LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

HABERMAS, METAPHOR AND RELIGION:

THE GRID OF INTERPRETATION

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO

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THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
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IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
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PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY
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BY

DANIEL LORCA

CHICAGO, IL

MAY 2007

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 UMI Number: 3261318

Copyright 2007 by
Lorca, Daniel

All rights reserved.

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Copyright by Daniel Lorca, 2007

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 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am very grateful to David Ingram for all his help and support. Without his gentle

supervision and trust this project would have been a fantasy. I am also grateful to my

friend Susana Cavallo: She gave me the guidance I sorely needed to embark on this

project. I am grateful as well to my friend Thomas O ’Donnell: His ceaseless questioning

o f my ideas made them intelligible. I thank also David Schweickart, David Yandell and

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Andrew Cutrofello for their comments. Finally, and most of all, I am grateful to my wife,

Marian Reich: She gave me all o f her support, always.

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 To my wife, Marian Reich

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 Throughout the course, w e’ll be looking at how speakers/writers use language to do

things, how listeners/readers recognize what it is that they are doing, and how it is that

“things do not turn out as we assumed.” (Larry McEnemy, “Assignment #1: Apology -

What Socrates is doing with language.” The first assignment in his class to teach how to

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become a better writer at the University o f Chicago.)
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 PREFACE

The title chosen to refer to this work is Habermas, Metaphor and Religion: The Grid o f

Interpretation. It is useful to understand how this title came about, because it sheds light

on what the theory is supposed to do and how it is supposed to do it. Just as importantly,

the title conveys that this work is a hybrid in two respects: First, it mixes what

Habermas has to say about religion (and incidentally, rationality as well) with

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metaphor; and second, it mixes what Habermas says about the literal use o f language at

the level of theory with things he did not say about metaphor.
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Habermas proposes an original and powerful account o f language based on

language-use. His views in The Theory o f Communicative Action are a version o f

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speech act theory that accounts for the act o f communicating itself in all kinds of

discourses. His views about language share with Austin’s account two things that are
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relevant here.

Austin decided not to talk about metaphor in How to Do Things with Words

(1975). He first distinguishes between serious and non-serious uses o f language. Next

he says that “non-seriously used language is parasitic upon normal use” (p.22). Then he

finishes the point by stating that he is excluding [the non-serious uses] from

consideration” (p.22). The example he gives later on o f a rion-serious use o f language is

clearly metaphorical even though he does not say that it is: “If I say ‘Go and catch a

falling star,’ it may be quite clear what both the meaning and the force o f my utterance

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 is, but still wholly unresolved which o f these other kinds of things I may be doing.

There are aetiolations, parasitic uses, etc., various ‘non serious’ and not ‘not full

normal’ uses” (p. 104). In short, Austin chose not to talk about the metaphorical use of

language because it was not his primary focus. He states that “our interest in these

lectures is essentially to fasten on the second, illocutionary act and contrast it with the

other two [locution and perlocution]” (p.104). Austin’s strategy is well justified: to

distinguish illocution from locution and perlocution there is no need to bring the

metaphorical into the mix.

Habermas’s use o f speech act theory with regard to metaphor has at least two

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similarities with Austin’s. Both o f them excluded metaphor from their accounts o f
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language use at the level o f theory. Both o f them regard metaphor as “parasitic” on the

literal as well. But unlike Austin, Habermas cannot disregard metaphor. More
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specifically, while Austin chose to ignore metaphor because his main focus was to

clarify illocution, Habermas needs to take metaphor into account because he wants to

explain not only religion and rationality, but also how rationality can come out o f
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religious discourse. Habermas needs to account for metaphor because without it we

cannot speak meaningfully about religious language. For example, the words o f Galileo

make the dependence of religion on metaphor evident:

. . . it is very pious to say and prudent to affirm that the holy Bible can never
speak untruth—whenever its true meaning is understood. But I believe that
nobody will deny that it is often very abstruse, and may say things which are
quite different from what its bare words signify. Hence in expounding the Bible
if one were always to confine oneself to the unadorned grammatical meaning,
one might fall into error. Not only contradictions and propositions far from the
true might thus be made to appear in the Bible, but even grave heresies and
follies. Thus it would be necessary to assign to God feet, hands, and eyes, as
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 well as corporeal and human affections, such as anger, repentance, hatred . . . .
[Therefore] it is necessary that wise expositors should produce the true senses o f
such passages, together with the special reasons for which they were set down in
these words. (From “Letter to the Grand Duchess o f Tuscany,” [p.294])

Virtually anyone who has studied religious language had to come to terms in one way

or another with the close connection between that kind o f language and metaphor. As a

matter o f fact, that connection is so essential that much o f the research on metaphor is to

be found within the study o f religious language. Therefore, given Habermas’s interest in

the distinction between religion and rationality and how the former can give rise to the

latter, metaphor is not something that he can ignore. And yet, he did at the level o f

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theory.

The problem with metaphor can be explained briefly if we take into

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consideration the role o f the concept “conversation” in Habermas’s philosophy. Once

we are rational, there are different areas o f validity. It is self-evident that those areas
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influence each other (for example, what we learn from science is relevant to our moral

assessments, and what we learn from literature affects in turn our morality). Therefore,
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once we are rational, the areas o f validity must be able to “converse” with each other or

else Habermas’s proposal will lack plausibility. Furthermore, even before those areas o f

validity are fully developed there must be a “conversation” between religion and

rationality, because it is precisely from the former that the latter is bom. Without that

“conversation” it is difficult to see how rationality could have come out o f religion as it

is explained in “The Rational Stmcture o f the Linguistification o f the Sacred” (The

Theory o f Communicative Action, Vol. 2, 1987, pp. 77-112). For example, Habermas’s

preoccupation about the kind o f “conversation” that is possible between religion and
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 rationality is evident in his essay “Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in this

World” {Religion and Rationality, 2002, pp.67-94), which is discussed in great detail in

the first chapter of this work. His preoccupation is also evident in his essay “Israel or

Athens: Where does Anamnestic Reason Belong?” {Religion and Rationality, pp. 129-

146). In that essay he writes: “ [There must be a conversation between religion and

rationality because] the tension between the spirit o f Athens and the legacy o f Israel has

been worked through with no less an impact in philosophy than in theology” (p. 133). In

that same essay he also lets us know that the conversation influences philosophy

deeply: “The concept o f saving remembrance paves the way for the disclosure o f a

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domain o f religious motives and experiences which long stood clamoring at the gates of
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philosophical idealism, before they were finally taken seriously [by philosophy]” (p.

132).
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The problem is not that Habermas’s views about the conversation between

religious and rationality are not plausible (they may or may not be, which is a question

that is not being posed here). The problem is that he is not entitled to express those
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views because he ignored metaphor at the level o f theory. More specifically, religious

discourse is dominated by metaphor, at least in rational societies, and therefore, without

explaining how metaphor is used to obtain religious discourses it is not possible to

explain what kind o f discourse religion is. And if we do not explain what kind o f

discourse it is, then it is just as difficult to see how we can explain the kind o f

conversation it can have with other discourses, or how it can give rise to rationality. To

put it briefly, the problem is this: If religion is in itself metaphorical in at least rational

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 societies, then any conversation with religion will have to depend at least in part on

metaphor; but given that Habermas excluded metaphor at the level o f theory, he cannot

explain the kinds o f conversation that are possible with religion. His views about how

religion and rationality converse are therefore unsubstantiated, and consequently, he is

not entitled to them. Fortunately the problem identified above has a solution: I will

argue that his exclusion o f metaphor in The Theory o f Communicative Action is not

well-founded because he provides no good reason for that exclusion. More importantly,

I will also argue that the two most fundamental aspects o f his theory o f communicative

action can be used to explain metaphor by taking full advantage o f speech act theory: I

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am referring to Habermas’s insistence on the performative and the role o f a “yes/no”

“agree/disagree” attitude to obtain communicative action. Therefore, if he ignored

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metaphor for no good reason, and if he needs to account for metaphor to talk about the
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conversation between religion and rationality, then a theory o f metaphor can be

designed to complement his views about language. That theory o f metaphor can then be

used to do what his theory cannot do alone: to explain the conversation between religion
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and rationality.

What has been said so far explains why this work has to be a hybrid in the first

sense mentioned at the beginning: It mixes Habermas’s views o f religion (and

rationality) with metaphor. I show that Habermas has a serious problem with his views

on religion and rationality because he cannot explain how they can converse with each

other (Chapter One). I also show that the problem is created by his lack o f attention to

metaphor at the theoretical level (Chapter Two). I also argue that his lack o f attention to

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 metaphor can be repaired because his theory o f communicative action provides a good

foundation to account not only for the literal use o f language, but also the metaphorical.

Then, in order to substantiate that claim, I propose a theory o f metaphor that takes

advantage o f Habermas’s theory o f communicative action at the most fundamental level

(Chapters Three, Four and part o f Five). Finally, to make sure that the problem with

religion and rationality has been solved, I apply the theory o f metaphor I propose to

Habermas’s views on religion and rationality to explain the kind o f conversation they

can have (part o f Chapter Five and Chapter Six). We have come full circle: His views

on religion and rationality need a theory o f metaphor to be substantiated, the theory of

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metaphor is therefore created in a way that is compatible with his linguistic philosophy,

and then, to close the circle, the created theory o f metaphor is applied to his views to
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substantiate them, which is what needed to be done in the first place.
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At the same time there is another sense in which this work is a hybrid. The basic

principle is this: If a theory cannot do justice to the many ways in which we use

language, then what needs to go is not the various ways in which we use language, but
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the theory. I have not compromised in this. The more attention I paid to how we use

speech acts in order to communicate, the more I realized that the distinction between the

literal and the metaphorical is too poor to account for all of the various uses of

language. There are utterances that are literal and metaphorical at the same time, and

yet, we have no theories with words that describe those utterances. For example, many

if not all o f our moral expressions fit into such a category: “abortion is fill-in-the blank”

is just one instance. On the one hand “abortion” has a literal meaning that we can agree

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 on (the “dictionary meaning”), but on the other, the connotations o f “abortion” may be

completely different in different communities. In a religious community it is used as

“against God’s command,” and in a feminist community it is used as “power and

control over one’s own life.” Those two communities may agree on the dictionary

meaning, the literal meaning, and yet they use “abortion” differently in their respective

communities because that concept is also charged with different connotations. The same

applies to all key moral concepts, such as “rights,” “just,” and “good.” Our moral

concepts are literal and metaphorical at the same time, and yet we have no theories that

refer to this combination.

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In particular, religious language seems to be dominated by a very powerful
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combination o f the literal and the metaphorical. For example, in Chapter Five I argue

that the utterance “God is my father” is at the same time metaphorical and literal. In one
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sense it must be literal because it captures a religious experience, the experience o f God

being my father: As far as I can tell, the religious person does not state a falsehood

when he says with conviction that “God is my father.” He means it. And yet, in another
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sense the utterance is also metaphorical, because if the speaker is also a rational agent,

then he or she must know that God cannot be the father o f a human being. Therefore, if

the religious person is also rational, then the same utterance counts also as a metaphor

that stands for “God is the creator or the sustainer.” As I said before, my great respect

for the various ways in which we use language forced upon me this fact about religious

discourse, and therefore I had to account for it. I have called this particular combination

o f the literal and the metaphorical “mythaphor.” In Chapter Five I explain why this

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 combination o f the literal and the metaphorical is possible using Habermas’s most

fundamental insights about language.

In order to do justice to Habermas’s very complex views on religion,

mythaphors have proven to be useful. As we shall see in Chapter One, Habermas thinks

that all religious utterances describe a religious experience, and that as such they cannot

be metaphors: when a believer says that “God is his father,” he means it. But Habermas

also thinks that those utterances must be interpreted as metaphors in order to cope with

the pressures brought about by the rise o f rationality. This combination is exactly what

mythaphors describe: a speech act used by a rational/religious agent that mixes the

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literal use o f language (to give expression to a religious experience: God is my father)
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and the metaphorical use o f language to cope with the pressures o f rationality (God is

the creator o f all things). I argue in chapters Five and Six that the conversation between
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religion and rationality can be explained by taking into account how mythaphors make

that conversation possible.

I should perhaps add that mythaphor is only one o f the many combinations of
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the literal and the metaphorical that must be taken into account to do full justice to the

various ways in which we use language; I suspect that there are dozens o f combinations.

In this work I have identified seven possibilities, including mythaphor. I have identified

only seven possibilities because they are essential to understand the conversation

between religion and rationality. Therefore, given the enormous variation in the use of

the literal and the metaphorical to obtain effective communicative action, it would be an

oversimplification to describe the theory I present as “a theory o f metaphor.” It is more

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 than that: It explains how and why the literal, the metaphorical, and the combination of

the two are used at the level o f speech acts to obtain effective communicative action.

This work is therefore a hybrid in another respect: It cannot be called properly a theory

o f metaphor or a theory o f the literal, because it is a theory o f both at the same time. In

order to give expression to this combination o f the literal and the metaphorical, I have

chosen to call the theory “the grid o f interpretation.”

When we consider the two senses in which this work is a hybrid, the title o f the

work, Habermas, Metaphor and Religion: The Grid o f Interpretation, seems well

justified. The first part o f the title conveys that Habermas’s account o f religions is

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problematic because he ignored metaphor at the level o f theory when he talked about

religion. At the same time, the second part o f the title conveys a solution for that
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problem: The grid of interpretation explains the various ways in which we interpret
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literal and metaphorical speech acts so that we can have religious and rational

discourses that converse with each other as described by Habermas.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii

PREFACE vi

LIST OF TABLES xvii

LIST OF FIGURES xviii

CHAPTER ONE: A Prima Facie case 1

Metaphor, Religious Experiences and Morality: An Example 5
An Overview o f the Organization o f this Work 24
CHAPTER TWO: Religion, the Literal and Metaphor 30
Habermas and the Literal 30
A Reconstruction o f Habermas’s Views on Religion 36

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Symbols, Analogical Thinking and the Figurative 45
CHAPTER THREE: The Requirements for a Theory o f Metaphor 58
Metaphor and Religious Experience 63
A Possible Objection 72
Habermas and Analogy
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Effectiveness in Communicative Action 79
Summary o f the Chapter 95
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CHAPTER FOUR: The Grid o f Interpretation 98

Habermas and the “yes/no” Attitude 103
Intersubj ectivity 110
The Grid o f Interpretation 116
Face Value 118
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Metaphor 122
Litaphor 126
Connaphor 130
A Graphical Representation o f the Grid 133
The Basic Grid from the Perspective o f the Speaker 136
An Interlude 137
The Basic Grid from the Perspective o f the Speaker and the Hearer 150
CHAPTER FIVE: The Grid o f Interpretation and Religion 156
Good Storytelling 158
Very Good Storytelling 171
Mythaphor 179
The Tension Within the Interpretative Strategies 186
An Objection: Analogy or Metaphor? 195
An Explanation o f Religious Discourse 198
Concluding Remarks 224

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 CHAPTER SIX: Religion and Rationality in Modem Societies 241
The Two Requirements in Chapter Three 254
The Other Two Options: Methodical Atheism and Postmetaphysical Philosophy 276
Concluding Remarks 278

BIBILIOGRAPHY 281

VITA 291

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 LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1 Linguistic options with respect to religious experience 68

2 Linguistic options with respect to religious experience, again 70

3 A graphical representation o f the basic grid o f interpretation 133

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4 Linguistic options with respect to religious experience, a third time 255

5 The survival o f religion in modem societies according to the grid of

interpretation 275
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6 The options within a modem society with respect to religion and rationality
according to the grid o f interpretation 277
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 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1 A simplified version o f the basic grid o f interpretation 140

2 The extended grid o f interpretation 157

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 CHAPTER ONE

A PRIMA FACIE CASE

A preoccupation with the relation between religion and reason is ever-present in

Habermas’s writings. The Theory o f Communicative Action (1987) makes it abundantly

clear that rationality itself develops out o f religion. He also has a collection o f essays

titled, quite appropriately, Religion and Rationality (2002), and in Postmetaphysical

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Thinking: Philosophical Essays (1992), Habermas tells us that we cannot understand

our own morality unless we do so in terms o f religion (of Judeo-Christian salvation):

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I do not believe that we, as Europeans, can seriously understand concepts like
morality and ethical life, persons and individuality, or freedom and
emancipation, without appropriating the substance of the Judeo-Christian
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understanding o f history in terms o f salvation. And these concepts are, perhaps,
nearer to our hearts than the conceptual resources o f Platonic thought, centering
on order and revolving around the cathartic intuition o f id eas.. . . But without
the transmission through philosophy o f any one o f the great world religions, this
semantic potential could one day become inaccessible, (p. 145)
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This preoccupation is not Habermas’s alone. A version o f it can be found in Plato’s

Republic (1992). The famous quarrel between philosophy and art in Plato’s ideal polis

can be rephrased, quite easily, as a deeply felt preoccupation with the relation between

philosophy and religion. Three brief commentaries suffice to establish this: First, the

Homeric poems were an essential element o f the most important religious ceremonies in

ancient Greece, and consequently, Plato’s censure o f those poems is not just a censure

o f what the artist can or cannot say: it also implicated religious belief. Second,

theatrical representations in ancient Greece had their origins not only in religious ritual,
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 2
but just as importantly, they were performed within a temple as a ritualistic offering to

the Gods.1Finally, a poet was not someone who simply composed poems based on his

mastery o f language; he was someone who composed religion.

Going back to Habermas, in the introduction to Religion and Rationality (2002)

Eduardo Mendieta explains that if we fail to include the question o f how rationality and

religion are inter-related, our understanding o f the early Frankfurt School will be

seriously undermined:

I would like to suggest that Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s reflection on religion

can be provisionally summarized in the following way: First, enlightenment is

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catalyzed by religion. We cannot understand the critique o f myth without
understanding how religion itself, and in particular the Christian and Jewish
traditions are forms o f demythologization.. . . Fifth, and finally, the Frankfurt
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School’s critique o f religion, which is less a rejection and more a
reappropriation, refuses to answer in favor o f one or the other side o f the dyad:
Athens or Jerusalem [that is, roughly speaking, rationality or religion]? One is
unthinkable without the other, (p.l 1)
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Furthermore, Mendieta also makes clear that there is no break between the early

Frankfurt School and Habermas when it comes to questions about rationality and
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religion. Far from abandoning that area o f inquiry, Habermas continues what the early

Frankfurt School started: “Another goal o f this collection [of essays in Religion and

Rationality\ is to make explicit, if the question was ever posed, how Habermas’s work

inherited, appropriating and transforming it, the critical tradition o f Jewish utopian

messianism o f the early Frankfurt School” (2002, p.2).

Finally, it is worthy o f mention that a very significant number o f Habermas’s

main sources, even when they are not part o f the early Frankfurt School, still share

with him a concern with reason and rationality in some form or another. Weber sees a

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 3
profound connection between the rise o f rationality and religion; Durkheim sees in

ritual and religion the foundation o f secularized society, and as such o f what we now

understand as being rational. Indeed, the only two notable exceptions are those sources

that as a group tend to be interested in psychology (Mead, with a strong anthropological

bent, and Piaget, with a focus on the development o f the child), and the philosophers o f

the ordinary language tradition: mainly Searle, Austin and Wittgenstein.

Everything points, therefore, to the conclusion that religion plays an essential

part in Habermas’s thought. It is difficult to understand what Habermas means by

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“rationality” if at the same time we do not address the question o f what he means by

“religion,” and vice-versa. It is therefore surprising to read the following observation

made by Mendieta in 2002:

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While the reception o f Habermas by theologians and sociologists o f religion
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continues to gain momentum, his reception by philosophers as a philosopher of

religion remains incipient. Philosophers and social theorists in general have
taken Habermas’ pronouncements on religion in his Theory o f Communicative
Action, especially in volume 2, and his sporadic and pointed criticisms against
mysticism and messianism in The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, as
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definite and representative o f his general outlook.. . . [the consensus is that]

Habermas has put religion to rest, and has pronounced its theoretical and social-
developmental death. In fact, a consensus has developed around the notion that
Habermas’ theory o f the “linguistification o f the sacred” entails the sublimation
or Aufhebung o f religion tout court. This misleading representation and
conclusion about Habermas’ positions on religion has made it undesirable, even
unnecessary, to engage him any further as an insightful philosopher o f religion.
This is most unfortunate.. . . (Introduction, p.l 1)

The first aim o f this work is to present Habermas’s views on religion as a whole, and

not just those expressed in his Theory o f Communicative Action (1984). This aim is not

merely informative: it is also critical. More specifically, when we consider what

Habermas has to say about religion in general, and when we consider what he says

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 4
about rationality, a deep, unresolved tension emerges between the two. Habermas’s

central preoccupation with religion and rationality is not merely a preoccupation: It is

an unresolved problem.

The second aim o f this work is to identify the source of all that tension (of the

unresolved problem). I shall argue that it is caused by insufficient attention to metaphor.

Once we acknowledge that metaphor plays an important role in communicative action,

it becomes easier to see that if we do not elaborate on that role, religion and rationality

will be at odds with each other. On the other hand, if we understand the role o f

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metaphor, then it becomes much easier to explain how rationality can come out of

religion, and how religion and rationality can co-exist.

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The last and final aim o f this work is to provide a theory o f metaphor and the

literal that is compatible with Habermas’s theory o f communicative action. I shall argue
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that this theory can be used to solve the above-mentioned problem.

I realize that my central claim may sound very far-fetched to most. At this stage
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it is not obvious that there is a problem to be solved, and assuming that there is, it is

even less obvious that it is caused by not considering metaphor sufficiently. Therefore,

what I would like to do next is to offer an example in which the tension between

religion and rationality is evident and is directly caused by not considering metaphor as

seriously as it should be. This example will give the main thesis o f this work at least

prima facie credibility, and as such, the reader will have a good reason to keep reading.

It should be stressed that this is only a prim a facie case: by the end o f this work it will

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 5
be beyond doubt that Habermas does have a serious problem with metaphor as it

relates to religious language and rationality.

Metaphor, Religious Experience and Morality: An Example

First I introduce the example very briefly, and then I explain it in great detail. I

use this strategy to let the reader know where I am going with the example once I start

the detailed analysis.

To begin with we need to keep in mind that Habermas thinks o f him self as a

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“postmetaphysical thinker.” We also need to keep in mind that postmetaphysical

thought can be carried out in two kinds o f discourse: theology and philosophy (which
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includes morality). According to Habermas, postmetaphysical thought (philosophy or

theology) can only be carried out if the thinker detaches religious experiences from the
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religious concepts: if a postmetaphysical philosopher wants to use the concept “ethical

life” to explain something about moral philosophy, he or she may do so only after the
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concept “ethical life” is no longer associated with the religious experience “ethical life.”

The same applies to postmetaphysical theology. At the same time, the way in which the

postmetaphysical thinker detaches the religious experience from the religious concept

he or she is using is by taking advantage o f the transformative powers o f metaphor. That

is, according to Habermas, metaphor transforms the religious concept so that it is no

longer associated with a religious experience. To sum up, according to Habermas

postmetaphysical thought uses religious concepts that do not refer to religious

experiences because those concepts have been transformed by way o f metaphor.

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