Para. 1801. 1802. 1803. 1804. 1805. 1806. 1807. BRd 45(1) CHAPTER 18 BRIDGE ORGANISATION AND MANAGEMENT CONTENTS Introduction and Scope of Chapter Further Guidance and References SECTION 1 — NAVIGATIONAL CONDUCT OF THE SHIP Definitions of Command Terminology Command Concepts and the Safe Navigational Conduct of a Ship at Sea Management of Key Command Areas General Aspects of Bridgemanship The ‘Sterile’ Bridge SECTION 2 - BRIDGE ORGANISATION Ocean and Coastal Navigation Organisations The WECDIS Pilotage Safety Officer (WPSO) Relative Navigation in Support of Pilotage/Blind Pilotage Warship Bridge Organisation for Pilotage Warship Blind Organisation for Blind Pilotage RFA/Merchantman Pilotage/Blind Pilotage Organisation 18-4 August 2018 Version 1BRd 45(1) CHAPTER 18 BRIDGE ORGANISATION AND MANAGEMENT 4801. Introduction and Scope of Chapter . This chapter provides a summary of ways in which the bridge can be organised and managed to enable safe and operationally effective navigation of the ship. The guidance is somewhat generic, in that specific ships or classes of ships which have different complements and different personnel available will have to fit the guidance to their individual circumstances. This chapter also covers aspects of what is known in the merchant marine as ‘bridge resource management’ or ‘marine resource management’ and how they apply to the Naval Service. 4802. Further Guidance and References There a number of references with which RN/RFA personnel must be familiar when it comes to bridge organisation and management. These are shown in Table 18-1 below in bold, along with a number of additional supplementary references (in italics) which may be of use to those wanting to further their professional knowledge and understanding. Table 18-1. Bridge Organisation and Management References REFERENCE REMARKS QRRNs (BRd2) Legal framework and terms of reference for officers and key personnel BRd 45(4) Conduct of Ships at Sea — further advice on bridge organisation for specific evolutions BRd 45(8) | WECDIS — details of WECDIS operations and organisation BRd 45(9) Operational Navigational Techniques — further advice on specific operational navigation aspects Intemational Chamber of _ | Carriage in merchant ships is strongly advised; www.ics- Shipping Bridge shipping.org Procedures Guide IMO Resolutions and Regulations, recommendations, performance standards etc Circulars Safety of Life at Sea IMO document; Chapter V covers Safety of Navigation; (SOLAS) available in UK from www.solasv.mega.gov.uk Bridge Team Management | Nautical Institute publication; available from NPGO (contact NA10) as BR 453 Bridge Watchkeeping — A Nautical Institute publication Practical Guide 18-2 August 2018 Version 4BRd 45(1) SECTION 1 — NAVIGATIONAL CONDUCT OF THE SHIP 1803. Definitions of Command Terminology 7 The following terms, defined in QRRNs, are used in the Royal Navy and RFA. Their definitions will be encountered elsewhere; where there is any doubt or ambiguity, readers should refer to QRRN as the authoritative reference. a. Command. Command is the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, co-ordination and control of military forces. b. Military Command. Military command is the authority to exercise command of non-sea-going ships, naval shore establishments, aircraft and boats. It includes command authority. c. Sea Command. Sea command is the authority to exercise command of sea- going ships of the Royal Navy. It includes command and military command authority. d. Conduct. Conduct is the direction of a team or the management of a series of tasks in the performance of a function (eg. the conduct of the ship, the conduct of navigation, the conduct of operations). Conduct includes planning and may include execution. e. Charge of the Ship. Charge of the ship is the authority delegated by the Command Officer (CO), or by the officer to whom command or conduct has been delegated, to the OOW for the safety of the ship at sea. f. Navigation, Navigation is the process of planning and executing the movement of ships from one place to another. Navigation includes ocean movements, coastal movements and pilotage, giving due consideration to problems of shiphandling and collision avoidance. g. Pilotage. Pilotage is navigation involving frequent or continuous determination of position or a line of position relative to geographic points, and usually requiring the need for close attention to the vessel's draught with respect to the depth of water. It is practised in the vicinity of land, dangers and navigational hazards. In practical terms it may be taken as navigation at distances less than about two miles from the limiting danger line (LDL). The exact distance from the LDL at which pilotage becomes appropriate will depend on circumstances and the size of the vessel and is a Command decision. h. Control. Control is the action of a functional superior in issuing instructions and guidance in a clearly defined professional field. i. Planning. Planning is the predetermination of actions involving people and resources as an integral part of conduct. j. Execution. Execution is the act of putting something into effect (orders, plans etc). k. Conning. Conning is the act of giving wheel, hydroplane or engine orders. 18-3 August 2018 Version 1BRd 45(1) 1804. |. Advising. Advising is the act of providing information to assist the recipient in making a decision. m. Blind Pilotage. Blind pilotage is navigation under pilotage criteria but where visual pilotage techniques are not possible due to the limits of visibility pertaining. n. Coastal Navigation. Coastal navigation is navigation within visual or rdar detection of range, but outside of pilotage/blind pilotage distances. For practical purposes this may normally be taken as navigation at distances between two and 15 miles from the LDL. The exact distance from the LDL at which pilotage becomes appropriate will depend on circumstances and the size of the vessel and is a Command decision. 0. Ocean Navigation. Ocean navigation is navigation outside visual or radar detection range of land. For practical purposes this may normally be taken as navigation at distances greater than 15 miles from the LDL. p. Tactical Navigation. Tactical navigation can occur in any of the three geographic situations defined above (pilotage/coastal/ocean), when the vessel is involved in operations, training or exercises of any kind. The warfare considerations involved may impose additional requirement over and above the purely geographic situation. q. Dived Navigation. Dived navigation is conducted by submarines, and can occur in any of the three geographic situations, and can involve tactical navigation as well. Dived navigation can be conducted at periscope depth or deep. r. WECDIS NavPlan. The WECDIS navplan will normally comprise a WECDIS ‘voyage plan’ which contains all the elements necessary for the safe passage of the ship, and any tactical or dived navigation elements further required. Voyage plans shall be constructed in accordance with BRd 45(8). s. Digital Navigation. Digital navigation is navigation on ENCs/RNCs using WECDIS or ECDIS equipment. The endorsed Navy Board policy is that all navigation in the RN shall be conducted digitally. Command Concepts for the Safe Navigational Conduct of a Ship at Sea The following concepts are introduced here, but are explored in much more detail in BRd 45(4) Conduct of Ships at Sea which is mandatory reading. 18-4 a. Command Concepts. The safe conduct of a ship at sea extends to much more than simply navigating accurately from position to position, important though that is. Controlling the movements of a ship at sea requires capable officers, good organisation and a clear understanding of the principles of safe conduct and precise shiphandling. August 2018 Version 1BRd 45(1) of the Watch (OOW), and the Principal Warfare Officer , rs (PWOs/PWO(SM)). The CO will have to give careful consideration to the qualifications, experience and competence of these officers regarding the conduct, control and execution of Navigation, to decide what degree of authority to delegate and how much personal supervision they require. To achieve safe navigation, the Command Organisation to conduct the ship's movements must be well established. In particular the CO shall consider: . The standing and temporary instructions for navigation, issue to officers. The delegation of authority weighed against the qualifications, experience and competence of the officers. ¢ The effectiveness of the navigational equipment. ¢ The management of potential human errors, including fatigue risk, together with the state of training and teamwork achieved by the navigation teams and their ability to plan and execute the correct navigation procedures. c. Captain’s Standing Orders (CSOs). Captain's Standing Orders state how the CO intends to direct the navigation and safe movement of the ship. (1) Layout of Orders. The CO should start CSOs by setting out the various authorities delegated to the NO, the OOW, and the PWO. This should be followed by instructions for particular situations in harbour and at sea, instructions for when to call the CO, and the reports the CO wishes to receive. (2) Ready for Sea Reports. In surface ships, unless covered elsewhere by other documents such as class standing orders, CSOs should specify the precise meaning of ready for sea reports from Heads of Departments and the NO. Submarines have different arrangements. (3) Bridge Copy. There should always be a copy of the conduct at sea section of CSOs available on the bridge/in the control room. d. Navigating Officer (NO). Subject to the guidance in QRRN, the CO will normally delegate the conduct of navigation and the execution of pilotage to the NO. The NO should have functional authority over the OOW for the conduct, planning and execution of the navigation and for the other tasks (training, records, equipment etc). The NO thus has considerable responsibility for the effective management of the entire navigational team; much will depend on the NO’s professional competence, leadership skills and integrity in setting and maintaining the highest standards on the bridge. 18-5 August 2018 Version 1BRd 45(1) 18-6 e. Officer of the Watch (OOW). The OOW is accountable to the CO for the safe conduct of the ship at sea. Only the OOW can have charge of the ship, so any officer who takes charge of the ship by definition becomes the OOW. If the NO is to con the ship for pilotage, the NO will usually take charge of the ship and become the OOW, although the previous OOW by convention retains the title to avoid confusion. Exceptionally, for training, an officer may hold the con only provided another suitably qualified officer retains charge; thus a YO may have the con for pilotage training but the NO will retain charge (as the OOW). If the CO gives a direct wheel or engine order (or in submarines a hydroplane or ship system order), the CO assumes charge of the ship; the CO may also take charge at any time by stating ‘| HAVE THE SHIP’. In this case, the CO must ensure there is a clearly defined and understood division of responsibilities on the bridge. When the ship is being controlled from the operations room, the OOW retains the right to query, modify, delay or veto any control order if it appears dangerous (see BRd 45(4)). f. Assumption by CO of OOW’s Responsibility for Ship Safety. Where the OOW cannot reasonably obtain sufficient information to accept responsibility for the ship's safety, such as during blind pilotage, the CO should be prepared to relieve the OOW of those responsibilities. This may also be relevant where a local pilot has full control (such as in the Panama Canal). g. Special Sea Dutymen (SSD). In surface ships, special sea dutymen (SSD) are the additional experienced personnel closed up over and above the normal steaming watch when the navigational situation demands. In some cases, reduced SSD may be required which is still an enhanced posture compared to normal steaming, but not so demanding on the SSD personnel. h. OIC of the Operations Room/PWO. The Officer in Charge of the Operations Room, who will normally be the PWO when closed up, shall provide the OOW with any available information, advice or intentions which may assist in avoiding collision, grounding or any other hazard. Whenever operational circumstances permit, the provision of such ship safety information is to take precedence over other considerations. The PWO may, when authorised, direct the movements of the ship through the OOW. i, Sea Order Book. The Sea Order Book (RNS 0553) should contain the CO's orders for ship movements and operations for a specified short term period. The NO usually drafts sea orders for the CO's approval before going to sea, at nightfall, and, on occasion before making a rendezvous/carrying out a replenishment. Sea orders must be explicit and they must be circulated in good time to the Executive Officer (XO), Heads of Departments, and PWOs as appropriate. Should the CO decide to delegate conduct of:the ship, a proper handover must be carried out, and the change shall be authorised in the sea order book and recorded in the Ship’s Log. Both books shall state who has conduct, and for how long. A main broadcast pipe shall be made dealing with what has occurred. The CO should not be afraid to consider handing over conduct to the XO during quiet periods in order to avoid over- tiredness. In submarines, Captain's Periodic Orders fulfil a similar purpose, but there is to be a set of periodic orders in force at all times; see BRd 45(4) for a full discussion of this subject which is outside the classification of this publication. August 2018 Version 1BRd 45(1) J. Information Flow and Reports to the CO. A list of the stan which the OOW is to call the CO should be included in CSOs, Tos oten ol also specify the circumstances in which the CO is to be called by the NO and PWO. Safe and operationally effective navigation is dependent on an efficient flow of navigation between the OOW, the NO, the Ops room/PWO, and the machinery control room (MCRy/ship control centre (SCC). The CO must be included when anything significant develops. Officers must know instinctively how the internal communications nets in their ship operate, including which open lines/broadcasts are monitored by the CO from their cabin. Avoid using telephone lines for conversations which should be had on an open line so that the CO (and other outstations) can monitor them. Above all, the CO MUST be called to the bridge before a situation becomes dangerous; the best rule of thumb is that, if the OOW is asking themself ‘should | call the CO about this?’ then the answer is invariably YES. k. Effectiveness of the Navigational Equipment. For safe and operationally effective navigation, all the necessary equipment must be correctly maintained, and then operated and managed effectively by the NO and OOW. This includes WECDIS configuration and updates, but also all the ancillary equipment such as gyro compasses, speed logs, echo sounders etc. The CO should take a personal interest in the navigation equipment to encourage the highest standards of maintenance and operation. 1805. Management of Key Command Areas It is a fact borne out by many investigations over many years, from all areas of the sea-going world, that most navigational incidents have at least some degree of human error involved, even if material failure is a contributory factor. Incidents are not normally caused by one mistake but are usually the result of a series of human errors, none of which may be serious on their own, but which collectively lead to an incident occurring. This is a complicated subject, which will be explored in some detail in the new edition of BRd 134 (expected late 2018), but in summary, the entire design of the RN's navigation of system is intended to provide a layered defence against mishaps. Nevertheless, incidents do happen, and experience suggests that human error in navigation incidents, in the form of poor management, occurs in three broad areas: * Planning (clarity of planning, capability of people, and communications) * Procedures * Execution A number of navigational incidents can be traced to failure at Command level to produce a sound plan and communicate it clearly. The analysis of a large number of real incidents has identified that the management of three key ‘Command areas’ in navigational planning, clarity, capability and communications, is particularly important; the questions listed in Table 18-2 below shall always be considered by the CO and NO when planning navigation. Failure to do is likely to increase the risk of an incident occurring. With regards to procedures and execution, it is increasingly recognised that fatigue plays a major role in many incidents at sea (see the MAIB website for too many examples). The management of fatigue at sea is a major subject in its own right and not possible in the space available here; see BRd 45(4) for the latest RN guidance. In summary, though, fatigue reduces performance and increases the risk of making a mistake; the only countermeasure for the fatigue performance decrement is sleep. 18-7 August 2018 Version 1BRd 45(1) Table 18-2. Key Command Questions for Planning Navigation AREA QUESTIONS TO ASK Clarity of planning What is the purpose of the manoeuvre? How is the manoeuvre to be carried out? Has the right level of planning been carried out? Is the plan based on sound facts, or an scanty information/assumptions? Is the plan sound overall, and as simple as possible in the circumstances? Have the potential consequences of any lack of planning been thought through? Capability of people How experienced is/are the CO(s) involved? participating How worked up at the bridge teams? How capable are the other participants (tugs, pilots, shore authorities etc)? Have onlookers/other third parties been considered (other shipping, fishing vessels, yachts etc)? How tired/fatigued are the key personnel and can they operate effectively? Is there an adequate margin of safety in the plan to allow for all these factors? OVERALL, is EVERYONE involved capable of executing the plan safely? Communicating the Are the instructions clear? plan Can/will the instructions be issued in time to be understood and briefed? Will ships joining the formation or group have alll the information they need? 41806. General Aspects of Bridgemanship Entire books can (and no doubt have) be written on the subject of what might be termed ‘bridgemanship’, and this paragraph should be considered in conjunction with Para 1907 below on the ‘sterile’ bridge. The NO, over and above their specific tasks and duties, has a more general as the ‘bridge manager’ (and indeed this specific role in many cases) and it is the NO’s duty, on behalf of the CO, to foster good bridgemanship from all the OOWs (and do not forget that this should also include all the PWOs who should be maintaining currency). Good bridgemanship involves (but is not limited to) the maintenance of the highest professional standards at all times on the bridge. This means that all reports should be made correctly, acknowledged correctly, and orders given and executed in the correct format with the appropriate formality. Good bridgemanship extends to a deep and thorough understanding of how all the relevant systems operate, from propulsion to steering through to alarms and radars. This should all be tested as a matter of routine as part of the platform endorsement process, but there should be nothing on the bridge that the OOW does not fully understand; this goes double for the NO who should be the subject matter expert on board. Bridgemanship also involves building a ‘bridge presence’; rather like the proverbial elephant, bridge presence is hard to describe but one recognises it when one sees it. Officers should seek to build their bridge presence throughout their careers; this does not simply mean shouting louder than everyone else but is rather subtler. Seek advice and guidance from FOST staff, staff at NTU in HMS COLLINGWOOD and, perhaps most importantly, the CO. 18-8 August 2018 Version 1BRd 45(1) 1807. The ‘Sterile’ Bridge In 1981, the US Federal Aviation Administration determined that in a number of aviation accidents, a major contributory factor had been aircrew being distracted or not working at peak efficiency due to non-essential conversations and activities taking place in the cockpit. They thus introduced the ‘sterile cockpit rule’, which prohibits non-essential activities during the most safety-critical Parts of the flight; this was part of a wider suite of ‘cockpit (or sometimes crew) resource management’ measures which were introduced at the same time to enhance safety in the US airline industry. The sterile cockpit concept reads across directly to the maritime industry, and something very similar should be enforced on the bridge during critical moments such as pilotage, replenishments etc. The OOW/NO should in any case keep a weather-ear on the general noise levels on the bridge, and should never hesitate to order silence if required, but wider sterile bridge measures include whole ship aspects. These whole ship aspects include (for example) training and awareness for ship’s company so that they know, for example, not to phone the bridge when SSD are closed up to ask for non-essential pipes. The policy can be made formal by defining a number of ‘bridge states’; in bridge state GREEN for example, normal visitors to the bridge and normal telephone traffic would be permitted, whereas in bridge state RED no visitors and no telephone calls (other than for emergencies and essential reports) would be permitted. Bridge states can then be ordered by the CO/OOW as required, and pipes on the main broadcast. Such procedures are in force in many shipping lines. 18-9 August 2018 Version 1BRd 45(1) SECTION 2 - BRIDGE ORGANISATION 1808. Ocean and Coastal Navigation Organisations For routine transits, RN/RFA bridges are designed to be able to be safely operated by the OOW and a helmsman (quartermaster/bosun’s mate) alone. If circumstances allow, use of autopilot will allow the helmsman to be a more effective lookout. The oow must be able to operate WECDIS and carry out all their other duties unaided. STCW guidelines are clear that the OOW should NEVER be on the bridge on their own at night. These organisation should be reviewed, however, depending on the circumstances of the case; night flying as part of an anti-submarine exercise in busy coastal waters isa very different prospect to a day transit in quiet waters. The CO/NO have a number of different options for enhancing the bridge organisation, ranging from adding an unqualified 2°¢ OOW, to another qualified OOW, to the NO or CO being on the bridge personally (assuming other measures such as SSD are not appropriate). In short, ocean/coastal navigation organisations will usually be determined by other considerations such as platform manning constraints. 1809. The WECDIS Pilotage Safety Officer (WPSO) The task of the WPSO is complex and safety-critical; it will rarely be suitable for this role to be filled by a YO. a. Role of the WPSO. The role of the WPSO is to support the NO in their execution of the pilotage, by providing an independent cross-check on the NO’s commentary (including through the plotting of operator fixes), and to give Command confidence that WECDIS is operating correctly by continually proving the system correct. To do this, they must be fully competent at operating WECDIS in general, and specifically they must be able to plot and report operator fixes (including visual and radar fixes, using all techniques such as transits and running fixes), managing AIS and ARPA data, and using all other electronic tools quickly and accurately. In the event of a failure or emergency such as GNSS denial, the WPSO must be able to switch the system to the INS ((f fitted and available) or to DR/EP modes. Alll this must be achievable in the short timescales required in pilotage waters. b. Choice of the WPSO. Due to the importance of the role, and the full range of skills required (as explained above), the role of WPSO should usually be carried out by a complement OOW, who must have completed the WECDIS course and has at least some training in or experience of planning and executing pilotage/blind pilotage. This role should not be assigned to a YO under training. The selection of a suitable officer for this task requires careful consideration by the CO, as follows. (1) Recommended Level. As a guide, the WPSO should normally be one of the appointed OOW1, 2 or 3 billets. (2) Cross-Training and Interchangeability. Greater flexibility within the ship can be obtained if the various OOW are rotated at intervals such that all gain experience of acting as both SSD OOW and WPSO. 18-10 August 2018 Version 1BRd 45(1) 1810. Relative Navigation in Support of Pilotage/Blind Pilotage Visual pilotage shall be conducted using traditional relative navigation techniques as described in Chapter 13, supplemented by the WPSO operating WECDIS as directed by Command and using the most appropriate position sources and sensors as per BRd 45(8). There is no longer a requirement to produce a radar relative navigation plan to support pilotage. For general steaming, the OOW must retain the ability to construct parallel indices to support coastal navigation. The navigation radar replacement (NPR) will be replacing obsolete and obsolescent navigation radars (in particular Radar Types 1007 and 1008) with the Kelvin Hughes SharpEye system. The system only supports the IMO- mandated minimum of four Pls at any one time, and thus cannot support legacy RN blind pilotage safely. For the avoidance of doubt, in accordance with the above policy, as there is no need to produce a blind plan, there is no need for a dedicated radar pilotage safety officer (RPSO) and personnel are to be employed during SSDs as required by Command. 1811. Warship Bridge Organisation for Pilotage The ideal pilotage organisation for RN warships is shown in Fig 18-1 below. Fig 18-1. Pilotage Organisation 7 ~~ "ops room 1 i 1 ; 1 1 ! t 1 {| SSDOOW NO WECDIS | F ACP } 1 PILOTAGE = 1 (ANTI- 1 ‘ SAFETY 1 | COLLISION { OFFICER 1 1 PLOT) SR ; 1 ' QM LooKouTs (wPso) ! i | ! 1 | 1 1 SPS 1 t WPSOASST | \ \ 1 1 i 1 1 t ECHO SOUNDER } i SPC 1 1 OPERATOR 1 ! ! Bi, diese. See fe g 18-14 August 2018 Version 4BRd 45(1) 18-12 a. Common Communication Circuit. Communications between the CO, SSD OOW, WPSO and anti-collision plot senior rate (ACP SO) should be conducted ona single common internal communications circuit (headset or loudspeaker), in order to provide a co-ordinated, coherent commentary to the Command. This has the advantage, if done correctly, of minimising overtalking, unnecessary duplication of reports, and ensures that each member of the team knows what advice is being given to the Command. Ships should ensure that the WPSO has access to the appropriate circuit, whether by socket/headset or cordless headset. Type 23 should use Group Line 1; other platforms should use Command Open Line or onboard equivalent. b. Command by Veto. The CO should normally exercise Command by veto, whilst carrying out a monitoring and co-ordination function for the whole team. c. SSD OOW. The SSD OOW supports the NO (who is actually the OOW, with charge of the ship - see BRd 45(4)) by overseeing all other aspects of the OOW’'s duties (including supervision of the QM and lookouts). The SSD OOW monitors the WECDIS/ACP commentaries via a headset. d. NO. The NO has charge of the ship and conducts pilotage visually using headmarks, sternmarks, beam marks, clearing bearings, and the NO’s pilotage notebook to provide a commentary to the CO, including anti-collision advice, calling out visual fixes for the WPSO to plot separately. The NO must be ready to switch to blind pilotage without delay, using a pre-planned WECDIS terminal. e. WECDIS Pilotage Safety Officer (WPSO). The WPSO has a vital role, supporting and checking the NO’s commentary, and the WPSO commentary on the common circuit must be tailored to amplify, augment, correlate and if necessary correct, but not simply repeat the NO’s lead role. A simple ‘WECDIS concurs’ will suffice in the absence of any major discrepancies. (1) System Configuration. On closing up, the WPSO must configure the system for pilotage, as required by the NO. (2) Position Monitoring. The WPSO should plot ‘check fix’ operator fixes called out by the NO and monitor the WECDIS against the RIO. Any discrepancies between the WECDIS position and other sources of information, including the NO’s commentary, must be reported immediately. (3) Commentary. The WPSO should support the NO’s primary commentary to the CO by adding ‘WECDIS concurs’ or stating how WECDIS differs from the NO (eg. ‘one mile to run by WECDIS’). In the event of a major discrepancy, the WPSO should preface their reports with ‘WECDIS does not concur’. ‘August 2018 Version 1BRd 45(1) 6 ee alen: If ARPA/AISIRIO are interfaced to the ‘system, the WPSO may (it reared by the NO or CO) provide some information in support of the Stal Pi ure Provided by the ops room and radar/ARPA displays. This PP inction is valuable as fixed and moving objects and their position relative to the planned route or navigational channel are particularly easy to distinguish on the WECDIS display, and WECDIS provides the best means of reviewing W-AIS contacts. Nevertheless, collision avoidance assessments and decisions are to be made based on monitoring of visual bearings and radar plotting, in accordance with the IRPCS Rule 7. (5) Other Reports. WECDIS distance to run to the wheel-over, wheel-over time and any discrepancy between the two should be report with fix reports on each leg. At the wheel-over, the WPO should report the ship's position relative to the planned position (eg. ‘wheeled over one cable early by WECDIS). Other information should be reported as required by the NO (eg integrity confirmations for GOS, headmark and soundings, identity/shoot-up bearings of other objects, anti-collision information (see above), distance to adjacent ships or hazards when berthing/unberthing, proximity to clearing bearings etc). f. WPSO’s Assistant. The WPSO should be provided with an assistant to help by maintaining a scratch pad of fix bearings etc. g. Anti-Collision Plot. The anti-collision plot (ACP or ‘anti-col’) senior rate must be briefed on the navigation plan, and must make full anti-col reports. The SSD COW has an important role to play in providing quality control to these reports, and controlling the net to ensure that ACP reports are not made at in appropriate times i.e. at or shortly before a wheel-over. The ACP SR is supported by the surface picture supervisor (SPS) and the surface picture compiler (SPC). Notwithstanding the interface of radar into WECDIS (RIO, ARPA) and W-AIS, primary radar remains the principal non-visual source of anti-collision information. h. Echo Sounder Operator. A dedicated echo sounder operator should always be closed up when the ship is in pilotage water. This operator should be briefed in advance on the minimum expected soundings for each leg, which should be provided in the form of a tote for the operator. The operator should make reports in accordance with BRd 45(1) procedures. i. QM and Lookouts. The QM and lookouts will fulfil their own individual functions, supervised by the SSD OOW. The SSD OOW should not issue their own conning orders in the event of a mistake by the QM or the throttles/lever operator, but should alert the NO (‘Check wheel, Navigator’). 18-13 August 2018 Version 1BRd 45(1) 4812. Warship Bridge Organisation for Blind Pilotage The ideal blind pilotage organisation for RN warships is illustrated below in Fig 18-2. It is essentially the same as for visual pilotage, with the important difference that the NO conducts the pilotage from a WECDIS terminal as the blind pilotage officer (BPO) rather than from the pelorus. In all other respects, it is unchanged. Fig 18-2. Blind Pilotage Organisation 18-14 BRIDGE OPS ROOM SSD OOW NO. WECDIS ACP (charge of ship) as BPO PILOTAGE (ANTI- (WEGDIS) SAFETY COLLISION OFFICER PLOT) SR QM LOOKoUTS a | WPSO ASST ers ECHO SOUNDER OPERATOR a. Common Communications Circuit in Blind Pilotage. A common internal communications circuit, similar to that used in (visual) pilotage is maintained, but with the NO on headset as blind pilotage officer (BP) giving a full commentary and the WPSO giving abbreviated commentary on it (‘WECDIS concurs/does not concur’). The SSD OOW may revert to a listening watch via loudspeaker rather than using a headset themselves. The various roles of the CO, SSD OOW, BPO, WPSO and ACP are slightly modified from those during visual pilotage. b. CO. The CO continues to exercise Command by veto, just as in visual pilotage. However, during blind pilotage, the CO should also consider relieving the SSD OOW of their responsibilities for ship safety (see BRd 45(4) and QRRN Chapter 8). c. SSD OOW. In blind pilotage, the SSD OOW has charge of the ship including all aspects of OOW duties (although the CO should consider relieving the OOW of ship safety responsibilities in certain circumstances. The SSD OOW operates under the BPO's control orders, unless an OOW veto is necessary, and monitors the co- ordinated commentary by loudspeaker or headset as appropriate. The SSD OOW should also provide visual bearings of any contacts or navigational marks sighted, and work with the BPO to establish the true limits of visibility. August 2018 Version 11813. BRd 45(1) Wecne. (NO). The No, as BPO, should conduct blind pilotage using the forward console. In blind conditions, the NO carries out the following tasks. (1) Primary Commentary. The BPO should fuse all navigational information and provide the primary commentary to the Command by headset on the common Circuit, passing control orders to the SSD OOW, and providing anti- collision manoeuvring advice. (2) Co-ordinate the Common Communications Circuit. The BPO should co-ordinate the common communications circuit, such that there is no over- talking or duplication, and ensure that proper circuit discipline is observed. Use should be made, where appropriate of the FLASH and ‘hold reports’ procedures. (3) Fixing. The BPO should co-ordinate the radar check-fixing routine, and may delegate the taking or radar ranges to another suitably experienced officer. Radar fixes should be augmented with visual bearings where possible. (4) Position, Manoeuvre and Assessment. The BPO should fuse positional information from all sources, and provide the SSD OOW with manoeuvring control orders in the standard format (see BRd 45(4)). In particular, once steadied on a new course, the BPO should make a track assessment and distance to run report to the Command from WECDIS, and then use WPSO to verify this assessment by comparison of radar check-fix/RIO and PI information. Noting any discrepancies, the BPO should then inform the Command as to the accuracy or otherwise of WECDIS. e. WECDIS Pilotage Safety Officer (WPSO). The WPSO carries out similar tasks as in visual pilotage, plotting check fixes as well, but makes a reduced commentary, reporting check-fix results and sounding checks. Gross discrepancies between the WPSO assessment and BPO’s assessment must be reported to the Command. f. WECDIS Pilotage Safety Officer’s Assistant. The WPSO’s assistant carries out the same tasks as in visual pilotage. g. Ops Room Anti-Collision Plot. The ACP carries out the same tasks as in visual pilotage. h. Echo Sounder Operator. The dedicated echo sounder operator carries out the same tasks as in visual pilotage. i. QM and Lookouts. The QM and lookouts carry out the same tasks as in visual pilotage. RFA/Merchantman Pilotage/Blind Pilotage Organisation : The organisations described in Para 1811 and Para 1812 above refer to warships which will generally tend to be well-supplied with personnel. Specific guidance for RFAs on how to modify these bridge organisations to meet their specific circumstances is in BRd 45(8) Chapter 5. In a merchantman, the organisation should be emulated as closely as constraints of personnel and equipment allow. 18-15 August 2018 Version 1