Regional & Federal Studies

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Signing up to devolution: the prevalence of

contract over governance in English devolution
policy

Mark Sandford

To cite this article: Mark Sandford (2017) Signing up to devolution: the prevalence of contract
over governance in English devolution policy, Regional & Federal Studies, 27:1, 63-82, DOI:
10.1080/13597566.2016.1254625

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 REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES, 2017
VOL. 27, NO. 1, 63–82
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2016.1254625

Signing up to devolution: the prevalence of contract

over governance in English devolution policy
Mark Sandford
House of Commons Library, London, UK
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ABSTRACT
Initial analyses of the ‘devolution deals’ that form the cornerstone of current
efforts to devolve power within England assess the policy against
conventional governance criteria: accountability, transparency, and the quality
of governance systems. In fact, English devolution policy has little connection
with territorial governance. Instead, it closely resembles a contractual process,
with central government determining the terms on which it will outsource
specified programmes and projects to local governments, complete with
requirements for ‘business readiness’, implementation plans, evaluation
requirements, and future joint working. Accountability, governance and even
geography take second place to the aim of improving central policy
outcomes via a contract-style relationship. This perspective is styled ‘post-
territorial devolution’: it accounts more effectively for the shape of the policy
so far than traditional governance perspectives, which are often laced with
normative positions.

KEYWORDS Devolution; governance; central-local relations; territorial policy; England

Introduction
Scholars have begun to grapple with English devolution since the policy burst
unexpectedly upon the political scene in November 2014 with the publication
of the ‘Greater Manchester Agreement’, bolstered by further ‘devolution deals’
published during 2015 and 2016 (CLG Committee, 2016; NAO, 2016; Sandford,
2016). It would be easy to perceive the policy as an imitation of devolution to
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in 1998–99 – a shift in territorial man-
agement catalysed by similar concerns around governance, democracy, and
economy. But the mechanics of English devolution have been very different;
it has been delivered so far through a series of bespoke, bilateral ‘devolution
deals’ negotiated confidentially between the UK Government and small
groups of local leaders.
Scholarly and think-tank publications, almost universally, have judged the
quality of English devolution policy by reference to its institutional structures,

CONTACT Mark Sandford sandfordm@parliament.uk

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
 64 M. SANDFORD

formal powers, and adherence to conventional democratic practice and

process norms. Most assess the validity, of the policy to the degree that it
mounts a challenge to the allegedly irrevocable centralism of the British pol-
itical tradition (Bentley et al., 2010; Richards and Smith, 2016) – a phenom-
enon that is perceived to have been fettered by devolution elsewhere in
the UK. Comment in this regard has ranged from the tentatively positive
(Coyle, 2015; Gains, 2015, 2016; Checkland et al., 2016; Harrison, 2016) to
the strongly critical (Deas, 2015; Talbot, 2015; Blunkett et al., 2016; Richards
and Smith, 2016; Walker, 2016b).
Furthermore, when teasing out the motivations of the actors involved in
English devolution policy, many analyses subtly intertwine an ostensibly
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analytical perspective with normative critique. The more generous interpret-

ations suggest an absence of accepted good practice in governance and
policy making, and then suggest that this failure will also fatally undermine
the success of the policy on the Government’s own terms (Hammond, 2016;
Pike et al., 2016; PSA, 2016). Less charitable approaches employ the vantage
point of the stereotypical harassed parent: ‘find out what little Tommy is
doing and tell him to stop it’. It is easy to conclude from the spectrum of analy-
sis so far that a broad, comprehensive, transparent reboot of the policy is the
only way to address both the technical and normative criticisms.
In this article I take an alternative tack, arguing that these approaches fun-
damentally misunderstand the objectives of UK Government policy. English
devolution deals are best understood not as developments in territorial gov-
ernance, but as a series of contract-style agreements between central govern-
ment and local public bodies, to pursue agreed outcomes in discrete policy
areas where a common interest can be identified. The UK government’s will-
ingness to ‘devolve’ power is predicated on local business cases, demon-
strable organizational competence, and local bodies’ capacity to deliver
results. The policy imposes quasi-contractual obligations, complete with
financial assessments, evaluation requirements, and conditions of ‘business
readiness’ in advance of the transfer of power. Issues of governance, account-
ability and geography, whilst not ignored, have taken second place to the
imperative of effective local policy delivery on behalf of the Government,
effectively in the capacity of a purchaser of services.
This is an intentional approach, not a marker of policy incoherence, residual
centralism, or ‘muddling through’ (Waite et al., 2013; Talbot, 2015; Blunkett
et al., 2016; Richards and Smith, 2016). The use of the term ‘devolution deal’
is not merely a public relations catchphrase but a deliberate and genuine
expression of the process. The word ‘devolution’ could mislead observers
into viewing this policy as a stymied or half-hearted approach to territorial
governance. Indeed, a number of authors have claimed that this is ‘not devo-
lution’ (Kings Fund, 2015; Pike et al., 2016; Walker, 2016b), but the weaker
approach of ‘delegation’. Either way, changing territorial governance is not
 REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES 65

the animating concern behind devolution deals. Perspectives that seek within
English devolution policy an answer to the ‘English Question’ (Hazell, 2006), a
comprehensive framework or culture of devolution (CLG Committee, 2016;
Cox, 2016; Pike et al., 2016), spatial rebalancing (Martin et al., 2015; Williams,
2015), or a form of constitutional change (Gains, 2015; Talbot, 2015; Walker,
2016a) neglect the Government’s intentions.
Instead, if we view ‘deal-making’ as a purely pragmatic means to contract
out the handling of policy programmes in particular localities to alternative
‘providers’, many dimensions of the policy are brought into sharper focus. It
is easier to understand why the Government prefers to devolve some
powers but not others; why devolution deals contain onerous management
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controls and conditions; why geography and fiscal devolution have formed
so little a part of the debate; and why only belated attention has been
paid to democratic accountability, governance and consultation. This
approach can be dubbed ‘post-territorial devolution’; the transfer to local
public bodies of tightly bound powers hedged in by quasi-contractual
terms, evaluation and financial incentives, glossing over the questions of
geography and accountability that are conventionally associated with terri-
torial governance. English devolution is about outcomes first and govern-
ance second.
There is no room in this article to give a comprehensive outline of the
timeline and direction of the policy as a whole (Danson et al., 2012; Sandford,
2016; Walker, 2016a), or to conduct a full review of the literature on public
sector contracting. Instead, an initial section will note some key character-
istics of public sector bodies’ approach to contracting. Four further sections
address specific features of the devolution deal process so far: implemen-
tation mechanisms; how the powers to be devolved have been selected;
the role of governance, accountability, and the public; and the approach
to geographies. In each section, the affinities between a contract-style
approach and policy so far are highlighted; and attention is also drawn to
points where traditional governance-related concerns appear to have gone
unheeded.
Evidence is presented from deal texts, media reports, Government policy
announcements and surrounding literature, published between November
2014 and July 2016. These were obtained via a broad-based review of articles
in the UK broadsheet press, local government sector media, and academic
blogs and brief think-pieces on the purposes of devolution deals. A small
amount of primary data has also been used. The article is intended to contrib-
ute to the literature on local and regional government in England and the
nature of relationships between them, demonstrating that a contract-based
perspective can be a useful framework for the understanding of future devel-
opments in English devolution policy.
 66 M. SANDFORD

Public sector contracting

In the last 40 years UK local authorities have made frequent use of contractual
arrangements with private or voluntary sector providers to provide statutory
public services and ‘back office’ functions. The introduction and extension of
‘compulsory competitive tendering’ for local authorities from 1988 onwards
meshed with the inception of ‘new public management’ (Hood, 1991;
Stewart and Walsh, 1992; Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; Dunleavy and Hood,
1994). The 1990s saw local authority relationships move away from giving
general grants to purchasing specified services, in the context of squeezed
public budgets (Taylor and Lewis, 1997).
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At its most fundamental a contract can be defined as ‘a written agreement

which is legally enforceable’ (Perri 6 and Kendall, 1997: 18). The existence of a
contract presupposes a contracting authority or ‘purchaser’ (letting the con-
tract), and a ‘supplier’, ‘contractor’ or ‘provider’ (fulfilling the contract). The
contract terms are clearly defined and a supplier is procured on the open
market (Curry, 2016). The two bodies operate in a principal–agent
relationship.
However, the latter description can be an oversimplification (Alford and
O’Flynn, 2012). Active contract management takes time and expertise,
which place demands on the contracting authority’s resources. The supplier
may have greater expertise and access to information than the contracting
authority, strengthening their hand in negotiations. Conversely, contracting
authorities may seek to renegotiate payments or terms at short notice, poss-
ibly in response to financial constraints. The emotive phrase ‘contracting out’
can denote a broad range of practical relationships. Broadly, a contract-based
approach to public services requires:

. a bilateral agreement between a purchaser and a provider, often with key

confidential elements (such as price);
. a formal procurement process, followed by an agreement between the
purchaser and the contractor to supply specified services or outputs,
which is normally legally binding (even if enforcement of the contract
may be rare);
. agreement on outputs and performance, which is often linked to payment
levels;
. more or less detail on delivery procedures that must be followed to achieve
the outputs;
. an ongoing relationship and dialogue regarding the content of the
contract;
. in long-term contracts particularly, the contract may transform the purcha-
ser and/or provider organizations.
 REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES 67

Local service delivery contracts normally include, alongside specified

outputs, an agreed price and some provision for penalties or other conse-
quences if the outputs are not produced (Perri 6 and Kendall, 1997: 20). Con-
tracts vary in the degree of control they seek over how outputs are achieved:
some contracting authorities seek tight control over the process, whilst others
encourage innovation. Though an open procurement process is the norm, a
contract can be negotiated over time with a preferred provider, where
there are few providers (‘thin markets’: see Girth et al., 2012). Alternatively,
potential providers can be issued with a problem and invited to design a
project specification to address the outcome most effectively (a ‘call for pro-
posals’: see Flynn, 2012: 216).
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Contracting authorities can take different approaches to managing con-

tracts, from a trust-based, flexible approach with minimal intervention to a
service-based contract with a formal ‘relationship manager’. The former
approach implies an ongoing negotiation and dialogue regarding
approaches and even outcomes, whilst the latter implies strict adherence
to the terms of the contract (Taylor and Lewis, 1997). The development of
a relationship of trust, beyond the terms of the contract itself, is closely associ-
ated with the former approach. Statements of shared values in contracts, or in
negotiations, are common; as are struggles to define quality when assessing
the performance of the contractor. Contracts inevitably face contingencies,
and instead of providing for every eventuality, contracting parties will often
agree on procedures to negotiate any difficulties that occur. Contracts will
also normally define outputs or outcomes and include provision for
payment linked to performance; this distributes risk between the purchaser
and the supplier.
A contracting authority is not necessarily an all-powerful ‘principal’ allocat-
ing discrete tasks to a series of ‘agents’, with its interactions governed purely
by the formal terms of the contract. Maintaining a long-term contractual
relationship may take precedence over contract enforcement. The purchaser
may seek to achieve wider goals than simply providing mandatory services
(Batsleer and Paton, 1997), via ‘relational contracting’ (Alford and O’Flynn,
2012) or an ‘obligational contractual relationship’ (Sako, 1992). In the latter,
the purchaser and the provider share risk and take opportunities to work
together in ways that go beyond the terms of the contract. Such contracts
are characteristically high-trust and witness frequent contact between many
individuals in the two organizations.
As will be seen in the following sections, many of these features of con-
tracting can be recognized in the implementation and negotiation of ‘devolu-
tion deals’, even though the deals are not contracts in the legal sense. The first
of these looks at the governance and public administration structures which
will deliver the powers in the devolution deals.
 68 M. SANDFORD

The implementation mechanisms for English devolution

A devolution policy pursued through a governance framework could be
expected to take a multilateral, universal approach. A broadly standard set
of powers would be available to a territory in any part of England; the
powers on offer, and the decision-making process to grant them, would
be justified via official documents and would be transparent and publicly
available. Government would use a statutory procedure, subject to Parlia-
mentary and public debate, to implement the changes. In contrast to this
outline, devolution deals have been negotiated bilaterally between Govern-
ment and local areas; whilst the governance framework of the deals will take
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statutory form, many of the policy areas to be devolved will not; specific
policy programmes, desired outcomes and funding pots, not generalized
responsibility for a policy area, are to be devolved; and the sealing of devo-
lution deals has been contingent on a (confidential) demonstration of organ-
izational capacity.

Bilateralism
Devolution deals have proceeded on a bilateral basis, with the Government
pursuing negotiations independently with small groups of council and
business leaders from selected local areas (CLG Committee, 2016;
Hammond, 2016; Pike et al., 2016; PSA, 2016). The Government has insisted
on confidentiality throughout. This normally meant that local stakeholders –
and most councillors within the participating authorities – had no information
on the content of deals before the final version was published. This secrecy is
redolent of a contractual concern with commercial confidentiality.
In Parliamentary debates, the Government repeatedly refused to provide a
list of powers on offer in the process, insisting that deals were to be based on
the ‘offers’ received from areas. This calls to mind the concept of a contractual
‘call for proposals’ noted above; and this in turn matches the emphasis on
building ‘trust’ reported by many participants in the negotiations (Grant
Thornton, 2015; PSA, 2016). Equally, ‘supplier control’ also featured in the
negotiations. Often, Government departments were content to devolve
powers once they had found a ‘formula’ (regarding what would be devolved
and how) that would satisfy them that powers would be well-exercised and
outcomes achieved that were better than current ones (PSA, 2016).
Asymmetrical devolution is the inevitable outcome of such an approach;
but this is unproblematic if the aim is to develop an obligational contractual
relationship, to drive central government’s desired outcomes. This accounts
for the Government’s ostensibly unsystematic approach to selecting areas
with which to agree deals. Large metropolitan areas, and other localities
which have accepted a narrative of a strong mayoralty and economic
 REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES 69

growth, have obtained deals, whilst areas such as Hampshire, Cumbria, and
Gloucestershire, which have refused to accept a mayoralty, have fallen behind.

The character of ‘devolved’ powers

In all devolution deals but one (Cornwall) so far, the transferred powers will be
exercised by a combined authority. The Cities and Local Government Devolu-
tion Act 2016 permits combined authorities to take on any statutory functions
and to establish an elected mayor. Statutory functions will be devolved via a
series of Orders, relating to each separate area, under the 2016 Act.
At first glance, the statutory nature of combined authorities contradicts the
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thesis of a contractual approach, as transferred powers will be enshrined in

secondary legislation. But a closer look at the devolution deals reveals that
most of the powers agreed for transfer so far have no basis in legislation.
They are programmes or funding streams set up through executive powers,
which can be transferred to alternative ‘providers’ by Government fiat.
Examples include adult skills funding, the Apprenticeship Grant for Employers,
and devolved business support services. Other ‘powers’ mentioned in the
deals do not yet exist, such as local ‘land commissions’, and supplements to
the national Work Programme. Thus most of the deals seek alternative deliv-
ery arrangements for pre-conceived policies; and in practice, combined auth-
orities will be dependent for their effectiveness upon the Government
honouring the negotiated contract. There is also no statutory guarantee of
future funding to enable the deal to be implemented: this too is dependent
on an ongoing relationship.
The main exceptions to this pattern are policing and bus franchising.
These are substantive statutory powers, but again, they are not all that
they seem. The Bus Services Bill includes considerable conditions to be met
to exercise franchising powers. Policing has only been offered to Greater
Manchester so far: this seems likely to have been driven principally by the
bureaucratic neatness of combining two directly elected conurbation-wide
figures into one. Boundary issues are a deterrent to the devolution of poli-
cing in many other areas. These policy areas do not contradict the general
picture of a Government seeking to control outcomes via quasi-contractual
processes.

Business plans
Most devolution deals require a ‘business case’ in advance of the devolution
of specific powers (HM Treasury, 2014, 2015c, 2016a). Greater Manchester’s
housing loan fund included complex ‘readiness conditions’, with a backstop
provision for the Homes and Communities Agency to act as the financially
accountable body if these could not be met. Devolving power subject to a
 70 M. SANDFORD

‘business case’ suggests a contractual approach, where the local ‘supplier’

must demonstrate its competence and capacity to deliver an agreed policy
outcome. Conditions of this kind were completely absent from the previous
generation of English devolution policy between 1997 and 2010.
Health devolution in Greater Manchester, despite proceeding through a
different legal route, is evolving structures with similar characteristics. The
Greater Manchester health and social care partnership board must ‘demon-
strate, through a business case, how it will be a financially and clinically sus-
tainable system within five years’ (NHS, 2016: 3). NHS England has
published nine ‘decision criteria’ to be used by NHS bodies when deciding
whether to engage with devolution proposals, including ‘health geography’,
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‘quality of care’, ‘financial risk management’, and ‘demonstrable leadership

capability’ (NHS, 2015). Performance-related trigger points have been
agreed for national intervention in Greater Manchester’s health service,
based on certain targets not being met (NHS, 2016). In other words, if perform-
ance does not meet the purchaser’s standards the contract will, so to speak,
be brought back in-house.
Devolution deal texts focus on how local areas can demonstrate commit-
ment to deliver specific outcomes. In contractual terms, these serve to build
a long-term relationship based in ‘trust’. Recent primary research with partici-
pants in the deal-making process (Grant Thornton, 2015; CLG Committee,
2016; PSA, 2016; Randall and Casebourne, 2016) has found that the quality
of the ‘offer’ from local government was key to central government’s willing-
ness to devolve.
A desire to build trust would also explain the quantity of commitments to
‘work with’ or ‘explore’ the devolution of further powers, programmes and
initiatives found in the deals. For instance, the proposed ‘devolution’ of
elements of the Work Programme in many deals consists of consultation
with local bodies during supplier procurement, with contracts continuing to
be agreed and managed by central government. A governance-based per-
spective could view these as ersatz devolution or evidence of bad faith: but
for contracting parties, they constitute initial mechanisms to build a long-
term obligational relationship.

Devolution of programmes
The ‘powers’ to be transferred in devolution deals comprise projects and pro-
grammes, aims, funding lines, and outcomes that are tightly drawn and
specific. The policy does not comprise the wholesale transfer of power and
accountability normally associated with the word ‘devolution (Cooke and
Clifton, 2005; Hildreth and Bailey, 2013), which characterized the process in
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Nor does it even comprise the transfer
of full strategic responsibility over a policy – as with, for instance, transport in
 REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES 71

Greater London. The deals give limited freedom to local areas to redesign
defined programmes to achieve outcomes agreed between both sides, and
in some cases (such as employment support) the procedure to be followed
post-‘devolution’ is also laid out in the devolution deal. This resembles a con-
tract-style definition of outputs. Unlike in Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland, where policy areas were transferred in their totality, English devolu-
tion will see wider responsibility for policy in areas such as adult skills, employ-
ment support and housing remain with central government.
Furthermore, most deal documents also include general requirements to
develop implementation plans and evaluations for each devolved policy
(HM Treasury, 2016d: 12, 2016e: 19; NHS, 2016: 5). Centrally mandated evalu-
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ations have never been commissioned for Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland, or indeed devolution to Greater London: the decision to do so
suggests that central government, as ‘purchaser’, regards itself as retaining
overriding responsibility for the programmes. Similarly, the ‘investment
funds’ on offer in most devolution deals will be subject to ‘five-yearly assess-
ment gateways’ (HM Treasury, 2014: 8; NAO, 2016: 11). These assessments are
to be jointly commissioned, but their very existence suggests that the
‘success’ of devolution policy will be judged by results rather than territorial
governance principles.

Selection of policies for English devolution

The aims of English devolution policy have not been set out in a single docu-
ment, and must be inferred from a small number of Government publications
(Cox and Hunter, 2015; NAO, 2016; PSA, 2016). The clearest rationale can be
found in the 2015 Autumn Statement:
The Northern Powerhouse is the government’s plan to boost the economy
across the North of England. It is built on the solid economic theory that
while the individual cities and towns of the North are strong, if they are
enabled to pool their strengths, they could be stronger than the sum of their
parts. (HM Treasury, 2015a: 61)

Four elements making up the Northern Powerhouse are then set out: trans-
port investment; science and innovation investment; investing in culture
and housing; and devolution of powers to local areas ‘who will give people
in northern cities and towns a strong voice’. In similar terms, the NAO’s
(2016) report on devolution deals describes ‘broadly-framed objectives to
support economic growth and rebalancing, public service reform and
improved local accountability’ (2016: 5).
The origins of English devolution policy within a national economic pro-
gramme casts a different light on the Government’s assertions that it has
an open mind on which powers to devolve. If the deal-making process is
 72 M. SANDFORD

viewed as a contractual negotiation, and the participation of the government

is based on specific imperatives – whether tacit or explicit – it would be
expected that these will frame the negotiations. This chimes with participants’
description of a tacit Government agenda (Cox and Hunter, 2015; CLG Com-
mittee, 2016; PSA, 2016; Walker, 2016a). This view is also borne out by the
similarity of many of the key offers within the deals, to the point of identical
chunks of text appearing in several deal documents. These are likely to reflect
Government views on the proper scope of the contract. This may also explain
why proposals for public service reform have so far been thin on the ground,
despite local advocacy; public services are not (so far) part of the Northern
Powerhouse.
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Viewing devolution deals as contracts also helps to explain the level of

fiscal devolution. This has been limited, and commentators have advocated
more radical approaches (Centre for Cities, 2015; Morrin and Blond, 2015).
The ‘fiscal freedoms’ on offer are not free-standing but link to commitments
within the deals – thus they are themselves contractual provisions. Borrowing
is to be agreed in advance with the Government. Business rates supplement
powers are to be subject to a cap, and revenue for both supplements and bor-
rowing will be project-specific. Council tax precepting will be subject to refer-
endums on ‘excessive’ increases.
The contract perspective also accounts for claims that certain departments,
such as Work & Pensions and Education, have been disengaged from devolu-
tion negotiations (NAO, 2016; PSA, 2016). The Government, as purchaser,
would have simply regarded those departments’ responsibilities as out of
scope. They would not be moved to engage by claims about the appropriate
territorial location for certain policies, nor even by a demonstration of local
competence. In the words of one participant in the PSA Commission on Infor-
mal Governance, ‘why would you devolve something that already works?’
(PSA, 2016: 7).
Thus the contract approach, based on organizational capacity and effective
delivery, is intended to achieve improved national policy outcomes. I will now
examine how this perspective helps to explain why governance and demo-
cratic accountability have received scant attention so far in the debate.

The public, governance, democracy, and accountability

Following the confidential deal negotiations, the negotiators had to ‘sell’ the
devolution deals to a wider audience. This is the stage of the process where
the contractual approach runs up against more conventional governance
requirements: transparency, democracy, and accountability. Unsurprisingly,
difficulties have ensued. The ‘contractual terms’ were negotiated between
small groups of leaders from the participating councils: councillors who sub-
sequently object to the contract terms only have the option of outright
 REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES 73

rejection. This has happened in several councils (e.g. Norwich, Gateshead,

North Somerset), throwing their participation in their respective deals into
doubt (Sandford, 2016). A territorial governance policy would be unlikely to
proceed on this basis. But if devolution policy is regarded as contractual in
nature, the apparent disregard of these matters until the latter stages of
deal-making becomes more comprehensible.

Public participation and governance

The lack of public participation in devolution deals has attracted criticism from
a number of quarters (Hambleton, 2015; CLG Committee, 2016; Gains, 2016;
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PSA, 2016). Most areas established public consultation exercises after the pub-
lication of their deal, and new combined authority areas are required to do so
by statute. Durham Council held a postal referendum in February 2016, which
achieved a 22% turnout. The University of Sheffield held an independent
series of ‘citizens’ assemblies’ in Sheffield and Southampton in late 2015,
examining the devolution deals then in existence (Flinders et al., 2016).
Overall, however, public consultation and participation have been limited
throughout. This is reflected in the literature: Lyall et al. (2015) found that
only 13% of publications on devolution mentioned improving democratic
accountability as a rationale for the policy, compared to 41% that mentioned
economic growth. An investigation by the Municipal Journal found that most
devolution deal areas had spent hundreds of thousands of pounds on consul-
tancy and setup costs, with little evidence of spending on engagement
(Clayden, 2016; CLG Committee, 2016).
The Government has taken the view that consultation and public engage-
ment are matters for elected local authorities to address. Most devolution
deals make no mention of the public or of consultation (Lyall et al., 2015;
CLG Committee, 2016; Hammond, 2016; Pike et al., 2016), focusing at con-
siderable length on the contract’s ‘terms’. Some do include single sentences
stating, for example, that the combined authority will be ‘accountable to
local people for the successful implementation of the devolution deal’ (HM
Treasury, 2016c: 24, 2016b: 16). But these statements are small and peripheral,
indicating that the key relationship in the deals is that between local and
central government.
Similarly, most local ‘stakeholders’ have had no role in the negotiation of
devolution deals. Significantly, the exception to this rule is the leadership of
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). The Government made clear that it
expected them to be centrally involved in making devolution proposals
(Grant Thornton, 2015; NAO, 2016). It seems likely that their involvement
was sought as, in effect, a quality assurance mechanism for the delivery of
the contract. Stakeholders have thus been involved according to the require-
ments of operational delivery, not as a governance mechanism – again in stark
 74 M. SANDFORD

contrast to practice between 1997 and 2010. Then, stakeholder involvement

was a central principle of the whole programme of devolution to Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland, and played a key role throughout English
regional policy – despite the stakeholders being kept some distance from
the levers of power (Sandford, 2005; Ayres and Stafford, 2014).

The mayor: democracy’s saving grace?

The requirement for a directly elected mayor might at first glance suggest that
a conventional attitude to democratic accountability lies behind the deals. The
Government has said on many occasions that devolution of ‘substantial
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powers’ will be conditional on a directly elected mayor (Sandford, 2016).

Statements in Parliament have indicated that the Government views
mayors as bringing speed and leadership to decision-making, but also as ful-
filling a hazy requirement for direct accountability for substantial spending
power (Centre for Cities, 2014; CGC, 2014).
But on closer inspection, the mayor’s location in the governance structures
of the deals does not give them untrammelled power. Local policy making will
be determined by the balance of power between a trio of forces. First, the
mayor will bring electoral accountability and local voice, on the basis of a
manifesto. But second, the detailed requirements of the deals themselves pre-
determine much of what the mayor must focus his/her attention upon. It is
not clear what happens if the mayor seeks to vary the terms of the deal on
the basis of his/her electoral mandate. Third, the structure of the combined
authority gives council leaders numerous points of constraint. The mayor
will appoint the combined authority’s board of leaders to a series of
‘Cabinet portfolios’, but will be unable to select alternative board members.
Some powers can only be exercised by the elected mayor; others require a
majority vote of the ‘cabinet’; other decisions (e.g. spatial planning strategies)
will require unanimity. The ‘cabinet’ will be able to reject the Mayoral budget
on a two-thirds majority.
This highly corporate decision-making process could oblige the mayor to
privilege the contractual relationship with the centre over political / electoral
imperatives. This casts doubt upon the idea that mayors will be able to
provide the leadership or accountability that their supporters hope for
and their detractors fear (Talbot, 2015; Gains, 2016). The set-up bears the
hallmarks of a short-cut to accountability for a new and unfamiliar structure
of distributed governance (Bentley et al., 2016). Questions of ‘policy diver-
gence’, so central to the study of UK devolution (Adams and Robinson,
2002; Lodge and Schmuecker, 2010; Danson and Lloyd, 2012) could struggle
even to arise.
Recent publications on the Parliamentary accountability of local govern-
ment indicate that central actors do not see mayors taking on the burden
 REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES 75

of accountability from central government. Central departments will still be

required to account to Parliament for the spending of those parts of their
budget that are devolved. They are to review their ‘accountability system
statements’ – the procedures through which they seek assurance that their
spending is in line with commitments to Parliament – but no major
changes are anticipated (NHS, 2015; NAO, 2016). This aligns with the frequent
requirements in deals for implementation and evaluation agreements
between Government and the local body on the use of devolved powers
and funds. Retaining central financial accountability would confirm that the
terms of the deal – the contract – are expected to prevail over the electoral
mandate of the mayor, and success criteria are to be set by the Government
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as ‘purchaser’.
Whether the terms of the deal, or council leaders’ own needs, stymie
mayoral autonomy in practice remains to be seen. To the extent that
mayors are able to overcome the confines of the deals (rather than talking
about doing so), the thesis of this article will be contradicted. Ironically,
given the considerable public and commentator scepticism about the role,
they are the only potential route through which local autonomy could
emerge (Cox and Hunter, 2015; Deas, 2015; Talbot, 2015; Gains, 2016;
Headlam and Hepburn, 2016; Richards and Smith, 2016; Walker, 2016a).

Geographies: the nature of ‘regions’

Ostensibly the story of changing ‘spatial imaginaries’ in England since 2000 is
one of a gradual move away from cartographical regions and towards a com-
bination of functional economic areas (FEAs) in large conurbations, combined
with a broad adherence to traditional county boundaries elsewhere (Waite
et al., 2013; Ayres and Stafford, 2014). The origins of this shift can be traced
back at least to 2007 (HM Treasury, 2007; Bentley et al., 2010; Pike et al.,
2012; Quinn, 2013; Ward et al., 2015). But there are also a number of indi-
cations in the current debate that the Government regards defined territories,
like accountability and public awareness, as an afterthought. As with city deals
and LEPs, there has been little evident consistency between the geographical
areas that have been offered devolution deals. Many recent reports from
advocates of devolution simply avoid this issue (e.g. Cox et al., 2014; Morrin
and Blond, 2015), or they propose territories with no clear definition and/or
no relationship to existing areas (City Growth Commission, 2014).
Devolution deal areas have been mooted that cut across county, police
and fire authority boundaries; exclaves and overlapping administrative
areas are to be permitted; and in some policy matters boundaries are to
remain fuzzy. This territorial cacophony has faced criticism (Cox and Hunter,
2015; Grant Thornton, 2015; Richards and Smith, 2016), but it assumes less
importance if the focus of the policy is on effective working with a trusted
 76 M. SANDFORD

‘supplier’. The rhetoric of ‘place’ – integrating public services or growth policies

subnationally – appears frequently within the devolution debate (NHS, 2016: 5),
but only in relation to efficient delivery. This is not to say that territory does not
matter in devolution deals: the deals agreed are mostly rooted in identifiable
FEAs (Pike et al., 2016), and some address public service reform in defined
sub-regions. But at least three aspects of English devolution policy suggest
that combined authorities’ status as territory-based public bodies is ancillary
to their capacity for robust business planning and implementation of the con-
tents of the deals.
First, despite Government assertions that the devolution process is ‘bottom
up’, media reports have indicated that the Government has intervened in ter-
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ritorial configurations in a number of areas. For instance, an initial devolution

bid from Hampshire and the Isle of Wight was abandoned by the Government
in favour of a bid based on urban South Hampshire (Smulian, 2016). The East
Anglia devolution deal was brought together from two bids from Norfolk and
Suffolk, with allegedly reluctant participation from Cambridgeshire. The con-
trasting nature of these interventions – one to create a large rural entity, one
to divide one – hints that no fixed policy exists regarding geographies.
Concerns to conclude a contract, with a strong mayoralty and economies
of scale, are more likely explanations.
Second, the geography of some areas involved remains in dispute, with
many reported breakdowns in relations and at least one threat of judicial
review. The East Anglia deal was divided in two following rejection by Cam-
bridgeshire, and four Norfolk districts promptly rejected the new Norfolk
and Suffolk deal. Two districts in the draft ‘North Midlands’ deal are seeking
to move over to the Sheffield city-region. West and North Yorkshire are
locked in dispute over the proper location of some rural districts that seek
links with the economy of Leeds. The Government has shown no inclination
to act as a territorial arbiter in these contests. It is unmoved by potential ‘sup-
pliers’ not being in a position to agree a contract.
Third, non-coterminous boundaries of existing public bodies have the
potential to create tensions in particular policy areas (NAO, 2016). For
instance, the ten boroughs of Greater Manchester have taken forward a
joint health and social care strategy, working with the 12 Clinical Commission-
ing Groups (CCGs) in Greater Manchester. One of the CCG areas spills outside
of the boundary of the Greater Manchester combined authority (into the High
Peak district of Derbyshire). When this issue was raised in the House of
Commons, health minister Alistair Burt said:
… the hospital in that circumstance may well have two bosses because the CCG
would be responsible for the whole lot and it would have to come, by agree-
ment, to a decision as to what was being provided within the combined area
as well as outside the combined area. … it is ultimately for the Secretary of
State to make sure the NHS guidance and duties are not breached, but it is a
 REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES 77

matter for local decision how this coterminosity is dealt with, because it will
occur in more than one area … These are places that work across boundaries,
and agreement will have to be reached on the delivery of the services. (House
of Commons, 21 Oct 2015, c1058)

In short, fuzzy geographies have not led the Government to formulate prin-
ciples of territorial governance. Taking a governance perspective, this
amounts to disregarding areas that do not seek ‘deals’, leading to asymmetry
and unfairness. But it is rational if contractual concerns – business readiness,
‘capacity’, and successful outcomes – trump any concern to define sub-
national geographies within England (Pike and O’Brien, 2015: R19).
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Conclusion
This generation of English devolution policy invites comparisons with the
attempts at devolution of power in England between 1997 and 2010.
Though patchy in its outcomes, that policy involved symmetrical devolution
of responsibility intended to improve the governance of defined territories.
The institutions created used recognizable procedures from the toolbox of
democracy: election, referenda, stakeholder involvement, public consultation,
scrutiny of decision-making, and strategic policy-making. The policy was
largely implemented by legislation, and was shaped by debates on govern-
ance and accountability that converged in the mid-1990s.
In the view of many of the initial commentaries on English devolution
deals, any continued evidence of central authority over ‘devolved’ matters,
or partnership, can be read as evidence of cynicism or bad faith (Deas,
2015; Hambleton, 2015; Blunkett et al., 2016; Richards and Smith, 2016), or
as a means of ‘policy dumping’ – the devolution of responsibilities without
sufficient funding (Pike and Tomaney, 2009; Waite et al., 2013; Ayres and Staf-
ford, 2014; Harrison, 2015). The view taken by this paper, of the process of
‘devolution’ not as a constitutional/territorial policy but as a series of con-
tract-based outsourcings of decision-making, brings into clearer focus the
limited attention paid to governance, geography, and broader questions of
funding. The contractual character of the deals is captured, perhaps inadver-
tently, by Richards and Smith’s description of them as ‘Whitehall concessions’
(2016: 23).
This perspective on English devolution policy does not mean it is irretrieva-
bly associated with privatization, budget squeezes, ‘policy dumping’,
reductions in service quality, or other familiar ailments. It is too early to
draw such definitive conclusions. It is not axiomatic that this bespoke, bilat-
eral, and tightly monitored approach to delivering policy locally is either inef-
fective or undemocratic. There are legitimate arguments in favour of the
shape of the policy so far (see for instance Gains, 2015, 2016; Harrison,
2016; Pike et al., 2016). Many participants and commentators have noted
 78 M. SANDFORD

the speed of change generated by the current approach, comparing it favour-

ably with the previous 20 years (PSA, 2016; Walker, 2016a). Effectiveness and
demonstrable outcomes may themselves be a valid route to building the
democratic legitimacy of new sub-national bodies. Calls for a theoretically
comprehensive and longer-term approach can overlook the political environ-
ment in which change is delivered. As George Osborne has said:
Let me be candid. I think if I had tried to deliver, simultaneously, new devolution
settlements in every major city, at the same time, and tried to get every city
authority to accept new elected mayors, it simply would not have happened.
Getting Manchester through the Whitehall machinery and overcoming the pol-
itical divide was difficult enough. (HM Treasury, 2015b)
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It is also not axiomatic that a more all-encompassing policy would increase the
powers on offer to local areas (Grant Thornton, 2015: 41). The regional insti-
tutions of the 2000s were all established through a conventional governance
process, yet their weaknesses and shortcomings were roundly critiqued at the
time (Hardill et al., 2006; Sandford, 2009). Bringing governance ‘back in’ to
English devolution policy does not guarantee effectiveness, public acceptance
or popularity.
This article offers a new perspective on the UK government’s underlying
aims and its stance on the devolution of powers to localities in England, high-
lighting evidence of an approach prioritising organizational relationships
directed towards pre-set outputs. Whether its argument is correct, and devo-
lution deals are contractual in nature, will be visible only over a five- to ten-
year period. If it is correct, deal areas could be expected to accumulate
further policy areas, leading to more funding and responsibility, strictly
limited to agreed outputs, with regular relationship management and evalu-
ation. Of course, a contractual relationship is always vulnerable to the client
terminating the contract, or, to extend the metaphor, maintaining a frame-
work agreement but refusing to tender any work. If the government allows
devolution deals to peter out, or establishes parallel or replacement pro-
grammes, one might conclude that it has decided to seek alternative ‘provi-
ders’. As things stand, ‘devolved’ areas have no statutory protection against
this eventuality.
If, instead, territorial governance is the true animating spirit behind the
policy, we might expect to see moves towards devolving more general respon-
sibility in areas such as skills, economic development and transport, together
with central government vacating those policy fields; a dampening of empha-
sis on evaluation, monitoring and central accountability; and a corresponding
broadening of mayors’ responsibilities and priorities. It is possible that a mayor
with a substantial electoral mandate could succeed in pushing the boundaries
of existing powers and negotiating further transfers of power from the Govern-
ment, in line with the ‘electoral chain of command’ theory (Dearlove, 1973;
 REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES 79

CLG Committee, 2016). But the experience of the Mayor of London is that
accruing further power – as opposed to a louder voice – is a long and pains-
taking process. The Government’s approach to relationship management,
rather than the formal division of powers, will be critical to the future shape
of English devolution – whether the relationship resembles a contract or a
more conventional form of intergovernmental relations.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
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