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Ainsley Weber

ILAS 2350 – Putnam (external reference)

Putnam (external reference)

The first half of the reading “Brains in a Vat” starts off by looking at the idea of how we

can determine something is representative. It uses an example of an ant that draws a line/shape

that looks like Winston Churchill by chance. The argument is that since it was done by chance

the drawing does not represent Winston Churchill. In order for this drawing to in fact represent

Winston Churchill the ant would have had to intentionally drawn it to look like Churchill. Put

simply the author is arguing intent is required for there to be representation.

The author then goes on to pose the question “how can thoughts ‘in-themselves’

represent anything?” The article makes the argument that thoughts are in fact intentional and

therefore can be used to represent things. He goes on to explore how intentionality and reference

is possible.

The author looks at what he calls magical theories of reference. He once again returns to

the example of the ants unintentional drawing of Churchill. He then looks at the concept that

people make connection between certain representations (his example was names) to their

bearers, what he calls the magical connection. He goes on to illustrate this by using an example

of aliens that have never seen a tree. He asserts that a human from earth would see the picture of

a tree and associate it with a tree, but the alien would not make this connection to the image since

they aren’t familiar with the connection. He goes on and makes a similar connection with words.

If words in a paper are produced at random (i.e. by monkeys), or are spoken out of memorization

without actual understanding, then they can’t really be assumed to refer to anything. He does

point out that some of the examples he uses were quite extreme and have a low probability of

actually happening, but as impossible as it seems the theoretically could happen.


Ainsley Weber
ILAS 2350 – Putnam (external reference)

The paper then moves into looking at the case of brains in a vat. What this refers to is a

science fiction idea that your brains (and brains of others) has been removed from your body and

connected to a computer giving you the. Illusion of reality. It’s a concept that has been discussed

among philosophers. Again, this is an extreme example, but the author raises the question “how

do you know you aren’t in this predicament”. The author himself makes the argument that no

this predicament couldn’t be possible because it is self-refuting. He makes the connection to his

earlier examples about reference and argues that the brains in a vat could think or say things

similar to what we would, but they cannot refer to what we can (his example, they cannot think

they are brains in a vat).

The author then goes on the explain the Turing’s test. In this test a computer has been

designed that can have an intelligent conversation, but how can we decide if the computer is

‘conscious’? A logician named Alan Turning suggested a person have a conversation with the

computer and with someone he does not know. If that person having the conversations cannot

tell the difference between the computer and the person then he argues the machine is conscious

and passes the “Turning Test”. The author points out that there has been criticism of this test, but

explores the test against looking at the idea of reference. The author looks at this in the context to

determine if the partner in the conversation (computer or human) uses words to refer as we do.

He call this the “Turing test for reference”, and goes on to conclude that this test is not definitive

because someone could pass this test and not be referring to anything. He argues that the

machine can know a lot but ultimately can’t recognize something right in front of it they way a

human could. The machine can be programmed to give the illusion of consciousness, but it is

really just doing what it was programmed to do. Therefor the machine cannot be referring to

anything and is not in fact conscious according to the author.


Ainsley Weber
ILAS 2350 – Putnam (external reference)

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