The British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Waves, Particles, and Explanatory Coherence

Author(s): Chris Eliasmith and Paul Thagard
Source: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Mar., 1997), pp.
1-19
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the
Philosophy of Science
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 Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 48 (1997), 1-19

Waves, Particles, and Explanatory

Coherence
Chris Eliasmith and Paul Thagard
ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the nineteenth-century debate concerning the nature of light.
We analyse the debate using a computational theory of coherence that models the
acceptance of the wave theory of light and the rejection of the particle theory. We
show how our analysis of the controversy avoids Achinstein's criticisms of Whe-
well's coherentist account, and argue that our interpretation is more computation-
ally tractable and psychologically realistic than Achinstein's probabilistic account.

1 Introduction

2 The wave-particle debate

3 Achinstein's analysis
4 Coherence

5 Coherence and the wave-particle debate

6 Independent warrant
7 A critique of the probabilistic approach
Appendix: ECHO simulation

1 Introduction

Peter Achinstein [1990, 1991] analyses the scientific debate that took place
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries concerning the nature of light.
He offers a probabilistic account of the methods employed by both particle
theorists and wave theorists, and rejects any analysis of this debate in terms
of coherence. He characterizes coherence through reference to William
Whewell's writings concerning how 'consilience of inductions' establishes
an acceptable theory (Whewell [1847]). Achinstein rejects this analysis
because of its vagueness and lack of reference to empirical data, concluding
that coherence is insufficient to account for the belief change that took place
during the wave-particle debate.
We challenge Achinstein's conclusions using a precise characterization
of coherence that incorporates many of Whewell's insights. We show that
this characterization can model the reasoning of the wave theorists in the
mid-nineteenth century, thereby explaining the acceptance of the wave
theory over the particle theory. We conclude with a critical comparison of

D Oxford University Press 1997

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2 Chris Eliasmith and Paul Thagard

the probabilistic and coherence approaches to modelling this scientific

revolution, arguing that the coherence account is more computationally
tractable and psychologically realistic.
The characterization of coherence that we apply to the wave-particle
debate is an abstraction from connectionist models of human cognition
that view thinking in terms of parallel constraint satisfaction. Coherence in
a set of representations is a matter of maximizing the satisfaction of
positive and negative constraints among the representations. For theory
choice, the representations are propositions representing hypotheses and
evidence. Positive constraints are established by explanatory relations
between propositions, and negative constraints are established by relations
of contradiction and competition. Algorithms are available for maximizing
coherence construed as constraint satisfaction, and we will describe a
computer simulation of how explanatory coherence supports the
nineteenth-century acceptance of the wave theory of light over the particle
theory.

2 The wave-particle debate

In 1807, Thomas Young summarized the wave-particle debate as follows
(Young [1807], p. 457):
It is allowed on all sides, that light either consists in the emission of
very minute particles from luminous substances, which are actually
projected, and continue to move, with the velocity commonly attrib-
uted to light, or in the excitation of an undulatory motion, analogous
to that which constitutes sounds, in a highly elastic medium pervading
the universe.1

Newton's Opticks, published in its final form in the fourth edition of 1730,
fostered this debate by supporting the particle theory of light and denying
the wave theory. However, by the 1830s, the corpuscular, or particle,
theory of light proposed by Newton was superseded by the wave theory
of light: this theoretical shift is often cited as a good example of conceptual
change in science (Cantor [1983]; Chen [1988]; Buchwald [1989];
Achinstein [1991]).
In this section we briefly outline the debate which preceded this impor-
tant scientific revolution and attempt to characterize both the strengths
and weaknesses of the particle and wave positions. Indisputably, the most
influential voice on the side of the particle theorists was that of Newton. He

Most experts in the field noted this reduction to two alternatives: 'Les physiciens sont depuis
longtemps partag6s sur la nature de la lumiere. Les uns supposent qu'elle est lanc6e par les
corps lumineux, et les autres qu'elle r6sulte des vibrations d'un fluide 61astique infiniment
subtil r6pandu dans l'espace, comme le son des vibrations de l'air'(Fresnel [1868], p. 4).

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 Waves, particles and explanatory coherence 3

proposed the particle theory as a rhetorical question:

Qu. 29. Are not the Rays of Light very small Bodies emitted from
shining Substances? (Newton [1730], p. 370)

He also explicitly rejected the wave theory of light:

Qu. 28. Are not all Hypotheses erroneous, in which Light is supposed
to consist in Pression or Motion, propagated through a fluid Medium?
(ibid., p. 362)

Newton's rejection of the wave theory of light and advocacy of the

particle theory convinced many scientists of his day that light was indeed a
particle. This belief was held until well after Newton's death in 1737
(Cantor [1983]). It was not until the middle of the eighteenth century
that Newton's theory became seriously challenged by wave theorists
such as Euler and Benjamin Franklin (Achinstein [1991]).
Though the wave theory of light had been supported in the early
seventeenth century by Descartes (1596-1650) and the Dutch mathema-
tician Huygens (1629-95), it lost general acceptance upon publication of
Newton's particle theory in Opticks. The resuscitation of the wave theory
is often attributed to the writings of Thomas Young, which did not appear
until the early years of the nineteenth century (Fresnel [1868]; Cantor
[1983]; Buchwald [1989]; Achinstein [1991]). Drawing on the writings of
contemporaries such as Fresnel, Lloyd, and Herschel, Young noted a
number of severe problems with the particle theory (Achinstein [1991]).
One of the most convincing reasons offered to dismiss the particle theory
of light was derived from a series of experiments and analyses performed
by Fresnel.2 These are the results Young relies upon when he notes:
when a portion of light is admitted through an aperture, and spreads
itself in a slight degree in every direction. In this case, it is maintained
by Newton that the margin of the aperture possesses an attractive
force,3 which is capable of inflecting the rays: but there is some
improbability in supposing that bodies of different forms and of
various refractive powers should possess an equal force of inflection,
as they appear to do in the production of these effects . . . which is a
condition not easily reconciled with other phenomena (Young [ 1807], p.
458, italics added).

In other words, Young feels that the particle theory should be rejected by
virtue of the fact that a hypothesis (forces at the edges of an aperture) is
contradicted by other, well-established hypotheses (force varies as mass).

2 As Powell noted: 'The important and conclusive experiment is that in which the aperture
has straight parallel edges. Here Fresnel's formula applies directly, and accords most exactly
with the phaenomena'(Powell [1833], p. 412).
3 Young is possibly referring to Newton's claim that: 'the unusual Refraction of Island-
Crystal looks very much as if it were perform'd by some kind of attractive virtue lodged in
certain Sides both of the Rays, and of the Particles of the Crystal' (Newton [1730], p. 373).

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4 Chris Eliasmith and Paul Thagard

Furthermore, Young notes the difficulty that a particle theory of light

has in explaining the observed uniform velocity of light:

How happens it that, whether the projecting force is the slightest

transmission of electricity, the friction of two pebbles, the lowest
degree of visible ignition, the white heat of a wind furnace, or the
intense heat of the sun itself, these wonderful corpuscles are always
propelled with one uniform velocity? (Young [1855], p. 79)

From this observation, Young concludes: 'The uniformity of the motion of

light in the same medium, which is a difficulty in the Newtonian theory,
favours the admission of the Huygenian' (ibid., p. 79).
Nevertheless, the alternative to the particle theory, the undulatory or wave
theory, had its own difficulties (Chen [1988]). One of the most commonly
cited criticisms against the wave theory is one that was forwarded by Newton
in his Opticks: 'If it [light] consisted in Pression or Motion, propagated either
in an instant or in time, it would bend into the Shadow' (Newton [1730], p.
362)-there had been no such observed diffraction.
However, the more serious difficulties with the particle theory, and new
evidence, including Young's own famous double-slit experiment, even-
tually convinced the scientific community that the wave theory was the
better of the two. Table 1, taken from Reverend B. Powell's 'Remarks on
Mr. Barton's Reply' [1833], was produced by a wave theorist though it was
intended as 'a synoptic sketch, which I believe to be perfectly impartial;
indeed, I have given every advantage to the corpuscular theory' (Powell
[1833], p. 416).
Of course, neither the wave theory nor the particle theory were, or
claimed to be, the perfect theory of light (e.g. neither explained complex
coloured fringes of apertures and shadows). As new experimental cases
arose, they were used to confirm or challenge the theories:

Mr. Barton has brought forward a new experimental case,-and the

science of theoretical optics is under great obligations to him for doing
so,-a case to which neither the undulatory nor any other theory ...
has as yet been applied. It remains to be seen how they may apply; and
this case will form a further test of the powers of either theory WHEN
FORMULAE APPLYING TO THIS CASE SHALL HAVE BEEN INVESTIGATED

(Powell [1833], p. 414).

Thus, it was not a matter of choosing the right theory, but, rather, the best
one.

3 Achinstein's analysis
Achinstein [1991] presents a probabilistic analysis of the transition from a
generally accepted particle theory of light to its rival, the wave theory, in

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 Waves, particles and explanatory coherence 5

Table 1. Synoptic sketch of the successes and difficulties of the particle and
wave theories (Powell [1833], pp. 416-17)

Phaenomena Corpuscular Undulatory

explanation explanation

Reflection Perfect Perfect

Ditto at boundary Imperfect Perfect
of transparent
medium
Refraction (light Perfect Perfect
homogeneous)
Dispersion Imperfect Imperfect
(?Cauchy)
Absorption Imperfect Imperfect
Colours of thin Perfect Perfect
plates (in general) (with subsidiary theory
of fits)
Central spot None Perfect
(Imperfect according
to Mr. Potter)
Airy's modification None Perfect
Thick plates Perfect Perfect
Coloured fringes of Imperfect Perfect
apertures and (with subsidiary theory of (Imperfect according to
shadows in simple inflection) Mr. Barton)
cases

- in more complex None None

cases

Stripes in mixed light None Perfect

Shifting by inter- None Perfect
posed plate (Imperfect according to
Mr. Potter)
Colours of gratings None Perfect
Double refraction Perfect Perfect
Polarization Imperfect Perfect
(with subsidiary theory (with subsidiary theory
of polarity) of transverse
vibrations)
Connexion with None Perfect
double refraction
Law of tangents None Perfect
Interferences of None Perfect
polarized light
Polarized rings Imperfect Perfect
(with subsidiary theory
of moveable polarization)

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6 Chris Eliasmith and Paul Thagard

Table 1. Continued

Phaenomena Corpuscular Undulatory

explanation explanation

Circular and elliptic None Imperfect

polarization:
at internal reflection
at metallic surfaces None None
(? Sir D. Brewster)
Conical refraction None Perfect

the nineteenth century. Achinstein argues convincingly that the wave

theorists used a four-part strategy in their attempt to show the superiority
of their theory over that of the particle theorists. The strategy was as
follows (Achinstein [1991], p.78).
1. Assume that either theory T1 or theory T2 is correct, and give
grounds for such an assumption.
2. Show how T1 and T2 explain various observed phenomena.
3. Show that T2 in explaining one or more of these phenomena
introduces improbable hypotheses, whereas T1 does not.
4. Conclude that T1 is probably true.

In his discussion, Achinstein stresses that wave theorists do not simply

examine the number of observations explained by a theory and its exten-
sions, but also the probability that those extensions to the basic theory are
valid. Furthermore, he claims that this 'probability' can be contrasted to
coherence, in that the latter can exist in the face of improbable extensions,
whereas the former, obviously, cannot (Achinstein [1991] p. 79).
Achinstein goes into great detail explaining how a wave theorist would
argue for the low probability of the particle theory. He relies on the
probability calculus to explicate the process wave theorists supposedly
used to prove their rivals improbable (Achinstein [1991], pp. 85-90). He
concluded that the wave theorists' strategies 'can be analyzed in inductive
and probabilistic terms' but not by relying on the concept of coherence
(Achinstein [1991], pp. 111, 133).
In criticizing coherentist analyses of the conceptual change which took
place, Achinstein discusses the debate between John Stuart Mill and
William Whewell concerning the verification of hypotheses in science
(Achinstein [1991], pp. 117-48). Achinstein characterizes the Whewellian,
or coherentist, position as insisting that:

an hypothesis explain [not only] known phenomena but that it explain

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 Waves, particles and explanatory coherence 7

and/or predict new ones as well particularly ones different in kind

from those it was initially designed to explain ('consilience'). Recog-
nizing that hypotheses being considered are usually additions to larger
systems, Whewell also imposes a requirement that such additions
render the system more coherent (Achinstein [1991], p. 118).

This characterization is only partly fair to Whewell's position. Though

Whewell does indeed place the restrictions Achinstein has noted (Whewell
[1847], pp. 62, 66-7, 77), he also places heavy emphasis on the simplicity of
a theory (Whewell [1847], pp. 71-2, 78-9). In doing so, Whewell has
introduced an important element in the assessment of hypotheses which
is not addressed by Achinstein in his dismissal of the Whewellian position
(Achinstein [1991], pp. 123-9).
Nonetheless, Achinstein has noticed important difficulties with the
coherentist position. The two which are most central to his dismissal of
the coherentist position are that 'coherence' is a poorly defined concept
(Achinstein [1991], p. 129).
Coherence is a vague notion, for which Whewell (like most others who
invoke this idea) offers no definition.

and that coherentists do not account for the primacy of certain elements in
their being empirically supported:

These three formulations of the method (of coherence), although by

no means identical, have in common the basic idea that the fact that an
hypothesis if true would correctly explain phenomena counts as some
reason for believing that hypothesis . . . there is no requirement that
the hypothesis in question, or any subsequent one, be inductively
inferable from any observations. More generally, there is no require-
ment that there be any independent warrant for the hypotheses intro-
duced (Achinstein [1991], p. 73).

4 Coherence

The first criticism can be met by a new characterization of coherence

(Thagard and Verbeurgt [forthcoming]). This characterization is an
abstraction of coherentist accounts of explanatory inference (Thagard
[1992b]), practical reasoning (Thagard and Millgram [1995], Millgram
and Thagard [forthcoming]), analogy (Holyoak and Thagard [1995]),
and impression formation (Kunda and Thagard [1996]). Here is a sketch
of a general theory of coherence that is developed in more detail elsewhere
(Thagard and Verbeurgt [forthcoming]):

1. Elements are representations such as concepts, propositions, parts

of images, goals, actions, and so on.

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8 Chris Eliasmith and Paul Thagard

2. Elements can cohere (fit together) or incohere (resist fitting

together). Coherence relations include explanation, deduction,
facilitation, association, and so on. Incoherence relations include
inconsistency, incompatibility, and negative association.
3. If two elements cohere, there is a positive constraint between them.
If two elements incohere, there is a negative constraint between
them.
4. Elements are to be divided into ones that are accepted and ones that
are rejected.
5. A positive constraint between two elements can be satisfied either
by accepting both of the elements or by rejecting both of the
elements.
6. A negative constraint between two elements can be satisfied only by
accepting one element and rejecting the other.
7. The coherence problem consists of dividing a set of elements into
accepted and rejected sets in a way that satisfies the most
constraints.

Many kinds of cognition, including hypothesis evaluation, concept appli-

cation, analogy, and decision-making, are coherence problems.
More precisely, consider a set E of elements which may be propositions
or other representations. Two members of E, el and e2, may cohere with
each other because of some relation between them, or they may resist
cohering with each other because of some other relation. We need to
understand how to make E into as coherent a whole as possible by
taking into account the coherence and incoherence relations that hold
between pairs of members of E. To do this, we can partition E into two
disjoint subsets, A and R, where A contains the accepted elements of E, and
R contains the rejected elements of E. We want to perform this partition in
a way that takes into account the local coherence and incoherence rela-
tions. For example, if E is a set of propositions and el explains e2, we want
to ensure that if el is accepted into A then so is e2. On the other hand, if el is
inconsistent with e3, we want to ensure that if el is accepted into A, then e3
is rejected into R. The relations of explanation and inconsistency provide
constraints on how we decide what can be accepted and rejected.
Formally, Thagard and Verbeurgt [forthcoming] define a coherence
problem as follows. Let E be a finite set of elements {ei} and C be a set
of constraints on E understood as a set {(ei, ej)} of pairs of elements of E. C
divides into C+, the positive constraints on E, and C-, the negative
constraints on E. With each constraint is associated a number w, which
is the weight (strength) of the constraint. The problem is to partition E into
two sets, A and R, in a way that maximizes compliance with the following
two coherence conditions:

1. if(ei, ej) is in C+, then ei is in A if and only if ej is in A.

2. if (ei, e1) is in C-, then ei is in A if and only if ej is in R.

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 Waves, particles and explanatory coherence 9

Let W be the weight of the partition, that is, the sum of the weights of the
satisfied constraints. The coherence problem is then to partition E into A
and R in a way that maximizes W. Because a coheres with b is a symmetric
relation, the order of the elements in the constraints does not matter.
Intuitively, if two elements are positively constrained, we want them
either to be both accepted or both rejected. On the other hand, if two
elements are negatively constrained, we want one to be accepted and the
other rejected. Note that these two conditions are intended as desirable
results, not as strict requisites of coherence: the partition is intended to
maximize compliance with them, not necessarily to ensure that all the
constraints are simultaneously satisfied, since simultaneous satisfaction
may be impossible. The partition is coherent to the extent that A includes
elements that cohere with each other while excluding ones that do not
cohere with those elements. We can define the coherence of a partition of E
into A and R as W, the sum of the weights of the constraints on E that
satisfy the above two conditions. Coherence is maximized if there is no
other partition that has greater total weight. Maximizing coherence is a
computationally very difficult problem, but algorithms are available for
providing good approximations (Thagard and Verbeurgt [forthcoming]).

5 Coherence and the wave-particle debate

Applying this characterization of coherence to the wave and particle
theories of light is simple. The elements are propositions, the positive
constraints are based on explanatory relations among the propositions,
and the negative constraints are based on relations of inconsistency or
competition. Here are seven principles of explanatory coherence that
establish the relevant constraints (Thagard [1992a], p. 136; see also Tha-
gard [1992b], pp. 65-6).

1. Symmetry: Explanatory coherence is a symmetric relation, unlike,

say, conditional probability.
2. Explanation: (a) A hypothesis coheres with what it explains, which
can either be evidence or another hypothesis; (b) hypotheses that
together explain some other propositions cohere with each other;
and (c) the more hypotheses it takes to explain something, the less
the degree of coherence.
3. Analogy: Similar hypotheses that explain similar pieces of evidence
cohere.
4. Data Priority: Propositions that describe the results of observation
have a degree of acceptability on their own.
5. Contradiction: Contradictory propositions are incoherent with
each other.
6. Competition: If P and Q both explain a proposition, and if P and Q

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10 Lthnris lasmith ana raul I nagara

are not explanatorily connected, then P and Q are incoherent with

each other. (P and Q are explanatorily connected if one explains the
other or if together they explain something.)
7. Acceptability: The acceptability of a proposition in a system of
propositions depends on its coherence with them.

For particular examples such as the wave-particle dispute, these prin-

ciples establish a set of positive constraints (where elements cohere with
each other) and negative constraints (where propositions incohere with
each other). Inference to the best explanation is performed by a computer
program called ECHO which has been applied to many examples in the
history of science (Thagard [1992b]).4 Applying ECHO to the wave-
particle debate is straightforward, using propositions such as: Light is a
wave. The appendix includes a list of all of the propositions, explanations,
empirical evidence, and contradictions important to both sides of the
wave-particle debate as outlined by Powell [1833] (see Table 1). ECHO
applies the seven principles of explanatory coherence to this set of data,
and decides which hypotheses to accept.
Application of ECHO to the wave-particle debate does not require any
special assumptions about the weights on the various constraints. In
running the program, we use one default weight for all positive constraints
(typically 0.04) and one default weight for all negative constraints (typi-
cally -0.06). The positive constraints are weakened when more than one
hypothesis is required to make an explanation; for example, if two propo-
sitions are required to explain something, then the positive constraints are
automatically halved to 0.02. Sensitivity analyses show that the actual
values of these weights are unimportant, so long as the absolute value of
the default weight on negative constraints is greater than the default weight
on positive constraints, which ensures that contradictory propositions are
not both accepted.
ECHO accepts the wave theory propositions rather than the particle
theory propositions for several reasons that together enter into the calcu-
lation of explanatory coherence. The wave theory explains many pieces of
evidence that the particle theory does not, for example, E7 'Light has a
central spot'. Most of the wave theory's explanations are simple, employ-
ing only the single hypothesis WH1, 'Light is a wave'. In contrast, the
particle theory has to invoke several additional auxiliary hypotheses such
as PH2, the theory of fits. Moreover, the particle theory implies NE 23,
'The mass and shape of slip does (should) affect dispersion', which is
contradicted by the actual evidence E23. Thus ECHO takes into account

4 Formulating the coherence relations as a constraint satisfaction problem makes connec-

tionist (neural network) algorithms a natural choice for solving the coherence problem.
However, other algorithms are also successful (Thagard and Verbeurgt [forthcoming]).

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 Waves, particles and explanatory coherence 11

constraints based on explanatory breadth, simplicity, and negative evi-

dence that generate the conclusion that coherence is maximized by accept-
ing the wave theory and rejecting the particle theory. On our view, theory
acceptance is inference to the best explanation, where the best explanation
is calculated by a judgement of explanatory coherence construed in terms
of constraint satisfaction.
Our account of theory acceptance and our input to ECHO stated in the
appendix do not presuppose any special theory of explanation. In the
context of the wave and particle theories of light, explanation is plausibly
construed as a causal relation: that light is a wave explains why it reflects
because light's being a wave causes it to reflect. The nature of causality in
turn can be understood in terms of physical processes that transform
matter and/or energy. Explanation, however, has many aspects and con-
struing theory choice in terms of explanatory coherence is compatible with
various ways of understanding causality and explanation (Thagard
[1992b], Ch. 5).

6 Independent warrant
Our explanatory coherence approach, using the program ECHO to max-
imize constraint satisfaction, captures most of the elements that Achinstein
deemed important to the wave-particle debate:

1. Assume that the wave and particle theories conflict by virtue of

contradictions and competitions between them.
2. Explanations by the two theories establish coherence relations.
3. The particle theory introduces implausible hypotheses, that is, ones
which cohere with propositions that contradict the available
evidence.

4. Accept the wave theory as part of the most maximally coherent

partition of the set of relevant propositions.

Achinstein denies, however, that coherence gives an adequate account

of the triumph of the wave theory of light. His argument is based in part on
an argument that coherence considerations cannot establish that the wave
theory was more probable than the particle theory. In the next section we
will argue that the controversy had little to do with probabilities. In this
section we will address Achinstein's other major objection to coherence
theories--that it neglects independent warrant.
Achinstein takes the concept of independent warrant from Mill and
Herschel who claim, in contrast to Whewell, that explanatory power,
consilience, simplicity, and coherence are not enough to justify acceptance.
In addition to a hypothesis explaining observed phenomena, there should

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12 Chris Eliasmith and Paul Thagard

be data providing some independent inductive support for the hypothesis

(Achinstein [1991], p. 134). Achinstein employs an 'eliminative strategy' to
produce an independent warrant, and claims that such a method is the one
employed by wave theorists (ibid., p. 137). He claims that wave theorists
could argue inductively that light was either a wave or a particle, then
justify acceptance of the wave hypothesis by elimination of the particle
hypothesis.
But Achinstein does not show how such an argument was developed by
the wave theorists, or how it might be developed. In principle, we can
imagine that light might be something quite unlike a wave or a particle,
perhaps an emanation from the incorporeal minds of divine beings. In the
scientific context of the nineteenth century, when the wave and particle
theories were the only live competitors, it was reasonable to base theory
choice on a comparative assessment of them alone. Achinstein provides no
textual evidence to support the claim that the wave theorists were using an
inductively supported argument for the exclusivity of wave and particle
approaches to justify their acceptance of the wave theory.
The reasonableness of focusing just on wave and particle theories does
not derive from the existence of independent inductive support for their
being the only possibilities, but from their being the only theories available
with any explanatory record. Our coherence model of the debate handles
this aspect adequately by basing the acceptance of the wave theory and the
simultaneous defeat of the particle theory on the former's greater
explanatory breadth, simplicity, and avoidance of negative evidence.
Historically and normatively, that was all that the wave theorists
needed. An account of explanatory coherence that takes into account
competition between theories and negative evidence (negative constraints)
and the explanatory relations among propositions (positive constraints)
can adequately model the wave theorists position in a way that supports
Whewell's view: Mill's call for independent warrant neither describes nor
prescribes the nature of scientific deliberation.

7 A critique of the probabilistic approach

Achinstein claims that wave theorists themselves viewed the debate from
the perspective of probability rather than coherence:

The objection to this explanation offered by nineteenth-century wave

theorists is not that it introduces ideas foreign to the particle theory,
ones that render the set of theoretical assumptions 'incoherent', but
that it introduces hypotheses that are improbable, given observations
made in this case and others (Achinstein [1991], p. 79).

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 Waves, particles and explanatory coherence 13

On the contrary, Young himself states the following:

Although the invention of plausible hypotheses, independent of any

connexion with experimental observations, can be of very little use in
the promotion of natural knowledge; yet the discovery of simple and
uniform principles, by which a great number of apparently hetero-
geneous phenomena are reduced to coherent and universal laws, must
ever be allowed to be of considerable importance towards the
improvement of human intellect (Young [1855], p. 140, italics added).

Furthermore, Young talks of hypotheses being 'consistent' (Young [1855],

p. 141) or 'connecting an immense variety of facts with each other' (ibid., p.
279). In fact, he explicitly asserts that the 'conformity to other facts' is an
excellent reason to accept the wave hypotheses (ibid., p. 170). It is clear
that nineteenth-century wave theorists discussed hypotheses in terms of
coherence, not in purely probabilistic terms as Achinstein contends. We
showed at the end of the last section how coherence captures all of the
major considerations of the debate that Achinstein thought important.
Our coherence account has two major advantages over Achinstein's
probabilistic account: computational tractability and psychological plau-
sibility. Connectionist coherence models like ECHO provide a computa-
tionally efficient way of dealing with large numbers of elements
(propositions).5 In contrast, Achinstein has no working model of how
probabilistic reasoning can produce the acceptance of the wave theory.
Producing such a probabilistic model is a difficult task. In order to include
the thirty-one propositions that are used in the ECHO model, a probabilist
would need 231 (2,147,483,648) probabilities for a full joint distribution,
more than two billion probabilities.
Hence the probabilist must rely on simplifications. One such method of
simplifying probabilistic networks6 has been developed by Pearl [1988].
The resulting networks (Pearl networks) are directed, acyclic graphs whose
nodes are multi-valued variables and whose directed edges indicate a
causal relationship. By localizing probability calculations through inde-
pendence assumptions, and introducing methods for translating multiply
connected networks to singly connected ones, Pearl has been able to
greatly simplify the solution of probabilistic networks (Pearl [1988]).
In a comparison of probabilistic networks to ECHO, Thagard [forth-
coming] formulates a method for translating any problem captured by
ECHO into a Pearl probabilistic network. However, there is a high price to

5 The largest ECHO networks to date model Copernicus vs. Ptolemy and Newton vs.
Descartes using more than 100 propositions (Nowak and Thagard [1992]a and b). Much
larger but still tractable networks have been generated by analogy programs (Thagard et al.
[1990]).
6 Such networks are also referred to as causal networks, belief networks, Bayesian networks,
influence diagrams, and independence networks.

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14 Chris Eliasmith and Paul Thagard

be paid for such a translation: there is no straightforward method for

assigning conditional probabilities in a Pearl network to give the correct
results; the size of the Pearl network becomes very large, and the indepen-
dence assumptions which must be made may be poor approximations
(Thagard [forthcoming]). Nevertheless, one can create a Pearl network
that greatly reduces the number of probabilities necessary to model a
specific situation. For the thirty-one propositions in the ECHO simulation
of the wave-particle debate, the probabilist can get by with 184
conditional probabilities, a massive improvement over 2 billion. However,
this reduction is only possible if 'one knows the conditional probability
distribution of each propositional variable given its parents' (Neapolitain
[1990], p. 164).
Probabilists know that finding these numbers is a difficult task. Though
humans are quite proficient at creating a causal network, and even
estimating the probability an event will occur, it is much more difficult
for them to determine the values in the conditional distributions of a node
given its parents (Neapolitain [1990], p. 181). For example, one would have
to estimate the probability that the theory of fits is correct, given that light
exhibits colours of thin plates (see the appendix). The probability cannot
be assumed to be 1, as there are other theories which may account for this
property of light. It is also unclear how a probability estimation will
change with the introduction of new evidence, or even which evidence
relates to which theories. How, then, does one arrive at a reasonable
probability value under such uncertain conditions? This question is not
resolved by Achinstein's analysis.
Furthermore, there are important restrictions to creating a probabilist
model. In creating a probabilist net one cannot simply specify a (directed
acyclic) network and the conditional probability distributions of every
variable given its parents. First, one must show that the specified condi-
tional distributions determine a joint probability distribution. Second, it
must be shown that the specified conditional probabilities are indeed the
conditional probabilities. Finally, the joint distribution and the graph
must be shown to satisfy the conditional independence assumptions of
the probabilistic network (Neapolitain [1990], p. 164). The only one of
these tasks that is necessary for the coherentist corresponds to the creation
of the probabilist network, the simplest of all the probabilist tasks.
Moreover, the strong independence assumptions necessary to reduce the
probabilistic network's complexity tractable are unrealistic. If one
examines the particle-wave debate, it is quite clear that a number of
hypotheses are dependent on each other, particularly in the case of the
particle hypotheses listed in the appendix. We issue the following challenge
to proponents of probabilistic accounts of scientific reasoning: develop a

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 Waves, particles and explanatory coherence 15

historically plausible and tractable computational model of how probabil-

ities can be used to justify the acceptance of the wave theory. Our ECHO
simulation shows that the coherence account already satisfies the criterion
of computational tractability.
Our coherence account operates in the tradition of naturalistic
epistemology, since connectionist models of mind have received much
empirical support in recent years, and ECHO and related models of
analogy and concept application have been used to explain and predict
the results of many psychological experiments (on empirical applications
of ECHO, see Byrne [1995], Read and Marcus-Newhall, [1993], Schank
and Ranney [1992], for the general approach, see Thagard [1996], Ch. 7).
In contrast, there is abundant psychological evidence that reasoning with
probabilities is not a natural part of human cognition (Kahneman,
Tversky, and Slovic [1982]). Hence our coherence account of scientific
change is more psychologically plausible than probabilistic accounts as
well as more computationally tractable.
In sum, we have used a computationally implemented theory of
explanatory coherence to give a historically accurate and thorough ana-
lysis of the acceptance of the wave theory of light. This analysis should not
be judged in terms of how well it approximates and motivates a probabil-
istic account of the wave-particle debate, since there is no reason to
believe that debate was fundamentally probabilistic. Probability theory
is wonderful in statistical contexts where samples from populations allow
us to speak of frequencies and propensities, but there is no reason why
belief revision in human scientists needs to be interpreted probabilistically.
Just as nineteenth-century wave theorists and particle theorists competed
to explain the nature of light, so coherence theorists and probability
theorists compete to explain the nature of scientific change. We have
provided in this paper a coherence account of the acceptance of the
wave theory of light that is at least as historically accurate as Achinstein's
probabilist account and that is superior in computational tractability and
psychological plausibility.

Acknowledgements
This research has been supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for
helpful comments.

Department of Philosophy
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1, Canada

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16 Chris Eliasmith and Paul Thagard

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Appendix: ECHO simulation

The following formulation of the problem as input to ECHO retains its
LISP structure. The propositions are taken unchanged from Powell's
assessment of the state of the debate in 1833, as found in Table 1, which
neither Cantor nor Achinstein criticize as unfair.
;; Wave hypotheses
(proposition 'WHI 'Light is a wave.')
(proposition 'WH2 'Light has transverse vibrations.')
;; Particle hypotheses
(proposition 'PHi 'Light is a series of particles emitted from a source.')
(proposition 'PH2 'Theory of fits.')
(proposition 'PH3 'Theory of movable polarization.')
(proposition 'PH4 'Theory of inflection.')
(proposition 'PH5 'Theory of polarity.')
;; Empirical evidence
(proposition 'El 'Light reflects.')
(proposition 'E2 'Light reflects at the boundary of transparent
medium.')
(proposition 'E3 'Light refracts, it is homogeneous.')
(proposition 'E4 'Light disperses.')

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18 Chris Eliasmith and Paul Thagard

(proposition 'E5 'Light can be absorbed.')

(proposition 'E6 'Light exhibits colours of thin plates.')
(proposition 'E7 'Light has a central spot (around circular objects).')
(proposition 'E8 'Light exhibits Airy's modification.')
(proposition 'E9 'Light exhibits thick plates.')
(proposition 'E10 'Light has coloured fringes of apertures and shadows
in simple cases.')
(proposition 'El 1 'Light has coloured fringes in more complex cases.')
(proposition 'E12 'Light stripes if it is mixed.')
(proposition 'E13 'Light shifts if a plate is interposed.')
(proposition 'E14 'Light has colours through gratings.')
(proposition 'E15 'Light has double refraction.')
(proposition 'E16 'Light can be polarized.')
(proposition 'E17 'Light has a connexion with double refraction.')
(proposition 'E18 'Light exhibits the law of tangents.')
(proposition 'E19 'Light when polarized has interference patterns.')
(proposition 'E20 'Light has polarization rings.')
(proposition 'E21 'Light can be circularly and elliptically polarized.')
(proposition 'E22 'Light has conical refraction.')
(proposition 'E23 'The mass and shape of slit does not affect dispersion.')
(proposition 'NE23 'The mass and shape of slit does (should) affect
dispersion.')

;; Wave explanations ;; Particle explanations

(explain '(WH1) 'El) (explain '(PH1) 'El)
(explain '(WH1) 'E2) (explain '(PH1) 'E2)
(explain '(WH1) 'E3) (explain '(PH1) 'E3)
(explain '(WH1) 'E4) (explain '(PH1) 'E4)
(explain '(WH1) 'E5) (explain '(PH1) 'E5)
(explain '(WH 1) 'E6) (explain '(PH1 PH2) 'E6)
(explain '(WH1) 'E7)
(explain '(WH 1) 'E8)
(explain '(WH1) 'E9) (explain '(PH1) 'E9)
(explain '(WH1) 'E10) (explain '(PH1 PH4) 'E10)
(explain '(WH1) 'E12)
(explain '(WH1) 'E13)
(explain '(WH1) 'E14)
(explain '(WH1) 'E15) (explain '(PH1) 'E15)
(explain '(WH1 WH2) 'E16) (explain '(PH1 PH5) 'E16)
(explain '(WH1) 'E17)
(explain '(WH1) 'E18)
(explain '(WH1) 'E19)

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 Waves, particles and explanatory coherence 19

(explain '(WH1) 'E20) (explain '(PH1 PH3) 'E20)

(explain '(WH1) 'E21)
(explain '(WH 1) 'E22) (explain '(PH1 PH4) 'NE23)

(contradict 'PH 1 'WH 1)

(contradict 'E23 'NE23)

(data '(El E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10 Ell E12 E13 E14 E15 E16 E17
E18 E19 E20 E21 E22 E23))

The program takes these inputs and creates a constraint network in which
coherence relations are implemented as positive constraints represented by
excitatory links and incoherence relations are implemented as negative
constraints implemented by inhibitory links. A simple connectionist algo-
rithm spreads activation among the propositions until some are accepted
(activation greater than 0) and others are rejected (activation less than 0).
See Thagard [1992] for mathematical details. Table 2 displays the final
activations of the main hypotheses in the wave/particle dispute. We have
done computational experiments that show that explanatory breadth,
simplicity, and negative evidence all contribute to the superiority of the
wave hypotheses over the particle hypotheses.

Table 2. Activation levels of hypotheses

in coherentist analysis of the wave par-
ticle debate

Hypotheses Final Activation

WH1 0.94
WH2 0.67
PH1 -0.85
PH2 -0.57
PH3 -0.57
PH4 -0.66
PH5 -0.63

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