EXECUTION (Rule 39, Sections 1 to 48)

Premiere Development Bank vs. Flores; GR No. 175339; 16 December 2008 Adolfo, Rochelle Angela Rabang

DOCTRINE:
​A judgment becomes “final and executory” by operation of law; In such a situation, the
prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, and issuance thereof is a ministerial duty of
the court. This policy is clearly and emphatically embodied in Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court.

The Court has recognized certain exceptions to the rule as where in cases of special and
exceptional nature it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to direct the
suspension of its execution; whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice; or
when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became final which
could render the execution of the judgment unjust.

FACTS:
● Panacor Marketing Corporation (Panacor), a newly-formed corporation,
acquired an exclusive distributorship of products manufactured by Colgate
Palmolive Philippines, Inc. (Colgate).
● To meet the capital requirements of the exclusive distributorship, which
required an initial inventory level of P7.5 million, Panacor applied for a
loan of P4.1 million with Premiere Development Bank. After an extensive
study of Panacor's creditworthiness, Premiere Bank rejected the loan
application and suggested that its affiliate company, Arizona Transport
Corporation (Arizona), should instead apply for the loan on condition that
the proceeds thereof shall be made available to Panacor. Eventually,
Panacor was granted a P4.1 million credit line as evidenced by a Credit
Line Agreement.
● As suggested, Arizona, which was an existing loan client, applied for and
was granted a loan of P6.1 million, P3.4 million of which would be used to
pay-off its existing loan accounts and the remaining P2.7 million as credit
line of Panacor. As security for the P6.1 million loan, Arizona, executed a
Real Estate Mortgage against a parcel of land
● Since the P2.7 million released by Premiere Bank fell short of the P4.1
million credit line which was previously approved, Panacor negotiated for
a take-out loan with IBA-Finance Corporation (IBA-Finance) in the sum of
P10 million, P7.5 million of which will be released outright in order to
take-out the loan from Premiere Bank and the balance of P2.5 million (to
complete the needed capital of P4.1 million with Colgate) to be released
after the cancellation by Premiere of the collateral mortgage on the
property. Pursuant to the said take-out agreement, IBA-Finance was
authorized to pay Premiere Bank the prior existing loan obligations of
Arizona in an amount not to exceed P6 million.
● Iba-Finance sent a letter to Ms. Arlene R. Martillano, officer-in-charge of
Premiere Bank's San Juan Branch, informing her of the approved loan in
favor of Panacor and Arizona, and requesting for the release of the real
estate mortgage. Martillano, after reading the letter, affixed her signature
of conformity thereto and sent the original copy to Premiere Bank's legal
office.
❖ Premiere Bank sent a letter-reply to IBA-Finance,
 informing the latter of its refusal to turn over the requested
documents on the ground that Arizona had existing
unpaid loan obligations and that it was the bank's policy to
require full payment of all outstanding loan obligations
prior to the release of mortgage documents.
❖ Thereafter, IBA-Finance paid to Premiere Bank the
amount of P6,235,754.79, representing the full
outstanding loan account of Arizona. Despite such
payment, Premiere Bank still refused to release the
requested mortgage documents specifically, the owner's
duplicate copy of the parcel of land.
❖ Panacor requested IBA-Finance for the immediate
approval and release of the remaining P2.5 million loan to
meet the required monthly purchases from Colgate.
IBA-Finance explained, however, that the processing of
the P2.5 million loan application was conditioned, among
others, on the submission of the owner's duplicate copy of
the TCT and the cancellation by Premiere Bank of
Arizona's mortgage. Occasioned by Premiere Bank's
adamant refusal to release the mortgage cancellation
document, Panacor failed to generate the required capital
to meet its distribution and sales targets. Colgate
informed Panacor of its decision to terminate their
distribution agreement.
❖ Panacor and Arizona filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against Premiere Bank before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
❖ The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Panacor and
IBA-Finance.
❖ The Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
RTC.
During the pendency of the case, respondent corporations received a notice of sheriff's
sale.Respondent corporations were able to secure an injunction from the RTC but it was
set aside by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied respondent corporations'
motion for reconsideration in a resolution.
The Court, in a resolution did not give due course to the petition for review of
respondent corporations as it did not find any reversible error in the decision of the
appellate court. After the Court had denied with finality the motion for reconsideration,
the mortgaged property was purchased by Premiere Development Bank at the
foreclosure sale was held for P6,600,000.00.
Respondent corporations filed a motion for asking for the issuance of a writ of
execution of our decision where we awarded P800,000.00 as damages in their favor.
The RTC granted the writ of execution sought. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order.

ISSUE:
​Whether or not the grant of the writ of execution by the RTC was proper.
HELD:
Yes. The Court finds the petition unmeritorious. The Court held that a judgment becomes
"final and executory" by operation of law. In such a situation, the prevailing party is entitled
to a writ of execution, and issuance thereof is a ministerial duty of the court. This policy is
clearly and emphatically embodied in Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. —
Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a
judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly
perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the
execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of
the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the
judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced
and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the
interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ
of execution. (Emphasis supplied.)

Jurisprudentially, the Court has recognized certain exceptions to the rule as

where in cases of special and exceptional nature it becomes imperative in the
higher interest of justice to direct the suspension of its execution; whenever it is
necessary to accomplish the aims of justice; or when certain facts and
circumstances transpired after the judgment became final which could render the
execution of the judgment unjust.
None of these exceptions avails to stay the execution of this Court's decision.
Premiere Development Bank has failed to show how injustice would exist in executing
the judgment other than the allegation that respondent corporations are in the process of
winding up. Indeed, no new circumstance transpired after our judgment had become
final that would render the execution unjust.

PNB vs. Lim, et al.; GR No. 171677; 30 January 2013 Angeles, Bernice Marie Sidocon

DOCTRINE: A final and executory judgment, no matter how erroneous, cannot be

changed even by this Court.
FACTS:
● Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI), is the owner and developer of Vista de Loro
Condominium (Vista de Loro), a condominium project that straddles on eight (8)
parcels of land located at the Puerto Azul Beach and Hotel Complex, Ternate,
Cavite. The lots are registered in PALI’s name under Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. 404201, 404202, 404203, 404204, 404432, 404433, 404434 and
404425 of the Cavite Province Registry of Deeds.
● 1993, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued in favor of
PALI, relative to Vista de Loro, a License to Sell pursuant to Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’
Protective Decree".
● 1994, PALI and PNB entered into a "Credit Agreement" by virtue of which PNB
loaned to PALI ₱150M, P120M, and P50M to finance the construction and
development of Vista de Loro. As security, PALI mortgaged to PNB the eight (8) lots
mentioned above.
● 1997, PALI and its co-respondent in the instant petition, Rina Parayno Lim (Lim),
 entered into a Contract to Sell, covering Unit 48C in Cluster Dominiko of Vista de
Loro. Unit 48C is covered by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 408 and
Cluster Dominiko is situated on the land covered by TCT No. 404201. PNB’s
mortgage is annotated on both titles.
● PALI defaulted in the payment of its loans. Thus, PNB moved for the foreclosure of
the subject mortgage and a Notice of Sale dated April 19, 1999 was thereafter
issued, scheduling the sale of the eight (8) lots at public auction on May 25, 1999.
● There were 2 cases for annulment of the mortgage: the first by PALI and the second
by Rina Lim. The first was dismissed by the RTC and the SC, but the second was
favorably acted upon the HLURB. The HLURB in that case declared the real estate
mortgage and void since PALI failed to secure the approval of the HLURB.
● The CA upheld the HLURB’s jurisdiction to annul the mortgage, to which PNB filed a
motion for reconsideration. Ultimately, the CA ruled that HLURB had the jurisdiction
to annul the subject mortgage which was affirmed by the Office of the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not, by reason of res judicata, the binding effect of the subject
mortgage on PNB and PALI cannot anymore be assailed?
HELD: Yes. As pointed out by Tranche 1, this Court had already sustained the validity of the
subject mortgage by way of a minute resolution issued on June 7, 2004, which became final
and executory on September 10, 2004. The said resolution affirmed the RTC’s finding that
even if the subject mortgage is voidable, PALI is already estopped from challenging its
validity for to rule otherwise would be tantamount to rewarding the latter to benefit from its
own inaction or negligence. With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues
concerning the same parties, it constitutes res judicata. However, if other parties or another
subject matter (even with the same parties and issues) is involved, the minute resolution is
not binding precedent. It is therefore clear from the above that for purposes of the application
of res judicata, minute resolutions issued by this Court are as much precedents as
promulgated decisions, hence, binding upon the parties to the action. In the case at bar, the
validity of the subject mortgage between PALI and PNB was the primary issue raised by the
parties and resolved by the RTC after the conclusion of a full-blown trial. On September 10,
2004, the issue was finally laid to rest. A final and executory judgment, no matter how
erroneous, cannot be changed even by this Court. Inevitably, res judicata operates to bar
PALI and PNB from raising the same issue lest there will be no end to litigation.

LBP vs. Spouses Dy Orilla; GR No. 194168; 13 February 2013 Apolinario, Eufemia Mulimbayan

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

City Government of Makati vs. Odena; GR No. 191661; 13 August 2013 Arboleda, Anreinne Sabille
Larizabal
DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Marmosy Trading vs. Court of Appeals; GR No. 170515; 6 May 2010 Bahia, Hannah Grace Israel

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

FGU Insurance Corp. vs. RTC; GR No. 161282; 23 February 2011 Bitong, John Eli Zuriel De Villa

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Macasasa vs. Sicad; GR No. 146547; 20 June 2006 Boncayao, Paty Kaye Cedro

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Silverio et. al vs. Filipino Business Consultants Inc.; GR No. 143312; 12 August 2005 Cabugatan, Muammar Montila

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: The facts of the case are as follows:
Esses and Tri-Star were in possession of the Calatagan Property, covered by TCT No.
T-55200 and registered in the names of Esses and Tri-Star.
On 22 September 1995, Esses and Tri-Star executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage in favor of FBCI. Esses and Tri-Star failed to redeem the Calatagan Property.
On 27 May 1997, FBCI filed a Petition for Consolidation of Title of the Calatagan Property
with the RTC Balayan.
FBCI obtained a judgment by default. Subsequently, TCT No. T-55200 in the names of
Esses and Tri-Star was cancelled and TCT No. T-77656 was issued in FBCI's name. On 20
April 1998, the RTC Balayan issued a writ of possession in FBCI's favor. FBCI then entered
the Calatagan Property.
When Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star learned of the judgment by default and writ of
possession, they filed a petition for relief from judgment and the recall of the writ of
possession. Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star alleged that the judgment by default is void
because the RTC Balayan did not acquire jurisdiction over them. FBCI allegedly forged the
service of summons on them.
Procedural Antecedents: On 28 December 1998, the RTC Balayan nullified and set aside
the judgment by default and the writ of possession. The RTC Balayan found that the
summons and the complaint were not served on Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star. The RTC
Balayan directed the service of summons anew on Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star.
The RTC Balayan denied FBCI's motion for reconsideration of the ORDER. FBCI then filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the RTC Balayan's 28 December
1998 Order. On 28 April 2000, the Court of Appeals denied FBCI's petition. The Court of
Appeals also denied FBCI's motion for reconsideration. On 13 August 2001, the Supreme
Court denied FBCI's petition.
RTC: On 14 April 1999, the RTC Balayan modified its 28 December 1998 Order by
upholding FBCI's possession of the Calatagan Property. The RTC Balayan ruled that FBCI
could not be deprived of possession of the Calatagan Property because FBCI made
substantial improvements on it. Possession could revert to Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star
only if they reimburse FBCI. The RTC Balayan gave Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star 15 days
to file their responsive pleadings.
The RTC Balayan issued the order suspending the writ of possession it had earlier issued to
Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star. The RTC Balayan reasoned that it would violate the law on
forum shopping if it executed the writ while FBCI's motion for reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals' decision and urgent motion to suspend the issuance of the writ of possession
remained pending with the Court of Appeals. The RTC Balayan noted that because of
FBCI's strong resistance, Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star have still to take possession of the
Calatagan Property. More than ten days had already passed from the time that the RTC
Balayan had issued the writ of possession. FBCI had barricaded the Calatagan Property,
threatening bloodshed if possession will be taken away from it. The RTC Balayan believed
that if it would not restrain Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star from taking possession of the
Calatagan Property, a violent confrontation between the parties might erupt as reported in
the Tempo newspaper in its 26 May 2000 issue. Without issuing a restraining order, the RTC
Balayan suspended the writ by requesting the counsel of Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star to
allow the court to study the voluminous records of the case, which are to be presented at the
hearing on 16 June 2000. The hearing would determine the existence of a supervening
event.
On 8 August 2000, Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star filed a complaint for annulment of
contracts with damages with the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, Branch 275.
PETITIONER ARGUMENT:
Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star argue that:
An ex parte motion cannot legally constitute an initiatory basis for the RTC Balayan to
conduct additional hearings in order to validate certain new allegations. Neither can said ex
parte motion be the basis for the suspension of a writ of possession being implemented.
When the RTC Balayan suspended the writ of possession, it was barred from hearing
intra-corporate disputes. And though Congress has now amended our law on the matter, the
RTC still cannot proceed because of due process and res judicata reasons.
A final and executory judgment cannot be enjoined except by an appropriate petition for
relief, a direct attack in another action or a collateral act in another action.
Respondent FBCI is asking for a suspension of the writ of possession while at the same time
threatening violence if the writ of possession were to be implemented. The RTC Balayan had
no lawful basis to suspend the writ under these admitted circumstances.
Respondent's theory that an order suspending a writ of possession is interlocutory in nature,
and therefore inappealable, is not supported by jurisprudence.

ISSUE:
(1) whether appeal is the proper remedy against an order suspending the execution of a writ
of possession;
(2) whether the issue of possession was mooted by the 15 June 2000 Order of the RTC
Balayan;
(3) whether the filing of a civil case with the RTC Las Pinas constitutes forum shopping.
(4) whether it is proper to hold the execution of the judgment.

HELD:
(1) First, interlocutory orders are those that determine incidental matters that do not touch on
the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. The proper remedy to question an
improvident interlocutory order is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, not Rule 45. A
Petition for Review under Rule 45 is the proper mode of redress to question final judgments.

An order staying the execution of the writ of possession is an interlocutory order. Clearly, this
order cannot be appealed. A Petition for Certiorari was therefore the correct remedy.
Moreover, Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star pointed out that the RTC Balayan acted on an
ex-parte motion to suspend the writ of possession, which is a litigious matter, without
complying with the rules on notice and hearing. Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star also assail
the RTC Balayan's impending move to accept FBCI's evidence on its subsequent ownership
of Esses and Tri-Star. In effect, Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star accuse the RTC Balayan of
acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, which is within
the ambit of certiorari.
However, in the exercise of our judicial discretion, we will treat the appeal as a petition under
Rule 65. Technical rules must be suspended whenever the purposes of justice warrant it,
such as in this case where substantial and important issues await resolution.

(2) Second, the RTC Balayan's 15 June 2000 Order lifting the suspension of the writ of
possession was issued to correct its action on FBCI's ex-parte motion, which did not have
the required notice and hearing. This issue has thus become a fait accompli. However, while
the 15 June 2000 Order is supposed to have mooted the suspension of the execution of the
writ of possession by lifting the suspension on 17 June 2000, Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star
claim that the writ has not been executed in their favor. Thus, the issues in this petition are
far from being moot. Also, the existence of a supervening event is another issue that must
be resolved since the RTC Balayan had instead submitted to the "higher courts" the
resolution of this issue.

(3) Third, Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star are not guilty of forum shopping for filing another
action against FBCI with the RTC Las Pinas during the pendency of this case with the RTC
Balayan. Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to obtain a favorable judgment.

The parties and cause of action in the present case before the RTC Balayan and in the case
before the RTC Las Pinas are different. The present case was filed by FBCI against Silverio,
Jr., Esses and Tri-Star for the consolidation of title over the Calatagan Property. On the other
hand, the case before the RTC Las Pinas was filed by Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star
against FBCI and other defendants for the annulment of contract with damages, tort and
culpa aquiliana (civil fraud).

In its complaint before the RTC Las Pinas, Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star informed the court
that there is a pending case with the RTC Balayan over the Calatagan Property. Silverio, Jr.,
Esses and Tri-Star made it clear in the complaint that the case before the RTC Las Pinas will
focus on the Makati Tuscany property and any reference to the Calatagan Property is
"meant to serve only as proof or evidence of the plan, system, scheme, habit, etc., lurking
behind defendants' interlocking acts constituting interlocking tort and interlocking fraud.”
Clearly, FBCI's claim of forum shopping against Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star has no
basis.

(4) The court may stay immediate execution of a judgment when supervening events,
occurring subsequent to the judgment, bring about a material change in the situation of the
parties. To justify the stay of immediate execution, the supervening events must have a
direct effect on the matter already litigated and settled. Or, the supervening events must
create a substantial change in the rights or relations of the parties which would render
execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable making it imperative to stay
immediate execution in the interest of justice.

In this case, there is no judgment on the merits, only a judgment on a technicality. Even
then, the judgment of default rendered in FBCI's favor was voided because the RTC Balayan
did not acquire jurisdiction over Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star due to a fraudulent service of
summons. The case for consolidation of title, from which this petition stemmed, is in fact still
being litigated before the RTC Balayan.

The issuance of the writ of possession in favor of Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star is also not
a judgment on the merits. A writ of possession is an order whereby the sheriff is commanded
to place a person in possession of real or personal property. The issuance of the writ of
possession to Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star is but an order of restitution - a consequence
of the nullification of the judgment by default. The order of restitution placed the parties in the
situation prior to the RTC Balayan's rendition of the void judgment by default. Title to the
Calatagan Property is still in the names of Esses and Tri-Star. Possession of the Calatagan
Property must revert to Esses and Tri-Star as legal owners of the property.
Nunal vs. CA; GR No. 94005; 6 April 1993 Celino, Rayan Jen Cosalan

DOCTRINE:
The judgment [once it becomes finale] may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law,and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the Court
rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The only recognized exceptions are the
correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void." Furthermore, "(a)ny
amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null
and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.

FACTS:
● This case originated from a suit filed by Emma Lyon de Leon in her behalf and as
guardian ad litem of the private respondents against Luisa Lyon Nuñal, now
deceased and represented by her heirs, herein petitioners, for partition and
accounting of a parcel of land located in Isabela, Basilan City.

● Subject parcel of land was formerly owned by Frank C. Lyon and May Ekstrom Lyon,
deceased parents of respondents.

● Private respondents claimed that said parcel of land, covered by a TCT in the name
of Frank C. Lyon, has been in possession of petitioner Nuñal since 1946 and that
she made no accounting of the income derived therefrom, despite demands made
by private respondents for the partition and delivery of their shares.

Procedural History:
● On December 17, 1974, the CFI rendered its judgment in favor of private
respondents and ordered the partition of the property but dismissed private
respondents' complaint for accounting.

● On July 30, 1982, the order of partition was affirmed by the CA and the case was
remanded to the court of origin for the ordered partition.

● On May 17, 1984, an order for the issuance of the writ of execution was issued by
the court a quo.

● On July 17, 1984, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary
Ekstrom Lyon, filed a motion to quash the order of execution with preliminary
injunction.
 ● She contends that not being a party to the above-entitled case her rights, interests,
ownership and participation over the land should not be affected by a judgment in
the said case; that the order of execution is unenforceable insofar as her share,
right, ownership and participation is concerned, said share not having been brought
within the Jurisdiction of the court a quo.

● On January 9, 1987, the lower court issued the assailed order directing the inclusion
of Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner with a share in the partition of the property

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court may order the inclusion of Mary L. Martin as co-heir entitled to
participate in the partition of the property considering that she was neither a party plaintiff nor
a party defendant in the case for partition and accounting of the subject property and that the
decision rendered in said case has long become final and executory

HELD:
● The decision of the trial court has become final and executory. Thus, upon its finality,
the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case.

● Consequently, any modification that he would make, as in this case, the inclusion of
Mary Lyon Martin would be in excess of his authority.

● The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties in
this case and all other heirs for her share in the subject property, in order that all the
parties in interest can prove their respective claims.

● The judgment [once it becomes finale] may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law,and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to
be made by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of land.

● The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of
so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of
course, where the judgment is void."

● Furthermore, "(a)ny amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and

executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose.

Capa vs. Court of Appeals; GR No. 160082; 19 September 2006 Cuevas, Kathleen Allysa Marie
Aquino
DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Manacop vs. Equitable Bank; GR No. 162814; 25 August 2005 Cutaran, Al Jarana

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

RCBC vs. Serra; GR No. 203241; 10 July 2013 DALIPE, Ria Alisandra Tolentino

DOCTRINE: In Camacho v. Court of Appeals, we held that where the delays were
occasioned by the judgment debtor’s own initiatives and for her advantage as well as
beyond the judgment creditor’s control, the five-year period allowed for enforcement of the
judgment by motion is deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended.
FACTS:
● In 1975, petitioner RCBC and respondent Federico Serra entered into a Contract of
Lease with Option to Buy over a parcel of land owned by Serra which was located in
Masbate
o In the contract, Serra agreed to lease his land for 25 years
o It was further agreed that RCBC was granted the option to buy the land
and improvement (property) within 10 years from the signing of the
contract
● In 1984, RCBC informed Serra that it wanted to exercise its option to buy the
property. To which Serra replied that he was no longer interested in selling such
property
● RCBC, then, filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against Serra
(Specific Performance case) in the RTC of makati
o The RTC initially dismissed the complaint
o Subsequently, RTC reversed itself and ordered Serra to execute and
deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC
o CA: affirmed the order of the RTC
o SC: affirmed also
§ Held that the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy was valid,
effective, and enforceable
§ The decision became final and executory upon entry of judgment
● Meanwhile, in 1989, Serra donated the property to his mother, Leonia Ablao
● Ablao thereafter sold the property to Hermanito Liok (Liok)
● Thus, RCBC filed a complaint for Nullification of Deed of Donation and Deed of Sale
with Reconveyance and Damages against Liok, Ablao and Serra
(Annulment case) before the RTC of Masbate City
o RTC of Masbate: ruled in favor of RCBC
§ Declared that the donation in favor of Ablao and the subsequent
sale to Liok was null and void
o CA: affirmed the RTC decision
§ Held that the donation to Ablao was simulated and done solely to
evade Serra’s obligation to RCBC; that since Ablao had no right
to transfer the property and Liok was not a buyer in good faith,
the subsequent sale to Liok was likewise null and void
● Liok, filed a petition for Review on Certiorari, while Serra and Ablao filed a Petition
for Certiorari
o In separate resolutions, the Court held that the CA committed no
reversible error nor was there grave abuse of discretion
● In 2011, RCBC then moved for the execution of the decision in the Specific
Performance case
o RCBC alleged that it was legally impossible to ask for the execution of
 the decision prior to the annulment of the fraudulent transfers made by
Serra
§ Thus, the period to execute by motion was suspended during the
pendency of the Annulment case
o Serra insisted that the motion for execution was already barred by
prescription and laches
● RTC: denied the motion for execution filed by RCBC
● Thus, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether RCBC is barred from having the decision in the Specific Performance case,
which was rendered in 1989, executed considering that under the circumstances in this
case, RCBC was unlawfully prevented from enforcing the 1989 Decision?

HELD:
​NO, RCBC may still move for the execution of the decision in the Specific Performance
case.

The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion
within five years from the date of its entry or by an action after the lapse of five years and
before prescription sets in. This Court, however, allows exceptions when execution may be
made by motion even after the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one common
denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor and/or is
incurred for his benefit or advantage.

In Camacho v. Court of Appeals, we held that where the delays were occasioned by the
judgment debtor’s own initiatives and for her advantage as well as beyond the judgment
creditor’s control, the five-year period allowed for enforcement of the judgment by motion is
deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended.

In this case, there is no dispute that RCBC seeks to enforce the decision which became final
and executory on 15 April 1994. This decision orders Serra to execute and deliver the proper
deed of sale in favor of RCBC. However, to evade his obligation to RCBC, Serra transferred
the property to his mother Ablao, who then transferred it to Liok. Serra’s action prompted
RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly, the delay in the execution of the decision was
caused by Serra for his own advantage. Thus, the pendency of the Annulment case
effectively suspended the five-year period to enforce through a motion the decision in the
Specific Performance case.

Furthermore, Since the decision in the Annulment case attained finality on 3 March 2009 and
RCBC’s motion for execution was filed on 25 August 2011, RCBC’s motion is deemed filed
within the five-year period for enforcement of a decision through a motion.

Far from sleeping on its rights, RCBC has pursued persistently its action against Serra in
accordance with law. On the other hand, Serra has continued to evade his obligation by
raising issues of technicality. While strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired,
liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not
serve the ends of justice.

Infante vs. Aran Builders; GR No. 156596; 24 August 2007 De La Serna, Samantha Grace
Mauleon
DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Quicho vs. Reyes, Jr.; P-14-3246; 15 October 2014 Dela Pieza, Mary Joy Valle

DOCTRINE: The sheriff shall demand from the judgment obligor the immediate payment in
cash, certified bank check or any other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment
obligee. If the judgment obligor cannot pay by these methods immediately or at once, he can
exercise his option to choose which of his property can be levied upon. If he does not
exercise this option immediately or when he is absent or cannot be located, he waives such
right, and the sheriff can now first levy his personal properties, if any, and then the real
properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment (Section 9,
Rule 39)

FACTS:
● A letter-complaint was filed by petitioner Atty. Quicho against Reyes alleing that the
procedure observed by Sheriff Reyes in implementing the alias writ violated the
Revised Manual for Clerk of Court.
● He cited the Manual which provides that "[i]f the judgment obligor cannot pay all or
part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment
acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the
judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for
value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to
immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to
satisfy the judgment”
● As the holder of the assets and properties of Traders Royal Bank (TRB), which was
the judgment obligor in Civil Case No. Q-89-3580 and whose assets were the
subject of the alias writ, Bank of Commerce (BOC) was given the option to choose
which property to be surrendered to satisfy the judgment. It was only when BOC was
unable to exercise the option that Reyes was allowed to levy on other properties.
● Petitioner claimed that BOC was forced to surrender under protest a real estate
property located in Paranaque City, to satisfy the judgment and preserve its other
properties. However Reyes did not give BOC a chance to exercise that option.
Instead of accepting the said property, Reyes blow-torched the locked grill door of
BOC's cash vault in Lipa City and forcibly took the money deposits of its clients as
well as its computers. Furthermore, Reyes brought with him agents of the NBI who
were in full-battle gear and carrying firearms, with members of the PNP; and ignored
the pleas of the BOC officers that such taking would cripple the bank’s operation. He
then concluded that these illegal acts of Reyes warranted his relief as sheriff of the
RTC.
● In his answer, Reyes denied the allegation against him. According to him, he did not
violate any law when he refused to accept BOC's offer of a property located in
Parañaque City to satisfy the judgment debt. He argued that the judgment obligor
was mandated to pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or
other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee and the law was silent
on a real estate property being offered as a form of payment..
● In his reply, Atty Quicho reiterated that Reyes was guilty of ignorance of law when
he refused the real estate property offered by BOC to satisfy the judgment debt. Atty.
Quicho refuted Reyes' argument that BOC was not entitled to exercise the option to
choose the properties to be levied. Under Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, it
was clear that if the judgment obligor could not pay the judgment debt in cash,
certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment oblige,
 he still had the option to choose which of his properties he could offer to satisfy the
obligation.
● Reyes countered that BOC had already waived its option to choose properties to be
levied upon because its offer to pay its liabilities by cashier’s check and real property
came only on December 11 and December 17, 2010, respectively, or eight (8)
months after he had served the demand to pay the judgment award on April 7, 2010.
He denied having disrupted the operations of the BOC when he levied the
computers as he did not take the computer servers with him
● OCA found sufficient ground to hold Sheriff Reyes administratively liable for his
overzealousness in implementing the alias writ of execution. Reyes should have
brought the matter to the Court instead of resolving it himself.
●
ISSUE: WON Sheriff Reyes committed grave abuse of authority in the implementation of
the Alias writ of execution.

HELD:

● Yes, Reyes committed grave abuse of authority in the implementation of the alias
writ of execution. Under Section 9, Rule 39, the duties of a sheriff are: (1) to first
make a demand from the obligor for the immediate payment of the full amount
stated in the writ of execution and of all lawful fees; (2) to receive payment in the
form of cash, certified bank check payable to the obligee, or any other form of
payment acceptable to the latter; (3) to levy upon the properties of the obligor, not
exempt from execution, if the latter cannot pay all or part of the obligation; (4) give
the obligor the opportunity to exercise the option to choose which property may be
levied upon; (5) in case the option is not exercised, to first levy on the personal
properties of the obligor, including the garnishment of debts due the obligor and
other credits, i.e., bank deposits, financial interests, royalties, commissions and
other personal properties not capable of manual delivery or in the possession or
control of third parties; and (6) to levy on real properties if the personal properties
are insufficient to answer for the judgment.
● It is clear that the sheriff shall demand from the judgment obligor the immediate
payment in cash, certified bank check or any other mode of payment acceptable to
the judgment obligee. If the judgment obligor cannot pay by these methods
immediately or at once, he can exercise his option to choose which of his property
can be levied upon. If he does not exercise this option immediately or when he is
absent or cannot be located, he waives such right, and the sheriff can now first levy
his personal properties, if any, and then the real properties if the personal properties
are insufficient to answer for the judgment.
● In this case BOC has exercised its option, although belatedly, by offering a parcel of
land located in Parañaque City. Yet, Reyes ignored BOC's option to surrender the
said property. He insisted and pursued to levy on cash and other personal properties
of the BOC despite the said offer. Such act indeed constituted a clear violation of the
Rules. Even on the assumption that BOC waived its right to exercise the option by
belatedly offering its real estate property as satisfaction for its obligation, still, it
would not exonerate Reyes from liability.
● Furthermore, considering that BOC's offer was not exercised immediately as strictly
required by the prescribed procedure under the Rules, Reyes was confronted with a
crucial issue that should have been threshed out. The nature of his function as
sheriff being ministerial, he had no discretion or authority to decide the legal
question involved. Hence, the Court agrees with the findings of the OCA and found
 Sheriff Reyes guilty of grave abuse of authority and was fined.

Dagooc vs. Erlina; A.M. No. P-04-1857; 16 March 2005 Delos Santos, Janah Joaquin

DOCTRINE: The law mandates that in the execution of a money judgment, the judgment
debtor shall pay either in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or any
other form of payment acceptable to the latter. If the judgment debtor cannot pay all or part
of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the
judgment obligee, the money judgment shall be satisfied by levying on the properties of the
judgment debtor.

FACTS:
● A complaint for misconduct and ignorance of the law was filed by Merlinda L.
Dagooc of Surigao del Sur, against deputy sheriff Roberto A. Erlina of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 40, Surigao del Sur.
● Complainant alleged that she was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. L-695 before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 28. The court rendered judgment by compromise
agreement which immediately became final and executory.
● The defendants, however, could not pay the money judgment. Instead of levying on
the properties of the defendants to satisfy the judgment, however, sheriff Erlina
asked them to execute promissory notes in favor of complainant which he asked the
latter to collect from the defendants.
● Complainant further alleged that respondent sheriff indicated in his return of service
that defendants were insolvent. But upon verification with the assessor's office of
Tandag, Surigao del Sur, complainant discovered that defendants owned real
properties, as evidenced by the real property field appraisal and assessment sheet.
● Respondent alleged that he was given a certification that defendants had no real
properties. So he made a return of service stating that defendants were insolvent.
● He denied calling up complainant for her to collect defendant's payment by means of
promissory notes. But he advised her to secure an alias writ of execution so he
could eventually go after defendants' real properties in Tandag, Surigao del Sur.

ISSUE: Whether respondent sheriff is guilty of misconduct and gross ignorance of the law.

HELD:
● YES. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the complaint meritorious
and the respondent sheriff guilty of misconduct and gross ignorance of the law.
● Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
● The law mandates that in the execution of a money judgment, the judgment debtor
shall pay either in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or any
other form of payment acceptable to the latter.
● Nowhere does the law mention promissory notes as a form of payment. The only
exception is when such form of payment is acceptable to the judgment debtor.
● It was obviously not acceptable to complainant, otherwise she would not have filed
this case against respondent sheriff. In fact, she objected to it because the
promissory notes of the defendants did not satisfy the money judgment in her favor.
● If the judgment debtor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank
check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the money
judgment shall be satisfied by levying on the properties of the judgment debtor.
● Respondent sheriff not only failed to levy on the properties of the judgment debtor
when they could not pay the money judgment in cash but also claimed the
 exemption for them. His conduct blatantly manifested his incompetence and
ineptitude in discharging his functions. Moreover, respondent sheriff was seriously
remiss in his duties when he stated in his return of service that the defendants were
insolvent without first diligently verifying such fact. As it turned out, the defendants
had real properties he could have levied on to satisfy the money judgment.
● Sheriffs, as public officers, are repositories of public trust and are under obligation to
perform the duties of their office honestly, faithfully and to the best of their ability.
They are bound to use utmost skill and diligence in the performance of their official
duties particularly where the rights of individuals may be jeopardized by their
neglect.

Manila Remnant Co. Inc. vs. Court of Appeals; GR No. 107282; 16 March 1994 Devesa, Imelda Mallari

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Josef vs. Santos; GR No. 165060; 27 November 2008 Diel, Joan Cervantes

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Fiestan vs. Court of Appeals; GR No. 81552; 28 May 1990 Dominguez, Mary Grace Belmonte

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

City of Naga vs. Asuncion; GR No. 174042 7/9/2008 Escudero, Thrishannel Pascual

DOCTRINE: As a rule, the issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the
discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case and will not be interfered with, except in
cases of manifest abuse. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The exercise of power
must have been done in an arbitrary or a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility. It must have been so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

FACTS: Macario A. Mariano and Jose A. Gimenez were the registered owners of a
229,301-square meter land covered by a transfer certificate of title located in Naga City. The
land was subdivided into several lots and sold as part of City Heights Subdivision (CHS).
The officers of CHS offered to construct the Naga City Hall on a two (2)-hectare lot within the
premises of the subdivision. Said lot was to be designated as an open space for public
purpose and donated to petitioner in accordance with the rules and regulations of the
National Urban Planning Commission. CHS amended its offer to five hectares, which,
through Resolution No. 89, the Municipal Board accepted. Mariano and Gimenez thereafter
delivered possession of the lots described as Blocks 25 and 26 to the City Government of
Naga (city government).

Eventually, the contract for the construction of the city hall was awarded by the Bureau of
Public Works through public bidding to Francisco O. Sabaria, a local contractor. This
prompted Mariano and Gimenez to demand the return of the parcels of land from petitioner.
On assurance, however, of then Naga City Mayor Monico Imperial that petitioner will buy the
lots instead, Mariano and Gimenez allowed the city government to continue in possession of
the land and constructed the Naga City Hal. It also conveyed to other government offices
portions of the land which house the NBI, LTO, and Hall of Justice, among others.

After the death of Mariano, Danilo D. Mariano, as administrator and representative of the
heirs of Macario A. Mariano, demanded from petitioner the return of Blocks 25 and 26 to
CHS but to no avail. Respondent thus filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against
petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Naga City, Branch 1.The MTC dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that the city’s claim of ownership over the lots posed
an issue not cognizable in an unlawful detainer case. On appeal, the RTC reversed the MTC
decision and directed petitioner to surrender physical possession of the lots to respondents
with forfeiture of all the improvements, and to pay P2,500,000.00 monthly as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the land; P587,159.60 as attorney’s fees; and
the costs of suit.

Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition for Review with Very Urgent Motion/Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with the Court of
Appeals. Respondents thereafter filed a Motion to Issue Writ of Execution which the CA
denied. The RTC issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the petitioner availed of the proper remedy to contest the disputed
order, resolution and notices.
2. Whether or not the RTC Judge Montenegro committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting execution pending appeal.
3. Whether or not the Court of Appeal committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s application for a writ of preliminary injuction.

HELD: 1. Yes. As a rule, petitions for the issuance of such extraordinary writs against an
RTC should be filed with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of this Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. Under the present
circumstance however, the Court took cognizance of this case as an exception to the
principle of hierarchy of courts for while it has been held that a motion for reconsideration is
a condition
sine qua non for the grant of a writ of certiorari, nevertheless such requirement may be
dispensed with where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government.

Under Section 1(c) and (f), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, no appeal may be taken from an
interlocutory order and an order of execution, respectively. An interlocutory order is one
which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon.
Such is the nature of an order granting or denying an application for preliminary injunction;
hence, not appealable. The proper remedy, as petitioner did in this case, is to file a petition
for certiorari and/or prohibition under Rule 65.

2. NO. Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court is pertinent: "SEC. 21. Immediate execution
on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. - The judgment of the Regional Trial Court
against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal
that may be taken therefrom." Thus, the judgment of the RTC against the defendant in an
ejectment case is immediately executory. Unlike Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules, Section
21 does not provide a means to prevent execution; hence, the court's duty to order such
execution is practically ministerial. Section 21 of Rule 70 presupposes that the defendant in
a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the judgment of the TC and
decides to appeal to a superior court. It authorizes the TC to immediately issue a writ of
execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course. Nevertheless, it should be
stressed that the appellate court may stay the said writ should circumstances so require.

Petitioner herein invokes seasonably the exceptions to immediate execution of judgments in

ejectment cases cited in Hualam Construction and Dev't. Corp. v. Court of Appeals and
Laurel v. Abalos, thus:

Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment) bring about a material
change in the situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable, or where there
is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing
circumstances, the court may stay immediate execution of the judgment.

Noteworthy, the foregoing exceptions were made in reference to Section 8, Rule 70 of the
old Rules of Court which has been substantially reproduced as Section 19, Rule 70 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, even if the appealing defendant was not able to
file a supersedes bond, and make periodic deposits to the appellate court, immediate
execution of the MTC decision is not proper where the circumstances of the case fall under
any of the above-mentioned exceptions. Yet, Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules does not
provide for a procedure to avert immediate execution of an RTC decision.

This is not to say that the losing defendant in an ejectment case is without recourse to avoid
immediate execution of the RTC decision. The defendant may, as in this case, appeal said
judgment to the Court of Appeals and therein apply for a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus,
even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately executory, preliminary
injunction may still be granted.

In the present case, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's application for a writ of
preliminary injunction because the RTC has yet to rule on respondents' Motion to Issue Writ
of Execution. Significantly, however it also made a finding that said application was without
merit. On this score, we are unable to agree with the appellate court.

3. YES. A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent threatened or continuous

irremediable injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated.
Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.
Status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a
controversy. As a rule, the issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the
discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case and will not be interfered with, except
in cases of manifest abuse. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. For a writ of preliminary
injunction to be issued, the Rules of Court do not require that the act complained of be in
clear violation of the rights of the applicant. What the Rules require is that the act
complained of be probably in violation of the rights of the applicant.

Under the Rules, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy.
This situation is different from injunction as a main action where one needs to establish
absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction. For the Court in which the
issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should
a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the
unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case
involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as
a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in
favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be
found to have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to
recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.

In the present case, the appellate court should have deferred resolution on the application
until the RTC has decided on the motion for execution pending appeal. Moreover, nothing in
the rules allow a qualified execution pending appeal that would have justified the exclusion
of the NBI, City Hall and Hall of Justice from the effects of the writ.

St. Aviation Services vs. Grand International Airways; GR No. 140288; 23 October 2006 Gesmundo, Jeanette Elaine Ilagan

DOCTRINE: In the absence of a special contract, no sovereign is bound to give effect

within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however,
under the rules of comity, utility and convenience, nations have established a usage
among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different countries.

A foreign judgment or order against a person is merely presumptive evidence of a

right as between the parties. It may be repelled, among others, by want of jurisdiction
of the issuing authority or by want of notice to the party against whom it is enforced.
The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity.

FACTS:
● Petitioner is a foreign corporation based in Singapore, engaged in repair and
maintenance of airplanes and aircrafts.
● Respondent is a domestic corporation engaged in airline operations.
● They had an agreement wherein the petitioner agreed to undertake the
maintenance and modification works on respondent’s aircrafts.
● They also agreed that the construction, validity and performance of such
undertaking shall be governed by the laws of Singapore, and that any suit arising
from the contract shall be submitted to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the
Singapore Courts.
● Petitioner undertook the contracted works and promptly delivered the aircrafts to the
respondent.
● However, respondent failed to pay despite repeated demands.
High Court of Singapore
● Petitioner filed complaint for collection of sum of money before the High Court of
Singapore.
● Upon petitioner’s motion, the court issued a Writ Summons to be served
extraterritorially upon respondent
● The Singapore court sought the assistance of the sheriff of Pasay City but respondent
failed to answer despite receipt of the summons.
● On petitioner’s motion, the Singapore court rendered a judgment by default in favor of
the petitioner.
RTC

● Petitioner filed a Petition for Enforcement of Judgment with the RTC Pasay.
● Respondent filed a MTD alleging that (1) the Singapore court did not acquire jurisdiction
over its person and (2) the foreign judgment is void for having been rendered in
violation of its right to due process.
● RTC dismissed the MTD holding that the 2 grounds for MTD cited are not provided
under Rule 16, ROC.
● MR was also denied.

CA

● Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.

● CA granted the petition and set aside the orders of RTC without prejudice to the re-filing
of the case.
● CA held that since the action before the Singapore High Court was a personal action,
service of summons should be personal or substituted, not extraterritorial, in order to
confer jurisdiction on the court.
● MR was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the judgment by default in enforceable in the Philippines.

HELD: Yes.
Ø In the absence of a special contract, no sovereign is bound to give effect, within
its dominion, to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.
Ø However, under the rules of comity, utility and convenience, nations have
established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign
courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries.
Ø The conditions for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in
our legal system are contained in Section 481, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended:
“SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments.—The effect of a judgment or
final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”

Ø Under the said rule, a foreign judgment against a person is merely presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties. It may be repelled, among others, by want
of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or by want of notice to the party against whom it
is enforced.

Ø The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption
of its validity.

Malonzo vs. Mariano; GR No. 53998; 30 May 1989 Guinto, Roleen Wendee Napoles

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: Universal Ventures, Inc. mortgaged its properties in favor of Banco Filipino
Mortgage & Savings Bank, as security for the payment of a loan. The mortgage deed
authorized the extra-judicial foreclosure of the property in the event of default in the
repayment of the loan. Universal Ventures, Inc. failed to repay the loan. Consequently,
Banco Filipino caused the extra-judicial foreclosure of the property by the City Sheriff of
Manila.
The foreclosure sale took place in due course; the mortgaged property was struck off to the
bank, as highest bidder, and the bank registered the sheriff's certificate of sale with the
Register of Deeds of Manila and on July 27, 1976 obtained a certificate of title in its name,
numbered 122496, in lieu of that of the mortgagor, which was accordingly cancelled. On the
same day that title was issued to it, Banco Filipino filed a petition for a writ of possession
with the Court of First Instance of Manila.

The petition recited the foregoing facts and the additional circumstances that (1) the
mortgagor, Universal Ventures, Inc., had failed to redeem the property within the one-year
period allowed by law, and (2) the mortgagor was still in possession of the property, as well
as certain other persons claiming rights under said mortgagor although said rights had not
been recorded in the Register of Deeds. Among the persons named in the petition as
"claiming (rights) under" Universal Ventures, Inc., were petitioners Avelina Malonzo, Barbara
Brown, and Bonifacia Monzon.

The writ of possession issued on March 4, 1980 and on the strength thereof, the Sheriff of
Manila attempted to evict the persons in occupancy of the property. Three of the persons
sought to be evicted, Enrico Malonzo, husband of Avelina Malonzo, Barbara Brown, and
Bonifacia Monzon, filed suit against Banco Filipino and the City Sheriff in the same Court of
First Instance of Manila seeking to perpetually restrain the enforcement of the writ of
possession against them on the ground that there was no ejectment case filed against them
and that they were not made a party to the Petition for Writ of Possession of Banco Filipino.
Hence, they were entitled to remain in possession of the properties and could not be ousted
under the writ of possession.

ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of possession issued by a Court of First Instance (Regional
Trial Court) in accordance with Act 3135, to give possession of property sold at an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale to the purchaser thereof, may be enforced against persons
other than the mortgagor who are in occupancy of the foreclosed property.

HELD: Yes. Under section 6 of Act No. 3135 and Sections 29 to 31 and Section 35 Rule 39
of the Revised Rules of Court, in case of an extra-judicial foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage, the possession of the property sold may be given to the purchaser by the sheriff
after the period of redemption had expired, unless a third person is actually holding the
property adversely to the mortgagor. An ordinary action for the recovery of possession is not
necessary. There is no law in this jurisdiction whereby the purchaser at a sheriffs sale of real
property is obliged to bring a separate and independent suit for possession after the one
year period for redemption has expired and after he has obtained the sheriffs final certificate
of sale.

The same rule was followed in a judicial foreclosure of mortgage and in an execution sale. If
the court can issue a writ of possession during the period of redemption there is no reason
why it should not also have the same power after the expiration of that period. The
petitioners cannot be deemed third parties "actually holding the property adversely" to the
mortgagor. They derive their rights to the possession of the property exclusively from the
mortgagor, in virtue of verbal agreements of lease. They were lessees at the time that the
property occupied by them was mortgaged by their lessor to respondent Banco Filipino. And
of that mortgage they were charged with constructive knowledge upon its registration in the
Registry of Property, if they did not indeed, actually know of it. The right pertaining to them in
this situation was that of being notified of the application for a writ of possession and of being
accorded an opportunity at a hearing to oppose the same, as by showing that they were
"actually holding the property adversely" to the mortgagor.

That right was duly accorded to them. They were served with copies of the motion or petition
for issuance of the writ of possession and had ample opportunity to oppose the same, to
persuade the Court that the writ should not issue or be executed against them. The
proceedings showed that, by their own assertions, they were not holding the property
adversely to the mortgagor, but were exercising rights under, derived from, said mortgagor,
who was their lessor. Upon the cessation of their lessor's rights over the property, their own
also ceased. The writ of possession was therefore properly enforceable against them.

MTC TO RTC (Rule 40, Sections 1 to 9)

Canlas vs. Tubil; GR No. 184285; 25 September 2009 HERNANDEZ, Corine Elizabeth
Oandasan
DOCTRINE: If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case
if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the
preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and
additional evidence in the interest of justice. (par. 2, Sec.8, Rule 40)

FACTS:

● Respondent Illuminada Tubil alleged that she was the owner of a residential lot and
that the Canlas were able to erect their house on the subject property only on mere
tolerance of respondent. After several demands to vacate and remove the house in
the subject property, and the refusal of petitioners to do so, the respondent filed the
unlawful detainer against them before the Municipal Trial Court of Guagua,
Pampanga.
● Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the MTC has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter. The MTC denied the motion because the grounds
relied upon were evidentiary in nature which needed to be litigated.
● Petitioners filed their answer and alleged among others respondent’s cause of action
was for accion publiciana, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC.
● The MTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer for
failure to show that the possession of the subject property was for by mere
tolerance.
● Respondent appealed to RTC, which affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. The
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
● Respondent filed a petition for review wth the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the RTC.It ordered the trial court to decide the Special Civil Case on the
merits based on the entire record of the proceedings had in the MTC and such
memoranda as are filed therewith, without prejudice to the admission of amended
pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice pursuant to par 2. Sec. 8
of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.
● Petitioners move for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
● Petitioners contends that the RTC does not have original jurisdiction over the subject
 matter of the case, thus, it cannot validly decide on the merits.

ISSUE: Whether or not par. 2, Sec. 8 of Rule 40 is applicable in this case.

HELD:

● No. The provision under par. 2, Sec. 8 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court is not
applicable in this case.
● Par. 2, Sec. 8 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provdes:

SEC. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. —

xxx xxx

If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has
original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the
preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and
additional evidence in the interest of justice.

● In this case the court held that the action is for unlawful detainer because the action
was filed within the 1 year period after the last demand. An unlawful detainer
proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the proper municipal
trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year
from the date of last demand and the issue in said case is the right to physical
possession.
● Having ruled that the MTC acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3582, it thus
properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer for
failure of the respondent to prove tolerance by sufficient evidence. Consequently,
Section 8 (2nd par.) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which ordains the Regional
Trial Court not to dismiss the cases appealed to it from the metropolitan or municipal
trial court which tried the same albeit without jurisdiction, but to decide the said case
on the merits, finds no application here.

Heirs of dela Rosa vs. Calderon-Bargas; GR No. 147939; 6 July 2007 Kim, Hye Ri Drilon

DOCTRINE: The RTC acting as an appellate court acquired jurisdiction over the case
of the petitioners upon their filing of the notice of appeal. The filing of the notice of
appeal in due time and the payment of the appropriate fees by the PETs perfected
their appeal in the RTC.
FACTS:
● Petitioners Heirs of Cristeta De La Rosa (PETs) was a party to a civil complaint for
forcible entry in the MTC of Tanay, Rizal where they were declared by the Decision of
the MTC to have illegally entered the parcel of land.
● PETs filed a Notice of Appeal from the said Decision, thus the MTC rendered an Order
directing the Clerk of Court to immediately transmit the records of the case to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) within the required period. The RTC of Morong, Rizal then
furnished the parties with a Notice of Appealed Case on 4 JAN ‘99.
● On 31 MAR ’99, Private Respondents (PRIVRES) filed a Motion for Dismissal of
Appeal, alleging that PETs had not filed the required memorandum despite the fact that
 they had only until 29 JAN ‘99 within which to do so.
● PETs filed an Opposition to the Motion for Dismissal of Appeal, averring that they had
not received the Notice of Appealed Case [dated 4 JAN]. Prior to the filing by the PETs
of the Opposition, RTC issued an Order dismissing the case for failure of PETs to file the
required memorandum.
● PETs filed an MR, but the same was denied. PETs then filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA, questioning the jurisdiction of the respondent Judge to try and hear the
case. They alleged that RTC Morong had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
PETs and over the subject matter of the action due to the failure of the clerk to furnish
them with the Notice of Appealed Case.
● CA denied the petition and affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC, declaring that failure
to comply with Section 6, Rule 40 of the ROC, is not jurisdictional.
● PETs filed an MR but was denied. PETs filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the
SC, contending that compliance with the directives of Sections 6 and 7, Rule 40 of the
Revised Rules of Court is mandatory and is important in order for the appellate court to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners and over the subject matter of the
case.
ISSUE: WON THE CA ERRED IN DENYING PET’S PETITION AND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION BASED ON ITS ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF SEC. 6-7,
RULE 40 OF THE 1997 RCP
HELD: NO.
PETs are of the mistaken notion that receipt of the letter of transmittal and of the notice of
appealed case is the reckoning point for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over their appeal.
This is contrary to the clear provision of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which states, in part, that a party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him
upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
The RTC acting as an appellate court acquired jurisdiction over the case of the
petitioners upon their filing of the notice of appeal. The filing of the notice of appeal in
due time and the payment of the appropriate fees by the PETs perfected their appeal
in the RTC. As a necessary consequence thereof, the MTC was divested of jurisdiction over
their case.
From the filing of the written notice of appeal, PETs appeal was perfected without need of
any further act, and, consequently, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case, both over the
record and over the subject of the case.
The alleged failure of the clerks of court to furnish petitioners copies of the letter of
transmittal and Notice of Appealed Case that resulted in their inability to file their
memorandum on time can no longer be reviewed by this Court. The findings of facts of the
RTC are deemed final and conclusive as to this Court, especially when they are adopted and
affirmed by the CA.

Encarnacion vs. Amigo; GR No. 169793; 15 September 2006 Librojo, Joseph Macasaet

DOCTRINE: If the case is tried on the merits by the Municipal Court without jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has original
jurisdiction thereof.

FACTS: Petitioner Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered owner of Lot located at

District 1, National Hi-way, Cauayan, Isabela, a single 707 square meter track of land owned
by Rogelio Valiente who sold the same to Nicasio Mallapitan

Mallapitan sold the land to Victoriano Magpantay. After the death of the latter in 1992, his
widow, Anita N. Magpantay executed an Affidavit of Waiver on April 11, 1995 waving her
right over the property in favor of her son-in-law, herein petitioner, Victoriano Encarnacion.
Thereafter, the latter caused the subdivision of the land into two lots

Nieves Amigo allegedly entered the premises and took possession of a portion of the
property sometime in 1985 without the permission of the then owner,

Victoriano Magpantay. Said occupation by the respondent continued even after TCT Nos.
T-256650 and T-256651 were issue to petitioner

Encarnacion, through his lawyer sent a letter, demanding that Amigo vacate the subject
property the demand letter was delivered by registered mail to amigo, Notwithstanding
receipt of the demand letter, Amigo still refused to vacate the subject property. Encarnacion
filed a complaint for ejectment, damages with injunction and prayer for restraining order with
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Isabela

In his Answer, Amigo alleged that he has been in actual possession and occupation of a
portion of the subject land since 1968 and that the issuance of Free Patent and titles in the
name of petitioner was tainted with irregularities

ISSUE: Whether or not the court of appeals erred in holding that the proper action in this
case is axxion publiciana and not unlawful detainer as determined by the allegations in the
complaint filled by petitioner.

HELD: In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real
property are:

1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for forcible entry
(detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for recovery of
physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and
should be brought in the proper inferior court;

2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession,
which should be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when the dispossession has
lasted for more than one year; and

3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion, which is an action for the recovery of

ownership which must be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court

The rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by
the allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from
the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought
are the ones to be consulted.

The length of time that the petitioner was dispossessed of his property made his cause of
action beyond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively made it one for accion
publiciana. After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the
Regional Trial Court via an accion publiciana which is a suit for recovery of the right to
possess. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year
from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty

APPEAL FROM RTC (Rule 41)

Sps. Lebin vs. Mirasol; GR No. 164255; 7 September 2011 Mabanglo, Aily Liezel Molina

DOCTRINE: the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by
law is mandatory and jurisdictional.

FACTS:

● In January 1985, the petitioners relayed their offer to the administrator of the Estate
of L.J. Hodges to purchase for P22,560.00 Lot 18, Block 7 of 971 (Lot 18), an asset
of the Estate situated on D.B. Ledesma Interior, Jaro, Iloilo City.
● They made a deposit of P4,512.00,... the equivalent of 20% of the offer.
● On August 1, 1985, the administrator sought judicial approval of the offer, stating to
the RTC that petitioner Erlinda Lebin was the actual occupant of Lot 18.
● The RTC commissioned one Atty. Tabares to conduct an ocular inspection of Lot 18
to ascertain if Erlinda Lebin was really the occupant. In his report, Atty. Tabares
confirmed that Erlinda Lebin was the only occupant of Lot 18.
● Accordingly, on August 28,... 1985, the RTC granted the administrator's motion for
approval of the offer.
● In the meanwhile, respondent Vilma S. Mirasol (Mirasol) also offered to purchase
the lot containing an area of 188 square meters where her house stood. The lot was
initially identified as Lot No. 4, Block 7 of 971 (Lot 4), but a later survey revealed that
her house was actually... standing on Lot 18, not Lot 4.
● Learning on November 11, 1985 of the approval of the petitioners' offer to purchase
Lot 18, therefore Mirasol filed on December 6, 1985 a petition for relief from the
order dated August 28, 1985.
● On December 17, 1987, pending resolution of the petition for relief, the petitioners
paid the last installment for Lot 18, and moved for the execution of the deed of sale.
Apparently, the motion was not acted upon by the RTC.
● The Regional Trial Court (RTC), in Iloilo City, issued an order dated May 3, 1995
(ruling that a property of the estate sold to the petitioners be divided in two equal...
portions between the petitioners and the respondent).
● The petitioners filed a notice of appeal and, later on, a record on appeal, but the
respondents moved to dismiss their appeal on June 15, 2000 on the ground of
tardiness of the record on appeal.
● The RTC granted the motion to dismiss on February 1, 2002. On March 13, 2002,
the petitioners moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, but the RTC denied the
motion for reconsideration on May 21, 2004.
● Thus, on June 23, 2004, the petitioners directly appealed to the Court, assailing the
orders of February 1, 2002 and May 21, 2004.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the petitioners' appeal for their failure to
timely file a record on appeal

HELD: NO. Among the innovations introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is the
elimination of the record on appeal in most cases, retaining the record on appeal only for
appeals in special proceedings and in other cases in which the Rules of Court allows
multiple appeals. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 has incorporated this innovation,
to wit:

Section 39. Appeals. - The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed
from: Provided however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be
forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.

No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire record
shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together with an
index of the contents thereof.

Section 3 rule 41 of the rules of court, retains the original 30 days as a period for perfecting
the appeal by record on appeal to take into consideration the need for the trial court to
approve the record on appeal. within that 30 days. A party aggrieved by a judgment or final
order issued in special proceedings should perfect an appeal by filing both a notice of appeal
and a record on appeal in the trial court, serving a copy of the notice of appeal and a record
on appeal upon the adverse party within the period;; in addition, the appealing party shall
pay within the period for taking and appeal to the clerk of the court that rendered the
appealed judgment or final order the full amount of appellate court docket and other lawful
fees. a violation of these requirements for the timely perfection of an appeal by record on
appeal, or the non-payment of the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees to the clerk of the trial court may be a ground for the dismissal of the appeal.

In this case, although they filed a notice of appeal on March 27, 1998 they submitted a
record on appeal only on May 5, 1998. undoubtedly they filed the record on appeal 43 days
from March 2,3 1998, the date they received the denial of their motion for their consideration
and/or new trial. they should have filed the record on appeal within 30 days from their notice
of judgment. their appeal was not perfected therefore because their filing of the record on
appeal happened beyond the end of their period for the perfection of their appeal.

The petitioner's filing of the motion for reconsideration interrupted the running period of 30
days hence there. Appeal started to run from May 15, 1995 the date they received the order
of May 3, 1995. They filed their motion for consideration on May 24, 1995 by then nine days
out of their 30 day period to appeal had already elapsed. They received a copy of the order
dated March 2, 1998 on March 23, 1998 thus the period to appeal resumed from March 23,
1998 and ended 21 days later on April 13, 1998 .

BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Pryce Gases, Inc; GR No. 188365; 29 June 2011 Mamisao, Michelle Espiritu

DOCTRINE: Under Section 9, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, "(a) party’s
appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter
thereof upon approval of the record on appeal filed in due time."
FACTS:

● Respondent Pryce Gases Inc. (PGI) is a debtor of International Finance Corporation

(IFC) an international organization and an affiliate of the International Bank of
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the Nederlandse
Financierings-Maatschappij Voor Ontwikkelingslanden N.V. (FMO), a Dutch
development bank engaged in promoting the expansion of private enterprise in
emerging markets.

● In August 2002, IFC and FMO filed a petition for rehabilitation with the RTC of
Makati due to the failure of respondent PGI to service its debts as well as the refusal
of PGI’s parent company, Pryce Corp., to provide financial support to respondent.
The case was raffled to Br. 142.

● IFC and FMO proposed a financial restructuring that called for the conversion of
dollar-dominated loans to peso and the splitting of the whole debt to two. Based on
the proposed financial restructuring, PGI’s loan from BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.
(BFB) shall be paid in ten years as it was a non-MTI creditor.

● Presiding Judge Estela Perlas-Bernabe of RTC Br. 142 inhibited herself from further
hearing the case, causing it to be raffled to Br. 138.

● The RTC gave due course to the petition for rehabilitation. In a Manifestation,
respondent PGI informed the court that Pryce Corp. had offered to help through
dacion en pago of its real estate assets, but BFB objected. Later on, the
rehabilitation plan was approved.

● In November 2003, BFB filed a notice of appeal. Respondent filed a motion to

dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to perfect the appeal due to failure to file
the record on appeal within the required period.

● Before the RTC could resolve the motion, BFB filed its Opposition and motion with
leave to withdraw notice of appeal and instead be allowed to file a petition for
review.

● However, the RTC dismissed BFB’s appeal ruling that record on appeal is required
to perfect the appeal in special proceedings.

● BFB file a motion for reconsideration (MR), but it was denied. Hence, BFB filed a
petition for certiorari in the CA.

● The CA dismissed the petition ruling that corporate rehabilitations are special
proceedings and as such, appeals from the final order or decision therein should be
by record on appeal in accordance with Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

● BFB filed a MR, but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTC in dismissing BFB’s
appeal.

HELD: NO. Section 5 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation provides that "(t)he
review of any order or decision of the court or an appeal therefrom shall be in accordance
with the Rules of Court x x x." Under A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, a petition for corporate
rehabilitation is considered a special proceeding.
Thus, the period of appeal provided in paragraph 19(b) of the Interim Rules Relative to the
Implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 for special proceedings shall apply, that is, the
period of appeal shall be 30 days since a record of appeal is required.

Note that on 14 September 2004, this Court issued A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC providing that all
decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation
and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic
Act No. 8799 shall be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, to be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the decision or final order of the Regional Trial Court.

However, in this case, BFB filed a notice of appeal on 3 November 2003, before the
effectivity of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC. Hence, at the time of filing of BFB’s appeal, the
applicable mode of appeal is Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides:

Sec. 2. Modes of Appeal. -

(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall
be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate
appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on
appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

Under Section 9, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, "(a) party’s appeal by
record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof
upon approval of the record on appeal filed in due time."

IN THE CASE AT BAR, BFB did not perfect the appeal when it failed to file the record on
appeal. The filing of the notice of appeal on 3 November 2003 was not sufficient because at
the time of its filing, the Rules required the filing of the record on appeal and not merely a
notice of appeal.

The issuance by the Court of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC did not change the fact that BFB’s appeal
was not perfected. Further, BFB filed its Motion With Leave to Withdraw Notice of Appeal
only on 20 April 2006 or almost two years after the issuance of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC on 14
September 2004.

Note further that appeal is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege. The
party who seeks to exercise the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the
rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost. While the Court, in certain cases, applies the
policy of liberal construction, it may be invoked only in situations where there is some
excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but not where its application subverts the
essence of the proceeding or results in the utter disregard of the Rules of Court.

In addition, BFB filed a motion for reconsideration of the 9 May 2006 Order of the RTC,
Branch 138. Under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation, the proceedings shall be summary and non-adversarial in nature and a
motion for new trial or reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.
Hence, in view of the failure of BFB to perfect its appeal and its subsequent filing of a motion
for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading, the 10 October 2003 Order of the RTC,
Branch 138, approving the rehabilitation plan had become final and executory. THUS, THE
CA RULING IS AFFIRMED.

Ricardo Silverio, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals; GR No. 178933; 16 September 2009 Manalansan, Lizel De Leon

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS:
- The controversy started from the settlement of the estate of the deceased Beatriz
Siverio. Her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for
the settlement of her estate
- While the case was pending, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo
Sr. as administrator
- Edmundo Silverio filed a comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo Sr. as
administrator, and that a new one be appointed
- RTC: granted the petition and removed Ricardo Sr. as administrator; appointed
Ricardo Jr. as the new administrator
- Nelia Silverio-Dee (private respondent) filed a MR
- Ricardo Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person to
Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the
decedent, Without Authority from this Honorable Court
- RTC: affirmed its previous Order and denied the MR filed; authorized Ricardo Jr. to
immediately exercise his duties as administrator; directed Nelia Silverio-Dee to
vacate one of the subject properties (in Forbes Park) within 15 days from receipt of
the order
- Nelia filed a MR of the Omnibus Order which was denied by the RTC
- RTC: (third order na) reinstated Ricardo Sr. as the administrator
- Ricardo Jr. filed a MR
- RTC: denied Ricardo Jr.’s MR; in the same order (4th order), the RTC allowed the
sale of various properties of the estate to partially settle estate taxes, penalties,
interests and other charges; one of the properties was the one in Forbes Park
- Nelia filed a Notice of Appeal
- Ricardo Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for Issuance of a Writ of Execution
against the appeal of Nelia, on the ground that the Record on Appeal was filed 10
days beyond the reglementary period
- RTC: denied the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected within the
reglementary period; issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of its second
order vacating Nelia from the Forbes property
- Nelia filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Prayer for TRO and Writ of
PI) with the CA
- CA: granted the prayer for the issuance of a TRO; the Notice of Appeal was filed
within the reglementary period; applied the fresh rule period as held in Neypes v.
CA; annulled the orders of the RTC
ISSUE: Whether the Omnibus Order (May 31, 2005) and the Order dated Dec. 12, 2005 are
Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41 (these are the
orders telling Nelia to vacate)

HELD: YES
- On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia to vacate the
Forbes property. She received a copy of the said Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of
filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, she filed a MR of the Order. The MR
 was denied in an Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order was received by
Nelia on December 22, 2005. On January 6, 2006, Nelia filed her Notice of Appeal
while she filed her Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006
- The denial of due course by the RTC was based on two grounds: (1) that Nelia’s
appeal was against an order denying a MR which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a),
Rule 41; and (2) that Nelia’s Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary
period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41
- Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from:
- (a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration…
- In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65
- Final order: one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court
- IO: one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be
decided upon
- GR: IO cannot be appealed separately from the judgment
- EXC: when such IO was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to
- CASE AT BAR → Nelia appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground
that it ordered her to vacate the Forbes property. The order is not a final
determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in
the estate or their rights therein. Until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an
inchoate right to the properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a
particular property
- The purported authority of Nelia, which she allegedly secured from Ricardo Sr., was
never approved by the private court. Therefore, she never had any real interest in
the Forbes property
- The May 31 Order of the RTC must be considered an IO and therefore, not subject
to appeal
- Private respondent (Nelia) employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of
Appeal with the RTC. For employing the wrong mode, the case should have been
dismissed
- The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the
reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper
remedy in the instant case. Private respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal
from the May 31 Order of the RTC
- (Gets ba. Basta she appealed an IO which is prohibited under Rule 41. Cannot
appeal IOs (GR), only final orders)
Briones v. Henson-Cruz; GR No. 159130; 22 August 2008 Matienzo, Joseph Napoleon
Salvador
DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: Ruby filed a petition for the allowance of the will of Luz however, Lilia opposed it.
The trial court designated Atty. Briones as Special Administrator of the estate. The heirs of
Luz filed a Notice of Appeal assailing the order as to the payment of Briones’ commission.
They subsequently filed their record on appeal. The trial court denied the appeal and
disapproved the record on appeal on the ground of forum shopping. The heirs filed with CA a
Petition for certiorari. CA reversed the decision of the trial court for the latter had no power or
authority to deny the appeal on the ground of forum shopping. CA also refused to resolve the
issue of forum shopping

ISSUE: WON multi- appeals are allowed in the same case.

HELD: YES. The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to
enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is
resolved by the court and held to be final. In this multi-appeal mode, the probate court loses
jurisdiction only over the subject matter of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over the special
proceeding from which the appeal was taken for purposes of further remedies the parties
may avail of. Where multi-appeals are allowed, we see no reason why a separate petition for
certiorari cannot be allowed on an interlocutory aspect of the case that is separate and
distinct as an issue from the aspect of the case that has been adjudged with finality by the
lower court. To reiterate, the matter appealed matter was the special administrator's
commission, a charge that is effectively a claim against the estate under administration,
while the matter covered by the petition for certiorari was the appointment of an auditor who
would pass upon the special administrator's final account. By their respective natures, these
matters can exist independently of one another and can proceed separately as envisioned
by the Rules under Rule 109.

Neypes vs Court of Appeals; GR No. 141524; 14 September 2005 Millado, Diane Angelica Juachon

DOCTRINE:
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal
must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of
the right to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules.
An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which,
considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
FACTS:
-Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano,
Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles
of land before the RTC- Oriental Mindoro.
-The petitioners filed various motions including (1) the motion filed by petitioners to
declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in
default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the
Philippines.
-On February 12, 1998 the trial court upon motion for reconsideration by the
respondents granted the dismissal of petitioners' complaint on the ground that the action had
already been prescribed.
- Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998
and, on the15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration.
- On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998Five days later, on July 27, 1998,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3,1998.
-On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was
filed eight days late.
-Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus on the ground that they filed
their notice of appeal within the reglementary period.
 -They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July
22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their
motion for reconsideration.
-The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition and ruled that the 15-day period
to appeal should have been considered the day they received the order dismissing their
complaint. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This
was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners' appeal was filed out of time when petitioners received the last
or final order of the court on July 22, 1998 and filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998
and paid the appeal docket fee on August 3, 1998.

HELD:
No, petitioners' appeal was filed on time. Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had
15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the
15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of
appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the
MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled that petitioners, having
filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1)
day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR.
Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15
days from receipt of the "final order" or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt
of the order dismissing amotion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Petitioners here
filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying
their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within
the fresh appeal period of 15 days.

Trans International vs Court of Appeals; GR No. 128421; 15 January 1998 Ng, Lawrence Andrew Adlawan

DOCTRINE: The court is confronted with the need to balance stringent application of
technical rules vis-a-vis strong policy considerations of substantial significance to relax said
rules based on equity and justice.

FACTS:

● Petitioner Trans International filed a complaint for damages against respondent

National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR for brevity) and two of its principal officers
arising from the rescission of a contract for the supply and delivery of woodpoles
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

● On May 22, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision sustaining the claim of
petitioner corporation. The Trial Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration. A copy
of the aforesaid order was personally delivered to respondent NAPOCOR'S office on
August 23, 1996 (Friday) and was received by Ronald T. Lapuz.

● Considering that it was almost 5:00 p.m., Lapuz placed the said order inside the
drawer of his table. However, on August 26 and 27, 1996 (Monday and Tuesday,
respectively) said clerk was unable to report for work due to an illness he suffered as
 a result of the extraction of his three front teeth. Said order was retrieved from his
drawer only in the afternoon of the 27th and was immediately forwarded to the
secretary of Atty. Wilfredo J. Collado, counsel for the respondents. At 3:10 p.m. that
same day, respondents thru counsel filed their notice of appeal.

RTC: On September 13, 1996, the trial court issued an order denying respondent's notice of
appeal and granting the motion for execution filed by petitioner.

On September 20, 1996, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals questioning the validity of the issuance of the aforesaid order on the ground that the
denial of their notice of appeal was on the basis of a mere technicality and that the writ of
execution should not have been issued since there are strong considerations which militate
the strict application of the rules on procedure.

CA: The Court of Appeals granted the respondent’s petition.

Petitioner avers that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess in jurisdiction when it gave due course to the petition of respondents
considering their admission that the notice of appeal was belatedly filed before the trial court.
Since the ground submitted by respondents for their late filing does not constitute excusable
neglect then the respondent court allegedly grievously erred in admitting the same.

ISSUE: Whether respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess in jurisdiction when it gave due course to the petition of respondents

HELD: NO, the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess in jurisdiction when it gave due course to the petition of respondents.

The court has on several occasions relaxed this strict requirement. In the case of Toledo, et
al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., we allowed the filing of an appeal where a
stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve
the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction. Thus, for a
party to seek exception for its failure to comply strictly with the statutory requirements for
perfecting its appeal, strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice and
preventing a grave miscarriage thereof must be shown, in order to warrant the Court's
suspension of the rules. Indeed, the court is confronted with the need to balance stringent
application of technical rules vis-a-vis strong policy considerations of substantial significance
to relax said rules based on equity and justice.

The case at bench squarely meets the requisites postulated by the aforequoted rule. In this
case, the one-day delay in filing the notice of appeal was due to an unforeseen illness of the
receiving clerk Ronald Lapuz in the office of the General Counsel of petitioner NAPOCOR.

The delay was properly explained and sufficiently justified; considerations of substantial
justice and equity strongly argue against a rigid enforcement of the technical rules of
procedure, considering not only that the delay was only for one day, and the petitioners have
pleaded an unforeseeable oversight and illness on the part of the receiving clerk, as an
excuse. More important, the decision sought to be appealed from awarded an enormous
sum in the amount of P37,554,414.99, by way of damages arising from the rescission of the
contract with private respondents, and legal and factual bases for the awards, and the 12%
interest thereon, are being questioned, on the ground among others, that the amount
awarded for unrealized profits ($1,325,703.68) was bigger than the amount prayed for in the
complaint ($788,700.00) [See Motion for Reconsideration, Annex "C" of Petition], to insist
that the one-day delay in filing the appeal despite the plausible reason adduced therefor is a
"fatal mistake" due alone to the negligence of counsel is to insist on a rigid application of the
rules, which as repeatedly enunciated by the Supreme court, should help secure, not
override substantial justice.
 RTC TO CA (Rule 42)
Brgy. Sangalang v. Brgy. Maguihan; GR No. 159792; 23 December 2009 Noval, Angelica Fronteras

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS:
● The controversy has its roots in a barangay jurisdiction dispute between petitioner
Barangay Sangalang and respondent Barangay Maguihan, both situated in Lemery,
Batangas
● Petitioner claims the lots to be within their territorial jurisdiction, whereas respondent
maintains that they are within their territorial boundary
● The case was lodged before the Sangguniang Bayan, which referred it to a hearing
committee.
● In turn, the committee formed rendered a report to the effect that the properties in
dispute belonged to petitioner
● The recommendation was affirmed by the sangguniang bayan of lemery
● Respondent appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) pursuant to
Section 1197 of the Local Government Code
● RTC rendered a Decision 8 ruling in favor of respondent
● Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the
RTC
● petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal. Later, petitioner filed an Amended Notice of
Appeal.
● the CA ruled that petitioner had availed itself of the wrong remedy in filing a notice of
appeal instead of filing a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
● the Decision of the Regional Trial was rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Appropriately, under Section 22 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, decisions of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by way of petitions
for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
● CA also ruled that if said appeal were to be considered as an ordinary appeal under
Rule 41, it still should be dismissed, because the submitted appellant's brief failed to
contain a subject index and page references to the records requirement in its
Statement of Facts and Case and Argument, as provided for in Section 13 of Rule
44 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure
● Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the CA
in a resolution

ISSUE: W/N this Court should even entertain petitioner's appeal.

HELD:
● the CA was correct in holding that petitioner had availed itself of the wrong remedy
● under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the jurisdictional responsibility for
settlement of boundary disputes between and among local government units is to be
lodged before the proper Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan
concerned, if it involves two or morebarangays in the same city or municipality.
Under Section 118 (e) of the same Code, if there is a failure of amicable settlement,
the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned and shall decide the
same within (60) days from the date of the certification referred to
● Section 119 of the Local Government Code also provides that the decision of the
sanggunian concerned may be appealed to the RTC having jurisdiction over the
area in dispute, within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court.
● jurisdiction, not its original jurisdiction. Hence, any further appeal from the RTC
 Decision must conform to the provisions of the Rules of Court dealing with said
matter.
● On this score, Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:Petition for review.
— The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in
accordance with Rule 42
● Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that petitioner has availed itself of the wrong
remedy. Since the RTC tried the case in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
petitioner should have filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court,
instead of an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. The law is clear in this respect.
● notwithstanding petitioner's wrong mode of appeal, the CA should not have so easily
dismissed the petition, considering that the parties involved are local government
units and that what is involved is the determination of their respective territorial
jurisdictions
● While the purpose of Section 13, Rule 44, is to present to the appellate court in the
most helpful light, the factual and legal antecedents of a case on appeal, 28 said
rule should not be strictly applied considering that petitioner's brief before the CA
contained only 9 pages, the records of the case consisted only of a few documents
and pleadings, and there was no testimonial evidence
Ross Rica Sales Center Inc. vs Ong; GR No. 132197; 16 August 2005 Oasan, Wendy Louise Macaraeg

DOCTRINE: Section 1, Rule 42 - Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of
the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days
only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except
for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. In this case,
Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a
matter of right, before the filing of the appellee’s brief. Applying this rule contextually, the
filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the
defective Notice of Appeal.

FACTS: Mandaue Prime acquired properties from Sps. Ong through a Deed of Absolute
Sale. However, the contract was sought to be annulled by the Sps. Ong in a complaint filed
before the RTC against Mandaue Prime. Later on, Petitioner Ross Rica Sales Center
(RRSC) and Juanito King and Sons Inc. (JKI) acquired those lands from Mandaue Prime
through a sale. Due to this, Mandaue Prime asks Sps. Ong to vacate the land so they could
give it to the Petitioner but Sps. Ong refused with their petition to annul the deed of sale with
Mandaue. Hence, Petitioner RRSC’s complaint for ejectment against Sps. Ong.

Procedural History:

● In their complaint for ejectment with the MTC of Mandaue, petitioner alleges they
own the parcels of land. That Sps. Ong previously owned them until they were sold
to petitioners by Mandaue Prime who in turn, bought the land from Sps. Ong.
● Consequently, such ejectment case with the MTC was resolved in favor of the
petitioners and ordered Sps. Ong to vacate and turn over the property.
● However, the petition for annulment of deed of sale by the Sps. Ong was pending
resolution in the RTC of Mandaue.
● After the RTC ordered the decision, Sps. Ong filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
● The RTC gave due course to the Notice of Appeal and the following day, Sps. Ong
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but is also denied.
● However, the CA ruled that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the ejectment case
 because there was no contract between the parties that would qualify the same as
one for unlawful detainer. Therefore, the CA set aside the orders of the lower courts.
● Aggrieved, Petitioner RRSC filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC was correct in stating that the Motion for Reconsideration was
barred due to the erroneous filing of the Notice of Appeal

HELD: NO. Although the Court agrees that the decision of the RTC is final and executory to
the substantive issue, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration was not barred by the
wrong filing of Notice of Appeal with RTC.

● Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC,
Petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the CA and not a Notice of
Appeal with the RTC.
● The Motion for Reconsideration was not barred but was a remedy to the erroneous
notice of appeal.
● The Court explains that it was remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration on the following day. Under Section 3, Rule 50, it allows the Court
the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the
appellee’s brief.
● Applying this rule, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an
effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal.
● Thus, the period of appeal was tolled by the filing of the MR and started to run again
at the time the MR was denied. Then a Motion for Additional Time to file the Petition
was filed with the CA.
● In this case, we count 15 days from receipt of the denial of MR (July 9, 1997) and
then another 10 days for the request for additional period to file a Petition for Review
(July 24, 1997). It is clear that the Sps. Ong filed their Petition for Review on time
which was on July 30, 1997.
● A petition for Review before the CA is the proper mode of appeal from the decision
of the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if
no appeal was interposed. However, due to the Motion for Reconsideration, the
defective Notice of Appeal was effectively withdrawn and the Sps. Ong was able to
file the correct petition for review on time.

Atty. Jesus F. Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals; GR No. 131094; 16 May 2005 Patriarca, Angelo Gabriel Bautista

DOCTRINE:

1. Mere filing of Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review which seems to act
as a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court does not perfect an appeal. The
Rule requires that in an appeal by way of Petition For Review, the appeal is deemed
perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely filing of the petition and the payment of docket
and other lawful fees. In the discussion of the Committee on the revision of the Rules of
Court, it was emphasized that to perfect the appeal, the party has to file the petition for
review and to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. The law and its intent are
clear and unequivocal that the petition is perfected upon its filing and the payment of the
docket fees.

2.Rule 42, Section 8(a), 3rd paragraph of the Rules of Court provides for residual
jurisdiction. Before the Court of Appeals gives due course to a Petition for Review, the RTC
retains jurisdiction for specified instances enumerated therein.

The residual jurisdiction of the trial court is available at a stage in which the court is normally
deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal.
This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval
of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on
appeal. Considering that no appeal was perfected in this case and the records of the case
have not yet been transmitted to the Court of Appeals, the case has not as yet attained the
residual jurisdiction stage so as to say that the trial court already lost the jurisdiction it first
acquired and that it is left with only its residual powers.

FACTS:

An unlawful detainer case was filed by respondent Conception Olivares against petitioner
Jesus Fernandez. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) dismissed the complaint for
lack of sufficient cause of action. Olivares appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila and reversed the MeTC decision. Fernandez filed a Motion for Reconsideration after
14 days of receipt of a copy of the decision. However, Fernandez received an order denying
his motion for reconsideration. Fernandez filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review which was granted.

In the meantime, Fernandez filed a Motion for New Trial before the RTC of Manila, citing
newly discovered evidence. In view of his Motion for New Trial, Fernandez, thru counsel,
filed in the Court of Appeals a Motion to Withdraw his Petition For Review which the court
duly noted in its resolution. In an Order dated 06 February 1995, the RTC denied the Motion
for New Trial. It explained that when Fernandez went to the Court of Appeals and filed a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, and the Court of Appeals
accordingly acted on the same by granting the extension sought, jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals over the parties and the subject matter had already attached. Fernandez filed a
motion for reconsideration but the trial court denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mere filing by petitioner of a motion for extension of time to file petition for
review (which intention [sic] was later withdrawn), automatically divested the regional trial
court (RTC) of its jurisdiction over the case, as to entertain a motion for new trial.

HELD:

NO. In general, in order for a Court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it
must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter, or the jurisdiction to hear and decide a case, is conferred by law. Jurisdiction
over the person, on the other hand, is acquired by service of summons or by voluntary
appearance.

At first glance and mindful of the rule that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such
as the motion for extension of time to file petition for review filed by Fernandez in this case,
is considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court it may seem at once
apparent that the Court of Appeals had in fact acquired jurisdiction over his person. It has
been repeatedly held that an appearance in whatever form, without expressly objecting to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person. He may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such
appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent
to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.

As we are dealing here with the jurisdiction of an appellate court, additional rules are
required for jurisdiction to attach therein, to wit:

(1)the petitioner must have invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals within the time for
doing so;
(2)he must have filed his petition for review likewise within the time for doing so;
(3)he must have paid the necessary docket fees; and
(4) the other parties must have perfected their appeals in due time.

The Rule requires that in an appeal by way of Petition For Review, the appeal is deemed
perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely filing of the petition and the payment of docket
and other lawful fees. In the discussion of the Committee on the revision of the Rules of
Court, it was emphasized that to perfect the appeal, the party has to file the petition for
review and to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. The law and its intent are
clear and unequivocal that the petition is perfected upon its filing and the payment of the
docket fees. Thus, it may be argued, and rightly so, that the Court of Appeals has not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the case because Fernandez merely filed a motion for extension of
time to file petition but not the petition itself.

WHAT IS THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE FILING BY FERNANDEZ OF A MOTION FOR

NEW TRIAL BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT?

Assuming that Fernandez filed his motion for new trial on time, we hold that the trial court
still had jurisdiction to rule on the matter as the jurisdiction it originally acquired had not yet
been lost.

The appellate jurisdiction of the trial court is to be juxtaposed with its residual jurisdiction as
set forth in Rule 42, Section 8(a), 3rd paragraph of the Rules of Court. Before the Court of
Appeals gives due course to a Petition for Review, the RTC retains jurisdiction for specified
instances enumerated therein, to wit:

(1) To issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do
not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, such as, the appointment of a receiver, and
the issuance of writs of preliminary attachment or preliminary injunction.
(2) To approve compromises.
(3) To permit appeals of indigent litigants.
(4) To order execution pending appeal in accordance with section 2 of Rule 39.
(5) To allow withdrawal of the appeal.

The residual jurisdiction of the trial court is available at a stage in which the court is normally
deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal.
This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval
of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on
appeal. Considering that no appeal was perfected in this case and the records of the case
have not yet been transmitted to the Court of Appeals, the case has not as yet attained the
residual jurisdiction stage so as to say that the trial court already lost the jurisdiction it first
acquired and that it is left with only its residual powers.

Macawiwili Gold Mining and Dev’t. Co. Inc. vs CA; GR No. 115104; 12 October 1998 Pujalte, Bianca Margarita Pardo
DOCTRINE: All appeals from judgments rendered by the regional trial courts in the exercise
of their appellate jurisdiction, whether the appellant raises questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law, shall be by filing a petition for review under Rule 42.
FACTS:
● Philex Mining Corporation, respondent, filed a complaint for expropriation against
Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. and Omico Mining & Industrial
Corporation, petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet.
● Based on P.D. No. 463 Sec. 53, Philex Mining sought to expropriate 21.9 hectares of
petitioners' mining areas where the latter's "Macawiwili claims" are located.
● The said complaint was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration relative
thereto was also denied, prompting Philex to appeal with the Couirt of appeals.
● Macawili & Omico filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that only
questions of law were involved and, therefore, the appeal should be to the
Supreme Court.
● Respondent Philex Mining seeks the dismissal of the petition on the ground that
petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration giving the appellate court an
opportunity to correct itself.
● However, the appellate court denied Macawili & Omico’s motion. Without filing a
motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari
contending that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying their
motion to dismiss the appeal.
● Macawili & Omico (Petitioner’s Argument/s): According to them, respondent’s appeal
raises only questions of law and, therefore, it should be brought to the Supreme
Court by means of a petition for review on certiorari and not, as Philex Mining did, by
bringing an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, the question
whether respondent has a right to expropriate petitioners' mining areas under §59 of
Presidential Decree No. 463 is a question of law.
● Philex Mining (Respondent’s Argument/s): On the other hand, Philex Mining
maintains that the issues raised in its appeal are factual and, therefore, the appellate
court is the proper forum for the ventilation of such issues.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal?

HELD: YES. The issues raised by petitioners in this petition are substantially the same
as those asserted by them in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal before the Court of Appeals.
The argument that respondent has no right to expropriate petitioners' mineral areas under
Presidential Decree No. 463 has already been raised, argued, and submitted by petitioners
for resolution by the appellate court in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal. To further file a motion
for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals would simply be to repeat their arguments.
For this reason, we hold that petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration is not fatal
to the allowance of their action.

Rule 42 provides that appeals from judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of
their appellate jurisdiction must be brought to the Court of Appeals, whether the appellant
raises questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

The rules on appeals from the judgments of the regional trial courts in civil cases may thus
be summarized as follows:

(1) Original Jurisdiction - In all cases decided by the regional trial courts in the exercise of
their original jurisdiction, appeal may be made to:
(a) Court of Appeals - where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
and law, by filing a mere notice of appeal.
(b) Supreme Court - where the appellant solely raises questions of law, by filing a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
(2) Appellate Jurisdiction All appeals from judgments rendered by the regional trial
courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction, whether the appellant raises
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law, shall be by filing a
petition for review under Rule 42.

The arguments advanced by Philex Mining are legal questions whose resolution does not
require an examination of the probative weight of the evidence presented by the parties but
a determination of what the law is on the given state of facts. These issues raise questions
of
law which should be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed
directly with this Court. The Court of Appeals committed a grave error in ruling otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the challenged resolution of the Court of Appeals
is SET ASIDE, and the appeal of respondent Philex Mining is DISMISSED

QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES TO CA (Rule 43)

Phillips Seafood Corporation vs. Board of Investments; GR No. 175787; 4 February 2009 Quiñones - Egagamao, Karess
Echem
DOCTRINE: Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a
verified Petition for Review, under the requirements and conditions in
Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies

FACTS: Petitioner Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation is a domestic corporation

engaged in the export of processed crabmeat and other seafood products. Petitioner was
incorporated on 20 October 1992 and registered under its previous corporate name of
Phillips Seafood Masbate, Inc.
- When Phillips relocated its plant to Roxas City, it filed with BOI an application for
registration, which the latter granted. In effect, Petitioner’s Certificate of Registration
No. EP 93-219 was extended up to 12 August 2000, pursuant to Article 39 (a) (1) (ii)
of Executive Order No. 226.
- Petitioner changed its corporate name from PS-Masbate to its current name of
Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation, which was approved by respondent BOI
on 16 February 2001. In a letter dated 25 September 2003, respondent BOI
informed petitioner that the ITH previously granted would be applicable only to the
period from 13 August 1999 to 21 October 1999 or before petitioner’s transfer to a
“not less-developed area.”

- Petitioner wrote respondent BOI requesting for a reconsideration of its decision. On 03

May 2004, petitioner received BOI’s letter denying its motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Office of the President, which dismissed petitioner’s
appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in a Decision dated 22 September 2004.

- The Office of the President likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in an
 Order dated 14 March 2005. Petitioner received a copy of the order on 01 April 2005. On
05 April 2005, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals,
questioning the dismissal of its appeal before the Office of the President.

- After respondent BOI filed its comment on the petition, petitioner filed an omnibus
motion asking for leave to file an amended petition to counter the issues raised in the
comment for the first time and to suspend the period for filing a reply. On 24 May 2006,
the Court of Appeals rendered the first assailed resolution denying petitioner’s omnibus
motion and dismissing its petition for review.

- The appellate court denied petitioner’s omnibus motion on the ground that the same
was filed with intent to delay the case. Simultaneously, the appellate court dismissed the
petition for review for having been filed out of time as petitioner opted to appeal to the
Office of the President instead of filing a Rule 43 petition to the Court of Appeals within
the reglementary period.

ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the petition for review for having filed
out of time?

HELD: No, Indeed, under E.O. 226, when the action or decision pertains to either of these
two instances: first, in the decisions of the BOI over controversies concerning the
implementation of the relevant provisions of E.O No. 226 that may arise between registered
enterprises or investors and government agencies under Article 7; and second, in an action
of the BOI over applications for the Office of the President is available. E.O. No. 226
contains no provision specifically governing the remedy of a party whose application for an
ITH has been denied by the BOI in the same manner that Articles 7 and 36 thereof allow
recourse to the Office of the President in certain instances. Nevertheless, Article 82 of E.O.
No. 22 is the catch-all provision allowing the appeal to the courts from all other decisions of
respondent BOI involving the other provisions of E.O. No. 226. The law is undoubtedly to
afford immediate judicial relief from the decision of respondent BOI, save in cases
mentioned under Articles 7 and 36. In relation to Article 82, E.O. No. 226, Section 1 of Rule
43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly includes respondent BOI as one of the
quasi-judicial agencies whose judgments or final orders are appealable to the Court of
Appeals via a verified petition for review. Appeals from judgments and final orders of
quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified
petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely
formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial
agencies. Thus, petitioner should have immediately elevated to the Court of Appeals the
denial by respondent BOI of its application for an ITH. From the letter dated 09 October 2003
of respondent BOI, which informed petitioner that its ITH would be extended only from 13
August 1999 to 21 October 1999, petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, a
recourse that is not sanctioned by either the Rules of Civil Procedure or by the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987. Petitioner cannot invoke Article 36 of E.O. No. 226 to justify its
appeal to the Office of the President. Article 36, along with Article 7, which allows recourse
to the Office of the President, applies to specific instances, namely, controversies between a
registered enterprise and a government agency and decisions concerning the registration of
an enterprise, respectively. Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. This enumeration is
exclusive so that other controversies outside of its purview, including petitioner’s entitlement
to an ITH, can invoke only the appellate judicial relief provided under Article 82. In the instant
case, the denial of petitioner’s application for an ITH is not within the cases where the law
expressly provides for appellate recourse to the Office of the President. That being the case,
petitioner should have elevated its appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43
Santos vs Go; GR No. 156081; 19 October 2005 Rollo, Noel Jethro III Macaspac

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Lapid vs Court of Appeals; GR No. 142261; 29 June 2000 Roxas, Marlen Navaluna

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Fabian vs Desierto; GR No. 129742; 16 September 1998 Salvador, Patricia Ann Pongos

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS:
Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction
business. Private respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the District Engineer of the First Metro
Manila Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he
was administratively charged in the Office of the Ombudsman. PROMAT participated in the
bidding for government construction projects including those under the FMED, and private
respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, involved the petitioner in an
affair

Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT
with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his
office. When petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and
resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation
and threats. Because of these acts, Fabian filed an administrative charge for grave
misconduct against Agustin committed by him will the goal of having him dismissed from his
position for violating Obudsman Act of 1989 and Presidential Decree No. 807 or the Civil
Service Decree.

The Ombudsman found Agustin guilty. Eventually, Augustin would be exonerated from all
these administrative charges when he moved the case for reconsideration.

After this, Fabian moved to appeal.Here she averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of
the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), 2 when a respondent is absolved of the
charges in an administrative proceeding the decision of the Ombudsman is final and
unappealable.
She accordingly submits that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority under
the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal
allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court.
Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she
found it "necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeal under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of

the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
HELD:

No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides
that:

In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of
the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

It cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate
jurisdiction of this Court. Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o
law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in
this Constitution without its advice and consent," and that Republic Act No. 6770, with its
challenged Section 27, took effect on November 17, 1989, obviously in spite of that
constitutional prohibition.

As a consequence of our ratiocination, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck
down as unconstitutional

St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC; GR No. 130866; 16 September 1998 Samonte, Maria Genevieve Castro

DOCTRINE:
● Under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the
decision of the NLRC.
● The remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a
precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably avail of the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, for which said Rule has now fixed the
reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision.
FACTS:
● Bienvenido Aricayos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San
Fernando, Pampanga.
● Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of
petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no
contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name
included in the semi-monthly payroll.
● He was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00
 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
● Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but
only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral
Home.
● Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee
relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction
over the case.
● Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC
contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to the evidence
submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a "volunteer" and not as an
employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or
a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-employee
relationship between him and petitioner
● On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned
decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate
proceedings.
● Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in
its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, hence the present petition
alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the NLRC is appealable to the Court of Appeals
HELD:
No. Under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the
decision of the NLRC. The present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of
R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases
within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such decision
shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the
parties. As sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the
aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any
further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65, for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period
of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for
finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in
Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take
cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process
considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65.

Ordinary Appealed Cases (Rule 44)

Corazon Cruz vs. MIAA; GR No. 184732; 9 September 2013 Santillan, Edward Jayson Baterna

DOCTRINE: An appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate
court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below. All
that said appellee can do is to make a counter-assignment of errors or to argue on issues
raised at the trial only for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in his favor, even on
grounds not included in the decision of the court a quo nor raised in the appellant's
assignment of errors or arguments

FACTS:
On December 7, 2005, Cruz filed before the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Pasig City, a
complaint for breach of contract against respondent Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA).

Cruz alleged that on August 12, 2003, she executed a lease contract with MIAA over a
1,411.98 square meter-property, situated at Pasay City, in order to establish a commercial
arcade for sublease to other businesses.

She averred that MIAA failed to inform her that part of the leased premises is subject to an
easement since the same was adjacent to the Parañaque River. As a result, she was not
able to obtain a building permit as well as a certificate of electrical inspection from
MERALCO, leading to her consequent failure to secure an electrical connection for the entire
leased premises.

Due to the lack of electricity, Cruz’s tenants did not pay rent; hence, she was unable to pay
her own rental obligations to MIAA from December 2004 onwards. Further, since some of
Cruz’s stalls were located in the easement area, the MMDA demolished them, causing her to
suffer actual damages. In view of the foregoing, Cruz sent MIAA her rental computation,
However, instead of accepting Cruz’s payment, MIAA sent a letter terminating the lease
contract.

MIAA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:

(a) violation of the certification requirement against forum shopping under the Rules of Court,
given that the lease contract subject of the Pasig case is the same actionable document
subject of the Manila case which is a complaint for partial annulment of contract also filed by
Cruz before the RTC of Manila and

(b) improper venue, since in the complaint for annulment of contract, as well as the
verification/certification, as it is indicated that Cruz is a resident of San Miguel, Manila.

RTC-Pasig City: issued an Order dismissing Cruz’s complaint for breach of contract due to
forum shopping since both the Pasig and Manila cases are founded on the same actionable
document. In addition, it observed that the Pasig case was not being prosecuted by the real
party-in-interest since the lessee named in the lease contract is one Frederick Cruz and not
Cruz. It did not, however, sustain MIAA’s argument on improper venue since Cruz alleged to
be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila; therefore, unless proven otherwise, the complaint
shall be taken on its face value.
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied.Thus, Cruz filed a
notice of appeal.
CA

In her Appellant’s Brief, Cruz assigned the following errors:

(a) that the RTC-Pasig City erred in holding that there was forum shopping, considering that
the causes of action in the complaints for breach of contract and annulment of contract are
separate and distinct;
(b) that the RTC-Pasig City erred in ruling that Cruz is not the real party-in-interest
considering that Frederick Cruz merely signed the lease contract as her attorney-in-fact; and
(c) that the RTC-Pasig City erred in not denying MIAA’s motion to dismiss since it was set for
hearing more than 10 days from its filing.
On the other hand, MIAA filed its Defendant-Appellee’s Brief refuting the foregoing
arguments. In addition, MIAA raised before the CA its argument on improper venue which
had been previously denied by the RTC-Pasig City.
the CA dismissed the Pasig case. While Petitioner did not commit forum shopping, the Pasig
case remains dismissible on the ground of improper venue as Cruz was bound by her
judicial admission that her residence was actually in Manila and not in San Juan.
Dissatisfied, Cruz moved for reconsideration but was denied by the CA.

ISSUE: whether or not the CA erred in dismissing Cruz’s appeal on the basis of improper
venue.

HELD: An appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court
any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below. All that
said appellee can do is to make a counter-assignment of errors or to argue on issues raised
at the trial only for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in his favor, even on grounds not
included in the decision of the court a quo nor raised in the appellant's assignment of errors
or arguments.

Jurisprudence dictates that the appellee’s role in the appeal process is confined only to the
task of refuting the assigned errors interposed by the appellant. Since the appellee is not the
party who instituted the appeal and accordingly has not complied with the procedure
prescribed therefor, he merely assumes a defensive stance and his interest solely relegated
to the affirmance of the judgment appealed from. It is highly erroneous for the appellee to
either assign any error or seek any affirmative relief or modification of the lower court’s
judgment without interposing its own appeal.

In the case at bar, the Court finds that the CA committed a reversible error in sustaining the
dismissal of the Pasig case on the ground of improper venue because the same was not an
error raised by Cruz who was the appellant before it. The CA cannot take cognizance of
MIAA’s position that the venue was improperly laid since, being the appellee, MIAA’s
participation was confined to the refutation of the appellant’s assignment of errors. As MIAA’s
interest was limited to sustaining the RTC-Pasig City’s judgment, it cannot, without pursuing
its own appeal, deviate from the pronouncements made therein.

Mercado vs. Sps. Espina; GR No. 173987; 25 February 2013 Silva, Virna Grace Marasigan

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Maricalum Mining corp. vs. Remington Industrial Sales Corp.; GR No. 158332; 11 February Siron, Charmaine Grace Medina
2008

DOCTRINE: One party's appeal from a judgment will not inure to the benefit of a co-party
who failed to appeal; and as against the latter, the judgment will continue to run its course
until it becomes final and executory. To this general rule, however, one exception stands out:
where both parties have a commonality of interests, the appeal of one is deemed to be the
vicarious appeal of the other.

FACTS:
● Private respondent Remington Industrial Sales Corporation sued Marinduque Mining
and Industrial Corporation (Marinduque Mining) for payment of P921,755.95 worth of
construction materials and other merchandise.
 ● The complaint, docketed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, was amended four
times to implead as co-defendants Philippine National Bank (PNB), Nonoc Mining
and Industrial Corporation (Nonoc Mining), Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP), Asset Privatization Trust (APT), Island Cement Corporation (ICC) and
petitioner, on the ground that they are assignees/ transferees of the real and
personal properties, chattels, machineries, equipment and other assets of
Marinduque Mining.

● In particular, petitioner was impleaded because "the properties, real and personal,
chattels, machineries, equipment and all other assets of the Marinduque Mining &
Industrial Corporation at Sipalay, Negros Occidental, mining projects at Rizal
Province, which were foreclosed by the Philippine National Bank and Development
Bank of the Philippines, were transferred to petitioner Maricalum.

● The RTC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, ordering petitioner-defendants to

pay the aforementioned sum.

● Petitioner and its co-defendants PNB, DBP, Nonoc Mining, ICC and APT filed with
the CA an appeal which the CA dismissed.

● DBP and PNB filed before the Court separate appeals, docketed as G.R. Nos.
126200 and 122710, respectively.

● On its own, petitioner also attempted to institute an appeal with the Court by filing a
motion for an extension of 30 days within which to file a petition for review on
certiorari and to pay the legal fees. However, for lack of an affidavit of service as
required under paragraph 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 1-88 and Administrative
Circular No. 3-96, the Court denied its motion in the Resolution, which became final.
Petitioner also sought to intervene in PNB v. CA but the Court disallowed it due to
the tardiness of its motion.
● Private respondent thus filed with the RTC a motion for execution, solely against
petitioner on the ground that the Supreme Court’s resolution having become final
with respect that the CA’s decision affirming RTC’s decision. The RTC granted the
Motion for Execution, over petitioner’s objection. This, prompted petitioner to file with
the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
● In the meantime, the Court rendered decision in DBP v. CA, where it ruled that the
original complaint filed in the RTC is dismissed, and this became final. In PNB v. CA,
the court tendered a decision, holding that it reverses the CA division and enters
judgment dismissing the complaint of Remington Industrial Sales as against PNB.
Thus, citing PNB v. CA, petitioner filed a manifestation before the CA, urging it to
dismiss the claim of private respondent and to annul the RTC orders. The CA,
however, dismissed petitioner's petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court’s decision in DBP v. CA and PNB v. CA inured to the
benefit of petitioner which was not a party either case, as to bar execution of the April 10,
1990 RTC Decision.
HELD: Yes. The Court’s decisions to said cases inured to the benefit of petitioner.

Indeed, one party's appeal from a judgment will not inure to the benefit of a co-party who
failed to appeal; and as against the latter, the judgment will continue to run its course until it
becomes final and executory. To this general rule, however, one exception stands out: where
both parties have a commonality of interests, the appeal of one is deemed to be the
vicarious appeal of the other.
The Court concluded that private respondent failed to discharge its burden of proving bad
faith on the part of Marinduque Mining and its transferees in the mortgage and foreclosure of
the subject properties as to justify the piercing of the corporate veil.

The adjudication rendered in DBP v. CA and PNB v. CA is plain: private respondent has no
cause of action against DBP, PNB and their transferees, including petitioner, for they are
corporate entities separate and distinct from Marinduque Mining, and cannot be held liable
for the latter's obligations to private respondent.

APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT (Rule 45)

Panganiban vs. Tara Trading Shipmanagement, Inc.; GR No. 187032; 18 October 2010 Suarez, Jacob Almero

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

DAR vs. Berenguer; GR No. 154094; 9 March 2010 Tablizo, Darlymple Dayne Robles

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS:
● In April 1998, the respondents received from the DAR notices of coverage of their
landholdings by the Government's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL).
● They protested the notices of coverage, filing in the office of DAR Regional Director in
Legaspi City, their application for exclusion of their landholdings from CARP coverage, and
praying for the lifting of the notices of coverage.
● In October and November 1998, the DAR Secretary, without acting on the respondents
application for exclusion, canceled their titles and issued certificates of land ownership
awards (CLOAs), covering their landholdings, to the members of the Baribag Agrarian
Reform Beneficiaries Development Cooperative (Baribag), not to the respondents’ workers
on the landholdings, although Baribag was not impleaded in the respondents application for
exclusion.
● In an order dated February 15, 1999, Regional Director Dalugdug denied the respondents
application for exclusion. Thus, they appealed the denial to the DAR Secretary.
● RARAD issued an implementing writ placing Baribag in possession of the respondents’
landholdings.
● On March 24, 1999, the respondents appealed before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board by filing a notice of appeal with the office of RARAD Florin. DAR
denied the respondents appeal of the order of Regional Director Dalugdug denying their
application for exclusion and petition to lift the notice of coverage.
● The respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), which
treated the petition as a petition for review.
● Respondents’ contention: They maintained that their landholdings were outside the coverage
of the CARL due to their being originally devoted to pasture and livestock raising, and later
being already classified as residential and industrial lands;
● Petitioner’s contention: DAR asserted that the presence of heads of large cattle in
respondents’ landholdings was not a sufficient ground to consider the landholdings as being
used for raising livestock.
● Ruling of the Court of Appeals: The CA granted the petition, and reversed the DAR
Secretary’s order.
 ● The CA set aside the writ of execution and writ of possession issued by RARAD Florin;
ordered the cancellation of Baribags CLOAs; and directed the DAR Secretary to restore the
respondents in the possession of their landholdings.
● Hence, the present appeal

ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals erred when it considered the respondents’ petition for
certiorari as a petition for review

HELD: ​The CA did not err in treating the petition for certiorari as a petition for review.

According to the Department of Education v. Cuanan, this Court ruled that the petition for certiorari
filed by therein respondent Cuanan with the CA within the 15-day reglementary period for filing a
petition for review could be treated as a petition for review, for that would be in accord with the
liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice.

The Court had occasion to expound on the exceptions to the rule that a recourse to a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 rendered the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy, thus: (a) when
public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice
so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts
to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. Whereon, exception (c) applies to the present case.

In the case at bar, Irregular actuations of the DAR: Unwarranted awarding of the landholdings to
Baribag in violation of Section 22 of the CARL. The DAR also violated the respondents’ right of
retention under Section 6 of the CARL, which accorded to the respondents as the landowners the right
to retain five hectares of their landholdings, and the right to choose the areas to be retained, which
should be compact or contiguous. DAR’s cancellation of all of the respondents TCTs effectively
nullified the respondents right of retention, thereby depriving them of their property without due
process of law.

Lastly, RARAD Florins issuance of the writ of execution in favor of Baribag was highly irregular. It
must be noted, first of all, that because Baribag was not even a party in relation to the respondents’
application for exclusion before Regional Director Dalugdug, RARAD Florin did not acquire
jurisdiction over Baribag. As such, the legal authority of RARAD Florin to implement the award to
Baribag by execution did not exist. Secondly, the denial of the respondents’ application for exclusion
was still pending review by the DAR Secretary when RARAD Florin issued the writ of execution to
implement Regional Director Dalugdug’s order to place Baribag in possession of the respondents
landholdings.
Hence, the issuance of the writ of execution was premature and bereft of legal basis.

Therefore, the petition for review on certiorari is denied

Nunez vs GSIS Family Bank; GR No. 163988; 17 November 2005 Uriarte, Juan Carlos Gandeza

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

China Road and Bridge Corp. vs Court of Appeals; GR No. 137898; 15 December 2000 Veloria, Jasmin Mae Pama
DOCTRINE:

FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

ORIGINAL CASES (RULE 46, Sections 1 to 7)

Zapanta vs. Co King Ki; GR No. 191694; 03 December 2014 Villan, Vera Mae Angelica Salvador

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Guy vs. Court of Appeals; GR No. 165849; 10 December 2007 Villanueva, Harvey John G.

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

NYK International vs. NLRC; GR No. 146267; 17 February 2003 Villareal, Marinel Rana

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Molina vs. Court of Appeals; GR No. 143156; 13 January 2003 Viloria, Patricia Jean Mamaril

DOCTRINE: The inclusion of the tribunal, which issued the decision, as nominal party, was
substantially complied with. When petitioners mentioned the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21
of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, they also referred necessarily to the judge who issued the assailed
resolutions.

FACTS: - The Philippine Daily inquirer published news that “PACC coddled GO, 2 NBI
execs claim,” by Molina and Pascual

- Afterwards, NBI agent raided a vacation house in La Union, owned by Armovit,

Go’s lawyer. They missed Go who left the house hours before the NBI agents
came.

- A source said 1. “They found some of his personal belongings near the houses,
swimming pool.” 2. “After the La Union raid, it was hard to track Go because he
was moving as if he was receiving advice”

- Phil. Daily Inquirer then reported that “NBI execs says Go tipped off by PACC,”
by Molina and Pascual
 - Armovit filed a complaint for libel against Molina and Pascual alleging that they
maliciously published reports accusing him of harboring and/or concealing a
convicted murderer.

- Provincial prosecutor of Ilocos Sur found probable cause and recommended the
filing of an information for libel hence 2 informations were filed one against
Molina and the other Pascual.

- Molina and Pascual sought the review of the resolution to the Regional state
prosecutor who reversed the findings of the Provincial prosecutor and withdrew
the informations.

- RTC of Vigan denied the motion to withdraw the indictments on the ground that
there was probable cause.

- Molina and Pascual elevated the case to the CA via a Special civil action for
Certiorari. CA found that the assailed orders were certified but there was no
showing the authority of the person certifying the orders and the Seal of the trial
court could not be identified on the copies of the orders, the petition was not
accompanied by pleadings and documents and they did not implead the Judge.

ISSUE: Whether or Not CA erred in dismissing the petition for Certiorari and prohibition, of
Molina and Pascual, on mere technicalities
HELD: Yes, CA erred in in stressing too much petitions failure to comply with technicalities.
A litigation is a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court
the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of
form and technicalities, asks that justice be done on the merits.

Rule 1, sec. 6 mandates that rules of procedure shall be liberally interpreted. We cannot
attribute to petitioners the perceived defects on the attached defects on the attached copies
of the trial courts orders because petitioners did not have control over their preparation.

Rule 131, sec 3, states that presumption in petitioners favor that they followed the pertinent
rules on attaching certified copies of the orders subject of their petition, as private
respondent failed to show evidence to rebut this presumption, presumption stands.

The alleged failure to attach all pleadings and documents is not sufficient ground to dismiss
the petition. The courts may liberally construe procedural rules in order to meet and advance
the cause of substantial justice. We have held that lapses in the literal observation of a
procedural rule will be overlooked when they do not involve public policy, when they arose
from an honest mistake or unforeseen accident, when they have not prejudiced the adverse
party, nor deprived the court of its authority.

It is not required under Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court that the trial judge himself be
impleaded in a petition for certiorari. The rule clearly states that a petition for certiorari may
be filed against the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
The inclusion of the tribunal, which issued the decision, as nominal party, was substantially
complied with. When petitioners mentioned the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, they also referred necessarily to the judge who issued the assailed resolutions.

*Note: Nachura “Rule 46 primarily governs original actions for certiorari filed in the CA, but
rule 65 generally serves to supplement the same. Rules 46 and 65 co-exist with each other
and should be construed so as to give effect to every provision of both rules”

**Note: Rule 46 is not stated in case

Shipside, Inc. vs. CA; GR No. 143377; 20 February 2001 Yumul, Karlo Del Domingo

DOCTRINE: To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must
be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to enforced.
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by real interest is meant a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential.

FACTS: Rafael Galvez conveyed two parcels of land to Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana,
Regina Bustos, and Erlinda Balatbat which in turn conveyed the said lots to Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Corporation. The latter then conveyed the said lots to petitioner
Shipside Incorporated. However, unknown to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation, the
Court of First Instance declared the land title of Rafael Galvez, including the two parcels of
land, null and void. The Court, in this case, issue a writ of execution of the judgment
declaring the land title of Rafael Galvez null and void.

Twenty four long years thereafter, the Office of the Solicitor General received a letter from
Mr. Victor G. Floresca, Vice-President, John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation,
stating that the aforementioned orders and decision of the trial court have not been executed
by the Register of Deeds, San Fernando, La Union despite receipt of the writ of execution.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation
of titles before the Regional Trial Court. The Solicitor General, nonetheless, argues that the
States cause of action in the cancellation of the land title issued to petitioners
predecessor-in-interest is imprescriptible because it is included in Camp Wallace, which
belongs to the government.

ISSUE: Whether the Republic has a cause of action.

HELD: NO. While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may
not be invoked by the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject
matter.

While Camp Wallace may have belonged to the government at the time Rafael Galvezs title
was ordered cancelled in Land Registration Case No. N-361, the same no longer holds true
today. With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA (Bases Conversion and Development
Authority) under Section 2 of Proclamation No. 216, the government no longer has a right or
interest to protect.

Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant
action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in
cases where the government is a party in interest.
Under Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

Vanguard Assurance Corporation vs. CA; GR No. L-25921; 27 May 1975 Adolfo, Rochelle Angela Rabang

DOCTRINE:
Generally, an appeal should not be dismissed on a ground which goes to the merits of the
case or the right of plaintiff or defendant to recover, except when the appellate court finds the
appeal to be manifestly and palpably frivolous.

FACTS:
● In the Court of First Instance of Manila plaintiff (now respondent) Jalwindor
Manufacturers, Inc. sued Felipe Hernandez to recover the sum of P30,000.00. In
its complaint plaintiff also prayed for a writ of preliminary attachment against the
property of the defendant to answer for any judgment which the former may obtain
against the latter. Upon plaintiff's filing a bond in the amount of P30,000.00 the
lower court issued the order of attachment against defendant Felipe Hernandez.

● Felipe Hernandez moved to dissolve or to lift the order of attachment and put up a
counterbond in the amount of P30,000.00, with petitioner Vanguard Assurance
Corporation acting as surety. Accordingly, the lower court approved the
counterbond and lifted the writ of attachment.

● They entered into a compromise agreement whereby Felipe Hernandez

undertook and agreed to pay the plaintiff P26,000.00 in three (3) monthly
installments. It was also provided in the compromise agreement that the
counterbond executed by the defendant would remain in full force and effect in
favor of the plaintiff and that in case of breach by the defendant of any provision of
the compromise agreement, he would be amenable to the execution of the
judgment and other relief available to the plaintiff as circumstances may warrant.
The court approved of the same and rendered judgment on the basis thereof.

● On motion of the plaintiff due to the defendant's failure to pay accordingly, the
lower court issued a writ of execution. However, no sufficient property of the
defendant was located and the writ of execution was only partially satisfied to the
extent of P5,000.00. Plaintiff demanded from the Vanguard Assurance
Corporation, as surety, the balance of P21,000.00 plus P652.57 representing the
costs of the suit. The demand for payment having been ignored, plaintiff filed a
motion with the lower court for an order to recover the unpaid balance from the
counterbond, pursuant to Sec. 17, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.

● ·Vanguard Assurance Corporation elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. After
the perfection of the appeal and before the parties had filed their respective briefs,
appellee Jalwindor Manufacturers, Inc. moved to dismiss the appeal, to which
appellant surety filed an opposition claiming that the motion to dismiss could not
be determined without resolving the entire case on the merits. However, the Court
of Appeals sustained the motion in its decision promulgated on December 17,
 1965 and held that the appeal is frivolous, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appeal interposed by the Vanguard Assurance
Corporation is hereby dismissed for being manifestly and palpably
frivolous, and the appealed judgment is affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellant surety."

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense showing full
payment by the defendant of the obligation sought to be enforced against the counterbond.
No.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal before the
submission of the briefs and before the parties could be heard on the merits. No.

HELD:
1. NO. It must be noted that the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court
of Appeals. In other words, the above findings of the trial court that there was really no full
payment of the judgment debt and the counterbond is still liable for the unpaid balance
was also found correct by the Court of Appeals when it fully affirmed the decision appealed
from. Besides, the petitioner's evidence to that effect partook of the nature of hearsay
evidence, considering that the defendant was never presented to testify thereon.
"The said liability may only be avoided if there is collusion between plaintiff and
defendant in securing the said judgment to the prejudice of the surety on the
counter-bond, or if the said judgment has already been paid by defendant. There is
no showing whatsoever of such collusion, nor was defendant presented as a witness
that he has fully said judgment."

2. NO, the Court of Appeals did not erred in dismissing the appeal of the petitioner on the
ground that the same was manifestly frivolous and instituted merely for delay The Court
held that based on the face of the record it could not see any prospect of the decision
appealed from being reversed or modified, in view of the clear and unequivocal provisions
of Sections 12 and 17 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court regarding the liability of a surety on
a counter-bond in attachment proceedings. To entertain the instant appeal by remanding
the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings would entail too much time and
effort which would impair the speedy administration of justice. The instant appeal is
manifestly frivolous and completely devoid of merit.
Thus, although, as a general rule, an appeal should not be dismissed on a ground which
goes to the merits of the case or to the right of plaintiff or defendant to recover, yet, in
exceptional instance, an appellate court may order the dismissal when the appeal appears
to be manifestly and palpably frivolous. And where, as in the instant case, the dismissal
has been ordered by the trial court, it will not be disturbed in the appellate court if the latter
finds the appeal to have been interposed ostensibly for delay.
It has been held that a frivolous appeal is one presenting no justiciable question, or one so
readily recognizable as devoid of merit on the face of the record that there is little, if any,
prospect that it can ever succeed.
The instant case is one such instance in which the appeal is evidently without merit, taken
manifestly for delay. Therefore the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
petitioner.
 ANNULMENT OF JUDGEMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS
(Rule 47, Sections 1 to 10)
Genato Investments, Inc. vs. Barrientos; GR No. 207443; 23 July 2014 Angeles, Bernice Marie Sidocon

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Bulawan vs. Aquende; GR No. 182819; 22 June 2011 Apolinario, Eufemia Mulimbayan

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Sps. Arcenas vs. Queen City Development Bank; GR No. 166819; 16 June 2010 Arboleda, Anreinne Sabille
Larizabal
DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Diona vs. Balague, et al.; GR No. 173559; 07 January 2009 Bahia, Hannah Grace Israel

DOCTRINE: The grant of a relief neither sought by the party in whose favor it was given nor
supported by the evidence presented violates the opposing party's right to due process and
may be declared void ab initio in a proper proceeding.

FACTS:
● The respondents obtained a loan from petitioner payable in six months and secured
by a Real Estate Mortgage over property in Valenzuela and covered by TCT.
● When the debt became due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand.
Thus, petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint praying that respondents be ordered
to pay the principal obligation with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, until full
obligation if fully paid.
● Respondents were served with summons thru respondent Sonny A. Balangue. They
filed a Motion to Extend Period to Answer. Despite the requested extension,
however, respondents failed to file any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon motion of
the petitioner, the RTC declared them in default and allowed petitioner to present her
evidence ex parte.
● The RTC granted petitioner's Complaint. The sum of P45,000.00 representing the
unpaid principal loan obligation plus interest at 5% per month, until the same is fully
paid.
● Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, alleging that respondents did
not interpose a timely appeal despite receipt by their former counsel of the RTC's
Decision.
● Before it could be resolved, however, respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside
 Judgment, claiming that not all of them were duly served with summons. According
to the other respondents, they had no knowledge of the case because their
co-respondent Sonny did not inform them about it. They prayed that the RTC's
Decision be set aside and a new trial be conducted.
● RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution to implement its Decision.
However, since the writ could not be satisfied, petitioner moved for the public auction
of the mortgaged property, which the RTC granted. In an auction sale conducted,
petitioner was the only bidder. Thus, a Certificate of Sale was issued in her favor
and accordingly annotated at the back of TCT.
● Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and to Set Aside
Execution Sale, claiming that the parties did not agree in writing on any rate of
interest and that petitioner merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her
Complaint. Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60% per annum)
until full payment. Resultantly, their indebtedness inclusive of the exorbitant interest
from March 2, 1991 to May 22, 2001 ballooned from P124,400.00 to P652,000.00.
● The RTC granted respondents' motion and accordingly modified the interest rate
awarded from 5% monthly to 12% per annum. Respondents filed a Motion for Leave
to Deposit/Consign Judgment Obligation.
● Displeased with the RTC's Order, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
● The CA rendered a Decision declaring that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in
awarding the 5% monthly interest but at the same time pronouncing that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in subsequently reducing the rate of interest to 12% per
annum.
● Respondents filed with the same court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and
Execution Sale with Damages. They contended that the portion of the RTC Decision
granting petitioner 5% monthly interest rate is in gross violation of Section 3 (d) of
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and of their right to due process. According to
respondents, the loan did not carry any interest as it was the verbal agreement of
the parties that in lieu thereof petitioner's family can continue occupying
respondents' residential building located in Marulas, Valenzuela for free until said
loan is fully paid.
● CA denied due course to the Petition. Upon respondents' motion, however, it
reinstated and granted the Petition.
● In setting aside portions of the RTC's Decision, the CA ruled that aside from being
unconscionably excessive, the monthly interest rate of 5% was not agreed upon by
the parties and that petitioner's Complaint clearly sought only the legal rate of 12%
per annum. Following the mandate of Section 3 (d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court,
the CA concluded that the awarded rate of interest is void for being in excess of the
relief sought in the Complaint.

ISSUE:
1.WON CA COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTED
RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A SUBSTITUTE OR
ALTERNATIVE REMEDY OF A LOST APPEAL.

2. WON THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR AND

MISAPPREHENSION OF LAW AND THE FACTS WHEN IT GRANTED
RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF THE DECISION
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID DECISION HAS
BECOME FINAL AND ALREADY EXECUTED CONTRARY TO THE DOCTRINE OF
IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT.
HELD:
We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to due
process and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

1. No. A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a
remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his
part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a
substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party's own neglect in promptly
availing of the same. However, even though a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may
be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence
recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment.

In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported both by the
allegations in the pleadings and the evidence on record. The Real Estate Mortgage executed
by the parties does not include any provision on interest. When petitioner filed her Complaint
before the RTC, she alleged that respondents borrowed from her the sum of P45,000, with
interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum" and sought payment thereof. She did not
allege or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither did she present evidence nor
testified thereon. Clearly, the RTC's award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks
basis and disregards due process. It violated the due process requirement because
respondents were not informed of the possibility that the RTC may award 5% monthly
interest. They were deprived of reasonable opportunity to refute and present controverting
evidence as they were made to believe that the complainant [petitioner] was seeking for
what she merely stated in her Complaint.

2. No.The respondents' principal obligation was only P45,000.00. Due to their former
counsel's gross negligence in handling their cause, coupled with the RTC's erroneous,
baseless, and illegal award of 5% monthly interest, they now stand to lose their property
and still owe petitioner a large amount of money. If the impugned judgment is not
rightfully nullified, petitioners will not only end up losing their property but will additionally
owe private respondent the sum of P232,000.00 plus the legal interest said balance had,
in the meantime, earned. Furthermore, with regard to petitioner's invocation of the
doctrine of immutability of judgment, the latter did not contest as she even admits that
the RTC made a glaring mistake in awarding 5% monthly interest. Obviously, she wants
to benefit from such erroneous award. This Court cannot allow this injustice to happen.

Llamas vs. CA; GR No. 149588; 29 September 2009 Bitong, John Eli Zuriel De Villa

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Lopez vs. Esquivel; GR No. 168734; 24 April 2009 Boncayao, Paty Kaye Cedro

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X
Orbeta vs. Sendiong; GR No. 155236; 08 July 2005 Cabugatan, Muammar Montila

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Alaban vs. CA; GR No. 156021; 23 September 2005 Celino, Rayan Jen Cosalan

DOCTRINE: X

FACTS:
● Respondent filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late
Elevencionado ("decedent").
● Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her
will.
● On 30 May 2001, RTC rendered its Decision,allowing the probate of the will of the
decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.
● More than 4 month later, or on 4 October 2001, petitioners filed a motion for the
reopening of the probate proceedings,
● Among others, they Claim that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition
due to defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
● RTC denied the motion for the judgment being final and executory.
● Elevating a petition for annulment of judgment to the CA, petitioners claim that they
learned of the probate proceedings only in July of 2001. CA denied the petition.
● Elevating another petition to the SC, petitioners mainly claim, as opposed to the CA,
that:
1.) They have not availed of or resorted to the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief from judgment or other remedies through no fault of their own because they
were Not made parties to the case in which the decision sought to be annulled was
rendered; and
2.) Petitioners were denied their day in court during the proceedings before the
RTC.

● On the other hand, the respondent mainly claims that:

1.)They could have resorted to a petition for relief from judgment instead since they
learned of the RTC's judgment only 3 and a half months after its promulgation; and
2.) There was no showing that they were denied their day in court, so no extrinsic
fraud exists to warrant the annulment of the RTC's Decision.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the petition for annulment of judgment with the CA is proper.
2.) Whether or not the petitioners were denied their day in court

HELD: X

Ceruila vs. Delantar; GR No. 140305; 09 December 2005 Cuevas, Kathleen Allysa Marie
Aquino
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Rule 48 - Preliminary Conference

Rule 49 - Oral Arguments
Rule 50 - Dismissal of Appeal
JUDGMENT (Rule 51, Sections 1 to 11)
Philippine Hawk Corporation vs. Lee; GR No. 166869; 16 Feb 2010

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X
Cutaran, Al Jarana
Limkaichong vs. Comelec; GR No. 178831-32; 30 July 2009 DALIPE, Ria Alisandra Tolentino

DOCTRINE: An unpromulgated decision is no decision at all. At the very least, they are part
of the confidential internal deliberations of the Court which must not be released to the
public. A decision becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated. Until such operative
act occurs, there is really no decision to speak of, even if some or all of the Justices have
already affixed their signatures thereto. During the intervening period from the time of
signing until the promulgation of the decision, any one who took part in the deliberation and
had signed the decision may, for a reason, validly withdraw one's vote, thereby preserving
one's freedom of action.

FACTS:
● The present case is a motion for reconsideration with prayer for oral arguments filed
by Louis Biraogo with regard the Court’s April 1, 2009 decision which granted
Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong’s petition for certiorari in another case.
● In the consolidated petitions, the issue was whether Limkaichong was qualified to
run for, to be elected to, and to assume and discharge the position of Representative
for the 1st district of Negros Oriental
o The contention of the parties in that case was that Limkaichong was not a
natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement provided
under the 1987 Constitution.
● The Court dismissed all other petitions, including Biraogo’s petition, and reversed
the Joint Resolution of COMELEC 2nd division which disqualified Limkaichong from
running as a congressional candidate in the 1st district of Negros Oriental due to lack
of citizenship requirement
● The subject April 1, 2009 decision rendered by the court held that the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal and no longer the COMELEC, should assume
jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.
● In his motion, Biraogo maintained that the court should reconsider its April 1, 2009
decision
● Biraogo observed that the April 1, 2009 decision is a complete turn-around from the
ruling in the Decision written by Justice Ruben Reyes which, although
unpromulgated, was nonetheless signed by 14 Associate Justices and approved by
the Court en banc on July 15, 2008
ISSUE: Whether the Court should reconsider its April 1, 2009 decision?

HELD:
NO, Biraogo had not convinced the court to reconsider its April 1, 2009 decision.

The Court in Belac v. Commision on Elections, held that a decision must not only be signed
by the Justices who took part in the deliberation, but must also be promulgated to be
considered a Decision, to wit:

[A] true decision of the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly
promulgated. Before that decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision
of the Court to speak of. The vote cast by a member of the Court after the deliberation is
always understood to be subject to confirmation at the time he has to sign the decision that
is to be promulgated. The vote is of no value if it is not thus confirmed by the Justice casting
it. The purpose of this practice is apparent. Members of this Court, even after they have cast
their votes, wish to preserve their freedom of action till the last moment when they have to
sign the decision, so that they may take full advantage of what they may believe to be the
best fruit of their most mature reflection and deliberation. In consonance with this practice,
before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated
during and after the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breasts of the Justices,
binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may
serve for determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for designating a
member to prepare the decision of the Court, but in no way is that decision binding unless
and until signed and promulgated.

We add that at any time before promulgation, the ponencia may be changed by the ponente.
Indeed, if any member of the court who may have already signed it so desires, he may still
withdraw his concurrence and register a qualification or dissent as long as the decision has
not yet been promulgated. A promulgation signifies that on the date it was made the
judge or judges who signed the decision continued to support it.

Thus, an unpromulgated decision is no decision at all. At the very least, they are part of the
confidential internal deliberations of the Court which must not be released to the public. A
decision becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated. Until such operative act occurs,
there is really no decision to speak of, even if some or all of the Justices have already affixed
their signatures thereto. During the intervening period from the time of signing until the
promulgation of the decision, any one who took part in the deliberation and had signed the
decision may, for a reason, validly withdraw one's vote, thereby preserving one's freedom of
action.

Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. CA; GR No. 126462; 12 November 2002 De La Serna, Samantha Grace
Mauleon
DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND NEW TRIAL

(Rule 52, Sections 1 to 4 and Rule 53, Sections 1 to 4)
Gonzales III vs. Office of the President of the Phils.; GR Nos. 196231-196232; 28 January Dela Pieza, Mary Joy Valle
2014

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS:
There are two petition that have been consolidated because they raise a commonrelating to
the President’s exercise of the power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the
protective cloak of independence of the Office of the Ombudsman (a constitutionally created
office)
In the first Petition (Gonzales Petition) (G.R. No. 196231) Manila Police District Senior
Inspector Rolando Mendoza, together with four others, (Mendoza group) was the subject of
an administrative charge for grave misconduct filed before the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM). Emilio Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law
Enforcement Officers (MOLEO) took over the case. The Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez
approved Gonzales’ drafted decision finding the Mendoza group guilty of grave misconduct
and imposing on them the penalty of dismissal from the service. The Mendoza group filed a
motion for reconsideration. On August 23, 2010, pending final action by the Ombudsman on
the Mendoza case, Mendoza hijacked a tourist bus and held the passengers as hostages.
The incident resulted in the deaths of Mendoza and several others on board the hijacked
bus. President Aquino directed the conduct of a joint investigation of the incident. The joint
committee (IIRC) found Ombudsman Gutierrez and Gonzales accountable, in
particular, the unjustified delay in the resolution of Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration spanning nine months precipitated the desperate resort to
hostage-taking. Gonzales was formally charged before the Office of the President
(OP) for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty
and for Misconduct in Office. The OP found Gonzales guilty as charged and dismissed
him from the service. Gonzales contends that the OP has no administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman. According to RA 6770, Section 21, it is the
Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy
Ombudsman

Second Petition: Sulit’s Petition

In 2005, The Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several
others before the Sandiganbayan with plunder and money laundering. In 2010, the Office of
the Ombudsman, through Sulit and her prosecutorial staff, entered into a plea-bargaining
agreement with Garcia whereby he would be allowed to plead guilty to lesser offenses in
exchange for surrendering the assets he was charged to have illegally taken. Although the
Sandiganbayan approved the Agreement, the public outrage it engendered prompted the
House of Representatives to investigate. The House Committee found that Sulit and her
deputies committed culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust --
grounds for removal under Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 -- and recommended to the
President the dismissal from the service of Sulit. The OP initiated an administrative
disciplinary proceeding against Sulit. Sulit questioned the OP 's jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
the OP set the case for preliminary investigation, prompting Sulit to seek relief from the
Supreme Court.

In both petitions, it challenged the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of Republic Act (RA) No.
6770. In its September 4, 2012 Decision, the SC upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2)
of RA No. 6770 and ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. However, the SC reversed the decision of the OP
and ordered the reinstatement of Gonzales. Hence, the OP filed the present motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the OP’s decision finding of gross negligence for its unjustified delay
in the resolution of Captain Mendoza’s MR

HELD:
No. Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other
persons may be affected. In the case of public officials, there is gross negligence when a
breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.

Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted on the
case forwarded to him within nine days. In finding Gonzales guilty, the OP relied on Section
8, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7 (or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, series of 1990, as amended) in ruling that Gonzales should have acted on
Mendoza’s Motion for Reconsideration within five days. Even if we consider this provision to
be mandatory, the period it requires cannot apply to Gonzales since he is a Deputy
Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the case; he is not simply a Hearing Officer
tasked with the initial resolution of the motion

Furthermore, The OP's claims that Gonzales could have supervised his subordinates to
promptly act on Mendoza's motion and apprised the Tanodbayan of the urgency of resolving
the same are similarly groundless. The Office of the Ombudsman handles numerous cases
and we cannot conclusively state, as the OP appears to suggest, that Mendoza's case
should have been prioritized over other similar cases.

Equally important, the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition of cases"

before, among others, quasi-judicial bodies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, is
itself a relative concept. Thus, the delay, if any, must be measured in this objective
constitutional sense.

In this case, the court held that facts do not show that Gonzales’ subordinates had in any
way been grossly negligent in their work. While GIPO Garcia reviewed the case and drafted
the order for more than three months, it is noteworthy that he had not drafted the initial
decision and, therefore, had to review the case for the first time.These are not inordinately
long periods for the work involved: examination of the records, research on the pertinent
laws and jurisprudence, and exercise of legal judgment and discretion. If this Court rules that
these periods per se constitute gross neglect of duty, the Ombudsman’s constitutional
mandate to prosecute all the erring officials of this country would be subjected to an
unreasonable and overwhelming constraint. Therefore the finding of the OP are baseless.

Rule 54 – Internal Business (CA)

Rule 55 – Publication of Judgements and Final Resolution (CA)
ORIGINAL AND APPEALED CASES
(Rule 56, Sections 1 to 7)
Navarro vs. Executive Secretary; GR No. 180050; 12 April 2011 Delos Santos, Janah Joaquin

DOCTRINE: Undeniably, the motion for intervention and the motion for reconsideration of
the May 12, 2010 Resolution of movants-intervenors is akin to the right to appeal the
judgment of a case, which, though merely a statutory right that must comply with the
requirements of the rules, is an essential part of our judicial system, such that courts should
proceed with caution not to deprive a party of the right to question the judgment and its
effects, and ensure that every party-litigant, including those who would be directly affected,
would have the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of their cause, freed
from the constraints of technicalities

FACTS:
● October 2, 2006: PGMA approved into law R.A. No. 9355, or An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands.
● November 10, 2006: Herein petitioners, who were former political leaders of Surigao
del Norte, filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The said petition was dismissed on technical
grounds.
● Despite the initial dismissal of their petition, herein petitioners filed another petition
for certiorari. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive
the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal
Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that
when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only
and a population of only 106,951. This was in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, viz:
○ Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected and of Section 461 of the LGC, viz:
○ Section 461. Requisites for Creation. x x x (i) a continuous territory of at
least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
x x x (b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute
to the income of the province.

● December 3, 2006: The Comelec conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the
ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code (LGC).
The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.
● January 26, 2007: The interim set of provincial officials of the Province of Dinagat
Islands appointed by PGMA took their oath of office.
● May 14, 2007: Registered voters of the Province of Dinagat Islands elected their
new set of provincial officials.
● February 10, 2010: The SC issued a 2nd resolution pertaining to the 2nd petition for
certiorari filed by herein petitioners. The SC declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional
for failure to comply with the requirements on population and land area in the
creation of a province under the LGC. Consequently, it declared the proclamation of
Dinagat and the election of its officials as null and void. The SC’s decision likewise
declared as null and void the provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that, the land area requirement shall not
apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands for being
beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch as such exemption is not
expressly provided in the law.
● May 12, 2010: Prior to the June 2010 national elections, the Comelec issued
Resolution No. 8790, which indicated that once the SC’s 2nd resolution becomes
 final and executory before the June 2010 elections, then the Province of Dinagat
Islands and the Province of Surigao del Norte will remain as two separate provinces.
However, if the SC’s 2nd resolution becomes final and executory after the national
elections, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of
the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, which means the results of the
2010 election in Dinagat Islands shall be nullified.
● June 18, 2010: Herein movants-intervenors, duly elected officials of Surigao del
Norte whose positions will be affected by the nullification of the election results in the
event that the May 12, 2010 Resolution of the Comelec is not reversed, filed before
the SC a motion for reconsideration of the SC’s February 20, 2010 resolution. They
averred that: (1) the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress
amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity,
when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption
from the application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the
Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
● July 20, 2010: The SC denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to
Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010
on the ground that the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file
the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.
● September 7, 2010: Herein movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the July 20, 2010 Resolution, citing previous SC rulings allowing intervention as
an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any
time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010
elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. It was only after they
were elected as Governor of Surigao del Norte, Vice Governor of Surigao del Norte
and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member of the First District of Surigao del Norte
that they became possessed with legal interest in this controversy.
● October 5, 2010: The SC issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the
decision in this case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010.
● October 29, 2010: Herein movants-intervenors filed an Urgent Motion to Recall Entry
of Judgment..

ISSUE: Whether Navarro et al has a locus standi being the movant-intervenors in the case
at bar.
HELD:
● YES. It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the
event their Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 29, 2010 is
denied and their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is denied with
finality. Indeed, they have sufficiently shown that they have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that if the May 12, 2010 Resolution be not
reconsidered, their election to their respective positions during the May 10, 2010
polls and its concomitant effects would all be nullified and be put to naught.
● Given their unique circumstances, movants-intervenors should not be left without
any remedy before this Court simply because their interest in this case became
manifest only after the case had already been decided. The consequences of such a
decision would definitely work to their disadvantage, nay, to their utmost prejudice,
without even them being parties to the dispute. Such decision would also violate
their right to due process, a right that cries out for protection. Thus, it is imperative
that the movants-intervenors be heard on the merits of their cause.
● The motion for intervention and the motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010
 Resolution of movants-intervenors is akin to the right to appeal the judgment of a
case, which, though merely a statutory right that must comply with the requirements
of the rules, is an essential part of our judicial system, such that courts should
proceed with caution not to deprive a party of the right to question the judgment and
its effects, and ensure that every party-litigant, including those who would be directly
affected, would have the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of
their cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.
● The SC had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of judgment in light
of attendant extraordinary circumstances. The power to suspend or even disregard
rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which
this Court itself had already declared final. In this case, the compelling concern is
not only to afford the movants-intervenors the right to be heard since they would be
adversely affected by the judgment in this case despite not being original parties
thereto, but also to arrive at the correct interpretation of the provisions of the LGC
with respect to the creation of local government units.

Triumph International vs. Apostol and Opulencia; GR No. 164423; 16 June 2009 Devesa, Imelda Mallari

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Heirs of Maura So vs. Obliosca; GR No. 147082; 28 January 2008 Diel, Joan Cervantes

DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As

distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a
case, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the
person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case
is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in
the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject
of an appeal.
FACTS:
● Pantaleaon Jomoc was the owner of a parcel of land covered by a TCT and located
at Cogon District, Cagayan de Oro. When he died the property was inherited by his
heirs.
● In Feb. 1979, the Jomoc heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Absolute sale of registered land in favor of petitioner Maura So, over the property for
P300,000.00, but the three respondents and Maura So failed to affix their signature
on the document and it was not notarized.
● The petitioner demanded the execution of a final deed of conveyance but the Jomoc
heirs ignored the demand. On Feb. 24, 1983, petitioner filed a Complaint for
specific performance against the Jomoc heirs to compel them to execute and deliver
the proper registerable deed of sale over the lot.
● On Feb. 28, 1983, the Jomoc hiers executed again a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land in favor of the spouses Lim Liong
Kang and Lim Pue King for P200,000.00.
● On Feb. 12, 1988, the trial court decided the case in favor of the petitioner. On
appeal the CA affirmed the decision with the modification that the award of
damages, atty’s fees and expenses of litigation was deleted. The defendants' heirs
and the spouses Lim filed separate petitions for review with the SC which were later
 consolidated. On Aug. 2, 1991, the Court rendered a Decision in these consolidated
cases upholding petitioners' better right over the property.
● On Feb. 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for execution of the said decision. The
respondents opposed the motion on the ground that they did not participate in the
execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial… and they were not parties to the case. The
trial court granted the motion for execution. MR was filed but was also likewise
denied. On July 22, 1992, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion for
execution and divesting all the Jomoc hairs of their titles over the property.
● All the Jomoc hairs filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the said order
of the RTC, but was dismissed. The resolution became final and executory.
● It appears that, on Mar. 12, 1992, respondents also filed a complaint for legal
redemption against petitioner with the RTC of Misamis Oriental where respondents
posited that since they did not sell their shares in the property to petitioner, they
remained co-owners, who have the right to redeem the shares sold by the other
heirs. The RTC resolved the case in favor of the respondents.
● In a resolution dated Jul. 14, 1994, the RTC granted petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. On Nov. 14, 1994, acting jointly on petitioners MR and respondents
Compliance/Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, the RTC rendered a
resolution denying the MR.
● On Dec. 28, 1994, later substituted by her heirs, petitioner filed with the CA a
petition for annulment of judgment, which reinstated the RTCs resolutions. This was
denied by the CA.
● The petitioners filed this petition for review.

ISSUE:
1.Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in not holding that the Trial Court acted
without jurisdiction because the SC had previously ruled that the lot in question had been
sold twice by all the hairs of Pantaleon to Maura So and later to the Lim spouses and said
final decisions and resolution cannot be revised and reversed by said trial court.

2. Whether or not the honorable court of appeals committed a reversible error in holding that
the original petition docketed as ca-g.r. sp no. 50059 is barred by res judicata because the
resolution in g.r. no. 118050 did not and cannot repeal the final and execut[ory] decisions in
g.r. no. 92871 and g.r. no. 92860, and the final and execut[ory] resolution in g.r. no. 110661,
as the resolution in g.r. no. 118050 is not on the merits, or by the supreme court en banc

HELD:
1. Petitioners argue that the RTC acted without jurisdiction when it rendered the Resolution
which recognized respondents right to redeem the property because this, in effect, amended
the Decision of the Supreme Court in the previous two cases which sustained the sale of the
property to Maura So.
Petitioners clearly confused lack of jurisdiction with error in the exercise of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise
of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case, and not the decision rendered
therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all
other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. And the errors
which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment
which are the proper subject of an appeal. The error raised by petitioners pertains to the trial
court's exercise of its jurisdiction, not its lack of authority to decide the case. In a petition for
annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioners must show not merely an
abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of authority to hear and decide the
case. On this basis, there would be no valid ground to grant the petition for annulment of
judgment. (The complaint for legal redemption was dismissed, upholding the finality of the
decision of the SC)
2. well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the
court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The reason for this is that litigation
must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and
efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party,
through a mere subterfuge, be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy
and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award
of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by law. The only
exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust
and inequitable. Again, none of these exceptions is present in this case.

Rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than defeat substantial justice, and
should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. Rules of procedure are merely
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice; they are promulgated to aid the court in
the effective dispensation of justice. The Court has the inherent power and discretion to
amend, modify or reconsider a final judgment when it is necessary to accomplish the ends of
justice.

If the rigid application of the Rules would frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always
within the Court’s power to suspend the Rules or except a particular case from its
operation.27 The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final.

As the case involves three final and executory judgments. The first is this Court’s Decision in
G.R. Nos. 92871 and 92860 which upheld the sale of the whole property by the Jomoc heirs,
including the herein respondents, to petitioner Maura So. The second is the Court’s
Resolution in G.R. No. 110661, which sustained the order of execution of the said decision
against the herein respondents despite the fact that they were not party-defendants in the
first case. And the third is the Court’s Minute Resolution in G.R. No. 118050 which denied
Maura So’s petition for review of the RTC Decision granting respondents’ right to redeem the
property.

It is the third judgment that is apparently in conflict with the two previous judgments. It
rendered final and executory the April 27, 1994 Resolution of the RTC which recognized the
right of respondents, as co-owners, to redeem the disputed land from Maura So. To recall,
the RTC premised its decision on its finding that respondents did not actually sell their
shares in the property to Maura So because they did not sign the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land in favor of So; hence, they remained
co-owners. This ruling is patently erroneous because this Court had already pronounced in
the first two final and executory judgments (in G.R. Nos. 92871 and 92860, and G.R. No.
110661) that the whole property had already been sold to Maura So. The RTC was barred
from holding otherwise under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment

In Collantes v CA, the Court offered three options to solve a case of conflicting decisions: the
first is for the parties to assert their claims anew, the second is to determine which judgment
came first, and the third is to determine which of the judgments had been rendered by a
court of last resort. In that case, the Court applied the first option and resolved the conflicting
issues anew.

Instead of resorting to the first offered solution as in Collantes, which would entail
disregarding all the three final and executory decisions, the SC find it more equitable to
apply the criteria mentioned in the second and third solutions, and thus, maintain the finality
of one of the conflicting judgments. The principal criterion under the second option is the
time when the decision was rendered and became final and executory, such that earlier
decisions should be sustained over the current ones since final and executory decisions vest
rights in the winning party. The major criterion under the third solution is a determination of
which court or tribunal rendered the decision. Decisions of this Court should be accorded
more respect than those made by the lower courts.
The application of these criteria points to the preservation of the Decision of this Court in
G.R. Nos. 92871 and 92860 dated August 2, 1991, and its Resolution in G.R. No. 110661
dated December 1, 1993. Both judgments were rendered long before the Minute Resolution
in G.R. No. 118050 was issued on March 1, 1995. In fact, the August 2, 1991 Decision was
executed already —respondents were divested of their title over the property and a new title,
TCT No. T-68370, was issued in the name of Maura So on July 24, 1992. Further, while all
three judgments actually reached this Court, only the two previous judgments extensively
discussed the respective cases on the merits. The third judgment (in G.R. No. 118050) was
a Minute Resolution, dismissing the petition for review on certiorari of the RTC Resolution in
the legal redemption case for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned resolution was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion and for being the wrong remedy. In a manner of
speaking, therefore, the third final and executory judgment was substantially a decision of
the trial court.

The matter is again before this Court, and this time, it behooves the Court to set things right
in order to prevent a grave injustice from being committed against Maura So who had, for 15
years since the first decision was executed, already considered herself to be the owner of
the property. The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and
stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve the
sacrifice of justice for technicality.
Firestone Ceramics, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals; GR No. 127022 and 127245; 28 June 2000 Dominguez, Mary Grace Belmonte

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
(Rule 57, Sections 1-20)
Magaling vs. Ong; GR No. 173333; 13 August 2008 Escudero, Thrishannel Pascual

DOCTRINE: A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy by virtue of which a

plaintiff or other proper party may, at the commencement of the action or at any time
thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into the custody of the court as
security for the satisfaction of the judgment that may be recovered.
FACTS: Ong instituted a Complaint about the collection of the sum of money with prayer for
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Spouses Magaling and Termo Loans
Corporation for its failure to pay its signed promissory note. The RTC granted the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment grounded on the allegation that Spouses Magaling and
Termo Loans "were guilty of fraud in contracting the obligation subject of the complaint about
the sum of money". The RTC also issued an Order directing the issuance of the writ prayed
for upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P390,000.00.

Spouses Magaling moved for the reconsideration of the Order of the TC granting the writ of
preliminary attachment on the ground that it was improperly or irregularly issued. The RTC
promulgated the first of two decisions, in this case, ruling in favor of Ong, and against Termo
Loans. In the second case, RTC found the Motion to Discharge Attachment impressed with
merit and thus, promulgated its second decision holding the Spouses Magaling free and
clear of any obligation or liability with respect to the sum of money claimed by Ong.

Ong appealed the instant case, and the Court of Appeals reversed the second decision and
held the spouses Magaling solidarily liable with Terms Loans. The Spouses Magaling's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeal acted with grave abuse of discretion and in
excess of jurisdiction in reinstating the preliminary attachment.
HELD: No. Once the writ of preliminary attachment is issued, the same rule provides for two
ways by which it can be dissolved or discharged: (1) the writ of preliminary attachment may
be discharged upon security given, and (2) said provisional remedy must be shown to have
been irregularly or improperly issued. There is no question that no counter bond was given
by the Spouses Magaling for the discharge or dissolution of the writ of preliminary
attachment, as their position is that the provisional remedy was irregularly or improperly
issued.

There is no showing that a hearing was conducted prior to the issuance of the 19 February
1999 Order of the TC discharging or dissolving the writ of preliminary attachment. That Ong
was able to file an opposition to the motion of the Spouses Magaling to discharge the
preliminary attachment is of no moment. The written opposition filed is not equivalent to a
hearing. The absence of a hearing before the TC bars the discharge of the writ of preliminary
attachment for the simple reason that the discharge or dissolution of said writ, whether under
Sec. 12 or Sec. 13 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, as amended, shall be granted only "after
due notice and hearing."

Yu vs. Ngo Yet Te; GR No. 155868; 06 February 2007 Gesmundo, Jeanette Elaine Ilagan

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Valmonte vs. CA; GR No. 108538; 22 January 1996 Guinto, Roleen Wendee Napoles
DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Davao Light & Power Co. vs. CA; GR No. 93262; 29 December 1991 HERNANDEZ, Corine Elizabeth
Oandasan
DOCTRINE: Preliminary Attachment – provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or
other party may, at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the
property of the adverse party taken into custody of court as security for satisfaction of
judgment to be recovered.

FACTS:

● Davao Light and Power Inc, Co. filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money and
damages against Queensland Hotel and Teodorico Adarna. The complaint contained
an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
● Judge Nartatez granted the writ and fixed the attachment bond at around P4Million.
The summons, copy of complaint, writ of attachment, copy of attachment bond were
served upon Queensland and Adarna. Pursuant to the writ, the Sheriff seized the
properties of the latter.
● Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the attachment for lack of
jurisdiction to issue the same because at the time the order of attachment was
promulgated (May 3, 1989) and the attachment writ issued (May 11,1989), the Trial
Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over cause and person of defendants.
● Trial Court denied the motion to discharge.
● CA annulled the Trial Court’s Order. Davao seeks to reverse CA’s order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a defendant before
acquiring jurisdiction over his person.

HELD:

Yes, preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a defendant before acquiring
jurisdiction over his person.

Rule 57 speaks of the grant of the remedy “at the commencement of the action or at any
time thereafter.” What the rule is saying is that after an action is properly commenced (by
filing of the complaint and payment of all requisite docket and other fees), the plaintiff may
apply for and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment. This he may do so, before or after, the
summons to the defendant.

The CA decision is reversed and the writ of attachment issued by Judge Nartatez is
reinstated.

Torres vs. Satsatin; GR No. 166759; 25 November 2009 Kim, Hye Ri Drilon

DOCTRINE: In Cuartero v. CA, SC held that the grant of the provisional remedy of
attachment involves three stages:
a. the court issues the order granting the application;
b. the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and
c. the writ is implemented.
For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must
have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no
power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the
Court will not bind the defendant.
FACTS:
● Petitioners Siblings Sofia, Fructosa, and Mario (substituted by his Heirs), all surnamed
Torres (PETs), each owned a tract of land in Cavite. Nicanor Satsatin enticed PETs
mother to sell the properties, and the latter agreed.
● PETs authorized Nicanor through a SPA to negotiate for the sale of their properties.
Nicanor then offered to sell the properties to Solar, who then agreed to purchase the 3
parcels of land and issued 32 post-dated checks in the sum of the entire purchase price.
● However, notwithstanding the receipt of the entire payment, Nicanor only remitted a
small portion of the amount to PETs. Despite repeated verbal and written demands,
Nicanor failed to remit to them the remaining balance. Thus, PETs filed a Complaint for
Sum of Money and Damages against Respondents Nicanor, Ermilinda, Nikki Normel,
and Nikki Norlin (all surnamed Satsatin) (RES).
● PETs filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment alleging among
other things that RES are about to depart the PH and that they are willing to post a bond
fixed by the court to answer for all costs which may be adjudged to the respondents xxx.
● The RTC issued an Order directing PETs to post a bond before the court issues the said
writ [pursuant to R57, S3 of the RCP]. PETs then filed a Motion for Deputation of Sheriff,
informing the court that they have already filed an attachment bond. RTC granted the
motion and issued a Writ of Attachment.
● A copy of the writ was served to RES. Two days later, summons together with a copy of
the complaint was served upon the RES. RES filed their Answer, and on the same day,
RES filed a Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment claiming, among others, that: the
bond was issued before the issuance of Writ, and that the Writ was issued before the
summons was received.
● RTC denied the Motion. RES filed an MR but was denied. RES filed before the CA a
petition for certiorari under R65. CA ruled in favor of RES, finding GAD on the part of the
RTC. PET filed an MR but was denied. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE #1: WON THE CA ERRED IN ORDERING THE LIFTING OF THE WRIT OF
ATTACHMENT PURSUANT TO SEC 13, RULE 57 OF THE RCP.
HELD: NO.
A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of the
court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the
defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the
satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be secured in the said action by the attaching
creditor against the defendant.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that there was grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in approving the
bond posted by PETs despite the fact that not all the requisites for its approval were
complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that all the requisites for its
approval are met; otherwise, the bond should be rejected. In this case, it is apparent that the
surety bond was defective for non-compliance with the requisites of a bond. The RTC was
not one of the RTCs where said bond can be accepted.
Moreover, in provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the distinction
between the issuance and the implementation of the writ of attachment is of utmost
importance to the validity of the writ. The distinction is indispensably necessary to determine
when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired in order to validly
implement the writ of attachment upon his person.
The SC has long put to rest the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
should be acquired in cases where a party resorts to provisional remedies. A party to a suit
may, at any time after filing the complaint, avail of the provisional remedies under the
Rules of Court. Specifically, Rule on preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of the
remedy “at the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment”. This
phrase refers to the date of the filing of the complaint, which is the moment that marks “the
commencement of the action”. The reference plainly is to a time before summons is served
on the defendant, or even before summons issues.
In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. CA, SC clarified the actual time when jurisdiction
should be had:
xxx issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment . . . these do
not and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his
person is eventually obtained by the court, either by service on him of summons or
other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the court's authority. Hence,
when the sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of
attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the
applicant's affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as
explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said
defendant as well as a copy of the complaint xxx
In Cuartero v. CA, SC held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment
involves three stages:
d. the court issues the order granting the application;
e. the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and
f. the writ is implemented.
For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court
must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the
court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any
order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.
Thus, it is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, but also upon consideration of fairness, to apprise the defendant of the complaint
against him and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the grounds therefor
that prior or contemporaneously to the serving of the writ of attachment, service of
summons, together with a copy of the complaint, the application for attachment, the
applicant's affidavit and bond, and the order must be served upon him.
In this case, at the time the writ was implemented, the trial court has not acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent since no summons was yet served
upon them. The proper officer should have previously or simultaneously with the
implementation of the writ of attachment, served a copy of the summons upon the RES in
order for the trial court to have acquired jurisdiction upon them and for the writ to have
binding effect. The subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition
of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated
service.
NOTE: There are 2 ways of discharging the attachment.
a. file a counter-bond in accordance with Section 12 of Rule 57;
b. quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or improvidently issued,
 as provided for in Section 13 of the same rule.
Whether the attachment was discharged by either of the two ways indicated in the law, the
attachment debtor cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the issuance of the
attachment writ by simply availing himself of one way of discharging the attachment writ,
instead of the other. The filing of a counter-bond is merely a speedier way of discharging the
attachment writ instead of the other way.

Security Pacific vs. Amelia Tria-Infante; GR No. 144740; 31 August 2005 Librojo, Joseph Macasaet

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Olib vs. Pastoral; GR No. 81120; 20 August 1990 Mabanglo, Aily Liezel Molina

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Trader Royal Bank vs. IAC; GR No. L-66321; 31 October 1984 Mamisao, Michelle Espiritu

DOCTRINE: Section 14, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court states that:

If property taken be claimed by any person other than the party against whom
attachment had been issued or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his
title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or
title, and serves such affidavit upon the officer while the latter has possession of the
property, and a copy thereof upon the attaching creditor, the officer shall not be
bound to keep the property under the attachment, unless the attaching creditor or
his agent, on demand of said officer, secures aim against such claim by a bond in a
sum not greater than the value of the property attached.

FACTS:
● In March 1983, petitioner Traders Royal Bank instituted a suit against the Remco
Alcohol Distillery, Inc. before the RTC of Pasay for the recovery of the sum of P2,
382, 258.71 obtaining therein a writ of pre-attachment directed against the assets
and properties of Remco.

● Deputy Sheriff Edilberto Santiago, pursuant to the writ of attachment, levied about
4.6K barrels of aged or rectified alcohol found within the premises of Remco.

● A third party claim was filed with the Deputy Sheriff by respondent La Tondeña
claiming ownership over the attached property. Then, it filed a
complaint-in-intervention alleging that it had made advances to Remco amounting to
P3M and which remains outstanding as of date.

● Without the complaint-in-intervention having been passed upon by the RTC,

respondent La Tondeña filed a motion to withdraw praying it be allowed to withdraw
the alcohol and molasses from the Remco Distillery Plant which was granted.
 ● However, it was reconsidered by the trial court declaring that the alcohol which has
not been withdrawn remain in the ownership of Remco. It likewise denied La
Tondeña’s motion to intervene. La Tondeña filed a motion for reconsideration (MR)
reiterating its request for leave to withdraw alcohol from Remco, but it was not
resolved because later on, it filed a motion to withdraw the MR.

● La Tondeña instated a case asserting claim of ownership over the subject properties
with the RTC of Malolos Bulacan, Br. 9 and prayed for the issuance of a writ of
prelim. mandatory and prohibitory injunction. Petitioner Traders filed a motion to
dismiss. La Tondeña filed an opposition to the motion. Petitioner Traders replied to
the opposition.

● Respondent Judge declared La Tondeña to be the owner of the disputed properties

and it also granted the application for injunction. Respondent Sheriff Victorino
Evangelista issued Deputy Sheriff Santiago of the RTC of Pasay the writ.

● The RTC of Pasay then required Deputy Sheriff Santiago to enforce the writ by
preventing respondent sheriff and La Tondeña from withdrawing or removing the
alcohol from Remco and required them to show cause for withdrawing the alcohol.

● Petitioner Traders filed with respondent IAC a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with application for writ of prelim. injunction to annul and set aside the order of the
RTC of Bulacan. The IAC dismissed the petition for lack of legal and factual basis.

● Petitioner filed a MR, but it was denied by respondent IAC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC of Bulacan acted without jurisdiction in authorizing
the issuance of the writ enjoining the sheriff of Pasay from interfering with La
Tondeña’s right to enter and withdraw the subject properties.

HELD: NO. There is no question that the action filed by private respondent La Tondeña, Inc.,
as third-party claimant, before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan wherein it claimed
ownership over the property levied upon by Pasay City Deputy Sheriff Edilberto Santiago is
sanctioned by Section 14, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Thus —

If property taken be claimed by any person other than the party against whom
attachment had been issued or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his
title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or
title, and serves such affidavit upon the officer while the latter has possession of the
property, and a copy thereof upon the attaching creditor, the officer shall not be
bound to keep the property under the attachment, unless the attaching creditor or
his agent, on demand of said officer, secures aim against such claim by a bond in a
sum not greater than the value of the property attached.

In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be decided by the court
issuing the writ of attachment. The officer shall not be liable for damages, for the
taking or keeping of such property, to any such third-party claimant, unless such a
claim is so made and the action upon the bond brought within one hundred and
twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of said bond. But nothing herein
contained shall prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the property
by proper action ...

This rule explicitly sets forth the remedy that may be availed of by a person who
claims to be the owner of property levied upon by attachment, viz: to lodge a third- party
claim with the sheriff, and if the attaching creditor posts an indemnity bond in favor of the
sheriff, to file a separate and independent action to vindicate his claim, as what respondent
La Tondeña did in this case.

In Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos, this Court resolved a similar question in
this wise:

xxx xxx xxx

It has been seen that a separate action by the third party who claims to be the
owner of the property attached is appropriate. If this is so, it must be admitted
that the judge trying such action may render judgment ordering the sheriff of
whoever has in possession the attached property to deliver it to the plaintiff-claimant
or desist from seizing it. It follows further that the court may make an interlocutory
order, upon the filing of such bond as may be necessary, to release the property
pending final adjudication of the title. Jurisdiction over an action includes jurisdiction
over an interlocutory matter incidental to the cause and deemed necessary to
preserve the subject matter of the suit or protect the parties' interests. This is
self-evident.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true of course that property in custody of the law cannot be interfered without
the permission of the proper court, and property legally attached is property in
custodia legis. But for the reason just stated, this rule is confined to cases where the
property belongs to the defendant or one in which the defendant has proprietary
interest. When the sheriff acting beyond the bounds of his office seizes a
stranger's property, the rule does not apply and interference with his custody
is not interference with another court's order of attachment.

It may be argued that the third-party claim may be unfounded; but so may it be
meritorious, for that matter. Speculations are however beside the point. The title is
the very issue in the case for the recovery of property or the dissolution of the
attachment, and pending final decision, the court may enter any interlocutory order
calculated to preserve the property in litigation and protect the parties' rights and
interests.

Generally, the rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgments or decrees of a concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power
to grant the injunctive relief sought by injunction, is applied in cases where no
third-party claimant is involved, in order to prevent one court from nullifying the judgment
or process of another court of the same rank or category, a power which devolves upon the
proper appellate court.

The purpose of the rule is to avoid conflict of power between different courts of coordinate
jurisdiction and to bring about a harmonious and smooth functioning of their proceedings.

IN THE CASE AT BAR, it cannot be argued that since private respondent La Tondeña, Inc.
had voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Pasay Court by filing a motion to
intervene, the denial or dismissal thereof constitutes a bar to the present action filed before
the Bulacan Court.

Intervention as a means of protecting the third-party claimant's right in an attachment

proceeding is not exclusive but cumulative and suppletory to the right to bring an
independent suit. The denial or dismissal of a third-party claim to property levied upon
cannot operate to bar a subsequent independent action by the claimant to establish his
right to the property even if he failed to appeal from the order denying his original third-party
claim. THUS, THE DECISION OF THE IAC IS AFFIRMED.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
(Rule 58, Sections 1-9)
Calawag vs. University of the Philippines-Visayas; GR No. 207412; 07 August 2013 Manalansan, Lizel De Leon

DOCTRINE: To be entitled to a writ of PI, petitioners must establish the following: (1) the
invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (2) the right of the
complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (3) there is an urgent and permanent necessity
for the writ to prevent serious damage.

FACTS:
- Petitioners enrolled in the Master of Science in Fisheries Biology at UP Visayas
under a scholarship from the DOST-Philippine Council for Aquatic and Marine
Research and Development
- They finished their 1st year of study with good grades and were thus eligible to start
their thesis in their second year
- They got Dr. Baleña as their thesis adviser. They also wrote a letter to Dean Baylon
to get approval of the proposed thesis committees
- Dean Baylon received the letter and questioned the propriety of the thesis topics. He
disapproved the composition of petitioners’ thesis committees and their tentative
thesis topics
- Dean Baylon ordered petitioners to submit a two-page proposal containing an
outline of their tentative thesis titles. He informed them he would create an ad hoc
committee that would take over the role of the adviser and of the thesis committees
- Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the RTC, asking it to
order Dean Baylon to approve the thesis committees and thesis titles. They asked
the RTC to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the dean
- RTC: granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which Dean Baylons
refused to follow
- UP Visayas assailed the RTC order before the CA through a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari, with prayer for a TRO
- CA: issued TRO against the implementation of the RTC order; petitioners had no
clear right to compel Dean Baylon to approve the thesis committees as a matter of
course
- Petitioner’s argument/s, among others:
- He was entitled to the injunction prayed for, as he had clear rights under the
law which were violated by the dean’s actions (right to education, due
process, equal protection under the law)

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in setting aside the preliminary mandatory injunction that the
RTC issued against Dean Baylon

HELD: NO
- The CA did not err in its decision, thus there could be no basis for the SC to exercise
its discretionary power to review the CA’s decision
- To be entitled to a writ of PI, petitioners must establish the following:
- (1) The invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and
 substantial
- (2) The right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable
- (3) There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage
- Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of an act, it
does not preserve the status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere
prohibitive injunction
- The issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction presents a fourth
requirement: it is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute
- When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear
legal right and therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper
- The dean has the discretion to approve or disapprove the composition of a thesis
committee. Petitioners had no right for an automatic approval and composition of
their thesis committees
Australian Professional Realty vs. Municipality of Padre Garcia; GR No. 183367; 14 March Matienzo, Joseph Napoleon
2012 Salvador

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Aldover vs. Court of Appeals; GR No. 167174; 23 September 2013 Millado, Diane Angelica Juachon

DOCTRINE:

A Writ of Preliminary Injunction is issued at any stage of an action prior to judgment or final
order to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before
their claims can be thoroughly studied or adjudicated. To justify its issuance, the applicants
must prove the following requisites: (1) that they have a clear and unmistakable right to be
protected, that is a right in esse; (2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicants; and, (4)
there is no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy to prevent the infliction of
irreparable injury

It has been held that the trial court (or the CA in this case) has a wide latitude in determining
the propriety of issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The assessment and evaluation of
evidence in the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction involve findings of facts ordinarily
left to it for its determination. Hence, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the
trial court's disposition in injunctive matters is not generally interfered with by the appellate
courts

FACTS:

- Siblings Tomas M. Reyes and Sidra M. Reyes and their father Alfredo Reyes (the Reyeses)
were the registered owners of a 4,044-square meter lot.
-They obtained a loan from Antonia B. Aldover (Aldover) secured by a Real Estate Mortgage
(REM) over the said property.
-When the Reyeses failed to pay, Aldover caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. At the foreclosure sale conducted, Aldover emerged as the winning bidder. A
Certificate of Sale was issued in her favor which was annotated at the back of TCT.
-Thereafter, Aldover filed with the RTC of Pasig City a verified Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Possession Branch 71 of the RTC of Pasig City issued a Decision granting Aldover's
Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession subject to the posting of a bond. the Reyeses
filed a Motion to Recall and Lift Issuance of Writ of Possession claiming, among others, that
the mortgage and the auction sale of property are both null and void as the mortgagee
(Aldover) was not armed with a special power of attorney to foreclose the mortgaged
property extrajudicially. Respondents filed before the RTC of Pasig City a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Title, Reconveyance and Damages with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction against Aldover and her husband
Carmelito (petitioners), the Reyeses, the Branch Sheriff, and the Registrar of Deeds of Pasig
City.
- In said Complaint, respondents filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
Injunction with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners and the Reyeses, which they later on
amended.
-Respondents also asserted that the right they sought to be protected in their Petition is clear
and unmistakable and that the invasion of such right is material and substantial.
-They thus prayed for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin
the implementation of Branch 71's Order of demolition.
-Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA Then
respondents posted the required injunction bond and the CA accordingly issued the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
- Petitioners subsequently filed a Motion for Inhibition of the CA Sixth (6th) Division which the
CA granted in a Resolution.
- Petitioners contend that the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed
January 3, 2005 Resolution and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Respondents, on the
other hand, deny having misled the CA

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in granting respondents'

ancillary prayer for preliminary injunction.

HELD:
No. We stress at the outset that this Petition for Certiorari merely assails the CA's
interlocutory resolutions granting respondents' ancillary prayer for injunctive relief. This does
not pertain to the main action for certiorari, prohibition and injunction in CA-G.R. SP No.
86363, which is still pending before the CA. We will thus limit ourselves to the determination
of whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the questioned Resolutions and
avoid matters that will preempt or render moot whatever final decision it may render in
CA-G.R. SP No. 86363. More specifically, we will not touch on petitioners' contentions that
respondents are guilty of forum shopping and that the latter's filing of a Petition for Certiorari
before the CA was premature and out of time for the assailed CA Resolutions pertain only to
the propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. A Petition for Certiorari lies
only to correct acts rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. "Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction."

"Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a

capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law."

A Petition for Certiorari is not the proper remedy to review the intrinsic correctness of the
public respondent's ruling. It is settled that as long as a court or quasi-judicial body acts
within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will
amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are not reviewable in a special civil
action of certiorari.

Thus, whether the CA committed errors in proceedings, misappreciated the facts, or

misapplied the law is beyond our power of review in this Petition for Certiorari for it cannot be
used for any purpose except to limit the action of the respondent court within the bounds of
its jurisdiction.

In fine, the CA cannot be said to have acted capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or

despotically in issuing its January 3, 2005 Resolution and February 10, 2005 Writ of
Preliminary Injunction to prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury. There is
preliminary showing that respondents have clear and unmistakable right over the disputed
portions of the property which must be protected during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No.
86363. Indeed, the precipitate demolition of their houses would constitute material and
substantial invasion of their right which cannot be remedied under any standard
compensation. Hence, the need for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Cabili vs. Balindog; A.M. No. RTJ-2225; 06 September 2011 Ng, Lawrence Andrew Adlawan

DOCTRINE: No court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another
court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.

FACTS:
- Civil Case No. 06-2954 is an action for damages in Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC
against the Mindanao State University (MSU).
- On November 29, 1997, the Iligan City RTC rendered a Decision, holding the MSU
liable for damages amounting to P2,726,189.90. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the Iligan City RTC decision.
- On March 10, 2009, the Iligan City RTC issued a writ of execution. The MSU,
however, failed to comply with the writ; thus, on March 24, 2009, Sheriff Gerard
Peter Gaje served a Notice of Garnishment on the MSU's depository bank, the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Marawi City Branch.
- The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the motion for execution, albeit
belatedly, in behalf of MSU. The Iligan City RTC denied the opposition in its March
31, 2009 Order. The MSU responded to the denial by filing on April 1, 2009 a
petition with the Marawi City RTC, for prohibition and mandamus with an application
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction
against the LBP and Sheriff Gaje.
- The respondent Judge issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing
 P2,726,189.90 from MSU's LBP-Marawi City Branch account.
- On May 8, 2009, complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, counsel of the private plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 06-2954, filed the complaint charging the respondent Judge for
interfering with the order of a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, by
issuing the TRO to enjoin Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2,726,189.90 from MSU's
LBP-Marawi City Branch account.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge, by issuing a TRO, interfered with the order of a co-equal
court?
HELD: YES. Respondent judge interfered with the order of a co-equal court.

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a

co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can
interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction
having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.

To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate the law in
issuing a writ of execution and have recognized that there should be a remedy against this
violation. The remedy, however, is not the resort to another co-equal body but to a higher
court with authority to nullify the action of the issuing court.

In the present case, the respondent Judge clearly ignored the principle of judicial stability by
issuing a TRO to temporarily restrain Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of execution issued
by a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, and from pursuing the garnishment of
the amount of P2,726,189.90 from MSU's account with the LBP, Marawi City Branch. The
respondent Judge was aware that he was acting on matters pertaining to the execution
phase of a final decision of a co-equal and coordinate court since he even quoted MSU's
allegations in his April 8, 2009 Order.

The respondent Judge should have refrained from acting on the petition because Branch 6
of the Iligan City RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on any question on the enforcement of the
writ of execution

If Sheriff Gaje committed any irregularity or exceeded his authority in the enforcement of the
writ, the proper recourse for MSU was to file a motion with, or an application for relief from,
the same court which issued the decision, not from any other court,[40] or to elevate the
matter to the CA on a petition for certiorari.

Strategic Alliance Development Corp. vs. Star Infrastructure Development Corp.; GR No. Noval, Angelica Fronteras
187872; 11 April 2011

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Greenstar vs. Adiong; A.M. RTJ 041826; 06 February 2008 Oasan, Wendy Louise Macaraeg

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Hernandez vs. National Power Corporation; GR No. 145328; 23 March 2006 Patriarca, Angelo Gabriel Bautista

DOCTRINE:

The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless restrained, the act complained
of will probably violate his rights and tend to render the judgment ineffectual.

FACTS:

Respondent National Power Corporation constructed of 29 steel poles in connection with its
230 kilo-volt Sucat-Araneta Balintawak Power Transmission Project. These poles, each of
which was 53.4 meters high, were to support overhead tension cables that would pass
through Dasmariñas Village, Makati City, where petitioners’ homes were located.

Trouble ensued when petitioners discovered some scientific studies, finding that
electromagnetic fields created by high-voltage power lines could cause a range of illnesses
from cancer to leukemia. In a privileged speech, Representative Francis Joseph G.
Escudero denounced the cavalier manner in which Napocor had ignored safety and
consultation requirements. An explanation was demanded by Representative Arnulfo
Fuentebella, chairperson of the House Committee on Energy.

Respondent admitted that it was still negotiating with petitioners, and that it had come up
with four options to address the problem: transfer the line, maintain a 12-meter distance from
the village, construct an underground line, or reroute along C-5 and South Luzon
Expressway. These negotiations resulted in an impasse.

On March 9, 2000, petitioners filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Napocor.
Judge Francisco B. Ibay issued an Order temporarily restraining it from energizing and
transmitting high-voltage electric current through the project. This Order was extended from
2 days to 18 days.

Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for TRO
and Preliminary Injunction and sought the dismissal of the Complaint, on the ground that the
trial court had no jurisdiction. It cited Section 1of Presidential Decree No. 1818, which states:

Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any

restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any
case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery,
forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any
public utility operated by the government, including among other public utilities for
 transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to
prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with or
continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of
such public utility or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution,
implementation or operation.

While the Petition was pending before the CA, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to stop Napocor from installing highvoltage cables and from energizing
and transmitting high-voltage electric current through those cables.

On May 3, 2000, the CA reversed the trial court’s Order on the ground that Section 1 of
Presidential Decree 1818 clearly proscribed injunctions against infrastructure projects. It
further cited Supreme Court Circulars 2-91 and 13-93 dated March 15, 1991, and March 5,
1993, respectively.

Petitioners filed the instant Petition, contending that the proscription in PD 1818 should not
be applied to cases of extreme urgency, such as when the right to health and safety was
hanging on the balance.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court may issue temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
on NAPOCOR project.

HELD:

Yes. Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions against
government infrastructure projects. In Garcia v. Burgos, Presidential Decree No. 1818 was
held to prohibit courts from issuing an injunction against any infrastructure project in order
not to disrupt or hamper the pursuit of essential government projects or frustrate the
economic development effort of the nation.

While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases involving the implementation
of projects and contracts on infrastructure, natural resource development and public utilities,
this rule, however, is not absolute as there are actually instances when Presidential Decree
No. 1818 should not find application. In a spate of cases, this Court declared that although
Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or
restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise
of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving
questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

Moreover, the issuance by the trial court of a preliminary injunction finds legal support in
Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be

granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual. (3a) (Emphasis supplied.)

The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless restrained, the act complained
of will probably violate his rights and tend to render the judgment ineffectual.

Here, there is adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion that the project of
NAPOCOR probably imperils the health and safety of the petitioners so as to justify the
issuance by the trial court of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioners adduced in evidence copies of studies linking the incidence of illnesses such as
cancer and leukemia to exposure to electromagnetic fields. The records bear out, to boot, a
copy of a brochure of NAPOCOR regarding its Quezon Power Project from which will be
supplying NAPOCOR with the power which will pass through the towers subject of the
controversy. The NAPOCOR brochure provides that because of the danger concomitant with
high voltage power, Philippine laws mandate that the power lines should be located within
safe distances from residences. And the Quezon Power Project mandates an easement of
20 meters to the right and 20 meters to the left which falls short of the 12-meter easement
that NAPOCOR was proposing to petitioners.

Allgemeine-Bau-Chemie Phils vs. Metropolitan Bank; GR No. 159296; 10 February 2006 Pujalte, Bianca Margarita Pardo

DOCTRINE: The appellate court's jurisdiction to grant a writ of preliminary injunction is

limited to actions or proceedings pending before it, as Section 2 of Rule 58 of the Rules
clearly provides: SECTION 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. — A preliminary
injunction may be granted by the court where the action or proceeding is pending. . . .
(Emphasis supplied),
or in a petition for certiorari , prohibition or mandamus under Section 7 of Rule 65.

FACTS:
● Asian Appraisal Holdings, Inc. (AAHI) obtained a loan from Solidbank Corporation
(Solidbank) amounting to P442,500,000 for the construction of Asian Star Building, a
20-storey commercial condominium in Filinvest, Alabang, Muntinlupa City.
● As security for the loan, AAHI executed a security agreement / Real Estate
Mortgage (REM) (registered and annotated on condo title) over its property
consisting of the lots covered by TCT and the condominium built thereon including
all units, parking slots, common areas and other improvements, machineries and
equipment.
● AAHI entered into a contract to sell with petitioner Allgemeine for the purchase of 2
Units covered by Condominium Title Certificate and the right to the exclusive use of
parking slots for a total purchase price of P23,571,280.
● Thereafter, the parties executed an addendum to the contract to sell whereby AAHI
assigned to petitioner the right to the exclusive use of a parking slot also covered by
CTC for a consideration of P600,000, which petitioner paid on even date.
● By separate letters, AAHI and Solidbank informed petitioner of the real estate
mortgage forged by them and was advised to remit its monthly amortizations for the
 units and parking slots it purchased to Solidbank. Petitioner was also requested to
inform Solidbank of the total installments it had paid for these units and parking slots
and the balance still due thereon.
● Petitioner which occupied the condominium units as its place of business had fully
settled its obligation to AAHI in the total amount of P26,588,409.30.
● RTC (Muntinlupa):
● AAHI defaulted on its loan obligation, Metrobank, to which the banking operations of
Solidbank were integrated, filed before the RTC Muntinlupa: a Petition for
Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage and Civil Case No. 00-196 -
Complaint against Solidbank, for Specific Performance with Preliminary Injunction to
enjoin the foreclosure of the REM.
● The mortgaged properties were sold at public auction to the highest bidder,
Metrobank, to which a Certificate of Sale was issued.
● Metrobank filed an Ex-Parte petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession –
granted and issued.
● Petitioner Allgemeine filed before RTC in Civil Case No. 00-196 (AAHI's complaint
against Solidbank for Specific Performance with Preliminary Injunction) a motion for
intervention, to which it attached a complaint-in-intervention with prayer for the
annulment of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale, delivery of title, and damages and
for the issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Metrobank to
consolidate its title and to take possession of its properties. - Granted
● The court Sheriff issued a notice to vacate which was served on May 16, 2002 upon
all building occupants who were advised to make the necessary arrangements with
Metrobank regarding their occupancy.
● AAHI filed Motion for Reconsideration which was denied prompting it to file
before the appellate court a petition for a writ of preliminary injunction.
● CA:
● Petitioner filed a separate petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction with the appellate court, also to enjoin
the implementation of the writ of possession issued by Muntinlupa RTC.
● Court of Appeals granted petitioner’s prayer for, and issued TRO. However, it
denied, petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
for failure to establish a clear and unmistakable right to the subject properties.
● The motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, petitioner
now comes before this Court on a petition for review, alleging that the appellate
court committed grave and palpable error in denying its prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: WON the filing of the writ of preliminary injunction is proper.

HELD: NO. The petition fails. In the case at bar, petitioner's complaint-in-intervention in Civil
Case No. 00-196 was pending before Branch 256 of the Muntinlupa RTC, not with the
appellate court. Petitioner's petition before the appellate court does not show, nay allege,
that in issuing the writ of possession, the Muntinlupa RTC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion for it to be treated as either one for certiorari or
prohibition.

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action and hence, the jurisdiction of a
court, are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Petitioner's
only prayer is "for the preservation of the status quo, that is, petitioner, having in possession
over the subject properties for several years, shall retain such possession until the
controversy [Civil Case No. 00-196] before the said trial court [Branch 276, RTC of
Muntinlupa City] has been finally resolved and respondents be prevented from taking over
such possession."

Clearly, what petitioner filed with the appellate court was an original action for
preliminary injunction which is a provisional and extra-ordinary remedy calculated to
preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is availed of to prevent actual or
threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard.

An original action for injunction is outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, however.
Under B.P. 129, the appellate court has original jurisdiction only over actions for annulment
of judgments of the RTCs and has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes
whether or not they are in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

The appellate court's jurisdiction to grant a writ of preliminary injunction is limited to actions
or proceedings pending before it (Section 2 of Rule 58) or in a petition for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus under Section 7 of Rule 65.

Thus, for want of jurisdiction, the petition before the appellate court should have been
dismissed outright. At all events, it is well-settled that an order granting or denying a
preliminary injunction is not appealable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.

Verzosa vs. CA; GR No. 119511; 24 November 1998 Quiñones - Egagamao, Karess
Echem
DOCTRINE: : An injunctive writ may be issued when the following requisites are
established:

1. The invasion of the right is material and substantial;

2. The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;

3. There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
FACTS: Fe Giron Uson is the owner of a parcel of land consisting of 19,955 square meters
located at Baquioen, Sual, Pangasinan, covered by O.C.T. No. 12783. She mortgaged the
land to Wilfredo Verzosa. She failed to pay her entire obligation to Verzosa, prompting the
latter to have the mortgage foreclosed. Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan set the foreclosure
sale on August 17, 1988.

-To prevent the Office of the Provincial Sheriff from proceeding with the foreclosure sale, Fe
Uson, on August 12, 1988, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, a complaint against Wilfredo Verzosa and the Provincial Sheriff, docketed as
Civil Case No. 16590, for annulment of mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.

-On August 22, 1988, defendant Verzosa filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On June 8,
1989, the complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was not personally verified by
plaintiff Fe Uson. On June 27, 1989, Fe Uson filed a motion for reconsideration which was
granted by the court. On June 29, 1989, she filed her amended complaint which bears the
proper verification.

-Meantime, Verzosa wrote the Provincial Sheriff to proceed with the foreclosure of mortgage.
-Fe Uson, through counsel, wrote the Provincial Sheriff requesting him to discontinue the
foreclosure sale in deference to the said pending case and to the action to be taken by the
Honorable Presiding Judge of the Court.

-The foreclosure sale was conducted by the sheriff. The property was sold to Verzosa being
the highest bidder. Thereafter, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was approved by Executive
Judge Antonio Belen and issued to Verzosa.

-The trial court issued an order admitting the amended complaint of Fe Uson.

-At this point, Verzosa filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No. 18898 for certiorari.
He alleged that the said order, admitting the amended complaint was issued with grave
abuse of discretion. On June 20, 1990, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan.

-After the expiration of the redemption period of one year, the defendant Sheriff issued the
Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale. Thus, O.C.T. No. 12783 in Fe Usons name was canceled and in
lieu thereof, T.C.T. No. 11087 was issued in the name of Wilfredo Verzosa.

-On July 12, 1990, Verzosa sold the land to Pilar Martinez. As a result, Verzosas T.C.T. No.
11087 was canceled and T.C.T. No. 11107 was issued to Martinez.

-Meantime, on October 16, 1990, or after one year from the filing of Verzosas petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, the said court dismissed the petition, thus sustaining the
validity of respondent courts order dated September 5, 1989 admitting Fe Usons amended
complaint.

-On May 20, 1991, Fe Uson filed her second amended complaint impleading as additional
defendants the Register of Deeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan and Pilar Martinez -and praying,
among others, the annulment of the latters title -- T.C.T. No. 11107.

-On August 20, 1991, upon Usons application for preliminary injunction embodied in her
Second Amended Complaint (which was opposed by Verzosa and Martinez), respondent
court issued an order directing the latter to cease and desist from entering, making
constructions and performing any act of possession or ownership over the land in question
covered by O.C.T. No. 12783, upon posting by plaintiff Uson of a bond of P10,000.00.

-Defendant Martinez filed a motion for consideration which was denied on September 18,
1991.

-On October 30, 1991, after hearing and upon posting of a bond in the amount of
P10,000.00 by Uson, respondent Judge issued an order directing defendants Verzosa and
Martinez and/or any and other persons acting under their command to desist and cease from
entering, intruding and making constructions on the land covered by O.C.T. No. 12783.

-On November 22, 1991, respondent judge, acting on Verzosas motion for clarification of the
order dated September 18, 1991, issued an order to the effect that the status quo being
maintained is the possession of plaintiff Fe Uson of the land and that such status quo does
not refer to defendant Pilar Martinez being the registered owner of T.C.T. No. 11107.

-It should be noted that the Complaint alleged that Private Respondent Uson mortgaged the
property to Verzosa for P25,000, and that the remaining unpaid balance was P915.75, an
amount she was willing to consign to the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not injunctive writ was wrongfully issued in favor of private respondent
HELD: No, An injunctive writ may be issued when the following requisites are established:

1. The invasion of the right is material and substantial;

2. The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;

3. There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
äläwvirtualibräry

The foregoing requisites are present in this case. The undisputed owner of the property
which was mortgaged to Petitioner Verzosa was private respondent who, upon learning of
the scheduled foreclosure, immediately filed a Complaint to annul the mortgage, praying that
a restraining order be issued to restrain such foreclosure. Private respondent insisted that
she had paid her P25,000 debt, except for the remaining unpaid balance of P915.75 which
she was willing to consign to the court. In other words, she had title to and possession of the
property and she claimed to have paid her obligation, except for the nominal unpaid balance
which she was willing to consign judicially. Hence, she had a clear and unmistakable right to
protect her title to and possession of the mortgaged property by enjoining the foreclosure
sale.

Given the above factual allegations, it is clear that private respondent was entitled to the
injunctive writ.

Federation of Land Reform Farmers of the Phils. vs. CA; GR No. 88384; 14 July 1995 Rollo, Noel Jethro III Macaspac

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

RECEIVERSHIP
(Rule 59, Sections 1-9)
Tantano vs. Espino-Caboverde; GR No. 203585; 29 July 2013 Roxas, Marlen Navaluna

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Republic vs. Saludares; GR No. 111174; 09 March 2000 Salvador, Patricia Ann Pongos

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: This case involved a writ of sequestration, by the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), which was based on the ground that the shares of stocks in
Lianga Bay Logging Company, Inc. (LBLC) owned by Peter A. Sabido formed part of
"illegally acquired wealth." The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG and the Office
of the Solicitor General filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against, among others, Peter A. Sabido.

Sabido filed a Motion to Lift the Writs of Sequestration before the Sandiganbayan, which the
court granted. Afterwards, PCGG filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of
Sandiganbayan praying for the nullification of the order which lifted the writ of sequestration,
on December 11, 1991, of LBLC. In the meantime, private respondent Hung Ming Kuk
filed a complaint for sum of money against LBLC, with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment, with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, of Lianga, Surigao
del Sur. The PCGG was not impleaded by Hung Ming Kuk as party-defendant nor was the
sequestration case referred to the RTC's proceedings.

Thus, the Republic of the Philippines filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65,
This petition, docketed as G.R. No. 109314, was later on consolidated with other similar
cases. After some time, the Sandiganbayan denied the earlier motion for reconsideration of
PCGG of Dec 11, 1991. The trial court granted the writ of preliminary attachment in favor of
Hung Ming Kuk.

Thereafter, Hung Ming Kuk filed a motion to declare LBLC in default for failure to file
responsive pleadings pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The RTC of Lianga,
acting on the motion of Hung Ming Kuk, issued an order declaring LBLC as in default.

SC en banc then issued its decision in the consolidated cases. In its decision, it nullified the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan that lifted the writ of sequestration of LBLC properties.
Hence, the Court effectively confirmed the validity of the writ of sequestration over said
properties. Peter A. Sabido's motion for reconsideration was denied. Finally, an entry of
judgment was issued on April 22, 1997

ISSUE: Whether or not the provisional remedy of attachment issued by the trial court, RTC,
in favor of the private respondent Hung Ming Kuk is valid.
HELD: No.

The Court noted the relationship between attachment and receivership, on one hand, and
sequestration, freeze order and provisional takeover on the other. The latter are ancillary
remedies in prosecuting the ill-gotten wealth of the previous Marcos regime. The Court
observed that sequestration, freezing and provisional takeover are akin to the provisional
remedy of preliminary attachment or receivership.

By an order of attachment, a sheriff seizes property of a defendant in a civil suit so that it

may stand as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be obtained, and not
disposed of, or dissipated, or lost intentionally, or otherwise, pending the action. When a writ
of attachment has been levied on real property or any interest therein belonging to the
judgment debtor, the levy creates a lien which nothing can destroy but its dissolution. This
well-settled rule is likewise applicable to a writ of sequestration.

In our view, the disputed properties of LBLC were already under custodia legis by virtue of a
valid writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG , when respondent Judge Saludares issued
the assailed writ of attachment in favor of private respondent Hung Ming Kuk. At that time
the writ of sequestration issued by PCGG against LBLC was subsisting. Said writ of the
PCGG could not be interfered with by the RTC of Lianga, because the PCGG is a coordinate
and co-equal body. The PCGG had acquired by operation of law the right of redemption over
the property until after the final determination of the case or until its dissolution.
Vivares vs. Reyes; GR No. 155408; 13 February 2008 Samonte, Maria Genevieve Castro

DOCTRINE:
Sec. 3, Rule 59 states that the "application may be denied or the receiver
discharged." In statutory construction, the word "may" has always been construed as
permissive. If the intent is to make it mandatory or ministerial for the trial court to
order the recall of the receiver upon the offer to post a counterbond, then the court
should have used the word "shall." Thus, the trial court has to consider the posting
of the counterbond in addition to other reasons presented by the offeror why the
receivership has to be set aside.
FACTS:
● On March 15, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion to Place Properties in Litigation under
Receivership before the trial court alleging that to their prejudice respondent had,
without prior court approval and without petitioners’ knowledge, sold to third parties
and transferred in his own name several common properties. Petitioners also
averred that respondent fraudulently antedated, prior to May 12, 1992, some
conveyances and transfers to make it appear that these were no longer part of the
estate of Severino under litigation. They further claimed that respondent was and is
in possession of the common properties in the estate of Severino, and exclusively
enjoying the fruits and income of said properties and without rendering an
accounting on them and turning over the share pertaining to Torcuato. Thus,
petitioners prayed to place the entire disputed estate of Severino under receivership.
They nominated a certain Lope Salantin to be appointed as receiver.
● On March 23, 2000, respondent filed his Opposition to Place the Estate of Severino
Reyes under Receivership, denying that he had fraudulently transferred any property
of the estate of Severino and asserting that any transfer in his name of said
properties was a result of the oral partition between him and Torcuato that enabled
the latter as well to transfer several common properties in his own name.
● On May 24, 2000, petitioners filed their Offer of Exhibits in support of their motion for
receivership. On the same date, the trial court issued an Order granting petitioners’
motion and appointed Salantin as receiver conditioned on the filing of a PhP 50,000
bond.
● Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that the appointment of a
receiver was unduly precipitate considering that he was not represented by counsel
and thus was deprived of due process.
● On August 4, 2000, the trial court allowed respondent to present his evidence to
contest petitioners’ grounds for the appointment of a receiver, and the trial court set
the reception of respondent’s evidence for September 4, 2000. However, on August
24, 2000, respondent filed a motion for postponement of the September 4, 2000
scheduled hearing on the ground that he was in the United States as early as July
23, 2000 for medical examination. On September 5, 2000, the trial court denied
respondent’s motion for postponement and reinstated its May 24, 2000 Order.
● On September 19, 2000, respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion to Discharge
Receiver, reiterating the circumstances which prevented him from attending the
September 4, 2000 hearing and praying for the discharge of the receiver upon the
filing of a counterbond in an amount to be fixed by the court in accordance with
Section 3, Rule 59 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
● On October 10, 2000, petitioners filed their undated Opposition to Motion to
Discharge Receiver.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT A DULY APPOINTED RECEIVER OF PROPERTIES IN LITIGATION
SHOULD BE DISCHARGED SIMPLY BECAUSE THE ADVERSE PARTY OFFERS TO
POST A COUNTERBOND.

HELD:
No. While the CA made a statement that the trial court should have discharged the
appointed receiver on the basis of the proposed counterbond, such opinion does not
jibe with the import of Sec. 3, Rule 59. The rule states that the "application may be
denied or the receiver discharged." In statutory construction, the word "may" has
always been construed as permissive. If the intent is to make it mandatory or
ministerial for the trial court to order the recall of the receiver upon the offer to post a
counterbond, then the court should have used the word "shall." Thus, the trial court
has to consider the posting of the counterbond in addition to other reasons
presented by the offeror why the receivership has to be set aside.

Citibank vs. Court of Appeals; GR No. 61508; 17 March 1999 Santiago, Monette Victoria Catungal

DOCTRINE: The CA was right in finding a defect in such assumption of receivership in that
the requirement of taking an oath has not been complied with. Section 5, Rule 59, states:

SECTION 5. Oath and bond of receiver. — Before entering upon his duties, the receiver
must be sworn to perform them faithfully, and must file a bond, executed to such person and
in such sum as the court or judge may direct, to the effect that he will faithfully discharge the
duties of receiver in the action and obey the orders of the court therein."

FACTS:

● In consideration for a loan obtained from Citibank, N.A.(formerly First National City
Bank) the defendant (private respondent herein) Douglas Anama executed a
promissory note to pay the plaintiff bank the same.

● To secure payment of the loan, private respondent Anama also constituted a Chattel
Mortgage of even date in favor of petitioner, on various machineries and equipment.

● For failure and refusal of the private respondent to pay the monthly installments
despite repeated demands, petitioner filed a verified complaint against private
respondent Anama for the collection of his unpaid balance, for the delivery and
possession of the chattels covered by the Chattel Mortgage.

● The trial court, upon proof of default of the private respondent issued an Order of
Replevin over the machineries and equipment covered by the Chattel Mortgage.
However, despite the issuance of the said order of seizure of subject chattels, actual
delivery of possession thereof to petitioner did not take place because negotiations
for an amicable settlement between the parties were encouraged by the trial court.

● A pre-trial conference was held and the lower court issued an order for joint
management by the petitioner and the private respondent of the latter's business for
ten days, after which the former would be appointed receiver for the said business.
When the parties failed to amicably settle the case, the lower court proceeded to try
the case on the merits.
 ● The Bank filed a Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Seizure, and the same
was granted despite opposition by Anama. Thereafter, the Bank took possession of
the mortgaged chattels and they were advertised for public auction.

● Private respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to set
aside and annul the questioned resolutions of the trial court on the ground that they
were issued "in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion" because of
the "lack of evidence and clear cut right to possession of First National City Bank
(petitioner) to the machineries subject of the Chattel Mortgage.

● CA granted the petition holding that the provisions of the Rules of Court on Replevin
and Receivership have not been complied with, in that there was non-compliance
with the requirement of a receiver's bond and oath of office which ruled that there
there was non-compliance with the requirement of a receiver's bond and oath of
office.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
BOND POSTED BY THE PETITIONER IS QUESTIONABLE AND/OR INSUFFICIENT

HELD: NO.

Petitioner contends that the CA made an error of judgment in finding that the petitioner did
not comply with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 59 by failing to post a receiver's bond.
Petitioner contends that although it is in agreement with the Court of Appeals that a
receiver's bond is separate and distinct from a replevin bond, under the circumstances it was
not required to file a receiver's bond because it did not assume receivership over the
properties.

The order of the trial court dated March 24, 1975 provided that the properties shall be under
joint management for a period of ten days, after which period "the bank, by virtue of the
stipulations under the chattel mortgage, becomes the Receiver to perform all the obligations
as such Receiver" and "in the event that the bank decides not to take over the receivership,
the joint management continues."

From the evidence on record, it is palpably clear that petitioner Citibank did, in fact, assume
receivership. Petitioner cannot therefore deny that nine days after the trial court issued the
order of receivership, it informed the private respondent that it would, as it did, assume
receivership.

The CA found that the requirements of Section 5, Rule 59 on receivership were not complied
with by the petitioner, particularly the filing or posting of a bond and the taking of an oath. It
should be noted that under the old Rules of Court which was in effect at the time this case
was still at trial stage, a bond for the appointment of a receiver was not generally required of
the applicant, except when the application was made ex parte. Therefore, petitioner was not
absolutely required to file a bond. Besides, as stipulated in the chattel mortgage contract
between the parties, petitioner, as the mortgagee, is entitled to the appointment of a receiver
without a bond.

However, the CA was right in finding a defect in such assumption of receivership in that the
requirement of taking an oath has not been complied with. Section 5, Rule 59, states:
SECTION 5. Oath and bond of receiver. — Before entering upon his duties, the receiver
must be sworn to perform them faithfully, and must file a bond, executed to such person and
in such sum as the court or judge may direct, to the effect that he will faithfully discharge the
duties of receiver in the action and obey the orders of the court therein."

Consequently, the trial court erred in allowing the petitioner to assume receivership over the
machine shop of private respondent without requiring the appointed receiver to take an oath.

Normandy vs. Duque; GR No. L-25407; 29 August 1969 Santillan, Edward Jayson Baterna

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

REPLEVIN
(Rule 60, Sections 1-10)
Smart Communications, Inc. vs. Astorga; GR No. 148132; 28 January 2008 Silva, Virna Grace Marasigan

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Dagudag vs. Paderanga; A.M. RTJ No. 06-2017; 19 June 2008 Siron, Charmaine Grace Medina

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS:
● This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a
judge filed by retired Lt. Gen. Alfonso P. Dagudag against Judge Maximo G.
W. Paderanga.
● The PNP received information that illegal forest products were being
transported from Cagayan de Oro to cebu. DENR recommended that the
illegal forest products be confiscated in favor of the government.
● a certain Roger C. Edma (Edma) prayed that a writ of replevin be issued ordering
the defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, and others to deliver the forest
products to him and that judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay him
moral damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. Judge Paderanga issued a
writ of replevin ordering Sheriff Reynaldo L. Salceda to take possession of the forest
products.
● In a motion to quash the writ of replevin, the defendants DENR, CENRO, and Gen.
Dagudag prayed that the writ of replevin be set aside, contending among others,
that the writ of replevin is not proper.
● Judge Paderanga denied the motion to quash the writ of replevin for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of a writ of replevin is proper
HELD: No. The issuance of writ of replevin is not proper.

Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. First,
under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance
of cases pending before administrative agencies.
In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He went
straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages.

Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies of special competence. The DENR is the agency
responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. The complaint for replevin itself stated that
members of DENR’s Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest products and brought
them to the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office. This should have
alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had custody of the forest products, that
administrative proceedings may have been commenced, and that the replevin suit had to be
dismissed outright.

Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of
replevin. There was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized the
forest products in accordance with law.

Judge Paderanga’s acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of
replevin constitute gross ignorance of the law.

BA Finance Corp. vs. CA; GR No. 102998; 5 July 1996 Suarez, Jacob Almero

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Chiao Liong Tan vs. CA; GR No. 106251; 19 November 1993 Tablizo, Darlymple Dayne Robles

DOCTRINE:
A certificate of registration of a motor vehicle in one's name indeed creates a strong
presumption of ownership. For all practical purposes, the person in whose favor it has been
issued is virtually the owner thereof unless proved otherwise. In other words, such presumption
is rebuttable by competent proof.

FACTS:
Petitioner claims to be the owner of a motor vehicle, relying on the certificate of registration under his
name. He sent the respondent to look and purchase a car which the letter did. However, the respondent
is now claiming ownership of the van.
Respondent contended that the purchase money was from the loan acquired from a friend-lender. He
gave the downpayment to the petitioner and asked to purchase the van. This led to the reason why the
car was registered under the petitioner's name. However, the balance will still be paid by respondent
himself. The friend-lender and an Isuzu motor employee corroborated the claim of the respondent.

Petitioner filed an action for replevin before the RTC Manila, but failed to convince the court to
decide in their favor. The RTC’s decision was affirmed by the CA citing that petitioner fails to
overturn the order of replevin by proving ownership

ISSUE: Whether or not ownership may be decided in a proceeding for replevin

HELD:
​Yes. An action for replevin is possessory in character and determines nothing more than the right of
possession. However, when the title to the property is distinctly put in issue by the defendants plea
and by reason of the policy to settle in one action all the conflicting claims of the parties to the
possession of the property in controversy, the question of ownership may be resolved in the same
proceeding. In this case, the ownership was established through evidence and testimonies presented
by the defendant. A certificate of registration creates a strong presumption of ownership. But such is
rebuttable by competent proof, but which the petitioner failed to overcome.

Northern Motors vs. Herrera; GR No. L-32674; 22 February 1973 Uriarte, Juan Carlos Gandeza

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE

(Rule 61, Sections 1-7)
Calderon vs. Roxas; GR No. 185595; 9 January 2013

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X
Veloria, Jasmin Mae Pama
Mangonon vs. Court of Appeals; GR No. 125041; 30 June 2006 Villan, Vera Mae Angelica Salvador

DOCTRINE:
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Lam vs. Chua; GR No. 131286; 18 March 2004 Villanueva, Harvey John G.

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X

Reyes vs. Ines-Luciano; GR No. L-48219; 28 February 1979 Villareal, Marinel Rana

DOCTRINE: X
FACTS: X
ISSUE: X
HELD: X