CASE DIGEST STATCON

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS

FACTS:

Respondent Government Services Insurance System or GSIS decided to sell 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation through public bidding pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50. According to its terms, the winning bidder is
to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support
to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.

Only 2 bidders participated.

1. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC
or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share
2. Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner

Petitioner, in a letter sent to GSIS, matched the bid price of 44.00 per shared tendered by Renong Berhad
pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder and the execution of the necessary contracts.

In a subsequent letter, petitioner sent a manager's check for 33,000,000.00 to match the bid Renong Berhad
which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

Because of the refusal of the GSIS, petitioner filed for prohibition and mandamus which the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale.

Petitioner invoked in its petition on Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution arguing that:

1. MHC had become a part of the national patrimony practically become a historical monument for the
Filipino nation
2. Respondent GSIS, a GOCC, owns 51% of the corporation’s shares, the hotel business of respondent GSIS
being a part of the tourism industry, is unquestionably a part of the national economy.

Respondent argued that:

1. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy
since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation
2. Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony based on the first and second paragraphs
of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
3. But even if it is, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only
51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the
building stands.
4. the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason,
the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Share

ISSUE:
Whether the provisions in Section 10, par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution are self-executing

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative because the provision is self-executing.

“On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence
of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.”

FRANCISCO Jr. vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FACTS:

Former President Joseph E. Estrada filed for an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide
and seven Associate Justices for the "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other
high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo Zamora and Didagen
Piang Dilangalen and was referred to the House Committee on Justice. The complaint is rules as sufficient in form
but voted to dismiss for being insufficient in substance.

Another impeachment complaint was then filed by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William
Fuentebella against CJ Hilario Davide on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3)
of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Numerous petitions from different personalities were filed contesting the second impeachment complaint
against CJ Davide.

ISSUE:

Whether the Constitution excluded the proceedings of impeachment from the coverage of judicial review

RULING:

Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by
the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent
of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the
different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is
inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop
there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions
are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of
law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the
text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter
it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the
cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain
the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De
Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our
Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
 others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all
other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to

be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction
which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the
same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto
may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it
safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:

The petition is about the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 248 issued by former President Corazon C.
Aquino which allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein
imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides as follows:

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

However, DOJ Opinion No. 73 and Executive Order No. 284 allegedly lumped together Section 13, Article VII and
the general provision in another article, Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB which provides that:
 Sec. 7.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 248 constitutional

RULING:

The Court ruled Executive Order No. 248 as null and void.

By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold
in addition their primary position to not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the
express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to
those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.

ENDENCIA vs. DAVID

FACTS:

This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of Republic
Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-
fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46,
representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice
of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, without special pronouncement as to costs.

ISSUE:

Whether Section 13 RA No. 590 can legalize and justify the collection of income tax of judicial officials.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ordered for the refund of the taxes.

The Legislature cannot override the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the constitutional provisions.

Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and
enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the provisions of said
laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this
authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution.

Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the
meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether
there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared
invalid and unconstitutional.

Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the
power granted to the courts by the Constitution.

When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the
duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating their
oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is
imperative and unceasing;

NIFTAFAN vs. COMMISSIONER of INTERNAL REVENUE

FACTS:

Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or
perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme
Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a
decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it
is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."

ISSUE:

Whether the members of the Judiciary are exempt from income tax

RULING:

The Court REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice's previous and standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget
Office of this Court to continue with the deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices of
the Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other members of the judiciary.

The deliberations in the 1986 Constitutional Commission reveal that the clear intent of the framers was to
delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary,² so as
to “give substance to equality among the three branches of the govt”. It was made clear that the salaries of
members of the Judiciary would be subject to income tax applied to all taxpayers.³ The payment of such income
tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries
during their continuance in office.

AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ

FACTS:

Petitioner Mons Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance of
writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts, from issuing and selling stamps commemorative
of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress.

Sometime in May 1936, the Director of Posts ordered the issues of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman
Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente
Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines.

In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United
States the designs of the postage stamps for printing.

Design:

In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design.

The stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches.

The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50.

The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant case,
although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions.

ISSUE:

Whether the issuance and selling of post stamps a violation of the Constitution

RULING:

The Court denied the petition.

It appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of
Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature.

It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and printing of
postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in
the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and
issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the
Philippines.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary
power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government."
The issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourist to this country."

PEOPLE vs. PALMA

FACTS:

This is a petition to resolve the sole issue of conflict of jurisdiction between the City Court of Naga (presided by
respondent judge) and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts for Camarines Sur and Cities of Naga and Iriga
over criminal cases where the accused is 16 but under 21 years of age and rules that the issuance of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code (PD 603) which includes such accused within the definition of youthful offenders (over 9
years but under 21 years at the time of the commission of the offense) did not transfer jurisdiction over such
cases from the regular courts (the City Court in this case) to the Juvenile Courts.

Respondent-accused Intia y Morada, 17 yrs old, was charged with vagrancy at the fiscal’s office of Naga City in
respondent judge’s court. The Respondent judge Hon. Palma dismissed the case on the ground that her court
"has no jurisdiction to continue to take further cognizance of this case" without prejudice to the refiling thereof
in the Juvenile Court.

The prosecution shares the view of the Camarines Sur Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court presided by Judge
Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa that jurisdiction over 16-year olds up to under 21 years remains with the regular
courts and has not been by implication transferred to the Juvenile Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the Juvenile Court has the jurisdiction over the case of a 17-year-old accused as stated in the law.

RULING:

No. The Court sustains the petition on the following grounds:

1. Republic Act 6591 which took effect on September 30, 1972 created the Camarines nand limited jurisdiction
over "criminal cases wherein the accused is under sixteen years of age at the time of the filing of the case. 1

The subsequent issuance of P. D. 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code which took effect on June 11,
1975 and defines in Article 189 a youthful offender as "one who is over nine years but under twenty-one years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense" did not by such definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal
cases involving accused who are 16 years and below 21 years of age from the regular courts 2 to the Juvenile
Court, as opined by respondent judge.

2. The Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. 603) concerning the welfare of the child and youth throughout the
country is a general law while R.A. 6591 which defined and confer jurisdiction on the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court for Camarines Sur is a special law 3 classifying expressly that it can try in criminal cases involving
offenders below the age of majority only those accused who are under 16 years of age at the time of
the filing of the case.

Jurisdiction is conferred by law and there is nothing in either R.A. 6591 or P.D. 603 that would sustain
respondent judge's ruling on reconsideration that "together, these two laws, the latter amending the former
confer jurisdiction on youthful offenders who are above 16 years but under 21 years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime upon the JDRC of Camarines Sur and remove the same from the City Court."
A general law cannot repeal a special law by mere implication. The repeal must be express and specific.
Furthermore, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Camarines Sur is a court of special and limited
jurisdiction and the enlargement or conferment of additional jurisdiction on said court to include accused
persons who are 16 years and under 21 years of age must positively appear in express terms.

VALERA vs. TUASON

FACTS:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra dismissing a petition for certiorari.

A complaint of forcible entry was filed in the justice of the peace of court of Lagayan where Judge Federico
Paredes was presiding. Finding himself disqualified to try the case by the reason of relationship to one of the
parties, he transferred the case to the justice of the peace of court of La Paz.

The justice of peace of court of La Paz, over the objection of the attorneys of the defendant, proceeded the trial
and render judgment for the plaintiff and returned the case with his decision to the justice of peace of Lagayan.

Meanwhile respondent Mariano Tuason is the new appointed justice of peace of Lagayan. After the case was
received in the court of the justice of the peace of Lagayan, the defendants moved for a new trial impeaching
the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace of La Paz which the respondent found the challenge null and void.

The Lagayan justice's ground for invalidating the decision of the justice of the peace of La Paz is that "the
designation of another justice of the peace to hear, try and decide a given case, when the justice having
jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the same disqualifies himself, is not in law given to the disqualifying justice
but 'to the judge of the district' who 'shall designate the nearest justice of the peace.' (Section 211, Rev. Adm.
Code)."

ISSUES:

Whether the disqualification of the justice of peace valid

RULING:

The appealed decision is reversed with costs against the appellee.

In every case, whether civil or criminal, of disqualification of a justice of the peace upon any ground mentioned
in section eight of this Act, the regular justice shall notify the auxilliary, who shall thereupon appear and try the
cause, unless he shall be likewise disqualified or otherwise disabled, in which event the cause shall be
transferred to the nearest justice of the peace of the province who is not disqualified.

One of the well-established rules of statutory construction enjoins that endeavor should be made to harmonize
the provisions of a law or two laws so that each shall be effective. In order that one law may operate to repeal
another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent.

The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act. Merely because a later enactment
may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied
repeal of the latter, since the new law may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one.

A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or
alter is manifest.
ESPIRITU vs. CIPRIANO

FACTS:

Petitioners seek the review and nullification of two orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, the
first, dated August 4, 1970 sustaining private respondent Ricardo Cipriano's motion to dismiss "on the authority
of Republic Act 6126", and the second, dated October 16, 1970, denying the motion for reconsideration of the
first order. This involves the retroactive application of the provisions in RA 6126 also known as the Rental Law.

Respondent Ricardo Cipriano argued that his failure to pay rentals is because of the provisions in RA 6126 stating
that no lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which another's dwelling is located shall, during the period of one
year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and the lessee prior to
the approval of this Act when said rental does not exceed three hundred pesos (P300.00) a month.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 6126 can be applied retroactively.

RULING:

The Court ruled otherwise.

The claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may, therefore, be given retroactive effect is
untenable. Far from being remedial, the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective
construction thereof is in order. Article 4 of the New Civil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect
unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is clear, the court’s duty is equally plain. The law being a
"temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation", it had a limited period of operation as in fact it
was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that "No lessor of a dwelling unit or land ... shall, during the
period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee
prior to the approval of this Act." The said law, did not, by its express terms, purport to give a retroactive
operation. It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that "Expressium facit cessare tacitum"4 and,
therefore, no reasonable implication that the Legislature ever intended to give the law in question a retroactive
effect may be accorded to the same.

HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs. MUNICIPAL BOARD

FACTS:

The Mayor and the Municipal Board of the City of Manila passed Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 on December
31, 1963, to take effect on January 1, 1964, declaring a state of emergency in view of the prevailing scarcity of
lands and buildings for residential purposes in the City of Manila which shall provide housing accommodations
especially for the poor at reasonable rates. An action was brought by the Homeowners’ Association of the
Philippines, Inc. and its President, Vicente A. Rufino against the Mayor and the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila to nullify the aforementioned Municipal Ordinance.

ISSUE:

Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 constitutional?

RULING:

The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment declaring said ordinance “ultra vires, unconstitutional,
illegal and void ab initio upon the ground that the power to “declare a state of emergency … exclusively pertains
to Congress”; that “there is no longer any state of emergency” which may justify the regulation of house rentals;
that said ordinance disconstitutes an unreasonable and unjustified limitation on the use of private
properties and arbitrarily encroaches on the constitutional rights of property owners”; that the power of the City
of Manila to “regulate the business of … letting or subletting of lands and buildings” does not include the
authority to prohibit what is forbidden in said ordinance; and that the same cannot be deemed sanctioned by
the general welfare clause in the City Charter.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION vs. ENRIQUEZ

FACTS:

The case is about the passing and approving of the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 which imposed conditions
and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President.
It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them
and to realign their respective operating budgets.

Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of a bill as prescribed by the Constitution, the
Congress presented the bill to the President for consideration and approval.

The President signed the bill into law and declared the same to have become Republic Act No. 7663 entitled
“"AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM
JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). However, on the same day, the President sent a Presidential Veto Message specifying
the provisions in the bill he vetoed.

There was no step taken by both of the House of Congress that will override the veto.

Four petitions from different taxpayers were filed questioning the constitutionality and the application of
Presidential veto on specific provisions in the bill.

ISSUE:

Whether the application of President’s veto on specific provisions valid?

RULING:

The petitions are DISMISSED, except with respect to

(1) G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special provision
on debt service specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for payment of the principal and
interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of
the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and

(2) G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the second paragraph of Special
Provision No. 2 of the item of appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways (GAA of 1994, pp.
785-786); and (b) Special Provision No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(GAA of 1994, p. 748), which is GRANTED

MORALES vs. SUBIDO

FACTS:
The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds
the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present
position. Upon the resignation of Brig. Gen. Ricardo G. Papa on March 14, 1968, the petitioner was designated
acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by
the mayor of Manila.

The respondent Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but
rejected his appointment for "failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements
for the said position."

He announced in the metropolitan newspapers that the position of chief of police of Manila was vacant and
listed the qualifications which applicants should possess.

The petitioner demanded that he be included in the list of eligible and qualified applicants from which the mayor
might appoint one as chief of police of the city. He contended that his service alone as captain for more than
three years in the Manila Police Department qualified him for appointment.

Citing section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, he argues that he has served successfully as captain, major and
lieutenant colonel in the MPD since 1954.

NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless HE

(1) holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning AND has served in the Armed Forces of
the Philippines OR the National Bureau of Investigation, OR

(2) has served as chief of police with exemplary record, OR

(3) has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least
three years; OR

(4) any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank
of captain and/or higher.

ISSUE:

Whether, within the meaning and intendment of the law, in addition to service qualification, one should have
educational qualification as shown by the possession of a bachelor's degree.

RULING:

The Court ruled that the petitioner is neither eligible nor qualified for the appointment of Chief of Police of the
City of Manila.

The petitioner's argument is fallacious in two respects. First, it fails to distinguish between eligibility and
qualification. For the statute may allow the compensation of service for a person's lack of eligibility but not
necessarily for his lack of educational qualification. Second, section 9 governs the appointment of members of
a police agency only. On the other hand, the appointment of chiefs of police is the precise gravamen of section
10, the last paragraph of which states:
 Where no civil service eligible is available, provisional appointment may be made in accordance with
Civil Service Law and rules: Provided, that the appointee possesses the above educational qualification:
Provided, further, that in no case shall such appointment extend beyond six months, except for a valid
cause, and with the approval of the Civil Service Commission.

Thus, while the Act gives credit for service and allows it to compensate for the lack of civil service eligibility in
the case of a member of a police agency, it gives no such credit for lack of civil service eligibility in the case of
a chief of police. On the contrary, by providing that a person, who is not a civil service eligible, may be
provisionally appointed chief of police the Act makes it unequivocal that the possession of a college degree or a
high school diploma (in addition to service) is an indispensable requisite.

Section 10, it must be admitted, does not specify in what capacity service in the AFP or in the NBI must have
been rendered, but an admission of the existence of the ambiguity in the statute does not necessarily compel
acquiescence in the conclusion that it is only in cases where the appointee's service has been in the AFP or in the
NBI that he must be required to have a bachelor's degree.

Except for the ambiguity referred to (the meaning of which is not in issue in this case), section 10 of the Act
needs no interpretation because its meaning is clear. That the purpose is to require both educational and service
qualifications of those seeking appointment as chief of police.

Thus, section 12 of House Bill 6951 (now section 10 of the Police Act of 1966) read:

Minimum Qualification for Appointment as Chief of a Police Agency. — No chief of a police agency of a
province or chartered city shall be appointed unless he is a member of the Philippine Bar, or a holder of
a bachelor's degree in police administration. Any holder of a bachelor's degree who served either in the
Philippine Constabulary or the police department of any city from the rank of captain or inspector,
second class, or its equivalent for at least three years shall be eligible for appointment to the position of
chief of the police agency.

In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill 6951 was referred, reported a
substitute measure. It is to this substitute bill that section 10 of the Act owes its present form and substance.

Thus, service in the AFP or the NBI was intended to be in the capacity of captain for at least three years.

At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase "has served as officer in the Armed Forces" was inserted
so as to make the provision read:

No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police
department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years
or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer
in the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

However, somewhere in the legislative process the phrase was dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was
retained. Upon checking the enrolled bill, the writer found that the text of section 10 of the Act is as set forth in
the beginning of this opinion. Under the enrolled bill theory, announced in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito8 this text of
the Act must be deemed as importing absolute verity and as binding on the courts.

RESOLUTION

FACTS:
The petitioner insisted that the version of the provision, as amended at the behest of Sen. Rodrigo, was the
version approved by the Senate on third reading. According to the petitioner the House bill division deleted the
entire provision and substituted what now is section 10 of the Police Act of 1966. It would appear that the
omission — whether deliberate or unintended — of the phrase, "who has served the police department of a city
or was made not at any stage of the legislative proceedings but only in the course of the engrossment of the bill,
more specifically in the proofreading thereof; that the change was made not by Congress but only by an
employee thereof; and that what purportedly was a rewriting to suit some stylistic preferences was in truth an
alteration of meaning.

ISSUE:

Whether the Judiciary can assail the validity of an enrolled bill by looking into the legislative process

RULING:

The Court cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other
branches of the Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said
branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise, it would be cast in the
unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of law-
making with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.

PESIGAN vs. ANGELES

FACTS:

At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982, of
Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by
the government of carabaos transported from one province to another.

Petitioners Anselmo Pesigan and Marcelino Pesigan filed a petition for an action of replevin on the recovery of
26 carabaos and a calf which were allegedly valued at 70,000 and damages of 92,000 which were confiscated
while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte.

The carabaos were confiscated and forfeited by the respondents Dr. Bella Miranda, provincial veterinarian, and
Arnulfo Zenarosa, town’s police station commander, in pursuant of the Presidential Executive Order 626-A
providing that:

no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall
be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos

The petition for replevin of the recovery of the carabaos was dismissed by Judge Domingo Medina Angeles for
the lack of cause of action.

The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 25 of the Interim Rules and
pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440, a 1968 law which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the Presidential Executive Order 626-A can be enforced before publication in the Official Gazette of the
Philippines

RULING:

The Court ordered respondents Miranda and Zenarosa to restore the carabaos, with the requisite documents, to
the petitioners, who as owners are entitled to possess the same, with the right to dispose of them in Basud or
Sipocot, Camarines Sur.

The said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted,
it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It
became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the
Revised Administrative Code.

Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected thereby.

Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general applicability should be
published in the Official Gazette. It provides that "every order or document which shag prescribe a penalty shall
be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect."

Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that even bureau "regulations and orders shall become effective only when
approved by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated".

Cemeco Holdings Inc., vs. National Life Insurance Co

FACTS:

Petitioner Cemco Holding’s Inc. filed for a petition for review to set aside and reverse the findings of Securities
and Exchange Corporation (SEC) that the acquisition of the petitioner of the shares of stock of Bacnotan
Consolidated Industries, Inc. (BCI) and Atlas Cement Corporation (ACC) in Union Cement Holdings Corporation
(UCHC) was covered by the Mandatory Offer Rule under Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known
as the Securities Regulation Code.

Securities and Exchange (SEC) passed a resolution for ACC and BCI, stockholders of UCC, to sell their shares of
stock of 21.31% and 29.69% respectively, to Cemco Holdings Inc., one of the principal stockholders of Union
Cement Corporation.

In the PSE Circular for Brokers, it was stated that as a result of petitioner Cemco’s acquisition of BCI and ACC’s
shares in UCHC, petitioner’s total beneficial ownership, direct and indirect, in UCC has increased by 36% and
amounted to at least 53% of the shares of UCC.

As a consequence of this, PSE sent a letter to SEC inquiring whether or not the Tender Rule Offer is applicable to
the purchase by petitioner of the majority of shares of UCC.

Director Justina Callangan of the SEC’s Corporate Finance Department responded to the query of the PSE that
while it was the stance of the department that the tender offer rule was not applicable, the matter must still
have to be confirmed by the SEC en banc which the SEC en banc resolved that the tender rule offer is not
applicable to the Cemco transaction.

Aggrieved by the decision, respondent National Life Insurance Company of the Philippines, Inc. a minority
stockholder of UCC, sent a letter to Cemco demanding the latter to comply with the rule on mandatory tender
offer. Cemco, however, refused.

Respondent filed a complaint with SEC to reverse the purchase agreement of Cemco void. Petitioner argued that
the tender offer rule applied only to a direct acquisition of the shares of the listed company and did not extend
to an indirect acquisition arising from the purchase of the shares of a holding company of the listed firm.

SEC ruled in favor of the respondent reversing its resolution and directed petitioner to make a tender offer for
UCC shares to respondent and other holders of UCC shares in accordance with Section 9(E), Rule 19 of the
Securities Regulation Code.

Petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals challenging the SEC’s jurisdiction to take cognizance of
respondent’s complaint and its authority to require Cemco to make a tender offer for UCC shares.

Court of Appeals affirmed SEC’s ruling.

Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the SEC has jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint and to require Cemco to make a tender
offer for respondent’s UCC shares.

2. Whether or not the rule on mandatory tender offer applies to the indirect acquisition of shares in a listed
company, in this case, the indirect acquisition by Cemco of 36% of UCC, a publicly-listed company, through its
purchase of the shares in UCHC, a non-listed company.

3. Whether or not the questioned ruling of the SEC can be applied retroactively to Cemco’s transaction which
was consummated under the authority of the SEC’s prior resolution.

RULING:

The Court affirmed Court of Appeals and Securities and Exchange Commission resolutions.

The SEC was acting pursuant to Rule 19(13) of the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Securities Regulation Code providing that SEC has the general adjudicative power which is implied from the
express powers of the Commission or which is incidental to, or reasonably necessary to carry out, the
performance of the administrative duties entrusted to it.

As a regulatory agency, it has the incidental power to conduct hearings and render decisions fixing the rights and
obligations of the parties.

On the second issue, the construction given to a statute by an administrative agency charged with the
interpretation and application of that statute is entitled to great weight by the courts, unless such construction
is clearly shown to be in sharp contrast with the governing law or statute.
The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or
modernizing society and the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying
those needs; it also relates to accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the
administrative agency charged with implementing a particular statute.

As for the third issue, the action of the SEC on the PSE request for opinion on the Cemco transaction cannot be
construed as passing merits or giving approval to the questioned transaction. There was no public hearing where
interested parties could have been heard. Hence, it was not issued upon a definite and concrete controversy
affecting the legal relations of parties thereby making it a judgment conclusive on all the parties. Said letter was
merely advisory. Jurisprudence has it that an advisory opinion of an agency may be stricken down if it deviates
from the provision of the statute.

While a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, this is
subject to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and
more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not
apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to deprive
the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there is no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication.

Executive Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries Inc.

FACTS:

Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo through Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo issued Executive
Order No 156 entitled "Providing for a comprehensive industrial policy and directions for the motor vehicle
development program and its implementing guidelines.”

The said executive issuance prohibits the importation into the country, inclusive of the Special Economic
and Freeport Zone or the Subic Bay Freeport (SBF or Freeport), of used motor vehicles, subject to a few
exceptions.

Respondent filed declaratory relief declaring Article 2, Section3.1 of EO 156 unconstitutional and invalid which
was granted by the lower courts.

Petitioners filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals denying the petition and sustaining the finding of the lower
court that Article 2, Section 3.1 is void for being repugnant with the constitution. The petition was also denied.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is then elevated to the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not EO 156 banning the importation of used vehicles through the Free Trade Zone is valid

RULING:

The Court ruled that said provision is VALID insofar as it applies to the Philippine territory outside the presently
fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area and VOID with respect to its application to the secured fenced-in former
Subic Naval Base area.

The provision complied with the requisites for a valid executive order.
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;

(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and

(4) It must be reasonable

Must be authorized by the legislature

Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. It
provides:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues,
and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

In accordance with the prescribed procedure

This exception pertains to the issuance of legislative rules as distinguished from interpretative rules which give
no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed; and are designed merely to provide
guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing. A legislative rule, on the other
hand, is in the nature of subordinate legislation, crafted to implement a primary legislation .

EO 156 is obviously a legislative rule as it seeks to implement or execute primary legislative enactments
intended to protect the domestic industry by imposing a ban on the importation of a specified product not
previously subject to such prohibition. The due process requirements in the issuance thereof are embodied in
Section 40128 of the Tariff and Customs Code and Sections 5 and 9 of the SMA which essentially mandate the
conduct of investigation and public hearings before the regulatory measure or importation ban may be issued.

Within the scope of the authority given by the legislature

To be valid, an administrative issuance must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It
must not supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute and other existing laws, for such is the sole
function of the legislature which the other branches of the government cannot usurp.

There is nothing in the foregoing excerpts which absolutely limits the incentive to Freeport investors only to
exemption from customs duties and taxes. Mindful of the legislative intent to attract investors, enhance
investment and boost the economy, the legislature could not have limited the enticement only to exemption
from taxes. The minimum interference policy of the government on the Freeport extends to the kind of business
that investors may embark on and the articles which they may import or export into and out of the zone.

Must be reasonable

There is no doubt that the issuance of the ban to protect the domestic industry is a reasonable exercise of police
power. The deterioration of the local motor manufacturing firms due to the influx of imported used motor
vehicles is an urgent national concern that needs to be swiftly addressed by the President. In the exercise of
delegated police power, the executive can therefore validly proscribe the importation of these vehicles
TOLENTINO vs. SECRETARY of FINANCE

FACTS:

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale
or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or
properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the... gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic
Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending
the National Internal Revenue Code.

PPI contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to
others, the law discriminates against the press. CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716 impairs the obligations of
contracts, and violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall “evolve a
progressive system of taxation”.

CUP argues that legislature was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the
present Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore,
be to infringe a constitutional policy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 7716 unconstitutional

RULING:

In the preceeding pages we have endeavored to discuss, within limits, the validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in its
formal and substantive aspects as this has been raised in the various cases before us. To sum up, we hold:

(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by Congress in the enactment
of the statute;

(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes — beyond those
prescribed by the Constitution — have been observed is precluded by the principle of separation of powers;

(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor interfere with the free
exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to an education; and

(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is regressive, oppressive
and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under the Contract Clause are prematurely raised
and do not justify the grant of prospective relief by writ of prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases are DISMISSED

LAGCAO vs LABRA

FACTS:

A petition for review was filed by the petitioner on the validity of Ordinance No. 1843 issued by the City of Cebu.

Ordinance No. 8143 was enacted by the SP of Cebu City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation
proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 which was registered in the name of petitioners.

Lot 1029 was one of the 210 lots donated by the Province of Cebu City. The lot is situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City
and has an area of 4,048 square meters. It was acquired by the petitioner on an installment basis.

However, the 210 lots including the Lot 1029 was reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province
tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the petitioner to sue the
province for specific performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance.

The court ruled in favor with the petitioners ordering the Province of Cebu to execute the deed of sale. The
Province of Cebu then executed a deed of absolute sale over Lot 1029 in favor of petitioners. Thereafter, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 129306 was issued in the name of petitioners and Crispina Lagcao.

After acquiring the title, the petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was already
occupied by squatters. The petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The MTCC approved
and ordered for the squatters to vacate the lot. The RTC affirmed the decision and executed a writ of execution and
order of demolition.

However, Mayor Alvin Garcia requested for the deferment of the demolition as they were still looking for a
relocation site. The MTCC approved and issued orders suspending the demolition for 120 days.; Unfortunately for
the petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution
which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279. The SP of Cebu City passed Ordinance
No. 1772 which included Lot 1029 among the identified sites for socialized housing.

Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted by the SP of Cebu City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation
proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 which was registered in the name of petitioners. The intended
acquisition was to be used for the benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale to the actual occupants
thereof. For this purpose, the ordinance appropriated the amount of ₱6,881,600 for the payment of the subject lot.
This was approved by Mayor Alvin Garcia.

Petitioners filed for the nullity of the Ordinance assailing its unconstitutionality but the said complaint was
dismissed by the RTC.

Petitioners argued that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property
for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of "public use" contemplated in
the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Ordinance No. 1843 which expropriates the parcel of land registered under the name of the
petitioners is unconstitutional or not

RULING:
The Court granted the petition.

Under Section 48 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,10 local legislative power
shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the city.

Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly
authorized by the legislature.11 By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to
expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160:

SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. − A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant
to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the
benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution and pertinent laws

Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners’ lot was enacted by the SP of Cebu City to
provide socialized housing for the homeless and low-income residents of the City.

However, local government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in
seeking solutions to this problem.

There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; and (2)
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public
character. The government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be
expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners’ property was singled out for expropriation
by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection.

Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the random expropriation of small lots to
accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatters is certainly not the condemnation for public use
contemplated by the Constitution.

RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban land reform and housing.
Sections 9 and 10 thereof provide:

SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. − Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following
order:

(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;

(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;

(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites,
and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;

(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which have not yet been
acquired; and
 (f) Privately-owned lands.

Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the
priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give budgetary
priority to on-site development of government lands. (Emphasis supplied).

SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. − The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include,
among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking,
donation to the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided,
however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted: Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small
property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act:

There was nothing in the records indicating that the City of Cebu complied strictly with Sections 9 and 10 of RA
7279. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners’ property without any attempt to first acquire the
lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that the other modes of
acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843,
there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners’ property as required by Section 19 of RA
7160.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact
but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. It must be in accordance with certain well-
established basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that an ordinance:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and

(6) must not be unreasonable

Ordinance No 1483 failed to comply with the requisites of an ordinance.

PHIL INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORP. vs. COA

FACTS:

Petitioner Philippine International Trading Corp filed for certiorari to annul the decision of the Commission on Audit
denying PITC appeal from the disallowances made by the resident COA auditor on PITC's car plan benefits.

PITC is a government-owned and controlled-corporation created under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 252 for the
purpose of promoting and developing Philippine trade in pursuance of national economic development. The PITC
Board of Directors approved a Car Plan Program for qualified PITC officer for which eligible officers are entitled to
purchase a vehicle, fifty percent (50%) of the value of which shall be shouldered by PITC while the remaining fifty
percent (50%) will be shouldered by the officer through salary deduction over a period of five (5) years. Maximum
value of the vehicle to be purchased ranges from Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) to Three Hundred
and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P350,000.00), depending on the position of the officer in the corporation. In addition,
PITC will reimburse the officer concerned fifty percent (50%) of the annual car registration, insurance premiums
and costs of registration of the chattel mortgage over the car for a period of five (5) years from the date the vehicle
was purchased. The terms and conditions are indicated in the “Car Loan Agreement”.

This program intends to provide financial assistance to qualified employees in purchasing their own transportation
facilities in the performance of their work, for representation, and personal use.

R.A. No 6758 also known as “Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 then took effect.

Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized
salary rates save for certain additional compensation such as representation and transportation allowances which
were exempted from consolidation into the standardized rate.

For the RA No 6758 to be implemented, the Department of Budget and Management Corporate Compensation
Circular No. 10 discontinued all the allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary.

On post audit, the payment/reimbursement of the Car Plan Program (50% of the yearly car registration and
insurance premiums and 50% of the costs of registration of the chattel mortgage over the car) made after
November 1, 1989 was disallowed by the resident COA auditor on the ground that the car plan benefits were not
one of the fringe benefits or compensation allowed to be continued.

PITC appealed the decision with COA but was denied.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the discontinuance of DBM Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 to implement RA No. 6758
constitutional and valid?

RULING:

The Court granted the petition.

First of all, the Court has confirmed in Philippine Post Authority vs. Commission on Audit the legislative intent to
protect incumbents who are receiving salaries and/or allowances over and above those authorized by RA 6758 to
continue to receive the same even after RA 6758 took effect. In reserving the benefit to incumbents, the legislature
has manifested its intent to gradually phase out this privilege without upsetting the policy of non-diminution of
pay and consistent with the rule that laws should only be applied prospectively in the spirit of fairness and
justice.

There was no intention on the part of the legislature to revoke existing benefits being enjoyed by incumbents of
government positions at the time of the virtue of Sections 12 and 17 thereof.

The vehicle being utilized by the officer is actually being used for corporate purposes because the officer concerned
is no longer entitled to utilize company-owned vehicles for official business once he/she has availed of a car plan.
Neither is said officer allowed to reimburse the costs of other land transportation used within his principal place of
assignment (i.e. Metro Manila) as the vehicle is presumed to be his official vehicle. In the event that the employee
resigns, retires or is separated from the company without cause prior to the completion of the 60-month car plan,
the employee shall be given the privilege to buy the car provided he pays the remaining installments of the loan
and the amount equivalent to that portion of the company's contribution corresponding to the unexpired period of
the car plan.

Secondly, COA relied on DBM-CCC No. 10 as basis for the disallowance of the subject car plan benefits. In De
Jesus, et al. vs. Commission on Audit, et al. DBM-CCC No. 10 is as of no force and effect due to the absence of
publication thereof in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Following the doctrine
enunciated in Tanada, publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines
is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce
or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through
the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

DBM-CCC No. 10 has been re-issued in its entirety and submitted for publication in the Official Gazette per letter to
the National Printing Office. Would the subsequent publication thereof cure the defect and retroact to the time
that the above-mentioned items were disallowed in audit?

The answer is in the negative, precisely, for the reason that publication is required as a condition precedent to the
effectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules and regulations before their rights and
interests are affected by the same. From the time the COA disallowed the expenses in audit up to the filing of
herein petition the subject circular remained in legal limbo due to its non-publication.

In Tanada vs. Tuvera, "prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot be dispensed with, for the
reason that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws
that are supposed to govern it.

PNB vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

A verified complaint was filed against petitioner Philippine National Bank for the alleged foreclosure of 2 parcels
of land mortgaged by the plaintiff Epifanio Dela Cruz to the petitioner. The plaintiff-respondent argued that
extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is required to be posted for not less than twenty days in at least
three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more
than four hundred pesos, such notices shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city. The defendant then consolidated ownership unto itself,
and subsequently sold the parcels to third parties. The defendant states that the extrajudicial foreclosure,
consolidation of ownership, and subsequent sale to the third parties were all valid.

Lots mortgaged to PNB are located at Bunlo, Bocaue, Bulacan.

(1) covered by Torrens Certificate No. 16743 and possessed of an area of approximately 3,109 square meters
(2) covered by Torrens Certificate No. 5787, possessed of an area of around 610 square meters, upon which a
residentia-commercial building stood

The lots were under the common names of the plaintiff (Epifanio dela Cruz), his brother (Delfin) and his sister
(Maria). The mortgage was made possible because of the grant by the latter two to the former of a special power
of attorney to mortgage the lots to the defendant.

The lots were mortgaged to guarantee the following promissory notes:

(1) a promissory note for Pl2,000.00, dated September 2, 1958, and payable within 69 days (date of maturity
— Nov. l0, 1958);
 (2) a promissory note for P4,000.00, dated September 22, 1958, and payable within 49 days (date of maturity
— Nov. 10, 1958);

(3) a promissory note for P4,000.00, dated June 30, 1.958 1 and payable within 120 days (date of maturity —
Nov. 10, 1958)

This date of June 30, 1958 is disputed by the plaintiff who claims that the correct date is June 30, 1961, which is the
date actually mentioned in the promissory note. This could have necessitated the renewal of two promissory
notes. No such renewal was proved, nor was the renewal ever alleged.

The two mortgaged lots were then auctioned for sale which the defendant PNB was the highest bidder.

The plaintiff did not volunteer to buy back the lots, PNB sold the lots.

The Notices of Sale of appellant's foreclosed properties were published on March 228, April 11 and April 12, 1969
issues of the newspaper "Daily Record".

The date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday while the dates April 11 and 12, 1969 are on a Friday and Saturday,
respectively.

Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be "published once a week for at least three
consecutive weeks".

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was valid compliance in regard to the required publication

RULING:

The Court denied the petition.

The pronouncement of this Court in Bonnevie vs. Court of Appeals (125 SCRA [1983]; p. 135, Rollo) is sought to be
utilized to press the point that the notice need not be published for three full weeks.

According to petitioner, there is no breach of the proviso since after the first publication on March 28, 1969, the
second notice was published on April 11, 1969 (the last day of the second week), while the third publication on
April 12, 1969 was announced on the first day of the third week. Petitioner thus concludes that there was no
violation from the mere happenstance that the third publication was made only a day after the second publication
since it is enough that the second publication be made on any day within the second week and the third
publication, on any day within the third week.

It must be conceded that Article 17 is completely silent as to the definition of what is a "week". In Concepcion vs.
Zandueta, this term was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days.

The publication effected on April 11, 1969 cannot be construed as sufficient advertisement for the second week
because the period for the first week should be reckoned from March 28, 1969 until April 3, 1969 while the second
week should be counted from April 4, 1969 until April 10, 1969.
GARVIDA vs. SALES Jr.

FACTS:

Petitioner Lynette Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order of the respondent Commission on Elections
suspending her proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay Lorenzo,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte.

Garvida applied for registration as a member and voter of Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte. Her application was denied by the Board of Election Tellers on the ground that petitioner, who was
then 21 years and 10 months, has exceeded the age limit for the membership of Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid
down in Section 3(b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.

Petitioner then filed for a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter" with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court which found petitioner qualified and ordered for her registration. The Board of Election Tellers
appealed on the RTC but the presiding judge inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close
association with the petitioner.

Petitioner filed her candidacy for the position of Chairman of Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Her application was disapproved by Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios per advice of Provincial
Election Supervisor Noli Pipo due to her age. Petitioner then appealed on the Comelec Regional Director Filemon
Asperin who set aside the order of the respondents and allowed the petitioner to run.

Respondent Rios issued a memorandum to the petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours
to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved. Private respondent Florencio Sales, a rival
candidate, filed for Petition of Denial/Cancellation of Candidacy against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing
her age qualification through a facsimile.

The same day respondent Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner, the COMELEC en banc issued an order
directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the
proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election.

The petitioner garnered 78 votes against respondent Sales with 76. But she was not proclaimed as the winner.
Months after, she was then proclaimed as the winner for the position of SK Chairman.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s age a ground for the disqualification of her certificate of candidacy to run as an elective
official in SK valid

RULING:

The Court dismissed the petition and declared petitioner Lynette Garvida as ineligible for being over the age
qualification for candidacy.

The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by Presidential Decree No. 684 in 1975 as the Kabataang
Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of all residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years but
less than 18 years of age providing its members a medium to express their views and opinions and participate in
issues of transcendental importance.

Its maximum age qualification was then raised from “less than 18 years old” to “not more than 21 years of age.”
Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid down by the Local Government
Code of 1991, viz:

Sec. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. — The katipunan ng kabataan shall be composed of all citizens
of the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least six (6) months, who are fifteen (15)
but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, and who are duly registered in the list of the
sangguniang kabataan or in the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay secretary.

A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may become a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan if he
possesses the following qualifications:

Sec. 428. Qualifications. — An elective official of the sangguniang kabataan must be a citizen of
the Philippines, a qualified voter of the katipunan ng kabataan, a resident of the barangay for at
least one (1) year immediately prior to election, at least fifteen (15) years but not more than
twenty-one (21) years of age on the day of his election, able to read and write Filipino, English, or
the local dialect, and must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

Sec. 3. Qualifications of a voter. — To be qualified to register as a voter in the SK elections, a person must be:

a) a citizen of the Philippines;

b) fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day that is, he must have been born
between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and

c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and actually residing in the barangay wherein he proposes
to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. Qualifications of elective members. — An elective official of the SK must be:

a) a qualified voter;

b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to the elections; and

c) able to read and write Filipino or any Philippine language or dialect or English.

Petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the
Sangguniang Kabataan except for her age which admittedly exceeded the limit.

The addition of the phrase "or the day of his election" is an additional qualification. The member may be more than
21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective
official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election.

The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election is
very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days.

When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each. One born on the first day of the
year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after his birth — the last day of the year. In
computing years, the first year is reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day
of the second 365-day cycle begins. On the 365th day of the second cycle, the person turns two years old. This
cycle goes on and on in a lifetime.

The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day
cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because that would be more than 21
365-day cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to petitioner's
claims.

The question of the age qualification is a question of eligibility. Being "eligible" means being "legally qualified;
capable of being legally chosen." Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed
in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office.