1162104

research-article2023
JAS0010.1177/00219096231162104Journal of Asian and African StudiesAshwarya

Original Article
JAAS
Journal of Asian and African Studies

India’s National Role Conception

2023, Vol. 58(4) 535­–555
© The Author(s) 2023
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DOI: 10.1177/00219096231162104
https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096231162104
under Modi: A Focus on Saudi journals.sagepub.com/home/jas

Arabia

Sujata Ashwarya
Centre for West Asian Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, India

Abstract
India’s conception of its peaceful role in international affairs, which evolved during the Nehruvian era, is not
an end in itself, but rather a wholesome strategic choice consistent with its economic development and great
power ambitions. Despite emphasising a radical shift in foreign policy, the government of Prime Minister
Narendra Modi deemed it essential to prioritise peace in international relations, particularly with the Gulf
Cooperation Council countries. The Abraham Accords, involving the UAE and Bahrain, have created a new
geopolitical environment that affirms India’s conception of security through peace and permits engagement
in key areas while ensuring economic gains.

Keywords
National role conception, peaceful role, Asia-centrism, peace and security, GCC states, energy, trade,
Indo-Saudi relations, security provider, Abraham Accords

This article examines the developments in India–Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) relations,
with a special focus on Indo-Saudi bilateral relations, by using the theoretical assumption of
national role conception (NRC). NRC can be understood ‘as the core of a grand causal map
which statesmen employ to make sense of the world’ (Shih, 1988: 600). K.J. Holsti in his ground-
breaking article, ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’, was the first to
recognise decision-makers’ perceptions of their state’s role, that is, their function and purpose in
the international arena, as a critical variable influencing the formulation and implementation of
a state’s foreign policy (Holsti, 1970: 245–246). In other words, NRCs encompass ‘what “we
want and what we do as a result of who we think we are, want to be, and should be”, where ‘the
“we” represents nation and state as a social collectivity’ (Krotz, 2002). Holsti’s emphasis on the
ego (actors) dimension of roles was later supplemented by some International Relations (IR)
scholars with the alter (others) dimension. Characterising the former as internal role conceptions
and the latter as external role expectations, IR role theorists argue that these two components are

Corresponding author:
Sujata Ashwarya, Centre for West Asian Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi 110025, India.
Email: scheema@jmi.ac.in
536 Journal of Asian and African Studies 58(4)

linked to a state’s overall foreign policy behaviour or ‘role performance’. As Wish (1980) noted,
‘national role conceptions are strongly related to the nation’s foreign policy behaviour, which is
thought of as role performance’ (p. 534). Currently, IR role theorists largely agree on three key
elements in analysing a state’s roles: domestic role conceptions, external role expectations and
role performance.
This article contends that India’s foreign policy under Prime Minister Modi reflects the coun-
try’s national role conception articulated during India’s early years of independence by Jawaharlal
Nehru, the country’s first Prime Minister and External Affairs Minister (EAM). Despite the obvi-
ous denigration of Nehru in contemporary Indian public discourse and Prime Minister Modi’s criti-
cal references to Nehru’s pacifism, this is correct (Gupta, 2020). The Nehruvian conception of
India’s peaceful role in the international arena was founded on Asia-centric internationalism, a
rejection of power politics, a belief in security through peace and a preference for ethical statecraft
based on persuasion over force (Daulet Singh, 2019: 41). Another author, arguing along the same
lines considers India’s international involvement to have ‘an intrinsic national interest to see peace
and security in as large a region as possible’ (Bava, 2007). Even the most ardent supporters of
Modi’s ‘muscular’ foreign policy agree that, while India must respond to urgent regional and global
challenges and strengthen military capabilities, it must also develop the ability to provide ‘the
public goods required to strengthen peace and security throughout the [Indo-Pacific]’ region (Tellis,
2016). It is no coincidence that India is the second largest troop and police contributor to UN
peacekeeping missions, and it is the second largest contributor as of October 2022, up from fifth in
2020 in Modi’s India (United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping, 2022).
Another claim of this article is that the Nehruvian NRC and its core beliefs, which established
India’s standing in the world and informed the political, economic and strategic aspects of its for-
eign policy, continue to shape India’s external relations, and that the GCC is no exception. The
GCC states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirate (UAE) –
recognise India’s role as a peacemaker and rely on it to keep regional peace and stability. The
purpose of this article is to determine whether the BJP government’s apparent revitalization of
India–GCC relations since Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office in 2014, and again in 2019
after a massive electoral victory, has changed or affected the impact of the Nehruvian NRC in for-
eign policy conduct.
In the first section, it investigates how economic and geopolitical factors interact with India’s
peaceful role conception in order to make a case for studying India–GCC relations. The second
section examines Modi’s electoral rise in 2014, which led the BJP to a landslide victory over the
Congress party – India’s dominant political party since its independence in 1947 – and whether it
signalled a shift in India’s perception of its role in international affairs. In the paper’s third section,
it is argued that the evolution of India–GCC relations enabled India’s long-held conception of its
role to manifest and that a complementarity of interest emerged between the two parties. This
involves a focus on India–Saudi Arabia relations through a semantic analysis of important agree-
ments. The fourth section investigates why it was ideologically important for PM Modi to reach
out to the GCC, as well as how his government’s foreign policy has changed and remained consist-
ent, particularly with regard to India’s role. To that end, the paper examines the distinctive aspects
of Modi’s outreach to the GCC and employs role theory to conduct a semantic content analysis of
official documents signed by Modi and Saudi Arabian officials. The final section examines how
emerging geopolitics in the region in the wake of the Abraham Accord can enable and facilitate
India’s increasingly close ties with the GCC states and Israel, which is no longer a pariah in the
region and is a friend of both. The formation of the so-called I2U2 forum, composed of India,
Israel, the UAE and the United States, and bringing together players with strong bilateral ties, can
signal the start of mutually reinforcing economic and political cooperation.
Ashwarya 537

Economic and geopolitical factors in Nehruvian NRC

How do economic and geopolitical factors influence and interact with roles and role expectations?
According to Gurol and Starkmann (2020), it is a ‘blind spot’ in role analysis. However, when
states wrestle with such factors in their role conception, it is reflected in their foreign policy behav-
iour, say role dynamics scholars. For Adigbuo (2007), the ‘developer’ role conception of govern-
ments could make them a player in economic foreign policy matters, providing aid to other
countries. Wehner and Nolte (2017) employed the role theory framework to understand the types
of geopolitical roles that policymakers seek to advance on behalf of states and regional groups in
order to confront pressing common security challenges.
India’s self-proclaimed peaceful role has always included a strong economic and geopolitical
undercurrent. Despite his opposition to great power politics, Nehru believed India could become a
great power not through the acquisition of lethal weapons or the formation of alliances, but through
domestic development and the formation of external relations premised on the avoidance of con-
flict and war. This was evident in his strategy for economic self-sufficiency, emphasis on industrial
infrastructure development, reliance on science and technology for national advancement and pur-
suit of nonalignment (Nayar and Paul, 2004: 27). Irrespective of how successive prime ministers
pursued this objective, Indian foreign policymakers have long sought a status befitting the coun-
try’s size, human resources and economic potential. No Indian leader, regardless of political party,
national elite, or bureaucracy, has ever wished to alter India’s role as a peaceful power aspiring to
great power status.
India’s rapid economic growth in the 1990s bolstered the country’s conviction that a rapid
transition from middle power to great power was indeed possible. In response to an unprece-
dented economic crisis brought on by a massive balance-of-payments problem in the early
1990s, the then-Indian government, led by Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao of the ruling
Congress Party, enacted an array of economic liberalisation measures. An era of high growth
followed, coinciding with the globalisation wave unleashed by post-Cold War changes in the
international order that enabled greater economic and commercial engagements. Kagan (2008)
noted that ‘the same economic dynamism and plunge into global commercial competition that
brought India out of its shell economically . . . also brought it out of its shell geopolitically’ to
pursue a change in rank (p. 41).
A great power always wields extra-regional, if not global, clout. India’s power remained unre-
alized because its perceived influence was limited to South Asia. As Indian commentators
implored their leaders to ‘break free from the claustrophobic confines of South Asia’, the Rao
government proposed the concept of ‘extended neighbourhood’ to denote areas of robust eco-
nomic interaction and power projection (Sen Gupta, 1997: 309). A more engaged foreign policy
emerged, with India making a concerted effort to connect with its neighbours in Southeast Asia,
Central Asia and West Asia. Under Rao’s leadership, the Congress government implemented a
‘Look East’ policy in the mid-1990s, strengthening India’s political, economic and military ties
with Southeast Asian nations and making this region India’s fastest-growing source of foreign
investment and trade growth (Andersen, 2001: 769). Then, in 2005, the new Congress-led coali-
tion government headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced the ‘Look West’ policy,
which aimed to strengthen ties with West Asian countries in a manner like the highly successful
eastern policy.
Prior to the official launch of the ‘Look West’ policy, government ministers took the initiative
to highlight West Asia’s critical importance to India’s geopolitical interests. Then-EAM Natwar
Singh (2004) referred to the region as ‘an integral part of India’s extended neighbourhood’ and
noted that ‘developments in West Asia today have a direct impact on India’s economy and society’.
538 Journal of Asian and African Studies 58(4)

India’s Defence Minister at the time, Pranab Mukherjee (2005), also made a statement, summaris-
ing the country’s economic and political concerns in the Persian Gulf:

Beyond the immediate region, India has vital interests in the Gulf . . . . The Gulf forms parts of our strategic
neighbourhood and important source of energy, home to over the 3.5 million Indians, and a major trading
partner. Parts of it are also a source of ideology, funding and recruits to the cause of Islamic radicalism and
terrorism.

The Look West policy aimed to strengthen trade, energy and security ties, with a focus on the Gulf
region and the GCC, as evidenced by the initial two Indo-Saudi comprehensive agreements of
2006 and 2010, which laid the groundwork for future growth of robust India–GCC relations.
Elucidating the significance of economic metric to state power in international relations, Gelb
(2010) argued that ‘most nations have adjusted their national security strategies to focus on eco-
nomic security’ and they ‘define their interests largely in economic terms and deal mostly in eco-
nomic power’. India’s leaders seeking great power status would likely concur.

BJP, Narendra Modi, and the ‘peace’ conception

In May 2014, the BJP, a pro-Hindu and nationalist political party led by Narendra Modi, defeated a
broad-based, inclusive coalition government led by then-Congress Party prime minister, Manmohan
Singh. Modi has deep Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) roots and a long history as a member
of the organisation, as do his ministers from his first (2014–2019) and second (2019–) governments.
The RSS is a pro-Hindu cultural organisation that promotes a nationalistic agenda under the banner
of ‘Hindutva’. As a political ideology, Hindutva entails the assertion and reinforcement of so-called
Hindu ‘culture’ and ‘values’, in tandem with efforts to militarise the Hindu community, thereby
preparing it to fulfil its nation-building responsibilities. According to the RSS, India is a ‘weak state’
not because of a lack of resources, but because its unity is threatened by plurality, and thus there is
a need for urgent uniformity to establish a strong state (Vanaik, 2007: 321). This mindset frequently
leads to anti-Muslim violence and polarisation in India, where the Muslims are a minority, constitut-
ing a population of 200 million out of India’s total population of 1.4 billion.
The BJP’s electoral victory with an absolute majority in Parliament was unprecedented; no
other party in the seven general elections held since the late 1980s had performed similarly.
Coalition governments had become so prevalent that the BJP’s victory appeared to be an outlier,
but it was not, as the party went on to win more seats in the 2019 parliamentary elections. The
BJP’s political consolidation implied that, as prime minister, Modi would have greater political
freedom in determining the country’s foreign policy, free of coalition partner demands. Modi ran
on a promise to transform India, including its self-image and international standing. These fac-
tors, however, did not cause the Modi government’s foreign policy to diverge significantly from
that of previous Congress governments; in fact, it has been remarkably risk-averse. Indeed, Prime
Minister Modi, who is often associated with an ostensibly ‘muscular foreign policy’, and a pur-
ported break from the Congress government’s apparent ‘meekness’ and ‘reluctance’ to assert
India’s ‘leading role’, was unable to resist the Nehruvian concept of ‘India as a peaceful country
seeking peaceful relations’.
Modi began his foreign policy initiatives by focusing on Asia (West Asia is an integral part of Asia
and India’s extended neighbourhood), demonstrating how the concept of Asia has remained ‘a space
for contemplating political possibilities’ (Nasser, 2021: 1) for all political dispensations in India. In
the first 5 years, 53 of his 93 international trips for state visits or regional dialogues were to Asia; in
2015, 18 of his 28 international trips were to Asia (East Asia, West Asia, South Asia and Central Asia;
Ashwarya 539

all proximate neighbourhoods). A content analysis of Modi’s joint statements with world leaders or
foreign speeches reveals an abundance of phrases such as ‘peace and friendship’, ‘peace and security’
and ‘peace and prosperity’. After all, no country would ever admit to being an aggressor or a source
of conflict. However, if Modi wanted ‘real’ transformation of India’s role, he could have said some-
thing akin to what China stated in its Arab policy paper, ‘Arab states are China’s important partners
in . . . the establishment of a new type of international relations’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016),
or he could have sounded an impactful narrative for the Global South similar to what China has done
with the slogan, ‘building a community with a shared future’ (Yi, 2022).
Instead, in his widely acclaimed Shangri-La Dialogue speech in 2018, Modi spoke passionately
about how India’s foreign policy was based on ‘peace’. He stated that India’s relations with ASEAN
are built on ‘peace and friendship’, and that his government seeks to ‘cooperate for an architecture
for peace and security in this region’. Furthermore, the Indian Ocean Region transit route must
‘remain peaceful and free for all’, and ‘our sea lanes will be pathways to prosperity and corridors
of peace’. Again, promoting ‘global peace and progress’ required a ‘peaceful border’ with China.
Modi continues, ‘We choose the side of principles and values, of peace and progress, not one side
of a divide or the other’. Finally, the ‘future [of growth and development] that we seek requires a
“stable bedrock of peace”’ (Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), 2018b).
A cursory semantic analysis of Modi’s Shangri La speech reveals his copious use of the words
‘peace’ and ‘peaceful’, as many as 16 times, as well as values associated with these words, such as
‘cooperation’ and ‘prosperity’, 21 times. In contrast, the word military, which can denote the much-
vaunted force and muscle, is spoken only once; the word ‘force’ itself occurs only once (MEA,
2018b). It is not a coincidence that PM Modi asserted the ‘peace’ conception in an Asian context,
and his frequent use of the phrase ‘[we] seek’, as opposed to ‘we want’ reveals a rendition of per-
suasive politics. The underlying tone of the Shangri-La remarks was strikingly similar to India’s
existential position in the world, as articulated in the Nehruvian NRC.
With three visits to the UAE, two to Saudi Arabia and one each to Oman, Bahrain and Qatar,
Modi reaffirmed India’s Asia-centric foreign policy preferences, while his visit to Kuwait was
cancelled due to the Covid-19 pandemic. In all these countries, Modi spoke of regional ‘peace and
security’ in the same breath, implying that security cannot be achieved without peace, and thereby
reiterating the Nehruvian concept of a ‘peace area’ that is also a secure area (Daulet Singh, 41).
During his visit to Oman in 2018, the joint statement between India and Oman discussed bilateral
strategic engagement in defence and security to promote ‘regional peace and security’ (MEA,
2018a). The joint statement issued with Qatar’s Emir, Abdullah Hamad Al-Thani, during Modi’s
visit to the GCC state in June 2016 reminded the peoples of the two countries of ‘their responsibil-
ity for promoting peace, stability, and security in the region and the world’ (MEA, 2016a). During
his October 2019 visit to Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Modi signed a joint statement with King
Salman bin Abdul-Aziz al Saud, expressing satisfaction ‘at the high-level consultation and coordi-
nation . . . on regional and international issues . . . in the framework of their responsibility towards
promoting peace, stability and security in the world’ (MEA, 2019a).
There are two things that stand out in Modi’s speeches and joint statements: first, they highlight
the deep continuities of India’s foreign policy, and second, there are unmistakable echoes of under-
lying principles of the Nehruvian NRC. In a similar vein, India’s External Affairs Minister S.
Jaishankar emphasised his country’s universalist outlook, as expressed by its belief that the world
is a family (Vasudeva kutumbakam in Sanskrit), during a speech at the launch of the Asia Society
Policy Institute in August 2022. He emphasised India’s unwavering commitment to a ‘cooperative,
inclusive, and consultative approach to international relations’, reinforcing the country’s emphasis
on pursuing peace through its foreign policy. In the same speech, he reaffirmed Asia’s centrality in
India’s understanding of its role, stating that the ‘progress of Asia’, of which India is a part, can
540 Journal of Asian and African Studies 58(4)

usher in a fairer world, and that an ‘Asian century’ cannot be realised until major states resolve
their outstanding differences so that they can coexist peacefully (Jaishankar, 2022).

India’s look west policy and the GCC: trade and migration
The Look West policy, an extension of India’s version of a peaceful rise to the role and status of a great
power, has resulted in strong commercial, security, and defence ties with the GCC states, resulting in
a number of entirely positive outcomes. Since the 1990s, ‘oil, economy, and diaspora have been the
driving factors’ in India–GCC relations (Taneja, 2020: 38). A structural shift in global energy demand,
evidenced by a shift in consumption from the West to the East at the turn of the 20th century, aided the
Gulf states’ overall approach to India. With its appetite for energy and investment, India’s burgeoning
economy presented an alluring prospect. As a result, the ‘Look West’ policy became complementary
to the Gulf’s perceptions of India as a thriving economy rather than merely a source of cheap labour,
and a market of 100 billion or more people became crucial to them (Pradhan, 2010: 98).
In 2005, India and the GCC signed a framework agreement for economic cooperation, followed
by a joint ministerial meeting in March 2006, the first institutional arrangement for cooperation.
The India–GCC Industrial Conference was conceptualised and organised by the Confederation of
Indian Industry (CII) under the auspices of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Ministry
of Commerce and Industry in 2004. It has resulted in long-term cross-border business partnerships
and investments, as well as serving as a platform for exchanges between GCC and Indian business
leaders across a wide range of fields. India and the GCC began negotiations for a Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) in January 2006, but such agreements have proven to be more successful bilater-
ally than multilaterally. In February 2022, India and the UAE signed a free trade agreement. An
FTA is being negotiated between India and Oman.

India–GCC trade
When India began economic liberalisation in 1991, it unleashed an insatiable appetite for ever-
increasing amounts of energy. The GCC states anticipated India’s peaceful rise and were eager to
facilitate and participate in it through robust commercial engagements. There has emerged a strong
complementarity of interests between India and the GCC states, with the latter selling their abun-
dant hydrocarbon resources and the former, an energy-deficient nation eager to buy. Notwithstanding
Indian policymakers’ efforts to diversify energy procurement, the six GCC states have come to
dominate Indian oil imports, accounting for a critical 34% of the total oil imports. Three of India’s
top five oil suppliers in 2021–2022 were from the GCC, with Saudi Arabia being the largest, fol-
lowed by Kuwait and the UAE (April 2021 to January 2022) (Mitra and Kasliwal, 2020; Ministry
of Commerce and Industry (MoCI), 2022a; Press Trust of India (PTI), 2022). Qatar has emerged as
India’s largest LNG supplier, accounting for more than half of total LNG imports, with the UAE
and Oman providing 11% and 4%, respectively (Jaganmohan, 2021; John, 2022). Petronet LNG,
India’s public sector gas company, imports 7.5 million tonnes of LNG annually under a 25-year
import agreement with Qatargas, which expires in 2028 and is likely to be renewed (PTI, 2021).
Not only did energy consumption, but also the high demand for oil-based products such as petro-
chemicals and fertilisers, lay the groundwork for a more pronounced and mutually advantageous
economic relationship between India and the GCC countries. Many of these products have been
traded in both directions because of India’s strong refining and petrochemical capacity, as well as
its proximity to the Gulf (Calabrese, 2017; Pradhan, 2010: 98).
Aside from oil and gas, the India–GCC non-oil trade figures demonstrate the Look West poli-
cy’s early success. Trade between India and the GCC was around $10 billion in 2003–2004, but it
Ashwarya 541

Table 1. India’s trade with GCC countries, 2003–2014 (all figures in US $ millions).

Financial year Export Import Total

2003–2004 7,067 3,253 10,320
2004–2005 9,815 7,064 16,878
2005–2006 11,775 7,805 19,580
2006–2007 16,374 30,994 47,368
2007–2008 21,760 45,090 66,850
2008–2009 32,125 59,505 91,630
2009–2010 30,480 53,497 83,977
2010–2011 42,472 74,915 1,17,388
2011–2012 45,360 102,182 1,47,542
2012–2013 51,054 108,092 1,59,146
2013–2014 48,221 101,799 1,50,021
2014–2015 49,296 84,433 1,33,728

Source: MoCI (2022a).

Table 2. India’s trade with GCC countries, 2015–2021 (all figures in US $ millions).

Financial Year Export Import Total

2015–2016 41,693 55,790 97,483
2016–2017 41,768 55,172 96,940
2017–2018 39,391 64,079 103,470
2018–2019 41,622 79,716 121,338
2019–2020 40,466 80,465 120,931
2020–2021 28,007 59,589 87,364
2021–2022 43,932 110,723 1,54,655

Source: MoCI (2022a).

steadily increased to $67 billion in 2007–2008. In just 10 years, bilateral trade between India and
the GCC reached $150 billion in 2013–2014. Between 2004 and 2014, India’s exports to the GCC
steadily increased, while imports remained higher (See Table 1). However, Indian exports have
been inconsistent since 2014, and imports, despite being higher, also exhibit an inconsistent trend
(see Table 2). Several factors contribute to India’s declining export trend, including a downturn in
GDP growth rate and manufacturing output (World Bank, 2022a, 2022b), with China, Japan, and
South Korea – all of which are manufacturing powerhouses – posing stiff competition in accessing
Gulf markets (Calabrese, 2017). The UAE is India’s largest export market in the West Asian region
and second-largest globally, owing in part to its status as a transhipment hub. Textiles, food prod-
ucts, information technology products, electrical goods, and machinery have found a lucrative
market in the GCC, with the UAE and Saudi Arabia ranking among India’s top 25 export destina-
tions (MoCI, n.d.). In the services sector, India has a comparative advantage over the GCC coun-
tries, which it can leverage to broaden its export portfolio.
India’s ability to import affords it economic influence with the GCC, but its ability to export
more will demonstrate economic strength. In a globalised world, ‘power shift’ requires a sound
economy with robust growth and development indicators, and this is precisely what would benefit
India’s great power ambitions. China, India’s Asian rival, has demonstrated how a strong economy
can propel a nation to global prominence and great power status.
542 Journal of Asian and African Studies 58(4)

Indian migrants in the GCC

India, along with the Philippines, is one of the top two countries of origin for Gulf migrants, with more
than nine million Indian expatriates living and working in the GCC. Historical ties to the region and
geographical proximity explain the presence of a sizable Indian labour force in GCC nations with small
indigenous populations and a shortage of both skilled and unskilled labour. Migration to GCC states has
been a significant source of revenue for India in the form of remittances for more than 50 years.
As a result of high global oil prices in the early 1970s, the Gulf countries were able to invest
heavily in infrastructure and development projects, creating a plethora of job opportunities for
expatriate workers. At the time, the majority of the workforce requirements were for semi-skilled
and unskilled labourers, which were mostly filled by large numbers of unemployed or low-wage
Indian workers. Opportunities expanded as the economic cycle accelerated, and white-collar Indian
workers also migrated to the GCC countries for work. Remittances began to increase India’s
national income and overall prosperity, particularly in high-migration states such as Kerala
(Calabrese, 2020). Expatriates in the Gulf remitted $49 billion in 2019 – 2% of India’s GDP and
two-thirds of total remittances to the country that year, accounting for more than 59% of total
remittances to India (Kulkarni, 2021; Mitra and Kasliwal, 2020).
Indian expatriates in the Gulf have an important impact and influence on India’s foreign policy
towards the GCC countries. Migrants are a geopolitical asset for India because they contribute to
the strengthening and revitalization of inter-state relations. Migrants foster ‘people-to-people con-
nections, which remain the solid foundation of India-GCC relations’ (Purayil, 2022). Expatriates
who have found financial success in the Gulf states are a source of investment and joint ventures
in India. In part to protect the economic and political interests of migrants, the ruling BJP moved
swiftly in June 2022 to punish party officials who made Islamophobic remarks on live television
that were strongly condemned by GCC states. The incident called into question India’s image as a
peaceful nation, portraying it as fractious and discriminatory towards its Muslim minority, and out
of step with the role that its international partners expect of it.

India’s NRC and Indo-Saudi ties

This article delves deeper into the unfolding of India’s national conception of its peaceful role in
relation to the GCC states through the lens of Saudi Arabia. My choice of Saudi Arabia as a case
study is based on the country’s enormous international political and economic power, which stems
from its vast energy resources and position as a leader among Muslim and Arab states. The GCC
was founded in Riyadh in May 1981, and the Kingdom represents the group’s political, economic,
and strategic imperatives. GCC states are likely to follow Saudi Arabia’s lead in determining the
course of their foreign relations, and a trend can be observed.
India’s role received an early acknowledgement from Saudi Arabia. During a brief visit to New
Delhi in December 1955, King Saud and Prime Minister Nehru issued a joint statement emphasis-
ing the importance of ‘a peaceful and non-military approach to the issues that divide the world’
(MEA, 1955: 404). In September 1956, Nehru was greeted in Riyadh with the slogan, ‘Welcome
Messenger of Peace’. Saudi Arabia was the second-largest oil supplier in the early 1970s after Iran,
and it was one of the preferred destinations for Indian migrant workers in the 1970s and 1980s
(Mudiam, 1994: 135–138). In 2004, at a conference in Goa, the then-CEO of Saudi Aramco,
Abdullah Jumah, stated that Saudi Arabia would meet all of India’s energy requirements, recognis-
ing the country’s growing demand for oil as a crucial element of Asia’s growth story. The 2006
Indo-Saudi Delhi Declaration and the 2010 Riyadh Declaration serve as models for similar agree-
ments with other GCC countries, ushering in a more active relationship with Saudi Arabia.
Ashwarya 543

Table 3. Indo-Saudi trade.

Year Imports from Saudi Arabia Exports to Total %increase/decrease % share of crude
Saudi Arabia trade in bilateral trade oil imports
Crude oil Non-oil commodity Total
imports imports imports
2006 7.52 2.45 9.98 2.55 12.53 268.52 75.4
2007 11.72 3.68 5.40 3.45 18.85 50.43 76.1
2008 16.45 4.75 21.20 5.61 26.81 42.22 77.6
2009 10.64 2.56 13.20 3.96 17.6 - 34.35 80.6
2010 14.62 3.98 18.60 4.68 23.28 32.27 78.6
2011 21.08 4.72 25.80 5.44 31.24 34.19 81.7
2012 24.51 5.10 29.6 8.82 38.42 22.98 82.8
2013 28.21 5.49 33.7 12.5 46.20 20.24 83.7
2014 23.9 3.00 30.9 13.6 44.50 -3.68 77.4

Source: UN Comtrade Database (2022).

Delhi and Riyadh declarations and Indo-Saudi joint statement

In January 2006, the late King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s visit to India as the chief guest for the
country’s Republic Day signalled the start of a new era in Indo-Saudi relations. The Delhi Declaration,
signed by then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the visiting Saudi monarch, committed the two
countries to a ‘strategic energy partnership’, recognising their complementary and interdependent rela-
tionship: India’s position as a significant global energy consumer and oil importer, and Saudi Arabia’s
position as the world’s largest oil producer and exporter (MEA, 2006). Oil imports from the GCC
countries, and Saudi Arabia in particular, represent a significant portion of India’s total imports and are
therefore crucial to the country’s economic growth and stability. Despite abundant natural resources,
hydrocarbons are scarce, requiring India to import more than 85% of its annual crude requirements in
fiscal year 2021–2022 (PTI, 2022), with the GCC providing one-third of the supplies. A nation’s geo-
political ambitions are typically supported by a rapidly expanding economy fuelled by extensive use
of energy resources. India is no different. Access to and availability of energy, specifically oil at a
reasonable price and in sufficient quantities in India, are critical for achieving this goal.
Since economic liberalisation began in 1991, securing Gulf oil supplies has been a key compo-
nent of India’s outreach to the GCC. The Riyadh Declaration (MEA, 2010), which established a
‘strategic partnership’ covering security, economic, and defence areas between India and Saudi
Arabia, was guided by the strong ties generated by energy reciprocity. During the then-Saudi
Crown Prince (the current king), Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud’s visit to India in 2014, the two
countries issued a joint statement emphasising reciprocal investments and the formation of joint
ventures. It included a directive to the relevant authorities on both sides to finalise a framework
agreement that would facilitate private sector investments, particularly in the petrochemical and
pharmaceutical sectors (MEA, 2014). In addition, the two countries established a joint business
council to promote and protect bilateral investments. An examination of bilateral trade between
India and Saudi Arabia from 2006 to 2014 reveals a growing trend. The one-time decline in 2009
can be attributed to the global economic downturn. Over a period of 8 years (2006–2013), India’s
crude oil imports from Saudi Arabia more than quadrupled due to high energy consumption and
rapid economic growth (Table 3).
The preceding discussion on Indo-Saudi economic relations in the aftermath of the Delhi and
Riyadh Declarations, as well as the 2014 Indo-Saudi Joint Statement, should not overshadow other
544 Journal of Asian and African Studies 58(4)

aspects of Indo-Saudi role dynamics and the expression of India’s peaceful national role conception
in them. A content analysis of the three documents reveals the frequent use of the terms ‘peace’ and
‘Asian cooperation’, suggesting that India and Saudi Arabia link their energy, trade, commercial,
scientific, and security ties to these values and beliefs. Several references to civilisational ties and
cultural aspects attest to the two nations’ shared Islamic heritage and desire to preserve it.
The three agreements contain 24, 31 and 25 references to energy and economic relations, dem-
onstrating, respectively, the dynamics of Indo-Saudi consumer and supplier ties, as well as their
growing trade partnership. Security concerns are treated equally, as evidenced by the nearly identi-
cal number of security-related references on the Indian and Saudi sides. References to peace and
Asian issues are the most numerous in the trio, affirming India’s role as a global stakeholder pro-
moting international peace and solidarity. When combined with the emphasis on economic engage-
ment, it is clear that India seeks peace not only for its own sake, but also to create a conducive
environment for partner countries to develop and grow. The numerical symmetry of each reference
element in the three agreements mentioned above suggests that India’s conception of its role cor-
responds to the expectation of its role (Table 4).
India and Saudi Arabia mention security and defence concerns 16 and 19 times in their declara-
tions, respectively, reflecting their desire to engage vigorously on these issues in light of the rise of
Islamist extremism in West and South Asia. The Delhi Declaration established a joint Indo-Saudi
focus on counter-terrorism, whereas the Riyadh Declaration, which confirmed the upgrade of rela-
tions to a strategic partnership, marked the start of more structured bilateral defence engagement.
In 2014, the visiting crown, who was also the country’s Defence Minister, signed a Memorandum
of Understanding (MoU) for defence cooperation with India. This was the highest-level Saudi
leader’s visit to India since 2006, signalling Indo-Saudi intent to broaden their strategic partnership
(Kumar, 2012; PTI, 2014). Furthermore, India and Saudi Arabia established a Joint Committee on
Defence Cooperation, which so far met five times, in 2012, 2016, 2017, 2019, and 2022, to discuss
and implement training and capacity building, joint exercises, intelligence exchange, maritime
security, and the promotion of defence industries. Strong counterterrorism consultations continue
to make steady progress, as attested by Saudi Arabia’s ease in deporting an Indian national identi-
fied as the ‘handler’ of terrorists responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks (Lakshmi, 2012). The
navies of India and Saudi Arabia conducted their first-ever joint exercise in August 2021, indicat-
ing a strengthening of defence ties (Express News Service (ENS), 2021).

Modi and the GCC states: managing a relationship

After his first electoral victory in 2014, there was widespread domestic concern about how Modi
would manage relations with the predominantly Muslim region as Prime Minister, as well as how
these countries would react to the BJP-RSS alliance’s militaristic Hindu nationalist rhetoric. Still
burdened by the 2002 communal riots in Gujarat, where he served as chief minister, Modi’s leader-
ship style ran counter to India’s expected role as a stable, pluralistic society that prioritised peace
as its core foreign policy principle. Thus, giving the GCC top priority was essential, and once in
office, Modi attempted ‘role adaptation’, which is the process of flexibly adapting to role expecta-
tions through strategies and policies while maintaining the role itself (Gurol, 2020: 23). For their
part, the GCC states preferred a cautious wait-and-see approach, expressing little enthusiasm for
Modi’s ‘decisive leader’ moniker or his calls for a rethinking of India’s foreign policy.
Given his track record as a leader, the GCC leaders could not accept Modi unless they were fully
informed of his policies. They did, however, back him up when he decided to keep India’s engage-
ment with the region on the same lines and framework as previous governments. According to one
observer, ‘the broad parameters of India’s Middle East policy were largely in place when Modi was
Table 4. Bilateral elements and their mentions: Delhi declaration, Riyadh declaration and Indo-Saudi joint statement.
Ashwarya

Declarations’ reference elements Delhi Declaration Riyadh Declaration Joint Statement on the occasion of the Official
(27 January 2006) (28 February 2010) Visit of Crown Prince, Deputy Prime Minister
and Defence Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia to India (26–28 February 2014)
Energy ties (crude, energy, gas, oil, petroleum, petrochemical(s), 13 10 10
renewable(s), solar)
Economic relations (economic, economy/economies, trade/ 11 21 15
trading, commerce/commercial, business(s), industry/industries/
industrial, invest/investing, exchange, investment(s), market(s),
marketing, taxation, entrepreneurs, venture)
Science and technology (science, scientific, technology/ 11 10 5
technologies/technological, technical, research, space)
Security issues (security, strategy/strategies/strategic, cyber, 16 19 11
intelligence, terrorism/terror/terrorist, violence, extremism,
trafficking, narcotics, arms, crime(s), laundering, defence,
weapon(s))
Expatriate issues (labour, immigrants/immigration, Indians, 0 1 0
worker(s), workforce)
Cultural and social links (culture/cultural, civilisation(s)/ 16 11 5
civilisational, people(s), Haj, umrah, education/educational,
youth, sport(s), health/healthcare, medical, exchange(s))
Peaceful relations (peace/peaceful(ly), treaty, cooperation, 28 26 15
coordination, tolerance, religious harmony, brotherhood,
principle(s), value(s), belief, ideal(s), respect)
Asia centrism/Asian issues (India/Indian(s), countries, Saudi 59 50 63
Arabia/Saudi/Saud, Iraq, Palestine/Palestinian, Iran/Iranian(s),
Yemen/Yemeni, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Arab, region(s)/regional,
Asian)

Source: MEA (2006b, 2010, 2014).

545
546 Journal of Asian and African Studies 58(4)

elected in 2014’. Instead of conceiving of a new course of action, ‘the new government followed
the same course, but intensified what was becoming known as the “Look West” policy. . . ’ (Burton,
2019). Modi’s government unveiled the so-called ‘Link West’ policy, reiterating the Persian Gulf’s
critical importance for India in terms of energy imports and security, trade, investment, worker
outflows, and remittances.
Modi made a series of visits to the GCC states, where he signed agreements on trade and com-
merce, health and tourism, defence and technology, assuring them of the stability of the relation-
ship ecosystem left by previous governments. The sheer number of his visits demonstrated the
government’s priority without changing the course of engagements with the region. So far, India’s
outreach under Modi has been consistent with the GCC’s expectation that it will maintain long-
standing, peaceful ties. His travels to the region have provided the continuity needed for political
and economic partnerships to develop and flourish over time.

The Modi government and Indo-Saudi joint statements

An examination of three Indo-Saudi joint statements undertaken during Modi’s premiership (Table
5) reveals the legacy role dynamics. Peaceful relations and values associated with peace are men-
tioned 100 times by both parties and are given equal or greater weight than economic relations,
which are mentioned 93 times. With a total of 237 references, issues relating to Asian nations and
regions are the most frequently mentioned of all topics covered. Instability in Iraq, civil war in
Syria, the persistence of the Palestinian issue, and the significance of India–Pakistan dialogue are
highlighted. Numerous security-related references (139) focus on regional geopolitical events such
as the emergence of extremism in the form of ISIS, the proliferation of extremist groups in Syria’s
civil war, and an increase in piracy incidents. None of them intends to project India’s military
power or commit its military strength to providing security in the region or elsewhere. If this is
interpreted as a sign of Modi’s much-touted muscular-tough foreign policy, it is incorrect and does
not represent a fundamental shift in the country’s external peaceful role.

India–GCC: specific elements of outreach under Modi

Unlike previous engagements between India and the GCC, which focused on energy security and
trade, the Modi government emphasised investments from the region. At the 9th India–GCC
Political Dialogue, India’s former external affairs minister, Sushma Swaraj, invited GCC nations
to participate in her government’s ‘Make in India’ campaign, a scheme to attract foreign capital
investment in manufacturing (Indo-Asian News Service (IANS), 2015). In his speeches to the
GCC countries, Modi urged the private and public sectors to invest in India and form joint ventures
with Indian companies for infrastructure development and petrochemical projects. Modi’s April
2016 visit to Saudi Arabia focused on investments and joint ventures in petrochemical complexes,
R&D, and exploration, tying the expansion of trade and investment ties to the objective of strength-
ening strategic relations (MEA, 2016b).
Continuing the emphasis on investment, the Union Cabinet approved an MoU between India and
the UAE in 2016 to raise up to $75 billion for the National Investment and Infrastructure Fund,
India’s first sovereign wealth fund. Furthermore, the UAE’s federal and local sovereign institutional
investments in India’s infrastructure sector have been declared tax-free until March 2024 (Prasad,
2020). Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two GCC countries with the largest sovereign wealth funds,
have invested the most in India since 2015 (Table 6). The GCC’s economic diversification plans
centre on investments and acquisitions of global assets. Their investments in India demonstrate that
their plans to diversify their economies beyond oil are compatible with India’s investment needs.
Table 5. Indo-Saudi joint statement, 2016–2019.
Ashwarya

Declaration elements Joint statement during India–Saudi Arabia Joint Statement Joint Statement on Visit
the visit of Hon’ble Prime during the State Visit of His Royal of Prime Minister of India
Minister of India to Saudi Highness the Crown Prince of Saudi to the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, 3 April 2016 Arabia to India, 20 February 2019 Arabia, 29 October 2019
Energy ties (crude, energy, gas, oil, petroleum, petrochemical(s), 15 19 3
renewable(s), solar)
Economic relations (economic, economy/economies, trade/ 37 43 11
trading, commerce/commercial, business(s), industry/industries/
industrial, invest/investing, exchange, investment(s), market(s),
marketing, taxation, entrepreneurs, venture)
Science and technology (science, scientific, technology/ 10 12 2
technologies/technological, technical, research, space)
Security issues (security, strategy/strategies/strategic, cyber, 54 57 28
intelligence, terrorism/terror/terrorist, violence, extremism,
trafficking, narcotics, arms, crime(s), laundering, defence,
weapon(s))
Expatriate issues (labour, immigrants/immigration, Indians, 3 2 0
worker(s), workforce)
Cultural and social links (culture/cultural, civilisation(s)/ 21 32 13
civilisational, people(s), Haj, umrah, education/educational, youth,
sport(s), health/healthcare, medical, exchange(s))
Peaceful relations (peace/peaceful(ly), treaty, cooperation, 32 52 16
coordination, tolerance, religious harmony, brotherhood,
principle(s), value(s), belief, ideal(s), respect)
Asia centrism/Asian issues (India/Indian(s), countries, Saudi 94 96 47
Arabia/Saudi/Saud, Iraq, Palestine/Palestinian, Iran/Iranian(s),
Yemen/Yemeni, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Arab, region(s)/regional,
Asian)

Source: MEA (2016, 2019a, 2019b).

547
548 Journal of Asian and African Studies 58(4)

Table 6. Investment (FDI equity inflows) from GCC states to India (all figures in US $ millions).

Country UAE Saudi Qatar Oman Kuwait Bahrain Total India’s total Share (%) of FDI
Arabia GCC FDI inflows inflows to India
from the GCC
2015–2016 985.14 10.82 2.10 55.83 6.17 15.34 1075.4 40000.98 2.69
2016–2017 674.70 11.87 16.43 14.51 11.52 80.27 809.3 43478.27 1.86
2017–2018 1049.82 125.16 0.23 28.92 18.85 19.67 1242.65 44856.75 2.77
2018–2019 897.62 20.09 9.13 33.01 7.95 8.79 976.59 44366.00 2.20
2019–2020 338.57 89.92 54.70 32.19 2.04 5.17 522.59 49977.05 1.05
2020–2021 4202.54 2816.08 159.44 15.12 9.07 2.90 7205.15 59635.54 12.08
2021–2022 1,032 11.55 240.86 11.52 5.04 0.21 1301.18 58773.27 2.21

Source: MoCI (2022b).

Table 6 displays the GCC states’ investments in India since PM Modi’s pitch: From April 2014
to December 2021, GCC investments in India totalled $13.5 billion, and in 2021–2022, 2.21% of all
FDI inflows into India. Financial analysts attribute these low figures to lingering ‘uncertainties over
the policy environment or regulatory hassles’ (Mohan, 2022). Could it, however, be linked to a loss
of faith in India’s growth story as the country’s social divisions have widened in recent years?
Professor of economics at Cornell University Kaushik Basu observes that, since 2016, India’s
annual growth has been lower than the previous year, reaching its lowest point during the Covid-19
pandemic (2020–2021), but this cannot be solely attributed to economic policies. Basu asserts that
trust is the foundation of a thriving economy, noting that a society grows when its members trust
one another and begin to invest; however, in India, this trust has been eroded by the divisive politi-
cal climate regarding religion (anti-Muslim sentiment among supporters of the BJP), which has
had a negative effect on economic indicators (see Bakshi, 2022; Inamdar, 2020). The prospect of
profitable trade and investment in a high-growth economy, or ‘the rise of the Indian market’
(Taneja, 2020: 37), attracted the GCC states to India at the turn of the 20th century. India cannot
afford to lose sight of the fact that, as previously stated, the path to great power status is one of
economic strength. Nonetheless, in the midst of political turmoil and its potential economic reper-
cussions, the signing of a free trade agreement (FTA) between India and the UAE in February 2022
is a positive economic development, which will permit increased bilateral trade and investment
flows. Given the GCC states’ striking similarities in trade basket composition, economic growth
patterns and socio-political structure, the India–UAE FTA could serve a template for a larger pact
with the GCC as a whole or bilaterally with individual member states.

India as a security provider?

At the Manama Dialogue, Arab countries implored India to play an ‘effective role’ (MEA, 2016c)
in global affairs, essentially asking it to become a ‘provider of public security’ or ‘net security
provider’. This stems from the geoeconomics of the shift in oil and gas exports from Gulf states to
the East from the West, and specifically to India and China. In the face of the United States’ reluc-
tance to take on new security commitments stemming from their conflict with Iran and the rise of
violent Islamist outfits in the wake of the Arab Spring, the GCC states appear increasingly inter-
ested in forming new security partnerships. Is India ready to play the role of a security provider?
How will this position fit into the idea of a peaceful international role?
Ashwarya 549

The United States has long been the leading provider of public security in East Asia and West
Asia, relying on alliances with Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Australia, among others, as well
as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Oman, to maintain its military presence project force, and
bring security to these regions. India, which continues to have the most poor people in the world
(See Roy and van der Weide, 2022), lacks the resources to become a net security provider. Comparing
India’s share of global GDP and military expenditures to those of great powers such as the United
States and China reveals a large disparity in terms of scale. India’s share of global GDP was 9.4%
compared with 18.4% for China and 13.6% for the United States. The United States’ military spend-
ing totalled $801 billion in 2021, with China coming in second with $293 billion. India ranked third
with USD 76.6 billion (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2022; World
Economics, 2021). India will not be considered a great power until it closes its growth gap with
advanced economies that can devote resources to military capability development.
The status of great power requires the formation of alliances in addition to internal military
expenditures and capabilities. When Jaishankar declares, ‘India will never be a part of an alli-
ance system’ (The Hindu, 2020), he reveals a pervasive and enduring belief among Indian poli-
cymakers that alliances, particularly their military components, pose a threat to world peace
and are, therefore, restrictive. ‘India’s strategic culture is such that it prefers to avoid formal
alliances; “strategic autonomy” has been a postcolonial rallying cry for decades’, noted Hagerty
(2009). India favours ententes over alliances because ententes are ‘more malleable than alli-
ances’ and eliminate ‘the negative costs of a more formal alliance commitment’ (Hagerty, 2009:
39–40). It is possible to argue that India’s aversion to alliances stems from a sober assessment
of its inability to project defensive power or become a net security provider in neighbouring
regions. In international relations, India maintains its conception of its role based on the insepa-
rability of peace and security. While this preference for entente is interpreted as ‘security insti-
tutions’ in Indo-US relations (Hagerty, 2009: 40), it could be understood as ‘strategic
partnerships’ in GCC relations.
The strategic partnership agreements between India and Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE, and
Qatar are highly nuanced and framed differently in each bilateral context, but they all offer the
potential for accelerated economic development. Thus, while the India–UAE Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership ‘has promoted and delivered significant investment opportunities’ (MEA,
2022a), it is critical to expand ‘trade and investment ties in order to advance strategic cooperation’
in the case of Saudi Arabia (MEA, 2019a), and ‘there is significant potential to enhance bilateral
trade in tune with the depth of India-Oman strategic partnership’ (MEA, 2022b). According to an
MEA annual report, the primary objective of India’s foreign policy is to ‘promote and maintain a
peaceful and stable external environment so that domestic tasks of inclusive economic develop-
ment and poverty alleviation can advance rapidly’ (Wadhwa, 2019). India’s conception of its
national role as a seeker of peace is not only a moral imperative to eliminate conflict and war from
the world, but also a strategic imperative for economic growth and prosperity.

India, GCC, and Israel

No discussion of India–GCC relations would be complete without mentioning Israel. The Abraham
Accords, which established diplomatic relations between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain, began the
process of normalising Israel’s relations with the Arab world, validating India’s long-held under-
standing of ‘security through peace’. The reconciliation of regional adversaries has helped ease the
strains of India’s delicate balancing act in dealing with them (Arabs and Israelis), and enhanced the
country’s ability to maintain peaceful and robust economic relations. The peace dividends are imme-
diately apparent. Under a trilateral agreement among India, Israel and the UAE, an Israeli company,
550 Journal of Asian and African Studies 58(4)

Ecoppia, will manufacture an innovative robotic solar cleaning technology in India for a flagship
project in the UAE.
India recognised Israel in September 1950, but did not establish full diplomatic relations out of
respect for its Muslim minority at home and solidarity with Arab-Palestinian losses in the 1948
Arab-Israeli War. In a 1982 interview with an Indian newsmagazine, Yusef Hasseen, Israel’s consul
in Bombay, accused Indian politicians of being beholden to Arabs and rejecting his country, add-
ing, ‘You must remember that there is a strong Arab-Muslim lobby in Delhi. There are Arab ambas-
sadors in Delhi who put a very strong political pressure on you not to have normal relations with
Israel’ (Mehta, 2013: 102). Although Hasseen was recalled for his remarks and the consulate was
closed for several years, by 1982 India’s economic stakes in the GCC were substantial due to expa-
triate workers, oil transactions, and vital remittances. Considering India’s escalating economic
difficulties, no Indian government could afford to disregard these facts.
Since normalising relations with Israel in the early 1990s, Indian policymakers have pursued a
policy of de-hyphenation in their country’s relations with both Israel and the GCC states, establish-
ing strong parallel relations and reaping distinct benefits. Aside from the ubiquitous energy and
trade, strong ties with the GCC assist India’s leaders in deflecting claims of discrimination against
the Muslim minority and preserving the country’s role as a peaceful nation. Israel and India have
strong ties in areas ranging from agriculture and technology to defence and security.
It would have been unthinkable a few years ago for India to engage with Israel and the UAE on
a single platform like the I2U2, an emerging transregional geoeconomic forum. I2U2 stands for the
first letters of the four participating countries’ names: India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States.
The forum’s first summit in July 2022 follows the formation of the International Forum for
Economic Cooperation at the previous year’s meeting of foreign ministers of the four nations. With
a focus on issues related to water and food security, decarbonization, transportation, space, health,
and supply chain resilience, I2U2 members have studiously avoided using the term alliance to
describe the grouping. One can attribute India’s participation in a forum primarily intended to sup-
port the emerging cooperation between Israel and the UAE to the country’s multifaceted relation-
ship with the United States, particularly the convergence of interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
However, India’s eagerness to participate is better explained by I2U2’s positioning as an economic
forum with a focus on ‘capital, expertise, and markets’ and a non-confrontational agenda. I2U2
gives India another chance to capitalise on its peaceful role and continue to foster complementary
and economically advantageous relations with the GCC countries, Israel, and the rest of the region,
as is the essence of its Look West/Link West policy.

Conclusions
A nation’s perception of its role in international relations usually emerges during its formative years
as a state and can withstand the test of time. Since the Nehruvian era, Indian leaders and policymakers
have acknowledged and embraced their country’s peaceful role conception, which is supported by an
Asia-focused engagement, the establishment of security through peaceful relations, and the prefer-
ence for persuasion over aggression in international relations. These are not fanciful ideas, but rather
the result of a pragmatic comprehension of their country’s manifest geography, neighbourhood,
contemporary history, civilisational ties, and most importantly, national interests rooted in economic
growth and development. The preceding analysis demonstrates that India–GCC interactions, founded
on complementarity, reflect India’s enduring peaceful role conception and its underlying ideas, lead-
ing to extensive collaboration on issues ranging from energy, commerce, science, and technology, to
security and defence. As the GCC states are aware of India’s peaceful ethos, the country’s rise does
not pose a threat to them. In fact, the documents examined in this article reveal that India–GCC ties
Ashwarya 551

have grown precisely because there is no threat. While Prime Minister Modi may have desired a dif-
ferent role for India, one that portrayed the country as a ‘strong power’ as opposed to a ‘peaceful
power’, he, too, had to accept the concept of peace as defining the Indian nation. In India’s conception
of its national role, peace has a multifaceted meaning connected to development and security, both of
which correspond to national interests.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD
Sujata Ashwarya https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6700-619X

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Author biography
Sujata Ashwarya is a professor at the Centre for West Asian [Middle Eastern] Studies in Jamia Millia Islamia,
New Delhi, India. Her research interests include the politics and international relations of the Middle East, the
political economy of energy, and India–Middle East relations.