R E V O L U T I O N A RY L E A D E R S

APPLYING COLLECTIVE LEGITIMACY TO LEADERSHIP ROLES

Essay #1 Sam Satterfield

International Organization Professor Castle October 7, 2011 In the article Political Leadership and Regime Formation Oran R. Young argues that leadership is a critical determinant of success or failure in the process of institutional bargaining that dominates efforts to form international regimes or, more generally,

institutional arrangements in international society.1 Young differentiates three forms of leadership that regularly come into play as structural leadership, entrepreneurial leadership, and intellectual leadership. While he does show the necessity of these three forms of leadership, he neglects a fourth form which would make leadership not merely a necessity, but also a sufficient condition for success.2

This fourth type of leadership lies in gaining legitimacy for ones argument and is considered at length by Inis L. Claude in the article Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations. In this essay I argue that by adding a fourth type of leadership, revolutionary leadership based upon Inis L. Claudes study of collective legitimization the emergence of leadership becomes both a necessary and sufficient condition for success in efforts to reach agreement on constitutional contracts at the international level. Though Claude did not intend his work to be used as a form of leadership, I feel the argument he makes for collective legitimization fits well as a leadership type.

I will look at Youngs argument of institutional bargaining and overcoming collective action problems. Then I will analyze Claudes study of collective legitimization and how it can be turned into a paradigm for a new form of leadership. Finally I hope to show that

Oran Young, Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society, International Organization, Summer 1991, 281.
2

Young does in fact recognize that his three forms of leadership are not all inclusive and makes a call at the end of his paper for students of international affairs to examine alternative leadership styles and strategies, which is what this paper is attempting to do.

this forth form of leadership makes Youngs argument of leadership necessary and sufficient to understand institutional regime formation.

In order to add this new form of leadership to Youngs argument, his argument must first be understood. It centers on the concept of institutional bargaining, or the efforts on the part of autonomous actors to reach agreement among themselves on the terms of constitutional contracts or interlocking sets of rights and rules that are expected to govern their subsequent interactions.3 In international society institutional bargaining has

collective action problems which often require the actors to operate under a unanimity rule instead of majoritarian rule. They also tend to push actors to integrative rather than distributive bargaining, and tend to focus them on a few key problems rather than perfecting their information. Young argues that these major hindrances to effective institutional bargaining can be overcome through leadership.

Leadership, as Young uses it, refers to the actions of individuals who endeavor to solve or circumvent the collective action problems that plague the efforts of parties seeking to reap joint gains in processes of institutional bargaining.4 Given this definition, Young gives three types of leaders. The structural leader translates power resources into

bargaining leverage in an effort to bring pressure to bear on others to assent to the terms of proposed constitutional contracts. The entrepreneurial leader makes use of negotiating skill to frame the issues at stake, devise mutually acceptable formulas, and broker the interests of key players in building support for these formulas.
3 4

The intellectual leader,

Young, 282. Young, 284.

by contrast, relies on the power of ideas to shape the thinking of the principals in processes of institutional bargaining.5 The key then is that these various leaders, through their actions and skills, can decrease the collective action problems in institutional bargaining.

Another way to decrease collective action problems is gaining collective legitimacy. Inis L. Claude, speaking of the United Nations role in world politics, defines collective legitimacy as politically significant approval and disapproval of the claims, policies, and actions of states, including, but going far beyond, their claims to status as independent members of the international system.6 By gaining approval from external sources,

pressure to work toward a particular institutional bargain can be increased. While statesmen have their own ways of justifying their foreign policies to themselves and their peoples, independently of external judgments, they are well aware that such unilateral determinations do not suffice. They are keenly conscious of the need for approval by as large and impressive a body of other states as may be possible. 7 A leader can seek collective legitimization in order to gain leverage over domestic constituents and effectively give power to institutional bargaining.

By understanding collective legitimization and its potential power, a fourth type of leader form can be created to add to Youngs model. The revolutionary leader is an individual which may work for a party or the entire bargaining group as a whole, and who fights for
5 6

Ibid, 307. Inis L. Claude, Jr. Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations, in Friedrich Kratochwil and Edward D. Mansfield, eds, International Organization and Global Governance: A Reader, New York: Pearson Education Inc, 2006, 205. 7 Claude, 207.

the legitimacy of new institutional bargains, regimes, or arrangements within a group or with the groups neighbors. Like all forms of leadership Young discusses, there are a few overlapping functions of leadership, but revolutionary leadership is unique in a few key ways.

In contrast to the structural leader who seeks to translate power into bargaining leverage, the revolutionary leader seeks to turn power into legitimacy. Claude says, Rulers seek legitimization not only to satisfy their consciences but also to buttress their positions. 8 The revolutionary leader converts power into authority, makes sure competence is supported by jurisdiction, and possession is validated as ownership by seeking collective legitimization.9 A revolutionary leader may come from the ranks of structural leadership, but his goals would be much different.

The revolutionary leader and the entrepreneurial leader also share many traits. Negotiation skills would also be important for both, but their audiences would be different. Revolutionary leaders are seeking to strengthen the bargain as it forms by giving it legitimacy from outside sources in order to put pressure on the bargaining groups. This also allows the bargaining actors to gain some freedom from their domestic organizations which may disapprove of the institutional bargaining and its members. So again, the revolutionary leader may come from the ranks of the entrepreneurial leaders, but is a different actor with different goals.

8 9

Ibid, 206. Ibid, 205.

The revolution, or new legitimacy, provided by a revolutionary leader is what every major international regime or bargain requires to gain sticking power. Other forms of leadership are necessary to move the bargain along, but unless legitimacy is courted and received the regime cannot continue, much like the League of Nations falling to gain the support of its creators country. No effective revolutionary leader arose, and so the organization fell.

As can be expected, my adaptation of Claudes argument for collective legitimization does not lend itself in every aspect to Youngs leadership model. One question I can not yet answer is how to determine the proper time for an actor or group to utilize a revolutionary leader. Another problem to address relates to what type of actor would choose to employ this form of leadership. Should it be weak actors seeking to be heard, or powerful actors hoping to apply other forms of pressure? This I cannot answer from the given texts. The rarity of a revolutionary leader emerging is a legitimate criticism as well, though it could also be a strength. In this last criticism lies the answer to my thesis.

Though the research needs to be much more in depth than I have done in this essay, I argue that it is those rare times when a revolutionary leader has emerged that institutional bargaining has actually been able to overcome collective active problems and create international regimes. Having the three other forms of leadership have also been

necessary, but, as Young states, not sufficient. In all of Youngs cases, as well as Claudes analysis of the UN, this hypothesis holds up. But more cases are needed. I believe that adding collective legitimization and revolutionary leadership adds the pieces

needed for Youngs argument to show what is both necessary and sufficient for collective bargaining to succeed.

In this essay I have argued that by adding a fourth type of leadership, revolutionary leadership based upon Inis L. Claudes study of collective legitimization the emergence of leadership can show both a necessary and sufficient conditions for success in efforts to reach agreement on constitutional contracts at the international level. I have done this by showing the power of collective legitimization to aid in overcoming collective action problems and creating permanent regimes. This study requires much more work and analysis, and I hope I can find the proof or flaw in this argument through further study.