Aspp 12262

Tried and Tested?
Dynastic Persistence and Legislative

Productivity at the Philippine House
of Representatives
Rogelio Alicor L. Panao*
Examining the determinants of legislative success at the Philippine House of

Representatives, this study shows empirically why continuous entrenchment by
political families can be detrimental to political institutions. Using count regression
models, the study analyzes the patterns of law production in the Philippine Lower
House beginning from the opening of the first post-Marcos Congress (8th Congress) in
1987 to the adjournment of the 15th Congress in 2013. The study finds that successive
terms in office facilitate the ability of legislators to engage in legislative activities but
only up to a point. Neophyte legislators who have yet to gain a foothold in their
districts appear to be more proactive in concretizing proposals into actual legislation,
at least initially. Over time, when legislative districts have become family turfs,
incumbents cease to invest in vote courting activities such as legislation, lending
credence to the unhealthy effect of political persistence on accountability.
Key words: dynastic persistence, lawmaking, legislative productivity, Philippine House of Repre-
sentatives, political families
T he prospect of reelection has been shown to have a significant effect on the

policy choices of incumbent representatives, consistent with the idea of
electoral exercises as accountability mechanisms whereby those aspiring for the
position must constantly invest in accomplishment and reputation (Besley &
Case, 1995; Kousser, 2006; Kurfirst, 1996). What does it cost voters, therefore,
when political clans become persistent and enduring fixtures of an elective
office, effectively defying term limits as in the case of the Philippine House of
Representatives? Does it matter for legislative productivity if lawmakers or
*Rogelio Alicor L. Panao is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science,

University of the Philippines in Diliman, where he teaches quantitative research methods
and introductory courses in Philippine politics and government. He earned his PhD in
Political Science from the International Christian University, Tokyo, Japan in 2013. He
was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 2016. He can be reached at rogelio_alicor.panao@
upd.edu.ph.
Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 8, Number 3—Pages 394–417

C 2016 Policy Studies Organization. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
V
Persistence and Productivity at Philippine House of Representatives 395
their families have consistently occupied their respective district seats? Are
legislators from political families any different from their less persistent coun-
terparts when it comes to peddling measures into legislation?
The role that elites and well-entrenched families play in politics, no doubt, has
long captured the interest of scholars of Philippine politics who sought to explain
whether the persistence of political dynasties has contributed to lagging eco-
nomic outcomes and democratic capture (Mendoza, Beja, Venida, & Yap, 2012;
Rivera, 2012). Mendoza, Beja, Venida, and Yap (2013) believe there is strong evi-
dence that political dynasties proliferate in the most economically depressed
provinces but admit that political dynasties may not necessarily be inducing pov-
erty. The study claims to map a landscape of political dynasties at the provincial
level and yet, rather interestingly, contented itself with data at the regional level.
Moreover, the findings are arguably in sharp contrast to Rivera’s (2012) earlier
observation that “on the whole, provinces with better income, health and educa-
tion indicators (HDI) show a higher number of political families” (p. 64).
Focusing their study on members of the Philippine House of Representatives
from 2001 to 2006, meanwhile, Tusalem and Pe-Aguirre (2013) found that repre-
sentatives who belong to political dynasties substantially degrade the quality of
local governance. The study, however, overstates the role of district representa-
tives in public goods provisions despite the fact that by law and by definition
legislators are not responsible for the day-to-day management of local govern-
ments. Examining legislative dynamics, Panao (2014) showed that political ties
can influence policy preferences in legislative policymaking but this seems to
hold true only for district representatives whose families have ties to local poli-
tics. Moreover, the study’s emphasis was on executive-legislative dynamics
and tested for the effect of political kinship merely as control variable.
Solon, Fabella, and Capuno (2009) observed that it is not so much the pres-
ence of political families that derail local development but the absence of politi-
cal competition among competing political families. Interestingly, what their
estimates actually suggest is that the probability of reelection among incumbent
governors from political clans is higher when these same governors invest
more on development expenditures.
Some studies looked into how formal institutions, such as constitutionally
prescribed term limits, contribute to the strengthening of political dynasties by
inducing incumbents to introduce more family members into various positions
of power as a means of self-perpetuation (Dal Bo, Dal Bo, & Snyder, 2009; Quer-
ubin, 2015). Solon and colleagues (2009) have shown empirically the link
between political entrenchment and electoral success. Simbulan (2005) and Riv-
era (2012, p. 67), for their part, looked into how political families have come to
substitute political parties in consolidating electoral support. In all these, the
question of how politically entrenched families actually constrain institutions is
never addressed in concrete terms.
This study narrows the gap by examining the determinants of legislative out-
put at the Philippine House of Representatives to ascertain whether dynastic
legislators—those whose political ties effectively make them impervious to term
limits—fare better in terms of legislative performance. Using count regression
models, I analyze the legislative activities of all elected representatives from the
opening of the first post-Marcos Congress (8th Congress) in 1987 to the
396 Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 8, Issue 3—2016
adjournment of the 15th Congress in 2013. The data on legislative output is based
on the statistical reports of authored and referred bills and resolutions prepared
by the Bills and Index Services of the House of Representatives and available
online through the browser-based online query system LEGIS. The models pre-
dict the dynamics of law production at the lower chamber in the past 26 years
using data that span five presidential administrations and seven Congresses.
The study makes two empirical contributions to Philippine legislative studies.
First, it examines the institutional and political determinants of lawmaking in the
Philippine context—an area where empirical introspection remains scant—and
shows how a clientelistic political setting distorts legislative production as an
accountability tool. The theoretical premise is that the lack of institutionalized
party system and the prevalence of personalistic politics allows political families
to act as functional surrogates and create a clientelistic system that insulate legis-
lators from their responsibility to constituencies in the delivery of benefits.1 We
see this in the pattern of legislative activity where neophyte legislators are pro-
ductive initially but whose zealousness dwindles once they are able to consoli-
date their districts into family bailiwicks. Second, utilizing data on legislative
records beginning from the restoration of democracy in 1987, the study offers an
evidence-based model of legislative activity at the House of Representatives. Leg-
islative dynamics remains largely unexplored as an area of Philippine politics.
Moreover, extant Congressional studies in the Philippines typically just focus on
one or two policies and restrict analysis into largely qualitative examination of
why certain legislative measures were passed into law (i.e., Falguera, 2004;
Lusterio-Rico, 2007; Tigno, 2004). The study at hand provides a general model of
lawmaking in the Philippines, analyzing how elected legislators engage in legis-
lative policymaking, and laying down the conditions under which legislative
proposals are able to find success in the legislative mill.
The article proceeds by first expounding the theoretical underpinnings used
to describe legislative lawmaking in the country and how they relate to political
accountability. I then describe the data, the variables, and the econometric
approach used to test the study’s assumptions. This is followed by an analysis
of the estimation results and a discussion of how the hypotheses on the varia-
bles of interest were supported by the findings. The last section wraps up the
discussion, recaps some of the interesting findings, and discusses their implica-
tions on competitive electoral exercise.
Legislation and Political Accountability

Political accountability is here construed to mean “a relationship between citi-
zens (subjects) as ‘principals’ and political representatives and decision makers
as “agents” (Kitschelt, Freeze, Kolev, & Wang, 2009, p. 742). The citizens hold
agents (politicians) accountable through regular elections. Politicians, in turn,
respond by delivering the benefits that their constituencies value (Kitschelt,
Hawkins, Rosas, & Zechmeister, 2010). Elected leaders are responsive if they
answer to some group—their winning coalition—that retains them in power
(Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 2003). In democracies, the win-
ning coalition is the group of voters who elected the incumbent to the office.
Incumbents, of course, may be replaced by challengers if they lose the loyalty of
a sufficient number of supporters in the winning coalition.
Legislation, on the other hand, refers to “proposals to issue binding authori-

tative decisions that incur costs and award benefits to citizens regardless of
whom they voted for in the election” (Kitschelt et al., 2010, p. 16). Legislation
can be construed as concrete manifestations of political accountability since
enacted policies provide a mix of private and public goods for constituencies.
Private goods are directed primarily to reward members of the winning coali-
tion (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Kitschelt et al., 2010). The transaction
entails monitoring and enforcement costs as the incumbent must make sure to
deliver the proper reward to the appropriate coalition of supporters. Where
there are programmatic citizen-politician linkages, such as through organized
and institutionalized political parties, this cost is reduced as parties create scale
economies in pursuit of voters (Kitschelt et al., 2010; see also Kitschelt & Wilkin-
son, 2007). With programmatically structured party systems, voters choose can-
didates based on alternative packages of policies they commit. This policy
competition creates an accountability relation that distributes valence goods
enjoyed by the larger public (Kitschelt et al., 2009, 2010).
However, in a clientilistic political setting the mode of rewarding benefits
remains direct and targeted, thus, keeping the cost of the exchange high (Kit-
schelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Kitschelt et al., 2010). Winning candidates may hand
down jobs or subsidies directly or personally to identifiable supporters such as
families and neighborhoods. Monitoring is costly and relies on a reward-sanction
mechanism utilizing social and organizational networks such as friends and fam-
ilies to ensure loyalty and weed out free riders (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; see
also Scott, 1972). Incumbents must know their supporters and vice versa because
clientilism, as an adaptive response to hostility and inequality, implies that
patrons can act directly or intercede in behalf of clients with the bureaucracy or
the state (Stein, 1984). When what patrons offer to give are vital, when they have
monopoly over distribution, or when patrons themselves have little need for cli-
ents, they are more likely to employ sanctions than benefits or threaten to with-
draw benefits already provided (Scott, 1972, p. 100). The client’s leverage is
enhanced when there are many patrons who offer the same services—say, the
crafting of policies providing jobs and social protection—who compete with one
another for electoral purposes (Scott, 1972, p. 100).
Programmatic linkages between citizens and politicians, Kitschelt and col-
leagues (2010) observe, require the presence of institutionalized parties. But in
polities where parties are weak, as in the Philippines, personal and social net-
works such as families serve as functional surrogates (Rivera, 2012; Simbulan,
2005). Manacsa and Tan (2005) note that “institutional choices have historically
inhibited the development of strong parties by denying the articulation of cer-
tain cleavages and impeding the rise of counter-elites” (p. 759). They identified
certain structures they consider inimical to the creation of strong parties such
as the dominance of the executive branch, the “synchronized” system of elec-
tions, and the institutional defects in the party list law. Family networks, most
of which are under control of a few dozen political families, utilize political par-
ties as mere “channels of political recruitment” (Ufen, 2008, p. 339). Political
parties in the Philippines are consequently reduced to transient organizations
(Manacsa & Tan, 2005; Teehankee, 2012) that tie their political fate to the pres-
ence of a viable presidential candidate (Choi, 2001; Kasuya, 2008), and are
generally perceived as lacking favorable characteristics that inspire citizen sup-

port (Gonzales, 2011). Powerful political families ultimately become embedded
in state institutions and distort the principal-agent relationship between the
public and the policymakers.
By examining the determinants of legislative production in the House of Rep-
resentatives, this article shows how the circumvention of term limits provides
impetus for electoral persistence among political families and undermines the
programmatic linkage between citizens and decision makers. But before the ana-
lytical discussion, I expound briefly in the succeeding sections the rationale for
this study’s focus on persistent families at the House of Representatives.
Political Families as Unit of Oligarchy in the Philippines

Why political families? The family is regarded as the most appropriate cate-
gory for analyzing elite oligarchic factions flexibly (Stein, 1984). Scholars of
Philippine politics, for instance, have long associated institutional dysfunctions
with the dominance of well-entrenched political clans in the country (Coronel,
Chua, Rimban, & Cruz, 2004; Gutierrez, Torrente, & Narca, 1992; Rivera, 2012).
The rationale is that those who wield power in society can also determine the
direction of economic policies and the distribution of economic resources (Ace-
moglu & Robinson, 2008). As political elites, well-entrenched families have
comparative advantage in vesting in de jure power given their wealth, weapons,
or influence in addressing collective issue problems (Mosca, 1939; Olson, 1965).
Philippine elections, for example, have long been characterized by factional
competition between rival patron-client networks among local influential fami-
lies producing “unrestrictedness, closeness, and intensity of competition for
elective office at all levels of government” (Lande, 1965, p. 115). Because elec-
toral politics require massive wealth and machinery to mobilize voters, elected
officials are preoccupied with exploiting access to state resources for particular-
istic benefit to ensure their reelection or to repay financial backers (Sidel, 2014).
Voters, on the other hand, are left defenseless against clientelistic pressure from
local bosses whose wealth and political machines are fueled by no less than the
state’s apparatus for capital accumulation (Sidel, 2000). Miranda (2012) goes as
far as referring to the Philippines as a nondemocratic oligarchy where the oli-
garchic social structure has severely limited access to power to a few dominant
political families, while the means of accessing power has been largely
undemocratic due to the absence of credible elections.
Families serve a plethora of functions. Where politics is part of the usual day-
to-day activities, it provides a socialization experience different from that in
nonpolitical families (Hess, 1966). Legislators who grew up in this environment
are more likely to see political participation as normal and usual. Teehankee, in
a 2007 Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) article, notes that
the 160 families who have made the Philippine Congress their second homes
have practically become fixtures in Philippine politics (Teehankee, 2007). These
families would typically have two or several members serving in the legislature
and account for 424 or about a quarter of the 2,407 who have sat in Congress
from 1907 to 2004. In a more recent work, Rivera (2012) found that 178 political
families have dominated the post-Marcos Congress since its inception in 1987.
This means that there is at least one political family in each of the 77 provinces
in his study, with some having as much as five or six ruling clans. There would
be, on average, about two political families contesting each other in their
respective turfs.
Families are also believed to transmit human capital (Farber, 1971; Kurtz,
1989; Laband & Lentz, 1983). Candidates from families with a tradition of pub-
lic service enjoy name recognition, goodwill, and skills which may be trans-
ferred from one member to another. One old study observed that the children
of legislators tend to enjoy greater and earlier political success than nonpe-
digreed counterparts (Laband & Lentz, 1985).
Political families are certainly not uncommon in contemporary democracies.
Studies relating to families are not new either (i.e., Asako, Iida, Matsubayashi, &
Ueda, 2015; Clubok, Wilenski, & Berghom, 1969; Fukai & Fukui, 1992; Hess,
1966; Kurtz, 1989). More recent works, such as those of Dal Bo and colleagues
(2009) and Rossi (2014) imply that perpetuation is a cycle whereby those who are
able to hold on to their office for a longer period of time are likely to secure rela-
tives to elective office in the future. However, there is evidence suggesting not
only that dynastic persistence proliferates but that it takes place at greater magni-
tude in the Philippines. Querubin (2015), for instance, found that those who had
been elected as representatives or governors are five times more likely to have a
relative in office in the future than candidates who run and lose. Candidates who
the study construes as dynastic2 are 25 percentage points more likely to succeed
in an election than their nondynastic counterparts. More importantly, however,
Querubin’s (2015) findings suggest that the political system itself paves the way
for new powerful families since previously nondynastic officials who have
gained access to power are more likely to create political dynasties of their own.
Since the first post-Marcos Congress, on average about half of the members of
the House of Representatives have had relatives who held elective positions at
the national or local level (Coronel, et al., 2004; Rivera, 2012; Simbulan, 2005). In a
system where political kinship is political capital, family members typically vie
for all elective local positions as much as possible, or succeed one family member
as seamlessly as possible. This effectively circumvents the term limits imposed
on elective positions, making it typical to encounter localities governed by the
same family for generations. Younger members of political clans usually take or
are made to take advantage of low-level local positions as training ground before
finally assuming positions as city mayors, provincial governors, or Congressional
representatives. Lower level offices may not necessarily be what aspirants desire
but, as De Dios (2007) notes, they are stepping stones for higher, more powerful
positions. The most potent combination to secure power, according to De Dios
(2007), is that of membership in the House of Representatives and holding the
position of governor or mayor as it consolidates local executive power with
access to national resources.
House of Representatives as Vector of Economic

and Political Privilege
Why powerful families proliferate in Congress is not by accident. Legisla-
tures have been held to be institutions where the privileged few protect their
holdings and status (Winters, 2011). Unlike ordinary citizens, the extremely
wealthy face particular political problems and challenges that are directly
linked to the material power resources they own or use in stratified societies.
Moreover, only oligarchs are capable of using wealth for wealth’s defense.
Wealth defense may be forthright as in the act of arming and resorting to vio-
lence to protect wealth from redistribution demands. It may also be carried out
more discreetly—whether individually, collectively, or impersonally—through
a state apparatus, such as Congress, that guarantees protection from multifac-
eted threats (Winters, 2014). In the case of the Philippines, Congress has served
as an important locus of rent seeking and political competition (Kang, 2003), as
well as a vector of wealth and political entrepreneurship for the elite (Coronel
et al., 2004; Gutierrez et al., 1992; Simbulan, 2005).
Congressional posts also serve as vehicles for self-entrenchment and self-
perpetuation. Quite often, the power to make laws, to conduct legislative inqui-
ries, to appropriate the national budget, and to scrutinize executive appoint-
ments, have been used by lawmakers to benefit themselves, their kin, and their
allies (Coronel et al. 2004; Gutierrez, 1994). As policy peddlers, legislators go to
Congress with a set of personal and political goals and work within the oppor-
tunity structure made available by their office (Schiller, 1995). Krinks (2002)
believes it is through institutional mechanisms such as an elective office where
those with large economic interests or seeking to evade legal obligation access
the apparatus of a weak state. By themselves or through nominees elected to
Congress, elites can intervene not just in the appointments of civil servants but
prevent those at the upper echelons of the state to change the rules or enforce
the proper rules (Acemoglu 2008; Krinks, 2002), and sustain in the process the
oligarchic status quo (Acemoglu 2008; see also Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008).
Because political dynasties can effectively secure reelection (either through
wealth, network, power, or influence) there is no incentive for House members
from well-entrenched political families to invest in vote-courting activities (Dal
Bo & Rossi, 2008). In one study of local health service delivery, economists
found that incumbents from political dynasties tend to discount the future util-
ity of providing local health services because family ties can secure votes in the
next election, even in the presence of term limits (Capuno, Quimbo, Kraft, Tan,
& Fabella, 2012). Politicians from ordinary backgrounds, however, do not resort
to such discounting being aware that a term limit is merely a recess and that
there is need to be constantly accountable.
At first glance the aforementioned studies point to the rather limited impor-
tance of legislation in the workings of a body whose seeming primary preoccu-
pation is to protect and promote private, particularistic, or parochial interests.3
Empirical studies, nevertheless, have shown that legislative policymaking
remain to be an important mechanism for allocating public goods (Tusalem &
Pe-Aguirre, 2013) and in coordinating programs where political parties are less
cohesive and incapable of interest aggregation (Kawanaka, 2010; see also Fal-
guera, 2004; Panao, 2014).
From a pragmatic perspective, political entrenchment can arguably guarantee
policy stability by allowing politicians to plan long-term projects and have
more opportunities to rectify policy failures. Reelection prospects, for instance,
have been shown to have a direct positive impact, at least on health service
delivery (Capuno & Panganiban, 2012), even if incumbent vote-courting
behavior is merely temporary or in response to yardstick competition from

other local governments (Capuno et al., 2012).
I hypothesize that the relationship between entrenchment and productivity is
not straightforward and that entrenchment induces performance only up to a
point. Thus, initially political entrenchment may increase legislative productiv-
ity but after some time representatives who come from political families that
dominate the office too long may behave no differently from the proverbial pol-
itician who sees no reason to invest in political capital.
As main independent variable, electoral persistence pertains to the number
of years the incumbent representatives or members of their families have occu-
pied the legislative seat without break. A relative is one who is related up to the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity to the previous occupant. This defini-
tion is consistent with the restriction set forth in laws governing public officials
such as Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code) and Republic Act 6713
(An Act Establishing a Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Offi-
cials and Employees). In some studies (e.g., Mendoza et al., 2012; Querubin,
2015) a name identification approach is used to determine which members
belong to political families. I avoided a name identification approach because,
as proponents of the aforementioned studies warn, it suffers from a number of
limitations such as not taking into account relationship by affinity and the fact
that two complete strangers can share the same family name (Mendoza et al.,
2012, p. 136). I resort instead to qualitative evidence to establish kinship.
Among the secondary materials analyzed include newspaper reports, personal
declarations,4 and data from PCIJ.
Legislative Success and its Other Determinants

Legislative success as a dependent variable is construed here in two ways: (a)
the number of measures a representative is able to peddle successfully to third
reading before the Lower House, and (b) the number of measures a representa-
tive is able to legislate into law.
Because the Philippine Congress is bicameral, bills undergo the legislative
process at two levels. All legislative measures must first be filed by a member
of Congress, whether in the Senate or in the House of Representatives. Any-
thing can be a subject of legislation as long as it observes the substantive and
procedural limitations under the Constitution. For instance, Congress cannot
pass laws that cannot be repealed by subsequent statutes or those that encroach
on the powers of the executive or the judiciary. Moreover, as a procedural
requirement, no bill passed either by the Senate or the House of Representative
shall become law unless it has passed three readings on separate days.
As Table 1 shows, legislative output varies for each member of Congress. On
average a member introduces about 36 bills for consideration but some are able
to bring to the floor as much as 1,532 legislative measures for deliberation in
one year.5 There are also members who have had not even a single bill. A typi-
cal member would be able to pass about four legislative proposals into law. The
savviest would have about 51 legislative measures approved into legislation.
But there are also members who cannot even facilitate the enactment of a single
legislation.
Table 1. Summary of Descriptive Statistics
Std.
N Mean Dev. Min Max
Variable
Bills introduced (authored and 8158 35.77 65.92 0 1532
co-authored) on a given year
Bills passed in third reading 8158 5.32 10.33 0 356
Bills passed into law 8158 4.04 4.87 0 51
Bills of national significance filed 8158 3.60 14.32 0 920
as principal author
Bills of local significance filed 8158 8.65 41.61 0 1394
as principal author
Bills of national significance filed 8158 19.99 33.43 0 1068
as co-author
Bills of local significance filed 8158 3.53 11.14 0 427
as co-author
Years incumbent or relative has 8158 6.15 5.10 0 27
held the post unbroken
Proportion of representatives who 8158 0.69 0.14 0.47 0.85
belong to the president’s coalition
Number of concurrent committee 8158 0.94 1.04 0 6
vice chairmanship
Bills passed on third reading per year
First term 916 0.61 1.53 0 24
Second term 888 5.54 5.37 0 63
Third term 858 10.18 8.46 0 85
President’s coalition/party ally 3138 5.87 12.74 0 356
Nominated under the Party List 956 2.86 5.09 0 45
Speaker 34 9.32 17.46 0 85
Majority leader 34 9.38 17.28 0 83
Minority leader 48 5.02 5.72 0 32
Committee chair 1774 6.37 13.45 0 260
Corazon Aquino 1314 5.32 5.23 0 45
Fidel Ramos 1792 6.89 7.72 0 54
Joseph Estrada 675 5.68 7.12 0 56
Gloria Arroyo (succession presidency) 3217 5.04 14.26 0 356
Gloria Arroyo 1160 3.44 5.16 0 41
Last two years of the president 3088 6.70 10.81 0 244
Male 6922 5.39 10.87 0 356
Female 1236 4.94 6.55 0 84
Bills passed into law per year
First term 4590 4.05 4.88 0 48
Second term 2212 4.38 5.16 0 51
Third term 1356 3.44 4.23 0 49
President’s coalitional ally 3138 4.45 4.92 0 51
Sectoral representative 956 2.12 3.15 0 22
Speaker 34 7.06 9.54 0 48
Majority leader 34 6.38 9.23 0 49
(Continued)
Table 1. (Continued)
Std.
N Mean Dev. Min Max
Minority leader 48 5.13 5.74 0 35
Committee chair 1774 4.33 4.95 0 51
Corazon Aquino 1314 5.64 5.93 0 40
Fidel Ramos 1792 5.97 5.26 0 34
Joseph Estrada 675 1.87 2.33 0 15
Gloria Arroyo (succession presidency) 3217 3.06 3.94 0 49
Gloria Arroyo 1160 3.20 4.81 0 51
Last two years of the president 3088 6.20 5.58 0 49
Male 6922 4.09 4.95 0 51
Female 1236 3.72 4.35 0 48
It is tempting to measure legislative success conveniently as a rate represent-

ing the proportion of bills a legislator is able to turn into law out of the total
proposals submitted to the floor. Rates, however, give a distorted meaning to
legislative production. For instance, if a member has introduced only one pro-
posal and it became law, the hit rate would naturally be 100%. A legislator
who has introduced 12 but is able to pass only six, on the other hand, would
have a hit rate of only 50% even if obviously more bills have been peddled
than in the erstwhile example. Furthermore, a rate approach presupposes that
all legislative measures are the same and ignores the relative importance legis-
lators and their constituencies attach to certain measures. A legislator who was
able to pass just a single legislation out of 100 proposals would appear to be
performing poorly in terms of success rate. Yet, such single law may be
enough, as far as the constituencies are concerned, especially if that very same
law paved the way for the much needed public work project or quality health
care.
But even if constituencies put premium on the actual laws passed by repre-
sentatives rightfully justifying a count model, it remains to be a crude measure
of legislative performance that does not really capture the substantive import of
policies produced through the legislative process. The most this study does in
terms of categorizing bills into their policy salience is to distinguish them
according to their local or national significance.6 I recognize this explicitly as a
methodological limitation of this study.
Controlling for Legislator Qualities and Other Determinants

of Legislative Success
To estimate the effect of political entrenchment on legislative productivity I
performed negative binomial regressions controlling for a number of variables
known to influence legislative output. These variables include partisan align-
ment (Abramowitz, 1985; Choi, 2001; Cover, 1986; Gronke, Koch, & Wilson,
2003; Kasuya, 2008; Neustadt, 1960, 1990), policy salience (Hogan, 2008; Mouw
& Mackuen, 1992; Talbert & Potoski, 2002; Wood & Peake, 1998), House leader-
ship (Adler, Cameron, & Minkoff, 2009; Evans, 1991; Fenno, 1978; Mayhew,
1974, 2005; Parker & Dull, 2009; Thomas & Grofman, 1992), president’s influ-
ence on lawmaking (Hager & Sullivan, 1994; Johnson & Roberts, 2004; Ostrom
& Job, 1986; Ostrom & Simon, 1988; Rivers & Rose, 1985), gender difference
(Poggione, 2004; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005; Volden, Wiseman, &
Wittmer, 2010), and socioeconomic conditions (Boix & Stokes, 2003; Przeworski
& Limongi, 1997; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000).
Partisan alignment as an indicator is construed several ways. One variable
creates categorical distinctions as to the effect when a representative is affiliated
with the president’s party, as well as when a representative is nominated under
the party list system. There are two types of representatives in the Philippine
House of Representatives (Art. VI, Sec 5.1, 1987 Constitution). The first type, the
district representatives, is composed of those elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila, and
voted upon exclusively by their respective constituencies. The second type, the
party list representatives, is comprised of members nominated through a party
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Unlike district representatives who are chosen exclusively by their respective
constituencies, party list representatives are nominated by party list organiza-
tions who won at least 2% of the valid votes cast at large (nationally) for the
party list system. Whereas district representatives are elected via the traditional
mechanism of legislative representation based on geographical districts, party-
list representatives represent groups of people advocating certain issues. Unlike
the typical district representative, party list members represent the marginal-
ized, underrepresented, and those lacking well-defined political constituencies.
Lacking strong political support, however, it is not unusual for party list repre-
sentatives to see their pet bills ignored or shelved in favor of counterpart meas-
ures by the district representatives.
Another variable captures the effect of divided government (Coleman, 1999;
Edwards, Barrett, & Peake, 1997; Fiorina, 1992; Howell, Adler, Cameron, & Rie-
mann, 2000; Krehbiel 1993, 1998; Mayhew 2005) by taking the proportion of
members of the House of Representatives who belong to the president’s coali-
tion in a given Congress.7
Policy salience categorizes bills into either of local or national significance
(coded 1 if a bill is of national significance), consistent with the idea that partic-
ularistic bills benefiting only a particular constituency or locality are more
likely to pass than controversial measures that contain policies aimed at
regulating broad economic or national activities (Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier,
& Sinclair-Chapman, 2003; Molinas, Perez-Li~ nan, Saiegh, & Montero, 2008).
Bills categorized by salience are further classified into those that representa-
tives authored personally and those that they co-authored with other members
(co-authorship).
Two variables measure the effect of the chief executive’s influence on the leg-
islative process. One categorizes Congresses into which administrations they
fall respectively. This variable captures legislative production when Corazon
Aquino (base period), Fidel V. Ramos, Joseph Estrada, and Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo assumed the presidency.8 The other gauges the so-called lame duck
effect and ascertains the temporality of executive sway over Congress (Collier
& Sullivan, 1995; Hager & Sullivan, 1994; Sullivan, 1991). This dichotomous
variable is coded 1 if an observation falls under the last two years of the presi-
dent’s term.
Committee leadership is a categorical variable that measures the effect of
involvement in the House’s leadership and committee structure, particularly
when a representative sits as any of the following: (a) speaker of the house,
(b) house majority leader, (c) house minority leader, (d) committee chairperson,
or (e) committee vice chairperson. Since representatives can be appointed as
vice chairperson to more than one committee, this variable was treated as
continuous.
I categorized legislators into gender (coded 1 if male) to gauge whether there
is a difference between male and female legislators in terms of legislative
productivity.
I use annual inflation9 to gauge the effect of socioeconomic conditions on leg-
islative activity, consistent with the idea that increased levels of economic dis-
tress tend to heighten legislative productivity, particularly those that propose
economic policies (Calvo, 2007; Fukumoto, 2008; Hiroi, 2008).
Estimation Approach
Legislative records of bills filed by each representative per year from 1987
(8th Congress) to 2013 (15th Congress), as reported by the Bills and Index Serv-
ices of the House of Representatives, were examined to test the relationship
between legislative productivity and political entrenchment. The data set con-
tains information on the legislative output of individual House members per
year with respect to the number of bills they proposed individually or in collab-
oration with colleagues. It also indicates how many of these bills successfully
hurdled third reading in the Lower House, as well as how many eventually
passed into legislation for a given year.
Table 1, which gives a descriptive summary of the key variables, shows that
there are observations with zero values and suggests the need to account for
overdispersion. As estimation approach I employed negative binomial regres-
sion which is an extension of Poisson used to model overdispersed variables or
where the conditional variance exceeds the mean—as in this case where there
are legislators who failed to obtain approval for even a single law in a given
Congress.10
The summary gives a number of interesting observations about lawmaking
in the Philippines. We see, for instance, that on their own, representatives gen-
erally propose more bills of local significance. This is expected since legislation
providing state or local benefits are generally less controversial and rarely sub-
jected to lengthy deliberation than policies that have statewide or national
implications (Anderson et al., 2003). These particularistic bills are more likely to
pass than measures that govern or regulate activities that affect the nation at
large (Molinas et al., 2008).
However, it is actually national legislations proposed in collaboration with
other representatives that typically preoccupy legislators. Co-authorships or
collaborations, however, do not necessarily imply that each of the designated
co-authors actually have a hand in the drafting of the bill. More often, these
laws remain the sole concern of their principal authors and co-authorships
serve merely as a nominal indication of support (Campbell, 1982; Koger, 2003).
Consequently, it is possible for a legislator to sit with not even a single legisla-
tion and still appear productive through co-authorships.
Persistence is measured in terms of the number of years the incumbents or
their relatives have held the Congressional post unbroken. Table 1 suggests
that there are representatives whose families have monopolized their Congres-
sional seats continuously for close to three decades.
The figures also show that since 1987 the president’s party has generally
enjoyed wide majority at the House of Representatives. The smallest proportion
of partisan support at the Lower House is 47%, while the average is 69% for all
Congresses examined.
The mean number of bills a member is able to pass on third reading appears
to improve with experience (term). Experience, however, does not seem to mat-
ter if we look at the mean number of bills a representative is able to successfully
peddle into law.
Legislators aligned with the president’s party appear to enjoy better legisla-
tive success than those from other parties. Members under the party list system,
on the other hand, appear to be marginalized even in the legislative process. Of
the legislative proposals coming from the party list representatives on any typi-
cal year, only about three would be approved on third reading. Of this, only
two would be eventually enacted into legislation.
There appears to be no substantial difference between male and female legis-
lators with respect to their average annual legislative output, be it in terms of
bills passed in third reading or actual number of bills passed into law. Never-
theless the descriptive summary also shows that women remain largely under-
represented in the Philippine House of Representatives and comprise about
only 17.8% of the members for the entire period studied.
House leadership also appears to have an impact on legislative success. For
instance, the House Speaker is able to facilitate the passage of around 40 meas-
ures per Congress on average, 30 of which would be passed into law. Commit-
tee chairpersons, on the other hand, have 30% more bills approved on third
reading before the Lower House than a typical member. We can see also that
representatives may be appointed as vice chairpersons to more than one
committee.
Results
Table 2 gives two fully specified models gauging legislative success. Model 1
tests the effect of electoral persistence measured in terms of number of legisla-
tive proposals that passed third reading in the Lower House. Model 2, on the
other hand, measures the effect of electoral persistence on the successful pas-
sage of bills into law. Both models suggest that legislative productivity
increases the longer representatives and their families dominate their respective
Congressional posts. This positive relationship, however, is only up to a point
and thereafter political persistence constrains legislative productivity.
Table 2. The Determinants of Legislative Productivity
Model 1 Model 2
Bills Passed Bills Passed
on Third into
Reading Legislation
Main
Persistence (years) 0.152 (0.0110)*** 0.219 (0.0108)***
Persistence squared 20.00601 (0.000477)*** 20.00806 (0.000491)***
Seniority (base is first term)
Second term 20.167 (0.0393)*** 20.306 (0.0371)***
Third term 20.446 (0.0528)*** 20.653 (0.0508)***
Gender difference (male 5 1) 20.0357 (0.0378) 0.0506 (0.0362)
Partisan alignment
Member belongs to president’s 20.0457 (0.0289) 20.0812 (0.0259)**
coalition
Divided government 20.671 (0.197)*** 20.185 (0.158)
Member is a party list nominee 20.346 (0.0592)*** 20.407 (0.0508)***
House leadership
House speaker 0.498 (0.206)* 0.691 (0.217)**
Majority leader 0.432 (0.201)* 0.492 (0.245)*
Minority leader 0.168 (0.151) 0.240 (0.143)
Committee chair 0.130 (0.0344)*** 0.0765 (0.0305)*
Committee vice chair 0.0652 (0.0155)*** 0.0688 (0.0132)***
Policy salience
Bills of national significance 20.00260 (0.00168) 20.00344 (0.00351)
(authored)
Bills of local significance (authored) 0.000353 (0.000236) 20.000109 (0.000256)
Bills of national significance 0.0137 (0.00133)*** 0.00271 (0.000552)***
(co-authored)
Bills of local significance 0.0242 (0.00264)*** 0.00226 (0.00121)
(co-authored)
Administration (C. Aquino as base)
Fidel V. Ramos 0.503 (0.0493)*** 0.243 (0.0414)***
Joseph E. Estrada 0.840 (0.0691)*** 20.472 (0.0628)***
Gloria M. Arroyo (succession) 0.412 (0.0717)*** 20.412 (0.0579)***
Gloria M. Arroyo 0.610 (0.0957)*** 0.173 (0.0850)*
Last two years of the president’s 0.525 (0.0369)*** 0.732 (0.0298)***
term
Socioeconomic conditions (inflation) 0.0881 (0.00572)*** 0.0233 (0.00419)***
_cons 20.0851 (0.193) 0.276 (0.152)
lnalpha
_cons 0.126*** (0.0235) 20.487*** (0.0303)
AIC 41,879.4 38,044.2
BIC 42,054.6 38,219.4
N 8,158 8,158
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. AIC, Akaike Information Criterion; BIC, Bayesian Informa-
tion Criterion.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
These models imply that legislators who are elected for the first time but
whose families are capable of holding on to the post indefinitely have no incen-
tive to be productive if their families have dominated the post for at least
13 years. The turning point for working toward the passage of pet measures at
the Lower House is 12.63 years (bills passed on third reading). It is 13.58 years
with respect to seeking bicameral approval for these measures. Members of the
Lower House, by constitutional provision, cannot run beyond three successive
three-year terms. However, there is no restriction against running subsequently
after the lapse of the prohibited period. It is even typical for politically well-
entrenched families to field other family members during the interim (Coronel
et al., 2004; Rivera, 2012). Both models suggest that political families with mem-
bers who were able to dominate legislative seats for three full terms and are
successful in consigning another relative anew in the same post immediately
thereafter have little need to invest in vote courting activities.
Elections are institutions for exacting accountability, thus, it should be no
surprise for legislators to work hard even if only to guarantee their reelection.
However, there is almost no motivation to work harder for a legislator who suc-
ceeds to a relative in subsequent elections, especially if the legislator’s family
has dominated the Congressional post continuously in circumvention of term
limits. One out of 10 representatives in the study belongs to a family who has
persistently maintained foothold on their district for more than 13 years. These
are representatives whose family networks, wealth, power, and influence serve
as sufficient political capital to guarantee the reelections of subsequent candi-
dates and the perpetuation of members in the Congressional seat.
Is it possible that the turnaround is not necessarily a decline in legislative
activism but more a matter of learning for representatives who have grown
wiser about legislative procedures with each successive reelection? While it
remains inconclusive how seniority impacts legislative output, there are never-
theless studies that show that increased levels and dispersion of seniority create
a cartel-like effect whereby more experienced legislators restrict the quantity of
legislation (Holcombe & Park, 1991; Sobel & Ryan, 2011). Perhaps neophyte
House members go to the trouble of authoring bills initially and then realize
eventually that they can achieve their purpose effortlessly by merely inserting
riders or revisions to other pieces of legislation. Models 3 and 4 in Table 3 are
iterations of the previous models but include interactions between seniority
and co-authorship variables. The interaction variables should indicate statisti-
cally significant negative relationships if indeed legislators grow wiser by
engaging more on strategic collaboration and lowering legislative output. Evi-
dence provided by the estimates, however, weighs against such assumption.
The results are substantially the same with respect to the other variables
What about the effect of legislator qualities and other political variables?
Looking at the dynamics of legislative production at the Lower House, there
appears to be no difference between male legislators and their female counter-
parts. In working toward the passage of bills in third reading female members
appear to be more proactive. Statistically, however, their enthusiasm is no dif-
ferent from that of male colleagues. Similarly there is no difference between
male and female representatives when it comes to seeking bicameral approval
for legislative proposals.
Table 3. Testing for the Effect of Policy Learning
Model 3 Model 4
Bills Passed Bills Passed
on Third into
Reading Legislation
Main
Persistence (years) 0.154 (0.0112)*** 0.218 (0.0109)***
Persistence squared 20.00609 (0.000484)***20.00804 (0.000494)***
Seniority (base is first term)
Second term 20.0834 (0.0601) 20.321 (0.0415)***
Third term 20.482 (0.0733)*** 20.631 (0.0546)***
Gender difference (male 5 1) 20.0329 (0.0377) 0.0500 (0.0363)
Partisan alignment
Member belongs to president’s coalition 20.0479 (0.0289) 20.0806 (0.0259)**
Divided government 20.696 (0.197)*** 20.182 (0.159)
Member is a party list nominee 20.345 (0.0592)*** 20.409 (0.0509)***
House leadership
House speaker 0.476 (0.200)* 0.692 (0.215)**
Majority leader 0.390 (0.192)* 0.509 (0.247)*
Minority leader 0.168 (0.152) 0.239 (0.142)
Committee chair 0.131 (0.0346)*** 0.0760 (0.0305)*
Committee vice chair 0.0635 (0.0156)*** 0.0692 (0.0132)***
Policy salience
Bills of national significance (authored) 20.00261 (0.00171) 20.00340 (0.00349)
Bills of local significance (authored) 0.000322 (0.000238) 20.000114 (0.000258)
Bills of national significance 0.0146 (0.00167)*** 0.00288 (0.000729)***
(co-authored)
Bills of local significance (co-authored) 0.0250 (0.00510)*** 0.000456 (0.00401)
Administration (C. Aquino as base)
Fidel V. Ramos 0.512 (0.0497)*** 0.240 (0.0415)***
Joseph E. Estrada 0.837 (0.0695)*** 20.466 (0.0628)***
Gloria M. Arroyo (succession) 0.412 (0.0716)*** 20.411 (0.0578)***
Gloria M. Arroyo 0.602 (0.0957)*** 0.175 (0.0852)*
Last two years of the president’s term 0.520 (0.0376)*** 0.735 (0.0301)***
Socioeconomic conditions (inflation) 0.0883 (0.00582)*** 0.0233 (0.00420)***
Second term 3 bills of national 20.00354 (0.00270) 0.000237 (0.00116)
significance (co-authored)
Third term 3 bills of national significance 0.00135 (0.00347) 20.00135 (0.00140)
(co-authored)
Second term 3 bills of local significance 20.00399 (0.00642) 0.00316 (0.00464)
(co-authored)
Third term 3 bills of local significance 0.00163 (0.00698) 0.000892 (0.00434)
(co-authored)
_cons 20.0989 (0.192) 0.278 (0.152)
lnalpha
_cons 0.124 (0.0234)*** 20.487 (0.0303)***
N 8,158 8,158
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Seniority appears to have a negative effect on legislative productivity. The

enthusiasm of representatives in legislative production, the results suggest,
dwindles with each subsequent reelection. This finding, nevertheless, must be
taken into context and should not be construed to mean simply that representa-
tives on their final terms are less productive. The three-consecutive-three-year
term limit is not an absolute disqualification. In fact, it is not uncommon to
encounter veteran politicians repeatedly enjoying fresh first terms. Neverthe-
less, the result supports the conjecture on the negative effect of persistence on
legislative productivity.
The estimation results also show that the effect of coalitional and partisan
alliance varies depending on the stage of the bicameral legislative process.
Whether or not a representative belongs to the president’s party hardly makes
any difference in the deliberation of legislative measures as far as the Lower
House is concerned. It is an entirely different story with respect to the delibera-
tion of bills at the bicameral level for at this stage partisan alignment with the
chief executive becomes a significant, albeit prejudicial, determinant of legisla-
tive success. The president’s partisan allies at the Lower House suffer a 7.8%
decrease in success rate of turning proposals into law. The variable measuring
the effect of divided government provides further credence to the counterpro-
ductive effect of partisan alignment with the president. Philippine presidents
have traditionally enjoyed wide partisan support at the Lower House (Coronel
et al., 2004; Kasuya, 2008) but what the estimates suggest is that this configura-
tion is not healthy for Congress institutionally, at least with respect to legisla-
tive productivity. Partisan alignment does not seem to matter in translating
proposals into legislation, suggesting that a different dynamics is at play in the
pursuit of bicameral approval.
Party list representatives, however, are sui generis. Party list representatives
are about 29% less likely to pass a bill on third reading and about 33% less
likely to see their measures enacted into legislation. From a supply side per-
spective of lawmaking where members are construed to engage in vote trading,
party list representatives themselves appear to be marginalized in legislative
deliberations. This dismal performance may be tied to the challenges besetting
party list organizations. Since its introduction in 1998, for instance, the rele-
vance of the Philippine party list system in its current form has always been at
question (Arugay, Carizo, & Velasco, 2004; Kimura, 2013; Torres-Pilapil, 2015).
Despite its innovative approach and noble intent to widen political representa-
tion, confusion and misunderstanding among voters and policymakers have
complicated the implementation of the party list concept (Wurfel, 1997). The
fact that the Supreme Court was allowed to interpret—and occasionally vacil-
late—with respect to many salient provisions of the party list law only under-
mined further the relevance of an otherwise well-intended system (Torres-
Pilapil, 2015). Prior high court rulings regarding the three seat cap and the 2%
vote threshold, among others, were seen to encourage further fragmentation
among groups with already shallow support bases (Kimura, 2013). The
Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement in Atong Paglaum v. Comelec, on the
other hand, while clarifying that the party list is open to both sectoral and non-
sectoral parties alike, diminished the importance of sectoral membership as a
requirement for nominees contrary to the original intent of the constitutional
framers.11 This article tackled the party list system merely in the context of leg-
islative productivity but its current defects and possible reforms certainly merit
further introspection.
House leadership and committee involvement also appear to be significant
predictors of favorable intracameral and intercameral approval. The House
Speaker is 65% more likely to obtain support for bills proposed and high cer-
tainty of bicameral approval for these measures. The incidence rate of passage
for House majority leaders, on the other hand, is 54% at the Lower House and
64% at the bicameral level. Committee chairpersons are about 14% more likely to
see their pet measures approved before the Lower House and 7% more likely to
see these same proposals enacted into law than the average representative. Com-
mittee vice chairpersons, on the other hand, increase the likelihood of their legis-
lative proposals to be dealt with favorably at the lower chamber with every
additional committee they help preside. Each additional committee assignment
also increases by 7% the likelihood of these pet bills to be approved into
legislation.
All succeeding presidential administrations after Corazon Aquino seem to
have exerted generally positive influence on legislative productivity in the
Lower House. Executive-legislative coordination during the Ramos administra-
tion, however, deserves particular mention for its positive impact on legislative
output. Ramos saw through the creation of the Legislative-Executive Develop-
ment Advisory Council which for a time served as an effective consultative and
advisory body on certain programs and policies essential to the realization of
the goals of the national economy. The former army general was also credited
for initiating several important legislative reforms that had vital spillover
effects on the economy (Bernardo & Tang, 2008).
Lame duck, originally a business term used to describe someone who was
insolvent or in default, has now become a common expression in the literature
to pertain to a president who may not be able to run for a reelection and, thus,
at risk of losing support for legislative programs (Neustadt, 1990). Here, the
incumbency of a president is likened to a punctured wheel in which air slowly
but continuously escapes out. After election, the influence of presidents fluctu-
ates, depending on how they address national concerns and the challenges
thrown at them, only to ebb finally as they approach their exit. The result sug-
gests, however, that instead of decreasing legislative productivity the incidence
rate of legislative success is actually higher in the last two years of the presi-
dent’s tenure. However, this is not entirely surprising because important legis-
lative enactments become the president’s legacy and the chief executive usually
tries to work on getting as much legislative agenda enacted into laws as possi-
ble especially during later stages of their incumbency (Hedtke, 2002).
Members who introduce more bills of national significance in collaboration
with like minded colleagues appear to court intracameral and intercameral
approval more strongly than those who choose to concentrate on narrow-
focused localized legislations or those who pursue their legislative programs
independently. This implies on one hand that legislators, regardless of senior-
ity, heavily engage in collaborative legislation as a procedural strategy. It may
also suggest, on the other hand, that members hardly engage in issue based
personal advocacies and opt to ride freely on the efforts of more prolific
colleagues.
As conceived, legislative activity tends to increase during periods of steep or
continuous upward inflationary movements, consistent with the idea that new
laws enacted represent changes in current policies to adjust to socioeconomic
and political changes (Fukumoto, 2008).
Conclusion
Institutional realities and how individual legislators behave in such context
are strong correlates of legislative fortunes (Anderson et al., 2003). I extend the
analysis using the Philippine House of Representatives as case and demonstrate
that along with institutional arrangements the qualities that characterize Philip-
pine legislators, particularly how long they and their families have been
entrenched in power, can constrain legislative behavior and distort political
accountability. The study not only provided a general model of lawmaking at
the House of Representatives but provided empirical support on how continu-
ous entrenchment by political families and their scions can be detrimental to
the effective functioning of the legislature.
In the Philippines, this study has shown, the likelihood of a proposed mea-
sure to be enacted into legislation is strongly determined by the personal and
political circumstances of its proponent. Members who belong to well-
entrenched political families are generally less inclined to work for the passage
of their legislative measures, lending credence to the unhealthy effect of dynas-
tic persistence on electoral accountability. Political accountability is under-
mined when politicians as agents can choose not to reciprocate the votes of
their principals by circumventing institutional safeguards and capitalizing on
family networks, wealth, and influence to ensure electoral success. Reelection
bids, consistent with the idea of an electoral exercise as an accountability mech-
anism, facilitate the enthusiasm of legislators to engage in policy production
but only up to a point. Neophyte legislators who have yet to gain foothold in
the district have all the reason to be proactive in concretizing proposals into
actual legislation, at least initially. But over time, when the legislative district
becomes family turf, entrenchment and its attendant advantages gives incum-
bents and their successors little incentive to invest in vote-courting activities
such as legislative production.
The findings echo what other scholars have raised about the need to look
beyond institutional structures to advance our understanding of democratic
policymaking (Asako et al., 2015). The more important implication, however, is
on the need to reexamine how the Filipino public exercises the right to elect
those who will make policy choices on their behalf. There is nothing wrong
with political entrenchment and dynastic persistence per se. They are institu-
tional advantages that can facilitate efficient decision making at the hands of
competent leaders. But, as the estimates show, pedigree does not always trans-
late to competence. Leadership and public management skills are not traits
passed down through genes, nor acquired purely by sheer electoral persistence.
Worse, when incumbents and their families have secured the office long
enough, they work less and the electorate ultimately loses.
It would be ideal if through constant voter education Filipinos would become

vigilant and discerning, not only to make sense of each electoral experience but
to make informed choices. Democracy supposedly benefits when through com-
petitive electoral exercises politicians would be reminded of the need to be con-
stantly on their toes.
In all likelihood, however, in the next election most will still go for names
that are familiar, or stick to the lineup that has better campaign gimmicks. And
this is what makes elections in the Philippines such a tragedy.
Notes
1
The author thanks the anonymous reviewer for a refinement of this conjecture.
2
Querubin (2015) defines dynastic candidates as “those with previous relatives in office” (pp. 2–3).
3
The author thanks the anonymous reviewer for this observation.
4
For instance, all public officials and employees are required to state relatives in the government in
their statement of assets and liabilities (SALN). The submission of the SALN is required by law under
Article XI Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Sec. 8 of Republic Act No. 6713 or the “Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.”
5
Representative Narciso Monfort of the fourth District of Iloilo filed a total of 1,532 bills in 1988.
6
The distinction as to which bills are local and which are of national import is the House’s, based
on how they were categorized by the Bills and Index Services.
7
Data was taken from the data set of political institutions (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, & Walsh,
2001).
8
The variable also makes a distinction between Arroyo’s succession presidency (2001–2004) and
her term as elected president (2004–2010).
9
Inflation data for the Philippines corresponds to year-on-year percentage change taken from the
World Economic Outlook of the International Monetary Fund (https://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/index.aspx).
10
In ascertaining the extent of overdispersion, a Poisson regression model was first fitted then
tested for the assumption that the variance is equal to the mean. The result suggests a violation of the
assumption that the data are conditionally Poisson distributed.
11
Atong Paglaum relaxed the requirement that sectoral nominees must themselves be members of
the sector they represent. See, Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, GR203766, 02 April
2013 (http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/april2013/203766.pdf).
References
Abramowitz, Alan I. (1985). Economic conditions, presidential popularity, and voting behavior in
Midterm Congressional Elections. The Journal of Politics, 47(1), 31–43.
Acemoglu, Darron. (2008). Oligarchic versus Democratic societies. Journal of the European Economic
Association, 6(1), 1–44.
Acemoglu, Darron, & Robinson, James A. (2008). Persistence of power, elites, and institutions. Ameri-
can Economic Review, 98(1), 267–293.
Adler, E. Scott, Cameron, Charles M., & Minkoff, Scott. (2009, September 3–6). Bill support rates: What
they tell us about theories of lawmaking. Paper Prepared for the 2009 American Political Science
Association Meetings, Toronto, Canada.
Anderson, William D., Box-Steffensmeier, Janet, & Sinclair-Chapman, Valeria. (2003). The keys to
legislative success in the U.S. House of Representatives. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 28(3), 357–
386.
Arugay, Aries A., Carizo, Jay A., & Velasco, Djorina. (2004). The party-list system of representation:
Trojan Horse for ‘new politics’? Political Brief, 12(4), 1–29.
Asako, Yashushi, Iida, Takeshi, Matsubayashi, Tetsuya, & Ueda, Michiko. (2015). Dynastic politi-
cians: Theory and evidence from Japan. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 16(1), 5–32.
Beck, Thorsten, Clarke, George, Groff, Alberto, Keefer, Philip, & Walsh, Patrick. (2001). New tools in
comparative political economy: The database of political institutions. World Bank Economic
Review, 15(1), 165–176.
Bernardo, Romeo L., & Tang, Marie-Christine G. (2008). The political economy of reform during the
Ramos administration (1992–98). Working Paper No. 39. Washington: Commission on Growth
and Development.
Besley, Timothy, & Case, Anne. (1995). Does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices?
Evidence from gubernatorial term limits. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3), 769–798.
Boix, Carles, & Stokes, Susan. (2003). Endogenous democratization. World Politics, 55, 517–549.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Morrow, James D., Siverson, Randolph M., & Smith, Alistair. 2003. The
logic of political survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Calvo, Ernesto. (2007). The responsive legislator: Public opinion and lawmaking in a highly disci-
plined legislature. British Journal of Political Science, 37(2), 263–280.
Campbell, James E. (1982). Cosponsoring legislation in the US Congress. Legislative Studies Quarterly,
7(3), 415–422.
Capuno, Joseph J., & Panganiban, Marian. (2012). The ties that do not bind: Party affiliations and the
delivery of devolved health services in the Philippines. Philippine Political Science Journal, 33(1),
63–80.
Capuno, Joseph J., Quimbo, Stella A., Kraft, Aleli D., Tan, Carlos A., & Fabella, Vigile M. (2012). The
effects of term limits and Yardstick competition on local government provision of health insurance and
other public services: The Philippine case. Discussion Paper 2012-01, University of the Philippines
School of Economics.
Choi, Jungong. (2001). Philippine democracies old and new: Elections, terms limits and party sys-
tems. Asian Survey, 41(3), 408–501.
Clubok, Alfred B., Wilenski, Norman M., & Berghom, Forrest J. (1969). Family relationships, congres-
sional recruitment, and political modernization. Journal of Politics, 31, 1035–1106.
Coleman, John J. (1999). Unified government, divided government, and party responsiveness. The
American Political Science Review, 93(4), 821–835.
Collier, Kenneth, & Sullivan, Terry. (1995). New evidence undercutting the linkage of approval with
presidential support and influence. Journal of Politics, 57, 197–209.
Coronel, Sheila S., Chua, Yvonne, Rimban, Luz, & Cruz, Booma. (2004). Rulemakers: How the wealthy
and well-born dominate Congress. Quezon City, Philippines: Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism.
Cover, Albert D. (1986). Presidential evaluations and voting for Congress. American Journal of Political
Science, 30, 786–801.
Dal Bo, Ernest, Dal Bo, Pedro, & Snyder, Jason. (2009). Political dynasties. Review of Economic Studies,
76(1), 115–142.
Dal Bo, Ernesto, & Rossi, Martin. (2008). Term length and political performance. NBER Working Papers
14511, National Bureau of Economic Research Inc.
De Dios, Emmanuel S. (2007). Local politics and local economy. In A. M. Balisacan & Hal Hill (Eds.),
The dynamics of regional development: The Philippines in East Asia (pp. 127–173). UK: Edward Elgar.
Edwards, George C., III, Barrett, Andrew, & Peake, Jeffrey. (1997). The legislative impact of divided
government. American Journal of Political Science, 41(2), 545–563.
Evans, Lawrence. (1991). Participation and policy making in Senate Committees. 1991. Political Sci-
ence Quarterly, 106(3), 479–498.
Falguera, Norris. (2004). Budget politics in the Philippines. Pilipinas: A Journal of Philippine Studies,
42, 1–24.
Farber, Bernard. (1971). Kinship and class: A midwestern study. New York: Basic Books.
Fenno, Richard F. (1978). Home style: House members in their districts. Boston: Little Brown.
Fiorina, Morris. (1992). An era of divided government. Political Science Quarterly, 107(3), 387–410.
Fukai, Shigeko, & Fukui, Haruhiro. (1992). Elite recruitment and political leadership. PS: Political Sci-
ence and Politics, 25(1), 25–36.
Fukumoto, Kentaro. (2008). Legislative production in comparative perspective: Cross sectional study
of 42 countries and time series analysis of the Japan case. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 9(1),
1–19.
Gonzales, Dennis T. (2011). Priorities for Philippine political parties: Mass membership, political
political education, and party development law. In L. F. Lye & W. Hofmeister (Eds.), Parties,
party systems, and democratization in East Asia (pp. 243–256). Singapore: World Scientific
Publishing.
Gronke, Paul, Koch, Jeffrey, & Wilson, Matthew J. (2003). Follow the leader? Presidential approval,
presidential support, and representatives’ electoral fortunes. The Journal of Politics, 65(3),
785–808.
Gutierrez, Eric. (1994). The ties that bind: A guide to family, business, and other interests in the ninth house
of representatives. Quezon City: Institute of Popular Democracy.
Gutierrez, Eric U., Torrente, Ildefonso, & Narca, Noli G. (1992). All in the family: A study of elites and
power relations in the Philippines. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy.
Hager, Gregory L., & Sullivan, Terry. (1994). President centered and presidency-centered explana-
tions of presidential public activity. American Journal of Political Science, 38(4), 1079–1103.
Hedtke, James R. (2002). Lameduck presidents: Myth or reality? New York: The Edwin Mellen Press.
Hess, Stephen. (1966). America’s political dynasties: From Adams to Kennedy. Garden City: Doubleday
and Co.
Hiroi, Taeko. (2008). The dynamics of lawmaking in a bicameral legislature: The case of Brazil. Com-
parative Political Studies, 41, 1583–1606.
Hogan, Robert E. (2008). Policy responsiveness and incumbent reelection in state legislatures.
American Journal of Political Science 52(4), 858–873.
Holcombe, Randall G., & Park, Glenn R. (1991). Committees in legislatures: A property rights
perspective. Public Choice, 70(1), 11–20.
Howell, William, Adler, Scott, Cameron, Charles, & Riemann, Charles. (2000). Divided government
and the legislative productivity of Congress, 1945-94. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25(2),
285–312.
Johnson, Timothy R., & Roberts, Jason M. (2004). Presidential capital and the Supreme Court confir-
mation. The Journal of Politics, 66(3), 663–683.
Kang, David C. (2003). Transaction costs and crony capitalism in East Asia. Comparative Politics 35(4),
439–458.
Kasuya, Yuko. (2008). Presidential bandwagon: Parties and party systems in the Philippines. Tokyo: Keio
University Press.
Kawanaka, Takeshi. (2010). Interaction powers in the Philippine presidential system. IDE Discussion
Paper 233. Chiba: Institute for Developing Economies-JETRO.
Kimura, Masataka. (2013). Toward a more workable Philippine party list system: Addressing prob-
lems of sectoral and proportional representation. Philippine Political Science Journal, 34(1), 62–82.
Kitschelt, Herbert, Freeze, Kent, Kolev, Kiril, & Wang, Yi-Ting. (2009). Measuring democratic
accountability: An initial report on an emerging dataset. Revista de Ciencia Politica, 29(3),
741–773.
Kitschelt, Herbert, Hawkins, Kirk, Rosas, Guillermo, & Zechmeister, Elizabeth. (2010).
“Introduction: Party competition in Latin America.” In Herbert Kitshchelt, Kirk Hawkins, Juan
Pablo Luna, Guillermo Rosas, & Elizabeth Zechmeister, Latin American party systems (pp. 14–54).
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kitschelt, Herbert, & Wilkinson, Steven I. (Eds.). (2007). Patrons, clients, and policies: Patterns of demo-
cratic accountability and political competition. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Koger, Gregory. (2003). Position taking and cosponsorship in the US House. Legislative Studies Quar-
terly, 28(2), 225–246.
Kousser, Thad. (2006). The limited impact of term limits: Contingent effects on the complexity and
breadth of laws. State Politics and Policy Quarterly, 6(4), 410–429.
Krehbiel, Keith. (1993). Where’s the party? British Journal of Political Science, 23(2), 235–266.
Krehbiel, Keith. (1998). Pivotal politics: A theory of US lawmaking. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Krinks, Peter. (2002). The economy of the Philippines: Elites, inequalities, and economic restructuring. Lon-
don: Routledge.
Kurfirst, Robert. (1996). Term limit logic: Paradigms and paradoxes. Polity, 29(1), 119–140.
Kurtz, Donn M., II. (1989). The political family: A contemporary view. Sociological Perspectives, 32(3),
331–352.
Laband, David N., & Lentz, Bernard F. (1983). Like father, like son: Toward an economic theory of
occupational following. Southern Economic Journal, 50, 474–493.
Laband, David N., & Lentz, Bernard F. (1985). Favorite sons: Intergenerational wealth transfers
among politicians. Economic Inquiry, 23(3), 95–414.
Lande, Carl H. (1965). Leaders, factions, and parties: The structure of Philippine politics. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Southeast Asia Studies.
Lusterio-Rico, Ruth. (2007). Civil society groups and the legislative process: The enactment of the
indigenous people’s rights act. Philippine Political Science Journal, 28(51), 55–84.
Manacsa, Rodelio C., & Tan, Alexander C. (2005). Manufacturing parties: Reeexamining the transient
nature of Philippine political parties. Party Politics, 11, 748–765.
Mayhew, David. (2005). Divided we govern: Party control, lawmaking and investigations, 1946-2002. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Mayhew, David R. (1974). Congressional elections: The case of the vanishing marginals. Polity, 6,
295–317.
Mendoza, Ronald U., Beja, Edsel L., Venida, Victor S., & Yap, David B. (2012). Inequality in democ-
racy: Insights from an empirical analysis of political dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress.
Philippine Political Science Journal, 33(2), 132–145.
Mendoza, Ronald U., Beja, Edsel L., Venida, Victor S., & Yap, David B. (2013, October 12). Political
dynasties and poverty: Evidence from the Philippines. Paper presented at the 12th National Conven-
tion on Statistics, EDSA Shangrila Hotel.
Miranda, Felipe B. (2012). Conceptualizing and measuring democracy. In F. B. Miranda, T. C. Rivera,
M. C. Ronas, & R. D. Holmes (Eds.), Chasing the wind: Assessing Philippine democracy (pp. 1–45).
Quezon City: Commission on Human Rights.
Molinas, Jose, Perez-Li~ nan, Anibal, Saiegh, Sebastian, & Montero, Marcela. (2008). Political institu-
tions, policymaking processes, and policy outcomes in Paraguay. In E. Stein, M. Tommasi, C.
Scartascini, & P. Spiller (Eds.), Policymaking in Latin America: How politics shapes policies (pp. 329–
370). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mosca, Gaetano. (1939). The ruling class. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Mouw, Calvin J., & Mackuen, Michaell B. (1992). The strategic agenda in legislative politics. American
Political Science Review, 86(1), 87–105.
Neustadt, Richard E. (1960). Presidential power: The politics of leadership. New York: Wiley.
Neustadt, Richard E. (1990). Presidential power and the modern presidents: The politics of leadership from
Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: Free Press.
Olson, Mancur C. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Ostrom, Charles W., Jr., & Job, Brian L. (1986). The president and the political use of force. The
American Political Science Review, 80(2), 541–566.
Ostrom, Charles W., Jr., & Simon, Dennis M. (1988). The president’s public. American Journal of Politi-
cal Science, 32(4), 1096–1119.
Panao, Rogelio Alicor L. (2014). Beyond roll call: Executive-legislative relations and lawmaking in
the Philippine house of representatives. Philippine Political Science Journal, 35(1), 59–77.
Parker, David C.W., & Dull, Matthew. (2009). Divided we quarrel: The politics of congressional
investigations. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 34, 319–345.
Poggione, Sarah. (2004). Exploring gender differences in state legislator’s policy preferences. Political
Research Quarterly, 57(2), 305–314.
Przeworski, Adam, & Limongi, Fernando. (1997). Modernization: Theories and facts. World Politics,
49(2), 155–183.
Przeworski, Adam, Alvarez, Michael E., Cheibub, Jose Antonio, & Limongi, Fernando. (2000).
Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Querubin, Pablo. (2015). Family and politics: Dynastic persistence in the Philippines. Retrieved from
https://0d7619fa-a-62cb3a1a-s-sites.googlegroups.com/site/pabloquerubin/RDPaper_QJPS_
Revised_wTables.pdf.
Rivera, Temario C. (2012). In search of credible elections and parties: The Philippine paradox. In
F. Miranda, T. Rivera, M. Ronas, & R. Holmes (Eds.), Chasing the wind: Assessing Philippine democ-
racy (pp. 46–94). Quezon City, Philippines: Commission on Human Rights.
Rivers, Douglas, & Rose, Nancy L. (1985). Passing the president’s program: Public opinion and presi-
dential influence in Congress. American Journal of Political Science, 29(2), 183–196.
Rossi, Martin. (2014). Family business: Causes and consequences of political dynasties. Working Paper 114.
Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia.
Schiller, Wendy. (1995). Senators as political entrepreneurs: Using bill sponsorship to shape legisla-
tive agenda. American Journal of Political Science, 39(1), 186–203.
Scott, James C. (1972). Patron client politics and political change in Southeast Asia. The American
Political Sciene Review, 66(1), 91–113.
Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A., & Mishler, William. (2005). An integrated model of women’s representa-
tion. The Journal of Politics, 67(2), 407–428.
Sidel, John T. (2000). Capital, coercion, and crime: Bossism in the Philippines. Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni-
versity Press.
Sidel, John T. (2014). Achieving reforms in oligarchical democracies: The role of leadership and coalitions in
the Philippines. Research Paper 27. Developmental Leadership Program, University of Birming-
ham, UK.
Simbulan, Dante C. (2005). The modern Principalia: The historical evolution of the Philippine ruling oligar-
chy. Diliman, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.
Sobel, Russel, & Ryan, Matt. (2011). Seniority and anti-competitive restrictions on the legislative
common pool: Tenure’s impact on the overall production of legislation and the concentration of
political benefits. Public Choice, 153(1), 171–190.
Solon, J. Orville, Fabella, Raul V., & Capuno, Joseph J. (2009). Is local development good politics?
Local development expenditures and the re-election of governors in the Philippines in the
1990s. Asian Journal of Political Science, 17(3), 265–284.
Stein, Howard F. (1984). A note on patron-client theory. Ethos, 12(1), 30–36.
Sullivan, Terry. (1991). The bank account presidency: A new measure and evidence on the temporal
path of presidential influence. American Journal of Political Science, 35(3), 686–723.
Talbert, Jeffery C., & Potoski, Matthew. (2002). Setting the legislative agenda: The dimensional struc-
ture of bill cosponsoring and floor voting. The Journal of Politics, 64(3), 864–891.
Teehankee, Julio. (2007, March 7). And the clans play on. Philippine Center for Investigative Journal-
ism. Retrieved from http://pcij.org/stories/and-the-clans-play-on/.
Teehankee, Julio. (2012). The Philippines. In T. Inoguchi & J. Blondel (Eds.), Political parties and
democracy: Contemporary Western Europe and Asia (pp. 187–206). New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Thomas, Scott J., & Grofman, Bernard. (1992). Determinants of legislative success in house commit-
tees. Public Choice, 74(2), 233–243.
Tigno, Jorge V. (2004). Governance and public policymaking in the Philippines: RA8042 and deregu-
lating the overseas employment sector. Philippine Political Science Journal, 25(4), 1–24.
Torres-Pilapil, Crisline G. (2015). The origins of the party list electoral system in the 1986 constitu-
tional commission. Social Science Diliman, 11(1), 85–125.
Tusalem, Rollin F., & Pe-Aguirre, Jeffrey. (2013). The effect of political dynasties on effective demo-
cratic governance: Evidence from the Philippines. Asian Politics and Policy, 5(3), 359–386.
Ufen, Andreas. (2008). Political party and party system institutionalization in Southeast Asia: Les-
sons for democratic consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. The Pacific Review,
21(3), 327–350.
Volden, Craig, Wiseman, Alan E., & Wittmer, Dana R. (2010). The legislative effectiveness of women in
congress. Working Paper 04-2010. Tennessee: Vanderbilt University.
Winters, Jeffrey. A. (2011). Oligarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Winters, Jeffrey A. (2014, August 28–31). Wealth defense and the limits of liberal democracy. Paper Pre-
sented at the Annual Conference of the American Society of Political and Legal Philosophy on
the topic of “Wealth,” held in conjunction with the Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Washington DC.
Wood, B. Dan, & Peake, Jeffrey S. (1998). The dynamics of foreign policy agenda setting. American
Political Science Review, 92(1), 173–184.
Wurfel, David. (1997). The party-list system: Sectoral or national? Success or Failure? Kasarinlan: Phil-
ippine Journal of Third World Studies, 13(2), 19–30.

Aspp 12262

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Aspp 12262

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Tried and Tested?

Dynastic Persistence and Legislative

Rogelio Alicor L. Panao*

Examining the determinants of legislative success at the Philippine House of

T he prospect of reelection has been shown to have a significant effect on the

*Rogelio Alicor L. Panao is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science,

Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 8, Number 3—Pages 394–417

Legislation and Political Accountability

Legislation, on the other hand, refers to “proposals to issue binding authori-

generally perceived as lacking favorable characteristics that inspire citizen sup-

Political Families as Unit of Oligarchy in the Philippines

House of Representatives as Vector of Economic

behavior is merely temporary or in response to yardstick competition from

Legislative Success and its Other Determinants

Table 1. Summary of Descriptive Statistics

It is tempting to measure legislative success conveniently as a rate represent-

Controlling for Legislator Qualities and Other Determinants

Table 2. The Determinants of Legislative Productivity

Table 3. Testing for the Effect of Policy Learning

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

Seniority appears to have a negative effect on legislative productivity. The

It would be ideal if through constant voter education Filipinos would become

You might also like