American National Standard

ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021

Radiation Safety for Cargo and Vehicle Security

Screening Systems Using X-ray or Gamma Radiation,
Energies Up to 10 MeV

Approved: January 14, 2021

American National Standards Institute, Inc.
Published by

Health Physics Society

950 Herndon Parkway, Suite 450
Herndon, VA 20170

Copyright © 2021 by the Health Physics Society.

All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, in an electronic retrieval system or otherwise,
without prior written permission of the publisher.

Printed in the United States of America

ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021

ii
The ANSI/HPS N43.16 Standards Subcommittee responsible for the development of this standard had the
following members:

Craig R. Jones, Co-Chair

U.S. Army Public Health Center

Richard T. Whitman, Co-Chair

Whitman Technical Consulting

Ronald Amoling
American Science & Engineering, Inc.

Maria Arribas-Colon
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Paul Bergstrom
National Institute of Standards and Technology

Gongyin Chen
Varian

Daniel Kassiday
U.S. Food and Drug Administration

Siraj M. Khan
Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Jeffrey Lodwick
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Daniel Madson
Leidos

Joel Sadler
L3 Communications

Mershad Shahabidin
Rapiscan Systems, Inc.

Daniel Strom
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (retired)

John Volz
Smiths Detection

iii
The current working group gratefully acknowledges the valuable contributions from the many past
working group members who have assisted with the development of this standard. Special thanks goes to
the following past members:
Frank Cerra
National Institute of Standards and Technology (retired)

Richard Schueller
American Science & Engineering, Inc. (deceased)

Steven Seltzer
National Institute of Standards and Technology (retired)

David Hamel
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Fran Szrom
U.S. Army Public Health Center (retired)

Alex Grosso
Customs and Border Protection, U
.S. Department of Homeland Security (retired)

Luke McCormick
Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (retired)

iv
This standard was consensus-balloted and approved by the Accredited Standards Committee N43
Equipment for Non-Medical Radiation Applications on November 11, 2020. At the time of balloting, the
N43 Committee had the following membership:

Chairperson Craig R. Jones

Vice Chair Richard Whitman
ABB Industrial Systems, Inc. John R. Dukes
American Iron and Steel Institute Anthony LaMastra
American Society for Testing and Materials Edward Walker
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Rajesh Garg
Health Physics Society Antonio Triventi
David Bytwerk (alternate)
Hopewell Designs, Inc. G. Spencer Mickum
Chris Vanderpool (alternate)
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements Susan M. Langhorst
National Institute of Standards and Technology Jack Glover
Timothy Barvitskie (alternate)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Tomas Herrera
Lymari Sepulveda (alternate)
U.S. Dept of the Air Force, Office of the Surgeon General Ramachandra Bhat
U.S. Dept of the Army Timothy Mikulski
LTC Brian Champine (alternate)
U.S. Dept of the Army, Office of the Surgeon General Craig R. Jones
Scott Goodison (alternate)
U.S. Dept of Energy John Blaikie
George Chiu (alternate)
U.S. Dept of the Navy Capt. Gregory R. Fairchild
U.S. Dept of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service Daniel Kassiday
U.S. Dept of Homeland Security Siraj M. Khan
Individual Members David R. Brown
Gregory R. Komp
David W. Lee
William Morris
Sander Perle
Marvin Turkanis
Richard Whitman

v
Foreword (This foreword is not part of American National Standard N43.16)
The use of ionizing radiation to screen vehicles and cargo containers has increased rapidly over past
decades. This technology makes it possible to rapidly screen vehicles and cargo containers for the
presence of threat items and contraband. It also minimizes the need for security personnel to open or
enter the vehicles or containers. When this technology became commercially available, little guidance
had been published for this type of radiation use. In March 2003 the HPS/ANSI Accredited Committee
N43 appointed working group N43.16 to draft a consensus standard addressing the radiation safety
aspects of the technology.
This standard applies to security screening systems used for non-intrusive inspection of vehicles and
cargo containers in which people are not expected to be present. The standard provides guidelines
specific to the radiation safety aspects of the design, maintenance, and operation of these systems. It
does not include electrical safety guidelines or any other safety, performance or use considerations
outside of the realm of radiation safety. The standard is intended for manufacturers, distributors,
installers, and users of the systems.
In setting dose limits the standard takes into consideration the minimization of the dose as balanced
against the security benefit to society. This precludes the frivolous use of the security screening systems
where no benefit is to be derived. The standard contains three informative annexes. Annex A
(informative) provides descriptions of typical systems and operational modes. Annex B (informative)
provides information on radiation measurement quantities, terminology, equipment and techniques.
Annex C (normative) provides the background and examples for obtaining dose limits around systems
based on actual operational conditions. Annex D (normative) provides techniques for performing radiation
surveys.
It is important to reiterate that this standard includes requirements for both the manufacturers and users
of screening systems. Sections 4 and 6 of this Standard contain requirements for both manufacturers and
users. Section 5 contains only manufacturer requirements. Section 7 contains user requirements. Full
compliance with this standard requires systems to be both manufactured and operated according to the
standard. Simply procuring equipment that meets all the manufacturing performance requirements does
not guarantee compliance. When there is no requirement for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
licensing or state registration, the authors of this standard recommend equivalent oversight be performed
by a qualified independent authority.
This standard does not address dose limits for intentional exposure of humans to the primary beam.
Users of systems intended to expose humans to primary beam x-rays, gamma-radiation, or both (e.g.,
pedestrians, occupied vehicles) as well as vehicles and cargo containers shall also comply with the
requirements of ANSI/HPS N43.17-2009 (Renewed as of 2018) Radiation Safety for Personnel Security
Screening Systems Using X-ray or Gamma Radiation.

Key words: cargo and vehicle screening, gamma rays, health physics, linear
accelerator (LINAC), national standard, radiation generating device (RGD),
radiation safety, sealed radioactive sources

vi
Contents

Foreword ................................................................................................................................ vi
1 Purpose and Scope ................................................................................................................. 1
2 Normative References............................................................................................................. 1
3 Definitions1
3.1 Shall and Should .............................................................................................................. 1
3.2 Specific Terms.................................................................................................................. 1
4 Federal, State and Local Regulations ..................................................................................... 4
5 Dose Limitation........................................................................................................................ 4
5.1 Dose to System Operating Crew ...................................................................................... 4
5.2 Dose to Bystanders .......................................................................................................... 5
5.3 Dose to Inadvertently Scanned Individuals ...................................................................... 5
6 System and Manufacturing Requirements .............................................................................. 5
6.1 Indicators and Controls .................................................................................................... 5
6.2 Safety Interlocks ............................................................................................................... 6
6.3 Ground Fault .................................................................................................................... 6
6.4 Labeling ............................................................................................................................ 6
6.5 Information to be Provided to the End User ..................................................................... 7
6.6 Records to be Maintained by Manufacturers.................................................................... 7
6.7 Records to be Obtained by Diealers and Distributors ...................................................... 8
7 Installation Requirements ........................................................................................................ 8
7.1 Site Selection ................................................................................................................... 9
7.2 Safety Systems ................................................................................................................ 9
7.3 Establishing the Radiation Control Area........................................................................... 9
7.4 Establishing Quality Control Parameters.......................................................................... 9
7.5 Warning Signs and Access Control ................................................................................ 10
7.6 Assessment of Potential Doses to System Operators.................................................... 10
7.7 Assessment of Potential Doses to Inadvertently Scanned Individuals ........................... 10
7.8 Documentation ............................................................................................................... 10
8 Operating Requirements ....................................................................................................... 11
8.1 Responsible Individual ................................................................................................... 11
8.2 Establish Operating Procedures..................................................................................... 11
8.3 Personnel Monitoring ..................................................................................................... 11
8.4 Personnel Training ......................................................................................................... 12
8.5 Radiation Safety Surveys ............................................................................................... 12
8.5.1 Initial and Periodic Radiation Safety Surveys ....................................................... 13
8.5.2 Routine Quality Control ......................................................................................... 13
8.6 Preventive Maintenance ................................................................................................. 14
8.7 Inadvertent Exposures ................................................................................................... 14
8.8 Records and Documentation .......................................................................................... 14
9 Informative References ......................................................................................................... 15

Annex A (Informative)
Security Screening Systems and Operations ........................................................................ 16
A.1 Imaging Technologies .................................................................................................... 16
A.1.1 Transmission Imaging .......................................................................................... 16
A.1.2 Backscatter imaging ............................................................................................. 16
A.1.3 Combined Imaging ............................................................................................... 17
A.2 Operational Modes......................................................................................................... 17
A.2.1 Moving Source Mode ........................................................................................... 17
A.2.2 Stationary Source Mode ....................................................................................... 18
A.2.3 Dual Mode ............................................................................................................ 18
A.3 Radiation Safety Implications......................................................................................... 18

vii
Annex B (Informative)
Radiation Dosimetry .............................................................................................................. 19
B.1 Radiation Dosimetry Quantities and Units ...................................................................... 19
B.2 Calculating Radiation Doses ........................................................................................... 20
B.3 Measuring Radiation Doses ............................................................................................ 21
B.3.1 Ionization chambers ............................................................................................. 21
B.3.2 Geiger Counters .................................................................................................. 21
B.3.3 Scintillation Detectors ........................................................................................... 21
B.3.4 Passive Dosimeters .............................................................................................. 22
B.3.5 Neutron Detection ................................................................................................ 22
B.3.5.1 Active Neutron Detectors .................................................................................. 22
B.3.5.2 Passive Neutron Detectors ................................................................................ 22
B.4 Air Kerma and Absorbed Dose Measurements for Compliance with
ANSI/HPS N43.16 .......................................................................................................... 22
B.4.1 Instrument Selection ............................................................................................. 23
B.4.2 Calibration ............................................................................................................ 24

Annex C )Normative)
Procedures for Measurements Made by Manufacturers ....................................................... 25
C.1 Air Kerma at a Reference location in the Primary Beam ................................................ 25
C.1.1 Equipment Required ........................................................................................... 25
C.1.2 Procedure ............................................................................................................ 25
C.2 Isodose Contours ............................................................................................................ 25
C.2.1 Equipment Required ........................................................................................... 25
C.2.2 Procedure ............................................................................................................ 26
C.3 Dose Per Scan to the Driver of the Vehicle Being Screened .......................................... 26
C.3.1 Equipment Required ........................................................................................... 26
C.3.2 Procedure ............................................................................................................ 27
C.4 Dose to an Inadvertently Scanned Individual ................................................................. 27
C.4.1 Equipment Required ........................................................................................... 27
C.4.2 Procedure ............................................................................................................ 27
C.5 Boundary of the Radiation Control Area ......................................................................... 27

Annex D (Normative)
Establishing the Boundary of the Radiation Control Area ..................................................... 28
D.1 The Radiation Control Area ............................................................................................ 28
D.2 Methodology ................................................................................................................... 28
D.3 Example Calculations ..................................................................................................... 28
D.4 Radiation Control Area Survey ....................................................................................... 29
D.4.1 Equipment Required ........................................................................................... 29
D.4.2 Procedure ............................................................................................................ 29

viii
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD
Radiation Safety for Cargo and
Vehicle Security Screening Systems
Using X-Ray and Gamma Radiation,
Energies Up To 10 MeV
1. Purpose and Scope
This standard sets forth guidelines and
performance criteria for radiation safety aspects
of the design, operation, and maintenance of non-
intrusive inspection (NII) systems using x-ray or
gamma radiation for security screening of cargo
containers and vehicles.
This standard does not apply to the following:
a) Cabinet x-ray system (as defined in Title
21, Code of Federal Regulations, Section
1020.40).
b) X-ray systems used for medical
diagnosis or treatment, medical
research, or non-destructive testing.
For security screening operations where human
occupants of a vehicle are intentionally exposed
to the primary radiation beam, this standard
addresses only those aspects of the operation
related to cargo or vehicle screening. Users
conducting such operations shall also comply
with the requirements of ANSI/HPS N43.17-2009
[R2019], Radiation Safety for Personnel Security
Screening Systems Using X-ray or Gamma
Radiation.
This standard does not address electrical or other
safety requirements, detection performance, or
other use considerations unrelated to radiation
safety. It also does not address the potential
effects of ionizing radiation on radiosensitive
cargo; however, it does require system
manufacturers to disclose the dose to an
inadvertently exposed individual, which provide
an estimate of the dose to cargo.
2. Normative References
ANSI/HPS N43.17 – 2009 [Renewed 2019],
Radiation Safety for Personnel Security
Screening Systems Using X-Ray or Gamma
Radiation, Health Physics Society, Herndon, VA.
ANSI/HPS 43.16-2021
3. Definitions
3.1 Shall and Should
The word “shall” is used to denote a requirement,
compliance with which is necessary to meet
current radiation protection standards; the word
“should” denotes a recommendation that is
intended to be followed when practicable.
3.2 Specific Terms
Absorbed dose: The energy imparted to matter
by ionizing radiation per unit mass of irradiated
material. The unit of absorbed dose, in the
Système Internationale (SI), is the joule per
kilogram, given the special name gray (Gy). (1 Gy
= 1 J kg–1 = 100 rad.)
Access: Entry or insertion of the body or a part
of the body into a particular area.
Access panel: Any barrier or panel that is
designed to be removed or opened for
maintenance or service purposes that, when
removed or opened, affects radiation shielding.
Access point: Any location through which
access to radiation areas or radioactive materials
is possible. This includes entry or exit ports of
sufficient size to permit human entry, irrespective
of their intended use.
Accessible area: Any area where the body or a
part of the body may be exposed to radiation
without necessitating a shutdown of the radiation
source.
Activity (A): The rate of transformation of
radioactive material (defined as the quotient of dN
by dt, where dN is the number of spontaneous
nuclear transmutations or disintegrations that
occur in a quantity of a radionuclide in the time
interval dt). The SI unit of activity is becquerel
(Bq). (1 Bq = 1 disintegration per second (s-1),
and 3.7 × 1010 Bq = 1 curie (Ci))
ALARA (as low as is reasonably achievable):
Making every reasonable effort to maintain
exposures to radiation as far below the dose
limits as practical, taking into account the state of
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
technology, the economics of improvements in
relation to benefits to health and safety, and other
societal and socioeconomic considerations.
Ambient dose equivalent: In this document
ambient dose equivalent refers to H*(10) which is
the dose equivalent at a point in a radiation field
produced by the corresponding expanded and
aligned field in the ICRU sphere (ICRU 1998) at
a depth of 10 mm on the radius opposing the
direction of the aligned field. The unit of ambient
dose equivalent, H*(10) is joule per kilogram (J
kg-1), with the special name sievert (Sv). (1 Sv =
100 rem).
Backscatter imaging: An imaging technology in
which an image of the vehicle or cargo container
is created from measurements of radiation
scattered or deflected from the object in the
backward direction.
Backscatter system: A security screening
system that employs backscatter imaging
technology.
Bystander: A person near the system, who is not
directly associated with the operation of the
system. Bystanders may include members of the
public in the vicinity of the unit, drivers of vehicles
being scanned who have exited the vehicle, and
traffic controllers.
Cabinet x-ray system: A cabinet x-ray system is
any system that meets the applicability criteria of
the federal radiation safety performance standard
for cabinet x-ray (Title 21 CFR § 1020.40 Cabinet
x-ray systems (a) Applicability and (b)
Definitions).
Collimator: A device or devices used to limit the
size, shape, and direction of the primary beam.
Contraband: Unlawful or unauthorized items
which may include explosives, weapons, drugs,
other threat agents, or stowaways.
Dose equivalent: It is the product of the
absorbed dose D at a point in tissue and the
quality factor Q at that point. The unit of dose
equivalent, H, is the joule per kilogram (J kg-1),
with the special name sievert (Sv, 1 Sv = 100
rem).
2
Effective dose: A summation of the equivalent
doses in tissues or organs each multiplied by the
appropriate tissue weighting factor as defined by
the ICRU (ICRU, 1998). The tissue weighting
factors were modified by the International
Commission on Radiological Protection in its
Publication 103 (ICRP 2007). The unit of effective
dose is joule per kilogram, and its special name
is sievert (Sv). (1 Sv = 100 rem).
Equivalent dose: The absorbed dose in an
organ or tissue multiplied by the appropriate
radiation weighting factor (ICRU 1998). The unit
of equivalent dose is joule per kilogram, and its
special name is sievert (Sv, 1 Sv = 100 rem).
High radiation area: An area, accessible to
individuals, in which radiation levels from
radiation sources could result in an individual’s
receiving an equivalent deep dose (Hd ) in excess
of 1 mSv (100 mrem) in 1 h at 30 cm (1 foot) from
the radiation source or 30 cm (1 foot) from any
surface that the radiation penetrates.
IDC(20): The isodose contour around the volume
outside of which the ambient dose equivalent rate
averaged over any 1 minute of continuous
operation does not exceed 20 microsieverts (2
millirems) per hour above background.
IDC(0.5): The isodose contour around the
volume outside of which the ambient dose
equivalent rate averaged over any 1 minute of
continuous operation does not exceed
0.50 microsievert (50 microrems) per hour above
background.
Inadvertent exposure: Unintentional exposure
of an individual to the primary beam. Inadvertent
exposures include ground guides or passers-by
who enter the radiation control area or
unauthorized individuals in cargo compartments
of the vehicle or container (e.g., stowaways).
Kerma: The quotient of dEtr by dm, where dEtr is
the sum of the initial kinetic energies of all of the
charged particles liberated by uncharged
radiation (e.g., photons and neutrons) in a volume
element of mass dm:
𝑑𝐸!"
𝐾= .
𝑑𝑚
The unit of kerma is joule per kilogram (J kg-1) and
its special name is the gray (Gy). If the interacting
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
medium is air, this quantity is often referred to as
air kerma.
Leak test: A test to determine the integrity of the
encapsulation of a sealed radioactive source.
Mobile system: A security screening system
designed to operate in a moving source mode.
Moving source mode: An operational mode
where the radiation source moves relative to the
ground while the vehicle or cargo container being
inspected remains stationary. Systems operating
in this mode are commonly referred to as mobile
systems.
Non-intrusive inspection (NII): Detection of
concealed contraband items which does not
involve the opening of, or the entry of personnel
into, the vehicle and cargo container.
Occupancy factor: The fraction of the time
during which the source is “on” that the maximally
exposed individual is present in the area in
question. For purposes of radiation protection,
the accumulated radiation dose in an area may
be multiplied by the occupancy factor to provide
a better estimate of potential radiation doses that
may be received by individuals. The maximally
exposed individual is almost always an employee
at the facility rather than a member of the public.
Recommended occupancy factors for various
types of areas are provided in several
publications, such as National Council of
Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP)
Report No. 147, and range from 1 for offices,
laboratories, and reception area to 1/40 for
outdoor areas with transient traffic.
Operational mode: The operational mode refers
to the motion of the source relative to the ground,
see moving source mode and stationary source
mode.
Portal system: A security screening system
designed to operate in a stationary source mode
where a vehicle moves through the primary beam
under the driver’s control. Note: ANSI N43.17-
2009 also applies when the vehicle occupants
move through the primary beam.
Primary beam: The radiation coming directly
from the radiation source through an aperture in
3
the source housing into the volume defined by the
collimator.
Qualified expert: A person having the
knowledge and training to assess both the
hazards presented by the specific radiation
source(s) under consideration and the
effectiveness of engineered and administrative
controls used to mitigate those hazards.
Examples of qualified experts would include, but
are not limited to, professionals certified by the
American Board of Health Physics, the American
Board of Radiology, or the American Board of
Medical Physics. Regardless of certification
status, the qualified expert must have knowledge
of: (1) the radiation physics associated with the
specific systems to be evaluated, (2) the
operating characteristics of the systems, (3) the
facility-specific operational practices that will be
used, (4) the operating history (problems) of
similar systems, and (5) applicable regulations
and national standards.
Quality factor (Q): An energy dependent
dimensionless factor by which absorbed dose is
to be multiplied to obtain the operational quantity
called dose equivalent. The quality factor for x-
rays and gamma rays is 1.0.
Radiation weighting factor (wR): An energy
dependent dimensionless factor by which
absorbed dose is to be multiplied to obtain the
radiation protection quantity called equivalent
dose. The radiation weighting factor for x-rays
and gamma rays is 1.0.
Radiation area: Any area accessible to
individuals in which radiation levels could result in
an individual’s receiving deep-dose equivalent in
excess of 0.05 mSv (5 mrem) in 1 h at 30 cm (1
foot) from the source or 30 cm (1 foot) from any
surface that the radiation penetrates.
Radiation control area: The physical area
required to safely operate the system and
perform non-intrusive inspection, including the
area needed for radiation protection, physical
safety, operational concerns, and other hazards.
Radiation generating device: For purposed of
this standard, an apparatus or a device emitting
or capable of emitting ionizing radiation produced
by electrical means. For example, an x-ray
system or linear accelerator (LINAC).
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
Radiation safety survey: An evaluation of the
radiation hazards in and around an installation. It
customarily includes a physical assessment of
the arrangement and use of the equipment along
with an assessment of the potential doses to
individuals under the full range of expected
operating conditions. This is typically
accomplished by a combination of on-site
measurements and calculations.
Roentgen (R): The special unit of exposure. One
roentgen equals 2.58 × 10-4 coulomb per kilogram
of air.
Safety interlock: A device or group of devices
with the associated control system that is
designed to sense a limit, an off-limit condition, or
an improper sequence of events and
automatically prevent or terminate radiation
exposure. This is typically accomplished by
preventing access to the hazardous area or by
terminating or preventing radiation emission.
Scattered radiation: Radiation whose path or
direction of propagation has deviated as a result
of interaction with matter.
Sealed source: Any radioactive material or
byproduct encased in a capsule designed to
prevent leakage or escape of the material.
Shutter: A device that, when closed, prevents the
beam from emerging from the source housing.
When the shutter is open, the beam emerges
from the source housing.
Skyshine: Radiation scattered by the air above a
radiation source to points at ground level beyond
a protective shield.
Source housing: An enclosure for a source that
provides attenuation of the radiation emitted by
the source.
Stationary source mode: An operational mode
where the radiation source does not move
relative to the ground. Systems operating in this
mode are commonly referred to as portal
systems.
System operator: A person having the
necessary training and experience to safely
operate the inspection system, and who is
authorized by the facility to perform the process.
4
Safe operation of the system includes initiating or
stopping the scan, verifying the system is
operating correctly, and/or controlling access to
the inspection area. This does not include
individuals who may be remotely viewing the
image results, but are not directly responsible for
the other functions.
Use factor (U): The fraction of time that the
primary beam is enabled.
Very high radiation area: Any area accessible
to individuals in which radiation levels from
radiation sources external to the body could result
in an individual’s receiving a deep-dose
equivalent in excess of 5 Gy (500 rad) in 1 h at 1
m (3.3 feet) from the source or 1 m (3.3 feet) from
any surface that the radiation penetrates.
4. Federal, State, and Local Regulations
Manufacturers, distributors and users of security
screening systems under this standard shall
comply with all applicable requirements in the
U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), which
include Title 21, Parts 1000 through 1004 and
1005.25, (U.S. Food and Drug Administration),
Title 10, Parts 19 & 20 and 30-33 (U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission), and Title 29,
1910.1096 regarding occupational safety (U.S.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration).
In addition, the installation, operation, and
maintenance of these systems may be subject to
state and local regulations. Users shall comply
with applicable state and local regulations, which
may involve registration, licensing, and
compliance with specific requirements.
5. Dose Limitation
This standard does not address dose limits for
human occupants of a vehicle that are
intentionally exposed to the primary radiation
beam. Users conducting such operations shall
also comply with the requirements of ANSI/HPS
N43.17-2009 [R2019], Radiation Safety for
Personnel Security Screening Systems Using X-
ray or Gamma Radiation.
5.1 Dose to System Operating Crew
The annual effective dose to any member of the
system operating crew shall be less than 50 mSv
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
(5 rem) and should be less than 1 mSv
(100 mrem). This standard assumes all system
operators are adults (age 18 or older). In addition,
all doses shall be maintained as low as is
reasonably achievable (ALARA).
5.2 Dose to Bystanders
The effective dose to bystanders from the
operation of a security screening system shall not
exceed 0.25 mSv (25 mrem) per calendar year.
In addition, bystanders shall not be exposed to
radiation fields that could produce an ambient
dose equivalent in excess of 0.02 mSv (2 mrem)
in any one hour.
In determining compliance with the annual
effective dose limit, use and occupancy factors
may be taken into consideration. In determining
compliance with the short term limit of 0.02 mSv
(2 mrem) in any one hour, only use factors may
be applied.
5.3 Dose to Inadvertently Scanned
Individuals
The effective dose to an individual for a single
inadvertent exposure shall not exceed 5 mSv
(500 mrem) and should not exceed 1 mSv (100
mrem).
6. System and Manufacturing
Requirements
The requirements of this section apply to the
original system manufacturer and to any
individual that makes modifications to a system
that affect compliance with the requirements of
this standard.
All indicators, controls, interlocks, and other
system components that affect radiation safety
shall be designed to function properly under the
environmental conditions in which the system is
designed to operate. The environmental
conditions under which the system is designed to
operate shall be clearly indicated by the
manufacturer.
6.1 Indicators and Controls
All indicators and controls shall be legibly labeled
to indicate their purpose.
5
Each system shall have a means to prevent
inadvertent production or emission of the primary
radiation beam. This may be accomplished
through the use of a captured key, password, or
other feature affording an equivalent level of
control.
Each system shall have a means for the system
operator to initiate and terminate the emission of
radiation other than the function of an interlock or
the main power control.
Each RGD shall have two independent means
which indicate when and only when the primary
beam is being emitted and which are discernible
from any point at which the initiation of radiation
emission is possible. Failure of a single
component of the system shall not cause failure
of both indicators to perform their intended
function.
Each system shall have one or more red lights
which indicate when and only when the primary
beam is being emitted. A sufficient number of
lights shall be used to ensure that at least one
light is visible from any location within the
radiation control area (as defined in paragraph
7.3) and from any access point into the radiation
control area. These lights shall be designed and
positioned such that they will not be confused
with traffic control lights, if used.
Each system shall have an audible warning signal
which is actuated when emission of the primary
beam begins. The audible warning signal shall be
audible above the normal ambient sound level in
the area and remain on for at least 3 seconds or
until emission of the primary beam is terminated,
whichever is less. For portal systems with
automatic scan initiation capabilities, the audible
warning signal is only required to sound if the
primary beam has not been emitted for five
minutes or more.
Each system shall be provided with emergency
stop switches. At least one emergency stop
switch shall be located on the control panel. A
sufficient number of emergency stop switches
shall be located within the radiation control area
to ensure that access to an emergency stop
switch does not require an individual to cross the
primary beam. Following interruption of radiation
emission by activation of an emergency stop
switch, resetting the switch shall not result in re-
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
initiation of radiation emission. Use of the control
for initiation of radiation emission shall be
necessary.
For systems with more than one operator-
selectable operational mode, a means shall be
provided to indicate the selected mode at any
location from which a scan can be initiated. Any
controls that are not intended to be used in the
selected mode shall be disabled.
A system with more than one operator-selectable
scan speed shall have a means to indicate the
selected scan speed at any location from which a
scan can be initiated. Any controls that are not
intended to be used at the selected scan speed
shall be disabled.
6.2 Safety Interlocks
Each access panel shall have at least one safety
interlock that prevents emission of radiation while
the access panel is open. In lieu of interlocks,
systems using a radioactive source may use two
physically locked barriers (e.g., one on the source
shutter and one on the source enclosure).
Systems with automatic scan initiation
capabilities must have a minimum of three
independent input signals to prevent initiation of
a scan until the driver of the vehicle to be
screened is in the designated position outside the
primary beam (e.g., position sensors, driver
position push button or card scanner).
Systems that use a radioactive source shall have
at least one shutter. Shutters shall automatically
close upon loss of power. Shutters shall not
automatically open when power is restored.
Manufacturers shall determine the minimum scan
speed (either the speed of the scanning system
or the speed of the vehicle being inspected, as
applicable). An interlock shall terminate emission
of the primary beam when the scan speed drops
below the minimum scan speed.
Failure of any single component of the system
shall not cause the malfunction of more than one
safety interlock.
Following interruption of radiation emission by
activation of a safety interlock, resetting the
interlock shall not result in re-initiation of radiation
6
emission. Use of the control for initiating radiation
emission shall be necessary (See Section 6.1).
6.3 Ground Fault
A ground fault shall not result in the generation of
x rays or the opening of a source shutter.
6.4 Labeling
The location or range of locations where the
primary beam exits the exterior surface of the
system should be indicated on the exterior
surface. If it is not indicated on the exterior
surface of the system, it shall be specified in the
operator’s manual.
Every manufacturer of a system to which this
standard applies shall provide the following
information in the form of a tag or label
permanently affixed or inscribed on the system so
as to be legible and readily accessible to view
when the system is fully assembled:
a) The full name and address of the
manufacturer
b) The place and date (month and year) of
manufacture
c) The model, serial number, and any other
information needed to identify the
specific design and configuration of the
system
d) The radionuclide, activity of the source,
and the date of assay shall also be
provided for systems containing a sealed
radioactive source.
e) For RGDs, the end point energy (keV or
MeV) and current (mA), and pulse rate
(Hz) if the RGD is pulsed. If more than
one energy, current, or pulse rate can
selected, the label shall indicate the
maximum value.
For RGDs, a warning label containing the words
“CAUTION: X RAYS PRODUCED WHEN
ENERGIZED” shall be permanently affixed or
inscribed on the system such that it is clearly
legible and visible at the location of any controls
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
which can be used to initiate emission of the
primary beam.
For systems containing a radioactive sealed
source, access to the sealed source and source
enclosure shall be clearly and legibly labeled in
accordance with the sealed source and device
registration (SSDR) and applicable federal or
state regulations.
For systems using a radioactive source, a
warning label using the words: “CAUTION:
RADIATION PRODUCED WHEN SHUTTER IS
OPEN.” should be prominently displayed near the
source housing.
6.5 Information to be Provided to the End
User
The manufacturer shall provide information to the
end user sufficient to achieve and maintain
compliance with this standard, allow the safe use
of the system, fulfill requirements, and prevent
intentional or frivolous misuse. This includes, but
is not limited to, the following:
a) Warnings of life-threatening dangers
(e.g., unauthorized modification of the
system).
b) Notification that NRC or state licensing
(for sealed radioactive sources) or state
registration (for x-ray sources) may be
required.
c) Operational procedures needed to
comply with this standard. [Ordinarily
these operational procedures shall be
part of the standard operational
procedure (SOP) for the system.]
d) A list and description of all system safety
features (e.g., interlocks, warning lights,
etc.)
e) A schedule of preventive maintenance
tasks, leak tests (for sealed sources),
and periodic checks of all safety features.
f) Sufficient information about the primary
beam to perform adequate radiation
measurements. At a minimum, this
information shall include the end point
energy (keV or MeV) of the primary
7
beam, current (mA), and pulse repetition
rate (Hz) for an X-ray source, or the
identity and activity of any radionuclides
used, the thickness and material of any
filtration along the beam path, location or
range of locations where the primary
beam exits the beam exit surface, and
the beam divergence characteristics in
both the horizontal and vertical
directions.
g) The air kerma at a reference location in
the primary beam and the operational
parameters under which the
measurement was made. The air kerma
shall be measured using the procedure in
Annex C.
h) Diagrams showing the dimensions and
locations of the IDC(0.5) and IDC(20).
The IDC(0.5) and IDC(20) shall be
determined using the procedures in
Annex C.
i) The dose per scan to the driver of the
vehicle being screened due to scattered
radiation and the operational parameters
under which the measurement was made
(for systems in which the driver may
remain in the vehicle during screening).
This dose shall be measured using the
procedure in Annex C.
j) The dose to an inadvertently scanned
individual and the operational
parameters under which the
measurement was made. This dose shall
be measured using the procedure in
Annex C.
k) The potential for neutron production and
the fraction of the total dose that is due to
neutrons.
6.6 Records to be Maintained by
Manufacturers
Manufacturers shall establish and maintain the
following records with respect to systems to
which this standard applies:
a) A description of quality control
procedures with respect to the system’s
radiation safety.
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
b) Records of the results of radiation safety
tests, surveys, and evaluations. The
records shall contain the procedures,
operational parameters, and test or
survey equipment used. As a minimum,
these tests, surveys, and evaluations
shall include those performed to
determine the information provided to the
end user as specified in section 6.5.
c) For those systems displaying aging
effects that may increase radiation
emission, records of the results of tests
for durability and stability of the system
and the basis for selecting these tests.
d) Copies of all written communications
between the manufacturer and dealers,
distributors, and purchasers concerning
radiation safety including complaints,
investigations, instructions, or
explanations affecting use, repair,
adjustment, maintenance, or testing.
e) A record of the manufacturer’s
distribution of systems in a form which
shall enable tracing of specific systems
or production lots to distributors or
dealers.
f) The records outlined in Section 6.7.
All records shall be maintained for a minimum of
five years.
6.7 Records to be Obtained and Retained by
Dealers and Distributors
Dealers and distributors of systems to which this
standard applies shall obtain enough information
as necessary to identify and locate first
purchasers. If a manufacturer also acts as a
dealer or distributor, the manufacturer shall
obtain this information. The information shall
include:
a) The name and mailing address of the
distributor, dealer, or purchaser to whom
the system was transferred.
b) The brand name and identification
information of the system (e.g., model
number and serial number).
8
c) Date of sale, award, or lease.
The information obtained shall be forwarded
promptly to the manufacturer of the system.
7. Installation Requirements
For safe and effective use of a security screening
system to be possible, the system must be
installed according to design requirements of
both the manufacturer or distributor and the end
user. Therefore, installation of a security
screening system shall be a joint effort between
the manufacturer or distributor and the end user.
The level of this interaction shall be
commensurate with the type and complexity of
the security screening system.
A radiation safety survey by a qualified expert
shall be performed after initial installation and
prior to first use to assess compliance of the
installation with the requirements of this standard
and any other applicable regulatory
requirements.
The installation process consists of the following
elements:
a) Site selection
b) Verification of safety systems
c) Establishing the radiation control area
and assessment of potential radiation
doses to bystanders
d) Establishing quality control parameters
e) Posting of warning signs and access
control measures
f) Assessment of potential radiation doses
to system operating crew
g) Assessment of potential radiation doses
to inadvertently scanned individuals
(e.g., stowaways)
h) Documentation of the process and
associated measurements
In addition to the requirements of this standard,
organizations often must comply with other
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
regulatory requirements such as environmental
impact statements.
7.1 Site Selection
Site selection requires consideration of the
following:
a) Space constraints
b) Site grading (the location should be as
level as possible to prevent roll back)
c) Occupancy of surrounding areas and
adjacent structures, including areas
above or below ground level
d) Traffic flow into, through, and from the
radiation control area
e) Security issues, including access to the
radiation control area and contingency
plans
f) Compatibility or interference with other
systems at the site (e.g., radiation portal
monitors or other radiation detectors,
other screening systems, etc.)
g) Radiation safety implications if multiple
radiation sources are used at the same
site.
7.2 Safety Systems
A means shall be provided for at least one system
operator to maintain full visual surveillance of the
radiation control area.
A means shall be provided for the system
operating crew to communicate with each other.
For systems operating in portal mode, a means
shall be provided to control movement of traffic
through the portal.
Each of the system safety features (see sections
6.1 and 6.2) identified by the manufacturer, per
section 6.5, shall be tested for proper operation.
This shall be performed by inducing an
appropriate fault condition. The assistance of the
manufacturer may be needed to induce some
fault conditions.
9
The qualified expert shall determine if any
additional site specific safety systems or controls
are required. The proper functioning of these
additional safety features shall also be verified.
7.3 Establishing the Radiation Control Area
A radiation control area shall be established
around each security screening system. The
radiation dose to the maximally exposed
bystander outside the radiation control area shall
not exceed the limit specified in section 5.2. The
potential for skyshine at distances away from the
radiation control area boundary shall be
considered.
Measurements used to demonstrate compliance
with this section shall be made using the
exposure parameters that result in the highest
dose (e.g., slowest scan speed, maximum beam
energy, and highest beam intensity). Acceptable
methods for demonstrating compliance with the
requirements of this section, along with example
calculations, are provided in Annex D.
For security screening systems, the total area
needed to conduct screening operations is
determined by considerations of radiation safety,
physical safety, traffic flow and control, and other
operational factors. This total radiation control
area typically exceeds the area needed for
radiation exposure control. In addition, traffic flow
through the area often makes it impractical to
mark or control access at the boundary of the
area which would be required for radiation safety
separately from control of this larger area.
Therefore, radiation warning signs and access
controls (see section 7.5) may be placed outside
of the boundary of this larger area and the entire
area treated as the radiation control area. In all
cases, the system operators shall be aware of the
location of the radiation hazard within the area,
ensure unauthorized individuals are not present
during system operation, and follow established
radiation safety procedures.
7.4 Establishing Quality Control Parameters
During the initial survey, the qualified expert shall
establish specific QC parameters (e.g. expected
doses or dose rates at specific locations under
specific conditions) that can be easily verified by
the system operators using readily available
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
instrumentation. These QC parameters are
intended to provide the users with the ability to
verify consistent and appropriate operation of the
screening system and adequacy of established
controls. This is most important for mobile or re-
locatable systems for which the radiation control
area must be re-established after each relocation.
7.5 Warning Signs and Access Control
All accessible areas in which an individual could
receive a radiation dose in excess of 0.05 mSv
(5 mrem) in any one hour at 30 cm from the
source or closest physical barrier shall be posted
as a Radiation Area. Additional information may
be included on the signage to clarify the
conditions under which the radiation hazard is
present (e.g. “when red light is flashing”).
All accessible areas in which an individual could
receive a radiation dose in excess of 1 mSv
(100 mrem) in any one hour at 30 cm from the
source or closest physical barrier shall be posted
as a High Radiation Area. Additional information
may be included on the signage to clarify the
conditions under which the radiation hazard is
present (e.g. “when red light is flashing”).
The maximum potential radiation dose an
individual can receive in one hour should be
determined by multiplying the maximum number
of scans possible in an hour by the dose per scan
at 30 cm from the beam exit surface.
If the system does not require either a radiation
area or high radiation area sign, post the area
with signs stating “Caution: radioactive materials”
or “Caution: x-rays”, as appropriate.
These warning signs should be affixed to the
security screening system near the radiation
source and image receptor on both sides of the
primary beam. Where this is not possible, the
signs shall be posted at the boundary of the
radiation control area.
The operating crew shall have a means to control
traffic flow into and through the radiation control
area. This shall be accomplished either by
administrative controls (e.g. ground guides) or
engineered controls (e.g. sensors, barriers,
interlocks). When traffic control is accomplished
by the use of engineered controls, the function
and integration of those controls with the security
screening system shall be verified. For example,
10
integration of traffic sensors with safety interlocks
triggered by the failure of a vehicle to exit the
radiation control area within a set time.
7.6 Assessment of Potential Doses to System
Operators
During the initial survey, the qualified expert shall
make an assessment of the potential effective
dose to the system operators. The potential
effective dose shall be determined using the
exposure parameters that result in the highest
dose (e.g., slowest scan speed, maximum
number of scans per hour, maximum photon
energy and intensity).
The potential effective dose to the system
operators shall be less than applicable dose limits
(see section 5.1) and ALARA.
The qualified expert shall take into consideration
the potential for neutron production, primarily in
the accelerator head, when performing this
assessment. Some materials commonly used in
accelerator heads can produce photoneutrons.
7.7 Assessment of Potential Doses to
Inadvertently Scanned Individuals
During security screening of vehicles and cargo
containers, there is a potential for individuals to
be present in the vehicle or cargo container for a
variety of reasons. These individuals may be
inadvertently scanned during the screening
process.
The qualified expert shall determine the potential
effective dose to inadvertently scanned
individuals. The potential effective dose shall be
determined using the exposure parameters that
result in the highest dose (e.g., slowest scan
speed, maximum photon energy and intensity).
The effective dose to an inadvertently scanned
individual shall be less than the limit specified in
section 5.3.
7.8 Documentation
The qualified expert shall prepare a written report
that documents the initial survey and the
decisions made based on this information that
affect the radiation safety of the operation. At a
minimum this report shall include:
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
a) Documentation that the site is
appropriate for the intended operation
1) Occupancy of adjacent spaces
2) Combined effects of multiple
radiation sources in or adjacent to
the radiation control area
3) Factors that require re-evaluation of
the radiation control area boundary
including new QA parameters if
necessary
b) Establishing the radiation control area
1) Diagram of the radiation control area
2) Measured dose per scan at the
boundary of the radiation control
area
3) Instruments used for measurements
including last calibration date
4) Calculated maximum annual dose to
bystanders and the operational
parameters assumed
c) Verification of Safety Systems
1) Systems checked
2) Test results
d) Establishing QA Parameters
1) The QA parameters
2) Recommended frequency for
checking QA parameters
3) Procedure for checking QA
parameters
4) Corrective actions to take if QA
parameters have changed
e) Posting of Warning Signs and Access
Control Measures
1) Required signs
2) Recommended locations
3) Identification of access control
measures
4) Verification that access control
measures are adequate
f) Assessment of Potential Dose to System
Operators
1) The potential dose to a system
operator, including the embyo/fetus
of a pregnant woman
2) Parameters used
3) Instruments used for measurements
including last calibration date
11
4) Recommendations for personnel
monitoring
g) Assessment of Potential Dose to
Inadvertently Scanned Individuals
1) The potential dose
2) Parameters used
3) Instruments used for measurements
including last calibration date
4) Recommended actions for
inadvertently scanned individuals
8. Operating Requirements
Even in the presence of robust engineering
controls, supplemental administrative controls
(work practices) to limit radiation dose are
required. Such controls include providing
operational and radiation safety training,
controlling access to areas around screening
systems, establishing operating and emergency
procedures, limiting system use time, and posting
of warning and access control signs. The using
organization’s executive management shall be
committed to implementing and maintaining
administrative controls.
Systems must be installed and used in a way that
provides safe transit paths and waiting areas for
the drivers to exit and enter their vehicles.
8.1 Responsible Individual
The executive management of the organization
using a screening system shall designate an
individual responsible for ensuring compliance
with radiation safety requirements.
8.2 Establish Operating Procedures
An organization using a screening system shall
document its procedures for operating the
system. These procedures shall be consistent
with the manufacturer’s operator’s manual and
the recommendations of this standard. These
procedures shall be reviewed by a qualified
expert.
8.3 Personnel Monitoring
The individual responsible for radiation safety
shall ensure a radiation safety assessment is
complete prior to the first use of the system and
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
after any change that could affect radiation
safety. This radiation safety assessment shall be
performed by a qualified expert. The assessment
shall include an evaluation of the potential annual
dose to system operators (including the
embryo/fetus of a pregnant woman), service
personnel, and the general public.
The results of this assessment shall be used to
determine whether personnel monitoring is
required in accordance with applicable
regulations and guidance. When personnel
monitoring is not implemented, the reasons shall
be documented. Even if personnel monitoring is
not required, it may be conducted for a variety of
reasons including:
a) verifying the effectiveness of engineering
controls;
b) verifying the effectiveness of
administrative controls;
c) assessing actual individual and group
exposures;
d) documenting exposures for regulatory or
legal purposes;
e) detecting unsafe working practices;
f) detecting changes in exposures
(including accidental exposures);
g) aiding the administration of the ALARA
process; and
h) satisfying labor or employee concerns.
8.4 Personnel Training
All personnel associated with the operation of the
system shall receive appropriate training
sufficient to operate the system safely prior to
performing their assigned duties. The scope and
depth of the training shall be commensurate with
the hazards associated with the system. At a
minimum, this training shall include:
a) Radiation safety training specific to the
system, including—
1) Types of radiation;
12
2) Sources and magnitude of common
exposures;
3) Units of measurement;
4) Time, distance, and shielding;
5) The concept of ALARA;
6) Biological effects of radiation and
radiation risks;
7) Emergency procedures;
8) How to use survey
equipment/dosimetry, if applicable;
9) Rights of pregnant workers.
b) Other safety hazards (e.g. physical
hazards, electrical hazards);
c) Proper operating procedures, including
all indicators and controls for initiating
and terminating the emission of radiation;
d) Physical security procedures to prevent
unauthorized use or access;
e) System operator awareness and control
of the radiation control area;
f) Responding to public inquiries about
radiation;
g) Familiarity with the information being
provided to inadvertently scanned
individuals;
h) Regulatory requirements;
i) Supervised hands-on training.
Proficiency should be demonstrated at the
conclusion of training.
Refresher training shall be required at least once
every twelve months.
8.5 Radiation Safety Surveys
Appropriate radiation safety surveys shall be
performed on systems by the manufacturer and
by a qualified expert representing the end user to
verify correct system performance and validate
the radiation control area boundaries.
All surveys shall be performed with appropriate
and calibrated survey meters. Results and all
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
necessary analysis shall be documented in the
survey records.
8.5.1 Initial and Periodic Radiation Safety
Surveys
Radiation safety surveys shall verify the boundary
of the radiation control area, potential doses at
system operator locations, and any other critical
parameters identified by the manufacturer.
Surveys shall be performed:
a) upon installation;
b) at least once every three years;
c) after any modification or replacement
that affects the radiation shielding,
scattered radiation, or radiation
production components;
d) when making a significant change in
operating procedures beyond the initial
plan, such as increases in rate of
screenings, number of hours per week of
operation, or changes in occupancy of
adjacent areas;
e) after any incident which could have
damaged the system in such a way that
radiation shielding, beam alignment, or
other radiation safety features might be
compromised.
Refer to Annex B for information on air kerma
measurements, selection of instruments, and
estimation of effective dose.
The results of the survey shall be documented
and provided to the user. At a minimum, the
survey report shall include:
a) the date of the survey;
b) name of person performing the survey;
13
c) model, serial number, and calibration
dates of instruments used;
d) raw data, assumptions, and calculation
parameters used;
e) survey results including potential doses
at the boundary of the radiation control
area, potential doses to system;
f) operators, and potential doses inside the
cargo container;
g) the significance of any changes from the
previous survey(s);
h) recommendations for root cause analysis
and corrective actions, if necessary;
i) recommendations for selected
measurements to be made during the
operator’s quality control surveys
8.5.2 Routine Quality Control
The system operators shall perform QC checks to
ensure that the system performs consistently
from day to day. At a minimum the routine QC
checks shall include:
a) Prior to operating the system, the system
operators shall follow the manufacturer’s
recommended start up procedure.
b) Daily, perform visual inspection of the
system and radiation control 13rea:
1) Check that postings are legible and
correctly positioned
2) Check that the radiation control 13rea
is clear (e.g. no unauthorized people,
no debris, etc.)
3) Check that all barriers are intact and
in place;
4) Check the system for damage
5) Check that warning systems (e.g.
visible and audible, as applicable) are
functional
c) At setup and when misalignment is
suspected (e.g. possible collision, visible
damage), perform a check of the
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
alignment of the primary beam and
detector array (or any beam stop).
d) At the frequency specified by the
qualified expert (see section 7.5.1),
Perform the recommended
measurements to ensure the system is
operating as initially installed. For
mobile systems, sufficient
measurements shall be performed to
verify the system and radiation control
area boundaries are properly set up.
8.6 Preventive Maintenance
The operating institution shall follow the
manufacturer's recommended maintenance
schedule. Maintenance or repair activities shall
only be performed by a person qualified to
perform such maintenance or repair. Any
maintenance performed shall be documented.
8.7 Inadvertent Exposures
System Operators shall cease scanning if an
individual (e.g., a ground assistant or passerby)
enters the radiation control area.
In the event of an inadvertent exposure, the user
shall record the facts relevant to the exposure. At
a minimum these facts shall include;
a) The nature of the inadvertent exposure
(e.g. unauthorized person in radiation
control area, unauthorized person in
vehicle or cargo area, system operator
out of position, etc.)
b) Geographic location where the
inadvertent exposure occurred
c) Date and time of the exposure
d) Name and age of the individual exposed
e) Contact information
f) Circumstances of the exposure,
including:
1) Individual’s location relative to the
primary beam
2) Type of vehicle or container if
applicable
14
3) System parameters (scan speed,
mode of operation, any other
variable parameter)
4) The manufacturer and model of the
security screening system involved
5) Cause of the inadvertent exposure
g) Operating crew contact information
h) Estimated radiation dose (may be based
on radiation dose to cargo information
provided by the manufacturer if a more
complete analysis is not available) Note:
If a system failure occurs during the
inadvertent exposure a more detailed
radiation dose estimate shall be made if
appropriate (e.g. if the radiation dose
may have exceeded the limit in section
5.3)
i) Any other pertinent information
The user shall provide a report to the individual
inadvertently exposed, if requested. Include the
estimated radiation dose and provide an example
that compares the radiation dose to a radiation
dose from a commonly known source of radiation,
for example: “The radiation from this inadvertent
exposure is roughly equivalent to _______”.
If the radiation dose from inadvertent exposure
exceeds an applicable radiation dose limit from
section 5 above, is the result of a system
malfunction, or is related to system maintenance,
the user shall report the incident. For a RGD, the
user shall notify the manufacturer and the
manufacturer shall report incident to the FDA as
required. For radionuclide based systems,
incidents will be reported to the appropriate
regulatory agency in accordance with applicable
regulations.
8.8 Records and Documentation
The institution operating the system shall collect
and maintain the following records:
a) Each system operator’s training records
including sufficient information to show
compliance with section 8.4;
b) Personnel dosimetry records shall be
maintained for a minimum of 70 years.
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
c) Upgrades, modifications, maintenance,
and repair records shall be maintained
for the life of the system;
d) QA Log
e) Records of radiation surveys as required
in Section 8.5;
f) Evidence and analysis to show that the
dose limits specified in Section 5 are
being met;
These records shall be maintained for 5 years or
more as noted above or as required by federal,
state, or local regulations.
Additionally the following information shall be
kept current and readily available to the system
operator:
a) The name and contact information for the
responsible individual designated as
required in Section 8.1.
b) A complete set of operating procedures as
required in section 8.2 shall be readily
available to the system operators.
9. Informative References
ANSI/HPS N43.3 - 2008 [Renewed 2018], For
General Radiation Safety – Installations Using
Non-Medical X-Ray and Sealed Gamma Ray
Sources, Energies up to 10 MeV, Health Physics
Society, Herndon, VA.
ANSI/HPS N43.14 – 2011 [Renewed 2016],
Radiation Safety for Active Interrogation of
Cargo, Energies up to 100 MeV , Health Physics
Society, Herndon, VA.
Attix, F.H. 1986. Introduction to Radiological
Physics and Radiation Dosimetry. N.Y. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Birch, Marshall, and Ardran. 1979. Catalogue of
Spectral Data for Diagnostic X-rays. Scientific
Report Series 30. London: The Hospital
Physicists’ Association.
International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP). 2003. Basic Anatomical and
15
Physiological Data for Use in Radiological
Protection: Reference Values. ICRP Publication
89. Oxford, UK: Elsevier LTD.
ICRP. 2007. The 2007 Recommendations of the
International Commission on Radiological
Protection. ICRP Publication 103, Oxford, UK:
Elseveir LTD.
International Commission on Radiation Units and
Measurements (ICRU). 1998. Conversion
Coefficients for Use in Radiological Protection
Against External Radiation. ICRU Report 57.
Bethesda, MD: ICRU.
ICRU. 2011. Fundamental quantities and units for
ionizing radiation (Revised). ICRU Report 85a. J
ICRU 11(1a)
International Standards Organization (ISO).
1999. X and Gamma Reference Radiation for
Calibrating Dosemeters and Doserate Meters
and for Determining Their Response as a
Function of Photon Energy – Part 3. ISO
Standard 4037-3
Knoll, Glenn F. 2010. Radiation Detection and
Measurement, Fourth Edition. Hoboken, NJ:
Wiley.
NCRP. 2004. Structural Shielding Design for
Medical X-Ray Imaging Facilities, NCRP Report
No. 147. Bethesda, MD: NCRP.
NCRP. 2007. Radiation Protection and
Measurement Issues Related to Cargo Scanning
with Accelerator-Produced High-Energy X Rays,
NCRP Commentary No. 20. Bethesda, MD:
NCRP.
Soares, C.G. and Martin, P.R. 1995. A Consistent
Set of Photon Conversion Coefficients for
Personnel and Environmental Dosimetry.
Proceedings of the Panasonic Users Group
Meeting, Somerset, PA, June 5-9, 1995.
Turner, James Edward. 2010. Atoms, radiation,
and radiation protection. Weinheim: Wiley-VCH
Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA.
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
Annex A (Informative)
Security Screening Systems and
Operations
This annex provides an overview of the key
imaging technologies used in security screening
of vehicles and cargo containers. This overview
is intended to provide both system operators and
radiation protection personnel with information
that will help to understand and evaluate the
nature of the radiation hazard associated with
their specific screening system and operation.
A.1 Imaging Technologies
There are two primary imaging technologies used
for security screening of vehicles and cargo
containers with ionizing radiation: transmission
imaging and backscatter imaging.
A.1.1 Transmission Imaging
In transmission imaging, the radiation is usually
collimated into a narrow fan-shaped beam.
Radiation transmitted through the vehicle being
screened is detected by an array of detectors
positioned opposite the radiation source as
shown in Fig. A1. As the screening system moves
past the vehicle (or, as the vehicle moves past the
screening system), the intensity of radiation
passing though the vehicle and its contents is
measured. The intensity of the radiation reaching
each detector depends primarily on the density of
the materials along the path of the radiation. This
information is processed by computer software to
create an image of the entire vehicle. The final
image looks very similar to a traditional medical
x-ray image. A typical image is shown is Fig. A2.
The radiation source in a transmission imaging
system can be a gamma ray source (sealed
source containing radioactive material) or a RGD
(x-ray tube or linear accelerator).
16
Fig. A1. Transmission Imaging. A narrow fan-
shaped beam of radiation passes through the
vehicle being screened. Variations in radiation
intensity due to the vehicle and its cargo are
measured at the detector array and processed to
create an image.
Fig. A2. An example of a transmission image.
Areas of higher density in the cargo and vehicle
appear dark while areas of lower density appear
lighter. (Photo used with permission.)
A.1.2 Backscatter Imaging
In backscatter imaging, the radiation is collimated
into a very narrow pencil-shaped beam. The
pencil-shaped beam is then swept across the
vehicle being screened while the screening
system moves past the vehicle (or, as the vehicle
moves past the screening system). Detectors are
placed on the same side of the vehicle as the
radiation source and measure the intensity of the
radiation scattered back toward the screening
system by the vehicle and its contents as shown
in Fig. A3. The intensity of the radiation reaching
the detectors varies depending the nature of the
materials along the path of the radiation (e.g., low
vs. high atomic number materials). As with
transmission imaging, the radiation intensity
information is processed by computer software
and an image of the vehicle and its contents is
produced. However, the image looks more like a
photograph than the transmission image (See
Fig. A4). Backscatter systems typically use an x-
ray tube as the source of radiation.
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
Fig. A3. Backscatter Imaging. A highly collimated
pencil-shaped beam is repeated swept across the
vehicle being screened. Very sensitive detectors
measure the variations in the intensity of back-
scattered radiation which is processed to create
an image.
Fig. A4. An example of a backscatter image.
Lighter areas indicate low atomic number
materials while darker areas indicate high atomic
number materials. (Photo used with permission.)
A.1.3 Combined Imaging
Some screening systems are capable of
performing both transmission and backscatter
imaging at the same time. This is most often done
with two radiation sources—one for transmission
imaging and one for backscatter imaging—along
with detector arrays positioned appropriately on
each side of the vehicle being screened.
A.2 Operational Modes
Security screening systems are usually operated
in one of two operational modes.
A.2.1 Moving Source Mode
In a moving source mode, the security screening
system (the source) is moved past a stationary
vehicle or cargo container. The screening system
may be mounted on a vehicle (usually a truck or
17
van) or it can be moved along short rails
constructed at a fixed location. In this mode, the
vehicle or cargo container is brought into the
radiation control area and positioned for
screening. Vehicle occupants typically exit the
area to a location outside the radiation control
area and the vehicle or container is screened.
This mode of operation is illustrated in Fig. A5. In
some cases, the driver of the vehicle remains in
the passenger compartment and only the cargo
area of the vehicle is screened. If the entire
vehicle is screened with the driver and/or
passengers inside, the user must ensure that the
requirements of ANSI/HPS N43.17 are met (see
Section 5).
Fig. A5. An example of a system operated in
moving source mode.
A.2.2 Stationary Source Mode
In a stationary source mode, the security
screening system is stationary and the vehicle
being screened is moved past the security
screening system, usually under its own power.
This means that the vehicle driver will be inside
the passenger compartment during the screening
process. Some systems are designed to initiate
radiation emission only after the occupied part of
the vehicle has passed the primary beam. In this
case, the occupied part of the vehicle is not
screened and the driver is exposed only to small
amounts of scattered radiation. In situations
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
where the entire vehicle is screened with the
driver and/or passengers inside, the user must
ensure that the requirements of ANSI/HPS
N43.17 are met (see Section 5).
Fig. A6. An example of a system operated in
stationary source mode.
A.2.3 Dual Mode
Some systems are able to operate in either
moving source or stationary source mode (e.g., a
vehicle mounted screening system that can be
parked and operated as a portal system).
A.3 Radiation Safety Implications
Each of these imaging technologies and
operational modes has implications for radiation
safety and survey measurements. In
transmission imaging, the detector array opposite
the radiation source provides some degree of
radiation attenuation. However, the detector
array may not intercept the entire radiation beam
and usually does not provide sufficient shielding
to reduce potential doses to levels required by
this standard. Therefore, additional distance
beyond the detector array is typically needed.
In backscatter imaging, a portion of the radiation
beam still penetrates through the vehicle or cargo
container being inspected, but is not used for
production of an image. The lack of a detector
array opposite the radiation source means more
distance will typically be needed than for a
transmission imaging system. However, due to
18
the highly collimated beam and the lower-energy
radiation typically used for backscatter imaging,
doses around backscatter systems are usually
very low except directly along the path of the
radiation beam.
If a system is operated in a moving source mode,
the radiation beam moves during a screening.
This reduces the potential dose at any given point
around the system, allowing the radiation control
area to be somewhat smaller in the direction of
the radiation beam. However, a larger distance is
typically required perpendicular to the beam to
allow for movement of the system. Conversely,
for a system operating in stationary source mode,
the radiation control area may be quite small
perpendicular to the primary beam, but
considerable larger in the beam direction.
In both modes of operation, the beam intensity
(i.e., the in-beam dose rate) and the scan speed
(relative speed of the source and target) are the
major parameters determining the dose to objects
or individuals in the screened vehicle. In many
screening scenarios, the hardest variable to
control—and therefore, the largest contributor to
variations in dose—is the scan speed.
The dose equivalent (H) to cargo (or an
inadvertently screened individual) can be
estimated from the following formula (adapted
from NCRP Commentary No. 20):
𝑤 𝜃𝑑
𝐻= ≈ 𝐻̇
𝑣 𝑣
Where, 𝐻̇ is the dose equivalent rate in the
primary beam, 𝑤 is the beam width (𝑤 ≈ 𝜃𝑑, θ is
the beam divergence in radians, d is the distance
along the beam to the point where the dose is to
be estimated), and v is the scan speed. Note that
unit conversion factors may be needed
depending on the units in which the values of
dose rate, distance, and speed are expressed.
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021

Annex B (Informative) estimates. These quantities are then

Radiation Dosimetry appropriately weighted by factors that take into
account the characteristics of the radiation field
This annex contains information necessary for through weighting factors based on the type and
making calculations and measurements of the energy of radiation yielding equivalent dose. It is
radiation output of security screening systems. necessary to also weight the quantities by factors
The discussion in this annex pertains only to that express the irradiation geometry (photon
quantities that are relevant to this standard and is fluence) and by those that categorize the effects
not intended to be a comprehensive treatment of of radiation on organs yielding effective dose.
radiation physics. For more comprehensive Equivalent and effective doses are given the
treatments of this topic see, for example, Knoll special unit sievert (Sv), which like physical dose,
(2010), Turner (2007). is energy deposited per mass (J/kg), but modified
by the appropriate weighting factors.
B.1 Radiation Dosimetry Quantities and Units
Operational dosimetry is used to track present
exposure to radiation. Operational quantities
The field of radiation dosimetry is customarily
include ambient dose equivalent, directional dose
broken into three practices. These practices are
equivalent and personal dose equivalent.
physical dosimetry, protection dosimetry, and
Ambient dose equivalent is the dose calculated at
operational dosimetry. Each practice uses
a point at a specified depth in the ICRU sphere
different dosimetric quantities and tools.
(consisting of a 30-cm diameter sphere of tissue
However, the practices are inter-related as shown
equivalent material) multiplied by a quality factor
in Figure B-1.
that depends on the radiation type (i.e. alpha,
beta, gamma and x rays, or neutrons) and is the
Physical dosimetry is the object of primary
primary operational quantity of interest here.
metrology. It derives from the national standards
Ambient dose equivalent assumes a uniform
for absorbed dose to water and for air kerma,
radiation field and is denoted by H*(d), where d is
which are established by the National Institute of
the depth in the sphere at which the dose is
Standards and Technology. Absorbed dose to
calculated (d = 0.7 mm is customary for
water is the energy deposited in water by
estimating shallow skin dose; d = 10 mm is
radiation divided by the mass of the water. The
customary to estimate deep dose). These
term kerma refers to the sum of the initial kinetic
quantities can be obtained either through
energy of all ionizing particles liberated (per unit
measurement or through calculation. As in the
mass) in a material. Air is the material used to
case of protection dosimetry, operational
determine the dosimetric standard for kerma. The
dosimetric quantities are given the special unit
standards are established through a combination
sievert.
of measurements and calculations (ICRU 90).
These standards are then disseminated to
secondary laboratories through transfer protocols
and, from these secondary laboratories, to the
measurement instruments of field workers
through calibrations. These measurement
devices are used in dosimetry in applications
involving the use of radiation in medicine and in
the irradiation of non-human objects. Absorbed
dose to water and air kerma are both expressed
in the unit gray (1 Gy = 1J/kg).

Protection dosimetry is used to establish

prospective risks and operational guidelines for
radiation facilities as well as for retrospective
analysis of risks due to irradiation. Protection
dosimetry is primarily done through calculation.
These calculations rely on physical dose

19
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
Figure B.1. Relationship between the physical,
operational, and protection quantities. (Adapted
from ICRU Report 85a.)
B.2 Calculating radiation doses
As discussed above, calculations play a key and
complementary role to measurements in
radiation physics and protection. This has always
been true, but as computers have become
cheaper and faster, the computer codes that are
used for radiation dosimetry have become
increasingly capable. These factors have led to
their increasing application in radiation dosimetry.
The purpose of this section is to discuss the tools
that are available for computational radiation
dosimetry. The main tools that are currently used
in computational radiation dosimetry are physical
reference data, dosimetry data and computer
codes. Physical reference data are the numerical
representation of the fundamental processes
when radiation interacts with matter. Dosimetry
data are numerical coefficients that relate gross
properties of incident radiation fields to dosimetric
quantities. Computer codes have sophistication
from simple approximations to full simulations of
the transport of radiation in matter.
Physical reference data typically take one of two
forms. The first form is the data representing the
interaction of a given photon, electron or neutron
with an atom or nucleus. The basic quantity is the
interaction cross section. Total cross sections
determine the attenuation of an incident beam in
matter. Differential cross sections determine the
properties of secondary particles produced by the
attenuation processes. The second form that
physical reference data takes, typically for
charged particle data, is the representation of
multiple interactions as single pseudo-
interactions. Data in these forms may be obtained
20
separately from the national laboratories, such as
the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL) and Brookhaven National
Laboratory (BNL), or from radiation advisory
bodies such as the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) or the International Commission
on Radiation Units and Measures (ICRU).
Dosimetric data are those data that directly relate
the incident radiation field to the resulting dose or
kerma. They encapsulate the contributions of
secondary processes without having to explicitly
treat them. As such, they present the opportunity
to greatly reduce computational effort in
evaluating radiation doses. These data also take
two forms. One form, used in primary metrology,
does this for individual photons (mass-energy
transfer, mass-energy absorption coefficients …).
The other form (fluence-to-kerma, fluence-to-
dose coefficients) does this for realistic fields
composed of photons and/or neutrons. The
former data are available from NIST. The latter
are available from standards organizations such
as American National Standards Institute (ANSI),
or from advisory bodies (ICRU, International
Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP)).
The physical and dosimetric data discussed
above are used by computer codes to determine
physical, radiation protection, and operational
dosimetric quantities. There are a number of
empirical and semi-analytic approaches that
were traditionally used in such work. Monte Carlo
transport simulations, given detailed input on the
source and on the system configuration, can
provide essentially exact evaluations of
dosimetric quantities. In the past, the
computational demands of Monte Carlo modeling
prevented the quantitative application of the
method in many circumstances, although
qualitative observations often become readily
apparent after a much smaller effort. The
principal barriers to use of the method at present
are obtaining the full details of sources and
configurations to be modeled and the effort it
takes to take the details and transform them into
input for the codes. These problems can be
overcome and Monte Carlo is increasingly the
method of choice in radiation dosimetry
problems. Codes can be obtained from a number
of sources, both domestic and international,
including Oak Ridge National Laboratory
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
(ORNL), European Council for Nuclear Research
(CERN), and the National Research Council of
Canada (NRCC).
B.3 Measuring radiation doses
This section gives an overview of the device
types that are available for practical field
measurements. The available device types
employ different physical principles to measure
dose or kerma. As a result, the devices are
typically used in different applications. After
introducing the dosimeter types, in the next
section, we discuss where and how they should
be used.
B.3.1 Ionization chambers.
The ionization chamber is a type of radiation
probe consisting of a volume of air (or other gas)
between two electrodes. A voltage is applied to
the electrodes. When the chamber is irradiated,
electrically charged ions are created in the air
volume of the chamber in the chamber walls and
in the air (or another gas) inside the chamber.
These ions and electrons are collected on the
oppositely charged electrode. Ideally, the number
of ions created is proportional to the energy
deposited in the air volume. In order for this to be
true, the chamber walls must be thick enough to
exclude the collection of ions and electrons
created outside the chamber walls.
Simultaneously, the collection of ions and
electrons within the chamber walls must be
properly accounted for as well as the effects of
the attenuation and scatter of the primary beam
by the chamber walls. An electrometer is used to
measure the charge or electrical current.
The amount of charge produced per unit mass of
air is related to air kerma by the calibration factor
or coefficient of the chamber and electrometer
setup. The air kerma rate is similarly determined,
using the calibration factor or coefficient by
measurement of the electrical current (charge
produced per unit time). If the air volume is not
sealed, the mass of air in the volume changes
with temperature and pressure. In this case,
appropriate gas law corrections should be made.
21
B.3.2 Geiger counters.
The Geiger counter consists of a Geiger Muller
(GM) tube and a pulse counting circuit. The GM
tube is similar to an ionization chamber except
that it is filled with a special gas and operates at
higher voltage. The electrodes are usually in the
form of a cylinder and a concentric thin wire.
Because of this geometry and the small thickness
of the wire, the electric field near the inner
electrode is extremely high. When radiation
interacts with the gas it ionizes the gas, producing
electron-ion pairs. The resulting free electrons
are accelerated by the electric field and go on to
produce other electron-ion pairs which in turn
produce more ionization. This avalanche effect
results in a fairly large electrical pulse, which can
easily be detected and counted by the circuitry.
Therefore, in intense fields, these types of
instruments will saturate, providing an
erroneously low reading.
This makes the Geiger counter extremely
sensitive to radiation. However, the pulses
counted are a measure of number of “events”
rather than actual energy deposited. Unless the
instrument is calibrated in a radiation field having
an energy spectrum identical to the field
measured, it is difficult to estimate dose from a
Geiger counter reading. Geiger counters are
useful for locating a source of radiation and giving
a general idea of its strength.
B.3.3 Scintillation detectors.
Scintillation detectors consist of a scintillator
material, a photomultiplier tube (or solid-state
light detector), and associated electronics. When
the scintillator is exposed to ionizing radiation, a
portion of the energy absorbed is immediately
released in the form of visible or near visible light.
The light is directed to the photomultiplier tube,
which converts it to an amplified electrical signal.
Like the GM tube, the scintillation detector can be
very sensitive. It has the advantage, however,
that the signal is proportional to the energy
absorbed in the crystal. If the electrical circuit
measures the current or charge produced (rather
than counting the number of electrical pulses
produced), the resulting measurement is an
indication of dose. Although this is a very good
way to measure the dose delivered to the
scintillator, it is not always indicative of the dose
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
that would be delivered to human tissue. Some
scintillator materials, called tissue-equivalent,
mimic the radiation response of muscle tissue for
a certain energy range.
B.3.4 Passive dosimeters
Thermoluminescent (TL) or optically stimulated
luminescent (OSL) dosimeters are preferred as
passive detectors for dose measurement due to
photons. They are capable of measuring both low
and high fluence rates, and low and high doses,
in the beam and near the scanning systems, as
well as environmental doses at distances away
from the source. Special calibrations may be
required for the high-energy photons produced by
accelerators and buildup caps may also be
required to establish electronic equilibrium.
Subtraction of doses from naturally occurring
background radiation is required for accurate
dosimetry for low doses (i.e. comparable to the
natural background). Long exposure times (e.g.,
from several months to a year) may be required
for both TL and OSL dosimeters used for
environmental monitoring due to the anticipated
low fluence rates. Subtraction of background
dose is particularly important when carrying out
environmental measurements.
B.3.5 Neutron Detection
B.3.5.1 Active Neutron Detectors. The neutron
dose equivalent rate meters employed for dose
measurements do not operate well in pulsed,
mixed fields near the primary photon beam. The
response is dominated by the photon flash to
such extremes that they respond to radiation
fields as pulse counters providing essentially no
neutron information. However, moderator type
neutron detectors, such as rem balls, perform
well in low intensity, out-of-beam, pulsed fields.
The moderation and slowing of the neutrons in
metal or concrete shielding, as well as the
moderator, will stretch out the time of the neutron
pulses reaching the neutron sensor and reduce
the maximum dose rate in the beam. There are a
few available neutron dose equivalent rate
meters with the response based upon foil
activation. Such meters are not affected by the
photon flash. However, the sensitivity of such
devices is limited. These considerations limit the
22
selection of detectors for neutron dosimetry
primarily to passive detectors.
B.3.5.2 Passive Neutron Detectors. Allyl
diglycol carbonate (commercially known as CR-
39®) is a solid-state nuclear track detector that
can be used to measure doses from neutrons.
CR-39® is a plastic material (commonly used for
optical lenses) which is etched after exposure to
reveal neutron tracks in the material. These
tracks are counted and used to determine the
neutron dose. A low dose results in too few tracks
for accurate counting. At high doses, the tracks
become superimposed and make accurate
counting difficult. As long as the doses are below
~250 mSv (for neutrons with energies between
40 keV and 40 MeV) accurate measurements are
possible. Consequently, CR-39® could be used
for in-beam neutron measurements. Neutron
doses can be measured with CR-39® both inside
and outside the radiation control area. Sufficiently
long exposure times are required for these latter
environmental measurements to ensure that the
detector threshold is exceeded for accurate
measurements. The detection threshold for
neutron measurements with CR-39® is 0.2 mSv.
CR-39® is not affected by naturally-occurring
environmental photon radiation or other low linear
energy transfer (LET) radiation, and is packaged
within the typical dosimeter so that it is protected
from environmental radon or other sources of
high-LET radiation.
B.4 Air kerma and Absorbed Dose
measurements for compliance with
ANSI/HPS N43.16
This section provides general guidance on the
selection and use of instruments for measuring
physical and operational dosimetric quantities.
The wide variations in intensity and beam energy
that are encountered makes the practice of
dosimetry very different, for example, in-beam
measurements compared to measurements at
the perimeters of the screening system. These
situations also vary substantially from those
encountered in the laboratories where such
instruments are calibrated. Appropriate
correction factors will be discussed.
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
B.4.1 Instrument selection
To check compliance with the dose limits, an
instrument is needed that is capable of making
accurate measurements of air kerma or dose for
the types of irradiation conditions encountered in
security screening. These conditions vary widely
depending on the system and the position relative
to the primary beam. The differences can be
encapsulated in terms of beam energy and
intensity. Usually these factors are correlated.
The highest energy radiation and the highest
intensities typically occur in the primary beam.
The scattered field is lower in intensity and
energy.
Higher beam intensities adversely affect some of
the devices listed above. One class of
instruments that may suffer at high intensities is
the ionization chamber. This is mainly the case
when excessive recombination occurs. The
degree of recombination can be assessed by
several methods in order to determine if it can be
corrected. Typically, in an intense field, small
volume ionization chambers are used to mitigate
this effect. Low beam intensities result in
insufficient ionization in small volume ionization
chambers. So, a chamber that is appropriate in
the direct beam is not typically useful in the
scattered field. A large volume ionization
chamber will produce a larger current at the
electrode but not necessarily a sufficient current.
If one uses a pressurized chamber the current
read usually increases to useful levels. Passive
dosimeters such as TLDs and OSLs can work in
both the primary beam and in the scattered field.
The downside of these dosimeters is that they
take time to read, perhaps they even need to be
sent to a laboratory to be read. This makes it
difficult to perform typical field dosimetry
functions. Radiation protection instrumentation is
typically calibrated by quasi monoenergetic
radioisotopic sources (Cs-137, Co-60). While
these sources have been used in cargo
inspection systems, they are swiftly being
replaced by accelerator-based sources. The
accelerator beams differ from the radioisotopic
sources both in energy, they are usually higher in
energy, and in the pulsed time structure of the
beam which increases the instantaneous
intensity.
23
For measurements in the scattered field, either an
air kerma measurement or an absorbed dose
measurement may be used along with a
conversion factor to determine ambient dose
equivalent or effective dose. Some instruments
may be calibrated directly in terms of ambient
dose equivalent. For traceability to the primary
standard at NIST, a calibration in terms of air
kerma or absorbed dose is preferred.
The verification of shielding also requires H*(10)
measurements and the above discussion
regarding the instrument calibration applies. For
this purpose, a second instrument for localizing
the “hot spots” is also useful. A count rate meter
employing a probe “wand” consisting of an array
of GM tubes is a suitable localization instrument.
The instrument should indicate the responses of
the GM tubes separately so that localization of
the highest exposure is possible. At least two
such instruments are commercially available for
surveying cabinet x-ray systems. After the “hot
spots” are found, follow-up measurements using
the calibrated meter should be made at those
locations.
The rest of this discussion pertains to accurate
measurements of air kerma or absorbed dose to
water. The most appropriate detector for such
measurements is an ionization chamber. The
instrument should have: (1) an integrating mode,
(2) high sensitivity, and (3) known energy
response. The integrating mode is necessary to
measure the total accumulated electrical charge
during the course of one or more complete scans.
Through use of the calibration factor/coefficient,
this yields a measurement of the air kerma or
absorbed dose at the point of measurement. An
instrument having only a rate mode (i.e.
measuring in Gy/s or R/s) may not be as useful
for measurements involving a scanning beam. To
obtain an accurate reading, the entire volume of
the ionization chamber should receive the same
amount of radiation exposure during the course
of the scan.
Instrument sensitivity is extremely important.
Outside of the beam, the level of air kerma to be
measured is often only slightly higher than
background radiation. The electrical signal
produced is so small that it requires a very stable
electrical circuit with a minimum of electronic
noise to be measured accurately. The ionization
chamber should be large enough so that enough
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021

electrical charge may be produced for the
electrometer to make an accurate measurement.
Even with a large volume ion chamber, the
electrometer itself should be very sensitive.
Automatic background subtraction is not
recommended. If the instrument used performs
automatic background subtraction, the process
should be understood and care should be taken
that all of the "real" signal is measured, taking into
account the time-dependent ionization rate and
the sequence and duration of scanning of the
ionization chamber volume.
The energy dependence (uniformity of response)
is also very important. The radiation fields
associated with these systems cover a large
range of energies. For measurements in the
beam, a small-volume ionization chamber is
recommended. If the chamber and associated
electrometer are calibrated for air kerma or for
absorbed dose to water at lower energy,
additional material should surround the chamber
to increase the response to approximately its
maximum. This buildup material, typically a cap,
is thus used to establish electronic equilibrium
within the active volume of the chamber. The
buildup material must be chosen so that it is fully
illuminated by the beam or corrections for partial
illumination must be made.
approximately the charge produced in 1500 cm3
of air by 10 µR).
B.4.2 Calibration
The instrument and ion chamber should be
appropriately calibrated under conditions likely to
be encountered during use. The calibration
should be traceable to one of the NIST standard
beams.
At the present time, the highest-energy standard
calibration beam at the NIST is a Co-60 source.
Some inspection systems use Co-60 or, perhaps,
Cs-137 sources and calibrations performed using
a Co-60 or Cs-137 source are directly applicable
to such systems. Increasingly, high-energy
accelerators are being used in inspection
systems. Once the accelerating potential
exceeds 2 MV, it is necessary to take into account
the differences between the calibration source
and the fielded system. This has been done
routinely for years by medical physicists. Among
the protocols developed for this purpose are
those specified in the reports of Task Groups 21
and 51 of the American Association of Physicists
in Medicine (AAPM).

For radiation fields composed in large part of

photons of relatively low energies (e.g., scattered
radiation), the chamber wall preferentially
attenuates the lower energy photons, so a thin
wall is preferable. However, for a large chamber,
because of structural integrity the wall cannot be
made very thin. Some ionization chambers are
pressurized in order to maximize the air mass and
therefore the sensitivity. This requires a thicker
wall to hold the pressure, and the pressurized air
itself also attenuates the radiation. All these
factors point to the fact that there will be energy
dependence, particularly when measuring x-ray
systems operating at low energy. The effects may
be minimized by choosing the best ion chamber-
electrometer system for the energy range in
question and by proper calibration. A large (at
least 1500 cm3), non-pressurized ion chamber is
recommended. A good quality electrometer with
at least a 0.1 picocoulomb (pC) resolution,
capable of measuring a pulse of charge of 5 pC
magnitude and 10 ms duration, within ± 10%
accuracy is also recommended (this is

24
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
Annex C (Normative)
Procedures for Measurements Made
by Manufacturers
Section 6.5 of this standard requires
manufacturers to provide specific information
about the system to the end user. This
information includes five data elements (items 6.5
g-k) that require measurement of radiation levels.
This annex establishes the procedures to be
followed by manufacturers in making these
measurements.
C.1 Air Kerma at a Reference Location
in the Primary Beam
A measurement of air kerma rate in the primary
beam at a specified distance is the most
fundamental measurement that can be made on
a security screening system. It can also be used
by the qualified expert to estimate radiation doses
along the path of the primary beam.
C.1.1 Equipment Required
An ionization chamber. Ideally, the ionization
chamber should be small enough to be
completely covered by the radiation beam. If the
chamber is larger than the beam width, a volume
correction factor shall be applied to the measured
value. For high energy beams, appropriate build
up material shall be used.
C.1.2 Procedure
1. Position the ionization chamber at the
reference distance (usually 1 m) from the
source (sealed radioactive source or x-
ray focal spot).
2. Set and record the appropriate source
information. For a sealed radioactive
source, this is the radionuclide (e.g, Co-
60) and its activity (MBq) at the time of
the measurement. For an electrically
powered RGD, this is the tube potential
(kV or MV) and tube current (mA), and
pulse repetition rate (Hz) if the source is
pulsed.
3. With both the beam and detector
stationary, initiate radiation emission and
25
record the air kerma rate. The radiation
beam shall remain on long enough for the
ionization chamber to reach a steady
state response. This time will vary
depending on the specific instrument
used, but is typically a minimum of 10-30
seconds.
4. Alternatively, a measurement may be
made in integrate or accumulate mode
for a set beam-on time. The rate can then
be determined by dividing the total air
kerma by the duration of the
measurement.
5. For instruments calibrated in exposure
units (i.e., roentgen), an appropriate
conversion factor shall be applied to
convert the exposure in roentgen to air
kerma in gray.
6. If the entire chamber volume was not
within the radiation beam a volume
correction factor shall be applied. The
volume correction factor is the ratio of the
chamber’s sensitive volume to the
volume actually exposed.
7. If the system has multiple operational
modes with different technique factors
(tube potential, tube current, or pulse
rate), this measurement shall be made at
each selectable mode.
C.2 Isodose Contours
The isodose contours at 0.5 μSv (50 μrem) per
hour (IDC(0.5)) and 20 μSv (2 mrem) per hour
(IDC(20)) provide a way to visualize the area
around a system in which a radiation hazard may
exist. For a system that moves during the
screening process, the isodose contours do not
provide a full picture of the hazard (see the
discussion in Annex A).
C.2.1 Equipment Required
A suitable radiation survey meter.
A scatter object consisting of three stackable 5
gallon plastic containers filled with water.
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
C.2.2 Procedure
1. Position the screening system on a level
surface with the radiation beam directed
toward an unoccupied area or an
appropriate barrier.
2. Mark a rectangular grid on the surface at
1 m intervals with the origin directly below
a convenient reference point on the
screening system (e.g., the location
where the radiation beam exits the outer
surface of the screening system) and one
axis of the grid centered along the beam
path.
3. Set and record the appropriate source
information. For a sealed radioactive
source RGD, this is the radionuclide and
its activity (MBq) at the time of the
measurement. For an electrically
powered RGD, this is the tube potential
(kV or MV) and tube current, and pulse
repetition rate (Hz), if it is a pulsed
source.
4. Initiate radiation emission. With the
radiation detector 1 m above ground
level, begin at the furthest grid point from
the origin along the beam path and move
slowly toward the source. Mark the
locations at which the dose equivalent
rate is 0.5 μSv (50 μrem) per hour and 20
μSv (2 mrem) per hour. (The point at
which to start can be estimated from the
in-beam measurement described in
section C-1 using the inverse square
approximation.)
5. Terminate radiation emission and place
the three water containers in a vertical
stack at the center of a flatbed trailer (or
similar support structure) in the path of
the primary beam at the distance from
the beam exit surface where the surface
of the vehicle being screened would be
located during normal operation.
6. Initiate radiation emission. With the
radiation detector 1 m above the surface
and beginning at the edge of the grid,
move along each grid line perpendicular
to the radiation beam and mark the
26
locations at which the ambient dose
equivalent rate is 0.5 μSv (50 μrem) per
hour and 20 μSv (2 mrem) per hour.
Make these measurements starting from
each of the four sides of the grid.
7. Determine the x and y coordinates of the
marked locations on the grid to create a
map of the isodose contours at 0.5 μSv
(50 μrem) per hour and 20 μSv (2 mrem)
per hour.
For the measurements in this section for the
IDC(0.5) and IDC(20), volume correction factors
need not be applied. For instruments calibrated in
exposure units (i.e., roentgen), the radiation
protection assumption that an exposure of 1 R is
equivalent to an ambient dose equivalent of 0.01
Sv (1 rem) may be used. For systems with pulsed
beams, the dose rate may be averaged over a
period of 1 minute.
C.3 Dose Per Scan to the Driver of the
Vehicle Being Screened
The driver of a vehicle is typically considered a
member of the general public and the dose
limitation requirements of section 5.2 apply. The
measured dose per scan can be used to estimate
the annual dose to a driver who frequently passes
through the screening checkpoint to ensure
compliance with this limit. The exception is a
driver who is an employee of the organization
operating the security screening system and
whose job is to drive vehicles though the
checkpoint. In this case, the dose limits for the
system operating crew in section 5.1 may be
applied.
The measurement procedure below is only
applicable in situations where the entire vehicle is
not screened, but the driver is still in the vehicle.
If the area of the vehicle containing the driver (or
any passengers) is exposed to the primary beam,
the provisions of ANSI N43.17 shall be followed
in determining the potential dose to these
individuals.
C.3.1 Equipment Required
An ionization chamber capable of measuring an
accumulated ambient dose equivalent on the
order of 10 nSv (1 μrem) or less.
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
A scatter object consisting of three stackable 5
gallon plastic containers filled with water.
C.3.2 Procedure
1. Position the screening system on a level
surface.
2. Position a target vehicle for screening
and place the three water containers in a
vertical stack in the cargo area of the
vehicle directly behind the driver’s
position in the cab as close to the driver
as possible.
3. Place the ionization chamber at the
location of the driver’s head (this is
usually the least shielded location on the
driver’s body). Place the ionization
chamber in an integrate or accumulate
mode.
4. Perform 10 screenings of the vehicle
without resetting the ionization chamber.
Record the total ambient dose equivalent
for the ten screenings.
5. Divide the total ambient dose equivalent
by 10 to obtain the average dose per
screening to the driver.
For instruments calibrated in exposure units (i.e.,
roentgen), the radiation protection assumption
that an exposure of 1 R is equivalent to an
ambient dose equivalent of 0.01 Sv (1 rem) may
be used.
C.4. Dose to an Inadvertently Scanned
Individual
This measurement is used to demonstrate
compliance with the dose limit for an inadvertently
scanned individual specified in section 5.3. It is
also an estimate of the dose to cargo, which may
be of interest in cases where radiation sensitive
cargo needs to be screened.
C.4.1 Equipment Required
An ionization chamber or dosimeter capable of
measuring an accumulated ambient dose
27
equivalent on the order of 10 μSv (1 mrem) or
less.
A scatter object consisting of three stackable 5
gallon plastic containers filled with water.
C.4.2 Procedure
1. Position the screening system on a level
surface.
2. Position a target vehicle for screening
and place the three water containers in a
vertical stack in the cargo area about 30
cm from the side closest to the radiation
source. Ensure the water containers are
sufficiently secured to remain in place
during the screening process.
3. Position the ionization chamber between
the water containers and the side of the
cargo container nearest the radiation
source and as close to the water
containers as possible. Place the
ionization chamber in an integrate or
accumulate mode.
4. Perform 10 screenings of the vehicle
without resetting the ionization chamber.
Record the total ambient dose equivalent
for the ten screenings.
5. Divide the total ambient dose equivalent
by 10 to obtain the average dose per
screening to the driver.
For instruments calibrated in exposure units (i.e.,
roentgen), the radiation protection assumption
that an exposure of 1 R is equivalent to an
ambient dose equivalent of 0.01 Sv (1 rem) may
be used.
C.5. Boundary of the Radiation Control Area
Manufacturer’s shall also determine the
dimensions of the radiation control area using the
procedures in Annex D. This determination shall
be made using the parameters that maximize the
size of the operational area (e.g., the combination
of number of screenings per hour and scan speed
that results in the largest total beam-on time per
hour).
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
Annex D (Normative)
Establishing the Boundary of the
Radiation Control Area
D.1 The Radiation Control Area
The primary purpose of the radiation control area,
as defined in this standard, is to ensure
individuals outside this area do not receive
radiation doses in excess of the limits specified in
section 5.2 of this standard. However, due to the
design of cargo and vehicle systems, the area
actually marked and controlled may be larger
than what would be needed for radiation
protection alone. Other factors, such as the flow
of vehicular traffic through the system, vehicle
size, and vehicle motion may require more space
and limit where barriers can be placed to control
entry into the area.
Cargo and vehicle screening systems typically
have a very narrow radiation beam and may have
a detector array and associated support
structures that provide some reduction in
radiation intensity. Thus the location of the
radiation hazard is primarily along the path of the
primary beam between the beam exit surface and
the detector array, if one is present. The radiation
hazard may extend a small distance to either side
of the beam due to scatter radiation from the
object being screened and other materials in the
path of the beam. In addition, the detector array
may not intercept the entire primary beam and,
although it provides some degree of radiation
attenuation, this is not its primary function.
Therefore, some degree of radiation hazard may
extend beyond the detector array. See Appendix
A for a more detailed description of the types and
usage of cargo and vehicle screening systems.
D.2 Methodology
The first step in determining the required radiation
control area dimensions is to determine the
maximum radiation dose per screening that can
be permitted at the area boundary. Once this
maximum value has been determined, the survey
methods of section D-4 can be used by the
qualified expert to establish the appropriate
radiation control area.
The maximum radiation dose per screening
depends on the applicable dose limit/constraint,
the nature of the screening system, and how the
system is used in a given screening operation.
Acceptable methods and issues that need to be
considered are illustrated below.
28
D.3 Example Calculations
Scenario 1
Consider a screening system that is used by a
given operating crew for a standard 2000-hour
work year (8 hours per day, 5 days per week, 50
weeks per year) to screen cargo containers. The
user organization has decided that the dose to
employees at their facility will not exceed 1 mSv
per year (a dose constraint equal to the dose limit
for the general public). Based on the nature of the
screening operation and screening system
design, it has been determined that a maximum
of 40 vehicles can be screened in one hour (i.e.,
positioning a vehicle for screening, conducting
the screen, interpreting the results, and removing
that vehicle will take approximately 1.5 minutes).
The only individuals near the system during
normal operation are the operating crew and
designated facility employees who bring the
containers to the screening location.
As a conservative approach, the system is
assumed to be in continuous use at the maximum
possible screening rate for the entire 2000-hour
work year. Because the system is assumed to be
in continuous use, a dose constraint of 0.5 μSv h-
1
(1 mSv per 2000 h) can be applied. Dividing this
dose constraint by the maximum number of
vehicles that can be screened in any hour gives
an allowable dose of 0.0125 μSv h-1 (0.5 uSv h-1
/ 40 screenings).
Scenario 2
Consider a screening system that is used at an
entrance to a secure facility where the operating
crew works 12-hour shifts, 6 days per week for
full year. At approximately 1-year intervals, the
operating crew rotates out and a new crew is
brought in. Because each operating crew works
for only a 1-year period and the operation has
national security implications, the organization
has determined that a dose constraint of
5 mSv y-1 (one-tenth of the occupational dose
limit) will be used. Given the system design and
the nature of the screening operation, a maximum
of 30 screening can be performed in one hour (2
minutes per vehicle). However, historical data
indicates that an average of 100 vehicles per day
arrive at the checkpoint for screening. Other than
the system operators, the only other individuals
present near the radiation control area boundary
are the drivers of the vehicles who are instructed
to remain in a designated area just outside the
radiation control area while their vehicle is
screened. Historical information also indicates
that two delivery truck drivers make regular visits
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021

to the facility and make, on average, two visits to ground and set it to an integrated
the facility per day. measurement mode.

In this scenario, both the dose to the system
operators and the vehicle drivers needs to be
considered and different dose limits are applied
to each. For the system operators, the dose per
screening at boundary cannot exceed
5mSv/y
6 d⁄wk × 50 wk⁄y × 100 screenings⁄d
= 1.7 × 10#$ mSv (0.17 µSv)
A more conservative value would be obtained if
constant operation at the maximum number
screenings per hour was assumed.
For the vehicle drivers, the maximally exposed
driver is expected to be present for only two
screenings per day. In this case, the dose limit for
the general public is used and the maximum dose
per screening is
1 mSv⁄y
6 d⁄wk × 50 wk⁄y × 2 screenings⁄d
= 1.7 × 10#% mSv (1.7 µSv)
Because the maximum dose per screening for the
system operators is the lowest, that value should
be used as the basis for establishing the radiation
control area boundary.
D.4 Radiation Control Area Survey
D.4.1 Equipment Required
An ionization chamber or other instrument
calibrated for dose measurements at the
appropriate photon energy. Ideally, the
instrument should be capable of measuring an
integrated dose of 0.01 μSv (1 μrem) or less.
3. Perform 1-10 screenings of a typical
vehicle or cargo container. (The number
of screenings needed will depend on the
sensitivity of the instrument and the
maximum dose per screen determined
using the methodology above. The
minimum measurable dose divided by
the number of screenings must be less
than the maximum allowable dose per
screening.)
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 at several locations
around the boundary of the radiation
control area.
5. Divide each of the measured values by
the number screenings performed for
each measurement to get the average
dose per screening. This value must be
less than the maximum allowable dose
per screening at each location.
6. If any measured values exceed the
maximum allowable dose per screening,
increase the dimensions of the radiation
control zone and repeat the
measurements.
Alternatively, measurements can be made at
designated grid locations around the system and
the appropriate dimensions determined by the
grid points at which the average dose per
screening is acceptable.

D.4.2 Procedure

1. Make an initial estimate of an appropriate

radiation control area size and set up the
system for screening operations. This
initial estimate may be based on
calculations, simulations, experience, or
a combination thereof and should
consider both radiation and non-radiation
factors. The system, as studied, needs to
match actual use conditions.

2. Position the survey instrument at a point

along the boundary of the radiation
control area at a height of 1 m above the
29