5

The Unipolar World Order and its

Dynamics
Birthe Hansen1

Since 1989 the academic debate on how to address the post-Cold War
world order has flourished. It centres on whether the current world
order is to be analysed in terms of being multipolar, still bipolar, for
the moment unipolar, fragmented, in the hands of the civilizations, or
democratic and peaceful. If the order is unipolar, as I assume, questions
arise as to what characterizes a unipolar order in general, and what can
be expected from a US unipolar order in particular.
The concept of unipolarity covers a great deal more than the mere
fact that there is one great power stronger than any other. It refers to a
series of international dynamics specifically connected to a unipolar
arrangement of power, including specific effects on patterns of conflict
and cooperation. The argument here is that: unipolarity induces ‘flock-
ing’ and hard work, it is a comparatively robust – but not necessarily
durable – world order, and the unipole is in a unique position to spread
its own political model and set the international agenda. Under
current circumstances US international policy so far has embodied
the spread of free market capitalism and liberal democracy. While
other states2 may benefit from the unipole’s management of world
affairs, they may also trap it by free-riding or by being offended by the
unipole’s exhausting concern for its own political position. If this view
is taken into account, we then face future international developments
where the USA will play a predominant international role, and in which
the unipolar distribution of power will affect international trends and
outcomes.
My aim is to introduce a theoretical model for unipolarity by pre-
senting some hypotheses on the main dimensions of international
politics, that is on the security dynamics in unipolar international
systems. The model draws on and follows the neorealist theory accord-

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© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2000
 Birthe Hansen 113

ing to Kenneth Waltz (1979).3 In the course of the presentation of the

model empirical examples are used for illustration.
Following an introduction of general neorealist notions and their rela-
tions to the current debate on the new world order, the chapter is
broken down into four parts representing the model’s main hypotheses
concerning (1) peace and war, (2) flocking, (3) hard work, and (4) the
unipole itself. Finally some considerations on the usability of the model
are put forward.

Why neorealism and polarity?

Kenneth Waltz’ neorealist theory is a structural theory which empha-

sizes the importance of the number of great powers in the international
system. According to Waltz, the number of great powers shapes the
security dynamics and conditions on which states act and interact.
Consequently, the focus when analysing a world order needs to be
placed on the number of great powers in question. As long as it is
still reasonable to describe the organization of international politics
in terms of anarchy and polarity4 (uni-, bi-, tri- or multipolarity),
these descriptions, nevertheless, become features of any interna-
tional order. Yet it has been argued, not least from post-structuralist
and reflectionist positions, that after the end of the Cold War the time
has come to put an end to structural theories. However, I see no reason
why as there are at least three good reasons for adopting a neorealist
position, namely its theoretical qualities, the promising results based on
previous use and tests – including the theory’s survival after bipolarity,
and its relevance for conceptualizing my topic, the new international
order.
First, neorealism has remarkable qualities in regard to explaining and
predicting possible outcomes, to inferring testable hypotheses, and to
identifying general tendencies and conditions regarding the world
order. In so far as empirical evidence supports the hypotheses, neoreal-
ism gains explanatory power which it potentially possesses owing to its
character. In addition, the theory can be credited in other respects such
as consistency and relevance.
Second, tests and applications have proved that neorealism has
worked well in the case of bipolarity and multipolarity (see for example
Walt, 1987 and 1988; Christensen and Snyder, 1990). Neorealism even
appears to have passed the big test of 1989 when bipolarity came to an
end. By 1989, three neorealist expectations seemed to have been proven
valid: