MAINSTREAM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

RATIONALE CHOICE THEORY

AIM/CONTRIBUTION

• To import the rigor and predictive power of neoclassical economics into political science.

• To produce a deductive science of the political on the basis of a series of simplifying assumptions.

• To model (mathematically) the implications of human rationality for political conduct.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

• Individual actors are the basic units of analysis.

• They are rational, efficient, and instrumental utility-maximisers who seek to maximize personal utility net of
cost alone.

• They have a clear and ‘transitive’ hierarchy of preferences such that in any given context there is only one
optimal course of action available to

them.

• Even where actors share a common collective interest, ‘free-riding’ is likely to militate against collective action
in the absence of other incentives

• Where such collective action dilemmas can be overcome powerful interest groups will deploy ‘rent-seeking’
behavior, lobbying for monopoly of powers and subsidies that are inefficient.

KEY THEMES

• The aggregation of individually rational behavior frequently produces collectively irrational outcomes

• Social welfare is often compromised by collective action problems and ‘Free-riding’

• The narrow pursuit of self-interest ensures that public officials cannot be trusted to deliver collective welfare
(public choice theory)

• The behavior of political parties in liberal democracies is predictable given the structure of the electoral system
and the distribution of voter

preferences.

KEY CONCEPTS
• Rationality

• Collective action problems

• ‘Free-riding’

• ‘Rent-seeking’

SILENCES AND LIMITATIONS

• Limited attention given to preference formation

• Limited attention given to the institutional context in which rationality is exercised

• Relies upon a series of implausible theoretical assumptions

• Through ostensibly predictive, tends to confine itself to post hoc rationalization

• Limited conception of the human subject

• Deals poorly with context in which altruism and collectively rational behaviour is displayed

• Deals poorly with processes of change (though note the contribution of the

evolutionary game theory)

BEHAVIOURALISM

AIM/ CONTRIBUTION

• To use rigorous statistical techniques in the analysis of political data

• To develop an inductive science of the political capable of generating predictive hypotheses on the basis of the
quantitative analysis of human behaviour at an aggregate level

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

• The logic of induction is sound – general ‘covering laws’ can be inferred from specific empirical observations

• Political behaviour exhibits regularities over time which allow law-like statements to be generated inductively

• The neutral and dispassionate analysis of raw political data is possible

• There is no separation of appearance and reality

KEY THEMES
• No a priori theoretical assumptions should be allowed to inform political analysis

• All theoretical propositions and assumptions must be exposed to rigorous and systematic empirical testing
before they are deployed deductively

• Ethical judgements must not be allowed to inform, distort or interfere with the systematic collation, recording
and analysis of empirical evidence

• Theoretical hypotheses take the form of probabilistic predictions based on the assumption that exhibited
regularities in the data analyzed are generalizable beyond the immediate context and time period in which the
data was collected Political power is synonymous with decision-making and may, as a consequence, be
operationalized quantitatively

• Political outcomes can largely be derived from an analysis of political Inputs

KEY CONCEPTS

• Causation and correlation

• Statistical significance

• Decision-making

SILENCES AND LIMITATIONS

• Problem of differentiating causation and correlation

• Tends to restrict itself to ‘visible’ variables and to those which can readily be quantified

• Assumptions about regularity problematize the extent to which behaviouralism can inform an analysis of social
and political change

• The dependence of inductive inference on the assumption of regularity renders behaviouralism problematic in
periods of social and political change

• Lacks a conception of agency

• Suffers from a narrow conception of politics and power

NEW INSTITUTIONALISM

AIM/CONTRIBUTION

• To restore the link between theoretical assumptions and the reality they purport to represent

• To acknowledge the crucial mediating role of institutions in shaping political conduct and translating political
inputs into political outcome
• To acknowledge the complexity and contingency of political systems

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

• ‘Institutions matter’ – political conduct is shaped profoundly by the institutional context in which it occurs and
acquires significance

• ‘History matters’ – the legacy the past bequeaths to the present is considerable

• Political systems are complex and inherently unpredictable

• Actors do not always behave instrumentally in pursuit of material self-interest

KEY THEMES

• Rationalism and behaviouralism tend to concentrate too heavily on political inputs in explaining political
outcomes, ignoring the key mediating role of political institutions

• Institutions become embedded in routine and convention and are, consequently, difficult to reform, transform
or replace

• The timing and sequence of events matters since history is ‘path dependent’ – large consequences may follow
from small or contingent events

• Actors are socialized within institutional settings which define informal rules and procedures

* Accordingly, logics of appropriateness may better explain political behaviour than those which assume
instrumental self-interest

• The rigidity of institutions means that political time tends to be characterized by periods of relative stability,
punctuated periodically by phases of intense institutional change

KEY CONCEPTS

• Institutions

• Path dependence

• Timing/sequence/history

• Punctuated equilibrium

SILENCES AND LIMITATIONS

• Despite its sensitivity to history, it is poor at accounting and limitations for institutional change, tending merely
to invoke (untheorized) exogenous shock
• Tends to exhibit a rather structuralist logic in which actors are prisoners of institutional contexts and the logics
of appropriateness they define

• In pointing to the mediating role of institutions and the high degree of variation between institutional contexts,
institutionalism tends towards rich description

• It is, as a consequence, perhaps overly reticent of bold theories and hypotheses

• In its emphasis upon path dependence and historical legacies it is rather better

at explaining stability than change