .ioyeuse- entree of 15^0: The echevinale
193.
families waited inside the city with the Magistrat and

their illustrious members later carried the emperor on a
dais; these activities reflected their authority and their
reliance on the prince. Meanwhile, the merchant-bourgeois
had ridden out to greet the emperor in a display of almost
vulgar wealth and crude force— note Herlin's clothes of clbth
of gold, and the troop upon troop of armed bourgeois.
It was also among the merchants and the bourgeois that
we find the popularity of the plays and farces which ex
pressed anticlerical ideas, This was only natural as they
were among those who had to pay the vice-curates for the
sacraments, to pay the taxes of the abbot of Hasnon on wine
and beer, and were supposedly beholden to support the mendi
cant orders with alms. Given their support of municipal
institutions which excluded the unemployed and the unde
serving from charity, it is not surprising that they dis
liked the clerics who not only abused their control of the
religious institutions, but also lived off the labor of
others.
The popularity of Calvinism among the merchants and
bourgeois is indisputable; the merchants filled the positions
of leadership in the consistory and the latter supplied the
protection as armed foot and horsemen during the presches.
The merchants filled similar positions on the consistory
as they had done in the Conseil rarticulier; in both cases
they had the same kinds of administrative and executive
functions, i.e. financial, charitable, and military. Simi
larly, the bourgeois were the rank and file in the urban
194.
militia and the rank and file in the columns of the Cal
vinists going to and from country services. While the mer
chant-bourgeois had boycotted the Catholic services and
held the sacraments in low repute, they were now participa
ting in the Calvinist church in positions of power and
leadership. Undoubtedly, one of their motivations for em
bracing Calvinism was the desire to. gain positions of leader
ship and power which had up that time been denied them in
the religious realm. The merchants seem to have joined
the Calvinist church because its organizational structure
allowed them to gain these positions whereas other religious
choices would not have served their political needs.
Lower down in the social order the journeymen did not
own their means of production and held the lowest privileged
positions in the guilds. As residents of mannant political
statusi they were excluded from any political participation;
they could not resist the discipline enforced on them by the
guilds and the institutions of charity and law enforcement.
Nevertheless, they had advantages which were denied the week-
workers and the peasants; As the journeymen trained in
privileged towns they were more readily admitted to work
than those from rural areas, and as they lived in the city
they enjoyed the security of the walls and the benefits of
charity. Their social life inside the city reflected their
economic and political disadvantages; they turned to enter
tainments which afforded them a measure of escape from
poverty and boredom, i.e. drinking and gaming.
195.
At the very bottom of the social order were the.peasants

who came to work for the week in Valenciennes and the unem
ployed floating population of the countryside. Their rural
society still needs to be studied in the areas of Valen
ciennes in order to ascertain1a complete picture of their
interests, but we do know about some aspects of their society.
In Valenciennes their labor was exploited for subsistence
wages with little expectations of ever attaining higher
status in the guilds. As forains they enjoyed none of the
advantages of the mannants and-in time of work stoppages
were not provided for by the charity system; they were the
groups most punished by a legal system whose chief function
was to protect property. In the countryside much of their
land was held by Catholic religious institutions and there
had been a long history of strife between peasants and such
abbeys as that of Hasnon over domain rights and rents.
Both the journeymen artisans and the peasant week-
workers seemed to be ready to flock to the scene of exorcisms
or to embrace magical remedies for their ills. Perhaps some
of these worker-peasants turned to the millenial visions pro
vided by the Anabaptist sect as did similar social groups
earlier in the century at Munster. Both the Catholics and
the Calvinists, indeed all men of substance, were bent on
the extermination of the Anabaptists who were considered
to be a threat to property and authority, and we have little
evidence of Anabaptism in Valenciennes during the l6th cen
tury. Instead, the poor v/orkers and peasants in and around
Valenciennes were drawn in large numbers to country presches
held by the Calvinists. The merchant-bourgeois, promoted this
church and allowed their workers to attend* because Calvinist•
workers posed no threat to them given the sermons of the
Calvinists which stressed obedience to legal authority.
.
197
CHAPTER FOUR: THE INQUISITION AS A FOCUS
OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TENSIONS
The first three chapters have revealed the internal in

stitutional tensions between different social groups which
made them ready to accept a particular religious preference.
Yet the static institutional analysis has not supplied all the
ansvêrs as to why the polarization into Catholic and Calvinist
d
parties took place because it ignors important economic and
political changes which occurred during the late 1550s and
early 1560s. These changes exacerbated the institutional ten
sions, and help to explain why the Calvinists attracted such
crowds and why they behaved more as an armed political party
than as a religious congregation. Underlying the 1550s and
1560s were general economic trends v/hich undoubtedly caused
discontent, although the lack of sources does not allow us
to prove it for Valenciennes. Vfe do have sources indicating
the effects of the government's response to heresy; for Val-
• enciennes, there were important economic and political changes
\
brought about by the ordinances and inquisition established to

eradicate heretics. These must be seen as arising out of the
conflict between local privileges and the pressure for a cen
tralized administration applied by the royal inquisition.
This chapter v/ill show hov; the inquisition and the royal ad
ministrators became the focus of discontent in Valenciennes;
it will indicate the process by which.the administration
alienated key levels of the Valenciennes population.
198.
1. Placards and the inquisition under Charles V
At the very beginning it is necessary to present the
background history of the government's policy toward heretics.
One can go back to earlier centuries for the start of this
policy, but for our purposes we will begin with the reign
of the Emperor Charles V.
Prom his earlies youth Charles V was taught to see him
self as a defender of Christendom, a role which he believed
was inseparable from his offices and dignity as sovereign.
Although this itinerant monarch had to contend with the poli
tical and financial burdens brought on by the chronic Kapsburg-
Valois wars, his devotion and conscientiousness enabled him
to accomplish much in the religious realm also. He felt
himself responsible in God's eyes for the spiritual health
of his subjects' souls and thus compelled to fight the doc
trinal deviations which arose during his reign. Like most
men of the 16th century, including the Protestants, he felt
that there was no other method to deal with heretics than
censorship, death, and confiscation of property. Thoughout
his long tenure in office these solutions were codified
in the emperor's ordinances or pi ac ards on heresy.
The history of the placards under Charles is well known
and only needs to be reviewed in outline here: The first
major ordinance came in March 1521 and called for the
seizure of all books of Martin Luther and for their public
burning; there was an accompanying prohibition on the printing,
199.
selling, baying, or owning of any written material attacking

the Holy See and/or ecclesiastical authority. A law laid down
in May of the same year prohibited the mention, of Lutheran
books in any other publication. In 1526 , the list of pro
scribed authors increased as the reformers themselves increased,
and assemblies and conventicles were'prohibited. By 1529 the
law stated that heretical books, or the ideas contained there
in, could not be read, disputed or discussed publicly ' or
secretly, while unauthorized vernacular Bibles were to be
confiscated. No one could discuss the Scriptures unless he
was a theologian from a university. Hotelkeepers and land
owners had to denounce their criminally unorthodox lodgers and
tenants, and the punishment for heresy was made loss of life
and confiscation of property. In 1531 an edict stipulated
that no one could any longer claim ignorance of the laws
regulating religious life.~
In 15^0 a nl acard was passed especially for Hainaut
and for Valenciennes in particular. It cites trade in pro
hibited books growing in the area of Valenciennes, along with
the increase of songs, ballads, and plays of rhetoricians
which allegedly contained heretical ideas. All bookstores,
libraries, and rhetorical houses in Hainaut were to be
searched and the forbidden books were to be seized and their
2
owners punished.
^Recaeil ces anciennes ordonnances de la 3elgiaue. Pays-Bas.

2e series, 1506-1?00 (Brussels, 1898-1922), Vol. II, pp 1-2,"
6 9 , 70-71, 73-33, 402, and 578-583; Vol. Ill, pp. ^ 6 5 , and
^52-^53.
^Recueil des ancier.nes ordonnances, Vol. IV, pp. 210-211, 22^,
and 232.
200.
Other general ordinances came in 1550* One in April of

that year carried a comprehensive index of considerable
length containing all prohibited book titles; the placard
of July required the certification of all newcomers to a par
ticular parish by the curate as to their Catholicity. In
155^ one of Charles V's last ordinances on religious or moral
matters set forth the guidelines of a policy which would be
later enforced by troops in Valenciennes,— that of assuring
urban governments were filled with loyal Catholics. The
pi a card ordered governors not to choose officers of justice
from those of doubtful orthodoxy. Only fervent Catholics
were to be made judges in order to obtain effective action
against heretics. 1
The specified punishments for religious crimes, i.e.
banishment, fines, and birching for minor offenses, burning
alive and confiscation of property for convicted heretics,
conflicted with many of the particularistic privileges of
cities and localities. At Valenciennes the magistrates
always formally contested the jurisdictional claims of the
prince based on lese-majesty divine because such claims ig
nored municipal rights based in charters. For example, the
Magistrat objected that appropriation of property contravened
^-Recueil des anciennes ordonnances, Vol. V, pp. 55-?8, and

335-333, Undoubtedly this policy was a reason why at Valen
ciennes influential Calvinist merchants like Michel Herlin
and Hoel LeBoucq were almost always passed over in the selec
tion of magistrates. Herlin only served once, in 1562 -156 3 ,
and LeBoucq not at all.
201.
the Valenciennes "bourgeois privilege of exemption from con

fiscation. But in spite of the numerous jurisdictional con
flicts in the years of Charles V's reign, there was no crisis
caused by the placards. In the early years of the reign
many magistrates and merchants feared the here.tics, and the
placards were rationalized by them as a safeguard against
the ravages of those threatening merchant-bourgeois life and
property. Strong bourgeois opposition to the pi acards and
the inquisition did not appear in the time of Charles V since
the Pl a cards were rarely enforced against privileged groups;
when they were enforced, it was usually against vagabond
Anabaptists or a few monks of Lutheran tendencies. 1 However,
with the growth of Calvinism among urban bourgeois groups
in the 15 ^0 's, and with the persecution after the visit of
Pierre Brully, the ordinances took on a new oppressive sig
nificance for merchants and magistrates.
It is well known that the inquisition in the l6 th cen
tury was a confusion of different jurisdictions. At dif
ferent times there were three judicial authorities which
either made claims to try heretical cases or actually did
so.in Valenciennes. For example, the magistrates claimed
^Before the 15^0's there were only a few executions in

Valenciennes of obscure heretics, and they were done by the
usual method: prosecution by the prevot-le-compte and con
demnation by the friaaristrat. Under the Burgundians there were
no systematic persecutions of heretics. In 1 ^ 9 two heretics
were put to death under Philip the Good, one for vauderie and
the other for sorcery. In 1531 two linen weavers named "Joose”
and Robert were executed for Lutheran tendencies, and in 153^
one I-iaillotin was executed for “heresies" See C. Faillard,
"Date des premiers proces c'heresie dans le nora de la France
et notament a Valenciennes,M 3SHPF. Vol. XXVII (1873),
pp. 300-303.
202.
the right to judge heretics prosecuted by the nrevot-le-comotei

this urban inquisition was not based on any charter specifying
the competence of the urban authority in religious matters,
but rather on precedent. Theoretically the right to judge
heretics belonged to the ecclesiastical courts of the sees of
Arras and Cambrai under canon law, but the Valenciennes magis
trates had been successful in excluding their claims because
the bishops had no force in the city. Another jurisdiction
was that of the sovereign and was based on the right of
lese-majesty divine; the prince's inquisitorial commissions
were usually set up because the other jurisdictions were not
functioning correctly.
In 1 5 ^ the Emperor's inquisition was instituted in
Hainaut in order to round up heretics in the wake of the
notorious Pierre Brully. The commission to investigate the
incident was headed by Francois de Bruyn, the first advocate
of the council of Flanders, otherwise known as Tisnacq. He
was charged to investigate heretics in the cities of Tournai,
Valenciennes, Lille, Arras, and Douai. He was to have juris
dictional supremacy over local authorities in the prosecution
of heretics. Tisnacq's relatively mild inquisition differed
from those of the early l$6 0 's only in the degree to which it
enforced the olacards; it aroused concern on three of the
most important issues whcih would later estrange the bourgeois
of Valenciennes: the abrogation of the city's competence to
judge heresy cases, the threat to bourgeois exemptions from
torture, and the exemption from confiscation of property.
203 .
Tisnacq*s commission also encountered similar early opposi
tion in the towns of Tournai, Lille, and Arras.
The royal commission started interrogations of prisoners
on the 28th and 29 th of December, and Brully only had to he
threatened with torture to point out all the houses of ad
herents in Tournai, Valenciennes, Arras, and Lille. The
heretics named included people of "quality” such as the Ber-
narde family in Tournai and the Herlins and Crespins of Arras
besides many others "of little substance". Executions took
place during January and February, 15^5* at Tournai when two
unrepentant cloth weavers were beheaded while Brully himself
was burned at the stake on the market place. Later, a tailor
his wife, and a save-weaver were executed for giving refuge
to Brully and for assisting at conventicles. These tortures
and executions of artisans were a common occurence in the
16 th century, and they usually did not disturb the bourgeois
families.
In Tisnacq*s inquisition the notable heretics were never
brought to justice, but allowed to flee, as in the case of
Jean Crespin of Arras. Or they were simply released for in
sufficient evidence, as in the case of members of the Herlin
family. Tisnacq was not supervised closely and found it to
his advantage to cooperate with the magistrates; when he
arrived in Tournai in December of 15^» he was presented with
a gift of four kegs of wine by the merchants. As there was
no opprobrium attached to venality of government officials
in the 16th century, Tisnacq perhaps received other considera
V
20k.
tions which helped to convince him to pursue a policy of good

relations and friendly treatment for the heretics of the upper
society. In spite of the fact that Tisnacq himself recognized
the main supporters of the minister Brully to he bourgeois
artisans and merchants and not the poor "simple people" of
the lower working population, only what were considered in
significant persons were prosecuted. The magistrates of the
French-speaking cities seem to have reached a modus vivendi
with the Tisnacq inquisition of Charles V; they cooperated
in punishing a few obscure people while letting the important
ones go.1
Yet, the executions of the year 15^5 did inflame moderate
Catholic opinion. Posters appeared in the streets of Tournai
and Valenciennes criticizing the harshness of the pla ca rds
and denouncing the inquisition. In spite of government
pressure on the magistrates to punish the persons responsible,
there were no arrests as a result of these publicized criti
cisms. Clandestine Calvinist activities in Valenciennes
and Tournai increased during the period 15^5-1550 and were
supported by rhetorician families like the Herlins and
Charles Paillard, "Une page de l'histoire des Pays-3as",

Letter of Tisnacq to Charles V, 6 February 15^5* PP*-63-70;
and 3euzart, Les Heresies -pendant le Koyen Age et la Reform,
pp. 178-179, That Tisnacq was a comparatively moderate in
quisitor is indisputable. His own report stares his mis
givings and unwillingness to recommend death for those who
had merely gone to two or three secret meetings. He stated
that he did not think the king meant the rlaccards to be
interpreted so arbitrarily, nemoire de Tisnaco, conseiller
imperial, sur le fait des complices cs Pierre ce brusley et le
recueil des confessions faits s en rsar ieg rrisonniers .
pour la loi de Tournay et de Valenciennes, A53, Papiers d'etat
et de l'audience, Farces de Vienne, no. a LVII and XLVIII.
205.
LeBoucqs of Valenciennes, and the de la 3arres of Tournai in

plays and farces portraying the corruption of the Catholic
Church and the folly of the persecution of reformers.^
After Tisnacq's mission the Brussels government established
a new position at Valenciennes of resident inquisitor. From
the beginning the unpopularity of the new post almost ren
dered it functionless, so it could not be filled by echevi-
nale appointees. A little known municipal clerk, Jean Cau-
drelier, was chosen but he claimed that attempts to prosecute
heretics were futile and that there was no money to be earned
in the office as the magistrates would not allow confisca
tions of bourgeois property. Soon, he renounced the post
which thenceforth remained vacant.
In 1551 four heretics were condemned to death by the
Valenciennes magistrates after considerable pressure from
Brussels. Three of the four were artisans, but one,Michielle
de Caignoncle, was the widow of a bourgeois shopkeeper. As
a unrepentent Calvinist, the widowrwas sent to the stake,
and her property was confiscated. Even though she was a
woman, and as such possessed no bourgeois rights, there was
consternation at the confiscation of her property among the
merchants.^ The execution was particularly unpopular with
■^Paillard, "Une page", p. 4-8.

2
Charles Rahlenbeck, Les chanteries de Valenciennes, pp. 121-
125, and Beuzart, Les heresies, pp. 157-159.
-^Paillard, "Note sur Michielle de Caignoncle," BSHPF, Vol.
XXVI (1877), PP« 25 ^-2 6 3 , She was the only person-killed from
a merchant family during the reign of Charles V. Her confis
cated property came to the considerable sum of 1,21**- livres
tournois.
the artisans and workers as the wido'w Caignoncle had a reputa
tion for charitable contributions to the poor. The contempora
martryrologist, Crespin, immortalized her philanthropy in his
description of her execution by having one of the poor arti
sans in the crowd call out in lamentation, "Alas, madame, you
will no longer give us alms!”1 Members of the crowd who
watched the executions were reportedly outraged by the deaths
and went so far as to threaten the prevot-le-cpm t e and magis
trates who participated in the judgments. Chroniclers com
mented on fears that there would be a riot by the irate
crowd i
, . . ceux de Valenciennes n'ont oubli£ la re
volte qui la craindoient quant l'on mist a mort,
en leur persecutions, C-ilies Vivier, Jacques et
Mic)ji.el LeFebvre avec Michielle de Caignoncle. •
• •
2. General economic trends at mid-century

Before continuing with the history of the tensions
caused by the inquisition under Charles's son, Philip II,
one has to take cognizance of the general economic trends
which economic historians have shown to underlie the crises
of Europe in mid-century. The long years of war had resulted
in the overexpenditure of princely finances and the bankrupt
cies of 1556 and 1559. On the one hand, the bankruptcies
caused the government to renege on the salaries of its
V. Crespin, Livre des Martyrs,1597 edition, 1551 year.

^Memoire de Jacques de Y«esembeke (Brussels, 1859), pp, 73-79*
207 .
officials and, on the other, they caused disruption of credit
markets and ruined banking houses. Coincident with diffi
culties in the financial world were industrial crises; in
the Netherlands, the cloth industries suffered decline be
cause of competition from the English putting out systems.
Also, there was an industrial overproduction in the 1550's
which the limited markets and undeveloped transportation
could not accomodate.
To what extent the economic position of Valenciennes was
damaged by these developments is not fully determinable.
Probably few merchant or echevinale families were important
enough to have been creditors of the king; we have seen them
as investors in land and municipal rentes but have no indica
tion that they held notes of the central government. Yet, to
the extent that the crown's financial bankruptcy led to in
creased rente sales and thus to increased municipal taxes to
pay for annuities, the financial troubles of the crown were
directly detrimental to merchants in Valenciennes. Unfor
tunately, since we possess no records of Valenciennes in
dustries, we cannot chart any decline that might have taken
place in the production of cloth in the 1 5 5 0 's and early
1560's. But since Valenciennes was a major cloth producing
and wool trading city, her merchants and artisans must have
adversely felt the competition from England in the early
1550 's.
In the late 1550's the countryside around Valenciennes

was one of the last battlegrounds of the Hapsburg-Valois
208.
wars, leaving: much of the area'burned and ravaged. From
1551 to 15591 war in the area was only broken once by the
treaty of Vaucelles in 1556J the all out war existing from

1552-155^ must have disrupted trade with France and with other
cities in the area. In the 1 5 6 0 *s we know that other areas
of the Netherlands saw declines in production of cloths. This
was accompanied by a rise in the numbers of unemployed workers,
a fact which has been correlated with the willingness of lower
populations to pillage abbeys and chapels of the church. In
Valenciennes we know that many cloth workers were indeed laid
off in the 1 5 6 0 's; such was the case in the spring of 1562
when emergency measures were taken to put the unemployed to
work on fortifications at two oatardsa day in order that, as
the magistrates said, the poor people could have the means to
earn a living.^"
During the two decades of the 1550’s and 1560's there
seems to have been periodic subsistence crises indicated by
inflation of prices of grain in Valenciennes. War was re
lated to the prolonged crisis of 1553-1559 when prices of
wheat on the Valenciennes market at first doubled and later
rose to ten times the price of the late 15^-0's. The war
between Sweden and Denmark which cut the trade route from
grainproducing East Prussia was related to the shortages of
the years 1 5 6^-1565 when prices again doubled in many areas
including Valenciennes. Figures indicate that throughout
"^Paillard, HTRV, Vol. II, Deliberation of Conseil Particulier

on the poor, 11 February 15^2, pp. 102-103.
*1 . . .
209.
the period 1 5 5 3 -1 5 7 1 there was a prolonged rise in prices of

wheat on the Valenciennes market, paralleling the early period
of religious conflict. 1
There are several other scattered sources from Valen
ciennes indicating a general price rise in the 1560's. For
example, one of the private hospitals of Valenciennes, the
Hostellerie de Sain Jehan, had to increase the dole to its
residents from six sols a week in 15^1 to eight sols in 1570
2
because of the high cost of living. As we have no compre
hensive wage lists to make comparisons with price increases,
we cannot say whether real wages rose or declined. But, if
we were to generalize on the experience of more well docu
mented cities, we would say that only the highly skilled
trades were successful in retaining as high a standard of
living during the inflation; for the lesser skilled artisans
and unprotected week-workers the price rise perhaps caused
considerable hardship.
Important tensions caused by the bankruptcies and in
flation were those affecting the nobility who were employed
in the armies and in the provincial administrations of the
central government. The Hainaut nobility, already lacking
the spoils of war since the treaty of Cateau Cambresis in
^ e have a l?th century copy of the missing records of the

Halle au.x Bleds of Valenciennes. There are lacunae in
figures for certain years making comparisons difficult, but
they are nevertheless sufficient for an appreciation of the.
trend. See MBV, ms. no. 835 and Appendix:-.D.
2 ✓
CD V
Simon LeBoucq, Histoire ecclesiastic?ue de la ville et compt

de Valenciennes: 1650, ed. A. Dinaux (Valenciennes, 1844),
p. 182.
210 .
1559* found the value of their livings from seigneuries de
creasing in an inflationary economy. Not able to work or to
keep down expenditures because of their cultural imperatives,
they found themselves increasingly in debt. From the very
petty nobles like de Wingle and de Famars, who had small
chateaux in the Ticinity of Valenciennes, to the powerful mar
quis de Berghes, who was appointed grand bailli of Hainaut
and governor of Valenciennes in 15^1» the nobility were in
steadily worsening economic straits. The financial diffi
culties of most European governments in the 1560*s resulted
in a chronic stinginess when it came to paying salaries.
For example, the m'arquis de Berghes found it more rewarding
to follow the suggestions of the merchants of Valenciennes
than in executing the orders of the regent and King. On the
one hand, Berghes thanked the Magistrat for money received
for his services in furthering the city's interests at court;
he implied that his interest in doing the magistrates' bid
ding would increase in proportion to the size of future emolu
ments.1 On the other hand, Berghes wrote to the rtegent that
non-payment of his wages forced’him to absent himself from
Valenciennes in favor of his brother's bishopric of Liege
where he could live at the diocese's expense. By the fall
of 1563 , the marquis owed 5*500 ecus to his maitre d'hotel
for debts incurred at Valenciennes; he begged the regent for
part of the 6,800 florins owed to him for services in 1562-t
1563, He stated that his debts, if allowed to continue
1HTRV, Vol. II, Berghes to the Magistrat. 27 July 1551,

pp. 29-30.
.
211
unpaid, would make it impossible for him to continue in the
government s service. 1
Given such scanty evidence for Valenciennes, one is only
able to conclude that there was 'probably an underlying dis
content in various levels of the population due to general
economic trends. It is plausible to assume that these trends
were particularly devastating to the poor artisans, the rural
week-workers, and the resident forains as they were the first
to be affected by layoffs,and high grain prices. As we shall
see, social and economic historians stress the role of these
workers in the riots of the 1560’s, but the evidence is always
of an indirect nature; because of the workers' lack of con
sciousness about their economic interests and about their
relationship to general trends, it is doubtful whether ex--
plicit evidence for their economic discontent exists in more
than a few places. In Valenciennes there never was any riot
in which the lower population sacked the houses of property-
owners. However, this fact is not an indication of the ab
sence of poverty and potential riot, but rather of the tight
control kept over poor segments of the population by the
municipal charity and militia organisations. Thus, to what
ever extent the poor were affected in Valenciennes, they could
only express their frustrations over joblessness and high
prices in ways accepted by the ruling elites of the city.
That, as we shall see, would be against the inquisition.
"'HTRV. Vol. II, Berghes to the regent, 8 December 1562,

pp.T7?-^78
212*
For the merchants.and the nobility at Valenciennes the

1 5 6 0 ss were also a time of economic hardship which contrasted
unfavorably with the period of relative affluence during the

reign of Charles V. The merchants were clearly affected by
increased taxation on their products, especially wine, cloth,
and dyes, while the nobility complained of unpaid wages.
These underlying economic tensions coincided with the more
explicit political and economic tensions which would be
caused by the inquisition at Valenciennes in the 1560's.
3. The policies of Philip II and his administration

Upon the accession of Philip II in 1556 there was no
change in the basic religious policies of the government.
Charles had made sure of continuity in this regard by pro
viding his son with an education in Spain which implanted a
devotion to religious responsibilities similar to his own.
Philip, in the absence of war, was to direct himself to those
responsibilities with an attention to detail which rivaled
that of a devoted bureaucrat. It is well known that all the
piacarcs published under Philip II had their precedents
under Charles and that the reorganization of the Netherlands'
bishoprics in 1559 was planned under Charles. 3ut there were
real differences in the enforcement of those policies as
Philip more closely supervised his officials and continually
encouraged them to uphold the ola cards with increased rigor.
Philip brought an uncompromising attitude to the task of
carrying out his legacy of religious ordinances and inquisi
tions. In his correspondence with the regent Philip demanded
213 .
to know the details of religious crimes involving obscure
peasants and artisans. He personally read and annotated the
texts of hundreds of letters on the subject of heresy and dic
tated replies specifying his recommendations for punishments.
He believed that his main duty as prince was, in his words,
to eradicate the "damnable sects" for the "honor and service
of God and to save the souls of my good subjects."^
After his accession, Philip republished all the old
•placards of his father on 10 October 1556 and started a cam
paign. to eradicate the known strongholds of heresy in the Low
Countries. One of these was Valenciennes. He sent a special
letter to Valenciennes in which he complained of the preva
lence of heretics there who
. , . se^forcent de jour en jour secretement
amener seduir et atirer a leurs dampnables
opinions faulses et erronees doctrines le
simple peuple tellement que trouvons estre re-
quisêt tres necessaires que dilligent remede
et serieuse provision se face contre tel
seditions. . . .
In spite of these exhortations, the magistrates continued
the policy which had attained a degree of success under
Charles V, namely to generally ignore the pi a cards. The
criminal registers for the years 1556 through 1559 show no
judgments of religious crimes. These were the last years of
war, disruptions of trade, famine, and the local failure of
harvests which put economic stresses on the population of
^Gachard, Correspondance frar.caise de Marguerite d'autriche,

Vol. I, Philip to Marguerite, 31 October 15^0, p. 312.
2ACV, Series AA, no. 9^» fo. l6vo.
214 .
Hainaut, disrupting them and setting them in motion to find
better conditions. The magistrates had their hands full in
preserving order and protecting the city from the ravages
of the opposing armies.
After the peace of Cateau Cambresis in 1559» the situa
tion changed when the Calvinists initiated the chanteries.
As a response, in February 1559 Philip published a general
T>1a card which stated that the farces and ballads of the
chambers of rhetoric had scandalized the Scriptures, priests,
and monks. The ordinance claimed that by these farces
le commune peuple est mal ediffie, seduit
et deceu, chose vrayement dangereuse et per-
nicieuse au bien publicq . . . au temps present
. . . les mauvaises et damnables sectes de jour
en jour pullulent et s'accroissent d'avantaige.1
For these reasons all plays, farces, ballads, songs, comedies,
and refrains, which mentioned ecclesiastics or referred to
them or their estates directly or indirectly were banned;
morality plays came under special attack as rhetoricians
were "thenceforth required to have scripts edited by curates
or royal officials. This rlacard followed the lead of that
of 1540 which had barred all plays critical of the church,
but it went further by providing for a system of enforcement
through the orev$t-le-c omte and other royal officials who
would thenceforth systematically pass judgment upon their
orthodoxy. This ordinance against songs and plays critical
of the church may have, in its turn, promoted an increase
in chanting in 1559-1562.
ÂCV, Series AA, no. 9 8 , ff. 103vo-109vo.
215 .
Later that year, on 8 August 1559 before leaving the
Netherlands for the last tine, Philip II wrote a long in
struction to the brevot-le-com-ts. He charged that the "prin
cipal evil" in the spread of heresy in Valenciennes was the
negligence of urban authorities in executing the placards.
Laxity would no longer be tolerated, and the government would
in the future expect the ordinances to be upheld "with the
utmost rigor, without respect to anyone, whosoever they may
be." He told his officials to proceed not only against the
heretics, but also against judges who would want to use "dis
simulation and connivance."1 This letter, undersigned by
Philip, exhibits a threatening tone toward the magistrates
which had not been apparent in the communications of the gov
ernment up to that time. The king reflected the growing opinion
on the part of many in Brussels that the magistrates and bour
geois of Valenciennes had been infected by heresy. C-ranvelle
had received a report on the observance of Catholic services
in his diocese of Arras in which the city had received special
o
opprobrium. The chanteries of 1559 convinced the government
that Tournai and Valenciennes were "evil" heretical cities;
Viglius, president of the Council of State, designated
Valenciennes the foremost "ville mauvaise" on his list of
disobedient cities by 1551 when the public singing there had
reached its peak. Philip himself considered the southern
J'ACV, Series AA, 98, piacards of 1553-1556, ff. 99-101vo.

2
See above, pp. 131-134.
216.
French-speaking cities propagators of heresies, and he wrote

that the chanting there had. to he stopped to prevent it from
spreading elsewhere.
By 1562 the regent was coming to .the conclusion that the
magistrates and merchants of Valenciennes were actually con
spiring with the Calvinists. Margaret wrote to Philip that
certain merchants of Valenciennes and Tournai had "business
contacts with the 'heretic’.s of Frankfort and with the Hugue
not: merchants of France. She suspected them of being permis
sive and tolerant toward conventicles, chanteries, and open
air preaching, and she was not sure that the magistrates them
selves were "clean" as they seemed influenced by their elders,
p
— evidently a reference to men like Herlin andie Boucq. She
considered the heretics prosecuted at Valenciennes few in
number compared to the massesof chanters that were reported
by her officers to be in the city. The regent continually
exhorted the magistrates to uphold the d a cards and punish
the heretics "by the punishments indicated by these -placards,
3
without any withholding, favor, or dissimulation." The king
took up this refrain against Valenciennes and Tournai magis
trates when he wrote on 10 November 1561 that the "perverse
sects" were growing day in and day out, and that all cities
1HTRV, Vol. II, Philip to the regent, 16 November 1561 ,

pp. 53-59.
^HTRV, Vol. II, regent to theking, 18 October 1561 , ?P» ^-6-1:.
^HTRV, Vol. II, regent to theMagistrat, 29 May 15-60, pp. 9-H.
See also, letter of 7 December 15~0, pp. 1^-15» and letter of
November 1561, pp. 51-52.
had to uphold the placards without "dissimulation".1 On
10 November 1561 the King again undersigned a letter to the
magistrates of Valenciennes and Tournai which exhorted them
2
to uphold the placards without "connivance" with the heretics.
This government preoccupation with heresy seemingly to
the exclusion of its consequences is not extraordinary in the
16th century\ in Calvinist cities like Geneva, there was a
similar possession of men's minds with what was universally
felt to he the horrors of heresy. As we have seen, Philip II
followed the policy of his predessor without any substantive
innovation. The increased pressure on the magistrates ap
parently was due to a corresponding increase in Calvinist
activities in the late 1550's and early 1 5 6 0 's. Neverthe
less, both sides saw the situation radically changing from
the relative calm of the reign of Charles V; just as the spread
of Calvinism seemed a radically new and most horrible phenone-
nom to Catholic government circles, the threats from Madrid
and Brussels against the rights and privileges of the bour
geois and magistrates must have seemed a new departure for
the upper society of Valenciennes. The records of the pla
cards^ at Valenciennes indicate no similar criticisms of the
urban authorities under Charles V in regard to heresy. For
the first time, it was not just a few artisans who were being
threatened, but rather the bourgeois and ^chevinale families
themselves.
1HTRV, Vol. II, Circular letter of Philip II, 10 November

15617 pp. 56-57.
2HTRV, Vol. II, Philip II to Valenciennes and Tournai magis
trates, 10 November 1-561, pp. 60-61.
.
218
Jurisdictional challenge from the archbishop of Cambrai
and the reestablishment of the royal inquisition: 1559-1561
• In the 15 6 0 *s the inquisition of the central government

was reestablished because of the laxity of the magistrates
in prosecuting heretics. But the circumstances of that re
establishment arose out of a jurisdictional conflict between
the city and the archbishop of Cambrai, MaximiIlian de Berghes
(but no relation to the marquis de Berghes), brought on by
the establishment of the New Bishoprics in 1559*
As mentioned earlier, the jurisdictional conflict with
episcopal courts had been successfully waged by the Magistrat
of Valenciennes for several hundred years. Nevertheless,
during the l6th century the bishop of Cambrai had pursued his
legitimate claim to inquisitorial power with the help of
the Dominicans of Valenciennes. These Dominicans of the
priory of St. Pol supplied the bishop with information
implicating both notable merchants and bourgeois and lowly
artisans as heretics; in the 1 5 5 0 's and 1560*s the prior,
Nicolas Decq, incurred the wrath of the magistrates’and
bourgeois for his spying activities and his interception
of mail sent from Strasbourg and Geneva to Valenciennes.
It was said that he caused several families to emigrate
because of the ihreat of their exposure as heretics.
^-Rahienbeck, Les Chanteries a Valenciennes, p. 128.
219 .
The jurisdictional tensions between the bishop of Cambrai
and the city went back to the late 1520's. The bishop at that
time attempted to act as prosecutor of several Lutherans un
earthed by St. Pol by demanding that they be arrested and
judged by the magistrates.1 In the 1540's the correspondence
from Bishop Robert of Croy to the emperor and the regent con
tained pleas for an increase of his inquisitorial power in
Valenciennes. 2 In unimportant cases the magistrates would at
times follow the bishop's recommendation, but always being
sure to state that their actions did not prejudice the city's
jurisdictional privileges. For the most part, the town suc
cessfully prevented any encroachment of the ecclesiastical
pretentions to inquisitorial power in Valenciennes.-"
The situation changed after the establishment of the
|l
New Bishoprics in 1559. They caused a further deterioration
^-Arsene Loin, "Documents concernant les placcards, 1'inquisi

tion et les troubles religieux dans les Pays-3as, et speciale-
ment dans le comote de Hainaut, sous regnes de Charles—Quint
et Phillippe II," 3CRH, 2© series, Vol.'8 (1855-86), pp. 23-24.
^See letter of Robert de Croy to Marie d'Autrich, 29-May 15^1*
BSHPF, Vol. IXX, pp. 124-127.
^Duberger, Inquisition en Belgique] p. 235.
4Conceived of as early as the 14th century and planned under
Charles V in the 1520's, the New 3ishoprics were designed to
rectify a chronic confusion of episcopal jurisdictions. The
old bishoprics of Utrecht, Liege, Cambrai, Arras, Tournai,
and Therouanne did not represent the Netherlands geographi
cally, politically, or according to population and language
barriers. In 1558 a definitive plan was produced on the basis
of that- of Charles V and the episcopal investigations of the
years 155^-1556. Instituted in 1559, the new dioceses were
grouped around three archdioceses: the primary archdiocese of
Kalines oversaw the bishoprics of Ghent. Bruges, Ypres, Antwerp,
Boie-le-Duc and Ruremonde. The archbishop of Utrecht oversaw
the bishoprics of Haarlem, Deventer, Kiddlebourg, Groningen and
220.
of the relations between the nobility and cities^ on the one

hand, and the royal government, on the other. It was thought
that the purpose of the reorganization was to establish an
inquisition on the Spanish model which would rely on episco
pal courts and authority.
The New Bishopric posts in the northern Netherlands were
handed out to jurists and ecclesiastical doctors,— to men like
Sonnius, Rythovius, Curtius, Lindanus, and Castro. Granvelle
and the Regent gave them these posts either as rewards for
past services or to ensure the enforcement of Catholic re
forms; the scholarly lawyers and ecclesiastical doctors were
relied on to pursue the dual program of the inquisition and
Catholic reform. Members of noble families who had held sees
.in the past were seen as serai-independent powers who had a
stake in the corruption of the Church. In order to pay for
the salaries of the new bishops, the revenues of many noble-
held abbeys were confiscated by decree. Thus, old lines of
patronage between bishops and abbots were disrupted and taken
away from regional noble and seigneurial families.
Especially alarmed about the New 3ishoprics were the
major trading cities led by Antwerp.^" The cities feared that
increased supervision by bishops would lessen their capacity
to circumscribe the olacards in the future. Their appre-
Leeuwarden. In the French-speaking provinces, the archbishop

of Cambrai oversaw the bishops cf Arras, Tournai, Namur, and
St. Omer.
^-Antwerp had originally been assigned a bishop, but she suc
cessfully resisted by cla;.i.iing it was an abrogation of privi
leges and a threat to her extensive foreign merchant community.
221.
hensions were not allayed when they saw that many of the men
filling the new offices had served on past inquisitorial com
missions. Valenciennes felt the effects of the New Bishoprics,
too, as her position of "belonging to "both the diocese of Arras
and the diocese of Cambrai was eradicated. From 1559 she
belonged wholly in the diocese of the powerful atchbishop of
Cambrai, MaximiIlian de Berghes. As the new bishops were in
structed to enforce the decretals of the Council of Trent,
the city knew it could expect increased pressure for episco
pal control of the parishes and for prosecution of heretics.1
The archbishop tried to increase his power in Valenciennes:
almost immediately. Supplied by information obtained by the
prior of St. Pol, he worked through the prevot-le-comte to
bring justice in 1559 to one Thomas Moutard, an artisan
charged with telling a priest while drunk that “the God of
the host is only an abomination". Moutard had such a notori
ous anti-Catholic reputation that when the archbishop threatened
to call on Brussels for help in bringing him to justice, the
Magistrat bowed to the ecclesiastical will. Although the
Magistrat protected itself from government sanctions brought
on by the archbishop, they nevertheless feared the reaction
of the Valenciennes Calvinists to the execution of Moutard;
it was well known by chroniclers that the magistrates feared
2
a riot during the execution, but it did not take place.
1Rahlenbeck, Les Chanteries a Valenciennes, p. 130.

^Crespin, Livre des Martyrs, edition of 1597, P« ^93* Also
Rahlenbeck, Les Chanteries, p. 132, anc Memoires de Jacques
de Wesembeke, p. 79.
222 .
When the chanteries reached their height of popularity
in 1561, the archbishop requested the magistrates to hand
over their function as judges of the heretics because they
were not trained in the metier of inquisition; he asked that
the magistrates allow his officers permission to proceed
where necessary against bourgeois citizens. The city re
fused, claiming that from time immemorial the right to judge '
heretics had belonged to the communal authorities. The arch
bishop then remonstrated before the regent in Erussels that
the city magistrates were neither competent nor inclined to
judge cases of heresy.
The jurisdictional conflict reached a climax when one
Henry Descouchy fled to Valenciennes in May 1561 to avoid
prosecution for unorthodoxy in the archbishop’s episcopal
see of Cambrai. The magistrates were at first willing to
hand over Descouchy to the episcopal authorities, but not
as the Archbishop requested, to allow the authorities to in
terrogate Descouchy’s "accomplices" in Valenciennes.'1' The
Dominicans of St. Pol had implicated other persons as Des
couchy ’s co-religionaries, but the archbishop aroused fear
and resentment by telling the Valenciennes magistrates
generally about the information, but keeping the names of the
individuals involved secret. The magistrates then retaliated
by refusing to hand Descouchy over and requested that the
^Por the claims of each side, see Vol. I, archbishop to the

Maoistrat, 2 June 15ol» PP« 351~355» and Deliberation of the
Conseil Particulier, 3 and k June 1561, pp. 358-359*
223.
archbishop produce witnesses to prove that Descouchy was a
heretic.. The archbishop replied that Descouchy should be
delivered on episcopal authority alone. The magistrates
claimed- in turn* that Charles V had allowed Valenciennes
citizens to prosecute heretical Valenciennes inhabitants
(including foreigners seeking asylum) and that the magistrates
had. traditionally judged such cases; the magistrates were
ready to accept the ecclesiastical jurisdiction but not over
bourgeois or mannants of Valenciennes even in matters of
heresy— only forains could come under the jurisdiction of the
archbishop, and those not within the walls of Valenciennes!1
A brief of the Conseil Parxiculier claimed that the canon law
jurisdiction of the archbishop had no precedents, and conse
quently, no authority. The archbishop had never had the
right to banish the laity from the diocese, a power which was
held only by the secular authority. The brief further stated
that the archbishop mistakenly wanted to make the case of
heresy a question of whether it was a spiritual crime or a
secular crime, while the real question was one of established
jurisdictions. As the Magistrat had prosecuted sorcerers
and other adherents of the devil, it had also always prose
cuted heretics. It was absurd, therefore, to say that ad
herents of the devil were under the ecclesiastical jurisdic
tion. With this flippant conclusion the brief stated that
2
Descouchy would not be relinquished.
1 HTRV, Vol. II, Magistrat to the archbishop of Cambrai,

4 June 15*61, pp. 3 60 -3 6 2 .
2HTRV, Vol. II, Deliberation of the Conseil Particulier,
7,vf
224.
•The magistrates and merchants of the Conseil Particulier

did not have a chance to enjoy their joke for long as the
jurisdictional conflict was settled by the already hostile
Brussels government in December, 1561, neither to the satis
faction of Valenciennes nor the Archbishop: The ilegent re
established the royal inquisition based on the precedent of
that of Tisnacq's in 15^-15/+5« The "compromise” agreement,
as the government called it, stipulated that the archbishop
would have jurisdiction of all heresy cases of ecclesiastics,
but that all lay cases would remain for the royal inquisitors
to prosecute and the magistrates to judge.
In order’
.to investigate, to interrogate, and to prose
cute heretics, the king willed by letters dated 22 December
1561 that the royal inquisitors be reestablished. He further
stipulated that as Descouchy was a native of Cambrai and not
seeking criminal asylum, he had to be handed over to the
Archbishop on the condition that the diocese pay the expenses
of Descouchy in prison. The justification for this compro
mise was the magistrates' incompetence in directing their
municipal police to investigate and arrest heretics, and
their obstruction of the efforts of royal officials to do so.
Other justifications cited were the prevalence of the chanting
and the threat of French subversion through the spread of
Huguenot heresies.^
19 July and 1 September 1561 , PP* 368-370, and the archbishop

to Philip II, 1561 without a date, pp. 3?4-380.
HlTRV, Vol. II, Ordor.nance of the regent, 4 May 15°3» PP» 386-
390, Deliberation of the Conseil Particulier, 1^-15 June 1561,
225.
In short, the right to jurisdiction over heretics

had been jealously contended during the century by a number
of different authorities. Although Valenciennes possessed
no theoretical basis for its own municipal jurisdiction
over heretics, it had nevertheless become customary for the
magistrates either to exclude other authorities altogether,
or, when this was impossible, to work closely with the
royal inquisitors to preserve the rights of bourgeois
citizens. With the continued exclusion of the ecclesias
tical court of the new archbishop of Cambrai, and with the
continued spread of heresy in the area, the Brussels govern
ment again imposed an inquisition on Valenciennes by the
king's right of lese-majesty divine. This reestablishment
of the royal inquisition, coming as it did after a long,
history of jurisdictional struggle, was in itself a renewed
threat to Valenciennes'political rights; as such, it was a
pp. 365-37?; letter of Creance, 22 December 1561, pp. 64—

65’. regent to the Magi strat, 15 October 1561, pp. 39-40;
regent to compte d'Sgmont, 15 October 1561, pp. 4-1-42; and
regent to Berghes, 16 October 1561 , pp. 4-3—4-5. The royal
inquisitorial commission in 1561 initially consisted of the
marquis de Berghes, Philibert de Bruxelles and Charles
Auxtruves. De Bruxelles and Auxtruyes were jurists and
councillors on provincial courts; as such they were resented
by their noble fellow commissioners as upstarts. By 1563
de Bruxelles and Auxtruyes had been replaced by other jurists,
C-uillaune Ratteler, Ficolas I-iicault, and Jorge Damboaer— the.
latter was a legist and criminologist who joined the other
two in the capacity of reviewer of the Valenciennes cou-
tun.es to see if they abrogated the king's right of lese-
majesty divine.
226.
reopening of the old tension between the cities particu

laristic privileges based on charter and custom and the cen
tralizing tendencies of the royal government.
5. Political and economic tensions caused by the inquisition

Tensions resulting from the royal inquisition increased
during the years 1562-1565 as the central government made
more and more concrete specifications for the operations of
the inquisition and saw to it that provisions of existing
laws were put into effect. On the day after the reestablish-
of the royal inquisition in Valenciennes, the regent pub
lished a special ordinance on heresy for the city. Given
evidence to suggest a liason with Geneva, the regent's intro
duction to the -clacard stated that the chanteries and open
air preaching in the vicinity were a result of a seditious
conspiracy with foreigners. The lax attitude of the magis
trates toward heretics was censored, aid it was stated that
such dissimulation in the future would result in the presence
of government enforcement personnel. The text of the pla
card went into great detail as to how regulations of the
ordinances were to be enforced, even specifying fines for
many categories of minor offenses. Chief among the require
ments was the enforcement of Charles V's little-used laws
for the certification of immigrants and travelers. The
immigrant forain was to bring certification from the curate
of the parish where he had lived or pay a prohibitive fine
of 10 florins; a similar fine was specified for lack of
certification when movins: from parish to parish within the
227.
city. Emigrants were to be pursued and prosecuted for

heresy if they left the city without obtaining certification.
Travelers were required to give proof of Catholicity to
inn-keepers who had to bring the certificates to the prevot
or his lieutenant within an hour after the closing of the
gates in the evening. Merchants of Valenciennes were banned
from travel to heretical cities in Germany, France, and
England. Hotel keepers and landlords who rented rooms or
houses to forains without certification were punished as
accomplices and harborers of heretics. Another section of
the ordinance stated that houses or hotels where conventi
cles were held with the knowledge of the proprietor were to
be razed to the ground without any consideration of the
Catholicity of the owner. Other regulations detailed
punishment for chanting, owning psalters, and education of
children in heretical schools. The ordinance admonished
the magistrates that thenceforth there was no excuse for
claiming ignorance of the olacards on these matters; the
regulations were to be published within the limits of the
city's jurisdiction twice yearly: on Christmas and on the
day of St. John the Baptist.3-
The city's reaction to this special ordinance is con
tained in a remonstrance of the Conseil Particulier dated
23 December 1561. It complained that the certification by
the curates before arriving and leaving was a great hardship
^See the text of this rla c ard received by the Valenciennes

magistrates, ACV, Series AA, no, 98, ff. nos. 122-12
to poor workers as they could not pay the fees which the
curates demanded for the certificates of orthodoxy. Certifi
cation requirements for all forains entering the city would,
they said, destroy the work force of the cloth industries
as most journeymen weavers had no certification and little
or no money. The remonstrance went on to complain that the
ban on trade with England, with Huguenot cities in France,
and with the Lutheran cities of Germany would have ruinous
effects on Valenciennes merchants as they traded with a good
many of these areas. Also, the magistrates desired to know
how the regulations were to be enforced. In the past the
curates and vice-curates had refused to give certification
to several persons even though they were known to have been
good Catholics; when called before the magistrates to explain
their reasons, the curates had refused to do so. And how
were the magistrates to stop people from emigrating without
certification? If bourgeois were exempt from torture, how
was one to determine if a bourgeois proprietor knew of the
conventicles going on in his .buildings?'1'
This remonstrance from the magistrates reflected their
increasingly difficult position between the government de
mands and the reality of.merchant support for Calvinism on
the other. Here we begin to see,too, that the ichevinale
families, although they were not part of the commercial
community, were not strictly the willing servants of the
government. The echevinale families.were not Calvinists
~HTRV, Vol. II, Deliberation of the Conseil Particulier,

23 December 15 6 1 , p. 66.
229.
for the most part, but neither were they going to be their
persecutors and receive the wrath of the merchants and arti
sans ,
As we shall see in the next chapter, the magistrates
further compromised themselves by allowing two Calvinists .
to escape execution in the spring of 1562’. Important measures
were then taken against the lax magistrates whose behavior
was seen as intolerable by the government. The regent wrote
to the king in minute detail that the escape of prisoners
would not have occurred without the magistrates' delays of
the execution of the sentences laid down in the pi acards.
Philip wrote back that the magistrates should be banned from
future office so as to be an example to others who would act
unscrupulously in their duties to God. He requested that
the regent fill the Magistrat with men "that you judge more
Catholic and loyal to God's service",1 Actually, the con
scious policy of filling the magistrature with Catholics had
been established a month earlier in the resolution of the
Council of State dated 3 June 1562; it resolved that, as the
principal cause of the incident was the "dissimulation and
very great connivance" of the magistrates, they would "no
longer be appointed magistrates". They were to be put under
2
surveillance so that they would not perpetrate further evils.
The policy of trying to restrict office in Valenciennes to
^KTRV, Vol. II, Philio to the regent, I July 1562, po. 36?-
3o B7~
2HTRV, Vol. II, Resolution of the Council of State, 3 June
15327 pp. 306-309.
230.
those families who showed loyalty to Catholicism and to the

King was undoubtedly an added political tension among both,
the echevinale families and the merchant community. For those
echevins excluded there was no longer a place in the profes
sional bureaucracy of the city, and they had to rely on other
means of'livelihood. For the merchants and the Calvinist
community, there was a new threat that the nl a cards would
be enforced to the letter by magistrates more willing to do
the government's bidding.
Although the government thus banned the magistrates of .
I56 I-15 S2 , the regent could not find capable men when time
came for renewal of the Magistrat in July of 1562. Most
Catholic echevinale families did not want the responsibility
of taking office given the opposition to the special pla- •
cards and the reestablishment of the inquisition. Ironi
cally, the magistrates which replaced those of 1561-1562
contained several well-known Calvinists. On this Magistrat
were the orevot, Jean de Lattre, whose son was instrumental
in helping Calvinists to escape from royal inquisitors,
Michel Herlin, the wealthy Calvinist who had sent his sons
to Geneva for an education, Guillaume LeBoucq, a relative
of the Calvinist Noel- Le3oucq, and Bertrand Gruel- who was
to be implicated in the 1566 -156 ? Calvinist resistance. The
royal governor of Valenciennes, the marquis de Berghes,
assured the regent that this new Magistrat of 1562-1563 was
loyal and Catholic when he renewed it in July.^ Berghes
^HTRV, Vol. II, Commisaires to Berghes, 4 July 15^2, pp. 379-

382 .
231 .
was evidently insincere in this assertion as Herlin, for one,
was a well known Calvinist. These magistrates of 1562-1563
allowed several heretics to escape the inquisition hy refusing
to judge them. Like the previous magistrates, they were later
banned from office. The next year, 1563 -156 ^, there was no
one from the echevinale families willing to take the. respon
sibility to be prevot. and the. regent had to bribe the old
bourgeois lieutenant of the prevot-le-co m te, Jehan Rolin,
seigneur de Locron, and a longtime cavalryman in the bande
d'ordonnance of Arschot, to take the cost. He was given the
1
baillage of Conde and the orevote of Mons for his trouble.
Thus, the policy of filling magistratures with those who
would bring heretics to justice was hardly successful, and
the attempts only agravated existing political grievances.
In spite of this failure, the government was able to
carry on its inquisition under the direction of its own of
ficers. In order to oversee the inquisition in the absence
of the chronically non-attendant governor, the marquis de
2 x ^
Berghes, and the equally non-attendant •prevot-le-co mt e, the
The echevinale families that declined office reportedly said

to the marquis that they would rather "se absentir et depayser
que d'aece-Dter la charge," HTRY, Vol. Ill, Berghes to the r.eger.T,
17 Kay 1563. pp. ^3-^V.
2For Berghes, the execution of heretics only served to win over
new converts to heresy. He suggested a convocation of the
States-General in order to establish a common religious policy
for the whole Netherlands, as, he said, enforcement of the
placcards could only be done with the consent of local author
ities. He also suggested that what was needed in Valenciennes
was church reform, and principally a supply of wise and virtu
ous curates in sufficient numbers to staff The parishes. These
suggestions to The regent were ignored. See HTRY, Vol. II,
Berghes to the regent, 30 November. 1552, pp.”539-^70; and in
troduction to Vol. II, pp. 50-51.
count of Boussu, Marguerite made her servant, the seigneur de
la Thieuiloye, prevot-le-comt e and one of the royal in
quisitors. La Thieuiloye was the trusted councillor and Maitrs
d'hotel of the Regents household, and as such became the first
resident royal official at Valenciennes effectively to en
force the placards. Arriving with his commission papers in
June 1562, La Thieuiloye quickly made the royal inquisition
a more efficient organization. He initiated the government's
1
own spy sjrstem to supplement that of the archbishop of Cambrai.
He hired Jehan Kayne, a Catholic bourgeois, to coordinate the
activities of the inquisitors, including the hiring of spies,
and the torture and interrogation of prisoners. Hayne was
known in Valenciennes as the "clerk" of the inquisition as
he collected voluminous spy reports from men like Jchan de
2
Hollande, an undercover agent who turned in many Calvinists.
La Thieuiloye and Hayne instituted a system of sur
veillance that brought both citizens and non-citizens to jus
tice. Scores of heretics were prosecuted during the period
1562 -156 ^. The process was the followings The inquisitors ob
tained the names of heretics taking part in Calvinist activities
from their own spies and from the Dominicans of St. Pol. Other
names were obtained by torture of those arrested. Prosecutions
^HTRV, Vol. II, Commission of La Thieuiloye, 16 June 15^2, p.

3o2~T~
^Hollande, like many spies, was a shady character himself, and
was later prosecuted by the government for fraud. No doubt
many of the persons turned in by such men were innocent but
prosecuted on false evidence elicited by torture. Hollande
received over 100 florins for his services before losing his
job. See JL H /f Vol. I, pp. 224-2^5.
233.
were procured from the •prevot-le-coiwote, and the Magistrat

rendered sentences.
The magistrates were powerless to obstruct the process
as La Thieuiloye threatened to use royal troops if they did
not cooperate. Nevertheless, the magistrates seemed to have
been able to protect merchant Calvinists as few show up in
the lists of the condemned heretics. The criminal registers
of the city show the cases involving heretical or religious
crimes to have jumped in 1562 with the arrival of La Thieuiloye
until the inquisition left in 1 5 6 5 . In the first two months
Sentences rendered for religious or heretical causes I

Year total number of cases deaths for heresy
15^6-7 1 0
1547-3 3 0
1548-9 1 0
1549-50 2 0
1550-1 2 0
1551-2 3 3
1552-3 0 0
1553-4 0 0
1554-5 0 0
1555-6 0 0
1556-7 lacuna
1557-3 0 0
1553-9 1 0
1539-60 2 1
1 5 6 0 -1 0 0
1561-2 24 7
1562-3 15 2
1563-4 26 5
1564-5 15 0
1565-6 10 1
1 5 6 6 -7 •4 0
1567-8 unknown hundreds 128
XA11 of the cases for 1561-1562 took place in June and July
of 1562, between the time that La Thieuiloye arrived anc
the Magistrat was changed in mid-July. The lara;e number of
cases in 1567 -8 , as we shall see, came after the government
had defeated the city in the crisis year of 1566. See M3V,
3ourgeois and choses communes, 1546-1563^ and for the re
pression after 1$56 see F. Beuzart, La repression a Valenciennes
aores les troubles religieux de 1566 (Clamart, 1930).
234.
of La nJiieulloy^s administration, there were 24 prosecutions

by the inquisition which resulted in seven deaths. All but
one of these deaths were of artisans; only one bourgeois
miller was executed. There was a marked drop in the number
of cases in the next year during the magistrature of DeLattre
and Herlin, but an increase again in the year 1563-4 under
Rolin's leadership.
Most of those prosecuted and convicted of heretical
crimes came from the occupationally poor groups in the city.
They seem to be mostly young mannant artisans with the
exception of Maximilian Philippart, a bourgeois miller who
allowed two Calvinists to hide in his granery. Of those ex
ecuted, Jacques Walin was a cobbler and a native of Valen
ciennes of only 19 years of age; he held to his erroneous
beliefs and was burned alive on the market place while singing
psalms.- Jacques Berthe, another young cobbler, recanted in
the end and was beheaded. Jehan Bruneau, a young shuttle
and loom maker, and Arnould Defau, a linen weaver, were un-
repentent and died at the stake' singing psalms. Similarly,
Jacques Carrette, a fine cloth weaver from Tournai, and Jean
Lansielle, a saye weaver of Lille, both died obstinately at
1
the stake. It must be remembered that these were not the
Calvinist leaders but only those for whom the inquisition
found it easy to obtain sentences from the magistrates. As
the inquisitorial commissioners well knew, many wealthy
members of the Calvinist consistory slipped through the in
1
M3V, 3ourgeois and chosen communes, 1561-2.
235.
quisition's net because they were so powerful that they went

untouched even under the threat of troops. How, for example,
could the Magistrat render sentence on men like DeLattre wTho
was -prevot? Thus, a list of those condemned for heresy shows
them to have had similar occupations as those who were nor
mally prosecuted for civil and criminal offenses; again, a
high percentage came from the workers of the cloth industries
who made up the largest occupational group in Valenciennes.
The criminal registres do not allow us to know the multitudes
who were named by spies, arrested, and interrogated but later
dismissed for lack of evidence or because they used influence
1
to obtain release.
In the midst of these executions which proved just as
unpopular as those of the 155Ps» the government in Brussels
promulgated another special ordinance for Valenciennes on
1 September 15^3* As in the pl.acard of 15^1, the ideas of
the ordinance were old but the detail and suggested methods
of application were new. The curates of the parishes were put
in charge of surveillance of the city's population whether
they were bourgeois or raannant, rich or poor. Because of La
Thieuiloye*s reports that the Catholics masses contained few
of the principal citizens of the city and that the Calvinists
seemed to be increasing with the passage of each succeeding
day in spite of the executions, the regent also called for
mandatory Mass and religious instruction for all inhabitants.
^-Christopher ?rum, a mathematician and friend of Robert Dudley,

was implicated in a private conventicle in a merchants house
in Valenciennes, but obtained release through Dudley's influ
ence. HTRY, Vol. Ill, Dudley to Berghes, 26 Oct. 15^2, pp. Y+^9-
^50.
236/
The curates were instructed to keep attendance lists of those

going to Mass and confession— a stipulation which resulted in
direct orroosition- in at least one case where the lists of a
" 1
curate were stolen. In order to keep satisfactory records
of those in attendance, the curates had to obtain master lists
2
of the names of all men, women, and children of their parishes.
The ordinance contained a ban on playing games or visiting
cabarets during religious services. Although we have no con
crete evidence to prove it, this ban was probably unpopular
with the worker-artisan population whose only days of rest were
Sundays and days of religious festivals; moreover, during week- .
days they were thenceforth prevented from going to taverns in
the evenings during vespers. The stipulated fine of 20 oatards
was prohibitive for an artisan-worker as it represented perhaps
a week's wages or more.
Other stipulations of the nlaca rd were designed to
strengthen existing laws restricting the spread of heresy.
The curate had to obtain the last address of all immigrants
and their reasons for leaving: it; the address of past masters
under whom immigrants had worked was also required. Old rules suer
as the banning of psalm singing in the'home, certification
of all foreign books, and a ban on receiving into private homes
^M3V, ms no. 703, fo 166. This case indicates that one Charles
Coureur, a save weaver, and native of Valenciennes^ was charged
with non-attendance at confession and "d'avoir leve et emporte
le pap5 er et registres de curet de St. Jacques ou estoient es-
cript les noms de paroischeiens ayant fait leur debvoir d'aller
a la confess®." According to La Thieullove, in the winter of
1562 only some 150 persons showed up at Mass ;.n all the parish
churches. HTP.V, Vol II, La Thieuiloye to the regent, 5 Dec. 15^2,
14.7I+-I4.76.
2
Unfortunately, these are no longer in existence.
237.
anyone without proof of orthodoxy were supplemented in the

1563 rlacarc with severe penalties. For example, if a house
was used for a conventicle, it was to be razed to the ground.
In the 1561 placard houses were razed only if the proprietor
knew of the conventicles, but in 15&3 a house was to be razed
even if the proprietor did not kncwofihe conventiclesi This
new stipulation meant that landlords had to check and recheck
their tenants in order to see that there was no heretical activity
taking place. Heads of households had to oversee their children,
servants, and roomers to prevent any destruction of their
property. Moreover, a clause of the 15^3 ordinance specified
that anyone knowing of any preaching or chanting, whether it
was in private homes, in the streets, or in the fields of the
countryside' had to report it or be considered guilty of heresy,
regardless if the person was a good practicing Catholic. Thus,
it' was dangerous to be a member of the family of a Calvinist,
or even a Calvinist's neighbor, as this law allowed for guilt
by knowledge of heretical activity. The citizens and the in
habitants of the city of Valenciennes had to individually
swear to uphold the 15&3 ordinance under threat of banishment
and confiscation for refusal. All persons of forain status
had to take the oath within 24 hours or be automatically
banished.
The potential severity of the 1563 Placard did not go
unnoticed, and unprecented measures were taken to oppose itx
The Conseil Particulier appointed a committee of both Catholic
and Calvinist magistrates and merchants to study the text and
compose a responsp. The committee contained such good
238.
Catholics as Michel de la Hove, such Calvinists as Michel

Herlin, and such scholarly echevins as Louis de la Fontaine
dit Wicart.^ Their work resulted in two remonstrances in
which they claimed that the regulations were unenforcable in
practice and unlawful in theory, given the privileges of Valen
ciennes. The restrictions on movement without certification
were seen as arbitrary and unwarranted penalties promoting the'
ruin of trade and industry and the depopulation of the city.
The most damaging aspect of the certification was cited as the
blockage and restrictions on the movement of the week-workers,
on whose labor much of the industry of the city was based.
It was pointed out that the fee for certification meant that
many of the poorer persons were restricted from entry into
the city. Not only did this prevent masters from hiring
workers, and ihus reducing manufacture of cloth, but it caused
hardship among many week-workers who depended on wages earned
in the city to support families in the countryside. Already,
it was claimed, the inquisitors had restricted movement in
and out of the gates in attempts to survey possible heretics:
Their action had hampered access to the city by foreign
merchants and prevented many artisans from entering the
city to work. Also, it was impossible to stop merchants
~*~HTRV, Vol. II, Deliberation of the Conseil Particulier.

13 September 15*53» PP* ^60-^61.
2
HTRY, Vol. II, Remonstrance of the Conseil Particulier,
2 6 and 28 June 15^3» PP» 353-350.
239.
from going and coming from the city on business; the bourgeois
had traditionally held such rights to leave the city without
notifying the magistrates , or without being hindered by anyone.
The remonstrances went on to claim that the prestige of Valen
ciennes had already suffered, and it was feared that wealthy
merchants and foreigners would no longer come to live in the
city as in the past. Nobility would no longer try to marry
their progeny to those of Valenciennes, while influential
families of Valenciennes would try to establish their children
elsewhere.
At this moment, the remonstrance went on, the city was
being depopulated. People were leaving Valenciennes because
it was seen as being singled out for unjust punishment. The
special pi a c a_rds and the persecutions were cited as putting
the bourgeois and inhabitants of Valenciennes under an in
tolerable "servitude and subjection" to the inquisition. The
committee also claimed that the new ordinances abrogated the
oldest and most sacred privileges of the bourgeois citizen,
namely the freedom from torture and confiscation of property.
They claimed that it was the policy of Charles V to never
touch the property of bourgeois, and they sent to the regent
copies of an oath signed by Philip II during the joyeuse
entree of .15^9 by which he swore never to contravene bour
geois -privileges.^ Moreover, the stipulation that the orevcH-
le-comte had to be notified of the movements of the bourgeois
and inhabitants was an enlargement of his rights not
~*~HTRV, Vol. Ill, Remonstrance of 15 September 15^3» pp. 465-

4 6 8 ; and also the points attributed to the remonstrance by
Berghes in his letter to the regent of 14 September 15^3»
pp. 456-458.
240 .
contained even in the mandated charter of 1540. Clearly,
the inquisition was- a direct economic and political burden
to Valenciennes society— both the merchants and artisans.
The political issues and tensions that resulted from
the- inquisition were those of torture and confiscation: There
had been a conflict between the inquisitors and the Magistrat
in the summer of 15^2 over the issue of whether or not a
bourgeois could be tortured. The inquisitorial commissioners,
who tortured persons of mannant or forain status with impunity,
requested the right to torture the few Calvinist bourgeois
arrested in order to find out the names of their "accomplices."
The commissioners' insistence and threats of the use of force
to continue restricting access to the city finally led to a
form of compliance by the magistrates. They had no choice
but to de-bourgeoisify (debourgeoiser) or to take citizenship
away from persons in custody. In. doing so, they stated that
their acts set no precedent for the torture of bourgeois. and
they were done without prejudice to the bourgeois right of
exemption from torture.^- Nevertheless, it was plain there
had actually been a loss of the privilege extracted by the
government through threat of force.
This solution was again extracted by the government in
15^3 during another attempt by the royal inquisitors to tor
ture a bourgeois. This tine the magistrates resistance was .

initially stronger, as they .claimed that from time immemorial
the town's citizens had been exempt from torture, and this
^HTRV, Vol. II, Deliberation of the Conseil Particulier,

8 May 1 5 6 3 , pp. 248-249.
241.
right had been confirmed in the charter of Jean c'Avesnes in

1290. The government claimed that the charter of 1290 had
only allowed exemption in criminal cases, but that the case
of lese-majesty divine had precedent over all local or regional
privileges, and on 22 December 15^3* the regent announced that
the inquisitorial commissioners had the right to torture
citizens in cases of heresy. The way in which Marguerite of
Parma wrote of Valenciennes' privileges indicates the cen
tral government's disregard for them*
Bt au regard du privilege pretendu par lesdicts
de la Loy de ne mectre a torture ung bourgeois.
. . . ledict Seigneur Marquis leur fers exhi-
ber leursd. privileges (s’aulcuns en ont) pour
veoir sy parlent sy generallement comme ilz pre-
tendoient, et en ce cas que ledt. priviliege fut
trouve selon leur pretendu, ledt. Seigneur Mar
quis leurs fera entendre que les cas exceptez
apres le droit escript, se comme d'heresie et
crisme de lese Mageste. ne doibvent estre com-
pris dudt. priviliege.
Here the rsgent simply dismissed one of the cherished privi
leges of Valenciennes by applying the king's right of lese-
majesty divine. For bourgeois of Valenciennes this eradi
cated abasic right that they had come to accept for centuries.
Upon receipt of the regent's order, a committee of nota
ble bourgeois immediately went to Brussels to remonstrate
before the duchess. It was made up of Jehan de Goegnies,
and Michel de le Hove, two undoubted Catholics, Michel Herlin,
and Pierre Rasoit, two Calvinists, and Antoine Corvillain
and Franchois d'Oultreman, the two pensionaries. They car
ried legal briefs consisting of copies of charters, oaths
~HTRV, Vol. IV, Berghes to the government, 11 February 1564,

p. 210? and, Duchess to the Conseil Particulier, 22 December
1563» quoted cn p. 39 of Vol. IV.
242.
of sovereigns, and precedents. It is unknown to what level

of government in Erussels they were admitted, but they proba
bly did not see the duchess.^ Finally, in order to preserve
their privileges 5n form, they again gave in to government
blackmail and had the citizens in question stripped of citi
zenship. They had been informed that this solution would
be sufficient again for the government's purposes, but if the
Magistrat did not care to go through with this process, then
2
the inquisitors would go ahead with the torture anyway.
The second and more important privilege threatened by
the inquisition was that of the confiscation of property.
Valenciennes contended that no bourgeois' property could be
confiscated due to privileges dating back to the earliest
charters in existence. The question was once more one of
particularistic privilege versus the edicts of the Prince
based on lese-majesty divine. Charles V had assumed that
the right of lese-majesty divine allowed him to utilize con
fiscation as the penalty for heresy. The 1534 coutume com
piled by the magistrates contained a special protocol which
Stipulated that the prince had no intention of prejudicing
the privileges of the town although confiscation was men
tioned in the cl a cards of 1520, 1529* and 1531* But the
government deleted this protocol from the charter of 1540
^KTRV, Vol. IV, Deliberation of the Conseil Particulier, 21

February 15-64, pp. 226-229; and copies of the legal brieS,
pp. 262-265.
2KTRV, Vol. IV, Regent to Magistrat, 8 March 1564, 262-
2 6 4 , and introduction, pp. 40-41.
243.
and established a precedent for the pla card of 15^9 which

abolished all regional privileges which prohibited con
fiscation of property. After specifying that confiscation was
one of the penalties for heresy, the edict of 15^9 stated
the following:
Aa surplus disons, declairons, stations at de-
cretons que en tous nosdicts pays de par deca,
norjobstant coutumes, privileges et usages
pretendues au contraire par aulcunes villes ou
pays, que, en cas susdicts, ne leur pourroit suf-
frager.l
Even though this pla card directly challenged the age-old
particularistic privileges of Valenciennes, no conflict arose
between the Magistrat and the emperor's government because
there were no attempts by the Brussels government to confis
cate bourgeois property in Charles' reign. In fact the records
of the confiscations at Valenciennes for Charles' reign filled
only 13 folio pages and contained appropriations of the prop
erty of only non-citizens of the artisan-worker ranks— except
2
•for the case of the widow caignoncle; as we have seen.
In comparison, the confiscation records of Philip II's
reign fill over a thousand folio pages and eleven manuscripts
for confiscated property in Valenciennes. While it is true
that the bulk of these confiscations came after the crisis
year of 1566, it is also true that confiscations of bourgeois
property began to appear for the first time during the in-
_
Recueil des ancienn.es orconnances, Vol. V, dp . 53-5^.

2
ADM, Chambre des comptes, Series 5, ms. no. 12696.
2kk.
1
quisition of the royal government in the years 1561 -1 56 5 ,
In 156l» the -pr^vot-le-co mte was directed to seize the prop
erty of two bourgeois Calvinists who had emigrated. In 1562
the property of the bourgeois Pierre Misnet was confiscated
when he fled to London to avoid arrest for heresy. During
the Summer of 15^2 the -pr^vot-le-com te was directed to bypass
the municipal auditors and collectors by utilizing royal
receivers for the increased revenues obtained from the prop
erty of condemned heretics; in September 15&3, La Thieulloye
directed the receivers to seal the houses of all Calvinists
who had fled, including bourgeois, and had inventories■made
of their contents. Many of the cases in the confiscation
registers indicate the arbitrary judgements that were rendered
by the inquisitors, and the harshness of the appropriations.
For example, the bourgeois Pierre Trefrize was found guilty
of possessing an illegal Bible, and property totaling 1,200
livres tournois was confiscated while he was in prison. Be
cause of his great age, his pleas for mercy, and his claims
of fidelity to the Catholic church, he was released and only
2
banned from Valenciennes instead of being executed. Such
actions probably explain' the the unwillingness of the rank and
file bourgeois, in his capacity as a militiaman* to enforce
the placcards; as we shall see later, the estrangement of the
bourgeois from the inquisition led both Catholic and Calvinist
gueteu^q to oermit Calvinist activities to proceed with impunity •
1
AD':, Charabres des comotes, Series B, ms. nos. 12697-12?08.
2
ADN, Ch&mbres des comptes, Series B, ms. no. 12697. fo. 3 vo.
2^5.
No one has written a history of the confiscations under

Philip II. We dont know if the increase in confiscations at
Valenciennes in his reign was part of an overall royal policy
or whether it was merely a special case. If the financial
problems of the crown had led to an interest in the revenues
available from heretics, there nevertheless were few profits
in the confiscations for the central government. The inquis
itors themselves were the ones who profited most, as the
property of heretics went to pay their expenses both while
they were on duty at Valenciennes and when they took leave
to on vacation. The rest of the revenues were paid out to
the surveyors, accountants, and receivers who made up the
administration of the confiscated property; other sums were
used to repair real estate and furniture before it was auc
tioned.. The apparatus and personnel of the inquisition
proved so costly that the confiscation records for the years
2
156 *1-1565 show a deficit of 766 livres- tournois.
The attempts by the magistrates of Valenciennes to

challenge the right of the inquisitors to confiscate property
met with little or no success. In January 1 5 6 3 * the Conseil
Particulier sent a brief to the Grand Council of Malines, the
regional judicial court; the brief contained copies of Valen
ciennes charters which specifically prohibited confiscation
of bourgeois property. The Council of Malines, for its part,
w'as confronted with an insolvable predicament. It could not
I ^'
ASN, Charabre des comptes, Series B, ms. no 1269 ?, if>f. 5 and
5 vo.
WADN, Charabre des comptes, Series B, ms. no 12697, fo. 7»
lit*
246.
decide against Valenciennes because such a judgement would

question the legality of all particularistic charters. It could
not decide against the king as the councillors depended on the
sovereign’s patronage for their judicial and administrative
positions. The Grand Council simply tabled the magistrates'
petition. The Conseil Particulier then compiled new arguments
based on the "absolute" right of the charter of 1290 which
stated that the freedom of a bourgeois from confiscation was
held at Valenciennes from "time immemorial"; the magistrates
produced papers signed by both Charles V and Philip II which
ratified the charter of 1290. Again, the Grand Council of
Malines ignored the Valenciennes petition by simply delaying
its judgement. In the meantime, the Regent ignored these
legal measures taken by Valenciennes by ordering the inquisitors
to proceed with the confiscation of the property of bourgeois
heretics "in spite of the case pending at Malines."^
In sum, the requirements of the inquisition at Valenciennes
had become politically, economically and socially oppressive
for the bourgeois and inhabitants of the city. The requirements
of the placcards of 15&1 and 15 ^3 , the banning of magistrates
from office, the apparatus of the inquisition— its spys and
clerks— , and the increase in persecutions resulted in tensions
between the government and Valenciennes. The city had become
the focus of the regent’s attention, shd she had sent hermost
trusted servant ^0 oversee the royal inquisition. The re
monstrances reflected the fears of the magistrates- for the
i-See the summation of these efforts by the magistrates and the
replies of the Regent in HTRV, Vol. IV, Deliberation of the
Conseil Particulierr 13 March 1564, pp. 268-271.
21*7.
survival of the city's political independence and economic

integrity.
6. Political and economic tensions caused by enforcement of

the inquisition by royal troops
Then tensions existing because of the olaccards and
.inquisition were multiplied by the government's action of
placing troops in the city in order to add force to the
authority of the inquisitors. The justification for the
movement of troops into Valenciennes was the magistrates’
laxity in allowing the escape of two Calvinists in the spring
of 1562.1 The regent had ordered the orevot-le-ccm te, Boussu,
the lieutenant of the duke of Arschot stationed at Lavennes,
and the lieutenant of the count of Berghes stationed at Cam-
2
brai to move into Valenciennes with their bandes d'ordonnance.
In spite of these armed forces, and in spite of the presence
of the inquisitors, the numbers of Calvinists in Valenciennes
seemed to increase. The executions seem to have stimulated
Calvinist activities resulting in the ‘grand cresches of
the spring of 15^3. La Thieulloye's response to these open-
air sermons in the countryside was to ask the regent for more
troops. In January, 1562, he wrote that he could not be re
sponsible for the loss of the town in the bandes d'ordonnance
were not reinforced by foot soldiers.-^ This counsel clashed
^See below, pp.

2KTR7, Vol. II, regent to Boussu, 28 April 1562, pp. 199-201,
and regent to ce Gongnies, 8 April 1562, pp. 202-203.
^HTRV, Vol. II, La Thieulloye to the regent, 5 January 1563.
pp. 195-196.
248.
with that of the marquis of Berghes who wrote that the bour
geois must be persuaded to prosecute their own Calvinists as
force would exacerbate the tensions already existing between
the city and the government; he said also that the government
did not have the funds for footsoldiers.^ But even Berghes'
opposition weakened during the height of the preaching in
2
lf?63« The regent authorized footsoldiers:in May of 15&3
and used as justification the charge that Valenciennes was
still insecure due to the activity of heretics and the threat
of French attack.3
The nobility found these garrisons a challenge to their
authority. 3ecause of the marquis de Berghes* reluctance to
put troops into Valenciennes and because of his long absences
and his general disapproval of the inquisition's methods, the
government decided that he was an unreliable commander of
troops. Margaret appointed as colonel of the garrison of
footsoldiers one Antoine de 31ondel, seigneur de Haultbois,
a petty noble willing to carry out the policy of the govern
ment. As soon as Berghes learned of Blondel's commission he
complained that as governor of Valenciennes he himself had
exclusive rights to command the troops. He contended that
the colonel was a foreign innovation intolerable to the rights
HiTRY, Vol. Ill, 3erghes to-the regent, 30 November 1562]-'po.

469-470.
2 HTRV, Vol. Ill, Berghes to the regent, 17-18 Kav 1 5 6 3 ,
pp. 284-283.
^HTRV, Vol. Ill, Resolution of the Council of State, 3 May
15o 37 PP. 235-239.
249.
of his office, and demanded that the kine give him command of
the. garrison. He met with T.ournai's governor, the count of
Kontigny, and they recruited opposition to the appointment
4
of Blondel among the rest of the greater nobility, notably

Orange and Sgmont. The aroused greater nobility stated to
the regent that if she wished to go to Valenciennes personally
to put the city's affairs in order, instead of one of them,
they would not oppose Blondel's commission.'*' Thus pressured
by noble members of the Council of State, the regent was
forced to put Blondel under the authority of Berghes. The
opposition that this episode had aroused, however, probably
caused Berghes to resent the inquisition even more than ever.
The city's burden became intolerable with the introduc
tion of footsoldiers: the consequences of this burden were
economically ruinous for Valenciennes in the years 1563 -1 5 6 5 *
The government had difficulty paying the troops from the be
ginnings of their stay. The bandes d'ordonnance, which were
made up of petty nobles and seigneurs, usually lived off
their own resources of rentes and land, or the spoils of war.
3ut the fixed resources of these cavalry troops were already
squeezed by the inflation, and after 1559 they no longer had
the plunder of war. Since the entry of the cavalry into
Valenciennes in 1562, Berghes complained to the Regent that
the credit was limited and that funds were needed from the
erovernment in order to pay a customary fee of two natards a
day for the upkeep of the cavalry's horses. In June of
1HTRV, Vol. Ill, Granvelle to Gonzalo Perez, 17 June 1563 , p. 346.

2This was the sum paid to cavalry troops in mid-l6th century
when they were billeted in a town.
.
250
1562 Berghes had to ask. Viglius de Zuychem, the president of
the Council of State, for help in soliciting the. money for
his bandes from the regent and the king.3- Berghes in return
received a letter from the regent containing promises and
2
exhorting him to continue God's work. The financial dif
ficulties of the calvary bands resulted in the impoverishment
of the soldiers' households or flock of attendants, servants,
women, and children who followed them.. According to Berghes,
the "great arrears” in wages was resulting in an unruliness
3
brought on by the gure'necessity of poverty.
After the footsoldiers were added in the summer of 1563 *
the financial problems increased quantitatively and qualita-
tively. Not only were four more companies of men added to
an already over-billeted town,^ but the footsoldiers acted in
^HTRV, Vol. II, Berghes to Zuychem, 15 June 1562, pp. 338-

341.
^KTRV, Vol. II, Regent to Berghes, 27 January 1562, px>. 354-
355.
^HTRV, Vol. II, Berghes to regent, 3° November 1562, pp. 469-
470. For the penury of the petty nobility, see Pontus Payen,
Vol. I, pp. 29-30. Part of the resentment against the govern
ment was his :.well-known disdain for the economic plight of
the nobility. The minister Granvelle wrote in several letters
of the debts of the greater nobility as a joke.
4
Although Marguerite had told Berghes not to levy troops
which had money owed to them, the penurious government almost
immediately was faced with threat of riot from the unpaid
foot. KTRV, Vol. Ill, Berghes to the regent, 17-18 Kay 1 56 3 ,
pp. 284-288.
În order to get the foot into a town already hostile to the
cavalry, La Thieulloye and Berghes decided upon the stratagem
of telling the magistrates that the troops were coming two
days later than they actually were: in this way any possible
rebellion by the bourgeois would fail. HTRV, Vol. Ill, Ber
ghes to the regent, 23 Kay 1563, PP* 292-293* But the regent
ordered Berghes not even to take the chance of telling the
251.
a more oppressive manner than the calvary. Whereas the

bandes dcordonnance found it easy to forage in the countryside
and to pillage the peasantry because of their mobility, the
footsoldiers confinement to the city resulted in intimida
tion of shopkeepers and taverners to sell needed stores at a
low price, or simply to make involuntary contributions.
In order to alleviate the soldiers* economic plight,
Margaret desired the city to supply hay and oats at a dis
count cheaper than the market price, and to exempt all troops
garrisoned in Valenciennes from the tax on wine and beer.
Since little suitable housing for the troops had been volun
teered, the regent ordered the troops to be billeted in the
houses of the principal bourgeois.-1- Next, .since no money was
forthcoming from the royal treasury in Brussels, she author
ized that Berghes could collect extraordinary taxes on
hearths, chimneys, and on various other items such as wine
and beer for the '.upkeep of the troops in Valenciennes.
This abrogated the traditional exemptions from direct taxes
which were allowed to the bonne villes ’ as opposed to the
2
peasantry who were subject to such taxes.
Berghes told the Regent that he could not pay the troops
and that there was little money forthcoming-'from the city
magistrates at all, and to simply move into the town by sur

prise, relying on the cavalry to secure the gates. HTRV, Vol.
Ill, Regent to Berghes, 26 May 15&3* PP» 296-297*
^HTRV, Vol. Ill, Deliberation of Conseil Particulier, 26 arid
28 June 1563 , pp. 358-360.,
•3
This oppressive direct taxation system would be expanded for
all the Low Countries under Alva in 1568-1570. See M.A. Ar-
nould. L*imoot sur le capital en Belgique au XVIG sietcle,
extract of Le Hainaut isconomiaue 19^6, pp. 25-26, and HTRV,
Vol. Ill, p. 120.
25 2 *
'government and merchant community as the city’s commerce had
"cooled down" as a result of the garrison's huge debts.^ On
7 October, the lieutenants of the bandes d'ordonnance them
selves appealed directly to the regent, claiming that their
credit’had expired, and that they needed funds immediately in
order to survive. Foraging among the gardens of the suburbs
and neighboring, villages had not alleviated their needs. Any
suggestion that the city contribute to the upkeep of the troops
through a tax, said the..lieutenants, resulted in great dis-
2
content among the bourgeois. By 31 October, the pay crisis
of the fall of 15&3 reached a critical stage; the foot- .
soldiers were looting shops and obtaining contributions by
force in order.to eat. In November, Berghes noted these ac
tions in a letter to the regent and stated that she "had
little understood by the past” the gravity of a situation
caused by unpayed troops? unless money was forthcoming, more
"oppressions" could be expected.-^ Even La Thieulloye, who had
requested these troops six months earlier, now begged the re
gent to have them billeted elsewhere. He himself, he stated,
prevented a riot of- the garrison by promising them 800 florins
in his private capacity as the maTtre d*hotel of the Regent.
An immediate result of'the pay crisis of the fall of 15^3 was
the departure of the bandes d*ordonnance. not because they
1HTRV, Vol. Ill, Berghes to the regent, 15 September 15&3t
pp. k62-k6k.
2 HTRV, Vol. Ill, Lieutenants to the r.egent, 7 October 15&3»’
pp. -520 -5 2 1 .
^HTRV, Vol. Ill,- Berghes to the regent, 9 November 15&3* P*
^HTRV, Vol. Ill, La Thieulloye. to the regent, 31 October 15^3.
pp. 553-555.
were ordered oat of the city, bat. simply out of necessity—
they moved into the countryside around Tournai where the
foraging was better.
The situation was not ameliorated for Valenciennes, how
ever, as the footsoldiers still remained. The marquis de
Berghes was a witness to the economic effects of the garrison.
He wrote that the inquisitor's policy of using troops at the
city's gates to restrict access and egress to those who had
certification of orthodoxy was detrimental to the city's
trade and industry. This virtual blockade of the city gates
had especially affected the lower population; the mannants,
he said, "greatly resented the closing of the gates because
of the resulting shortages of food".'1' In a remonstrance sent
by the Calvinist consistory to Berghes in Kay 15^2, the
merchants Jacques Gellee and Michel Herlin indicated their
concern for the uncertified artisan-worker who was restricted
by the troop's actions; the passage indicated the concern
of the merchants for the integrated economy of the city.
Monseigneur notre gouverneur, il vous fault
entendu que tous les mestiers et estatz de mar-
chandises sont ensemble comme une chaine, de
laquelle quant ung chaynon ou plusieurs sont
desauldez, que lors le resider est estime de
petite valeur; aussi la vostre Excellence
scayt trop mieulx que nous que le noble et le
innoble recoit ses deus des mains des artisans
et laboureurs, si comme de la sueur de travail
des marchans.2
^HTRV, Vol. Ill, Berghes to the resent, 1 May 15^2, po. 230-
231.
2KTRV, Vol. Ill, Sectaires to Berghes, 24.May 15&2, p. 291.,
25
If the forains and week-workers were not allowed access, the .

whole economy of the city would suffer, and thus, the letter
concluded, the garrison should be removed.
There is also a pitiful remonstrance from the poor art-
isan-workers themselves which clearly indicates their jobless
ness and the starving condition of their women and children.
The restrictions on the entry of wool traders had resulted
in layoffs because of shortages in material for weavers and
spinners t.o work. Similar shortages in foodstuffs had driven
up the cost of living. To what extent the problems of the
artisan-workers were a result of general trends and to what
extent the result of the garrison is unknown. Nevertheless,
the artisan-worker remonstrance blamed their plight on the
garrison; they held to the popular belief that "the cardinal
and the bishop of Cambrai" had deceived, as they said, "our
king” into compliance with the policy of using troops. The
remonstrance summed up the chief problem of the city under
the garrison.
La grande povrete, laquelle est bien grande
en ceste ville entre le petit populaire pour
faulte de marchandise, laquelle pour le present
cesse en partie, y assistant aussi la chierte
des vivres augmentee de puis le venue de la gen
darmerie.
These letters were forwarded to Brussels, but members of
the central administration seemed not to be concerned with the
economic conditions in Valenciennes. The regent passed on
iHTRV, Vol. Ill, Remonstrance of the artisans contained in

letter cf the Kaeistrat to the regent, 1 October 1563 , "op.
503-506.
JO >
255.
the information that the bourgeois and the people of Valen

ciennes were complaining that the use of troops was pre
venting the free intercourse of trace and a rise in the prices
of foodstuffs.^ . Similarly, Cardinal C-ranvelle reported to
Gonzalo Perez that he was being blaimed for the effects of
the garrison in Valenciennes.2 Nevertheless, the Brussels
government did nothing to alleviate the situation. The regent's
attitude is best summed up by her letter of 13 October 15^3
to La Thieulloye. She stated that she knew the garrison had
caused widespread poverty by stopping'the looms of the'sayeteurs
but this was repayment for the city’s insolence in condoning
heresyj she was not going to give mercy to a city which had
repeatedly refused to uphold the placcards, and the troops
were not to be withdrawn until the work of the inquisition was
completed.-^
The devotion of the regent to her politico-religious
responsibilities seems to have led her to relegate.;to a second
ary consideration the hardships of her trusted administrator
of the inquisition. La Thieulloye wrote in October and Nov
ember 1563 of his need for funds if he himself was to avoid
poverty.
Je suplie tres-humblement qu’il plaise a Vostre
Alteze oraonner mon paiement, car je suis icy
1HTRV, Vol. Ill, Regent to Philip, 8 May 1562, p. 21^.

2Corresoondance de Granvelle, Vol. VII, p. 220.
^HTRV, Vol. Ill, Regent to La Thieulloye, 13 October 15^3»
pp. 525 -5 2 7 ; unfortunately, we have to rely on these few com
ments for the effect of the garrison at Valenciennes, as there
are neither more complete descriptions nor any figures in
dicating possible decreases in production.
en une des plus chiere villes de oardeca et
re fut qu'en suis indigent. . . .
Later a letter stated that he found himself destitute be
cause of lack of funds.2 The answers of the regent to these
entreaties were typical of royal employers in the 16 th
century. She wrote of her hope that God would find money
for his wages, because the financing of the crown did not
permit them to be paid at that time.^
The policy of the city government on the question was
consistent throughout the period. The magistrates disclaimed
the justification of the government for the entry of the
troops, i.e. that Valenciennes was open to French attack
because of its Calvinist activity. They offered to establish
new bourgeois forces to take the place of the garrison in
order to guard the town from the French, and in order to
alleviate the problem of the garrison’s wages. They also
indicated willingness to use this new force to prevent
preaching sessions in the countryside. They consistently
refused to pay anything to the upkeep of the garrison
troops, or to allow any new taxes to be levied inside the
city. 3erghes stated their case before the regent in a
^HTRV, Vol. Ill, La. Thieulloye to the regent, 31 October

15^3. PP. 553-555* See also the letter of 13 October 1 5 6 3 .
2HTRV, Vol. Ill, La Thieulloye to the regent, 13 November
15337 pp. 567-5£3.
3HTRV, Vol. Ill, Regent to La Thieulloye, 6 November 15^3» •
p. 5^3.
257.
letter of 10 August 1 5 6 3 . He distinguished between the

regular bourgeois guets overseen by the 15 constables and
the new proposed force: Whereas the regular militiamen
were restricted by ordinances of 1491 and 1553 to activate
inade the town, the new companies proposed by the Conseil
Particulier would have the authority to move outside the
walls to prevent preaching in the countryside.^- This recom
mendation of the marquis was first rejected by the regent as
it would put arms into the hands of those already corrupted
2
by Calvinist doctrines. It took nearly a year for the
magistrates, the marquis, and finally La Thieulloye to
convince the regent that the plan was workable. The culmi
nating argument was not the financial one, but the fact that
the inquisition had pacified the town and Calvinist activity
had ended. The inquisitorial commissioners reported that
enforcement of the 15&3 ordinance had resulted in increased
attendance at Mass and that the executions had done their job
of sufficiently cowing the population into compliance with
the placards. On 11 August the regent and the Council of
State resolved to have the footsoldiers discharged from their
garrison at Valenciennes, but only after the city had paid
for their upkeep for the whole period.of their stay, including
^HTRV, Vol. Ill, Berghes to the regent, 10 August 1563»

pp. 399-401.
2HTRV, Vol. Ill, Regent to Berghes, 13 August 1563, pp. 420-
421. Margaret's distrust of the rank and file bourgeois was
to prove prophetic, as these bourgeois companies were to form
the backbone of the city's defences during the seige of
1566-1567.
258.
the sums already advanced by the government. Moreover, the

three proposed companies of bourgeois were to be established.
Forcing cities to pay the wages of garrisons before removing
them had become standard procedure for the penurious govern
ment of Philip II. Either Valenciennes would find the
money, said the iegsnt, or'it would continually be saddled by
the garrison. The order of the regent was accompanied by a.
letter allowing for the collection-of new imposts inside
Valenciennes to pay for the annuities on rentes to be floated
for the sum. Later the bill for a total of 68,977 livres
The bill submitted to the town for the garrison's removal
^0? livres .. . wages of Colonel Blondel and his officers

150 livres .. . wages of six officers of enseign rank
hi,82^ livres .. . wages of foot from June 1563~?ebruary, 156h
h2,38l livrestotal
36,596 livres already paid by the Regent for wages from
February, 156h-September, 156h
68,977 livres grand total equaling the bill presented to the
magistrates
tournois was presented to a session of the Conseil Particulier

on 2 September 156h.'1‘ Berghes, who found his role as inter
mediary between the government and the city distasteful, pre
sented the bill with reluctance. Berghes' position was
filled with conflicting- influences which he found hard to
resolve. For example, on the one hand, he had to follow the
~SiTRV, Vol. Ill, Points proposed by Berghes, 2 September 156h,

pp. 3hO-3hl,
regent’s orders to protect his position as governor, and he
had to find money for his troops to retain their loyalty and
to remain in command of them. On the other hand, he knew
the city to be penniless, and he did not hesitate to present
its case to"the regent; perhaps, he had obtained another re
tainer to plead their cause. In his letter of September 4
of 15 ^ he wrote of poverty as a result of a stagnant economy
complicated by plague: "In truth, Madame, one cannot close
one's eyes to the poverty in which the city is plunged."
He then asked for a compromise agreement in which the city
only had to pay a part of the bill for the troops.-*- The
Conseil Particulier argued that increased taxation would en
courage further depopulation. There had already been many
rich merchants leaving because of the restrictions of the in-
2
quisition and the imposition of the garrison. Moreover,
the council protested, there were the enormous debts of the
soldiers owed to merchants and shopkeepers which were not
included in the bill. To ask for the whole amount was simply
an impossibility.3 Berghes added that the damages caused by
the garrison were irreparable; the city had already been
forced to dispense some 2^,000 to 2 5 ,0 0 0 livres to the
troops which.was not included in the bill.4
-*-HTRV, Vol. IV, 3erghes to the regent, ^ November 15^*

pp. 3^9-353.
2HTRV, Berghes to the regent, 3 September 156 ^,
pp. 347-3^8; and the Deliberation of the Conseil Particu
lier, 3 September 15^» PP« 3^9-350.
^KTRV, Vol. Ill, Deliberation of the Conseil Particulier.
16 September 156^, pp. 371-375.
SiTRY, Vol. Ill, Berghes to the regent, k- September 156^,
pp. 3^9-353.
260.
After a series of negotiations which saw the regent
write two sets of letters to the marquis, one to be presented
to the Magistrat.'and the other containing the real intentions
of the regent,1 the government finally accepted a sum of
20,000 florins in immediate payment and 1 6 ,0 0 0 more over
time. The magistrates found it impossible to float rentes
given dim prospects of collecting money in taxes to pay the
annuities. Finally, they had to give as security for the
20,000. florins the gold seal of the municipality.^ It is
questionable whether the remaining 16,000 florins was ever
paid as negotiations dragged on for months without any
apparent resolution.
7. Conclusions
During the reign ofCharles V the inquisition at Valen
ciennes had not resulted in widespreadopposition because
it had not been systematically enforced. Upon the accession
of Philip II* unfavorable economic trends and increased
activity of Calvinism coincided with a more rigorous enforce
ment of the Placards. During this period various levels of
Valenciennes society were estranged from the religious
policies of the government for very real political and economic
reasons. Key groups in positions of authority allowed the
^HTRV. Vol. Ill, Regent to 3erghes, 29 September 15^,

pp. 256-259. Margaret's duplicity is exemplified time and
again by such actions.
2HTRV, Vol. Ill, Regent to 3erghes, 23 September 15^,
pp. 376-379.
^HTRV, Vol. Ill, Magistrat to the regent, 26 September 156 ^,
pp. 3B7-3B9.
261 .
process of polarization into Catholic and Calvinist parties
to take place in order to protect their own interests.
For the king the spread of Calvinist doctrines in
the area of Valenciennes seeme'd a horrible new phenomenon
which had. to he met with a special effort to live up to his
religious duties. The king and regent directed their atten
tion to Valenciennes and Tournai where heretics were known
to have existed among the merchants and bourgeois. The
government's attention fixed upon the urban magistrates and
their own royal officials who were seen as cooperating with
the heretics. When these authorities appeared supine before
overt chanteries and preaching, and when the magistrates re
jected the efforts of the new archbishop to prosecute the
heretics, the Brussels government decided to reinstate its
own inquisition in Valenciennes.
The regent and king had failed to understand the poli
tical problems which influenced the actions of the magistrates.
The echevinale families could hardly enforce the placcards
against men like Michel Herlin who held powerful positions
in the Conseil Particulier, and in the bourgeois militia.
In a city where the social order was enforced by the citi
zens, the magistrates had to retain the favor of those who
controlled the citizen militia. The echevinale families
had a precarious position as professional urban bureaucr&s
because they depended on both the merchant community and the
king. They could neither prosecute the influential mer
chants who made up the Calvinist consistory, nor could they
262.
reject the orders from the central government. Perhaps they

were even as horrified by the Calvinist religous doctrines
as were members of the central government, but their need
to protect their political position made them act, as the
government said, with "dissimulation" in enforcing the
placards. The magistrates' interests dictated that they
had to defend the city's privileges, in order to retain their
own positions of power. With the justification of legality
wrought by ancient custom and charter, they fought against
ecclesiastical courts, royal p l a c a rds, and the royal inqui
sition, all. of which abrogated the city's bourgeois privi
leges. For them, the threat of the inquisition in the 1550's
and the 1 5 6 0 's must have seemed a new sinister challenge to
their particularism, much more dangerous than the jurisdic
tional struggles with Charles V. Nevertheless, they pro
secuted a number of Calvinists when forced to do so by the
pressure of the royal inquisition and its troops, but even
then the heretics were generally only of non-citizen status.
Merchants like Herlin went free; bourgeois rights were pro
tected by strategems as the bureaucratic managers of the
city's affairs desperately sought compromises.
Unfortunately, mediating efforts of the magistrates
were not enough to prevent the process of polarization into
religious parties which continued in Valenciennes despite
the increased rigor of the inquisitors. Indeed, the inqui
sition and its troops created economic and political tensions
v/hich seemed to out weigh questions of doctrine and to dwarf
263.
whatever problems were caused by generally unfavorable eco

nomic trends. The royal inquisition posed a threat not
just to the Calvinists of Valenciennes, but also to the
Catholic citizens in respect to what they considered to be
their basic rights. Even though one can say the inquisition
had no monopoly of religious persecution in the 16 th cen
tury as .executions also took place at Calvinist cities, one
has to see the effects of persecution on a regional basis.
For Valenciennes, the Catholic inquisition was oppressive
for the whole community, for Calvinists and Catholics, and
for rich and poor alike. In an effort to catch a minority
of heretics the government had set up an apparatus which
abrogated the political privileges of its citizens and
damaged the material well-being of all inhabitants. The
special rlaca rds were so exacting in their requirements
that if all the restrictions on trade and on certification
of artisans had been enforced, the city's economy would
probably have come to a halt,,
For citizans the abrogation of the privileges of freedom
from torture and freedom from confiscation were very impor
tant; it meant a real threat to their persons as they could
be tortured into giving confessions of heresy even if they
were practicing Catholics, and it meant a threat to their
property more real than any offered by the vagabonds or
Anabaptists. The enforcement of the regulations of the
nlacards of 1561 and 1563 and the increased tortures and
confiscations were aptly referred to by the magistrates as
’-2*fa*#
26k.
a “subjection" of their lives’to the inquisition. For the

upper and lower inhabitants alike, the oppresions resulted in
strong remonstrances. Calvinist activity did not stop until
the entry of r.oyal footsoldiers into the city in 15 &3 * indi
cating that the inquisition established a year earlier in
1562 had not in itself stopped the increase in Calvinist
adherents.
Citizens and non-citizens of both religions were ad
versely affected by the garrison which, according to wit
nesses, left the city in poverty and financial ruin. Its
blockade of the gates caused a cessation of industry and
trade, while the necessities of its troops drove them to
plunder* The garrison left the city's population substan
tially reduced as many fled its oppressions? the years of
the troop occupation reportedly resulted in damaging Valen
ciennes' reputation as a trading and industrial city. The
experience of Valenciennes under the garrison was perhaps
the most important factor in the estrangement of the rank
and file bourgeois from the inquisition, and perhaps also
from the inquisition's patrons, the archbishop of Cambrai,
the Dominicans, and government advisors like Cardinal Gran-
velle. It seemed it did not matter if the bourgeois arti
san was a good Catholic; all inhabitants were arbitrarily
affected by the inquisition and garrison. The Catholic
citizen found himself joining, with the Calvinists in oppo-.
sition to the inquisition and garrison, not for doctrinal
reasons necessarily, but for very real economic and political
ones.
Finally, in a larger context, what the Valenciennes
experience clearly illustrates is the conflict between cen
tral government and particularism so prevalent in 16 th
century Europe. Magistrates and bourgeois felt their privi
leges threatened by the councilors and bureaucrats,- while the
nobility believes their traditional authority was being un
dermined by new military ranks. Because the government
utilized the New Bishoprics and the inquisition as two of
the main ways to impose its will, the foes of the inquisi
tions were also the foes of centralization. Thus, we see
the emergence of an alliance of Calvinism with all groups,
both noble and urban, whose privileges were threatened by
the centralizing tendencies of the governments of Philip II,
CHAPTER FIVE: THE BREAKDOWN OF AUTHORITY
IN THE YEARS 1559-1566
The estrangement of the marquis de Berghes, of the magis

trates and of the bourgeois from the inquisition led to their
increased unwillingness to enforce the directives of the govern
ment on religious matters. From 1559 to 1566 there is evi
dence of a progressive breakdown in the functions of these
officials and groups in enforcing the ol acards. Nobles
would refuse to take part in royal inquisitions or to oversee
troops which supported the inquisitors' sanctions. Urban
magistrates and bourgeois militias would passively stand by
allowing riots to take place which could have been prevented.
This chapter will document the crisis of authority from 1559
until the year of 1566 when the normal roles of government
officials seemed to break down altogether.
1. Opposition of the great nobility

The key year for the genesis of noble opposition seems
to have been 1559 * although signs of it can be detected
earlier. 1559 was the year of Philip's departure for Spain,
the year of the New Bishoprics, and of the Peace of Cateau-
Canbresis,— all events which were to adversely affect the
nobility. The contention that Philip was excluding them
from power in favor of upstart laymen was chief among the
complaints of the nobility.
In the process of enfoicing the inquisition and promoting
IV /
.
267
church reforms, Philip and the regent relied on the lawyers
and humanists of the judicial courts and on learned ecclesias
tics to fill the posts in inquisitorial commissions; these
lawyers were particularly well equipped to foil the privi
leges of regional charters and to attend to the laborious
litigations of heretical cases. In the provinces and cities
these inquisitors from the central administration challenged
the traditional role of the noble governors— they became
powerful officials with direct contact with the regent and
the king and thus many times exerted preponderant influence
in the locality. Their perquisites from'the inquisitorial
offices were numerous,— salaries, gifts, bribes, and the
confiscations of heretical property. The great nobles saw
all this power and wealth as rightfully theirs; had not they
been the generals, councillors, and companions of the Bur
gundian dukes and of CharlesV? Had not their families in
the past filled positions as bishops and abbots, and thus
had preponderant power in localities?
In the early 1560*s mob'ie discontent focused on the
chief ministers of the regent. This discontent was well-
publicized and established the trend of opposition which
would culminate in 1566 with the' breakdown of the regular
functions of government on both urban and provincial levels.
In a desire to promote centralized conciliar government,
Philip had instructed the regent to utilize in his absence •
the advice of a smail group of men in a private council be
fore that of the great nobles: in the official Council of
268.
State. The members of this private council were Viglius de .
Zuchem Ab Ayta, a jurisconsult and nobleman of Frisia, Charles
de Berlaymont, a Southern nobleman in charge of finances, and,
most important of all, the famous Cardinal Granvelle. None of
these men had lineage to compare with that of the great
nobles, and their power was based on their willingness to
obediently execute the policies of the king in the most ef
ficient possible manner. They were all considered upstarts
by the nobility, especially Granvelle who aroused their
jealousy by amassing scores of ecclesiastical benefices in
cluding the nev; archbishopric of Malines. Of course, the
collections of benefices was not new in the Netherlands, but
the number and the wealth of those of the low-born Granvelle
surpassed those of any noble family. The great nobles were
jealous of the power and patronage of Granvelle which seemed
to be steadily growing. In their minds he seemed to become
a personification of their political and economic plight.
Two years after the king's departure in 15Î» Egmont
and Orange, the most powerful of the greater nobles, com
plained that the regent only came to the Council of State
in order to observe formality while the real decisions of
government were being made in private. The resentment toward
Granvelle. smoldered during 1561 and 15^2, as 3erghes and
other great nobles believed Granvelle to be promoting the
inquisition, which they saw challenging their authority.
^The kina allayed the fears of the grand seigneurs success

fully by brinaina to Spain and courting the cûnt of Hornes
in I56 I and the Count of Sarcont in 15&3? ne assured each of
Blaming the chief ministers of monarchs was a standard pro
cedure £>r dissatisfied nobles in most countries in the 16 th
century; As one could not accuse the sovereign of malprac
tice without falling out of favor altogether, one attacked
his ministers instead. It was imagined by many that Gr'anvel
ruled the king, and that it was his policy rather than the
king's that precluded the great nobles from consultation.
Other more erronious notions about Granvelle were that he
was forming a league with -the Guises in France in order to
introduce the inquisition.to both countries. It made no
difference that the cardinal counseled against the king's
desire for an extension of the inquisition, and against the
sending of troops to France to be used against the Huguenots
Another erroneous rumor about the cardinal was that it was
he who initiated the New 3ishoprics, while in reality it was
decided upon under the emperor and expedited by Philip II.
It was also thought that the cardinal wanted to destroy the
privileges of the provincial governors in order to aggran
dize power for the king in his person.
This latter contention was the only one which had truth
to it. Granvelle had advised the king in June of 1562 that
the grand seigneurs had too much power and that they should
be reduced to a half a dozen. Egmont and Orange, he said,
should be called to Spain and arrested for insubordination,
them that he had no intention of reducing their influence.

In fact the kins was following the council of Alva who ad
vised that tnis course of action would deceive the Nether
lands nobles and divide them. By the summer of 15 ^3 > hcweve
the nobility refused to send any more of their members to
Spain to be diverted f/om their complaints against the carci
270 .
while Granvelle claimed that he himself was innocent of the
many accusations leveled against him by the over-powerful
nobles. ...He fought back deftly, keeping the king posted on
the meetings of the great nobles at Brussels, Tournai, and
Eindhoven, and observing in his letters that such confedera
tions of nobles were inadmissable in a well-run state. He
especially chastised Orange for his relations with the duke
of Cleves and for his Lutheran connections in Germany. Gran
velle found the -religious views of Orange reprehensible, .
while considering the actions of other nobles, including
Kontigny and Berghes, to be complacent against the Calvinists
in their provinces. If the provincial estates became any
stronger, Granvelle suggested, the great nobles would be
in impregnable positions of leadership and the king would not
be able to overrule them. While the cardinal expressed his
contempt for Orange, he reserved his hatred for the marquis
de 3erghes. He described 3erghes as the most insolent, the
most flippant, and the .cockiest of the opposition. In sum,
Granvelle feared that the nobles desired to do avay with the
authority of the king and that they might try to take his
(Granvelle's) life.
While it is true that during 15^2 Berghes met with the
other great nobles to form a league against the cardinal and
that a coordinated attempt to oust him also started, Granvelle*s
concern that the nobles desired to challenge the king was in
flated. In Kay of 15&3 Sgmont, Orange, and Hornes, with the
written approval of 3erghes and Kontigny, wrote a well-known
271 .
letter asking the king to recall Granvelle. If the king did
not submit to their wishes, they said they would not return
to the Council of State but retire to their domains or
provincial governorships. On the 26th of July Sgmont,
Orange, Hornes, Berghes, Mansfeld, Keghem-* de Ligne, and
Hocgstraeten presented themselves before the duchess. They
claimed to be loyal vassals of the king and requested that
all they desired was the removal of Granvelle as counselor.'1'
A break came in the impasse in August, of 15&3 when Margaret
wrote to the king that hatred of Granvelle was causing the
unpopularity of her administration, and to retain the car
dinal in office in the face of such strong opposition was
impossible. The king asked Granvelle to retire to his
Eurgundian estates voluntarily, and the Cardinal did so,
using the health of his mother as an excuse. This was a
pyrrhic victory for the great nobles, however,, as they had
only disposed of a symbol of their political and economic
troubles. Over the succeeding years only a few of them
realized that it was the king..himself and the regent who
furthered the policies which led to the loss of their
authority and their positions as military and executive
leaders.^
În July of 15^3 when 3erghes requested permission to go to

Brussels to discuss the Valenciennes situation in the Council
of State, it was refused, because, as Granvelle related, the
government did not want 3erghes in the capital for fear he
would meet with the other great nobles in order to plot against
the government. Berghes isnored the refusal, and arrived at
Brussels on the 5th July, sayins that he did not receive the
counter order until he was in route. Corresnondance de Gran
velle, 7/eiss, Vol. Ill, Granvelle to C-onzalo to Perez. pp. 119-120,
^Charles Paillard., Considerations sur les causes generales des
troubles des Pays-Bas au XVIe si£cle (Brussels T 1874). p-p. 87-66.
The general opposition to the highest ministers of the
regent had a parallel in the actions of the great nobles in
their capacities as provincial governors. The Valenciennes
context has already illustrated some of the problems of the
marquis de Berghes. It seems also to have beome less possi
ble for him to function as an effective and active governor
as time went on: In June of 15^3 he told the regent that
he was going to abstain from proffering his advice on the
situation at Valenciennes, as no one in Brussels seemed to
pay any attention to it. He stated that thenceforth he
would simply execute the government's orders and that he
desired to have them in writing.^ He would, he said, leave
the general affairs of Valenciennes in the hands of the
royal inquisitorial commissioners and Blonde! as they had
2
"the strong hand" as the immediate overseers of the troops.
Indeed, after the summer of 15^3 Berghes' government role
seems to have been strictly that of a mechanical transmitter
of edicts from Brussels without trying to enforce them. He
absented himself as much as possible from Valenciennes and
left the work of enforcing the edicts to the •prevo>
t-le-comte
La T'hieulloye. When he was called upon to present oppressive
ordinances, such as that of 1 September 15^3» he merely asked
the magistrates to publish them, saying that they emanated
3
from hisher authority than his own.
1 HTRV, Vol. Ill, 3erghes to the regent, 13 June 15^3» PP» 3^1
2 HTRV. Vol. Ill, Berghes to the regent, 5 June 1563 , pp. 319-
^HTRV, Vol. Ill, 3ershes to the regent, lh September 15&3»
pp. 456 -^58 . He even tele the government that he -had said
so to the Kagistratl
Cities had come to utilize the offices of the noble
Governors to protect their interests against both the inqui
sition and the centralizing tendencies of the government.
The magistrates of Valenciennes had relied upon 3erghes to
support their contentions that they should have jurisdiction
over heretics * and that the political- and economic conse
quences of the royal garrison were disastrous. Even though
the great nobles had traditionally acted in a mediating
capacity between the cities and.the provincial estates, on
the one hand, and the King on the other, the roles of great
nobles like 3 erghes during the 1 5 6 0 's indicated an increasing
breakdown of their primary function as the executors of the
royal will. Even though their interests were decidedly dif
ferent from those of the Calvinists, and considerably dif
ferent from those of urban magistrates, the great nobles were
tacitly cooperating with the coalition of forces coming to
oppose the inquisition. At no time in the years 1 56 2-1 56 6 did
the great nobles openly support the heretics, and thus alienat
themselves completely from the sovereign. They had too much
to lose by doing so. 3ut they did allow and even encourage,
as in the case of Orange, opposition on the lower level to
give their functions as mediators more importance. Their
opposition to Granvelle at 3russels and the breakdown of
their primary function as enforcers of royal edicts on the
local level seems to have been a factor in the increase in
Calvinist activity and the paralysis of urban officials in
the enforcement of the placards.
^7Y
•27^.
2. The "maubruslez" incident: opposition of urban magis
trates and militia
Traditionally the urban magistrates in Valenciennes had
used the tactics of delay and deceit when confronted with
government demands which threatened their political inde
pendence or economy. To some extent the "maubruslez" inci
dent in 1562 is illustrative of the traditional mentality of
the magistrates and bourgeois, but to a greater extent it
illustrates the cle facto breakdown of royal authority on
the urban level of government. With the Regent's attention
’riveted on the city, the old tactics of delay were not suf
ficient and collusion with the heretics was the result.
Planned passivity in the face of opposition by various levels
of peacekeeping forces, including the marquis de Berghes,
the magistrates, and the bourgeois militia allowed for the
escape of two Calvinist deacons before execution against
the explicit orders of the Regent to prevent it.
The story of the incident starts in the autumn of 1561
when two Calvinist deacons, Simon Foveau and Philippes
Maillart, were captured after the royal inquisitors had
seized certain papers of Guy De Bres who was then minister
at Tournai. ' They were well-known activists of the Valen
ciennes' reformed church who had attended conventicles and
distributed alms to the Calvinist poor. Originally from a
village in the vicinity, the two had immigrated to Valen- .
ciennes and had become skilled artisans of bourgeois status;
Foveau was a master soap maker while I<1aillart was a fabricator
7
275.
of women's socks and slippers. Committed to the Calvinist
doctrines since the late 1 5 5 0 's, they had reportedly studied
in Geneva for a short time. When interrogated by the Valen
ciennes inquisitors, their answers on religious matters were
those of doctrinaire and orthodox Calvinists."1" After the in
cident which made them famous, they were lionized by Protes
tant historians as the true trumpets of Calvin and damned
by Catholic ones as agents of the devil.
The magistrates had been prompted by the r.egent and the
inquisitors to sentence them as unrepentant heretics to
death at the time they were captured in the autumn of 1561 .
Pressure was also exerted on themagistrates by the Cal
vinist consistory inside the city; merchant support for the
deacons was indicated in a letter sent formally to the Con-
seil Particulienon 4- February 15^2. It claimed that the
two deacons were innocent of any crime except their desireto
promote the True Church. It wasthe magistrates' duty to
punish those who committed crimes, but not to hinder good
citizens like Foveau and Maillart in their religious duties.
The mass of Calvinists, the letter stated, wanted to hold
the magistrates in honor and desired to obey their authority,
but if the injustice of death for the deacons was to be de
creed, the writers feared that a riot would result. The
•*-The answers exhibited conformity with the Calvinist creed

on both ecclesiastical and political matters, and they re- .
fused to abjure to save themselves. The texts of the in
terrogations accompany letters of the Magistrat to Berghes
dated 17 February and 3 March 15^2. HTRY, Vol. II, pp. 113-
135.
consistory explicitly voiced their fears that the rank and
file Calvinists would resort to violence in order to save
the deacons. This preliminary warning was confirmed by the
rank and file themselves on 2h February in a letter ob
viously written by men of little education as many words
were misspelled and the language was colloquial. The letter
warned the magistrates that there would indeed be an attempt
to rescue the deacons. The rescue, the letter said, would
be justified in the eyes of God as the two deacons were
earnest adversaries of idolatry, and only desired to live
constant to the Word of God as revealed in the Scriptures.
If "oppressions’1 were to be the result of such a rescue the
persecutors would reap the eternal fires of hell. The
letter begged the magistrates to Uphold the True Church and
to use discretion to avoid a bloody tumult during the at
tempted rescue.^ The Calvinists seem to have been complying
with the dictum of their Genevan leader that cooperation
must be sought with the secular magistrates, but, for the
reformed of Valenciennes, this did not mean docility in the
face of the burning of their leaders, and they were not ad
verse to exerting pressure on the magistrates through the
2
threat of violence.
^See the texts of the two letters, HTRV, Vol. II, Consistory
to the Magistrat, pp. 114-1^5* and Calvinists to the Magis-
trat, pp. l60 -l6 2 .
2A show of Calvinist force came several weeks before the day
of the attempted executions t On the night of 23~2;
4 March
two to three hundred armed men assembled on the market place
next to the street leading to the prison. The bourgeois
guets evidently allowed these men to assemble with their
277.
The response of the magistrates was to postpone the

execution and to redouble their efforts to try to convince
the deacons to abjure and be converted back to the Catholic
faith. The magistrates wrote to the regent that as the dea
cons were not dangerous criminals they should be given ample
opportunity to correct their errors. In an attempt to indi
cate the unpopularity of the execution requested by the
government, the magistrates sent the two letters from the
Calvinists which threatened a rescue. They indicated their
position as magistrates was tolerated as long as they could
uphold justice against criminal acts against the lives and
property of the city's inhabitants, but that their position
became untenable when they had to execute men whose only
crime was abrogating the olacards. The magistrates indica
ted that they could not be responsible for the safety of the
city if the executions were to be pursued.^-
3y 26 March 1562 the regent rejected any further delay
of the executions. She wrote that the city authorities had
exhibited a pusillanimous attitude to the chanteries which
had given the heretics a chance to grow in number and bold
ness, and that the tardiness of the execution of the deacons
was encouraging a.further increase in heresy. She told the
weapons and didn't attempt to arrest them afterwards. Dis

guised by hoods and false beards, they chanted several psalms
and called out to one of the docor.s, "Simon, te portes-tu
bier.?" The answer came back from the cell, "oui". The as
semblage broke up after more psalms. APR, Papiers c'Btat et
de 1'Audience, Pardes de Vienne, 15-2. no. LVI.
2HTHV. Vol. II, letters of the Magistrat to the resents 17
and 25 February 1 5 6 2 , pp. 113-121; 10 March 1552, pp. 146-147;
24 March 1 5 6 2 , pp. .155-154.
278.
Magistral: to execute the deacons immediately and to take all

necessary precautions to prevent the threatened rescue of the
prisoners.^- The r.egent wrote another letter on k April 1562
admonishing the magistrates to arrest those who threatened a
rescue and to proceed to an immediate, public, and exemplary
2
execution of the deacons.
Faced with a crisis situation by Calvinist pressure on
the one side and the call for execution by the government
on the other, the magistrates had to find some formula which
would enable them to survive. The integrity of their juris
diction had to be retained in the eyes of the government,
and therefore the execution had to be attempted. On the other
hand, they could not afford to antagonize the mass of mer
chants and artisans by firing on a crowd during a rescue
attempt. Moreover, many of the bourgeois gueteurs favored
the Calvinist party and could not be relied upon to fire on a crowd
even if given the order to do so. The attitude of the rank
and file bourgeois had already been evident during the fall
of I56 I when a report of the Conseil Particulier for 3 Novem
ber reported that there were few bourgeois who were in
terested in arresting chanters as they were not a threat to
property; the report stated that many of the chanters were
3
members of the bourgeois guets.
HiTRV, Vol. II, Regent to the Kagistrat, 26 March 15^2, po. 163 -
l55T"
2KTRV, Vol. II, Regent to the Magistrat, k April 1 5 6 2 , pp. l6S-
171.
^HTRV, Vol. II, Deliberation of the Conseil Particulier. 3
November 1561* PP*
279.
The position of the magistrates was illustrative of

their divided loyality as a social group in the first place,
i.e. dependence on both the patronage of Brussels and the
cooperation of the merchant-artisans. When faced with a situa
tion where either one of their loyalties would be compromised,
they were perfect compromisers and crisis managers. As we
shall see, while there is no specific evidence which states
their intentions on the day of the "maubruslez”, there are
some facts which suggest that the magistrates were simply
taking part in a ritual without intending to proceed to the
execution when serious opposition developed. In other words,
it was an elaborate charade which was presented as a spec
tacle in order to retain the jurisdictional integrity of
the Kagistrat in the minds of the government at Brussels.
Later they would be able to say that they had done everything
that was possible, but that the opposition was simply too
strong. Their actions indicate a double role of covert coopera
tion with the Calvinists while overtly proceeding with the
preparations for the execution.
The preparations of the magistrates are indicative of
their double standards: Of sixty of the principal citizens
chosen to oversee the bourgeois guets on the day of the exe
cution^ exactly 30 were either Calvinists or Calvinist sym
pathizers. 3esides the well-known Calvinist Kichel Berlin,
whose family was implicated by Tisnacq in 15^, there were
also such notable merchant bourgeois as GeorgesI£ Blon,^-
^Leader of a comoar.y of “tous nuds"against the royal forces

in 1566-1567.
280.
Michel Herlin le Josne,"1* Franchois Voisin,^ and Jean Le

Mesurerur. All these men fought against the royal troops
in 1566-1567. The magistrates could not have been unaware
of the sympathies of men like these who sat with them in the
Conseil Particulier, and their appointment was perhaps an
added precaution for the prevention of bloodshed on the day
of the execution; by making sure that the bourgeois forces
were half Calvinist, they were neutralized from any rcle in
putting down a rescue attempt.^ On the other hand, their
inclusion.as guet leaders is another indication of the
strength of the Calvinist community at Valenciennes and the
pressure it could bring to bear on the urban magistrates.
Meanwhile, the marquis de Berghes had decided to leave
Valenciennes before the execution, evidently so as not to be
responsible for its failure. Considering the threats of
rescue received the r.egent thought that Berghes' desertion
was very damaging to the situation, and she ordered him to
go back to Valenciennes.^ The marquis, resting with his
brother at Liege several weeks before the date of the execu
tion, wrote to the regent that he respectfully declined to
^"Oldest son of Michel Berlin and a captain of bourgeois cavalry

in 1566 *1 5 6 7 .
2
Leader of a company of bourgeois in 1566-1567 and a leader
of iconoclasts.
^ Left the city as a Calvinist exile in 1562 and returned to
fight against the royal forces in 1566 -1 56 7 .
^KTRV, Vol. II, Ordinance of the Magistrat, 26 April 1562 ,
pp. I76 -I8 5 .
^HTRV, Vol. II, Regent to Berghes, 17 January 1562, p. 9 9 .
V o \
281.
go tack to Valenciennes because his authority would be im-

■ paired if he associated himself with the magistrates who had
.delayed the execution for months; he wanted the magistrates
to take the consequences for their delays alone. This letter
was a clear indication that Berghes took the threat of a
rescue seriously and was looking after his own interests.
This letter also illustrates the nobles* refusal to execute
the government's will during the incident. ^
On April 27 at dawn the stage had been set for the exe
cutions. The bourgeois guets were mustered and placed on
the market place and around the city hall while others were
assigned to guard homes in the streets in the eventuality
that the threatened riot would get out of hand and become
a threat to property. Five a.m. Monday morning had been
chosen as the time of the executions becaue it was thought
that there would be less chance of a dangerous riot as the
poor week-workers would not have'returned from their peasant
HTRV, Vol. II, Berghes to the regent, 26 March 15^2, pp. 165 -
l£>6 , and Berghes to the regent, 28 March 15^2, p. 1 6 7 . The
government continued to exhort Berghes to attend right up to
the eve of the attempted execution. Regent to Berghes at
Liege, 23 April 15^2, pp. 17^-175* Berghes received a letter
from the regent after the rescue expressing a marked disap
proval of his conduct. Also, in a letter to the king, she
accused Berghes of insubordination by staying at Liege
without approval and related that even after the incident
Berghes had been unwilling to leave Liege. HTRV, Vol. II,
Regent to Berghes, 28 April 15&2, pp. 20^-205, and pegent
to the king, 8 May 15&2, pp. 208-217.
282.
homes in the countryside after their Sunday day of rest. 1

Nevertheless, at the appointed hour a huge crowd of indi
genous shopkeepers, artisans, and workingmen had gathered on
the market place and stood behind the barriers arranged
around the scaffold. Workers were still piling firewood
around the stake when the magistrates appeared on the balcony
of the city hall. Biseau, the city clerk, unrolled a scroll
and read a sentence which clearly lay the responsibility
for the executions on the regent, the king, and their rla- -
cards. This document, of which we have a copy, sets forth
in exquisite detail the opinion that the executions were by
order of "Madame la Duchesse de Parme" and by regulations of
the edicts and placards of the king at the request of the
royal officer, Jean Rolin, lieutenant prevat-le-comt e . The
document also contains the usual formulas against any riots
during the execution, but these appear to have been inserted
2
so as to absolve the magistrates of any charges of laxity.
After the reading, the two prisoners were led'.in heavy
chains from their cells into the alley next to the city hall.
As they emerged from the alley onto the market place and
were led toward the scaffolde only the clank of chains was
heard by the hushed crowd. Then Foveau raised his head and
^ h e hour of execution was only told to the guets during the

night. The magistrates did not want word to reach the peasant
villages before the execution as it was feared that they would
want to take part in the rescue. Paillard, Notes et eclair-
cissener.ts, pp. 8 -9 .
ÂC-B, Cartulaires et mss., Vol. 191» fo. 153“i5^»
283.
began to sing, "Oh eternal. . It was not a cry of anguish

but the start of a victory psalri sung often during the chan-
teries. Usually the condemned Calvinists sung the 5^th psalm
which began "Oh, all powerful God, save me. . . ," but Foveau
had started with the 9^th psalm, which called for the punish
ment of the proud and the corrupt:
0 Eternal, Dieu des vengeances,
0 Dieu, punisseu.r des offences,
Fay Toi cognoistre clairement.
Toi gouverneur de 1'univers,
Hausse toi oour rendre aux pervers
De leur orgueil ce payement.
After the first few words the crowd took up the singing of
the psalm. A few seconds later the first missile, a woman's
shoe, sailed out of the crowd toward the magistrates followed
by a shower of rocks. The guets stood their ground impas
sively as the magistrates retired from thebalcony. The
jailors retreated before the onslaught taking Foveau and
Maillard back into the alley and into the prison. The crowd
on the market place quickly began to demolish the barricades
and the scaffolding. At one end of the square a lieutenant
of the marquis de 3erghes stood in an unofficial capacity
with a number of his bande d'ordonnance just as impassively
as the bourgeois guets.
A few seconds later the crowd surged through the alley
up to the prison, and several men used a timber from the
scaffolding to ram down the door. With hurrahs from the
crowd, a group went in and quickly emerged carrying the
deacons hoisted upon their shoulders. Foveau and Kaillart
were carried onto the market place in triumph, where the
crowd was led in several psalms of thanksgiving. It was said
that the term "maubruslez" or "badly' burned" originated in
those few moments as a sort of joke and cry of relief— "They
are saved! Our precious maubruslez!" Witnesses on the market
place concurred that all in attendance, even members of the
bourgeois guet,seemed to be rejoicing over the rescue. When
anartisan soap maker was later asked'by royal officials if
he had sung with the rest of the crowd during the rescue, he
answered, "3y God, yes, like everyone else." At the same
time, Louis Brochart, the bourgeois preacher, harangued the
crowd not to abuse their victory and to show constancy to
the Word of God by acting with moderation.'1'
The rescue had the widespread support of the merchant
community and the bourgeois rank and file, besides the mem
bers of the crowd. The key to the success of the rescue was
the crowd*s lack of threat to the lives and property of the
bourgeois, who, as militia members, were prepared to stand
by and allow the deacons to be saved. There was no attempt
on the part of the rioters to do anything other than rescue
the deacons; only once did someone in the crowd suggest that
they go sack the Dominicans. The proposed action against
the Dominicans was not suggested simply for monetary reasons
as there were richer and more accessible religious houses to
sack-like the nunnery of the Sisters of Beaumont. The
Calvinists probably wanted to sack the Dominicans as they •
“For a description of the events, see S. Bcuton, "La journee

des mau-brulez," ANFKB, Vol. Ill, pp.
285.
acted as the spies of the archbishop of Cambrai. That, however,

was discouraged by the Calvinist leadership and never occurred.
In sum the Calvinists kept tight control of their flock to
accomplish the rescue without any threat to property.^"
In spite of this factual lack of stealing during the
riot, economic motivations of the rioters must be considered.
The marxist historian Kutner has perhaps correctly linked
the "maubruslez” incident with the joblessness of cloth
workers in the months of February and March of 1562. He
points out that at Valenciennes the Conseil Particulier took
emergency measures to prevent the poor, as the magistrates
said, from "finding livings whereever they could", or, in
other words, by stealing. The magistrates decided to provide
work on the city's fortifications at two patards a day for
the month of March in order to provide the jobless with a
living. But Kutner does not go on to point out that loth
century urban magistrates were constantly aware of the possi
bility of riot caused by hunger, and that they had an array
of charitable and military measures to protect property from
attack. Similarly, he does not present either the motivations
^The m arquis de 3erghes himself supported Calvinist conten

tions which stated that " . . . tous ceulx aui se sont esrr.eu
audict jour ne se sont pas esmeuz pour battre ny occire ni
■oilier oersonne. . . . " See the annex to his letter of 22
May 156?, 'HTRV. Vol. II, p. 29^. On the other hand, the
threatened sack of the Dominicans was mentioned by a Catholic
annalist who cid not mention the special place of the Domini
cans in the system of the inquisition. Henry d'Oultreman,
Histoire, p. 201.
^HTRV, Vol. II, Deliberation of the Conseil Particulier, 11
February 15 6 2 , pp. 102-103.
. 286.
of the magistrates or bourgeois militia during the incident,

nor the precautions which were taken to allow a rescue of
the deacons but to prevent plunder.
When unemployment arose in the spring of 1562, the magis
trates realized the gravity of the situation and utilized the
public works program which had effectively prevented imminent
discontent in the past. During the month of April, when it
became apparent that the Calvinists were going to attempt to
rescue the deacons during the execution of sentence, the
magistrates and merchants were apprehensive that the violence
would set off a general riot. As we have seen, this was the
chief motivation for holding the execution on a day and at
aitime when the poorest rural workers were absent. It was
also the motivation for distributing the militia in key posi
tions around the city. The Conseil Particulier explicitly
stated that the militia captains should be on the alert to
prevent pillage which might ensue as a result of the rescue.
After the incident the magistrates took the precaution of
placing contingents of militia at the gates and at the ram
parts to exclude peasant-vagabonds from the city as the news
of the riot spread into the countryside.'1'
These fears and precautions of the magistrates indicate
that economic trends in the spring of 15^2 had indeed caused
a potentially dangerous situation for propertyowners in
Valenciennes. One can say that perhaps some of the poor
~K?RV, Vol. II, Deliberation of the Conseil.Particulier.

2? April 15 6 2 , pp. 191-192, and Magistrat to the Regent, 27
April i5«2, pp. 193-195*
(
287.
artisan workers who took part in the "maubruslez" incident

would have welcomed a general riot, or that they even may
have joined the crowd who rescued the deacons in order to
express discontent over their joblessness. Although there
is no direct evidence for this notion concerning the motives
of the members of the crowd, it seems to be a reasonable as
sumption. It can also be argued that the consciousness of
the workers* economic condition was subsumed in religious
conceptions, and so the acts of chanting psalms and following
orders of preachers is no indication that their motivations
were solely religious.
Yet, where Kutner errs is in his overstatement of the
case. He presents the plight of workers as the only cause of
the "maubruslez" incident, and thus by implication he appears
to believe that it would have taken place whatever the magis
trates and bourgeois militia had done. It is this statement
of cause and its implication that is misleading and erron
eous, as. the motivations of the workers, both economic and
religious, were only one set of factors in a complicated
;situation. The magistrates, as we have seen, were not pas
sive and powerless objects, naively fulfilling their duties
as executioners. The possibility of a hunger riot was one
of the haz.ards which they had to accept during the charade,
but they had taken all the necessary charitable and military
.. precautions before the execution of.sentence on the two
deacons; they had delayed carrying out the sentence, they
288.
had accepted remonstrances from the consistory and the rank

and file Calvinists, they had blamed the sentences on the
placards and the'resent, and they had pat Calvinists in
charge of half the militia. If, on the other hand, the
bourgeois militia had been ready to fire on the order of a
determined Kagistrat t it is doubtful that the indigenous
artisans would have rioted. Thus, it seems that while job
lessness was perhaps important as one of the reasons why
lower levels of the population were ready to partake in the
events, it does not exâin why they were allowed to do so.
The answer to the latter question lies in the motivation and
actions of the magistrates and the bourgeois militia who
covertly declined to carry out the directives of the central
government.
3. The noble confederates and the general breakdown of

authority in 1556
As we have seen, the causes of the estrangement of
urban and noble groups did not abate, but seemed to intensify.
During the crisis year of 1566 it was the nobility who led
a strong opposition to the inquisition and encouraged not
only the spread of Calvinism but also the passivity of the
magistrates during the preaching and the iconoclasm of the
summer months. 1566 was the year when the authority of
the government seemed to break down altogether.
Noble opposition coalesced in August 1565 in reaction
to orders of Philip II for the publication of the decretals
of the Council of Trent, Although Philip had doubts about
^ 7
2.89 •
the aspects of the decretals which threatened his own power,

he nevertheless came to see it as his duty to enforce.them in
the Netherlands, The decretals augmented episcopal authority
and struck the traditional systems of patronage in the Church
a further blow. City governments and provincial councils prc-
' tested the projected increase in episcopal jurisdiction in
heresy cases, while abbots, religious chapters, and the uni
versities of Douai and Louvain protested new episcopal rights
to appoint'to: benefices. In Kainaut, the abbots claimed that
their records had been destroyed in the wars, and even
though they had no proof of their immemorial rights to ap-.
point curates to parishes precedent should stand. Simi
larly, cities like Valenciennes presented all the old argu
ments and charters which had in the past protected their
particularism.
When the "Letter of Segovia" from the King ordering en
forcement of the ordinances on heresy in all their rigor was
published in the Netherlands in December of 15^5» the event
inflamed an already critical situation. The letter called
for the systematic use of force to ensure orthodoxy; the in
quisitors were to be helped in all that pertained to their
charges, while magistrates and officials who were negligent
in the prosecution of heretics had to be replaced by more
zealous ones. In effect, this letter gave notice that the
prince's intention was to disregard the advice of the great •
nobility and the remonstrances- of the cities. He was going
to pr-cceec with an unpopular religious policy whose enforcement
aggravated problems of authority, privilege, and economy for
almost every level of the Netherlands' society.- It was a
signal of the king's intransigence, or, as it was thought, o
the intransigence of his advisors. More than any other even
in the winter of 15&5 led "t0 'the resolve of many of the
nobility to act in concert to block the inquisition.
Opposition to the Letter of Segovia initially cane from
the great nobles: In the Council of State, Orange, Egmoht,
and Hornes warned Viglius that the enforcement of the in
quisition would initiate a tragedy for the Low Countries
and counseled postponement of the publication of the Letter
of Segovia. Orange repeatedly warned against any use of
Spanish troops which he conceived as having disasterous con
sequences. Egmont threatened to resign his governorships
of Flanders and Artois if the nl acards were upheld in their
rigor. The marquis de 3erghes, who no longer sat in the
Council of State, offered his resignation as governor in
a letter of 8 January 1 5 6 6 .. His reason was explicit,— the
Letter of Segovia was the
occasion plus grande aue toutes les aultres
precedentes, quy est I'espie commandement de
sa matieste d'executer en toute rigeur les plac-
cars ordonnez sur le fait de la religion, le
desire d1habandonner ces estatz me presse de
plus en olus. . . . je ne me puis persuader
que ceste rigeur soit^rem£de propre a ces£e_
maladie tant inveterr^, comme est ces heresies
et emprimee en 1'opinion de tant de gens.-
The great nobles reflected the fearful rumor which spread
across the Low Countries that it was the government's intent
1KHSAV, Vol. V, Berghes to the regent, 9 January 1566,

pp. 150-151.
C-K '
291 .
to institute an inquisition on the Spanish model which was
infamous for its brutality and scope.
In mid-December 15^5, "the nobility came to Brussels for
the marriage of the duchess of Parma's son, Alexander Farnese.
The publication of the Letter of Segovia on the 18th of Decem
ber came during the preparations and festivities. A number of
secret meetings took place among the already disgruntled lesser
nobles, and they organized against the -inquisition which had
long been the focal point of their discontent. The Calvinist
members of the.lesser nobility took the lead in planning and
writing the document later to be known as the Comoromis des
Nobles. It was probably Jean Karnix, a Calvinist noble who
1
had studied in Geneva, and the layman Gilles LeClercq, a law
yer from Tournai who drew up the Comoromis.
The majority of noblestwho were interested in more per
sonal issues than the persecution of heretics^ found in the
Calvinist inspired document a ready-made statement of opposition
to government policies which had reduced their status both
economically and politically.- The reasons for the discontent
of the lesser nobility during the 1560 s have not been system
atically researched, but they seem to have been due to the
trends affecting other ruling groups at mid-century. The
end to the Kabsburg-Valois wars brought loss of jobs, the
inflation devalued seigneurial rents and the royal bankruptcies

1JL
"" "* ~~ *
LeClercq was a key man in the organization of the Calvinist^

opposition in the spring of 1$66. Ke' was a native of Tournai
where he was a member of the consistory; he frequented^the city[s
Chamber of Rhetoric with other well known Calvinists like Fasquier
de la Barre. In the 1560 s he had become an organizer and co
ordinator in the effort of the Calvinists to win over the
‘ nobility. . Ke was secretary of the Anwerp synod, ana a friend
of Louis of Nassau which allowed him access to Orange and the
German nobility.
292.
reduced wages. When abbeys were dissolved to pay for the

saleries of newly created bishops, many nobles lost positions
and revenues which had belonged to their families for genera
tions. Others became anti-government partisans because their
traditional patrons, the greater nobility, were excluded from
power. To nobles like Brederode, the Compronis promised an
end to the policies which had lessened' his authority in the
bandes d'ordonnance and had led to his increased economic
problems. Whether the inquisition had or had not caused the
problems was immaterial for the nobles who signed the doc
ument; for them, the inquisition had become the symbol of
their dissatisfaction and the justification of their op
position to the royal government.
1
In the Comrromis des Nobles, we see the nobility adhering
to legalism as they accuse the King's advisors or "perverse
persons" and not the king himself for the policy of the in
quisition. They explicitly stated in the Conroromis that they
had no intention of diminishing the grandeur of the king, but
rather they desired to serve the king and work in his best
interests. Unable to conceive of ridding themselves of the
sovereign who was the actual source of the policy, they could
only (knowingly or not) accuse ministers who could be dis
missed.
The nobles accused the ministers of persuading the king
to impose the inquisition on the Netherlands by force. The
inquisition, they stated, was contrary to all divine and human
I
See the text of the Comoromis in Trachsel, De Colomban
aux C-ueux(Brussels. 19^9)» PP. 155-153.
293 .
laws; they thus directly challenged the notion that the king's
right of lese-majesty divine justified the inquisition. The
inquisition, the Calvinist writers continued, surpassed all
the barbarities that had ever been practiced by the most cruel
tyrants. It would lead to the total ruin of the Low Countries
because it subverted the legal system by putting all authority
and jurisdiction under the inquisitors to the detriment of .
traditional political privileges and rights. Thus, the inqui
sition v/as explicitly indicted as a threat not only to the re
formed religion but to the authority, privileges and franchises
of the magistrates and the nobility. The Cora-oromis concluded
that the signatories of the paper solemnly swore to the utmost
of their pov/er that the inquisition would be prevented in the
Netherlands.
For the majority of signers, the pledge was a calculated
display of strength to try to force the restoration of their
relatively better position under Charles V. The signers had
no interest in doing av/ay with, the hierarchical structure of
society with the sovereign prince at the top; on the contrary,
they sav; the threat in the corruption of the hierarchical
system by the jurists who filled tte inquisition's posts.
The document was the declaration of a defensive union of mostly
Catholic nobles, sworn aga.inst the inquisition for a variety
of reasons. Progressively, these"Confederates" or "Beggers”,
as they were called, were forced into alliance with the Cal
vinists by the pressure of events.
The Com-oromls des Nobles was presented on the fifth of
April 1566 in Brussels by the noble signatories who walked two
inf
29b.
. by two to the palace through the streets lined by an applauding

populace. They were received at the palace by the r.egent with
. Egmont, Orange, and other greater nobles in attendence, These
grand seigneurs seemed to stay aloof from, the activities
which'they had helped to inspire. Having too much to lose by
opposing the government so forthrightly, they acted as the
moderate patrons of the Confederates ana the brokers of the
government. Men like Orange undoubtedly encouraged the Con
federates, one of whom was Orange's activist brother, Louis
of Nassau, The pressure exerted by the “Baggers" afforded
the greater nobility a unique opportunity to play their tra
ditional roles as the arbiters of power as the chief council
lors and authorities of the king's government. If they could
allay the opposition of the Confederates through compromise,
they would be restored to their traditional positions as
indispensable administrators of the prince.
The Calvinist activists, Marnix and Le Clerq,
did not rely only on the Conrpromis to bring pressure on
Philip II, they also solicited the help of Calvinist and
Lutheran nobles in the Holy Roman Empire. After the Letter
of Segovia-was distributed in mid-December 15&5* Le Clerq
traveled to 'Heidelberg in southern C-ermany to enlist the
help of the Elector Palatine, Frederick III. Le Clercq's
mission resulted in Frederick's request to the emperor to
intervene with Philip II in support of the Compromis, and •
a copy of De Bres* Confession of Faith was included to show
that the Calvinists were- loyalists. The e'lector argued
that imperial intervention against the inquisition was
sound, because the Low Countries were still part of the
Holy Roman Empire.
At the same tine the Calvinist nobility made an attempt
to enlist the help of the Lutheran nobility of the Empire
and the Lutheran community in t;he Low Countries. De 3res
left refuge at Sedan, where he had stayed since the repres
sion of the chanteries at Tournai in 1562, and he travelled
to Antwerp where he met with Lutheran and Calvinist merchant
and nobility. Together De Bres and the merchants tried to
work out doctrinal agreements on such disputed points as the
interpretation of the Lord's Supper. ' This attempt at
unification of the two reformed religions reportedly had
the support and encouragement of the prince of Orange him
self. Although the attempt at reconciliation failed, there
was nevertheless some success in unifying resistance to the
inquisition. In both Germany and the Netherlands there was
a wave of sympathy in favor of the Comoronis and the growing
opposition to royal religious policy.'*'
In April Le Clerq sent letters to the consistories of
various towns, including Valenciennes, advising them to put
pressure on their town magistrates to follow the lead of the
Ân alliance with the Lutherans and Calvinists of the Empire

was the only foreisn alliance which would not lead to ceclar
tion of rebellion. By the Golden Bull the Netherlands were
traditionally considered part of the Empire. De Bres had
written to the consistory of Antwerp that it was necessary
to come to an understanding with the Lutherans in order to
"ronore entierement la force du -ape" in the Low Countries.
3. Van den Brinck, "Het iiuwe1i Y van V/illem van Oranfce en
Anna van Saxen" in Pieces du XVIs sichels, Vol. I, p. 155•
O- (I?
.
296
lower noblity "by formally objecting to the inquisition. The

aim was to enlist the pressure of the cities and of .the
merchant communities in order to give the request of the Con
federates more weight. This was the signal for stepped up
activity in the cities where, because of political, social,
and economic tensions, many Catholics were now ready to join
the lead of the nobles.
The reaction of the merchant community at Antwerp was
immediate. Pasouilles and libelles were circulated from
house to house, posted on the doors of churches, and nailed
to the gates of the hotels of the great nobles. These posters
claimed that as the Netherlands belonged to the Holy Roman
Empire by the C-olden Bull of 13^7, they were exempt from the
inquisition by the Treaty of Augsburg which allowed the Em
pire de facto toleration. Meanwhile the cities of Brabant
and Flanders claimed their privileges excused them from many
aspects of the Trent decretals and the placcards. The states
of Artois desired guarentees of their governor Egmont for
the protection of the innocent against arbitrary inquisitorial
power; in Hainaut, similar appeals were made to Brussels and
to the marquis de Berghes by the Valenciennes magistrates.
From many of these cities Brussels received disquieting re
ports of the popular opposition to the letter of Segovia:
From Valenciennes the royal officials De le Val and Clarem-
bault wrote that the receipt of the circular letter of 18 .
December had resulted in the strong protests of the magis
trates whose lax and rebellious attitude allowed thepopulace to
ZTI
297 .
express anger against the inquisition.^- On the night of
30-31 March posters appeared in Valenciennes criticizing the
decision of the duchess not to accept the remonstrances- of
the' four chief cities of Brabant; Brussels, Antwerp, Louvain,
and Bois-le-duc, which had claimed the inquisition was an
abrogation of their privileges. Hundreds of critical hand
bills also were handed out, and many of these were attached
to the doors of the prevot, the parish churches, the town
gates, and around the markets. Here again the legalism of V
the Calvinist propaganda is apparent as these posters re-
2
portedly always appealed to privileges and rights.
Throughout these early months of 1566» it was the mer
chant community of Antwer*p that took the lead in opposition
to the inquisiton instead of the traditional centers of
Calvinist activity in the Low Countries, Tournai and Valen
ciennes, which had been cowed by the oppressions of 1561 -
'1565 * The Antwerp merchants were Hed by Martin Lopez, one
of the first laymen who signed the Compromis des Nobles,
and Lopez headed an organization in Antwerp called the Union
des Marchands which followed the example of the Confederates
in organizing to combat the inquisition. The Union claimed in
its remonstrances that religious persecution had resulted
in the emigration of skilled artisans and merchants, who had
1MHSAV, Vol. .V, De La Val to 3erghes, 22 January 1566,

pp. 152-153.
2MH3AV, Vol. V, De La Val to the regent, 31 March 1566,
pp. 15c-157.
had to flee to avoid confiscation of their property; trade
with Lutheran cities in Germany and with Elizabeth's Eng
land, they further charged, had been hampered and in some
cases paralyzed by these withdrawals of personnel and capi
tal. The inquisition's methods, including torture and the
use of trrops, it was argued finally, ruined confidence in
the money and commodity markets.^" The establishment of
the Antwerp Union added another pressure group on the govern
ment.
The Antwerp merchants’ consistory and able leadership
was the basis for the synod held in Antwerp during the sprin
of 15^6; through the secretary of the synod, Gilles Le
Cleicq, the Antwerp consistory advised the consistories of
Valenciennes and Tournai about the intentions of the Con
federates and about the efforts undertaken in Germany. At
•all the major junctures of the spring and early summer,
the Antwerp consistory played a key role in coordinating
the efforts of the reformed church all over the Netherlands.
The Union of Merchants criticized the "moderation" of many
of the magistrates and nobles by calling it ‘taoorderatie"
or murderous; this pun equated moderation with murcer as it
was claimed that moderates only saved heretics from the
stake to execute them by the sword. A Comoromis des Mar-
chands written by the Union specifically condemned such
moderation and called for the sacrifice of life and property
Ê. Trachsel, pp. l?9-lSh.
i'll
299.
if need be, to combat the inquisition. They advocated that

the Calvinists make a show of strength to bring about the neces
sary changes in the government policy. 1
Well-publicized news of the opposition of the Confederates
and merchants.spread from the Low Countries to Germany and
England. The Calvinist belief that there had finally been a
breakthrough against the inquisition encouraged the return of
religious refugees to the Netherlands. Yet, many exiles who
had deserted their homes with only what they could carry on
their backs when they were condemned to death or banishment,
returned to find that their property was confiscated and that
they had lost their families to the ranks of the itinerant
vagabonds. Several of. these men became radical Calvinists in
tent on vengeance; they returned from England, France, Germany
and Switzerland armed and ready to step into the first ranks
2
for the work of the Lord.
During the months of April and May, consistories were
created in cities where they had not existed previously, and
there was an increase of preaching in the countryside. As the
spread of the Grands Presches took place in June and July,
more pressure was put on the Confederates to protect the
I : 1
MK.SAV, Vol. V, Regent to the Estates of Hainaut, 9 and 16
April 3.566, pp. 159-160. When the government did not give in
to their demands, many nobles acquired a more moderate at
titude. When they were accused of promoting Calvinist activity,
many nobles protested that they were loyal Catholics and re
quested that the government print the Comoromis to show that
they did not condone heresy. They claimed that they had only
opposed the inquisition? what they desired was the moderation
of"
<*%
the placcards,
• “
not their eradication.
Ôn the refugees* return see Pontus Payen, Vol. I, p. 1 3 5 .
300.
Calvinist activities. A crucial meeting took place from l*f

to 22 July in the small town of St. Trond in Brabant. Attending
were some two hundred of the noble Confederates and the dele
gates of the Calvinist consistories, including a deputation
from the Antwerp Union, a contingent from Valenciennes led by
Perigrin de la Grange, and representatives of the Antwerp
synod led byieClercq. The consistories petitioned the nobles’
for organized protection from the inquisition to assure public
tranquility.^ They asked that each province be assigned a noble
representative to keep order until the States-General could
meet and develop a religious policy for the whole Netherlands.
In some areas, the Confederates had already filled this func
tion, as at Valenciennes where d'Audrignies and de Lumbres,
two Hainaux Confederates, had acted as peace-keepers and
liasons between the Calvinist consistory and the Karnix-
Nassau-LeClerca group. In effect, what the Calvinists were
\
asking for at St. Trond was the replacement of the officials

of the king with the noble Confederates in those areas where
the confrontation between the inquisition and the Calvinist
flocks had threatened to become violent. The Calvinists wanted
noble protection in order to neutralize the royal inquisition.
After considerable debate, the Confederates pledged to
protect the consistories in the free exercise of their religion,
but they did not agree to take over regional responsibility as
they feared that the individual nobles would be singled out
for punishment by the Brussels government. The mechanism
1
E. Trachsel, pp. 179-134-.
301 .
used by the merchants and ministers at St. Trond to obtain
protection was to cite the threat of disruption by the Cal
vinist rank and.file if persecution was not ended; in turn,
the nobles justified their declaration of protection by citing
the same threat of disruption by claiming that if the Calvinists
were provoked by the forces of the inquisition the violent
.ruin of the Netherlands .-would be the result. At this meeting
the nobles also accepted the Confession of Faith of Guy De
Bres. The Antwerp pastor Junius made some changes in those
parts of the document which were obnoxious to the Lutherans,
but the Confession was adopted by the Calvinist'ministers
nonetheless. Thus, a segment of the petty nobility not only
embraced the political stategy of the Calvinists, but decided
to join their religious party.^
In the winter of 15^5~15^^» "the nobility had taken the
lead in establishing overt opposition to the royal inquisition
by the Con-promis des Nobles. The publicity accompanying this
event led to a popular overt opposition by merchant groups
in the trading cities. The Reformed church under the leader
ship ofLeClercq and the Calvinist nobility solicited the help
of German nobles. These developments in turn encouraged
Calvinist consistories to give up their clandestine existence
and exert pressure on the urban magistrates by criticizing
their enforcement of the -placards. Hopes of abolition or
moderation of the inquisition unleashed by the nobility led
to the return of Calvinist refugees and an increase in Calvin
ist activity by the lcv;.er levels of Netherlands society.
I
E. Trachsel, pp. 18^-185.
.
302
The Grands Presches at Valenciennes in 1566
In the midst of this opposition to the inquisition during
June 1566 the Grands Presches began. Chronicles report that
the preaching started in the area of lower Flanders around
Bethune, Lille and St. Omer and then spread northward to Ypres,
Bruges, and Antwerp from whence it moved southward to Tournai
and Valenciennes,^ Preaching in the countryside was nothing
new, as it had been evident in all areas of the Low Countries
during the period 1559 through 1562; until 1566, however, it
had been relative3.y small and preachers had shown a degree of
caution which was lacking in the Grands Presches of 15 6 6 .
Like most of the Calvinist activities in the 1560s, the
preaching sessions attracted different social groups for a
variety of reasons. Again, the regional differences between
the Flemish areas and the French-speaking ones reflected con-
2
trasting leadership at the sermons. An historian of the
preaching in the area of lower Flanders has shown that the ■
preachers there were relatively uneducated, sometimes being
artisans, sometimes v.Torkers, and sometimes de-frocked priests
with only an occasional visit from a trained minister. Even
in Antwerp where the scholarly Junius preached to the wealthy
merchants two of the popular preachers during June and July
were reportedly an artisan dyer and a tanner. In the vicinity
of Tournai and Valenciennes, in contrast, the countryside
preaching was directed by men trained at Geneva. At Tournai
1Pontus Payer?., v0 l. I, p.-155,-and J. de- fesembeke, VoL L p. 218.

^P. Beu2art, Los heresies rendant le Moyen-Age et la Reforms
dans la region 6 e Douai, c ‘Arras et au rays de 1'Alleu(paris,
1912), pp.'292 -2 9 5•
303.
both Amboise Wille and Jean Taffin came from bourgeois mer
chant clans. The Taffins were particularly well established
as Jean*s brother Nicolas was a doctor of law, the third
councillor of Tournai, while his other brother, Jacques
Taffint was a companion of Gilles Le Clercq and a liason
with Orange.1 At Valenciennes there were two Geneva-trained
ministers, Peregrin de la Grange and the well-known Guy De
Bres.
La Grange had been in residence at Valenciennes since
June 1 5 6 5 . In the spring of that year the consistory of
Valenciennes had started to reorganize after the garrison
had left. It sent two skilled artisans, Jehan Flebin and
Jehan de la Court to Geneva to ask for a trained minister
to take up residence at Valenciennes. They procured the
services of La Grange, a fiery preacher from a petty noble
family of Dauphine*. La Grange had preached at.Rouen in 15^2
during that city's sack by the troops of the duke of Guise,
when a reported 2,000 persons were massacred, but La Grange
had managed to escape to Geneva where he studies until 1 5 6 5.
At Valenciennes he was always to take the most radical at

titude toward the Catholics, counselling resistance to troops
and the organizing of the Calvinist flocks on a military
basis. Perhaps as a result of his experience as a veteran
of the first religious war in France, and perhaps because
he was French and proscribed by the placards , he was
1Pontus Paven. Vol. I, p. p. 2 0 7 , n. 55.
w
^.
30
always suspicious and resentful of the government's attitudes.^"
A second minister at Valenciennes, Guy De Bres, was hired
during the summer and arrived on 9 August, After the start
of the preaching, the consistory of Valenciennes offered De
Bres a salary of 100 livres tournois per year to take over
direction of the Valenciennes reformed church. V/e do not
know of the circumstances of this call, but it could have
arisen from differences between the radical La Grange and

the conservative merchants and Confederates.^
It is a matter of contention whether the Grands Presches
were part of a deliberate Calvinist policy. In some areas
they seem to have been spontaneous, but, it others like
Tournai and Valenciennes, they were planned in advance.
In some places they Y/ere perhaps a consequence of returning
exiles, while in others they resulted from the conscious
decisions of merchant consistories and Geneva-trained minis
ters. This aspect of the Grands Presches needs to be studied
in greater depth and v*ill not be known until many mere
.regional studies are completed, But we know that by the
time the preaching reached Tournai and Valenciennes there
v/as a more or less understood policy of even the more con
servative Calvinists that the preaching was to be encouraged.
After the preaching reached Antwerp, too, the influential
^For La Grange, see Oilier, Guy De Bres, p. 117: Braekman,

Guy De Bres, p. 233: Poullet,.Correspondence de C-ranvelle, •
Vol. II, worrillon to Granv3 lie, p. 4o3; HTHV, Vol. Ill,
p. 1^; Paillard, Les grand oraschcs calvinistes de Valenciennest
7 Juillet-lS Aout 1$66 {"Paris, 1$7?)> p. o; and le Boucq.,
Mistoire des troubles religieuse, p. 29
~3reakman, Guy De Bres, p. 2 3 5 .
consistory there decided to promote it all over the Low
Countries. This was done, it was said, with the approval
of the Calvinist Confederates and Le Clercq.
• The evangelism started around Valenciennes "by a peculia
set of circumstances which again highlighted the attitude
of passivity toward heresy on the part of both the urban
magistrates and the noble governor, the marquis de Berghes..
On the 2?th of June Amboise Wille, the Tournai minister,
received a letter from the Antwerp consistory advising that
sermons begin in the Tournai and Valenciennes areas. This
advice was relayed to La Grange at Valenciennes. On the
30th of June at 8 a.m. Vfille and La Grange initiated the
nresches in the vicinity by delivering .joint sermons outside
the gates of Tournai. La Grange ended by announcing that
there would be a presche at the gates of Valenciennes on
the 2nd of July.-*-
The attitude of the Valenciennes magistrates to this
warning was not very different from that of their prede
cessors during the "maubruslez" incident of 1562. It was
decided to close the city gates to persons from the outside
and to admonish those who were seen leaving the city not
to give the government the pretext to subjugate the city.
The magistrates were not prepared to mobilize the milita
companies to prevent Calvinist services outside the gates.
These measures were justified in a letter to the regent from
.the magistrates and Berghes by stating that the bourgeois
^•paillard, Les grand nresches, p. 7.
companies would not be strong enough to stop the Calvinist
activity.^ Clearly here again we see the magistrates taking
a compromising way out of a dilemma: The magistrates saw
that the preaching in 1566 was a general phenomenon, and the
decided to follow the example of Tournai and Antwerp and to
allow preaching outside the city walls and gates, but to pre
vent them from taking place inside the walls,. It was rea
sonable to assume, they perhaps thought, that Valenciennes
would not be singled out for punishment if she followed
general procedures established elsev/here.
The reaction of the local Confederates to the pro
jected sermons at Valenciennes was one of apprehension,
D'Audrignies tr'ie'd- to intercede with La Grange to pre
vent the sermon. He treatened La Grange at a meeting in
the noble’s townhcuse in Valenciennes, and disputed the
authority of the Antwerp consistory which had advised the
start of preaching at Valenciennes. When La Grange refused
to accede to the nobleman’s wishes, d'Audregnies threatened
La Grange, According to 3erghes,
II luy assceura que, s'il passoit oultre,
que luy le premier, luy romproit la teste,
et y ameneroit si bonne trouppe que ses audi-
teurs ne le pourroit defendre.
Whether d'Audrignies' approach was a general policy of the
Confederates at tHs time, or whether it was a decision of
^MHSAV, Vol. V, Bershes to the Regent, 2 July 1566, p. 211.

2 iVHSAY, Vol. V, Bershes to the Resent, 5 July 1566, pt>. 23 S-
240.
/
307.
of the local nobles is unclear. On the one hand, some Con

federates were known to have thought that the king would
interpret their request for moderation' unfavorably if it en
couraged general preaching; they had promised to reestablish
law and order as that had been the stated intention of the
request for disestablishment of the inquisition. These
nobles feared that the Calvinist activity of June and July
would be viewed as a dissolution of law and order for which
they could be blamed by their discrediting of the inquisi
tion through the Conrpronis. On the other hand, some of the
more committed Calvinist Confederates were known to have
promoted the presches in order to put pressure on the govern
ment. It was seen that a chaotic situation which threatened .
the very existence of the government would play into their
hands by forcing the regent to acquiesce in their request.
The initial actions of d*Audregnies and de Lumbres at
Valenciennes would seem to indicate that they supported the
former position.
The marquis de Eerghes had also advised the magis
trates that if the city wanted to avoid further disruptions
of their tranquility it would be best to prevent the spread
of preaching. Yet, after the city government came to its
decision not to stop sermons outside the walls, Berghes
supported their decision in a letter to the regent.^" More
over, interrogations of Calvinists taken later implicated
'S'lHSAV, Vol. V, Berghes to the regent, 5 July 1566, pp. 238-

2$0~
308.
Berghes In the start of the preaching in the Valenciennes

area. The summation of these interrogations "by royal of- .
ficials indicates the .following story t The marquis was
1
leaving for Spain on the l6th of June when he met with a
local Confederate, Robert de. Waron. He reportedly told
de Waron that he had no objection to nresches outside the walls
of Valenciennes as long as they were done with a show of
modesty and in an organized manner presenting no threat to
the Catholics. Why Berghes made thes'e remarks is unknown;
perhaps he was merely commenting upon the decision of the
magistrates, or perhaps he had no interest in seeing his
charge come to bloodshed in his absence. Perhaps he told
de Waron so as to warn the Calvinists not to attempt sermons
inside the city. At any rate, Berghes was unaware that his
comments would have such a decided effect on the situation
•as they did. Certainly he did not expect that his remarks
• would dissolve the opposition of the Confederates and lead
1
Many historians have portrayed Berghes as a man of keenin
telligence and of great diplomatic tact who adhered to alib
eral philosophy alien to the oppression of the inquisition.
There is truth in this portrayal, especially in regard to his
individual talents, but he also has to be seen as belonging
to a social group. In the end result, his own interests as
a member of the upper nobility were the determining factors
of his actions. He fought long and hardest to preserve his
authority and the command of his troops, and the absences from
his post indicate his desire to alleviate financial burdens
brought cn by rich noble tastes. He was to meet a less
glorified death than that of Bsmont or Hornes who were ex
ecuted publicall.y for treason. Berghes left for Spain in
June 1565 with Kontigny to try to persuade the king to
restore the nobility to its rightful place in order to calm
the Ketherlands. Both Berghes and Kontiany were detained in
Spain and were soon deac. Berghes reportedly died of fever
on 21 Kay 15^7, but it was always believed that he was
poisoned. HTRV, Vol. II, p. ??, n. 1.
309.
directly to a resumption of the preaching in the Valenciennes

area. Yet this was their effect, according to the interrogations,
as de V/aron relayed Berghes' comments to the consistory of
Valenciennes and to d'Audrignies. The latter then dropped his
objection to sermons outside the walls of Valenciennes, and
la Grange's presche took place on the very next day, the l?th .
of June.^ The importance of the nobility seems to be indis
putable, for without the comments of Berghes the preaching might
2
not have taken place at Valenciennes at all.
5. The image-breaking
In August 1566 during the height of the Grands Presches
image-breaking began in Catholic churches in Flanders. Chron
iclers and historians do not agree on the date of the start
of the iconoclasm and the estimates range between the 10 th and
3
the 15 th of August. The area of its genesis was the same
as that of the preaching— lower Flanders. The first outbreaks
were in the rural areas between Roubaix and Dunkirk, and prob
ably one of the first was the cloister of St. Laurent. Another
of the first institutions to be attacked was the hospital of
St. Antoine in the countryside near the city of St. Omer on
the afternoon of the. 13 th after a sermon by one Jacques de
•A
Buysere. From there the iconoclasm spread to the vicinity
^BesongeV, pp. 112 -1 1 3 .

^For an analysis of the reports of spys at these presches,
see above pp. 181-133.
^For example, 10 August by Trachsel, De Colonban aux Gueux,
p. 1^5; and 15 August by Paillard, Kuit mois, p. 21^.
"'Strada, Histoire ces Guerres de Fla nores. Vol. I, pp. 290-
291. See also Pont us ?ayc-n, Vol. I, p. 1?2.
.
310
called the cays de l'Alleu between the towns of Hazebrouck,

Armentieres and. Bethune just to the west of Lille,^ and then
quickly.moved to the cities of St.. Omer. and Ypres.on the 14th
and 15th. It struck in the vicinities of Lille, Orchies,
and Douai on the 15 th and l6 th where churches in the towns
of Sstaires, Gorge, Levantie, Richebourg, and Sailly were
invaded. While these areas were situated only some 25 kilo
meters from the city of Valenciennes, the iconoclasm did not
spread at this time into Hainaut and the French-speaking
area. Rather it traveled north to Ghent and through the
rest of Flanders reaching Antwerp by the 20th of August.
Only on the 23 rd and the 24-th of August did it spread south
into the area of Tournai and Valenciennes.
We must briefly investigate the historiography surrounding
the iconoclasm in Valenciennes because of the importance
placed on image breaking by the social and economic historians
on why the conflict began in 15 ^6 . Pirenne, Espinas, and Kutner
reacted against earlier political interpretations by finding
the causes of conflict mainly in nascent capitalism; they gave
a large role in 1566 to the cloth workers who broke images to
obtain food and money. As we shall see, this interpretation
works for some areas but not for Valenciennes. The develop
ments there can only be explained by a breakdown of government
functions among the middle layers of society— the merchants,
the echevins. and the bourgeois. Valenciennes has been used
as an example of the social and economic interpretation,'and
1 ~
P. Beuzart, Les heresies •pendent le I-’
Toyen-Age et la Rcfforme
dans la region ce Douai, *Arras ex au oavs de.l'Alleu, 0 0 .
2 83 -2 8 5 , and 2 92 -3 0 2 .
.
311
it is necessary to indicate to what extent this interpretation
is a distortion of reality.
The iconoclasm at Valenciennes is one of the most mis
understood events taking place in 1566 because of the con
flicting accounts of contemporaries, who were possessed of
the strong prejudices of the era. The surviving eyewitness
accounts are all Catholic. Kost of the leading Calvinists
were later executed or tried to disclaim their role in the
iconoclasm in the subsequent period of Catholic orthodoxy.
Of the two eyewitness accounts extant today, the first
was originally written by two arch-Catholic tax collectors
of Valenciennes, Jean Laleux and Joachim Goyemans,'3' This
It has been published by A.P.L. Robaulx de Soumoy under the

■title Histoire des troubles advenus a Valenciennes a cause
des heresies 1562-157? tiree de •plusieurs ecrits en 1699 rar
Pierre Joseph Le Bouca (Brussels, 1554). Robaulx de Soumoy
found this manuscript at the biblioth^que municipale of lions,
no. 200 -2 7 7 , but this was a copy of an earlier manuscript
which was in the possession of the 17 th century archivist at
Valenciennes, Simon Le Boucq. With the help of Pierre Le Franca,
the present archivist of Valenciennes, I found a manuscript,
no. 589, in the Valenciennes biblioth^que municipale which
coincided in text with the manuscript printed by Rou’ oaulx de
Soumoy and attributed to Pierre-Joseph LeBoucq. This manu
script is entitled "Histoire particuliere des troubles ad
venus en 1a ville de Valencienneg it cause des heresies, ce-^
puis I’an xvclxi jusques a lan xv et soixante disnoef. Tire
hors de plusieurs escrits a la main et memoires de plusieurs
bourgeois de ceste ville, sigramment de feux Joachim Goye-
mans, et Jean Lalous, tesmoings occulaires de ces troubles
et guerres civiles. L ’an seize cens et six." This manuscript
was oversiened Jean Doudelet, indicating that it is in fact
a copy compiled by Jean Doudelet, a chanoine of the Church of
St. Ger around the turn of the l?th century, of various ac
counts of the troubles, notably those of two eyewitnesses,
Joachim Goyemans and Jean Laleux. Both the latter were un
known in any chronicles of the time, but I have found ref
erences to them in tax registers. They were tax farmers and
staunch Catholics, who had even more to lose by rebellion
than the echevinale families. Thus, it is an arch-Catholic
version of the events compiled by Doudelet, owned by Simon
LeBoucq and subsequently edited by Rcbaulx de Soumoy. The
.
312
is a version of the events which has been utlized by several

historians to show the Valenciennes* image-breakers to be
thieves and sackersj It portrays them as sinful libertines
from the common people* who were led by two bourgeois pro
vocateurs recently from Antwerp where they had seen the icono
clasm on the 20th. The iconoclasts, according to C-oyemans anc
Laleux, destroyed nearly everything in the churches, not only
the relics and statues but also the rood-lofts, grill screens,
and benches. The version goes on to claim that some 500
Valenciennes Calvinists sacked the Abbey of Crespin some 10
kilometers to the northeast and then went on to the parish
churches of Tournai and St. Amand where the abbey was plun
dered during the night. Not only were refectories demolished
but the dormitory was broken into and the windows and furni
ture smashed, causing 1 0 ,0 ^3 livres tourr.ois worth of damage.
The Crespin abbey and church also were reportedly demolished
when they refused to accept a Calvinist preacher.
Doudelet manuscript has been mutilated in places as the names-

of certain of the rich Calvinists have been cut out or des
troyed with black ink. The Kons manuscript merely omits
these eradications of names altogether, and the printed ver
sion does not include them either. Comparison with known
consistory members during the siege shows that the names cut
out are those of NoelLe Boucq, and Tassar.Ifi Boucq, the uncles
of Simon Le Boucq, through whose hands the manuscript went.
This shows the oppressive effects of the inquisition and
the Catholic orthodoxy which seem to have prompted relatives
of theLe Boucq family to eradicate the names of their ances
tors from any connection with Calvinism. These ommissions
may have helped to mislead contemporary historians into be
lieving that there were few notable bourgeois in the con
sistory,
^Pierre-JoG®h^jB Boucq, Histoire des troubles acver.ues a
Valenciennes a cause des her&sie's: 1^62-1579. ed. A.P.L.
de Rcbaulx de Soumoy (Brussels, ld6ii), pp". 13-13.
313.
The second eyewitness account of the iconoclasm was
written by Kenry d'Oultreman (15^6-1605)* bhe nephew of
Francois D'Oultreman* the moderate Catholic pensionary of
the -city; who carried on negotiations with the government
during the crisis of I566 -I5 6 7 .1 In spite of -i'Oultrenan's
Catholic connections, his account of the iconoclasm is re-
markedly moderate in tone, especially in that portion de
scribing what took place inside the walls of the town.
D'Oultreman states that the accounts of atrocities against
the persons of monks and priests at Valenciennes like the
stories of the Calvinists cutting up monks and roasting
them over fires were to be discounted. Also, he suggested
that the popular notion that the interest of the iconoclasts
was to steal from the chapels and churches was untrue:
Les huguenots se donnerent bien de garde
d'offenses aucunement les images vivantes, non
pas mesme de voler les richesses des Bglises. . .
de peur de salir leur zele pretendu, et: estre
estimez brigans et meurtriers.
In particular, he wrote that the abbot of St, Jean, who had
the temerity to confront the Calvinists in the chapel of
his abbey and offer a "great sum of money" to save a giant
D'Oultreman's version appears in his Histoire de la ville

et com~pte ce Valenciennes (Douai, 1 6 3 9 7 7 It was edited and
printed by Henri's son Pierre (1591-1^5^), a Jesuit. There
is a third manuscript purporting to be an eyewitness account
in the Haeue archives which seems to be a copy of D'Oultre-
man's original manuscript as it follows his account almost
word for word. This manuscript has additions carrying it
to 1621, years after Henry D'Oultreman's death— thus it is
perhaps a manuscript of D*Oultrenan*s son. Koninklijke
3ibliotheek te 's-Gravenhage, Handschrift no. 71G15.
2 x
D'Oultreman, Histoire ce la ville et com.-pte de Valenciennes.
pp. 20^-205.
31b.
rood-screen and diverse organs, was refused by the image-
breakers. They proceeded to smash the organs but left the
abbot unmolested. D'Oultreman alsc relates the story of a
Franciscan friar who offered money in order to save the
relics of Saint Victor Martyr. This offer was also refused,
but the friar received no other pains for his attempt than
verbal abuse.
Describing activities outside the walls of Valenciennes,
DÔultreman goes on to assert that the iconoclasts of Valen
ciennes joined a group from Tournai and together marched
to pillage various monasteries including those of Vicogne,
St. Amand, and Marchiennes. After carting off furniture
from Marchiennes, he describes how they were defeated by
Fery de Guyon. In his account D'Oultreman offers no explana
tion as to why there was no stealing in Valenciennes, as he
himself attests, and why there was pillaging in the monas
teries in the countryside to the west and at Marchiennes.1
A critical look at these eyewitness accounts reveals
that their greatest fault was not their Catholic bias, but
that they made no distinction between the iconoclasts of
Valenciennes and those of the abbeys miles to the West. It
seems that these chroniclers were following a popular Catholic
conception of the iconoclasm which blamed Valenciennes for
the abbeys' sack while in reality it was accomplished by
another group of people altogether. They failed to stress
the different nature cf the image breaking inside the walls
^D'Oultreman, Histoiret pp. 205--07.
compared to that which occurred in the countryside.
Modern historians of the 19th. century and 20th century
have not systematically investigated these differences either:
The Catholic historian Emile Carlier follows the chronicle
accounts and states that the Valenciennes rabble was excited
by preachers to sack the monasteries. For Carlier, the icono
clasts were from forain status, including many criminals who
had taken advantage of the privilege of asylum; he sees all
the iconoclasts as thieves and sackers,^ Protestant his
torians like Charles Rahlnebeck wanted to absolve the Cal
vinist consistories of any complicity in the iconoclasm as
it was thoroughly discredited by the 19 th century; he thus
helped to propagate the myth that the iconoclasm was the
result of lower class Anabaptists for which there is no
2
proof at all. Later in the 19 th century the historian J.M.
Motley relied on the Hague version of D'Oultreman's manu
script to come to the opposite conclusion that there was
no stealing in Valenciennes. He then uses that information
to come to his erroneous conclusion that there was no stealing
3
in the iconoclasm in the Netherlands as a whole.
Smile Carlier, Valenciennes et le Rcsi d'Esr-agne au XVIe

siecle (Valenciennes, 1679)» PP* 150-15^ Charles Paillard
considered Carlier's book a perversion of the events in Valen
ciennes and wrote his Notes et eclaircissements in 18?9 in
order to systematically dispute Carlier's version,— not be
cause Carlier was a Catholic, but for sound historical rea
sons, i.e. Carlier did not base his assertions on any evidence
other than the papular, accounts of historians and of the ,
LeBoucq-Laloux-Goyemans manuscript.
^He says "ni meme un seul consistoire des ?&ys-Bas ne consent
a les reconr.aitre et a profiter de leur fureurs," Charles
Rahlenteck, Les Chanterses a Valenciennes, p. 1^3.
3j.M, Motley, Rise of the Dutch Republic (London, 1950) Vol. I,
pp. ^72 -^7 4 ,
> 4!—
.
316
In the 20th century the Marxist historian Kutner has
asserted that the Valenciennes image-breaking was a result
of the capitalism of the cloth industries. He ascribes the
general outbreak of preaching and iconoclasm to a harvest
failure in the winter of 1 5 6 5 -1 5 6 6 and to long-term exploita
tion of cloth workers.3' Other, social and economic historians
have concurred that exploitation in the putting out indus- -
tries around Valenciennes and the harvest .failure must
2
have had some role in the outbreaks of 1 5 6 6 . But both the
Marxist and social and economic historians seem to be gener
alizing on the Flemish example where there was a more de
veloped rural putting out system than in Valenciennes, and
greater exploitation. Hone of these historians have studied
the Valenciennes situation in depth; they did basic research
on Flemish towns like Kondschoote and peasant areas like
the rays de l’Alleu. They have further failed to make the
necessary distinctions between Valenciennes and towns like
Hondschootes Valenciennes did not have any rural putting
out system except in the stage of spinning. Moreover, it
was a tightly-run walled town efficiently controlled by the
bourgeois citizens as opposed to wall-less Hondschoote.
Valenciennes did not have any resident "proletarians"— its
inhabitants were on higher status than the week-workers from
"Scutner, Met Hongernaar, introduction

2
See for example, Smile Coornaert, "Draperies rurales,
draceries urbaines. L'Evolution de lfIndustrie flamande au
Moyer. Age et au XVIe siecle," R3?H (1930), Vol. XXVIII, •
pp. 79-30.
J >1 '
317 .
the countryside. In effect, like Motley, but in reverse,
such social and economic historians are generalizing on
facts found- elsewhere.
The-Valenciennes iconoclasm has been utilized by Caltholic
historians to show that the Calvinists were a rabble intent
on sacking and stealing from the churches, by Protestant
historians to show that the iconoclsm was done by the poor and
not by the Calvinist consistories whose othodoxy precluded
such acts of violence, and by social and economic historians
to show that the poor were driven to excess because of the
exploitation of 'workers and the harvest failure of 1565 -I565.
Motley, perhaps because of his desire to see in the "Revolt
of the Netherlands'* a republican and nationalist movement,
refused to see any thefts during the iconoclasm. All of these
versions of the image-breaking" at Valenciennes seem to either
be based on the accounts of the contemporary chroniclers or
on Catholic, Protestant, Marxist, or Liberal doctrines to
which the historians adhered. All except Motley embrace the
notion that it was a lower- order, a rabble or a proletarian
group which carried out the iconoclasm at Valenciennes.
In actual fact, the story of the image-breaking, as it
appears in the correspondence of the Magistrat, the regent,
and the Calvinist consistory and in the comprehensive report
of the inquisitorial commissioners, shows the above versions
to be incorrect. The iconoclasm was not just a social and .
economic, or a religious'act, but also a political one; the
correspondence shows that there were not only elements of the
318.
worker-artisans involved in the breaking of images, but also

the noble Confederates and the richest merchants of the city*
They also show that the story of the iconoclasm at Valenciennes
is inextricably involved with the maneuvering of the noble
Confederates and their allies, the merchants of the Calvinist
consistories of Antwerp, Tournai, and Valenciennes at Brussels.
The story is related to the Accord which was made between the
nobles of the Compromis and Marguerite of Parma on the 23rd tc
the 25th of Augustx^
News of the Flemish iconoclasm arrived at Valenciennes
at the same time as a letter from Jean Taffin on the 16th of
August. Taffin, the minister at Tournai, wrote that he was
in touch with Orange at Antwerp; he said that the prince
would be in Brussels on the 19th or 20th of August, and
requested the Valenciennes consistory to send emissaries to
pressure the great noble to use hi's influence in the Council
of State in the Calvinist cause. Taffin desired that Orange
help to obtain the release of Calvinists held in.prison at
Tournai. A contingent of Valenciennes Calvinists went to
Brussels on the 18th of August, not knowing the full implica
tions of the gathering of the nobility there or the crisis
caused in the inner circles of the govenment by the iconoclasm
in Flanders. The consistory sent seven merchants and two
cabareteurs, namely the merchants Francois Voisin, Jacques de
Walers, Jacques Gellee, Francois Patou, Jehan Mathieu, Pierre
Gruel, and Jehan Lescuyer besides the cabaretiers Allard 3ar
^For the story of the iconoclasm at Valenciennes see the

Besonge. pp. 116-117.
JH
319.
and Jacques Joffroy.

These men stayed in the suburbs of Brussels, in contact
with the Confederates through Gilles LeClercq who also helped
them to draw up the request they were to present to Orange.
On the 22nd of August, two days after the iconoclasm had reached
Antwerp, a rumor circulated in Brussels that the Calvinists
were preparing a public presche and image-breaking in the
capital. It was said that there were crowds gathering in the
middle of the city, and there were some who were even conspiring
to sack the Regent’s chapel. The rumor, true or not, was re
peated to Marguerite of Parma who was already apprehensive
over the violence of the Flemish image-breaking. Marguerite
appealed to the nobility to stop the Calvinists and save Brussels
from the iconoclasts. The Confederates, in turn, obliged the
. Regent to make concessions which were finalized in the Accord
of 23-25 August.
On the night of the 22nd, the Gellee, Wallers, Patou, and
Lescuyer met with the Kainaut Confederates d*Audrignies, and
de Lumbres who were directly in touch with the prince of
Orange. They were told that the Regent was about to make con
cessions and that the emissaries could meet with the nobles
on the next day to learn what they were. The Hainaut Con
federates were allowing the merchant Calvinists of Valenciennes
‘ to know ahead of time what was contained in the Accord being
worked out with the government. Because of the substance of
the Accord of 23.-25 August and because of the emissaries actions
subsequent to learning of the Accord,' it is evident that the
5*°
320 .
decision to hold an image-breaking in Valenciennes was de
cided at Brussels. .
•The text of the Accord indicates that it was a unilateral
act eninating from the government and presented to the Con
federates for their approval and cooperation. By the Accord
the government recognised the status quo in return for a gen
eral pacification; Calvinists would be allowed the freedom to
hold oresches where they had done so before the date of the
Accord, but all image-breaking 'was to cease. ^
Upon receiving knowledge of the Accord on the 23rd of
August, the Valenciennes Calvinists evidently assumed that if
they took possession of the Valenciennes parish churches before
the Accord was acceptedby the nobility, then they could
remain in them to preach. This-would be legalized by the
authority of the government as sanctioned in the Accord.
The Calvinists at Brussels dispatched Jacques Joffroy to Val
enciennes to convince the consistory to seize the parish churches
as soon as possible, Joffroy arrived at Valenciennes at
eight in the evening of the 23 rd, and, after notifying the
consistory, a session of the Conseil Particulier was hastily-
assembled and Joffroy informed the magistrates that image-
breaking had taken place at Antwerp and Tournai and that
the same would occur atValenciennes. It had been decided by
the consistory to breakthe images inthe parish churches,
and then to preach in them.
Ân analysis of the Accord appears in C. Faillara, Motes et

’eclaircissements, pp. 102 -1 0 5 .
23esonge, P* 11?*
321.
The magistrates asked for clarification from the consis

tory of the developments .at Brussels and tried to delay the
iccnoclasm until word arrived from the other Calvinist
merchants. The consistory complied by postponing the icono-
clasm and seizure of the churches until the emissaries re
turned from Brussels on the next day, the 2^th of August.
The consistory informed the Magistrat and the Conseil
Particulier that the image-breaking could be delayed no
>•
longer, but that it would be held after dinner when the crowds
from the market would have dispersed, making the city more
safe from sack or riot. During the afternoon of the 2^th,
a rumor circulated that the bountof Egmont had sent letters
authorizing image -breaking.'*' This seeming cooperation from
both the Confederates and the upper nobility undoubtedly went
a .long way in persuading the more conservative Calvinists like
Guy De Bres to accede to the wishes of the consistory. It
seemed to the Calvinists that the regent was granting freedom
of religion to those cities which had had the temerity to
hold -presches inside the walls, and if Calvinist actions else
where were to be legalized by the Accord, why not at Valen
ciennes also? Be Bres had stated time and again in his works
that the cooperation of the magistrates was necessary in order
to establish Calvinism. Given the conservative merchant leader
ship of the reformed church at Valenciennes, it-is doubtful
whether the iconoclasm would have occurred in the city with?-
out the .justification supplied by the Accord of 23-25 August.
_
Besonge, pp. 117-118,
.
322
Later on the day of the 2^th, the rest of the group
from Brussels arrived, and Franchois Voisin informed the
magistrates that the iconociasm would take place without
further delay at the appointed time after dinner. The in
quisitors reported that the magistrates later pleaded help
lessness to stop the iconociasm and seizure of the churches
due to the fact that the bourgeois companies were filled
with Calvinist sympathizers.1 This was true as the largest
and most popular of the companies was captained by Michel
Kerlin. This again indicates that Calvinism; had gained con
siderable support from the bourgeois citizens of the city
since Calvinism's introduction by Brully in the 15 ^0 *3 . With
no power to decide otherwise, the magistrates then prepared
for the iconociasm by making sure it did not become an un
controllable riot. The bourgeois companies were stationed
on the market place in ranks, the constabulary and guets
were mustered in the streets, and squads were sent to patrol
the walls. There was no hope that these forces would stop
the iconociasm, but they could be relied on to guard muni
cipal buildings and their own houses. The magistrates
also organized several scores of men into brigades to rescue
the valuable gold relics from the churches after they were
£
broken.
13esonge, p. 117.
2 •
Besonge, p. 118. .
3 «
323 .
All the leaders were Calvinist consistory members, and
from the middle to upper levels of Valenciennes society.
The report of the royal commissioners listed the leaders of
the iconociasm and church seizures as revealed, by confes
sions they later obtained from consistory members. The
records show that several were listed as "notable,!and rich",
namely Francois Voisin, Phillippes Muchet, and Guillaume de'
Roisin. Several were merchants, namely, Jacques Gellee, and
Pierre Gruel, wine merchants, Allard Bar, a cabareteur and
merchant draper",.and Franchois Pattou, and Jehan Patou,
shopkeepers. There were proprietors like Jacques Joffroy
of the Lion.d'or and Aimery 3ettreman of the Le Kure. Finally,
there were some upper level artisans, namely Nicolas Machon,
a scribe, Jehan le Vasseur, a locksmith, Andrien Laverchin,
a master carpenter, Pontus du Blairon, a master candlemaker,
and Francois de le Haye, a hosier.
These men led rank and file Calvinists into every
church and chapel of Valenciennes on the evening of the 24th.
At no time did bourgeois guets and companies attempt to stop
the image-breaking; interrogations show that no order was
given by the magistrates to prevent the Calvinists from en
tering the churches. After the destruction, the magistrates
collected the broken relics and stored them in the City
Hall after making an inventory.^ The next morning the same
men who oversaw the image-breaking organized a cleaning of '
^Besonge', p. 118.
324 .
the occupied parish churches. Broken tables and benches
were mended, and the remains of what were considered idola
trous pieces of furniture were swept up and burned.
Three of the churches denuded of their ornaments and
statues immediately served as places for Calvinist preaching.
Guy De Bres preached in Sain-Gery, while LaGrange preached
in Saint-Jean and the Beguinage.1 On the 26th the Confederates
d*Audrignies, de Lumbres, de Villers, de Famars, and de
Wingle arrives at Valenciennes to the shouts of "Long live
the beggars!" They carried letters from the government set
ting forth the Accord and an ordinance prohibiting preaching
in new places. These regional nobles declared to the con
sistory that they would personally uphold the Accord in
Valenciennes,— an act which seemed to legalize the seizure
2
of the churches.
It is clear that the iconociasm inside the walls was
overseen by merchants in the consistory. In part, it was
motivated by religious reasons; it served as ah opportunity
for the reformed church to accomplish an act which the Cal
vinists thought to be part of their moral mission. 3ut, most
importantly, it gave the Calvinist consistory an opportunity
to introduce a change of regime from Catholicism to Cal-
visn in Valenciennes. As such, it was a political act, a
^Besonse, pp. 118-119.

2
D'Outrenan, p. 205.
325.
signal of liberation from the Catholic system of control of

social organizations and a rejection of the Catholic monopoly
of the city’s religious life. It was also a form of intimi
dation, but one which was controlled and exhibited a single-
mindedness and concentration which could not be changed by
bribes or exhortations. It frightened both royal officials
and ecclesiastics and drove them out of the city or put them
behind the security of locked doors. For the Calvinists of
Valenciennes, who were notoriously legalistic and conserva
tive, finally, this was an opportunity to further their reli
gion with the needed approval of the Confederates and with
the cooperation of the magistrates. As a result, their act
would then be legalized by the Accord given out by the central
government itself.
Since the cooperation of the secular authority seemed
to have been obtained, Calvin's prerequisite for religious
change had been accomplished. This is evident by the fact
that De Bres did not disassociate himself from the. action
as he had done earlier during the chanteries. He was counting,
as he related in his interrogations later, on the leadership
of the nobility and particularly on Orange. With evidently
a clean conscience he went to preach in Saint Gery the day
after. It was thought by the Valenciennes Calvinists that
they had beaten the deadline of the Accord and were success
fully covered under its provisions.
This picture- of the iconociasm within the walls of
Vdenciennes, however, does net prove the social and economic
326.
interpretation of the. iconociasm to be completely false.

In fact, the poor and oppressed did have a role in the rural
iconociasm outside the walls of the city. Yet, it must be
stressed that the rural iconociasm grew out of an entirely
differnet social milieu. The actions of rural iconoclasts
during the image-breaking can be seen to reflect different
social needs.
The rural iconoslasm occurred'in the villages and the
abbeys of Vicogne, Crespin, Karchiennes, and St. Amand to
the west of Valenciennes. It started on the night of the
2^-th and continued through the 27 th when the image-breakers
were slaughtered by Fery de Guyon. This iconociasm which
admittedly involved stealing and carting off of furniture,
came as a result of the news of the iconociasm in the cities
of Valenciennes and Tournai. Perhaps there were a few •
Valenciennes Calvinists who brought the news to the peasants
of neighboring villages, but the consistory did not super
vise the iconociasm outside the walls. Sacking of abbeys
would have been condemned by men like De Bres, and considered
a danger to property by most merchants. The abbeys were
sacked by impoverished peasants and rural workers and per
haps vagabonds who had found a unique opportunity for material
gain. Also peasants perhaps found an expression for their
hatred for tithes and rents which' they were forced to pay
to the rich monasteries. These groups, who had undoubtedly
suff-ered from the harvest failure during the preceding winter,
would perhaps have sacked the town of Valenciennes if it had
been unprotected.
.
327
Thus, in the Valenciennes area we see two entirely dif

ferent kinds of iconoclastic activity relecting the motiva
tions of dissimilar social groups. One was merchant-artisan
and the other was made up of peasants, workers, and vagabonds;
The former were relatively wealthy and lived in a privileged
society secure behind protective walls; their problems were
to protect their privilege and their favorable economic
position from the encroachments of the inquisition. The
latter groups v:ere poor and lived on a subsistence economy
at the prey of not only the propertied groups but of the
jobless vagrants who stole their crops to eat.
Historians of the general iconociasm in the Low Coun
tries have made the same mistakes as have those of the icono-
clasms at Valenciennes. They have singled out only those
aspects which fit their theses and have refused to recog
nize that the act of breaking images could serve different
purposes for different social groups. The differences in
motivation evident in the vicinity of Valenciennes can be
»
also be seen in other parts of the Netherlands. For example,
in rural Flanders where image-breaking started, historians
have found that the icnonclasm was spontaneous and unplanned
and that there was no conspiracy on the part of the Calvinists
of the area as to when it was to take place or where it was
to go; it travelled by word of mouth and by the iconoclast
bands themselves, or by vagabonds or radical preachers. Kany
times the;/ stole from the churches where they brok images.
This is the area which best supports the Narxist thesis.3"
■^Beuzart, p„ 288, and V7. Brules, "De opstand van het incus-
.
327
Thus, in the Valenciennes area we see two entirely dif

ferent kinds'of iconoclastic activity relecting the motiva
tions of dissimilar social groups. One was merchant-artisan
and the other was made up of peasants, workers, and vagabonds ;
The former were relatively wealthy and lived in a privileged
society secure behind protective walls; their problems were
to protect their privileges and their favorable economic
position from the encroachments of the inquisition. The
latter groups were poor and lived on a subsistence economy
at the prey of not only the propertied groups but of the
jobless vagrants who stole their crops to eat. .
Historians of the general iconociasm in the Low Coun
tries have made the same mistakes as have those of the icono-
clasms at Valenciennes. They have singled out only those
aspects which fit their theses and have refused to recog
nize that the act of breaking images could serve different"'
purposes for different social groups. The differences in
motivation evident in the vicinity of Valenciennes can be
also be seen in other parts of the Netherlands. For example,
in rural Flanders where image-breaking started, historians
have found that the icnonclasm was spontaneous and unplanned
and that there was no conspiracy on the part of the Calvinists
of the area as to when it was to take place or where it was
to go; it travelled by word of mouth and by the iconoclast
bands themselves, or by vagabonds or radical preachers. Kany
tines the;/ stole from the churches where they brok images.
This is the area which best supports the Karxist thesis.^"
^Beuzart, p„ 288, and W. 3rules, "De opstand van het incus-
328.
On the other hand, in some places in Flanders closer to

Antwerp, and in the northern provinces, the iconociasm was
more or less planned and systematic, starting with a sermon
and commencing with organized image-breaking, with' the
iconoclasts even being paid in some instances. This kind
of iconociasm emanated from urban milieus similar to those
of Valenciennes. At towns like Leeuwarden, Utrecht, and The
Hague the iconoclasts were paid by the magistrates of the
city; at Valenciennes De 3res wrote to Ambrose Wille at
Tournai askine if it was the correct orocedure to pay the
1
iconoclasts for their work. Clearly, the iconociasm in
these cities was not done with motives of plunder; perhaps
their intent was similar to that of Valenciennes, that is
both religious and political.
6. Conclusions
As it was the nobility who first established the opposi
tion to government policies, it was necessary to devote a
large part of this chapter to the role of the nobility in
the Netherlands as a whole. The well-known actions of the
trigebied in 1536", Anciens Pays’et assemblies d’Ftats

(Louvain, 1°52), Vol. LV, pp. 73-101. 7<hereas in the Walloon
areas the psalms and poems of Karot and 3eza v/ere put to
music and chanted, in the Flemish areas there v/ere songs of
a considerably more radical content. For example, the fol
lowing chant translated into the French from the Dutch cited
by J. van Vloten, Nederlands Onstand tegsn Soan.ie 156^-1567
(Haarlem, lr56), p. 8 3 .
U s nettent des robes de velours
A leurs idoles de vieux bois,
Nous laissent, nous membres de Christ
Courir nuds et srelottans.
Le mouvement iconoclaste en 1536
cite?" Annalss de la Fed'eration
JLfJ U C UC J C l r i i ' J U C j J J session, Tournai,
1952), Vol. II, pp. o7-7^, and "Lesonse,” p. 120
of the grands seigneurs against. Cardinal Granvelle stimulated
opposition on other levels of government to directives
emanating from Brussels. On the provincial level the mar
quis de Berghes left the affairs of Valenciennes to the in
quisitors and the colonel of the garrison as they had, as
Berghes said, the "strong hand". Noble-government relations
v/ere exacerbated in the 1560's by what the nobility considered
to be an abridgement of their customary political rights.
If in the past they had not considered themselves to be
strictly the executors of the sovereign's will, in the
1560‘s they became less inclined to enforce the policies
v/hich they had no part in establishing. Excluded from

private councils in Brussels and excluded from power by the
apparatus of the inquisition in the provinces, men like
Berghes came to exhibit a more tolerant attitude tov/ard
heretics. Clearly this was a breakdown of his primary
government function as grand bailli of Hainaut and royal
governor of Valenciennes in executing government orders.
Before the "maubruslez" incident he refused to attend the
execution, and in 1566 during the start of the grands
oresones he stated that he had no objection to "moderate"
preaching. These actions indicate that he was consciously
rejecting the direct orders of the government on matters of
heresy.
The opposition of the upper nobility in.turn encouraged
opposition among the lesser nobility. The lesser nobility,
who played perhaps the most crucial role in the year of
crisis in 15 $6 » had reasons of their own for discontent with
330.
government policies. Their overt organization in opposi
tion to the inquisition, their league made up of petty
seigneurs and captains of bandes d*ordonnance would have been
impossible without the tacit acceptance of the great nobles.
The patronage of men like Berghes and Orange encouraged the
Confederates, especially activists like Orange's brother
Louis of Kassau. The Confederates filled the need of the
great nobles for a pressure group which would force the
government to restore the latter to their positions of chief
councillors and mediators in the central organs of the govern
ment. In their arguments the petty nobles in turn utilized
the threat of violence from below caused by the inquisition
to promote their own claims to a an important mediating
position. This attitude is explicit in both the Compromis
and the meetings at St.Trond where the petty nobility
proclaimed to be the loyal vassels of the king, but opposed
to the inquisition because it would lead to bloodshed.
Without this direct and explicit patronage of the Con
federates, the Calvinist consistories and ministers of cities
like Valenciennes would never have started their offensive.
If the nobles were using the Calvinist pressure to promote
their importance as mediators, the Calvinists in turn were
taking the opportunity offered by noble opposition to the in
quisition to launch their own campaign. The role of the
Confederates, in sum, must not be underestimated; at Valen
ciennes the Hainaut Confederates allowed members of the-
Valenciennes consistory to know of’the yet incomplete
331.
Accord, an act which seems to have led directly to the

iconociasm and seizure of parish churches at Valenciennes.
Inside Valenciennes the breakdown of the magistrates'
functions was never so apparent as during the "maubruslez,:
incident in 15^2 and during the preaching and the iconociasm
in 1566. The difference in the two years seems to have
been only in the extent to which the magistrates tried to
cover up their passivity toward heretics. In 1562 they had
taken the precaution of presenting an elaborate charade, but
in 1 5 6 6 they made no pretense of trying to stop the icono
ciasm and seizure of parish churches» Since the chanteries
in 1559 the echevinale families had not moved against the
Calvinists, and they had appeared supine before them in the
1 5 6 0 ' s. How could they enforce the p la cards if they did
not control the militia? Throughout the years from 1559 to
1566, they had to resist both the orders of the government
to enforce the inquisition and the influence of powerful
militia captains like Kichel Herlin who sat in the 'Co-nseil
Particulier, the central decision-making body of the city.
They knew they were faced with two determined forces, the
king and the regent on the one hand, and the closer reality
of the Calvinist merchant community on the other. Knowing
that the merchants had a controlling influence over the
bourgeois militia, the magistrates could do little to stop
the rescue of 15 ^2 , or the preaching and iconociasm of 1 5 6 6 .
Moreover, v/ere not the nobility exhibiting a lax attitude
toward heretics Ihemselves? The marquis had absented himself
332 .
during the executions and had not objected to the preaching
of the Calvinists in the vicinity of Valenciennes; in 1566
were not the Confederates legalizing the Calvinist preaching
where it had previously occurred? Were the magistrates to
hold out against these overwhelming forces in what had become
a popular cause by 1566 ? Clearly, they could no- longer
function as the enforcers of the Bla cards; the passivity
of the militia would allow the Calvinist crowd to endanger
their persons if they attempted to confront the heretics .
alone.
As for the bourgeois militia, it reflected its own
particular interests: Ivlade up of the city's citizens, the
militia was not a paid professional or mercenary force in
clined to follow the dictates of the government in order to
receive its salary. Its interests in existing were, as we
have seen, to enforce the law and order and to protect prop
erty. The Anabaptists and vagabonds of the countryside had
to be fought, but it was not apparent to most bourgeois
that the Calvinists were any threat to order or to property.
On the contrary, the Calvinists had themselves fought the
Anabaptists. Moreover, the recent experience of the bour
geois was that the persecutors of the Calvinists had done
more harm to bourgeois rights and to bourgeois property than
had any heretical group; the inquisition had abrogated
privileges like the exemptions from torture and confiscation
and subjected the city to regulations and troops which had
seriously impeded the economy of the city, V/ere the bourgeois
333 .
to fire upon Calvinists who came from among their merchant
patrons and from their own artisan ranks? The actions of
the militia indicate that they were not inclined to do so.
During the chanteries of 1559-1562 the militia had stood
by while crowds sang in the streets^ during the "maubruslez"
incident, the militia had remained at their posts and re
portedly rejoiced along with".the other members of the crowd
during the rescue of the deacons, and during 1566 they stood
by again as the image-breaking and seizure of parish churches
went on. Clearly, on this lower level of the Valenciennes'
population the doctrienes of Calvin which brought horror to
the Icing and members of his administration did not seem as '.
bad as the more real oppressions of the inquisition. The
militia was interested in the protection of their own
property, and this they did well. It was only in the en
forcement of the olaccards and the inquisition that they
proved to be functionless.
The breakdown of authority culminating in 1566 meant
many things to many different groups. Two groups not a
part of the hierarchy of authority v/ere allowed by the break
down to seek their own interests. These v/ere the Calvinists
and the poorest peasant-workers of the rural areas. These
groups overlapped and it has been hard for historians to
disentangle the complex mesh of their interests. Nonethe
less, the broad outlines of their various motivations have .
become apparent: One has to distinguish between the various
areas of the Netherlands:, the' Calvinist movement had different
3 3 *.
leadership in Flanders than it did in the French-speaking

cities of Valenciennes and Tournai. Similarly, the social
background of those who took part in the iconociasm in
Valenciennes was different from that of those who sacked
the abbeys of Marchiennes and Vicogrein the countryside to
the west of the city. For the bourgeois Calvinists of Val
enciennes, the iconociasm was a political act which al
lowed them to reject their clendestine religious services and
announce the establishment of an overt reformedchurch; it
accomplished the seizure of the parish churches and put an
end to the Catholic monopoly of religious intitutions. For
the poor peasants and week-workers who sacked the abbeys of
Marchiennes and Vicogne, the iconoclastic movement was an
opportunity to find sustinence in a year of harvest failure,
and a chance to express their resentment about their con
dition to at least one of the propertied authorities who
oppressed them. Those who initiated the iconociasm in Flanders
played a great role in the crisis year of 1 5 6 6 , and had similar
motivations as did the peasants and week-workers in the vic
inity of Valenciennes, but the iconoclastic movement could
not have spread among the more conservative Calvinists inside
cities like Valenciennes without the general crisis of author!t
In sum, during the years 1559-1566 the actions of the
magistrates and of the bourgeois reflect a continuity with
the -oast. As the representatives of a semi-independant urban
entity whose coutumes preserved particularistic privilege, the*.*

acted as they had always dene, in their own interests. Similar
in those years the nobiLity were reacting to what they con-
335.
sidered to be new developments and perversions of government

which abrogated their traditional positions as the chief
. powers of the Netherlands. As the placcards were enforced
with increased rigor, the New Bishoprics were established,
and Philip relied on the use of the more efficient bureaucrats
'in inquisitorial committees, it seemed to these groups that
it was the king that was innovating and not they. The years
1559-1566 indicate an increasing breakdown of the basic function
of government at various levels. No longer finding it econom

ically or politically profitable to enforce the directives
of the central government, magistrates and royal officials
increasingly delayed and rejected the execution of orders from
Brussels. As different levels of the society were forced to
organize to look after their own interests, the normal roles
of officials changed; many practicing Catholics found they
had to compromise in order to survive in increasingly untenable
positions/ The breakdown of government structures was ex
acerbated by pressure from groups who exploited the polariza
tion of society into Catholic and Calvinist parties for their
own interests. A permissiveness was established towards the
growing activity of the Calvinists until in the crisis year
of 1560 normal patterns of authority broke down altogether.
CHAPTER SIX* THE SIEGE OF VALENCIENNES
We now come to the point in our history where we ask

the question why Valenciennes "became the first battleground
in the "Revolt of the Netherlands". This chapter will in
vestigate the actions of the government, the nobility,- the
magistrates, and the merchants from August 1566 until the
end of the siege of Valenciennes in March 156 ?. The leader
ship of both the Calvinist and Catholic camps will be delineated
and their ideas and aims defined. The chapter will indicate
the political relationship between the consistory, the Magistrat.
and the Conseil Particulier and show what social group control
led the city during the siege. Finally, the chapter will in
dicate the political, social and economic consequences of
the siege for Valenciennes,
1. From the iconociasm to the outbreak of hostilities: August

to December 1566.
The well-known attitude of many contemporaries to the
iconociasm was one of condemnation. There were enough cases
of sack and pillage accompanying the image-breaking to frighten
many propertied groups with the specter of another Munster.
In rural regions in Flanders where the image-breaking was led
by peasants and vagabonds, there were undoubtedly many Calvinist
merchants who themselves feared for their lives and property.
The pillaging also had the effect of dampening the ardor of
many Catholic nobles and merchants who had opposed the pla cards
and inquisition for political and economic reasons; after
337.
August 1566„ a sizable number of nobles and laymen who had

supported the Compromis gravitated back towards the govern
ment.
Catholic propagandists capitalized as much as possible
on the reaction to the violence of the summer months by
picturing the iconoclasts as a great hoard of canaille who
not only broke sacred images but also presented a threat to
property6 On the defensive, the Calvinists opted for a posture
which was only half true; the ministers and representatives
of the Calvinist churces began to disclaim any responsibility
for the iconociasm.1 In many areas there was enough truth in
this to make it seem plausible to many of their adherents;
the iconociasm had started in areas which did not contain
trained Calvinist ministers or even well-organized consis
tories, and there had been actions during the image-breaking
which went directly against the doctrines of the Reformed
church.2
While the iconociasm had momentarily put the government
at a disadvantage, in the long run it created a situation
which seemed to justify the use of force against the heretics,
1E. Trachsel, De Columban aux Gueux, pp. 1^3“1^9.

" ...
The myth that neither the ministers ncr the consistories had
a role in the image-breaking seems to have become the official
line of many Protestant historians. Both Rahlenbeck and Oilier
subscribed to this view; for them, the iconoclasts were the
persecuted Calvinist .flocks who could no longer tolerate the
evil of graven images. Rahlenbeck and Oilier are silent on
the excesses of pillage and sack which the Catholics and later
the Marxist Kutner have stressed, but their tendency to dis
claim a role for the merchant consistories has furthered' the
myth that the image-breaking was a result of v;hat the Catholics
called canaille and the Marxists called proletarians.
338.
Government officials in late September v/ere already quoting
rumors that an enraged Philip II v/as threatening retribution.
On 29 September, Morrillon wrote to Granvelie that
On diet que le roy, entendant les saccageroenS
des eglises, s'est tire la barbs, jurant par
1'ame de son pere qu'il les coustera chier, et ,
qu*il print la fiebvre que lui dura XXIV heurs.
Why was it Valenciennes that came to be the focus of the
government's attention and receive the brunt of the repression?
Why didn't the government attack the areas in South Flanders
where the iconociasm had started? Why not Tournai where the
Calvinist community had been established for years just like
at Valenciennes?
.A well-organized iconociasm based on theological
and political principles, as at Valenciennes, appeared more
dangerous than the rural iconociasm to serious Catholics and
to loyal defenders of the King. Valenciennes was seen as
particularly odious•in Catholic and government circles because
the Calvinists there had seized the parish churches during the
image-breaking; the heretical ministers had persisted in
preaching in them and publicizing their intention to celebrate
the Lords Supper in them in the month of November. This had
happened in no other city including Tournai which had a stronger
Calvinist community than Valenciennes in the early 1560s,
The significance of the Calvinist intention to
celebrate the Lord's Supper should not be underestimated when
considering the polarization of attitudes in the fall of 1566 .
I
Correspondence de Granvelie, Vol I, p. 509*
339.
For the Calvinists, the Lord's Supper was an absolute renun

ciation of the host of the Mass and a promise of fidelity
to the Reformed- church. The Calvinists intended the ceremony
as a total expression of faith by which they would solemnly
abjure their allegiance to the Catholic church without any
power to return.*” For the king and regent, this challege to
the sanctity of the Mass also challenged the sacred duties of -
the sovereign; everywhere the government found a celebration
of the Lord's Sapper, it treated the celebrants as rebels.
The intensity of the regents reactions to the Lord's Supper
is illustrated in a letter of late November; when the ministers
of Valenciennes were preparing for the celebration on the 26th
of November, the regent instructed the governor of Lille that
if anyone from that city or Tournai went to the event at
Valenciennes they were to have their houses burned to the
ground.2
Although the iconociasm at Valenciennes was directed by
the merchants and presented no threat to bourgeois, lives and
property, this was no cause for forgiveness by the govern
ment. On the contrary, the seizure of the parish churches
and the intention to celebrate the Lord's Supper were seen
as a direct threat to the political authority of the crown
as manifested in the tl a cards-. Valenciennes achieved a
notoriety among Catholic circles as the most evil city in
1
Renon de France, Histoire des troubles des Pays-Bas, T. I,
p. 2
2
MHSAV, Vol. VI, Regent to the Mngistrat. 26 November 1566,
p. 2l6; and regent to Rassenghit Tn# 24- November 1566, p. 216.
See also Memo ires de Pasquier dr- la Barre. T. I, p. 2 6 5 .
3^0.
in the Netherlands. Imaginative horror stories were told

how at Valenciennes scores of priests and monks were slowly
roasted over small fires after the iconociasm.^ Thus, to
the royalists and Catholics, the politico-?religious events which
took place at Valenciennes seem to have teen more important
than simple pillaging, and led to the government’s determina
tion to punish the city.
Another primary consideration of the Regent In focusing
attention on Valenciennes was the proximity of the city to the
French border. The regent’s fear of French attack or of
seditious actions on the part of the Valenciennes Calvinists
was not without reason. The history of the Hapsburg-Valois
wars had shown that Hainaut was a special target of French
armies. The regent also had information that the French
Huguenots under Francois de Coligny were planning to invade
the Netherlands in order to unite the Calvinists and to claim
2
the French-speaking provinces for France. The regent, as
a result, took measures in Valenciennes to assure the city's
security. For example, she ordered the interrogation and
torture of Frenchmen found in the vicinity of the city to
3
see if there was a conspiracy afoot. In October after
being advised that ministers like la Grange were foreign
^D’Outtreman, Histoire, pp. 20^-205«

^MHSAV, Vol. VI, Regent to Noircarmes, 15 September 1566,
pp. k2-k6.
^MHSAV. Vol. VI, Regent to La Kamaide, 6 September 1566,
pp. 29-30.
agents, she sent out a circular letter calling for the arrest
of all French preachers. ^ Finallys this fear of French
attack was to be the justification on the 20th of November
1566 for the government’s order for the reestablishment of .

troops in Valenciennes. ^
The government also had the means with which to chas
tise Valenciennes* The departure of Berghes for Spain in
June had left vacant the offices of g-rand bailli of Hainaut
and governor of Valenciennes. The iiegent thereupon appointed
Philippe de Ste,-Aldegonde, knight of the order of.the
Golden Fleece, seigneur de Noircarmes, and a descendant of
the female line of the de Lannoy, a distinguished noble
family of the Netherlands. Noircarmes himself had few im
portant lands and was not accepted as an equal by the greater
nobility. From an early date he distinguished himself in the
service of the government from which he obtained appointment
to office and a sizable living. He was originally only pro»
visional governor of Valenciennes and an interim grand bailli
of Hainaut, but was later confirmed in those charges when it
became apparent that Berghes had been detained indefinitely
in Spain. Throughout the period of the siege he was to act
according to the directions of the r.egent and never to exhibit
the kind of opposition that had been characteristic of the
EXarquis de Berghes. For Noircarmes, the appointment was a
^MHSAV, Vol. VI, Circular letter, 9 October 1566, p. 88.
2MHSAV, Vol. VI, Regent to the Magistrat. 2 6 November 1566,

pp. 239-2^0.
3^2.
step up in status, and he did not want to lose it by contesting
government policies.'*' Unlike Berghes he. did not have the
patronage system to uphold as he was not a traditional com
mander of numerous bandes d8ordonnance. When he conducted the
siege, he did so as a new commander-in-chief v;ho requisitioned
inorder to pay and feed the troops. The inquisition did not
restrict his rights, but rather gave him an opportunity to
win new favor from the ;king and regent as their faithful
servant.
Before his appointment in June 1566, Noircarmes had been
Governor of St. Omer, a town in the midst of the most radical
heretical area of Flanders. Perhaps his observation of violent
behavior there affected his judgment at Valenciennes. Noir
carmes, while stationed in Mons, the capital of Hainaut,
during late August and early September 1566, heard many
horror stories from Catholic emigrants; evidently influenced
by these he believed that if he went to Valenciennes the
Calvinists would massacre monks under his eyes to undermine

2
his authority. After the iconociasm at Valenciennes, Noir
carmes wrote both the the magistrates and to the r.egent that
The Conseil Particulier sent 77 livres tournois to Noircarmes

for his entertainment in an attempt to soften his attitude*
The wine merchant Bertrand Gruel, a Calvinist sympathizer,
also sent 120 lots of wine to Noircarmes as a gift. This
show of favor had no apparent effect on Noircarmes. MHSAV,
Vol. VI, Deliberation 0? the Conseil Particulier. 16 Septem
ber 1560, pp. ^2-^6. These gifts compare most favorably with
the gifts sent to the regional Confederates at the same time.-
They only received 27 livres tournois. MHSAV. Vol. VI, Delibera
tion of the Conseil Particulier, 19 September 1566, pp. ^8-50.
2D'Cutreman, Histoire. pp. 20^-205, At no time did the Valen

ciennes Calvinists harm any priests or monks. In fact, they
were1left in their cloisters until the city was declared rebel,
and then they were forced to leave without any violence against
their persons.
3^3.
he was not prepared to go into the city without the accom
paniment of troops because he feared for his person. Simi
larly, the newly appointed prevot-le-co mt e , Claude de la
Hamaide, Seigneur de la Vechte, afeo feared to go into the
city leaving it without royal officers.1
.In other cities overseen by the greater nobility, there
was a normalization of relations with the government after
the iconoclasm. The prince of Orange at Antwerp allowed
preaching and the celebration of the Lord's Supper to go on
in the suburbs, while at Malines Hoogstraeten did the same.
The count of Hornes at Tournai never mentioned the phrase
"freedom of religion", but he nevertheless permitted it out
side the walls. In Ypres, where Egmont was in charge, there
were both -presches and Calvinist marriages, in the places
v/here they had taken place before the Accord (although Egmont
later restricted them in compliance with government wishes).
Of all the major cities only Valenciennes had no normaliza
tion of relations in the fall of 1566.
Refusal to permit a normalization in Valenciennes was
the government's reaction to developments in the city which
appeared to directly challenge royal authority. The icono-
clasra and seizure of parish churches by the Calvinists had
marked the culmination of the breakdown of the Magistrate
functions in the government's eyes by indicating
1MHSAV, Vol. V, Noircarroes to the riegent, 30 April 15^6,

p"."^20. Vol. VI, Noircarmes to the regent, 21 September 1566,
pp. 56-57. Deliberation of the Conseil Particulier, 3 Sep
tember 1566, pp. 6-9 .
3^.
the helplessness of the Magistrat as the political body which

enforced royal edicts.^- After the iconoclasra and the ejection
of the Catholics from the parish churches, the government

2
refused to deal with the Magistrat. On the other hand,
for the merchant-bourgeois, the legal means used by the
echevinale families to block the inquisition and government
centralization had failed; the magistrates' function in pro
tecting the city's privileges through charters and the pro
vincial courts had proved fruitless. Thus, the merchants
turned to other organizations, and in the face of the un
willingness of both the government and the Calvinist mer
chants to compromise, the Magistrat could no longer even
pretend to uphold the government's authority.
The correspondence between Valenciennes and the regent
from August to December of 1566 indicates that the decisions
of government inside Valenciennes were being made by the Con
seil Particulier. not the Magistrat. This.indicates that as
hostilities became more of a possibility, as the government
gathered its troops for a test of strength and siege of
Valenciennes, the decisions in Valenciennes had to be made
by the leaders of the bourgeois companies and the bourgeois
guets who sai in the Conseil Particulier— not by the ineffec
tual echevins. It was, afterall, the bourgeois companies
^MHSAV, Vol. VI, Deliberation of the Conseil Particulier.

3 September 1566, pp. 6-9. The attitude of the government
was presented in this session of the Conseil Particulier.
2 MHSAV, Vol VI, Deliberation of the Conseil Particulier,

30 September 1566, pp. 71-72.
3^5.
guet who had the power to enforce or not-to enforce authority

inside the city.
The most popular and the most powerful leader of the
bourgeois militia had been the Calvinist merchant Michel
Herlin. During the joyeuse entree of Charles V in 15^9» Mer
lin had led the city's bourgeois cavalry and at the end of
the royal troops' occupation in 15&5 he had been appointed a
captain of the newly created-bourgeois companies. In 1566 -
Herlin and Calvinist merchants like Jacques Gellee made the
Calvinist voice in the Conseil Farticulier predominant.
Given the social prejudices of the era, merchants could not
normally gain positions in the I.agistrat because they lacked
the kind of intermarriages and noble backgrounds the echevi
nale families had obtained over centuries. 3ut in the 1560's
due to the opposition to the inquisition, the oppressions
of the garrison, and the popularity of Calvinism, the merchant
Calvinists had obtained the support of a majority of the
bourgeois citizens. They were then able tc gain a political
predominance over the echevins in the fall of 1566 by making
the Conseil Particulier more important than, the Magistrat.
The echevinale .families were intimidated during the
autumn of 1566 by the power of the merchants, and they could
no longer act with authority. The merchants allowed the
echevinale families to sit with them in the Conseil Particu
lier, but the latter sat in subserviant ambassadorial posi
tions. The merchants used magistrates like Francois d'Oultre-
man as couriers, relaying messages back and forth from
>
Kj Iw
346.
the Conseil Particulier to the regent and Noircarmes.*'
On the government side, Noircarmes simply refused to
enter the city's gates after the iconoclasm and suggested that
troops were needed to reestablish royal authority in the city*
In a letter to the Magistrat, he pictured.Valenciennes as a-

2
nother Geneva ruled by its consistory* Noircarmes later in
formed the Conseil Particulier that he would only deal with the
consistory as it seemed the municipal officials had ceded

3
power to it* There was truth to this assertion, as men like
Michel Herlin and Jacques Gellee in the Conseil Particulier
were also the most powerful men in the Calvinist consistory*
The consistory never had a formal political function at
Valenciennes even during the height of the siege, and it is
Impossible to know if the important decisions were taken in
the consistory rather than the Conseil Particulier. How
ever, this question does not matter much as the same merchants
that controlled the Conseil Particulier also controlled the
consistory. As Noircarmes had already observed during the
height of the preaching, the principle merchants of the city

ij.
were the authors of all the Calvinist actions. For Noircarmes,
the predominance of the Conseil Particulier and the consistory
at the expence of the magistrates, the catholics and the
1For the relationship between the consistory and the Magistrat

and the Conseil Particulier see MHSAV, Vol. VI, Deliberation
of the Conseil Particulier, 21 October 1 5 6 6 , pp. 136-137*
2MHSAV- Vol. VI, Deliberation of the Conseil Particulier* 3
September 1566, pp. 6-9.
3MHSAV, Vol. VI, Deliberation of the Conseil Particulier, J O
September 1566, pp. 71-72.
.
^MHSAV, Vol. V, Noircarmes to the -.egent, 31 July 1566, pp.
340-341
3^7 •
royal officials could only be rectified by troops.^*

Given the attitude of the government, the intransigence of
the Calvinists in retaining the parish churches might have
seemed unwise. Howeverr men like Herlin and Gellee were not
oblivious to the consequences of their actions, and were
taking calculated risks based on information that they had
received from both the Antwerp merchants and the nobility.
They had received the encouragement of impressive and power
ful men to persevere in their interpretation of the Accord of
23-25 August, and to follow the policy of Calvinists in other
cities. On 29 September, a circular letter was sent by the
Antwerp consistory calling for a synod to meet at Ghent in
2
order to coordinate the actions of the Netherlands Calvinists.
A letter on the same subject came to the consistory of
Valenciennes from GillesLe Clercq which stressed the need for
Valenciennes support of the efforts of other consistories
in towns which had to deal with garrisons already inside their
walls. Le Clercq asked Valenciennes to temporize in its nego
tiations with Noircarmes until the synod of Ghent had formula
ted a common policy for the whole Low Countries. He advised
Valenciennes not to give in hastily to government demands
because if one city capitulated there would be others which
would inevitably follow. He cited the cases of Ghent, Ypres,
and Bruges which were delaying negotiations with Egmont in
3-MHSAV, Vol. V, Noircarmes to the regent, 29 August 1566, pp.

^13-^17.
2
MHSAV. Vol. VI, Circular letter to ministers of the Low
Countries, 29 September 1566, pp. 69-70* La Grange attended
this synod as the emissary of Valenciennes.
3^8.
order to obtain a better interpretation of the Accord .
LeClercq advised that emissaries sent to Noircarmes not be
given the power to conclude treaties, but that they be forced
to report back to the consistory; this method would assure
that the consistory could control the negotiations and stall
for time as long as possible.^" In a following letter, Le
Clercq even asserted that Orange himself would come to their
aid militarily if the need arose. In response, the Calvinist
consistory and the Conseil Particulier rejected the govern
ment demands to vacate the parish churches and held out for
the right to free exercise of religion and a place to erect

3
their own temple inside the walls.
As the Conseil Particulier and the consistory found the
new governor Noircarmes hostile, they sought advise elsewhere.
Merchants from the Conseil Particulier approached the ciount
of Kernes, who, in the period of a few weeks, had gained a

k
reputation for moderation among the Calvinists at Tournai.'
During a meeting on the 6th of September, Hornes assured ?5ichel
Herlin, ••Nicolas Bassee, and Jacques Gellee that liberty of
conscience was permitted by the Accord as was the exercise of
religion. But Kornes advised the merchants not to use the
term "exercise of religion" as it was resented by the govern
ment. Then on the 11th of October 1566 the Valenciennes
3-MKSAV, Vol.VI, Gilles LeClercq to the consistory of Valen

ciennes, 1 October 1566, pp. 73-75,
2 Pal liara, Interrogators s nolitioues de Guy de Bray, p. 62*
3?aiilerd:,'Interrogatoires poiitiques de Gay de Bray, p. 59.
h,' *
’MHSAV,~ Vol VI, Wille: to the' ministers', of Valenciennes, 20

September, 1556» •pp. 52-55,
'?*n
3^9 •
merchants entertained Hornes at a dinner held in the tovm of
St. Amand, In the words of Michel Herlin# Hornes "understood
that liberty of religion was general until otherwise advised
by a legitimate assembly of the 3tates~C-eneralM.i
Another stimulus for the continuation of resistance to
Noircarmes* demands had been the establishment of a Calvinist
defensive league by activists from Lower Flanders. These
activists had sent Gilles Dumont to the Antwerp consistory to
promise a force of 20,000 to 30»000 raen willing to march to
the aid-of any besieged city. These were mostly rural
peasant workers who were exploited in Flemish putting out
systems and probably from the same social milieu that had
initiated both the -presches and the iconoclasm. They were
of a very different social group from the urban merchant-

2
bourgeois who controlled Valenciennes. The consistory of
Valenciennes was informed of the Flemish league as early as
September by one of the ministers at Tournai# Amboise Wille,
who cautioned that the league should not be called upon un
less there was a dire necessity.^
The policy of resistance to' government demands is
illustrated by the letter of the Conseil Particulier to the
Regent on k September 1566. The letter stated that the
regular bourgeois gusts and the three bourgeois companies
-*-See the interrogations of Michel Herlin in Van Langeraad#

Guido de Bres, p. LXXVII.
. 2For descriptions of these peasant-worker armies see Cor-
respondance francaise de Marguerite de Parma# Vc-1 I# p. 229?
and Corrosnondanci" ds Granvelle. Vol. Ill# p. 63.
3MHSAV. Vol. VI, Wille to the ministers cf Valenciennes# 20
September.1566# pp. 23-25*
%$£>
.
350
were keeping calm in the city ana there was no need for
troops as suggested by Noircarmes. As for the Calvinists,
the letter said, that they were acting calmly and that there
was no threat from them, as any royal officer could see if
one would only come to'the city. The Conseil Particulier
suggested a normalization based on the Accord and on pre
cedents established in other cities* it asked the regent to-
direct Noricarmes to settle with Valenciennes as Kornes had
settled at Tournai* Noircarmes should come to Valenciennes
and indicate the places where a Calvinist temple could be
built for services inside the walls as Calvinist ministers
had preached there before the acceptance of the Accord.^"
The government turned down the request for temples in
side or outside the walls of the city and explicitly denied
that Valenciennes* Calvinists had the right to preach in
the parish churches. The regent claimed that continued
preaching inside the Catholic buildings was an abrogation
of the Accord; she viewed the requests for their continuation

2
through the Conseil Particulier as an insolence. Ndircarmes,
meanwhile, continued to refuse to enter the city to publish

3
the Accord while the preaching was going on. By September 19
Noircarmes had raised the issue of the Calvinist celebration
^KHSAV, Vol. VI, Conseil Particulier to the Regent, 4 Septem

ber 1566, pp. 12-VT,
2MKSAV, Vol. VI, Collart to the Magistrate k September 1566-,

pp. 18-19, and Noircarmes to the Magistrat, k September 15^6,
pp. 20-21. '
ÎvlHSAV, Vol. VI, Deliberation of the Conseil Particulier,

l'6"’September 1566, pp. ^2-^6.
351.
of the Lord's Supper and added it to his reasons for not
entering the city,3- Thus, the regent had a legal justifica
tion for punishing Valenciennes which she did not have in
other areas. The lâl justification came as a result of the
government's interpretation of the Accord with the Confederates.
For the Calvinists, the Accord was a bilateral agreement
between the regent and the Confederates which became effective
on the 25th of August when it was accepted by the Confederates.
This date was crucial to Valenciennes as the iconoclasm and
seizure of the churches there had taken place on the evening
of the 2^th while preaching in the parishes occurred on the
morning of the 25th. The Valenciennes consistory claimed that
they had met the deadline and were to be allowed' the right
of preaching inside the parish churches of the city. A second
point of contention in the Accord resulted from the unclear
definition of the word "presche”. The text of the Accord
stated that the Calvinists would have the right to hold
"presches" in areas where they had already occurred. For the
Calvinists, this meant that they could continue the baptisms,
marriages, and communions which had been celebrated during
the open air presches of June, July, and August; it also
meant to them that they could continue these ceremonies in
the seized parish churches. The Confederates agreed with
this interpretation by claiming that “entire exercise of
religion” was meant by "presches” in the Accord, but that
\lKSAVr Vol. VI, Deliberation of Conseil Particulier. 19

September 1566* pp. ^8-50.
352 .
the words had not "been used because the contracting parties
had not wished to irritate the .king.
The government, however, proceeded on the assumption that
the Accord was a unilateral act emanating from the princely
authority embodied in the regent. Thus, the regent based
the effective date of the Accord on the 23rd and never recog
nized the right of the Calvinists to preach inside the walls..
of V a l e n c i e n n e s . T h e government claimed that Calvinist
"presches" would contain nothing more than mere preaching,
and the celebration of the Lord's Supper at Valenciennes
was an abrogation of the Accord from the very beginning.
Moreover, the seizure of the parish churches was considered
inexcusable and, in the regent's mind, cause enough to deny
the Accord from Valenciennes even if the Calvinist there
later complied with the government's interpretation of the
document.^
In actuality its text seems to indicate that the Accord was

a unilateral act. Nevertheless, the regent was asking for
the compliance and cooperation of the Confederates in quelling
the disturbances,and it was in this way considered a bilateral
act by the Confederates. Historians and contemporaries have
been as confused over the date of the Accord as were the two
sidest For example, the Catholic chronicler, Pontus Payen,
speaks of the treaty of the 2^th of August, while the Pro
testant historian Keteran dates it on the 25th.
^Charles Paillard, Notes et eclaircissements sur l'histoire

generale des Pays-Bas et sur l'histoire de Valenciennes au
XVI~ si^cle (Valenciennes. 1879). p p . 10^-105. See also
Paillard, Huit mois. p. 2^9* and MHSAV, Vol. VI, p. 99. The
conflict over the language of the Accord of 23-25 August was
not immediately apparent: in fact, the formal denial of the
government that they had sanctioned the celebration of the
baptism, marriage, and communion came only on the ^th of
December 1566 in a circular letter'othe magistrates of towns.
Nevertheless, the government position had been evident for
some time before that at Valenciennes where Noircarmes ob
jected to a celebration of the Lord's Supper in November.
353.
More importantly, the regent's correspondence indicated
that she never intended to honor the Accord, except for a few
months until she had the necessary force to crush the here
tics, Marguerite stated to the king in late August that the
Accord was granted under duress in an effort to prevent im
minent iconoclasm in Brussels, She told Phillip that he did
not have to honor it, and when the government had sufficient
force to put down the heretics, he could simply revoke it,3-
Marguerite began gathering troops in early September by
creating a personal guard of 800 footsoldiers in order to
prevent any further intimidation of her person in the capital.
During the fall garrisons were put into Lille, Mons, Tournai,
and other cities known to have Calvinist communities. On
18 November Marguerite told Philip that she was raising twelve
new companies of foot in order to regain ground lost to the

2
heretics. The loyalist nobles Mansfeld and Berlayemont
were put in charge of troops raised in Luxembourg and Namur.
Finally, in the winter of 1566-1567, when the government had
obtained the military means to crush Calvinist resistance,
whe wrote to Philip asking him to declare the Accord null and
void 1 she desired that the king publish a new edict directing
the provincial governors to eradicate all preaching by force

3
and to uphold the rla cards in their rigor,J
^■Gachard, Correspondence de Philit>r>e II. Vol. I, Marguerite

to Philip, 27 August 1566, p. ^ 52.
2
Gachard, Vol. II, Marguerite to Philip, 18 November 1566,
p. ^81,
■^Gachard^ Vol. I. Marguerite to Philip, 3 January 1567, p. 501.
35^.
The uncompromising attitudes of both the government and
the Valenciennes Calvinists led to a test of will in late
October. At that time the government decided to issue an
ultimatum. Either Valenciennes would accept places but no
temple for preaching outside the walls and refrain from the
celebration of the Lord's Supper, or the city would be de
blared rebel on 1 November 1 566 for abrogating the pl.aca~.rds
and the Accord. The regent declared that the city had to
accept the demands without counter-proposals or queries as
these would be considered a negative response to the ultimatum.
In effect the city's legalistic arguments based on the Accord
were rejected. Not only were the Calvinists of the city to
be punished, but so were the Catholics it contained since a
declaration of rebellion would result in the loss of all
bourgeois property and privileges. The government attitude
was that if the magistrates and the bourgeois were unwilling
to uphold the rlacards. it did not matter whether they were
Catholics or not. They were dissimulators and conspirators
with the heretics and had to take the penalties. The Magistrat
was the corporate judicial body which condoned heresy and
abrogation of the Accord, and thus it was guilty of rebellion
if it did not uphold the government's will .1
The ultimatum resulted in the capitulation of the Cal
vinist consistory. Calvinist notables like Michel Herlin,
3-MHSAV. Vol. VI, Regent to Noircarmes, 25 October 1566,

pp. 140-145.
355.
Simon Logier, and Pierre Conrart told the other members
of the consistory that the terms had to accepted* The in- .
transigence of the consistory melted before the threat of
the declaration of rebellion which would have resulted in
the destruction of all the city's privileges. The govern
ment terms were accepted on 31 October 1$66 a day before the
ultimatum's sanctions were to go into effect.^
Yet* the capitulation of the consistory did not lead to
an immediate attempt by the government to normalize relations,
and the correspondence of the regent seems to indicate she
had no intention of allowing a normalization based on the
Accord at Valenciennes. On 25 October a week before the ul~
timatum expired, she wrote to Noircarmes that if Valenciennes
gave in to government demands she doubted whether the city
should be granted any rights under the Accord as the Cal
vinists there had contravened it from the very beginning*
She cited the city's pernicious obstinacy in continuing to
preach in the parish churches since the iconoclasm of late
August and by its attack on the Mass through a publicized

2
intention to celebrate the Lord's Supper in November. The
next communication indicating the intention, of. the r.egent
after the capitulation was dated the 8th of November. Evi
dently proceeding on the assumption that Valenciennes should
HlHSAVa Vol. VI, Deliberations of the Conseil Particulier,

29 and 30 October 1566, pp. 140-141, 148-150, and 151-154. i
2MHSAV. Vol. VI, Regent to Noircarmes, 25 October 1566-

141-145,
356.
be punished by troops, the regent ordered four companies of'

Luxembourgers and a company of arquebusiers under the seigneur
de Trelon to advance into the vicinity of Valenciennes and to
follow orders from Noircarmes.'*' This seems to indicate that
the regent had decided that she had nothing to gain from
reaching an agreement with Valenciennes; opinion had turned
against the iconoclasts and time had allowed her to collect
the necessary troops to deal from a position of force.
Noircarmes' intentions were not stated in any corres
pondence but his actions during the month of November belie
the government's lack of interest in coming to terms with
Valenciennes on the basis of the Accord. On the 19th of
November Noircarmes finally sent word that he was ready to
meet with the consistory. He asked that emissaries of the
consistory and the Conseil Particulier meet him at the for
tified Catholic stronghold of Conde some 10 kilometers to
the north of Valenciennes. When the emissaries arrived at
Conde on the 20th, they found Noircarmes mounted and spurred
with a company of several hundred cavalry troops. Noircarmes
commanded the prevot, De Lattre, to send a messenger ahead
to inform the Calvinist consistory to be ready to meet him
at the Tournai gates, from whence they would go into the
countryside where Noircarmes claimed he would indicate places
where the Calvinists could preach. A few minutes later
Noircarmes, the troops and the emissaries set off for
^MHSAV, Vol. VI, Regent to Quarre, 8 November 1566, pp. 170-

171.
Valenciennes. When Noircarmes arrived at the Tournai gates,
the consistory was not in evidence— only a few magistrates
had appeared. This apparent boycott of the meeting by the
influential merchants infuriated Noircarmes, and he pro
ceeded to lecture the prevot and the magistrates for their
past lack of obedience to the king; he denounced the Calvinists
for the crimes they had committed in the past. He cited the
iconoclasra, the seizure of the parish churches, the celebra
tion of the Lord's Supper, and the harboring of foreign
ministers. As his speech continued it became evident that
he intended to. proceed on the assumption that the whole
city population had thwarted him. He decreed the cashiering
of the three bourgeois companies which, he correctly observed,
had not upheld their oath to combat heresy; he then denounced
the citizens and inhabitants of Valenciennes as disobedient
and rebel for permitting the takeover of the parish churches.
Having completed his speech, he and his troops rode away from
the gates without entering the city. The consistory immedi
ately made excuses for not appearing at the gate by claiming
that it had not had sufficient advance warning of the meeting.
The Calvinists expressed astonishment that Noircarmes could
so summarily treat such an important matter on the spur of
moment. Noircarmes refused to read the consistory's letters
of excuse and apology brought the next day by the members of
the Magistrat: his rage at what he felt was a personal affront
led him to detain Catholic magistrates like d'Oultreman who
were frantically trying to arrange a normalization to
358.
avoid hostilities.^
From this point until the opening of armed hostilities
on December 2 developments moved swiftly. In spite of the
fact that the celebration of the Lord's Supper was delayed
and did not take place on November 26 as planned, Noircarmes
wrote to the regent that the city was "superbly rebel" as its
population "had not any other God and king than their minis
ters." He went on to suggest the dispatch of more troops to
his command for the cutting of the Scheldt river and the
blockading of the roads in order to prevent provisions from
reaching the city and in order to destroy the wine and wool
staples at Valenciennes. 2 He suggested that the towns of
St. Amand, Quievrain, and Vico'gne be garrisoned in order to
complete the blockade. Finally, he recommended that Valen
ciennes be officially declared rebel if it did not accept
troops.^ On the 22nd Marguerite agreed with Noircarmes
that the situation at Valenciennes was scandalous and
authorized a blockade.^ On the 23rd she agreed to the
Â reliable memoire of this abortive meeting has come down

to us from the hand of Francois D'Oultreman, the pensionary
of Valenciennes, and from Pierre Biseau, an emmissary from
the Magistrat. The memoire was made for the royal commis
sioners in the summer of 1567 after the siege. They indi
cated both the cavalier attitude of Noircarmes and the in
transigence of the consistory. MHSAV, Vol. VI, pp. 155-169.
2
MHSAV, Vol. VI, Noircarmes to the regent, 20 and 22 November
156 ?,“ pp. 179-189 and 190-193.
^MHSAV. Vol. VI, Noircarmes to the regent, 23 November 1566,

pp. 209-210, and 25 November 1566, pp. 228-230.
^KHSAV. Vol. VI, Regent to Noircarmes, 22 November 1566,
pp. 199-200.
iys
359.
■billeting of troops in the town of St. Amand and other vil- -

.lages surrounding Valenciennes.^ By the 24th. she had told
Noircarmes to demand that Valenciennes receive a new garrison
including the cavalry of Arschot, Boussu, Montigny, and
Berghes which she was putting under his commandt if they
not comply, she would issue the requested declaration of
rebellion.
By the time that Noircarmes had presented this new ul
timatum to the city on the 31st of November, developments had
already taken place which made its acceptance impossible for
Valenciennes. Noircarmes had occupied St. Amand on the 23rd
and 24th with a large contingent of cavalry. St. Amand was
known for its anti-Cathoiic sympathies. Under the harsh rule
of the so-call.ed ',,anti-lmoIlk:.,, Morrillon who held the
abbey of St. Amand for the absentee abbot Granvelie, the
town contained a sizable Calvinist community led by the
de-frocked priest Jean Cateau. Throughout the night of the
23 rd the soldiers swept through the town and sacked the
houses of both the St. Amand bourgeois and peasants using

the excuse that the inhabitants were all Calvinists. They
carried off the livestock and the stores of grain while com
mitting outrages on the inhabitants including rape, torture,
and summary executions for heresy. Fleeing persons, inclu
ding the preacher Cateau, arrived at Valenciennes where
^MKSAV, Vol. VI, Regent to a mayeur of St. Amand, 23 Novem

ber 1566, pp. 201-203.
2MHSAV, Vol. VI, Regent to Noircarmes, 24 November 1566,
pp. 207-33,
360.
they recounted stories of rapine to the p>pulace and to the

magistrates. On December 1st the magistrates drew up a
remonstrance to Noircarmes detailing the acts of the royal
troops and on the same day they replied to the government
ultimatum in the negative. Considering the opposition in
Valenciennes to the troops which had pillaged St. Amand,
the magistratesr acting as the ambassadors of the city,
asked Noircarmes for assurances from the greater nobility
that the same would not happen to Valenciennes if she gave
into the government demands.^* The cavalry of Noircarmes
pillaged under the city walls on the morning of 2 December.
The soldiers foraged among the houses and gardens and drove
off livestock while the inhabitants of the suburbs fled
into the city with what belongings they could carry; the
magistrates complained to Noircarmes in a letter of 2 Decem
ber that inhabitants of the suburbs were pillaged by royal
2
troops. Inside Valenciennes there was a general call to
arms for self-defense. A deputation of bourgeois came to
the Conseil Particulier and requested that the armories be
opened and artillery be set up on the walls to try to protect
■^KHSAV, Vol. VI, Magistral to Noircarmes, 1 December 1566,

pp. 272-275.- Noircarmes did endeavor to stop his troops from
attacking Catholics "soubz umbre qu'ils sont hughenaulx.1; he
instructed his captains only to confiscate property of vil
lagers without committing "foulles" against them, This was
an impossible order to enforce given the needs of the soldiers
and their habits of pillaging in the 16th century. As Noir
carmes himself admitted to the Magistral, "Vous savez que
quant gens de gherres sont au champs, il ya tousjours de-
sordre et ne peult lfon ainsy tenir sur cul." MHSAV, Vol. VI,
Noircarmes to captains of ordonnance. 6 December 1566, pp. 53**—
535> and Noircarmes to the Magistral. 9 December 1 5 6 6 , pp. 350-
35^.
2KHSAV, Vol. VI, Magistral to Noircarmes, 2 December 1566 ,
pp. 278-281.
£W
361.
the suburbs. The Conseil Particulier then ordered Noel

LeBoucq, the royal artillery commissioner, to roll out his
cannons.
On the same day, a company of mounted bourgeois rode
outside the walls in order to try to prevent flocks of sheep
from being driven off by the royal cavalry? this action re
sulted in the first skirmishes between the two forces,
leaving a few dead and wounded on both s i d e s O n 3 Decem
ber, as the pillaging in the suburbs by royal troops continued,
there was an "extraordinary deliberation" of the Conseil Par
ticulier which resulted in the reestablishment of the three
bourgeois companies which had beencashiered by Noircarmes
on 20 November. Michel Herlin the Younger, Pierre Conrart,
Jehan de Lattre the Younger, Simon Logier, and Jehan Mahieu
were commissioned to. lead new bourgeois cavalry forces
against Noircarmes’ troops in the countryside. In response
to. a petition from people living outside the walls, the
Conseil Particulier ordered bourgeois guets numbering 100
arquebuses and fascines to advance into the suburbs for
2
their protection.
The sources leave no doubt as to the reasons why these
bourgeois were ready to fight and why they were unwilling to
assent to a garrison* The royal soldiers were systematically
SlHSAV, Vol. VI, Magistrat to Noircarmes, 2 December 1566,

pp. 2?8-281.
2 . . .
MHSAV, Vol. VI, Deliberation extraordinaire of the Conseil
Particulier, 3 December 1 5 6 6 , pp. 295 -2 9 6 .
confiscating and pillaging property outside the walls, and
the bourgeois expected no mercy if troops were permitted in
side the walls, On 3 December the magistrates formally remon-
strated to Noircarmes that his soldiers were pillaging mer
chandise and flocks of sheep belonging to Valenciennes citi-
' zens. Lists of the confiscated flocks and their owners were
submitted} for example, they noted that 2 ^0 sheep belonging
to Jehan Herreng and Jehan le Roy, ?8 from the flock cf
Franchois Voisin, 120 from that of Jehan Plichart, and so
on,.had been taken. The total number of confiscated sheep,
from both Calvinists and Catholics, came to- 1,8^1 head.'*’ A
subsequent letter from the magistrates cited the pillaging
of wine and herrings from the wagons of Nicolas Courart and
Pierre Wicart, besides shipments of saye cloths owned by
Jehan Turbier. The letter went on to state that the city
was unwilling to accept a garrison without assurances. They
claimed that they had fought against Noircarmes* troops
because of
1*effect audict Sainct-Amand, comme sembla-
belment en ce que pluisieurs soldatz, puis peu
de jours, auroient mengiez.. et pilliez tant es
faulxbourgs de ceste ville etâu villages pro
chains, qui scevent avoir este aux presches,
meismes les aulcuns enmenez avecq leur biens
et signamment grand nombre de blancques bes-
tiai.lle, que pluisieurs noz bourgeois avoient
en aulcuns villaiges et aux champs, soubz
umbre qu'ilz alloient ausdicts presches, meis-
mement herrengs et aultres leurs merchandises
et biens de grande importance. • , 2
^MHSAV, Vol. VI, Magistrat to the Smissaires, 3 December 1566,

pp. 318 -3 2 0 .
2 MHSAV, Vol. VIc Magistrat to the regent, 6 December 1566 ,
pp. 321 -3 2 7 .
363.
On 4- December 1566 the regent sent a letter to the
magistrates in which she justified the use of force against
the city. The Accord, she wrote, only allowed, for “simple
preaching" and not the practice of other ceremonies such as
baptism, marriage, and the Lord's Supper. Nor did the Accord
allow for the establishment of consistories or the presence
of seditious foreign ministers. Valenciennes had broken the
main clause of the Accord by allowing preaching to take place
inside the city after the Accord was decreed. Moreover, the
Accord had never allowed the iconoclasm and the seizure of
the parish churches which took place in Valenciennes after
the 23rd of August; these were crimes which had to be punished
under the placcards. This was the first time that the govern
ment had presented a complete interpretation of the Accord,
and it had come after the blockade and the beginning of
hostilities.1
• The government finally declared on 1^ December that
the city was rebellious. The Catholic echevinale families,
the bourgeois merchants and artisans, the mannants. and the
forains were all declared rebels against the king along with
the Calvinists; no distinctions were made between political
or religious groups. The government treated Valenciennes
as a corporate entity whose inhabitants were all guilty be- .
cause of their toleration of Calvinists. ;In the declaration
of rebellion the regent explicify cited the failure of the '
^MHSAVg Vol. VI, Regent to the Magistrat. ^ December 1566,

pp. 297-300.
36b.
Calvinists to meet with Noircarmes on 20 November. She also

cited the pernicious celebration of the Lord's Supper which,
whe said, encouraged French Huguenots to attack the frontier
city.^ Calvinism was obviously feared by the regent as a
French phenomenon; its rituals were seen as dangerous for
reasons of state. The presence of a French Calvinist minister,
La Grange, was described as "dishonest" and "seditious". The
declaration of rebellion went on to state that in order to
uphold the rl aca rds and the Accord the government had tried
to introduce a garrison but this was refused even though as
surances had been givenTy Noircarmes against oppressions.
It was claimed that the bourgeois of Valenciennes sortied
out, and, without any reason, "pillaged" and "sacked" the
soldiers of the King who were stationed around the city.
Given these actions on the part of the city, besides its
"frivolous and impertinent" allegations against the royal
forces, Valenciennes was thenceforth declared rebel and an
"enemy of the Netherlands" to be stripped of all its privi-
2
leges and property.
2. Organization inside Valenciennes during the siege

After the declaration of rebellion on lb December, there
was a further disintegration of the normal patterns of
■Âctually, the Lord's Supper was never celebrated before the

declaration of rebellion; the ministers had intended to have
a communion on the 26th of November, but had postponed it
given the hostility of the regent. It was finally celebrated
while the city was under siege on 5 January 1 5 6 7 .
2
A copy of the declaration is printed in L.A. Van I/angeraad,
Guido de 3rav; Zi.in leven en werken {Zierikzee, 1884-),
pp. XCIII-XCVI.
authority inside Valenciennes. The merchants* roles as
military leaders became of primary importance and.the func
tions of the echevins became almost non-existent. Many
Echevinale families chose to leave Valenciennes after the
declaration of rebellion to save their personal property
and reputations by throwing themselves on the mercy of the
hing. Most Echevinale families were intermarried with.,
regional nobility and had the contacts,— and many the wealth—
for taking up a new life elsewhere. Others undoubtedly knew
that their basic interests lay with the favor of the Prince
by whom they had held offices in Valenciennes for genera
tions. They knew that after the reduction of Valenciennes
there would be a need for magistrates who had shown loyalty
to the crown. Nine of the thirteen magistrates of 1566-1567
fled to royalist garrison towns after the declaration of
rebellion. They were the prevot. Jean Rasoir, the Catholic
echevins, Anthoine Le Pdvre,^ Claude de le Hove, and Jean
de le Croix, besides the lesser known Jacques Le Simon,
Jacques Henne, Jean Molin, and Claude des Campos.
The remaining four echevins made up a rump Magistrat
which met as an integral part of the Conseil Particulier
throughout the siege. Of these four one belonged to a power
ful echevinale family, Nicolas de la Fontaine dit Wicart,
and the three others were from lesser known bourgeois fami
lies, namely Nicolas Vivien, Jean Le Francq, and Jean Turbier.
1Anthoine Le Poivre, Seigneur de Rozel, attempted to punish

heretics even in the fall cf 1566.
366,
Vivien and Wicart were at least Calvinist sympathizers but

nothing is known of the relgious affiliations of Le Francq
and Turbier.^ Among those who legally sat in the Conseil
Particulier were the treasurer, Vincent Resteau, a Calvinist
consistory member and a save merchant, NoelLe- Boucq, the
Valenciennes royal artillery officer whose merchant family
was deeply involved in Calvinist activities, and Pierre Con-
rart, a merchant and the maitre des oeuvres of Valenciennes,
The most powerful and wealthy man customarily on the Conseil
Particulier was Michel Herlin the Elder, the wine merchant,
who had greeted Charles in 15^9 at the head of a troop of
bourgeois cavalry and had served on the Conseil Particulier
as a commissioner of the General Aumosne and as one of the
three captains of the bourgeois companies established in
1565 on the departure of the royal garrison.
During the siege in the first months of 15^7 the rump

Magistrat. along with these basic members of the Conseil
Particulier me;t in what came to be called the Conseil Extra
ordinaire. This was the rump Magistrat and the Conseil Par
ticulier in extraordinary or permanent session. After the
siege, the Calvinist merchants were to claim that all the
measures taken in Valenciennes had come from the legal
authority.of the Magistrat, or what was left of it. Herlin
carried this legalistic allusion so far that he even claimed
^Wicart*s wife attended many of the presches in June and

July while Vivien's three daughters appeared at De Bres'
first sermon in July. See BCHE’ .v. Series I, Vol. Ill (1887),
pp. 1 6 3 , 1 6 5 , 1 6 7 , 180, and 182.
367.
•that he had only been following orders from the Magistrat in

his official capacities as captain of a bourgeois company, and
a maitre des oeuvres. But the documents of Valenciennes during
the siege indicate that the directives and executive orders
all came from the merchant dominated Conseil Extraordinaire
and not the Magistrat which in effect had ceased to exist
Under this Counseil Extraordinaire# and a few unwieldy ses
sions of the little used Grand Conseil which was called to
obtain the consent of the mass of the bourgeois. measures
were taken to assure the city’s social and military inte
grity from November 1566 to late March 1 5 6 7 •
Perhaps the most important problems were those of un
employment and the provisioning of Valenciennes. When the
blockade was set up in November and the siege began in Decem
ber# all trade with the city halted. Inside the cloth in
dustries ceased production as wool was not available to the
workshops. Since June and July there had been periodic
work stoppages caused by the religious activities and the
closing of the gates during the crises, but now virtually
all employment ended. Not only did the resident journeymen
and master weavers of the cloth industries feel the effects of
blockade, but so did all the semi-independent artisans; the
cobblers, tailors, and shopkeepers. Some way had to be
found to occupy these people and to feed them. The municipal
The predominance of the Conseil Extraordinaire and the

merchants over the beseiged city has been discussed by
C# Paillard# Notes et eclaircissen-eirts. pp. 15^-157*
368.
stores of grain were insufficient, and at an early date in

the blockade it was realized that the city's ability to hold
out depended upon obtaining the necessary, provisions, by re
quisition. Many of the seigneurs and more wealthy merchants
had grain stored in their townhouses which would assure their
needs, but the greatest danger to the city, as both magis
trates and merchants well knew, was starvation among the
lower levels of the population. The merchants of the Conseil
Extraordinaire and the consistory successfully prevented any
bread riots during the siege by instituting the system of
public works and requisitions frequently utilized by 16th
century towns in similar situations.
The main provisions to help the unemployed came in
meetings on the 6th and 17th of December 1566, the 24th
and 28th of February, and the 10th of March, 1567. Each
provision renewed the system of public works which employed
the ablebodied on the city's fortifications. As we have
seen, the same measure was utilized during the scarcity of
grain in the years 1553 and 1565 -1 5 6 6 , and therefore was a
normal municipal response to the problem of a starving popu
lation. Money for the work on fortifications was taken
from the municipal treasury. The usual notation appeared
in the book of the massards justifying the expenditure by
citing the potential threat of riot from poor elements of
the population if they could not eat. The notation also
indicates the prevalent moral view that idleness had to be
avoided by forcing the poor to earn livings so they could
buy food on the market*
369.
Auaicts Thomas Despretz et Pierre Conrart, cora-

missaires ausdicts ouvraiges de la ville. Pour
deniers par eulx employer esdicts ouvraiges ex-
traordinaires mis sus pour le solaigement des
pauvres mannants de ceste ville. Adfin de'leur
donner moyen de gaigner leur^vye et 6viter'oy-
sivete, crair.dant tumulte, sedition et grant
desordre apparavant,suyvant I'ordonnances des
consaulx particuliers tenus les VIe et XVII
de decembre et le XXIIIie de febvrier XVcLXVI
(old time), comme aussy du grand conseil tenu
le dernier dudict mois de Febrier et encorres
dudict grand conseil tenu le Xe de mars dudict
an XVcLCVI • . • la somme de Vllm IIIc Livres
Tournois.^
These hottiers were paid by the 38 year old merchant drapier.
Pierre Conrart, the regular commissioner of works of Valen
ciennes and his treasurer Thomas Despretz, a member of a
minor £chevinale family. Supervision of works was overseen
by the maTtres des oeuvres, the hotelier Jehan Mahieu, and
the merchants, Bertrand Gruel, Michel Herlin, and Francois

O
Voisin. The sum of 7,300 livres tournois was enough to pay
for 4-00 fortifications workers for three months. But a con
siderable amount of money for the hottiers came from the sale
of requisitioned grain, and there were probably some 1,500
workers employed altogether.^
Other measures dealing with the problems of the poor
were taken in the meetings of the Conseil Extraordinaire of
the 17th, 23rd, and 24-th of December, 1566, It was decided
^•ACV. Series CC, Comptes des Massards, 1566-1567, fo. 24-9.

2See the confessions of Pierre Conrart: AGB; Conseil des
Troubles, Vol. 104, ff. 19-25* At various times during the
siege other men served as supervisors of works including the
ex-preVot, Jean de Lattre, the grossier Nicolas Bassee, the
massard Nicolas Vivien, and the 6chevi.nale scholar Pierre de
la Fontaine dit Wicart.
^Paillard, Notes et eolaircissements. p. 128.
to raise by a mandatory tax on the bourgeois the sum of 80
livres -sournois per week in order to supplement the funds of
the General Aumosns. During the siege the General Auiaosne
was controlled by the Conseil Extraordiivsire in order to
provide for the poor of both religions; the municipal dole
was probably serving an expanded number of persons given the
fact that all industry had stopped inside the city* This
mandatory welfare tax on the citizens was indeed innovative
in Valenciennes as contributions to charity were customarily
voluntary. Yet, it must be seen as a response to the exi
gencies of the siege, and as such, it represented the same
kind of temporary measures taken by other beseiged cities of
the time.^
During the early months of 1567 the Conseil Extraor
dinaire directed the captains of the bourgeois forces to
systematically requisition grain in order to obtain the
food resources necessary to provision the city. On the 15 th
of January it was decided to requisition grain from the coun
tryside and to expropriate all grain stores of private in
dividuals in the city.
A este conclud et avise de denommer et com-
mectre ceulx cy apre.s pour de rechy fairs
visitation et retrouve par les maisons, boulen-
giers, cambiers (brasseurs) et aultrss, que
aussy prendre regard et entendre ace qu*il
poelt avoir es granges, eglisss et aultres 1 ".
lieux, eomme sur les basteurs, et cue le grain
. que journellement l'on y bat soit recoeill.ie
xPaillard, Notes et eclaircissemetvts, pp. 136-137.
et mis en certain lieux et grenier-s seure-
ment que, pour par eulx, en furnir.,la halle
et estre '.vendu et distribue.
Grain from the stores of farms, villages, religious insti
tutions and seigneurles of the vicinity of Valenciennes
were seized and notes of credit given in exchange, Each
owner of requisitioned grain was promised recompense from
the municipal treasury. The recompense was to be the grain*
market price minus a fee for carting the grain to the
Valenciennes market for sale, A deliberation of 25 January
1567 shews that the intention of the Conseil Extraordinaire
was to avoid the charge of stealing by reimbursing the

abbeys and farms from which the grain came. The Conseil-
found it
expedient (pour moins yrfiter- la'court) de
lever deniers et les prendre sur le vendaige
que on faict des bledz et grain venant des
censses et viens d'abbays. • . que pour cy-
apresles remboursser par ceste ville,2
After the seizure of the grain, it was brought from
the countryside to Valenciennes by paid wagoners-; who were
sometimes helped by soldiers and groups of hottiers, When
it reached the city it was brought to a centralized depot
in the Halle aux Bleds in order to be sold at a fixed price
to the populace,-^ The grain was sold under the supervision
^Paillard, Notes et eclaircissements, Deliberation of the

Conseil Extraordinaire, 15 January 15&7, P* 139*
2Paillard, Notes et eclaircissements, Deliberation of the *
Conseil Extraordinaire, 25 January 15&7, p, 143.
^See the testimony of Gilles du Bois, a mason, and Pierre
Abraham, a comber, who v;orked as hottiers, and who carted
grain along with the paid wagoners AGR, Conseil des trou
bles, Vol. 104, ff, 76-77.
372.
of a special committee consisting of Pierre Conrart, and

the Calvinist merchants Francois Sauimon and Jean Pattoul,
At no time in the siege did the money economy break down*
Faced with increased poverty as the siege continued, various
ways of raising funds for subsidization of the poor were sug
gested and discarded* One was the idea of coining the gold
from relics brought to the city hall for safe keeping during
the iconoclasm, but it was rejected as dangerous to the repu
tation of the city even as an emergency measure. The idea
of floating municipal rentes was discarded because of the
lack of available investment capital. Finally, it was de
cided to utilize the money collected at the Halle aux Bleds
which would regularly have been saved for the repayment of
the owners of requisitioned grain. In this way some 300
livres tournois per week could be used to pay the hottiers.
Thus, money obtained from the sale of requisitioned grain
went to subsidize the poor and then again reached the Halle
as the hottiers utilized it to buy food.^
The second great problem facing Valenciennes was that
of defense. As we have seen, bourgeois forces were sent
out to protect the suburbs, and cannons were stationed on
the ramparts even before the declaration of rebellion. By
9 December when reports were received of the convergence of
royal troops and siege machinery in the garrison towns, the
Conseil Extraordinaire made further military provisions.
^•AGR, Conseil des Troubles, Vol. 104, Confession of Pierre

Conrart, fo« 55*
373.
In order to facilitate the firing of artillery from th9 walls
of the town, and to deprive the royal troops of cover, the
buildings and trees in the suburbs were destroyed between
the 9th and l^th of December. Included in these destruc
tions were the empty Carthusian monastery and the suburban
parish church of St. Yaast-la-haut. Cannons were set up to
fire at points where the government's siege machinery and
trenches would be dug, and work on fortifications was ini
tiated.
The bourgeois companies v/hich had been cashiered by
Noircarmes during the abortive meeting of November 20th had
never really ceased to exist although the Conseil Particulier,
in its negotiations with Noircarmes, had said so. During
the seige they doubled in number as bourgeois volunteers
joined in the defense of the city. The names and number of
bourgeois in each company are indicated in their rolls for
the period of the siege.'1' The company of Michel Herlin had
grown from the regulation 100 men to a total of 212, The
other companies were originally led by Catholics, but after
the companies were formally cashiered by Noircarmes in Novem
ber, they were taken over by the "notable and rich bourgeois”
of Calvinist leanings, namely Jean de Lattre the Younger and
Jehan Pottier. Their companies numbered 210 and 169 respec
tively. Added to these companies of bourgeois foot totaling
ÂGR, Conseil des.Troubles, Vol. 104, fo. 92. Some of the

names on this list also appear in spy reports as those who
attended the -presches of June and July 15 6 6 , but most seem
to be little known artisan bourgeois.
37$.
591 men were three troops of bourgeois cavalry of undetermined

number led by Michel Herlin the Younger, Jehan Herreng, a
save merchant, and Jehan Rogier, a notable bourgeois. These
cavalry troops acted as a strike force against royal posi
tions and were in charge of blockade running and requisitioning
grain from the farms, monasteries and granaries of the coun
tryside.
Able-bodied unemployed who were not enrolled as hottiers
were utilized as soldiers to supplement the bourgeois forces.
The initiative for the establishment of this unprecedented
force came frcm the wealthy wine merchant Jacques Gellee,
a consistory member. His plan called for three companies
of soldiers who would be paid by private contributions the
sum of two oatards a day. The utilization of persons of
mannant and fsrain status customarily not allowed to carry
arms was truly innovative. It was .thought, however, that
the armed non-citizens would pose no great threat to the
bourgeois because they were to be armed only with hallebardes
and pikes. The consistory presented this proposal to the
Conseil Extraordinaire in a deliberation of 15 December 1566:
A este assemble et communique bon et grand^
nombre d^ bourgoies auxquelz a este propose et
remonstre , . . pour entendre avec les cones-
tables a mectre et ranger sou'oz dixaniers,
cinquanteniers tout hommes tant maryez que
a maryer non estans soubs enseignes ny aultre-
roent polliciez.
AGR, Actes concernant Valenciennes, Deliberation of the

Conseil Extraordinaire, 15 December 1566. The other organ
izers of the soldats a deux oatrrds were men from minor
£chevinale families, namely Claude Vivien and Simon Despretz.
Also there were the merchants Claude martin, Nicolas Thoillier,
and Pierre du Cornet.
375*
The proposal was accepted, and we have lists of the contri
butors to this force called the soldats a deux -patards.^
there, are 87 bourgeois names on the list, including most of
the notable Calvinists like Jacques Joffroy, Jehan de Lattre,
Allard Bar, Pierre de la Rue, Jehan le Josne, Rolland LeBoucq,
Nicolas Bassee, Francois Voisin, Pierre Conrart, and Jacques
Gellee. From the echevinale families who remained in the
city contributions were made by members of the Viviens,
Gruels, and L'Aousts, and de la Fontaines dit Wicart. These

87 merchants, wealthy masters, and property owners seem to
have made up the Calvinist segment of Valenciennes wealthy
citizens. The names of the most notable echevinale families
were missing as there were no Le Poivres, Desmasieres, Rasoirs,
or Greberts on the list; these Catholic echevinale families
had probably already left Valenciennes.
Although we know that the soldats a deux pataids numbered
somewhere around 600, we only have a sample of 3° names of
2
the soldats taken from execution records and confessions.
Of this sample of 30, occupations were found for 22 of them;

nine of these were from the cloth industries, and 13 were
from general artisan ranks. The sample is so small that to
ÂGR, Conseil des Troubles, Vol. 10*+, following the lists of

the bourgeois companies, fo. 92. The collectors of monies for
these particular lists were Jacques Gellee and Jehan Tisart.
Later the bourgeois captains of the soldats If deux ratards
would each have lists and collect money for their^ own com
panies as related in the confession of Claude Vivien, fo. 55*
^P. Beuzart, La repression, passimi AGR. Conseil des Troubles,
Vol. 10*+, The former contains records of those executed, and
the latter contains confession records.
generalize on it would be very risky, but it seems to indicate
that the ranks of these pikemen were mostly filled by artisans,
including skilled trades such as locksmiths, masons, and car
penters, besides soapmakers and dressmakers. During the
siege the mass of the independent artisans were poverty-stricken
and with the prolongation of the blockade all artisan ranks
including the very skilled found the regular market for their
labor dry up. The largest occupational group, but not the
majority in total number, were the workers from the save
industries; weavers and combers who were already the poorest
segments of the population were the largest single groups
in the sample.
The governments confession records taken in 15^7 show
us that many joined the soldats si deux patards not for any
religious purpose, but simply to feed themselves or their
families. For example, the 34- year old stone mason, Guil
laume Baccon» a native mannant of Valenciennes, said that he
. • . avoit este soldart "a deux patards environ
cincq sepmaines seayant fait, casser a la chan
deliers parce qu'il avoit trouve de la besoigne
de son stil, et ce que avroit este souldart,
avroit est£ povre il ne avoir moyen de gaigner
sa vie. . .
Or there is the testimony of the 44 year old Martin Pcllart,
a comber of save wool, who said that he joined the soldats
during the siege because he had six small children who needed
to be fed. Because of his large family he was given 6 patards
ÂGR, Conseil des Troubles, Vol. 104, fo, 3.
permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

377.
per day for serving as a pike soldier.1 Another soldat a

deux natards, Jacques Leseur fought "to support his family,
having five children." The occupational sample does not
indicate political status, but there could have been many
poor bourgeois among the soldats; it seems reasonable to as
sume •that the poorer bourgeois did not have the savings to
fight without wages in the bourgeois companies.^ The sample
seems to indicate that there were no peasants in the ranks
of the soldats a deux natanfe. There probably were not many*
as the Conseil Extraordinaire had all foreigners and non
residents screened in an attempt to alleviate the burden of
h
so great a number of mouths to feed.
The three companies of soldats a deux oatardswere put
under the command of three notable bourgeois of Calvinist
persuasion: Jehan Mahieu was a hotelier of the "cherf-marche"
and one of the maitre des oeuvres of the city, while Georges
le Blond and Pierre Mustelier were both "notable and rich
bourgeois". After the death of Mustelier, the bourgeois
Phillippes Le Febvre took over his company. The middle
1AGR, Conseil des Troubles, Vol. 10^, ff. 8-9.

ÂGR, Conseil des Troubles, Vol. lOh, fo. 35*
^The eyewitness Henry D'Outreman ascribes the soldats a deux
patards to an attempt to alleviate the poverty of the besieged
bourgeois, but perhaps his assertion is a result of the di
luted meaning- of the term bourgeois in the early 17th century
when his memoirs were edited and published. By that time the
bourgeois citizen had lost most of his privileges and rights
making the status indistinguishable from that of a mere inhabi
tant.
^Paillard, Notes et eclaircissements, p. 130. The delibera
tion of the Conseil of 2:* December called for the investiga
tion and singling out refugees and strangers to determine
their quality; some 3«ere allowed to stay and others were
escorted to the .gates of the city.
378
leadership of the soldats it deux tatards. i.e. the sergeants

like the shoemaker Jehan de la Haye, were also of bourgeois
rank. The chief activity of the soldats et deux •patards was
to sally forth from the gates of Valenciennes as the pike
auxiliaries1 to the bourgeois cavalry led by Michel Herlin
the Younger.
The soldats a deux -pa-farrig were later described in the
manuscript of the two Catholic tax collectors as rabble made
up of murderers and other criminals who had been given asylum
by the city. Ignoring the organized requisitions under bour
geois leadership, the Laleux-Goyemans manuscript describes
the activities of the soldats a deux -patards as "sacking".
It seems to follow the popular conception at the time that
the iconoclasts of the abbeys in August were one and the
same as the "sackers" in the winter months during the siege.2
This conception has been accepted as late as the 19th century
by the Catholic historian Carlier.^ The Protestant historian
Rahlenbeck also follows the chronicle accounts by portraying
În all the confessions there were no examples of a solaat ^

deux oatards having more than a pike or hallebard* see the con
fessions of Herlin de Werchin, Jehan Leseau and Jehan le
Clercq. They served as pikemen, guarding the flanks of the
bourgeois arcquebusiers, according to the military tactic of
the era. ACR. Conseil des Troubles, Vol. 104-, ff. 34— 35.
and 7 6 .
2
LeBoucq, Histoire des troubles, pp. 20-23.
■Ê. Carlier, Valenciennes et Le Roi d'Ssoagne. pp. 5-9.
See also the editor Alex Henne's comments on the tout nuds
in Pontus Payen. p. 327. Henne is mistaken when he attri
butes the '‘sacking" and burning of the abbey of the Chartreux
to the soldats k deux oatardst the leveling of the abbey was
supervised by bourgeois forces from the 9th to the 14-th of
December 1566 while the soldats a deux t>a~ards were not or
ganized until the 15th and 16thof December.
379 .
them "pillaging" the environs of Valenciennes and burning the
abbeys of Fontenelles and St. Saulve without any mention of
requisitions or bourgeois leadership.^ These errors were
were followed by the interpretation of the Marxist historian
Kutner, who accepted the stories of pillage and sack# but
attributed them to the social misery of oppressed "prole
tarians" of the cloth industries. •
The soldats a deux ratards were in reality unemployed
artisan-workers who were forced to hire out their labor to
the merchant elite in order to keep themselves and their
families from starving. That they were from the poorer
occupational groups and reduced to poverty is indisputable.
They were given the nickname "naked ones" or tout nuds
probably because of their ragged and poverty-stricken ap
pearance. This nickname first appears in the confession
records of the government officials taken after the siege,
but its originators are unknown. In official documents
of the Conseil Extraordinare they were referred to as sol
dats a deux ratards, indicating that the Calvinist merchants
in their official capacity did not call them tout nuds.
Perhaps they appeared as a poor rabble to both the Calvinist
merchants and the Catholic forces, and the term was used by
both sides during the siege. On the other hand, one can
argue that the term tout _nuds was perhaps solely a Catholic
epithet; the phrase had been used metaphorically in passion
^■Rahlenbeck, Les chanteries a Valenciennes, p. 1^5.
-plays to describe the legions of the devil. Perhaps it
was used by the more well clad Catholic soldiers in Noir-
carraes' array in a double sense designating both poverty and
heresy. The royal forces had the chance to observe the
poverty of the pikemen when they routed.the bourgeois
cavalry at the village of Prouvy and slaughtered 80 soldats
a deux patards. .
In any case, the tout nuds requisitioned grain at the
direction of the Conseil Extraordinaire and did not steal
it. Even if many were from the ranks of exploited workers
in the cloth industries, it is doubtful they could conceive
of their group or proletarian interests; they were not
allowed to act in their own behalf but rather they were
organized on a disciplined military basis and led by the
same merchants who controlled the Conseil Extraordinaire and
the consistory. As the ill-armed pike auxiliaries of the
bourgeois forces or as the carters of requisitioned grain,
they had a subservient role and little power during the
defense of Valenciennes.
3. The reduction of Valenciennes

The merchants who controlled the city during the
siege persisted in proclaiming their innocence of the
charges of rebellion and sedition. They disclaimed that
they had started the hostilities or had any intention of
disloyalty to their sovereign prince. Valenciennes' posi
tion was presented in Guy De Bres' remonstrance presented
permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

322 .
381.
on 10 January 15$? to the Order of the Golden Fleece.

The remonstrance asked for aid in convincing the govern
ment to retract the declaration of rebellion and in seeking
a normalization of relations on the basis of the Accord of
23-25 August; The document systematically rebutted the'
reasons given by the government for the declaration of re
bellion 1 It contended that from August to November Noir-
carroes had not appeared in Valenciennes to enforce the Ac
cord. The Accord had legitimized the free exercise of
religion as the presches had always contained marriages,
baptisms, and the Lord's Supper. As for the government
accusation that the ministers had illegally continued to
preach in the parish churches, this was done, the remonstrance
claimed, because the government had not normalized the situa
tion; the Calvinists had been ready to leave the churches
and to preach outside the city if the government had only
indicated the places and given assurances that they would
not be attacked by royal troops.
As for the government contention that Valenciennes had
taken up arms against the king, the remonstrance claimed
.that the bourgeois had only fired upon soldiers of the king
because they had been pillaging the suburbs and confiscating
property. Troops had not been allowed in the city because
of St. Amand where the royal forces had burned, stolen,
and raped their way through the town:
^Printed in full in L.A. Van Langeraad, Guido de Bray. Zi.in

leven en werken (188m-, Zierikseej, pp. XCVII-CVIII.
382.
Or sur ceste difficulte et dilation rece-

voir la gendarmerie dedans la ville, mon
sieur de Ndrcarmes a tant fait, que d'assem
bler gens pour venir ruiner ceste ville et
le pays d'alentour: Si. pour executer par
violence et force la desolation paravant
conceve et arrestee, il les a amenez a St.
Amand et lieurs circonvoisins, afin de nous
fermer tous passages, et ainsi nous tenir^,
assiegez. Si ses gens ont pille, fourrage,
et saccage les povres fideles, jusqu'au
a arracher les chausses des jambes des
petits enfanst S'ils ont fait des insol
ences et outrages monstrueus jusques a
forcer femmes et filles, et les vendre apres
au son du tabourin, et br'usler a petit feu
un povre homme deplaye, non pour autre
cause, qu'en haine et despit de la Reli
gion: S'ils ont rompu 1'exercise de la
Religion ou il estoit establi, suivant 1'ac
cord de son Altesse avec les Seigneurs con-
federez: S'ils sont venus aus faulxbourgs
pour les piller, afin d'affamer la ville:
S'ils ont commence a tuer et massacrer ceus
qui ne les cerchoyent point, est-ce chose
estrange, contre nature et raison, que se
voyans ceux de la ville menacez et environ-
nez de tels dangers, estar.s assaillis de
si pre, astans si mortelement poursuivis,
ils se sont mis en defence pour se garen-
tir de telles violences. Et si en se de-
fendant, ils ont tuC quelaues soldats de
Monsieur de Noircarmes, il faut plus tost
imputer la faute a ceux qui sont venus
ainsi outrageusement les assailler, qu'aux
autres se defendans le plus modestement
qu'il leur est possible.1
For De Bres, the attacks against the troops of Noircarmes,
of which Valenciennes was accused, were justified acts of
self-defense.
The remonstrance continued that in spite of the violence
initiated by the royal forces, the consistory and the Cal
vinists still held obedience to their natural prince as a
^Van Langeraad, p. XCVIX.
high principle; for them it was not a matter of expedience
hut of conscience. The witnesses to their services, they
stated, could vouch for the fact that not a word was spoken
in their sermons against either their king or their magis
trates, but that, on the contrary, they daily preached the
rendering of obedience, love, honor, and reverence to kings
and other secular authorities. A listener at their sermons
could here that they preached the rendering good for evil.
It was true that the ministers preached that the Word of God
was sacred and was to be held in the conscience of the indi
vidual irregardless of the commands of the magistrate, but
it was also true that the ministers exhorted the flock to
render all political considerations to the superior authority
of the prince,— not because of fear of punishment, but as a
matter of conscience. In fact, the remonstrance claimed, the
Calvinists humbly and with “innocence and affection” held
themselves loyal and obedient to their king.
The remonstrance went on to say that Valenciennes
could not understand the stated reason why the government
wished to introduce a new garrison. It contested the notion
that Valenciennes was vulnerable to French attack by stating
that the bourgeois forces were capable of handling any in
cursion from that quarter. Moreover, the troops utilized
by Noircarmes to besiege Valenciennes had been taken from
frontier outposts leaving them open to French attack. One ‘
could only conclude that it was not because of the French
that a garrison was asked to be put into the city, but,
384.
given the actions of Noircarmes* troops at St. Amand, it

•was the desire to massacre the Calvinists. For Valenciennes,
the government desire to impose a garrison on the city had
brought back the memory of the cessation of trade and more
than 50»000 florins extorted from the city during the last
ganison, besides the memory of violences against their
women and girls.'*'
This remonstrance written by De Bres exhibits the poli
tical beliefs which prevailed among Calvinists until after
the St. Bartholomew massacre of 1572» i,e, the reformed
church should render obedience to secular magistrates in
political matters. For the merchants and bourgeois under
siege, these claims made a great deal of sense as a policy to
follow if the îng and regent were to be convinced to retract
the declaration of rebellion. The Valenciennes merchants
and bourgeois had never, after all, wanted to do away with
royal authority. They had only wanted to protect their own
privileges and rights against the encroachments of the in
quisition, which they saw as innovative, foreign, and arising
out of the mistaken advice of royal ministers. In fact, the
particularistic privileges of Valenciennes were necessarily
\
based on a political legalism, that of the charters and

coutumes. It would have been impossible to obtain help from
a foreign prince without negating the whole body of charters
granted by the sovereign over centuries. This adherence to
■*"Van Langeraad, p. XCVIII.
CV.L
U-
385.
legality, as we have concluded before, was an integral

part of the l6th century urban mentality«
The merchants who controlled Valenciennes during the
siege in fact rejected help offered by the French Huguenots.
The liason with the Huguenot leader, Conde,vas promoted by
the French minister La Grange and the ex-echevin Jean de
Lattre; both these men had little to gain by adhering to
the legalistic theory of De Bres and the consistory. La
Grange was a proscribed Frenchman, and De Lattre was, as a .
member of the 1562-1563 Magistrate banned from office for
showing leniency towards heretics. After the commencement
of hostilities in December, Jehan de Lattre made contact
with Conde, who sent one of his trusted servantss the seig
neur de Bouchavannes, totte\viciriL{y* of Valenciennes to talk
at length withthe merchant leadership. Conde*s man stayed
for a time in Valenciennes and then moved outside the block
aded area to Bouchain from where he communicated with the
consistory by runners during the months of January and
February.
Interrogations -of prisoners after the siege show that
Bouchavannes retreated into France when it became evident
that the consistory and the merchants were not interested in
accepting French assistance. It was reported, even by
Catholic witnesses, that the minister Guy De Bres had suc
cessfully argued against the appeal to foreign troops; the
consistory over-ruled the pro-French party and* opted for a
strict aherence to the traditional legalistic position of
386 .
loyalty to the natural prince. The merchants undoubtedly
saw the effect of an alliance with the French as potentially
disasterous as it might even have united the nobility and
the government in a new round of the Hapsburg-Valois wars?
and Valenciennes would have been considered a rebel city
even by her noble allies.^ The Calvinist merchants were
also encouraged to adhere to their legalistic stance by
contacts with the indigenous nobility '.Since the meeting of
St, Trond the Calvinist churches had pledges of support from
the Confederates, and the merchants* undoubtedly asked why
they should rely on the French and risk a charge of treason,
when Brederode and Louis of Nassau ware prepared to render
aid. Were Hornes and Orange not using their influence to
see that the declaration of rebellion was retracted?
In late December two prominent members of the Valen
ciennes consistory went to Antwerp to determine what help
would be offered by Orange, his brother Nassau, and the Con
federates. These bourgeois merchants-, Jacques Gellee and
Antoine Morrenart, stayed in Antwerp throughout the siege and
passed on information concerning the intentions of both the
nobility and the government. During the months of January,
February, and March 156 ?, they sent optimistic reports stating
that-the greater nobility, particularly Orange, were ready
to intervene with the king and regent in Valenciennes'
^■C. Paillard, "Relations entre Louis de Bourbon, Prince de

Conde et les insurges.des ?ays~3as» 1506 -156 ?", BSHPF,
Vol. 2? (18?3), pp. 130 -1 3 8 ,
387.
behalf. A letter of 13 January 156? told of the journey of

Nassau to Germany in order to raise troops and of Brederode's
plans to raise a force in the Netherlands,— all for the lifting
of the siege of Valenciennes if the negotations with the
government failed.^
The next month Gellee and Morrenart sent word of
Brederode*s promise to maintain the Calvinists in the free
exercise of their religion if sufficient armed forces could
be raised. The reformed churches, according to Brederode's
plan, had to furnish the money to pay for troops? the emmis-
saries reported that many urban consistories had been willing
to contribute to such a force at a meeting at Breda on the
*tth of February. The meeting took place in the residence
of Orange which was full of noble Confederates discussing
the Valenciennes situation. The Confederates decided to send
another request to the Regent asking that all the troops
2
gathered for the reduction of Valenciennes be dispersed.
This information was relayed from the meeting by the Hainaut
Confederates de Villers and de Wingle to Morrenart and Gellee.
At Valenciennes the consistory was encouraged further
by Gilies Le Clercq who came to Valenciennes just before the
closing of the blockade in late February. Le Clercq reported
favorably on the effort of Brederode and asked for a contribu
^-Charles Paillard, ed., "Interrogatoires politiaues de Guy

de Bray; documents inedits et originaux" BSHPF, Vol. XXVIII
(Paris, 1879)* p. 60.
2Paillard, "Interrogatoirespolitiques de Guy de Bray*',
pp. 60-6l.
368.
tion for the troops being raised. Later, letters from Morre
nart and Gellee related that Hornes had told Gellee personally
that if Valenciennes could hold out three weeks after the
closing of the blockade by royal troops there would be enough
time to find a favorable solution to their problems. Ac
cording to De Bres, this gave the Conseil Extraordinaire,
the consistory, and the Valenciennes bourgeois false hopes
that they would be saved at the eleventh hour by the inter
vention of the greater nobility.'1’
Meanwhile, the government simply ignored the remonstrance
of Valenciennes and rejected the arguments it contained. For
the king and regent the harboring of heretics was a rebellious
act in itself as the sovereign was seen as responsible for
the souls of his subjects. Protestations of loyalty meant
nothing when the king’s right of lese-majesty divine, mani
fested in the placards and inquisition, was rejected; for
the government, the privileges of Valenciennes, legal or not,
were an obstruction to the enforcement of royal prerogatives
2
and the execution of religious responsibilities.
The government increasingly realized the importance
of Valenciennes* subjugation; the example of the city's de
feat would help, it was thought, to show that the government
was determined to eradicate heresy. Among noble and merchant
■bPaillard, "Interrogatoires politiques de Guy de Bray”,

pp. 62 -6 5 .
2 s
Paillard, Notes et eclaircissements. pp. 110-114.
389.
circles in the Netherlands and abroad, the efforts of

Valenciennes to defend itself had become the center of at
tention and a cause cel^bre. The government knew it had to
defeat this symbol of heresy and particularism to discourage
a further disintegration of its authority. If the stronghold
of Valenciennes was reduced it would appear as a great victory
for both the king and the Catholic Church, What better way
was there to cow the Calvinist movement as a whole than to
attack and defeat one of its strongpoints? The letters of
both the regent and the king duirng the blockade and siege
of Valenciennes leave no doubt that they both considered the
success of Valenciennes* exemplary punishment crucial to
the Catholic cause in the Low Countries.1 As the chronicler
Pontus Payen pointed out after the royal armies had surrounded
the city in 1566,
Madame la Duchesse, forcant son nature, ^
trouva convenable d*use d'une telle severite
allendroit des Valencenois pour servir d'ex
ample aux aultres villes rebelles qui aur-
oient la hardiesse d'attendre l'armee Royale
et de endurer le canon* en quoi elle ne fut
deceue de son opinion, car nul n'osa depuis
lever les testes ni desobeir a ses comman-
demens.
The determination of the government was strengthened
by military victories over Flemish heretics in late Decem
ber. The government inquisition at Valenciennes later
•^•Correspondance francaise de Marguerite de Parma. Vol. I,

pp. 225-228, 262-264' 2^4-345, and 353.
^Pontus Payen. Vol. I, p. 328,
390.
reported that the decision to send levies from Flanders to

the aid of Valenciennes was taken by a council of Flemish
ministers meeting at Neuf-Bglise in late December.1 At the
end of the month peasant-workers in Flanders started to as
semble and to organize into companies; the Count of Flanders,
Egmont, reported to the regent that levies of Calvinists were
being raised from all sides. The inquisitorial commissioners
of the chatellainie of Lille reported that in the rural nays
d'Alleu several hundred peasant-workers had armed to aid
Valenciennes,J Meanwhile, rumors began to circulate which
grossly exagerated the numbers of these men; for example,
Morrillon reported to Granvelle that
Dans la Basse-Flandre les affairs sont en
tres grand desordre, et l'on craint que ce
ne sont la guerr^ des rustiques d'Allemagne,
car ils sont armes qu'il ne s'en faut rien,
et ont leurs bandes et compagnies en order
pour se^rassembler en un jour LM or LXM
hommes.
In actuality two peasant-worker armies^ totaling a little
over ^,000 men advanced into the area between the Lys and the
Scheldt to the east of Lille. The largest troop numbering
^Besoigne. pp. 131-132.

2
Corresoondance francaise de Marguerite de Parma. Vol. I,
p7 2 2 9 , 5
•^Quoted in Beuzart, La Repression a Valenciennes, p. ^9.

il
Corresoondance de Granvelle. Vol. II, Morrillon to Gran-
velle, 27 October 15^6, p. 6 3 .
^For the formation of the armies, see W. Brulez, "De opstand
van het industriegebied in 1566" Ar.ciens -pays et assemblies
d"Stats (Louvain,'1952), Vol. IV, ppT'78-100.
391.
3,000 men camped at the small town of Lanncy on the night
of 27 December.
That night Noircarmes led eight companies of infantry
and five of cavalry from the Valenciennes blockade and
marched for a surprise attack at dawn on the 28th. He crossed
a marsh on the flank of the Calvinists and then charged into
the encampment. The Calvinists fought well but were finally,
routed. Of the original 3»00° Flemings, all were tracked
down and slaughtered by Noircarmes* cavalry except some 300
who escaped after discarding their arms. On the 29th of
December the smaller troop of Flemings were surprised by the
governor of Lille, Rassenghien, while camped at V/attrelos,
a village about ten kilometers to the northwest of Tournai,
At the head of a troop of four to five hundred regular sol
diers, Rassenghien massacred the Calvinists in a cemetary
and burned others alive inside a church where they had put
up a stout defense. The victories of Lannoy and V/attrelos
were celebrated in the Catholic capitals of Europe where
the Eegent, king, and the pope reportedly rejoiced at the .
1
news.
In early March 15&7 Morrenart and Gellee sent word
from Antv/erp that according to Orange important decisions
■**For the chronicle accounts of the battles, see J.F. Le

Petit, Grange chronioue. Vol. II, p. 131i Correspondence de
Granvelle, ..Vol. II, pp. 187-189? Pontus Payen, Vol. I, pp.
278-285; Memoires de Pasquier de la Barre, Vol. II, p. 16; .
Coussmaker, Troubles religieux dans la Plandre maritime,
Vol. IV, pp. 19-21; and Strada- Kistoire de la Guerre des
Pays-Bas, Livre IV, p. 1 56 . For the effects in the Catholic
circles, see Corresooncance de Granvelle, Vol. II, p. 233,
and Correspondancs "francaisede Marguerite de Parma. Vol. I,
pp. 252-253.
.
392
were being reached in the Council of State, When the long
awaited assistance from the greater nobility in the Council
of State finally materialized in mid-March, it was a great
disappointment to the merchants and bourgeois of Valenciennes,
The regent, dealing from a position of strength, had permit
ted the grands Seigneurs to convince her to allow a compro
mise solution to the Valenciennes situation, but one that
would, in effect, enable the government to succeed in its
aim of subjugating Valenciennes.
At a meeting on the 14th of March outside the blockaded
city, the Catholic nobles Egmont and Arschot explained the
government terms to emissaries from the Conseil Extraordi
naire : Valenciennes had to immediately open its gates to
Noircarmes' army and a new royal inquisition. For this
capitulation the government was willing to grant a pardon
from its declaration of rebellion, and to allow the Calvi
nists to retire from the lands of the king with their movable
property within 1^ days from the time of the entry of the
troops. Both Egmont and Arschot explained that these were
the best terms they could arrange under the circumstances.
Moreover, the Valenciennes emissaries were told that Orange
himself supported the. compromise,^
What can be said of.Orange’s actions in this period?
What stopped him from coming to the defense of Valenciennes
and raising the standard of armed opposition as he was to do.
^-Paillard, "Interrogatoires politiques de Guy de Bray,”

pp. 64-66.
393.
a few years later? Why did he support the compromise which
was so unfavorable to Valenciennes? To a great extent, he
was trapped between his desire to act as a loyal mediator
in the crisis and other desires to support the Confederates
led' by his brother Louis of Nassau. The two desires were
not in themselves contradictory, as he could still appear es
the loyal supporter of the government while covertly helping
to organize the Confederates? pressure from the lesser no.-
bility in defense of the Calvinists allowed him a controlling
position as mediator. Nevertheless, Orange saw his position
crumbling when he could not convince the upper nobility in
the Council of State to offer concerted opposition to the
regent and her policy of repression, and when Nassau could
not raise the funds necessary for a military stand against
the government forces. He was perhaps aware that the govern
ment was already collecting proof of his clandestine en- •
couragement of the Confederates and the Calvinists through
interrogations. Orange tried to arrange a suitable compro
mise for Valenciennes in the Council of State but the govern
ment’s hard line forced him to support the proposals decided
upon by Egmont, Arschot, and the regent. During the negotia
tions of Egmont and Arschot and Valenciennes, Orange sent
word through Morrenart and Gellee that the city should not
count on him an longer, and he counseled the city to arrange
the best terms possible on tho basis of the compromise pro- •
posal.'*' A short time after this Orange himself fled the
^Paillard, "Interrogatoires politiques de Guy de Bray", p. 6 5 .
Netherlands and sought refuge with his Lutheran relatives
in Germany.
When the merchant-bourgeois received the letters from
Gellee and Morrenart telling of Orange's advice to accept'
the terms offered by Egmont and Arschot, there was an ex
plosion of despair and confusion at Valenciennes where hopes
had long rested on the intervention of Orange. The letters,
elicited an outburst of disillusioned hatred on the part of
De Bres. The interrogation of the eyewitness Jean Cateau, the
refugee minister from St. Amand, tells of the great expecta
tions which De Bres and the consistory had for aid from Orange,
and of De Bres' rage when it was realized that Orange had de
serted them. De Bres called Orange an evil man and accused
him of abusing the people of Valenciennes; he wrathfully asked .
God to punish the prince some day. De Bres contended that
Orange had caused the ruin of Valenciennes by his unfulfilled
promises*
Guy et aultres quils avoient grande espoir

de secours sur la personne du prince d*Orange,
conte de Hornes, conte Ludovic et aultres avec
lequel prince journellement traictoient en
chaire plusieurs ministres et signamment Taf-
.fin, ayant le ccnfessant aussi en bonne me-
moire qui ledict Guy, apres que 1'on auroit
receu nouvelles qu'il n'yâuroit pas de se
cours, s'auroit, en sa presence, grandement
doller desdits seigneurs qui les auroient
trompe et trahy, se plaignant signamment en
grande aygreur dudict prince d*Orange, I'ap-
pelant meschant, malheureux qui les avoit
abbuse et que Dieu le punira- quelque jour,
pour ce qu'il les avoit sy long temps en-
tretenu en folle esperance de secours, et
qu'il n'y en avoit point, estant partant
cause de la ruine de ladicte ville, leurs
ayant mis le hart au col, proferant,encores
plusieurs autres semblables propos.
IPaillard, "Prcces de Jean Cateau; documents inedits et origi-

naux", BSHPPe Vol. XXVIII (1879), pp. 3^7-351.
tb ' ' -
395.
Another Calvinist agent of Valenciennes at. Antwerp, the
merchant Warghin, accused Orange of deceiving and betraying
the city; he claimed that Nassau would not come to the city's
aid without his brother's consent.^
In spite of his rage at Orange, De Bres took the let
ters from Antwerp and read them on the 16th of March before
an emergency session of the Grand Conseil which was called
to consider the compromise terms. At first the rank and
file bourgeois-citizens would not believe the letters. They
so firmly believed in what they thought was Orange's inten
tion to save them that they called the letters forged or
misled. Nevertheless, on the basis of the letters, and in
spite of their anger at Orange, De Bres and the consistory
advocated acceptance of the compromise arrangement as there
was no other recourse. However, La Grange and De Lattre
argued that the terms as they stood were unacceptable. Was
the city again to be put under the yoke of an oppressive
armed force which would permit the systematic punishment of
its bourgeois:in disregard of their privileges? All who
wanted to escape the inquisition would have to banish
themselves from their homes, their livings, their heritage,
and their friends. La Grange proclaimed that it was better
to die on the ramparts than to give in to such demands.
Besides, was not Brederode now raising troops to come to
their aid?
Such arguments played on the fears and hopes of the
^Faillard, "Interrogatoires politiques de Guy de Bray", p. 66.
n* •
396.
rank and file bourgeois in this session of the little used

Grand Conseil. Speakers also voiced fears that even if the
terms were accepted, the garrison would not.be controlled*
It was feared they would close the gates, and there would
be a general massacre. The experience of St. Amand and their
own experience with royal garrisons in 1 5 6 2-1 56 5 had evidently
impressed the population of Valenciennes so that they were
unable to overcome their fears of royal troops. As a chroni
cler at Tournai remarked,
lesquels n'ont autre chose en la bouche
sinon raourir sur les remparts plutot que
de se rendre obeissants d'autant qu'ils
disent que aussi bien apr£s avoir accepte
garrison 1' on les fera mourir l'lin aPr^s
1.'autre.1
La Grange's view prevailed to the extent that counterpro
posals were drawn up asking for safe-passage before the entry
of troops for all those who wanted to emigrate. This reply
was in itself a compromise between the moderate positions of
De Bres, the consistory, and most of the merchants on the
Conseil Extraordinaire as opposed to the more intransigent
2
replies of La Grange, De Lattre, and their supporters.
The government, however, took this reply as a negative
ansY/er to the terms offered by Egmont and Arschot. Although
negotiations continued there was no agreement reached. The
regent was in no mood to make further concessions as her
êmpires de Pasauier de la Barre, Vol. II, p. 138.

^Paillard, "Interrogatoires politiques de Guy de Bray",
p. 66.
ft*
.
397
hand had been strengthened by the defeat of a group of Cal
vinist Confederates at Austrueel on. the 13th of March. The
Calvinist ConfederateJean de Marnix, seigneur de Toulouse,
had gathered a group of 3,000 Calvinist volunteers at Aus-
truweel on the banks of the Scheldt, not far from Antwerp.
His intention had been to wait for the reinforcements of
Brederode before attempting to lift the siege of: Valenciennes.
On the 13th of March Philippe de Lannoy, Seigneur de Beau
voir and captain of the regent's guard, marched against
Marnix with only 800 well-trained veterans of the Hapsburg-
Valois wars. Lannoy achieved a total surprise on the first
assault on the rebel camp; he scattered the Calvinist force
to neighboring farmhouses where they were burned out and
slaughtered in a. repeat of the royal victory at Wattrelos.
Marnix was killed, and his body was reportedly mutilated by
the opposing troops.

Militarily, Valenciennes' capacity to continue resis
tance vas lessening. Noircarmes had amassed one of the largest
forces since the end of the Hapsburg-Valois wars: His mili
tary strategy and needs had been debated on the 20th of
December at.Brussels in the Council of State by the regent,
Noircarmes, Arschot, Egmont, Mansfeld, and Berlaymont. It
was decided that a month of blockade and hunger would put the
city on its knees. This would be followed with a bombard
ment of about eight days duration, ending in an assault on
the walls.1 In order to assure success against any eventuality,
"For the military history of the siege, see W. Bruslez, ”Het

beleg van Valenciennes in 1506 -1567 ” Het Leger-De Natie
398 ..
including French attack, Noircarmes asked for hO companies
of foot and six or seven companies of cavalry with 26 cannons
with crews. He did not obtain all'.these troops, but he re
ceived some 800 cavalry in the bandes d*ordonnance of Arshot,
de Roeux, de Berghes, de Boussu, de Montigny, de Treslon,
and de Bommy, His foot consisted of some 2,200 men* six
companies of 150 men came from the garrisons of Landrecies,
Avesnes, Mariembourg, Quesnoy, Philippesville, and Chateau
Cambresis* Five other companies were captained by the seig
neurs d*Inchy, de Berneraicourt, du Bignicourt, de Preux, and
de Rongy. Three regiments of foot which were nominally cap-
tahed by de Berlaymont, de Mansfeld and de Roeux were also
present along with the troops raised in Flanders by the
Baron de Rassenghien, the governor of Lille. This army
totaled over 3»100 men opposed to Valenciennes' force of
around 1,200 men, many of whom were ill-armed with pikes
and spears. Noircarmes' council at Conae consisted of the
count of 3oussu, the siege expert, La Cressoniere, and the
seigneurs, de Goignies, de Brart, de Robles, and d'Angilla.
Since the beginning of March Noircarmes had begun to
advance trenches towards the walls. By the 19th of March
just after the abortive mission of Egmont and Arshot, he
advanced his cannons and trenches close enough to start
bombardment. On the 20th of March after constant bombard
ment, Noircarmes ordered an initial charge by Manseld's men
between the Cardon gate and the Notre Dame gate. On the
(Brussels, 1951)» PP» 382-385, hl8-^22, and h60-463; and

D'Oultreman, Histoire, pp. 208-209,.
399 .
night of the same day, Noircarmes over-ran a forward defen
sive trench in the suburb of Montoise, All attacks on the
walls themselves were beaten back by the stout resistance
of the bourgeois firing cannon and :arquebuses. Noircarmes
was delayed in the assaults on the walls by sorties of
Valenciennes' bourgeois cavalry which disrupted the peasant
crews digging the royal trenches and fortifications. But
on the 21st and 22nd Noircarmes trained his constant artil
lery barrage on the weak spots of the Montoise gate and the
northeast section of the city. The tower of St. Nicolas, a
strong point on which Valenciennes defenders had cannons,
was demolished and the bombardment went on for 30 hours
without cease during the day and night of the 22nd and 23 rd;
in that period a reported 3,000 cannon bals rained on walls
and buildings while fires consumed sections of the city.
On the morning of the 23rd Valenciennes knew the end
was near as sections of the wall were breached. During that
morning as the battle raged around the Montoise gate, the
Valenciennes women and children crowded in the streets and
chanted psalms as the beffroy's bells tolled. When all hope
was lost, it was noted that the carillon was ringing the notes
of the 22nd psalm put into verse by Clement Maroti
Mon Dieu, mon Dieu, pourquoi m'as-tu^laisse,
Loin de secours d'ennui tant oppresse,
Et loin du cri que je t'ai address^
En ma complainte.
At noon the military leaders conceded to their men that
capitulation had become inevitable. Resistance ceased and
the Calvinist merchants, the consistory, and ministers
kco,
prepared for escape or found places to hide. The:depleted

and exhausted bourgeois and soldats st deux patards sought
refuge in cellars and houses. As Noircarmes' army rode into
the city in triumph, elderly men, women, and children lined
the streets holding green branches in their hands as a sign
of supplication; their voices begged the troops of Noircarmes
for mercy and deliverance from sack. Surprisingly, their
wishes were granted this time as there was no massacre or
general pillage.
Summation and aftermath of the siege

Valenciennes became the focus of a government repres
sion because developments there appeared more dangerous than
those elsewhere. The government regarded the iconoclasm
by the lower layers of society in the rural areas as less of
a threat to its authority than the actions of the Valenci
ennes Calvinists. Marguerite of Parma understood that the
takeover of the parish churches and the resolve to celebrate
the Lord's Supper could not go unpunished. They were not
only a direct threat to the institutions of the Catholic
Church and the sanctity of the mass, but they were also a
threat to the authority of the king as set forth in the
placards. She was influenced to attack Valenciennes by
consideration of state, too; fear of a French Huguenot at
tack on the southern provinces was increased by Valenciennes'
^D'Oultreman, Histoire. pp. 209-217.
401.
adherence tc what was considered a French, and therefore a

seditious'heresy.
The government seems to have had no intention of hon-
• oring the Accord from the beginning. The Accord was for
the regent only a means to calm the Netherlands until the
military advantage could be regained. In any case the
regent seems to have been little disposed to grant the pro- •
visions of the Accord to Valenciennes, as the city had tried
to use the document to justify both its seizure of the
parish churches and its resolve to celebrate the Lord's
Supper. The government delayed in normalizing relations
after the ultimatum in late October, and royal troop move
ments indicated that by early November the regent was pre
paring for a test of strength with the heretical forces
at Valenciennes. Government methods traditionally used
in the 16 th century to enforce authority seemed to have
precluded any other solution than that of exemplary punish
ment. After Valenciennes had been singled out, the exigencies
of power dictated that, the government had to proceed to the
subjugation of the city. Although unsuccessful, the Egmont-
Arshot proposals were given a chance to work by the regent
because they would have allowed the government to obtain a
cheap and safe subjugation of the city by an unopposed re
establishment of a royal garrison within the walls.
On the Valenciennes side, we see an alliance of forces,-
not all of whom were Calvinist. The Ca3.vinist merchants
who had taken control from the echevinale families were .
402.
encouraged not to give into government demands by the count

of Hornes and indirectly by the prince of Orange. The mer
chants desired to obtain the kind of protection afforded
other cities by the grand seigneurs. The Calvinists of
Valenciennes claimed that they were allowed to preach in
side the parish churches as they had done so before the ac
ceptance of the Accord. They held to the view that the term
presche meant more than mere preaching9 and that the freedom
to hold presches granted by the Accord allowed them to cele
brate the Lord’s Supper.
Given the inquisition^ long history of persecutions
of the Calvinist community in Valenciennes, it was no wonder
that the Calvinists there took a hard line after the icono-
clasm since they appeared to have the widespread support of
the nobility for the free exercise of religion. Similarly,
it is not surprising that the rank and file bourgeois re
sisted Noircarmes* demand to open the gates to another gar
rison since their last experience with troops had led to
political and economic subjugation. Valencienneshad gone
beyond the actions of the other cities like Tournai by seizing
the parish churches, why should they have given up these
gains without obtaining at least the same kind of normaliza
tion that was occuring at other cities? In the meantime,
they exhibited the traditional strategems of urban particu
larism by playing for time and trying to squeeze as much
legal justification as possible out of the Accord.
After the declaration of rebellion and the attack by-
royal forces, Valenciennes was forced to defend itself. As
military leaders, .the merchants took control of the city
from the majority of functionless ichevins. The merchants
were then forced by the exigencies of the siege to establish
•the Conseil Extraordinaire, the hottiers, the tax to subsi
dize the General Aumosne. and the soldats a deux patards.
Yet, these institutions were not particularly new or inno
vative. The merchants had always held power of law enforce
ment in their roles of militia leaders in the Conseil Par-
ticulier; the Conseil Extraordinaire was merely a council
made up of the old Conseil Particulier and the cooperative
echevins in permanent session. The hottiers had been used
before in periods of unemployment, and the tax on the bour
geois for the General Aumosne had a precedent in a similar
tax for the Hotel Dieu during the plague years in the 1550's
Finally, although it was traditional for only the bourgeois
to be armed, the arming of the mannants and forains with
pikes was not a great break with the past as the bourgeois
still retained power by monopolizing firearms and swords.
Moreover, the soldats a deux petards were organized on a mili
tary basis and leadership and discipline were supplied by
the bourgeois merchants and artisans. In short, inside the
city the wealthy merchants and the middle ranks of society,
the bourgeois, were able to control the lower population
through efficient charity and military measures.
bok.
Throughout the siege the merchant-Calvinist leadership
remained constant to a legalistic position taken up in both
the Compromis des Nobles and in the doctrines of Calvin.
They always proclaimed their loyalty to their natural prince
and rejected foreign intervention in the city's behalf. They
relied upon the indigenous nobility of the Netherlands to
protect them and to convince the king of their innocence of
rebellion. However, the nobility and the Valenciennes mer
chants lost the advantage militarily and allowed the regent
to reassert the old politico-religious principles evident in
the placcards and the inquisition. The Accord was disallowed
and the heretics were again declared illegal rebels. With
royal military predominance assured the protestations of
loyalty to the sovereign were simply ignored by both the. king
and regent.
The government was correct in predicting the psychologi
cal effects of Valenciennes' defeat on the Calvinist movement,
— at least in the sort run. After the celebrated reduction of
Valenciennes all the cities which had contested the govern
ment's desires to put in garrisons capitulated. Notably,
Maastricht, Ghent, Hasselt, and Bois-le-Duc gave in, and Bois-
le-Duc was abandonned by the Calvinists as Noircarmes ap
proached with its garrison. The more compromised Confederates
and merchants fled into Germany, and the Netherlands were
quiet for two years before the resumption of hostilities.
For Valenciennes the reduction inaugurated a period
of central government control from which the particularism
of the city would not be able to fully recover. A week after
the reduction, on 4- April 15^7, the regent proclaimed that
Valenciennes had thenceforth forfeited all civil.and criminal
jurisdictions to the royal officer, the Drevot-le-comt e .
All municipal institutions, including the rentes and taxes,
the Aumosne General, and the hospitals were put into the hands
of royal officials. All bourgeois political, judicial, eco
nomic, and social rights and privileges were seized by the
central government in 15^7 • A new inquisitional commission
was established; it consisted of Noircarmes, la Hamaide, a
new orevot-le-corote, Jehan de Brunes, procureur-genera1 of
Flanders, Clair Hembault, the colonel of the new garrison,
Jehan de le Val, and Anthone de Brun, both counsellors at
Mons, and Sampson Villain, orocureur du Rov at Valenciennes,
Under the regency of the duke of Alva in 1570, the Council of
Troubles proclaimed confiscation of the property of all
bourgeois excepting those not participating in the rebellion.^-
These losses of privilege and property were small com
pared to the physical trials brought on the city by the inqui
sition and garrison* Most of the members of both the con
sistory and the Conseil Extraordinaire were rounded up; ar
rests started almost immediately after the reduction of the
city as soldiers closed the gates in order to trap the Cal
vinists. A ✓makeshift prison camp was set up to hold the
2
hundreds of captured heretics. Arrests were followed by
^■J.F. Le Petit, Grand Chronicue. Vol. II, p. 131, and Me-

moires of Marc Van Vaernewyck, Vol. I, pp. 415-^19.
^Memoires de Pascuier de la 3arre, Vol. II, pp. 83 and 2 6 9 .
406 .
interrogations and torture, and then by a series of execu
tions which were monotonous in their regularity during the
succeeding two years. First 67 leaders of the rebellion,
mostly bourgeois and notable Calvinists, were executed over
.a period of time ending in December 15&8. Among them were
Michel Herlin, Guy De Bres, Perigrin de la Grange, and Jehan
Mahieu. At the end of 1568 Alva's counsellor Hessele asiced
for the execution of all remaining prisoners even if they
could only be identified as going to Calvinist sermons.^-
In January 15&9 there were a series of mass executions
taking an additional 57 lives of men of mannant status. During
January 1569 rumors spread throughout Valenciennes that Alva's
council would make further arrests and executions. An exodus
started as some 400 families fled the city, scattering to
2
France, Germany, and the provinces to the north.
Further disaster came to Valenciennes in 1570 when the
unpaid German and Spanish garrison troops put Valenciennes
to sack in an action similar to the so-called "Spanish Fury"
at Antwerp. Then on 23 May 1572 another calamity befell the
city as a few 1566 rebels with a troop of French Huguenots
led by the Kainaut Confederate de Pamars returned to Valen
ciennes, These ghosts of the past yelled "Long live the
Beggersi" and "Orange! Orange!" before a populace cowed
■^Poullet, Correspondance de Granvelle, Morillon to Granvelle,

January 15&9, p. 445; and P. Beuzart, La Repression a Valen
ciennes apres les troubles religieux de 15^6, passimT
^Pcullet, Correspondence de Granvelle, Vol. IV, Morillon to
Granvelie, p, 46o.
407.
and decimated by the inquisition. In battles on the 28th

and 29th, the Spanish garrison, with reinforcements from Alva
under Juan de Mendoza, massacred the rebels along with the
non-combatants who got in the way. Many Valenciennes fami
lies died in fires set during the battle, and many more
drowned in themoats as they sought refuge from the flames.
The bodies of men, women, and children were seen floating
down the Scheldt river into which the moats ran. The garri
son again sacked, raped, and pillaged their way through Valen
ciennes on the night of the 2 9 th of May 1572 and continued
pillaging during the next few weeks. The Spanish forced
the inhabitants to buy back their stolen furniture and goods
and blackmailed many to unearth their secret caches of money
and stores. In spite of a government order to desist, the
sack lasted for 12 to 14 days into the second week of June
1.572, The Valenciennes inhabitants were reportedly denuded
of all their property while the city streets rung with cries
and lamentations.^
The departure from the Netherlands of Alva in 1573
augured well for Valenciennes as the Spanish garrison was
replaced in 1574 by troops raised in' the Netherlands, By
1576 Alva's 20,000 Spanish troops had so alienated the
Netherlands that the provinces united under the so-called
Pacification of Ghent to drive them out. The next year on
the tenth anniversary of Valenciennes' reduction, the new
governor of Valenciennes, the Count of Lalaing, took out
"4)JOutreman, Histoire. pp. 2 21 -2 2 3 .
4c8.
the garrison and allowed the city to destroy its barracks

and castle. During the campaigns against the French led by
Alenôn, and during the renewed hostilities with Orange to
the north, the city remained loyal to the king.
In 1577 the government allowed Valenciennes to regain
some of its urban institutions. The Magistrat with its cri
minal and civil jurisdictions was reestablished, although
there was an enlarged supervisory role for the orevot-le-
c o m t e . The echevins regained the right to decree the neces
sary laws regulating the guilds, the municipal police, and
the institutions of charity, but their decision were re
viewed closely by the royal official. The records of the
Magistral indicate that only Catholic echevinale families
were admitted to office after the repression. Chief among
them were those Echevinale families who had fled after the
declaration of rebellion in December 1566,ramely, the De la
Croix, the Le Poivres, and the Rasoirs. Also included in
the lists of the Echevins after the repression were the
names of non-resident strangers who were created bourgeois
citizens on the same day as'their appointment to office,—
an unheard of procedure earlier in the century. These non
residents included men like Adrien de Villers, the orevot
in 1577* and Jean de Ghoegnies, the seigneur d*Erquesnes,
the orevot in 1578. On the other hand, old and prestigious
echevinale families who had stayed in Valenciennes during
HlBV, ms. no. 739* Les magistrats de la ville de Valenciennes,

1302-1697.
409 •
the siege, like the de la Fontaine dit Wicarts,' seem to have

been res.tricte-d from holding office; the family had served
20 times in the century before 1566 and only t«vo times
afterward.
The Conseil Particulier and the Grand Conseil were not
allowed to convene during the rest of the 16th century. By
the coutume of 1611 and the decrees of provincial courts in .
l6l5» the authority of the councils ceased to exist. The
privileges of the bourgeois, specifically their rights to'
carry arms and to be exempt from confiscation and torture
also ceased to exist. Although the ceremonies of the muni
cipality continued to exhibit pride in the old coutumes,
they were nothing more than a proud heritage. The term
bourgeois became a mere honorary designation with no real
significance in terms of political status; the status of
bourgeois became indistinguishable from that of an inhabi
tant in the l?th century, and the ruling elite scorned it
by seeking patents of nobility.
These changes in the political institutions of Valen
ciennes reflected deeper social changes brought on by the
events of 1566-1604. Valenciennes' population had been de
pleted by perhaps one-half, and its industry had been ruined.
The cloth industries never recovered as there was a decline
from over 1 ,6 0 0 masters in the 1 5 5 0 's to less than 150 in
•*-For institutional changes as a result of the repression,

see L. Cellier, Une commune flamande; recherches sur les in
stitutions politiques de la vilie de Valenciennes, pp. 67.
97-93, and 121-122.
1610. 1 Commerce on the Scheldt never regained its pre-1 566
tempo, principally due to the blockade of the Scheldt es
tuary by the Northern Provinces and the ruin of the entrepot
of Antwerp, Instead of a prosperous industrial and trading
city, Valenciennes became a commercial backwater suffering
a permanent depression. The large and energetic merchant
community which had controlled the city's commerce, industry,
and institutions of charity and law enforcement had ceased
to exist.
If Valenciennes' Chambers of Rhetoric had been able
to express the merchant elite's independence of thought and
culture before the repression, the social life of the first
half of the 17 th century reflected the influence of centralized:
bureaucratic rule and enforced orthodoxy. During the Thirty
Years War any taint of heresy in one's past was enough for
social ostracism from Valenciennes' elite society. Families
like theLe Boucqs tried to erase traces of their family
crimes from the archives of the previous century. The in
tolerance of the magistrates is noted in the increased use
of torture to persecute social deviates; men and women who
did not act according to the norms were made to confess to
sorcery or heresy. It was thought that Satan had penetrated
the world under the works of Calvin and Luther and in the
persons of heretics and magicians, and that it was necessary
to exterminate these evil spirits. Such ideas arose under the
H'. Deschamps de Pas, "Enquete industrielle sur l'etat de

la manufacture des draps dans les Pays-Bas au commencement
du XVIIe siecle," Kemoires de I'Academie d*Arras. Vol. XXXV
(1863), p. 1 6 3 .
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission
411.
inquisition and were carried into the 17th century by the

Catholic magistrates. Witch hunts culminated in a score of
public burnings between the years 156 ? to 1 65 0 .^ In sum,
culture in Valenciennes had become standardized, and con
formity was forced upon the inhabitants of the city by in
direct and'direct means.
Th. Louise, De la Sorcellerie et de la Justice criminelle

a Valenciennes (XVIe-XVIT^ siecles) (Valenciennes. 186l)
pp. xit and 50 -&3 *
CONCLUSION
To what-extent has the study of Valenciennes shown

Pirenne's social and economic observations on the genesis
of the Revolt of the Netherlands to be true? To what ex
tent are the more extreme views of Kutner correct? Kow
much truth is there in the more political observations of
Motley and Geyl?
In answering these questions it is necessary to review
the indisputable facts which led Pirenne to state his notion
that it was industrialisation that "prepared the ground" for
the Reformation in the southern provinces, m e cannot ignore
the fact that it was in the textile producing areas in the
southern Netherlands that the preaching and iconoclasm
started and that it was there that the resistance to the
Catholic and royal forces was most apparent during the years
1566 -1 5 6 7 . It is also there that capitalism--for what it
was, given the limited markets and the undeveloped trans
portation networks of the 16th century— was most advanced
and where there was a strong merchant-industrial class and
the existence of large numbers of worker-artisans.
In the Valenciennes area we have found that the mer
chants and masters filled the positions in the Calvinist
consistory and led the Calvinist rank and file in activities
of chanting, preaching, and image-breaking; it v/as these
merchants and industrial masters who led and paid for the
military resistance to the crown during the seige of 1566 -
4 l3 .
1567. On the other hand, we have found that it was the large
mass of lower level peasant-workers of the textile industries
of Valenciennes who pillaged and looted the monasteries
around the city; it seems plausible to assume that the con
ditions of work in the industrial area and the subsistence
crises of 1565-1566 were among the chief factors promoting
these workers and peasants to pillage. Pillaging during
the iconoclastic activity seems to have occurred to a
greater extent in the industrialized areas than it did in
non-industrialized areas. The strength of the merchant
opposition seems to have been centered in the south also.
Thus, the observations of Pirenne remain essentially intact.
In spite of the basic validity of Pirenne's observa
tions, they need considerable refinement and qualification
if they are not to be distorted and overstated as has been
done by 3. Kutner. Kutner's contribution lies in his docu
mentation of the subsistence crises and the conditions of
work in the textile industries which made the lower classes
ready to loot and pillage. But Kutner's work obscures the
differences between Valenciennes' organization of the work
force and the organization in other areas like Hondschoote
and Ghent. His analysis tends to portray the industrial
areas as virtually homogeneous, and his blunt terminology
of entrepreneur-capitalists and proletarians leaves the
1
incorrect impression that capitalism was in an advanced
staee throughout the textile producing areas.
'O . •
m .
In actuality, a comparison of just a few of those areas

has indicated considerable differences both between urban
and.rural areas and between different urban areas. There
seem to be at least three different types of organization of
the work force which contained varied degrees of economic
protection and political privilege for textile workers.
In the unwalled and rural Hondschoote the guilds were con
trolled by entrepreneur-capitalists who utilized a putting
out system. In the walled city of Ghent the ancient worker
artisan guilds were politically strong and prevented putting
out systems and blocked innovation. Then there were the
politically weak but nevertheless well-regulated guilds of
Valenciennes which prevented a putting out system but accomo
dated innovation by switching production mainly to saye
cloth. These institutional differences in.the guild struc
tures of Hondschoote, Ghent, and Valenciennes influenced
not only their different economic development in the 16 th
century, but also the different behavior of their popula
tions during the period of crisis in the 1560’s.
V’e have also found that even a walled and privileged
city like Valenciennes has to be studied in relation to
its surrounding countryside from which many of its lower
level workers wore recruited. In the countryside around
Valenciennes there was the same kind of pillaging and loot
ing as there was in the rural industrial areas in Flanders,
but inside the walls of Valenciennes where security was
enforced by efficient criminal and charitable institutions
415.
there was no pillaging or looting during the iconoclasm.

The leadership of the Calvinists was different inside Valen
ciennes as compared to the rural Flemish areas. In the
rural areas the crowds were led by preachers who came from
the ranks of the worker-artisans themselves. In cities like
Valenciennes and Tournai the preachers and ministers came
from the ranks of the upper level artisans or the merchants
and many of these were Geneva-trained. In the countryside
around Valenciennes the targets of the iconoclastic crowds
were the rich monasteries of Marchiennes and St. Amand; the
iconoclastic movement gave the peasants and poor workers
the opportunity to loot and pillage. Inside the walls of
Valenciennes the targets were the parish churches; the aim
of the urban merchants and artisans was political and reli
gious— to gain hold over the city’s institutions of religion.
In such cities as Valenciennes there were considerable
restrictions on rapid expansion of industrial capitalism
in the 16th century. There were a variety of different
economic and political statuses which tended to fragment
and differentiate the work force. The hierarchy in the •
guilds and 1he hierarchy leading to citizenship did not
allow for a simple proletarian-entrepreneur relationship
to develop as there were too many intermediate levels of
privilege and vested interest. The guilds at Valenciennes
were very:complex; there were merchants among the ranks
of masters, privileged and skilled Hanse workers among
the journeymen, and the existence of valets in the appren
ticeship ranks. Such factors as better accessibility to
work and better expectations for advancement for the inter
mediate levels of the work force undoubtedly tended to ob
scure the class consciousness which is theoretically neces
sary for the existence of a proletarian class. The organi
zation of the labor forces indicates that there were other
factors at work besides the basic relationship of the
worker to the means of production.
The lack of proletarian consciousness at Valen
ciennes is reflected in the behavior of the workers during
the period of crisis. At best only the lowest level of the
work force, the peasant week-workers of the countryside
partook in pre-revolutionary actions, i.e. during the icono
clasm they looted and pillaged rural monasteries in response
to the subsistence crisis of 1 5 6 $-1 $ 6 6 but they had no
political aims in mind to better their economic and social
position. Kutner has erred in his assertion that the tout
nuds were a revolutionary force of proletarians and the
backbone of Valenciennes' defense during the siege of 1$6 6 -
1 5 6 7 . The tout nuds were indigenous artisans considerably
above the social level of the week-workers of the country
side; if any group was proletarian it was the latter and
not the former. Moreover, the tout nuds were the poorly
armed pike auxiliaries of the citizen militias. It was
the citizen militias who were the main fighting forces
during the defense of Valenciennes. It is clear that Kutner
is useful in explaining why the very lowest level of the
?.
41
work force was ready to revolt, but his description of events

has distorted the .significance of Valenciennes' actions in
1566. He never sufficiently explained why the middle
class wanted to revolt or why they allowed the proletarians
to be armed. Without a refinement of class distinctions and
without an investigation of the interests of various groups
ranginff from the week-workers to the high nobility, the
reason why Valenciennes was the center of Calvinist resis
tance in 1566-1567 cannot be understood.
The key to the success of Calvinism in Valenciennes
was the refusal of the forces of order to enforce the edicts
prohibiting heresy. In the 1 5 6 0 's the citizen militias and
the merchants who controlled them were not willing to fire
on rioters whose sole interest was the rescue of heretics
from burning, and they were not willing to arrest chanters
who offered no threat to their property and privileges.
Similarly, nobles like the marquis de Berghes were not
willing to oversee the execution of heretics even when
directly ordered to do so. The dissaffectioh among.-.the
rank and file of the militias and the insubordination of
magistrates and noble officials assured the success of the
preaching sessions and the iconoclasm in Valenciennes
during the summer of 1566 . The effectiveness of the muni
cipal forces of order depended on their willingness to
obey the royal edicts for with their monopoly of firearms
they could have handled a crowd considerably larger than
themselves. Without the breakdown of authority and the
418.
breakdown of the functions of the forces of order, it is

doubtful that the iconoclasm and preaching would have
spread into a tightly controlled city like Valenciennes.
Yet, this conclusion begs the question as to why it was
that merchants, citizens, and important layers of the
nobility were willing to stand passively by or even willing
to participate in heretical activities. The answer lies
in the fact that in the 1560 *s ties of economic interest
and political affiliation among the upper classes were stronger
than allegiance to the established order or to religious
orthodoxy.
The ties of economic interest and political affiliation
between the merchant-bourgeois of the cities like Valen
ciennes and a large segment of the nobility were caused by
both long standing institutional tensions and by economic
and political developments at mid-century. The main in
stitutional tensions for the merchants seem to have been
their exclusion from positions in the magistracy, their
exclusion from positions in ecclesiastical benefices, and
the system of municipal rentes which taxed their products
for the benefit of faineant rentiers and the king. The
study of Valenciennes institutions has shown that there
was a correlation between religious affiliation and group
interests which seems to indicate that the institutional
tensions were reflected in differing religious preferences.
On a higher level of society the main institutional tensions
of the nobility seem to have been their exclusion from the
419 .
central council of the government and the increasing ten
dency of the crown to rely on efficient bureaucratic jurists
as government administrators.
During the 1550‘s and 1560's evidence of economic
grievances of the merchants is found in their remonstrances
criticizing the increases in local taxes on their products;
these taxes resulted from the new bond sales which had
been necessitated by royal bankruptcy. These grievances
coincided with probable declines in the production of cloths
because of market gluts and English competition in the early
1550’s. Economically and politically the merchants of
Valenciennes were particularly affected by their "subjec
tion" by the inquisition and garrison during the years
1563 -1 5 6 5 ; the inquisition arbitrarily abrogated established
chartered rights of citizens,and the garrisons adversely

affected trade and industry by blocxades of the gates and
by depredations on the local merchants. For the'nobility
the end to the Hapsburg-Valois wars in 1559 resulted in a
decline in their political and economic status while govern
ment bankruptcies led to arrears in their pay. The cen
trally controlled inquisition threatened the authority
of the nobility both in their positions as provincial
governors and in their roles of military leaders; moreover,
the unpopularity of the government’s policy of religious
persecution with the merchants and the bourgeois of tbwns
like Valenciennes tended to undermine the authority of men
like Berghes who we re nominally in charge of the inquisition.
During the 1 5 6 0 's these tensions and underlying poli
tical and economic grievances became increasingly apparent
in the correspondence between the government, the urban
magistrates, and the noble officials. The letters indicate
that by 15^3 Calvinist merchants, Catholic echevins, and
Catholic nobles like Berghes were coalescing to rid Valen
ciennes of the inquisition and the garrison. The unpopu
larity of the inquisition in the Netherlands as a whole re
sulted In a Netherlands-wide opposition to the inquisition
in 15^6. The focus of discontent on the inquisition was
led by the lower nobility who took the initiative with the
publication of the Comoromis des Nobles in the spring of
1566. Such nobles as Marnix, Brederode, and Nassau set
an example of defiance to the royal will that merchants
and militiamen on the urban level were quick to follow.
The political coalition of nobility and the merchants in
towns like Antwerp, Tournai, and Valenciennes contained .
both Calvinists and Catholics; the Calvinists played a key
organizational role, but the opposition contained many who
were more interested in economic and political issues than
issues of doctrine. It was in the context of this wide
spread opposition that royal authority and enforcement of
the royal edicts on heresy broke down in the summer months.
As the events of 1566-1567 went on, there was a process
of polarization whereby religious affiliation became iden
tical with political party. Catholic nobles who had been
compromised by their lack of support for the inquisition
found themselves being investigated and prosecuted for
treason along with Calvinists. Similarly, when Valenciennes
was declared rebel by the government, all its inhabitants,
both Catholic and Calvinist, became liable for punishment,
and they found themselves united in the defense of the city
from the royal armies. Because the inquisition had become
the focus of economic and political discontent by its dis
regard for established procedures and chartered privileges,
many nobles and merchants found themselves .in alliance
with Calvinism in an effort to rid the Netherlands of the
inquisition; it was precisely because Valenciennes was
both a bastion of privilege and a Calvinist center that
her defense became a cause celebre during the winter of
1566-156?.
The central government was not strong enough to stop
the spread of the heretical activities in 15 6 6 . The 16th
century centralization of government, like l6 th century
capitalism, was far from being fully developed: The govern
ment had no standing army and had to rely on the bandes
d*ordonnances of the nobility and the militias of the
towns to enforce its edicts. Except in the central insti
tutions where men like Granvelle and Viglius predominated,
the crown had few professional bureaucrats; in the pro
vinces and towns the crown had to rely on the semi-profes
sional magistrate families and the nobility. The govern
ment had no system of centralized taxation and attempts
to institute such a system in the first half of the century
had failed. Thus, the government found itself thwarted
"by privileged towns like Valenciennes which had special
tax relationships, strong militia forces, and effective
leaders who used chartered privileges to block royal
authorits'. During 1566 the iconoclasm in Valenciennes
was seer, as more pernicious than the unorganized looting
in rural Flanders: The organized takeover of the parish
churches
■N.
in Valenciennes directly challenged royal preroga-
tives and the execution of the government's relgious re
sponsibilities. The principal reason why the government
singled out Valenciennes for punishment in the winter of
1566-1567 seems to have been the desire to show other
privileged towns that the government was determined to era

dicate heresy and to uphold its prerogatives.
In sum the observations of Pirenne, Coornaert, and
Kutner are important to indicate why the iconoclasm and
heresy spread among the workers of the industrial cities
of the southern Netherlands; yet their interpretations need
to be refined to show the limits of capitalist organiza
tion of labor and to distinguish more exactly the nature
of class interests. Pirenne*s ideas have to be balanced
by those of such historians as Motley and Geyl who stress
the effects of government centralization and the effects
of religious persecution; Motley and Geyl, however, do
not systematically investigate class interests on the
hicher levels of society and generally ignore the interests
of the very lowest levels altogether.
with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
This study does not attempt to interpret the meaning
of the Revolt of the Netherlands as a whole, Yet for Valen
ciennes at least the result was not a middle class revolu
tion even though the middle classes promoted her brief
encounter with revolt; the reduction of Valenciennes
spelled the virtual end to the city's independence, and
she never regained all the rights and privileges which
were enjoyed before 15 6 6 . In 17th century Valenciennes,
as in the whole recaptured southern Netherlands, there
was a period of relative economic depression compared
to the first half of the loth century. Titles of nobility
became popular, and the title of bourgeois lost its privi
leged meaning. If there was a so-called progressive middle
class revolution in the northern provinces, in the southern
provinces in towns like Valenciennes the result of the
revolt was more akin to a repression carried out by an
increasingly powerful and centralized government.
424 .
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Reference books
Bernier, T. Dictionnaire geogra-phiaue. historique. ar-
chvôlogique, biographique et bibliographicue
da Kair.aut. 2nd edition. Mons, 1891.
Brucher, M. Archives departementales da Nord; repertoire
numeriQue. 2 vols. Lille, 1921.
Caffiaux, M. "Notice sar les archives communales de
Valenciennes," Bulletin de la Commission da
Nord, Vol. XIV(18^9)» pp. 169-172.
Chotin, A. Etudes etymologicues et archeologioaes sur les
noTns des villes, bourgs, villages, hameaax.
fore'ts, lacs, rivieres et ruisseaux de la
•c.~vir.ce da Hainaat. Tournai, n.d.
J. Atlas des villes de la Belgique aa XVIe
DeDeventer, .
si^cle. Brussels, 1924.
Dehaisnes, A . and J. Finot, Inventaire sonmaire des archives
d^nartenantales anterieares & 179.0. Lille, 1872-
Bevillers, L . Inventaire analytiqu.e des archives des Etats

de Hainaat. Hens, 188A-I906.
Dinaux, A. "Note sur un auto-da-fe de 1578," ANFMB, Vol.
II, pp. 538-540.
Dollinger, P . and P. Wolff. Bibliographie d1histoire des .
villes de France. Paris, 1967.
Godefroy, F, Dictionnaire de l*ancienne lar.gae franâise
et de tous ses dialectes du IXe au XVe siecle.
9 vols. Paris, 1888.
Hecart, G. Dictionnaire rouchie-francais. Valenciennes,
Henault, M . Catalogue descriptif et raisonne des manuscrits

de la 3ibliothe*aue de Valenciennes.
. . Valenciennes,
Lacroix, A. Inventaire analytique et chronologiaue des

archives des chatnbres du clerge, de la noblesse
et du tiers etat du Hainaut. Mons, 1852.
Laenen, J. Les archives ce 1‘^-cat a Vier.ne, au -point de vue

de 1*histoire de Belgique. Brussels, 192a .
425.
LeGlay,. A. Histoire et description des archives generates

du Nord. Paris, 1843.
________________ "Memo ire sur les archives de l'abbaye de St.
Jean a Valenciennes.," RASAV, Vol. XIV, p. 343*
.• Memo ire sur les bibliotheques publiques et

'les principales bibliotheques particulieres du
departement du Nord. Lille, I84l,
.» Notice sur les principales bibliotheques
particulieres du departement du Nord. Lille,
1841.
Mangeart, J. Catalogue descriptif et raisonee des manuscrits

de la Bibliotheque de Valenciennes. Paris, 1886.
Molinier, M. Manuscrits de la Bibliotheque de Valenciennes.
Vol. XXV of Catalogues general des manuscrits
des bibliotheques de France. Paris, 1894.
Mols, R. Introduction a la demographie historique des
villes dcEurope du XIVe au XVIIIe siecle. 3 vols.
Louvain, 1954-195&".
Pirenne, H. Bibliographie de 1*histoire de Belgique. Brus
sels, 1931 .
Ruv/et, J. Les archives et bibliotheques de Vienne et
l'histoire de Belgique. Brussels, 1956.
Terlinden, C. Liste chronologicue des edits et ordonnances
des Pays-3as: Rdgne de Philippe II (1555-
1598). Brussels, 1912.
Vander Maelen, P. Dictionnaire gepgraphique de la province
de Kainaut. Brussels, 1833.
2. Primary sources; manuscripts

Brussels. Archives generates du Royaume.
Chambre des comptes.
16468-76 Aides de Hainaut. 1436-1564.
30705-52
Papiers d'Etat et de 1 'Audience; Conseil des troubles.
102-104 Cartulaires et mss. sur les troubles a la ville
309-315 de Valenciennes; documents divers; 1566 -15 72 ,
42 6 .
74? Recueil de documents relatifs a 1'accord et
1 ‘acceptation des aides et subsides par la
ville de Valenciennes. 1558-1576*
The Hague, Algemeen Ri.iksarchief.
Collectie Gerard
14 Pieces concernant les troubles des Pays-Bas,
1567-1572.
The Hague, Koninkli.ike Bibliotheek.
71-G-15 Histoire des choses les plus memorables qui
se sont passe en la ville et compte de
Valenciennes depuis le commencement des
troubles des Pais-Bas sous le regne de
Philippe II roi d'Espagne jusqu'st i'annee l62l.
Lille, Archives deoartementales du Nord.
Chambre des comptes; Series B.
1200, 12881- Comptes des assennes de Valenciennes. 1339-
:3044 1358, and 1459-1569.
3617, 3624, Comptes des biens confisques pour cause d'
7017, 12623, heresie dans la ville de Valenciennes. 1540-
12665-12669, 1572.
12696-12707,
12744-12746,
12794 and
12799.
12442-12509 Aides des Etats de Hainaut et la ville de
Valenciennes. I5 OO-1 5 6 9 .
19486 Recueil de documents sur le Hainaut. XlVe
au XVIIe siecles.
Valenciennes, Archives communales.
Series AA
93 Placcards. 1553-1566.
Series CC
.146-1 ' Arrest Vincent Resteau et Mtr Kicolle Vivien,,
massars de la ville de Valenciennes cornenchant
le viii jour du mois de septembre xvclxv esquelz
arrestz s'ont contenues et declarez oultre les
rentes heretiers et viagiers duez chacun an par
la ville est les payements aquitz (Jicelles.
1565-1566.
(no no.) Comptes des massards. 1537-1533* I55^-1555»
and 1565 -1566 .
Valenciennes. Manuscrits de la Bibliotheque municipale.
668 Manuscrit de 1*abbess de Fontenelles, Marie
LePoivre. 1566 -1 6 0 9 .
6 7 5 -6 7 6 Copie des privileges et franchises de Val
enciennes prise directement sur'les originaux
de I'Kotel de Ville.
6 7 7 -6 7 8 Copies des privileges, franchises, lettres,
missives, acts publics, etc., de la ville de
Valenciennes.
679 Recueil des pieces sur l'histoire de Valenciennes
689 Histoire particuliere des troubles advenues en
la ville de Valentiennes a cause des heresies,
depuis l'an xvclxi a l'an xvc et soixante dispoef
Tire hors de plusieurs eacrits a la main et me-
moires de plusieurs bourgeois de ceste ville,
signamment de feux Joachim Goyemans, et Jean
Lalous, tesmoings occulaires de ces guerres
civiles. 1606 .
690 Troubles de la ville de Valenciennes par les
huguenots. 1579-1585.
700-706 Bourgeois et choses communes. 15 ^6 -1567 *
732-733 Recueil des reglements, arrets et ordonnances
pour 1 'usage de messieurs du Magistrat de la
ville de Valenciennes. 1557-1569*
739-7^0 Magistrats de la ville de Valenciennes. 1302-1697
7^-1 Inventaire et denombrement general des titres
franchises, privileges, exemptions, immunitez,
dons, concessions, biens fonds, rentes, charges,
offices, droits d*octroys et d'impots et autres
biens et revenues appartenans a la ville de
Valenciennes, ses prerogatives tant en matiere
de jurisdiction qu'autrement, avec les proces,
sentences, arrets et transactions intervenues en
consequence centre les Etats de Haynaut, Conseil
Souverain de Mons, Baillaige de Tournay et- Tour-
naisis, et aultres. Xle-XVIIIe si^cles.
7^7 Brefs extracts des chartres d'aucuns stilz de la
ville de Valenciennes qui de pendant la Basse
Halle par Simon LeBoucq.
748 Ordonnances des metiers de Valenciennes.
777 Memoires des troubles des pays-bas commencant
apres la pacification"des troubles et guerres
du pays d’Allemagne. 1565 -1 5 8 5 .
808 Melanges genealogiques.
809-818 Casimir de Sars; livres de genealogies.
935-936 Recueil des-pieces relatives a Valenciennes.
Copie de la XVIIIe si£cle,
940 Coutumes de la ville, banlieu et chief-lieu
de Yalenciennes, decretee par 1'Empereur notre
sire en 1540.
3. Primary sources; printed

Beuzart, P., ed. "La Reforme dans le diocese d’Arras en 1555
d*apres un document inedit," BSHPF, Vol. LXXVI
(1 9 2 7 ), pp. 468-4?6.
"BesongC des commissaires du Ro^ a Valenciennes sur le faict
des troubles et rebellion," in P; 3euzart, La
Repression a Valenciennes apres les troubles
reiig'leux de 1566. Clamart, 1930. pp, 105-140.
Blaes, J., and A. Kenne, eds. Memoires sur les troubles des
Pays-Bas, 1565-1580. 5 vols. Brussels-Ghent,
1859-1865.
"Copies des sentences criminelles rendues par messieurs les
commissaires du roy notre sire en la ville de
Valenciennes," in L. Van Langeraad, Guido de
Bray: Zi.jn Leven en werken. Zierikzee, 1884. "
pp. LXXVII-LXXXII. ■
De Bres, G. Le Baston de la foy chrestienne.Lyons, 1555.
_____________ . Confession de Foy. 1 5 61 .
_____________. Oraison au Seigneur. 1564.
_____________. La Racine, source et fondementdesAnabaptistes.
Abel Clemence, 1565* ■
_____________. "Requeste de ceus de 1‘Sglise reformee de
Valenciennes a messeigneurs les chevaliers de'
1*Order du Conseil d'Etat," 3SHPF. Vol. CVII
(1961), pp 22-24.
"Declaration sommaire du faict de ceux de la ville de Valen
ciennes," in L. Van Langeraad, C-uido de Bray.
Zi.jn Leven dn Werken (Zierikzee, 188*0, pp.
CXI-CXIV.
De Coussemaker, E,» ed. Troubles religieux du XVIe siecle cans
la Flandre Maritime, 1560-1670. k vols, Bruges,
"Deposition faite le 8e du mois de ju.illet 1*566 oar devant .

couronnel et de le Vais" BCHSvO Voi. Ill (1887),
pp; 160-188.
De Robaulx de Soumoy, A., ed. Memoires de Fery de Guyon.
Brussels, 1858.
Des Marez, G., ed. "Documents relatifs aux exces commis k Ypres
par les iconoclastes," Compte rendu des sceances
de la commission royale d'histoire. Vol. VII
11897),“pp. 5^7-582.
Diergerick, J., ed. Documents du XVIe siecle concernant les
troubles religieux. *t- vols. Bruges. 187^-1877.
"Enqu&te et rapport de 1' official a 1'eveque d4Arras sur
l'etat de la religion dans son diocdse." BSHPF,
Vol. LXXVII (1927), p ^72-475.
Faider, C., ed. Coutunes du pays et comote de Hainaut. 3
vols. Brussels, 1871-1878.
Gachard, L., ed. Collection de documents inedits concern--
ant 1'histoire de 3elgique. Brussels. l833-
Correspondance de Philippe II. b vols.

Brussels, 1848-1861.
Gilliodts van Severen, L., ed. Recueil des anciennes coutumes
de la Belgique. Brussels, 1891.
Guicciardini, L. Description de tous les Pavs-Bas. Antwerp,
1582.
Henne, A., ed. Memoires de Pontus Payen. 2 vols, Brussels,
1 8 —
Herminjard, A., ed. Correspondance des reformateurs dans les

pays de langue francaise. 9 vols. Geneva. 1866-
I H 9 7 : 9 . •
Kervyn de Lettenhove, J., ed. Documents inedit relatifs a

1 'histoire du XVIe si&cle. Brussels, 1083.
?30.
Loin* A., ed. "Documents concernant ies placards, l'inqui-
sitionet les troubles religieux dans les Pays-
Bas, et specialement dans le compte de Hainaut,
sous les regnes de Charles V et de Philippe II,"
BCRH, Vol. VIII (1856), pp. 22-60.
Faillard, C.t ed. Histoire des troubles religieux de Valen
ciennes^ 4 vols. Brussels-The Hague, 187^-
1876 T
_____________., ed. "Interrogatoires politiques de'Guy de

Brayt documents in6 dits et originaux," BSHPF,
Vol. XXVIII (1879). PP. 59-67.
_____________., ed. "Interrogatoires politiques de Perigrin
de la Grange: documents iri^dits et originaux,"
3SHPF, Vol. XXVIII (1879), pp. 22^-233.
_____________., ed. "Papiers d’etat et documents inedits
pour servir a 1'histoire de Valenciennes pen
dant les annees 1566 et 1 56 7 ," KHSAV, Vols.
V-VI (1878-1879).
_____________., ed. "Proems de Jean Cateau; documents in-
6dits et originaux," 3SKP?, Vol. XXVIII (1879),
PP. 3^7-351.
Pijper, F., ed. "Procedures tenues a l'endroit de ceux de
la religion du Pays-Bas," Bibliotheca Refor-
matoria Needlandica, Vol. VIII, pp. 4-91-643.
Pinchart, A., ed. memoires de Pasauier de la Barre et de
Nicolas Sdldoyer pour servir at 1*histoire de
Tournay, 1565-1570. 2 vols. Brussels, 1839-
1865.
Pirenne, H., ed. "Additions au recueil de documents rela
tifs § I’histoire de l’industrie draoi^re en
Flandre," BSRH. Vol. XCIII (1929), pp. 33-66.
_____________., ed. Recueil de documents relatifs a 1'his
toire de l’incustrie draniere en Flandre.
4 vols. Brussels, 1906-1924.
"Placcart de sa Ka. contenant les actz commis par ceulx de
Valenciennes, et pour lesauels ilz sont de-
clarez rebelies," in L.A. Van Langeraad,
Guido de Bray. Zi.in Leven en Werken. Zierikzee,
188 ?; pp.“xcili-xcvi.
Poullet, E., ed. Correspondance du cardinal de Granvelle,

1563-16c-6. 12 vols. Brussels, 1877-1896.
Rahlenbeck, C., ed. “Deposition faite le 8e du mois de
•.julLlet 156 S oar devant couronnel et De Le Val,
BGHBW. Vol. Ill (183?), pp.. 160-1S8.
., ed. Memoires de Jacoues de Wesembeke.
_
Brussels, 1859.
“Remonstrance et supplication de ceus de I'Bglise reformee
de la ville de Valenciennes a messeigneurs
les chevaliers de l'Ordre," in L.A. van Lan
geraad, Guido de Bray. Zi.in Leven en Werken.
Z ie r ik z e e T ~ l8 8 5 7 ^ p T lc C m - C V ^
Theissen, J.S., ed. Correspondance fran?aise de Marguerite

d'Autriche, duchesse de Parne, avec Philiooe II.
. Utrecht, 1925.
Van Vaernewyck, M. Memoires d'un oatricier- gantois sur
les troubles religieux en Flandre, 15o6-15o8.
2 vols. Ghent, 1905-1908.
Wauters, A., ed. Memoires de Vigliuis et d'Hopperus sur le
commencement des troubles des Pay-3as. Brus
sels, I8 5 8 .
Weiss, C., ed. Paoiers d'etat du cardinal de Granvelle.
9 vols. Paris, 1841-1852.
4. Secondary sources; general

Bentivoglio, C, Histoire des guerres de Flandre. U vols.
Paris and Brussels, 1770.
Brandt, G. Histoire abregee de la Reformation des Pays-
Bas. 3 vols. The Hague, 1?2!T.
Carlier, E. Valenciennes et le roi d'Espagne. Valen
ciennes, 1879*
Collinet, R. La Reformation en Belgioue au XVIe sieTcls.
• Verviers, 19^-7.
De Ket'eren, E. L ’histoire des Fays-Bas deouis l'an 1315
.iusoues a l'an 1612. The Hague, 1618.
D'Outreman, H. Histoire de la ville et compte de Valen-
ciennes. Douai. 1639.
Forneron, A. Histoire de Philippe II. 4 vols. Paris,
1881-1882.
432 .
Gil'les de Pelichy, C. "Contribution a 1’histoire des
troubles politico-religieux des Pays-Bas au
XVI si^cle," Handelingen voor de geschiedenis
der Genootschaol Societe d'Emulation de Bruges,
Vol. LXXXVI (1889), pp"."90-144"
Gossart. I5, Bsoagnols et Flamands au XVIe siecle. 3 vols.
Brussels, 1905-1910*
Halken, L,,E. La reforrae en Belgique sous Charles-Quint.
Brussels, 1957*
Hecart, G. A.J. "Biographie Valenciennois, " RASAV, Vol. Ill
(1351-1352), pp. 2^-348.
Henne, A . Histoire du regne de Charles-Quint en Belgioue.
10 vols. Brussels, 1853-1860.
Kutner, E. Het Konger.jaar. Amsterdam, 19^9*
Lancelin, H. Histoire de Valenciennes depuis ses origines,
avec un plan de la ville en 17o?. Valenciennes,
1933*
Le Boucq, P. J. Histoire des Troubles advenues a. Valenciennes
at cause des heresies, 15o2-1579, ed. A.P.L^
de Roubaulx de Sounoy. Brussels, 186^.
Le francq, P. "Esquisse d'un histoire de Valenciennes,"
RR, Vol. XXXIX (19^7), PP* 188-189*
Le Petit, J-F. La Grande Chronioue ancienne et mocerne de
Holla'nde .iusoues k la fin de l6oo. 2 vols.
Dordrecht, 1601.
Mabille de: Poncheville, A. Le nays de Hainaut. Paris, 1935*
Mirguet, V Histoire des beiges et de leur civilisation.
Brussels, I89 S.
Motley, J. L. The Rise of the Dutch Republic. Rotterdam,
1872.
Paillard, C. Considerations sur les causes generales des
troubles des Pays-Bas au XVIe~siecle~ Brus
sels-, 187^*.
. "Huit mois de la vie d'un peuple," Memoires
couronnes oar 1*academic rovaie de Belgioue,
Vol. XXVIII (1877). 1 \
433 .
•
_________ . Eotes et eclaircissernents sur I*histoire
gentsrale du Pays-Bas et sur 1'"histoire de
Valenciennes. Valenciennes, 1379.
Pirenne, K. Histoire de Belgique. Vol. III. Brussels,
1907.
RahlenbecX, C. L*inquisition et la Reforrae en Belgique.
Brussels, 1857.
Renon de France. Histoire des troubles des Pays-Bas. 3 vols,
Brussels, 1886-1891.
Trachsel, E. De Colomban aux Gueux.. Brussels, 1949.

Vinchant, F. Annales de la -province et com-pte du Hainaut.
6 vols, Hons, 18^-8-1853•
5. Secondary sources; social and economic
Altmeyer, J. Histoire des relations commerciales des Pays-

Bas avec le nord de 1*Europe pendant le XVI^
si&cle. Brussels, 1840.
Arnould, M .-A. Les denom'brenents de foyers dans le compte*
de Hainaut XIVfa-XVIfe siecle. Brussels, 1956.
_____________ . "L’impot sur le capital en Belgique- au
XVIe siecle," Le Hainaut economioue, Vol. I
(1946), pp. 17=55:
Mortal!te et enidCxnies sus l'Ancien Regime
dan le Hainaut et oueloues regions limitrophes.
Vol. XXXIII of Les coner^s et epilogues de
1'universite de Liege. Li&ge, 1 9 6 5 .
"Les rentes d'etat en Hainaut au XVI0 et
au XVIIe siecle," Annales du cercle archeolo-
gique de Soignies, Vol. VIII (1942). on. l64-
182.
"Les repercussions demographicues du sac
de Binch en 1554," in Melanges George Smets.
Brussels, 1952, pp. 57-71.
Bigwood, G. L*impot. Brussels, 1910.
Une loterie -oatriotique au XVIe siecle.
"Brussels, 1901.
"Les vianobles du Valenciennois," KHSAV,
Vol. II'(1863), pp. 197-205.
Brulez, W. "L*exportation des Pays-Bas vers l'ltalie par
voie de terre au milieu du XVIe siecle," AH5S,
Vol. XIV (1959), pp. 461-^91.
Bruwier, M. "La bourgeoisie foraine en Kainaut au Moyen-
Age," R3PH, Vol. XXXIII (1955), pp. 900-920.
Caffiaux, H. La bourgeoisie valenciennoise au Moyen-Ase.
Valenciennes, 187^.
Cappliez, C. Histoire des metiers de Valenciennes et de
leurs saints natrons. Valenciennes, 1893*
Carlier, E. Les cabarets da Valenciennes et la cave du
vin de messed~neurs de la ville au XVII
si^cie. Valenciennes, 1880.
Carpentier, B. "Le beguinage Sainte-Elizabeth de Valenci
ennes de sa fondation au XVIs siecle," CAHV,
Vol. IV (1959), PP. 103-182.
Coornaert, E. "Les bourse d'Anvers aux XVs et XVIe silcles,"
Revue historicue, Vol. CCXVII (1957), pp. 20-
28.
. Un centre industriel d*autrefois: La dra-
_
•perie-sayetterie d'Hondschoote: XIV^-XVIII**

siecles. Paris, 1930*
... "Draneriesrurales, draoeries urbaines,"
RBPH, Vol. XXVIII (1950), pp. 59-96.
_____________ . "Les echanges de la France avec l'Allemagne
et les pays du Nord au XVIe siecle," AH5S,
Vol. XXXV (1957), pp. 241-25^.
_____________ . "L'Stat et les villes," RH, Vol. CCVII
(1952), pp. 185-210.
Les francais et le commerce international
a Anvers, fin XV^-XVfe sitcleT 2 vols.
Paris, 1 9 6 1 .
_____________ . "La genese du systeme capitaliste: arand
capitalisme et economie traditionnelle a An
vers au XVIe siecle," AHSS. Vol. VIII (1936),'
pp. 127-139.
*3 5 .
Craeybeckx, Un grand commerce d'importation: Les vins

de France aux anciens Pays-3as ("XIIIe-XVIg'
siecle). Paris, 1958.
De Poerck, G. La draperie en Flandre et en Artois au Moyen-'
Age: technique et terminologie. '3 vols.
Bruges, 1951*
Deschamps de Pas, J. Snou£te industrielle sur l'etat de
la manufacture des draos dans le Pays-3as au
commencement du XVIe siecle. Extract from
Vol. XXV of MSmoires de l'Academie d*Arras.
Arras, I8 6 3 .
Doehaerd, R. L'expansion economic; ue beige au moyen age.
Brussels, 19 *6 .
Espinas, G.- Documents relatifs a la draperie de Valenciennes
au ?.loyen-Age. Lille, 1931*
_. "Groupe fconomique, groupe religieux: les
tisserands de Valenciennes au XIV9 siecle,"
AHSS, Vol. II (1930), PP. * 8 -6 3 .
_. L*organisation corporative des metiers de
la draperie a Valenciennes dans la seconde
moitfe'du XIV9 siecle; 1362-1403. Paris-
Louvain, 1932.
Lacroix, A. Notice chronologique et analytioue sur les
ipidemies et les Epizooties oui ont regne en
Hainaut, a civerses Cpoaues, de 1006 a 1632.
Brussels, 1959.
Lefrano, P. "Kesures 'conservatoires' appliquee aux im-
meubles confisoues It Valenciennes ^ la suite
du siege de 1566 -1 5 67 ," RN, Vol. L (1 9 6 8 ),
pp. 117-115.
Le Glay,. A. "Lettre £ un membre de la societe d'emulation
de Cambrai sur le mot 'mulouinier'," ANFKB,
Vol. I (1829), pp. 51-53. *
Lepreux, J. "Notes sur les corps de metiers de la ville de
Valenciennes," RASAV, Vol. VII (1855-1856),
pp. 200-203.
Malotet, A. ^L'Industrie et le commerce des toiles fines
a Valenciennes dans les temps modernes," RN,
Vol. IV (1910), pp. 281-32O'.
^36.
•Maugis, E. "La saieterie Amiens, 1^80-1587," VSW, Vol. V
(1907), pp. 1-114.
Kembre, E . "Les ^nidemies et les pestes a Valenciennes
jusqu'au XVIIIs siecle," CAHV', Vol. H (1936),
pp. 35-64.
_. "Un texte ancien relatif a la Dentelle de
Valenciennes." CAHV. Vol. I (1930), pp. 57-60.-
Munro, J.H. "Bruges and the Abortive Staple in English
Cloth: An Incident in the Shift of Commerce .
from Bruges to Antwero in the Late 15th Cen
tury," RBPH, Vol. XLIV (1966), pp. 1137-1159.
•Pirenne, H. "Une crise economique au XVIe siecle. La ‘
draperie urbaine et ‘la nouvelle draperie en
Flandre," in Histoire economique del*Occi
dent medieval" Brussels, 1951s pp. 621-543.
Sayoas, A. "La speculation dan les Pays-3as au XVIe
siecle," Journal des ‘economistes, Vol. XLVI
(1901), pp. 393-340. -
Sivery, G. "Le ,/in: Commerce et consomraation paysanne
dans le sud du Hainaut at la fin du Koyen-Age,"
RN, Vol. XLIX (1967). PP. 231-292. '
Stievenart, i. To-pograohie historique et medicale de Valen
ciennes. Valenciennes, 1846'.
Torfs, L. Pastes des calamites publicues survenues dans
les Pays-3as' et nartlculi£rement en Belgioue
denuis les temos les plus recu.les .iusou*~a
nos jours. 2. vols. Paris-Tournai, 1859-1862.
Van der Yi'ee, H. "Les archives hospitalieres et l'etude de
la T>auvrete aux Pays-Bas du XVe au XVIIIs
siecle," RN, Vol. XLVIII (1 9 6 6 ), pp. 5-16.
_• The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the
European Economy^ The Hague, 1 9 6 3 .
Varihaeck, M. "Histoire de la sayetterie a Lille," BSEPC,
Vols. XVI and SVII (1910).
Yercauteren, F. "Note sur la survivance de la hanse des
XVII villes du XVe au XVIIe sie*cle," RBPH,
Vol. XXVIII (1950), pp. 1078-1091.
Verlinden, C , J. CraeybecJpc, and E. Scholliers. "Mouve-
ments des nrix et des salaires en Belgique au
XVIe siecle," AESC, Vol. X (1955), pp^ 173-198.
437.
6, Secondary sources; political

Bauchond, 11, La .justice criminelle de la magistrat de
Valenciennes au Moyen-Age. Valenciennes, 1904.
_____________ . "L'emancipation des mineurs dans le droit
valenciennois du XIVs et XVe sie?cles,V MSHDP,
Vol. II (1939), pp. 5-19.
Caffiaux, H. Abattis de maisons a Gommignies; Cresoin et
Sainte-Saulve. Valenciennes, 1863.
__________ - Le banissement. Valenciennes, 1891.
_____________* Le bourreau de Valenciennes. Lille, l89i.
_____________. "Essai sur 1'organization militaire de la
ville de Valenciennes, 1067-1?S9," MHSAV,
Vol. V (1884), pp. 1-145.
Cellier, L. '.'Chartes coramunales de Valenciennes," MHSAV,' •
..... Vol. II (1872),
_____________. Une commune flamande: recherches sur les
institutions politiques de la ville de Valen
ciennes. Valenciennes, 1873.
_____________. Les -prevots de Valenciennes; notes chronolo-
giques. Valenciennes, I876 .
Devillers, M. "Participation des Itats de Hainaut aux as
semblies des Etats-generaux des Pays-Bas
(1438-1790)," 3CRII. Vol. LXXIV, (1905), pp. 27-
132.
Binaux, A. "Beffroi de Valenciennes," AKFMB, Vol. IV
(1842), pp. 250-269.
_____________. "Reconciliation de la ville de Valenciennes
avec le roi d'Espaigne, 1579," Revue agricole
industrielle, historique et artistique. Vol. V
11850).
Dubois, A. Essai sur I'histoire municioale de la ville de
Valenciennes. Valenciennes, I84l. '
Espinas, G. "L*evolution gerierale des privileges urbains
dans les centres principaux de la Plandre
franâis depuis les origines jusqu'a la Revolu
tion, " Ti.idschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis,
Vol. V (1923), pp. 148-472.
"Les raannants dans le droit urbain en Flan
dre au Mcyen-Age," in Melanges Paul Fournier.
Paris, 1929. pp. 203-217.
Gilissen, J.- “Les villes en Belgique, Histoire des insti
tutions administratives et judiciares^des
villes beiges," Recueils de la societe Jean
Bodin, Vol.' VI (195**), pp. 531-604.
Gondry, G.-H. "Memoire historique sur les grands baillis
de Hainaut," Memoires et publications de la
societe des sciences, arts et des lettres du
Hainaut, Vol. X (1888), pp. 1-2^7.
Louise, T. De la sorcellerie et de la .justice criminelle
a! Valenciennes; XVIe et XVIIa sig’cles. Valen-
ciennes, ISol.
Poullet, E. Histoire politique nationale. Origines,
dgvelopements et transformations des institu
tions dans les anciens Pays-Bas. 2 vols.
Louvain, 13S2-1892.
Verriest, L. Corpus des records de coutumes et des lois de
cheflieu de l'ancien compte de Hainaut. Mons,
19^ • 1
_____________ . Le regime seigneurial dans le compte de

Hainaut du XIe sie'cle a la revolution. Lou
vain, 1816-1917•
Wauters, A. De I'origlne et de premiers developperaents
des libert^s communales en Belgique et cans le
Nord de la France. 3russels, I8 69 .
7. Secondary sources; religion and culture

Bauchond, M. "Un libraire de Valenciennes au XVIe siecle:
Pierre Koustade," CAHV, Vol. I (1930). pp. 89 -
92.
'
__________ . Memoire de la procession de la ville de
Valenciennes compose par Sire S. LeBouca en
I6 5 3 . Valenciennes, 1908.
Brassart, M. "Fetes populaires au XVIe siecle dans les
villes du Nord de la France et particutiSre-
ment a Valenciennes," Souvenirs de la Flandre-
Wallonne, Vol. XI (I87 I), pp. **0-5***
439.
"L*crdre du chanelet de Notre-Dame-de-le-

Sauch." Souvenirs de la Flandre-Wallonne,
Vol. XIII (1873), PP. 15S-1?0. "
3rulez, W. "L’Election de Louis de Berlaimont comme arcYie-
v£cque de Cambrai en 1570," RBPH, Vol. XXXI
(1953), PP. 509-519.
Carlier, S. Les .joueurs de Hautbois de la villi de Valen-
ciennesT Valenciennes, 18&L.
_____________ . Le mystere de Valenciennes en 1547. Valen
ciennes, 1879.
Carpentier, 3. "Le beguinage Sainte-Elisabeth de Valen
ciennes* de sa fondation au XVIe siecle,"
CAHV, Vol. IV (1959), PP. 103-182.
Courraaceul, V. Histoire de la ville de l*abbaye de Saint-
Aitiand. Valenciennes, 1865.
De Moreau, E. Histoire de l'Eglise en Belgidue. Vol. IV
(1378-1559) and Vol. V (1559-1633). BrusselsT
Louvain, 1949-1952.
_________ - "Le clerge des Pays-Bas miridionaux el
l'epoque des troubles (1566-1585)," BLAR5,
Vol. XXXIII (1947). pp. 195-214. ’
Denis, C. Introduction a 1*histoire de St. Amand en
Pevfle. Douai, 190 5 .
Dewez, J. Histoire de I'abbaye de St, Pierre d'Hasnon.
Lille, 1S90.
Dir.aux, A. "Les chartreux a Marly et k Valenciennes,"
ANFM3, Vol. IV (1842), pp. 137-164.
"Entree joyeuse de 1'Empereur Charles-
Quint en sa ville de Valenciennes avec les
fils du Roi de France (1540)," ANFMB, Vol. IV
(1842), pp. 349-36 6 .
Dupire, N. "Le mystere de la passion it Valenciennes,"
Romania, Vol. XLVIII (1922), pp. 571-584.
Foucart, P. Les Peintures de Martin de Vos a Valenciennes.
Faris, 1 8 9 3 .
Giese, H. La oassion de Jesus-Christ .jouee I Valenciennes
l'an 15^7. Greifswale, 1905.
440.
Hecart, G.A.J. Recherches historiaues, bibliographiaues,

• critiques et litteraires sur le theatre £
Valenciennes. Paris, 1816.
Henault, M.M. Representation d'un mystere de la passion
Valenciennes au XYIe siecle (154? ). Valen-
ciennes, 1590.
Julien, A. Histoire et culte de Notre-Dame du Sainte-
Cordon, patronne de la ville de Valenciennes.
Valenciennes, 1886. ' ' 1
Konigson, E. La representation d'un mystere de la passion

1L Valenciennes en 154*^ Paris, 1969.
Lebeoue, R. "Jean Molinet et la passion de Valenciennes,"
Romania. Vol. LIX (1933), pp. 438-447.
LeBoucq, S. Histoire ecclesiastiou.e de la ville et compte
de Valentienne: l650i Valenciennes, 1844.
______ . Memoire de la procession de la ville de
Valenciennes. Valenciennes, 1908.
Leroy, 0. "Chambres dramatiaues ou litteraires dites
rhetoriaues," ANFMB, Vol. IV (1842), pp. 101-
126. ‘
Liebrecht, H. Les Chambres de Rhetorique. Brussels, 1948.
Mabille de Poncheville, A. Legendes de 1'Escaut et pays
circonvoisons, Lille, Valenciennes, Arras,
Douai, Cambrai, Dunkerque, Anvers, Hesdin,
etc. Lille, 1945.
Schreiner, H. Nouvelles Etudes sur la premiere passion
de Valenciennes. Grlijswald, 190?.
Spriet, L. Marchiennes1 son abbaye. Orchies, 1898.
Van Gennep, A. Le folklore de la Flandre et du Hainaut
francais (department du Nord). ■ 2 vols.
Paris, 1935-1936.
8. Secondary sources; Reformation and Counter-Reformation

Altmeyer, C.M. Les precurseurs de la Reforme aux Pays'-Bas..
Brussels, 1886.
Bakhuizen van den Brihk^ J.N. "La confession de foi des
Sglises reformees de France de 1559 et la
confession des Pays-Bas de 1561 ," BGHSW, 6 th
series, Vol. VI (1959), PP. 3-2.8.
441 .
Bernus, A. Un laiaue de XVIe siecle. Brussels*, 1895•
Beuzart, P. Les heresies -pendant le moyen-age et la Reforms
dang la region~de Douai, d'Arras et au. rays de
l'Alleu. Paris, 1912.
"Huguenots et Gueux, 1560-1585." BSHPF,
Vol. CX (1941), pp. 174-198.
. "Pierre Titelmans et 1* inquisition en Flan-
dre, 1554-1567," BSHPF, Vol. LVIII (1924),
pp. 224-242.
La repression a Valenciennes anr£s les
troubles religieux de 1 5 6 6 . Clamart, 1930*
Bordier, H. Chansonnier huguenot du XVIe silcle^ Paris,
n.d.
Bouton, E. "La journee des mau-brulez,” ANFMB, Vol. Ill
(1833), PP. 50-63.
Braekman, E. "Etat . et eglise chez Guy de Bres," CCSB,
vol. xxvii (1966), pp.'13-20.
"Les fondercents de la vie de Guy de Eres,"

CCSB, Vol. IV (1961), pp. 12-19.
"Guy de Bres et la nropagande anabartiste,”
ASKPB, 4th series, Vol". I (1952), pp. 14-31.
"Guy de Bres; rages choisis-;," CCSB, Vol.
XXXI (1 9 6 7 ), pp. 4-10.
.. Guy de Bres: sa vie. Brussels, i9 60 .
Brulez, Y7. "Be opstand van het industriegebied in 1566,"
Anciens rays et assemblies d'Stats, Vol. IV
T1 9 5 2 ), pp. 78-100.
_____________ . "Het beleg van Valenciennes in 1566 -1567 ,"
Het Leger-De Katie, Vol. IX (1951), pp. 382 -3 85 .
•
__________ . "Nadere bijzonderbeden over Guy de Bray,”
TG, Vol. X (1953), PP. 418-422..
Crespin, J. Guy de Bres, I'un des reformateurs des Pavs-
Bas. Geneva, 1835*
_____________ . Histoire des martyrs. 3 vols. Toulouse,
1885-1889.
De Clerca, C. "Jean et Jacques Taffin Jean D ’Arras et
Christoohe Plantin," De Gulden Passer, Vol.
XXXVI (1958), pp. 125 ^13 ^
Delleraan, T. Het martelaarschao van Guido de Bres minister
der goddeli.jken woords in de Keaerlanden.
The Hague, 1941.
Delsive, J. Le protestantisme dans la seigneurie de Saint-
Amand de 1562 a! 1584. Valenciennes, 1910.
Deplace, L. ”Le Protestantisme st Tournai et la corapagni'e
de Jesus," Precis historic!ues, Vol. XL (1891).
Dinaux, A. "Les huguenots k Valenciennes," AN, Vol. II
(1 8 3 2 ), pp. 432 -4 5 4 .
Dugnoille, J.-P. "Quelques recherches recentes sur 1‘his-
toire du orotestantisme en 3elgique," RBPH,
Vol. XXXIII (1955), PP. 1 55 -1 63 .
Frossard, G.-L. "Executions capitales a Valenciennes, 1567-
1568," BSHPF, Vol. XXVII (18?8), pp. 270-275.
FuncX, A. "La Reforme a Valenciennes," BSHPF, Vol. XXXII
(I8 8 3 ), pp. 49-60.
•Halken, L.E. "Les Martyrologes et la critique," in Melanges
historicues offerts a M. Jean Msyhoffer. Lau
sanne, 1952, pp. 52-72.
Hubert, E. Etude sur la condition des Protestants en Bel
gique de-puis Charles-Quint .jusau'st Joseph II.
Brussels, 1882.
Kingdon, R.M. Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of Religion
in France; 1555-1563~ Geneva, 1956.
_____________. Geneva and the Consolidation of the French
Protestant Movement» 1564-1572. Madison,
Wisconsin, 196 7 .
______ . "Les idees politiques de Beze d'apres son
traite de 1*author!te du magistrat en la
punition des heretiques," Bibliograohie
d'Humanisme et Renaissance, Vol. XXII (i960),
FPT5S6-569;----- :
----
Le Boucq, P.-J, Histoire des troubles advenues k Valen-.
ciennes g cause des heresies: 1562-1579.
Brussels, 1864.
LeCornu, F. Origine des Fglises reformees Wallonnes de
Pays-Bas. Utrecht, n.d.
Louise, T. Conseil des troubles ou conseil de sang: sen
tences Valenciennes, 17 et 20 .janvier-8 mars,
1566. Valenciennes, 1876.-
Marichal, W. "Le culte reforme, " CCSB, Vol. XXVIII (1966),
pp. 1-1^;
Mej'hoffer, J. Le Martvrologe Protestant des Pays-Bas.
Brussels, 1907*
Moreau, G. Histoire du Protestantisme k Tournai. Paris,
"La Reforme dans le Hainaut et le Tournaisis,

"BSHPB, 3rd series, Vol. VIII (19^9). pp. ^09-
5217“
Ollier, D. Guy de Bres, le Reformateur Wallon. Paris,
Paillard, C. "Dates des premiers proems d’heresie k Valen

ciennes," BSHPF, Vol. XXVII (1876), pp. 301-;
303.
_____________. “Les grands presches Calvinistes de Valen
ciennes: juillet et aout 1566," 3SHPF, Vol.
XXVI (1877), pp. 33-^3 and 73-80.
_____________. "Note sur Michielle de Caignoncle," BSHPF,
Vol. XXVI (1877), PP. 25^-263.
. "Le proces de Pierre Brully," ARBMC, Vol.
XXVIII (1873), pp. 8-49.
"Relations entre Louis de Bourbon, Prince
de Conde et les insurges de Pays-Bas: 1566 -
1567," BSHPF, Vol. XXVII (1878), pp. 130 -1 3 8 .
Pannier, J. ' Un heros du XVIe siecle, le Reformateur des
Pays-Bas Guy de Bray. Brussels and Calais,
n.d.
Piaget, An and G. Berthoud. Notes sur le Livre des Martyrs
de Jean Cr&spin. Neuchatel, 1930.
«
Rahlenbeck, c. "Les chanteries de Valenciennes,""BCHEW,

Vol. Ill (1883), pp. 121-159.
IM.
"C-ui de Bres: etude historique," La Revue
Belgique, Vol. XXIX (1878),.pp. 105-155T
_____________. L*inquisition et la Reforme en Belgique.
Brussels, 1857.
•
____________ . Jean Taffih, un reformateur beige au XVIe
si^cie. Leiden, 1886. .
_____________ . "Notes sur les auteurs, les imprimeurs et
les distributeurs des pamphlets politiques et
religieux du XVI siecle." Bulletin du 'biblio
phile beige, Vol. XV (1870), pp. 42-55.
Reuss, R. Pierre Brull?/-, ancien dominicain de Metz.
Strasbourg, 1879.
Scheerder, ifl.J. "Le mouvementîconociaste en 1566? fut-il
spontane ou premedite?" Anr.ales de la Federa
tion archeologiaue et historiaue de Belgique.
Vol. II (1952), pp.•67-7^.
Stelling-Michaud, S. Le.Livre du Recteur de l'Academis de
Geneve: 1559-1878. Geneva^ 1959.
Van der Bssen, L. "Episodes de 1*histoire religieuse et
commerciale d'Anvers dans la seconde moilie du
XVIe siecle," BCRH, Vol. LXXX (1911), pp. 321-
362.
_____________ . "Les progres du lutheranisme et du calvinisme

dans le monde commercial d'Anvers," VSW, Vol.
xii (191 *0 , pp. 152 -23 ^.
Van Langeraad, L.A. Guido de Bray, Zi.in leven en werken.
Zierikzee, l884’.
Veltenaer, C. Theodore de Beze et ses relations avec les
theologiens des Pays-Bas. Kampen, 1904-.
Verheydan, A.L.E. Ansbaotism in Planders: 1630-1650.
. New York, 1961.
"Les anabaptistes dans les Pays-Bas meri-
dionaux au debut du regne de Philippe II,
1|55-1567," Annales du XXXVe congrgs de la
federation archeologiaue et historiaue de
Belgique. Vol. II (l9~55). vv. W-4-91.
Le martyrologe orotestant des Pays-Bas du
"Sud au XVIe siecle. Brussels, I960,
APPENDIX A
Chart I
CRIMES RESULTING IN FINES FOR THE PERIOD

1546-1566
Crime• Number
wounding-battery 399
fraud in weights and measures 247
drinking outside the town; tax
evasion 52
abrogation of market regulations 23
curfew abrogated 46
littering the streets or rivers 14
abrogation of certification laws 1
Source; MBV, ms. nos. 700-703.
Chart 2
CRIMES PUNISHED BY BANISHMENT AND/OR CORPOREAL PUNISHMENT FOR

________________ THE PERIOD 1346-1566_____________________
Pescri'Dtion of crime_____________________________ number
robberies, burglaries, and thefts 50
idle and vagabond; robberies, burglaries, and thefts 33
idle and vagabond; suspected of robberies, burglaries,
or thefts 7
suspected of robberies, burglaries,or thefts 1
idle and vagabond 1
attempted robbery . 1
idle and vagabond; begging 1
debtors 10
abandonment of infants 4
idle and vagabond; scandalous life 2
receiving and/or selling stolen goods 3
frauds 1
scandalous or lubricious life 6
adultery ‘ 2
incest 1
condoned lubricity of daughter 3
swearing against bourgeois 1
•swearing against God 4
swearing against authority 2
swearing against ecclesiastics ’4
suspicion of sorcery and/or magic arts 10
perjury 1
returned after banishment 8
446.
spreading infectious diseases 1

dncondgLbly committed violent crimes 5
idle and vagabond; swearing 1
wounding an officer of the city or a militiaman 4
unruly behavior 4
attempted murder 1
breaking confinement in the city 1
homicide outside the city; incorrect asylum procedure 3
swearing against authority and God 2
prostitution 2
corruption of sergeants at arms 1
attempted rape 4
swearing and attempted murder 1
heretical activity or abrogation of the certification
_____ laws (during the religious troubles) ;
____ 48
Source: K5V, ms. nos. 700-703._________________________
Chart 3
CRII.es RECEIVING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT DURING THE PERIOD 1546-1566

Crime number
homicide 22
incorrigibly idle and vagabond; robbery, burglary.
theft 20
incorrigible robber, burglar,or thief 7
vandalism and robbery 1
idle and vagabond; homicide 3
rape or attempted rape of children 2
rape of a pregnant woman 1
sorcery 1
robbery and battery 1
battery and attempted rape 1
incorrigibly returning after banishment 1
robbery and wounding authorities 1
incorrigible violence 2
violence and swearing against mother and father 1
incorrigibly idle and vagabond, disobediant to parents,
threatened officers of justice 1
heretical activity (during the religious troubles) 15
Source: H3V, ms. nos. 700-703.
Chart 4
OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS COMMITTING MORS THAN

10 CRIMES IN THE- PERIOD 1546-1 566
.Occupation number of crimes
saye weavers 124
innkeepers and cabareteurs 108
cordmakers 35
combers 34
linen weavers 23
laborers. 22
bakers 21
merchants (all types) 20
fine cloth weavers 17
washers of cloth ■14
gardeners 13
cloth finishers 12
carpenters 11
fullers 10
Source: M.3V, ms. nos. ?00-703. There
were also ?4 other occupational groups
with under 10 crimes committed per aroup.
APPENDIX 3
SUPERINTENDENTS OF THE PASSION PLAY IN 1 W

Name title or position
Arnould de Cordes seigneur de Maubray; lieutenant
pr£vcH of Valenciennes
Louis de la Fontaine dit
Wicart seigneur de Salraonsart and de
Bassee; wealth?/ rentier
family which was active in
arts for generations; owned
large library; wrote history
of his trip to Jerusalem; a
knight of the Holy Sepulcre
Phillippe Dorville receveur of Bouchain
Quentin Coret echevin and "prince of olai-
sance" for 15^7 at the fes
tival at Lille
Nicolas de la Croix bailli de Vertaing
Michel Herlin seigneur de Jenlain, "le rich-
issime," militia captain
Jean Stechlin
Henri D'Outrercan father of the historian by the
same name, married to a daugh
ter of Louis de la Fontaine
dit Wicart
Jacques Sanger
Jehan de Jonquoy
Jean Lipson
Yves Grain d'Or the apostolic and imperial
notary
Source: Henau.lt, Repressntation d'une mystere, pp. 12-13.
449.
APPENDIX C
INDIVIDUALS SERVING AS CONSISTORY MEMBERS. 1563-1566

’occupation or other indication
Name ____________________ of social status___________
'
Bar, Allard cabareteur and merchant draper
Bizou, Jacques reportedly "notable and rich"
Campion, Mathieu. linen weaver
Coppin, Guillaum merchant
De la Court, Jehan shoemaker
De la Deuze, Daniel merchant draper
De la Kaye, Mathieu shopkeeper
De la Hue, Pierre saye merchant and captain of
militia
De le Thor, Jacques wagoner
De Phaloize, Afflegand merchant
De Rozin, Guillaume scribe
De Wallers, Jacques reportedly "notable and rich"
Druart, Pierre
Du Pret, Jehan
Gellee, Jacques wine merchant
Gervais, Etienne saye v/eaver
Godin, Jehan echevinale family'
Guyot, Jean dyer
Herlin, Michel (The Elder) wine merchant and captain of
militia
Herlin, Michel (The Younger) wine merchant
Joffroy, Jacques cabareteur and innkeeper
LeBoucq, Holland saye merchant and artillery
maker ■
Le Clercq, Jacques saye weaver
Le Josne, Gery tanner
Le Mesureur, Jehan merchant
Le Thieullier, Jehan saye merchant
Logier, Simon captain of militia
Machon, Nicolas butcher
Mahieu, Jehan wine merchant and innkeeper, and
superintendent of public works
Morrenart, Anthoine merchant
Muchet, Philippes candlemaker
Pattou, Franchois merchant
Resteau, Vincent saye merchant and municipal
treasurer
Steclin, Jehan
Vivien, Claude
Viven, Nicolas a municipal treasurer
Vois in , Franchois reportedly "notable and rich"
Wargrein. Jehan
Sources "Besoigne des Commissaires du Rev noire sire a Valen-
ciennes sur le faict des troubles et rebellion advenue en
icelle ville," AGR, Paoiers d'etat et do 1'audience, no. 536.
450.
APPENDIX D
KIC-HBST PRICES 0? WHEAT FOR SELECTED

YEARS AT THE HALLS AUX 3LSDS AT
VALENCIENNES
price in livres
vear oer huitel sols deniers
1499 1 0 0
1545 4 0 0
1546 6 13 0
1548 1 5 6
1549 •1 11 6
1553 3 "4 6
1557 4 10 6
1559 11 1 0
1565 5 6 0
1569 4 0 0
1571 4 0 0
1572-1581 drooned to between.two to
three livres rer huitel
1582 8 0 0
1583 7 0 0‘
1584 7 0 0
1535 5 10 0
1586 ■ 1 3 -1 4
1587 (soring) 21 0 0
1588 4 0 0
1589-1594 some four 1.ivres
1595 * 9-10
1596 9 0 0
1597 9 0 0
1598 8 •0 0
1599 4 10 0
1600 4 0 0
Source: KBV, ms. no. 8 3 5 . These
figures come from a cony of "the now
lost records of the Halle aux Bleds
of Valenciennes made by Simon LeBoucq,
the 17th century archivist of Valen
ciennes. A huitel. or oitel. witel.
etc., is one-half of a ouartet de
semenee , a measure used~in Hainaut
and in parts of Flanders in the 16th
century.

1972 Clark Valenciennes 1540-1570

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

1972 Clark Valenciennes 1540-1570

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

INFORMATION TO USERS

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest

A Xerox Education Company

University Microfilms, A XEROX Com pany , Ann Arbor, Michigan

Geoffrey Whithare Clark

Submitted in partial fulfillment

Some pages may have

University icrofilms, A Xerox Education Company

The dissertation, is an attempt to treat systematically

the rebellion of the city of Valenciennes during the early

stages of the revolt of the Netherlands from Spanish rule.

The study was designed to ascertain to what extent the well-

known rebellion of Valenciennes was directly influenced by

what Henri Pirenne saw as a wave of industrial capitalism

in the Southern Netherlands cities of the 16th century, and

to what extent it was caused by other factors like the in­

Concentrating on social groupings and the tensions a-

rising from group interests, the first half of the work

investigates the city's economic, political, and religious

institutions. The extent of trade and the nature of guild

organizations were reconstructed albeit from skimpy

municipal regulations lacking in statistics. Statistical

information was available for a study of patterns of

municipal bondholding, patterns of municipal officeholding,

and some 20 years of criminal cases. The investigation of

political institutions included a functional analysis of

judicial, financial, and charity organizations which in­

dicated what social groups they favored. The study of

religious institutions mapped the relationships between

the parish churches, the local abbeys, and the dioceses. A

correlation of religious affiliation with social groups was

made in an attempt to see if socio-economic and political

tensions were reflected in religious preference.

The second half of the study investigates the behavior of

different social groups to the extent that they can be gleaned

ftom memoires, correspondence, and the accounts of government

spies. Outlining the chain of action and reaction that brought

the inquisition to Valenciennes, this part of the study indicates

how the actions of the central administration in Brussels

became the focus of economic and political discontent in Val­

enciennes. The targets of the activities of Calvinist crowds

at preaching sessions and during the iconoclastic movement in

1$66 are described,.the promoters of these activities are iden­

tified, and the complex motivations underlying the various

participating groups are indicated. During the siege of

Valenciennes, the roles of officials in authority and the roles

of the forces of order inside the city are described.

The results of the study indicate that industrialization

in Valenciennes was limited by restrictive guild and municipal

regulations. Nevertheless, relative to other cities there was

a considerable development in industry, especially in light

wool textiles! there were social tensions existing because of

the large number of urban.and urban-rural workers in these cloth

industries, but the workers' behavior was neither unified nor

consistent because they were split up into different herarchical

groupings with dissimilar working conditions and expectations.

The study cautiously indicates that social tensions and religious

preference among different sections of the ruling oligarchies

were due to such factors as accessibility to municipal office,

accessibility to ecclesiastical positions, and ability to gain

demonstrable cause of the city's rebellion led by the merchant

to what extent it was caused by other factors like the in

judicial, financial, and charity organizations which in

became the focus of economic and political discontent in Val

1$66 are described,.the promoters of these activities are iden

the inquisition established in the city in the years im

were written. For example, the Catholic memoirs of eye

The Belgian demographer M.A. Arnould estimates the Valen

1C. Cappliez, Histoire des metiers de Valenciennes (Valen

^L..Cellier, Une commune flamande; recherches sur les insti

^-We have to rely mainly on a 17 th century copy of saye or

The most important documents for the study of Valen