LESSON FIVE—COMPETENCE &

COMPELLABILITY OF WITNESSES
MUMA ANDREW
LESSON 5—COMPETENCE & COMPELLABILITY
OF WITNESSES
• SCOPE OF THE LESSON:
1. Meaning of “Competence” and “Compellability”
2. General Rule as to Competence and Compellability;
3. Historical Development of the law on competence &
compellability of witnesses;
4. Exceptions to the general rule as to Competence and
Compellability:
¨ Accused persons;
¨ Spouses;
¨ Children;
¨ Persons of unsound mind
¨ Sovereigns and diplomats;
¨ Bankers.
 Meanings: “Competence” & “Compellability”

• A witness is said to be competent if he/she may be

called to give evidence, i.e. if, as a matter of law, they
are qualified/permitted to give evidence.
• A witness is said to be compellable if, being
competent, he may be compelled (by the court) to give
evidence.
• A witness must first be shown to be competent before
they can be compelled to give evidence.
• A competent and compellable witness may
nonetheless be entitled, on grounds of public policy or
privilege, to refuse to answer some or all of the
questions put to them.
 Historical Development of the Law

¨ At common law, there were numerous rules which operated

to prevent a wide variety of persons from giving relevant
evidence.
¨ The are still some persisting qualifications on the
competence of certain categories of persons to give
evidence, which will form the main focus of this lesson.
⧫ We highlight, in the ensuing few slides of this
presentation, the development of the rules as to the
competence and compellability of—
⧫ non-Christians and atheists;
⧫ Parties;
⧫ persons interested in the outcome of legal proceedings,
⧫ Convicts; and
⧫ spouses of parties to proceedings.
 Historical Development of the Law

1. Non-Christians & Atheists:

¨ At common law, the evidence of non-
Christians and atheists was excluded by
virtue of the requirement that witnesses
testify on oath on the Gospel.
¨ The rule was modified in the 18th Centure for
Non-Christians. Atheists, on the other hand,
were allowed to testify for the first time vide
the Evidence Further Amendment Act 1869.
(See Adian Kean at p. 99).
Historical Development of the Law

¨ In Kenya, the modern law on the issue (of

oaths, which rendered non-Christians and
Atheists incompetent) is set out in section 15 of
the Oaths and Statutory Declarations Act (Cap.
15) which empowers a court to administer:
¨ an oath (to those witnesses who subscribe
to a religious belief and who have no
objection to taking an oath); or
¨ a solemn affirmation to those witnesses who
are atheist or for religious or other reason
are opposed to taking an oath.
 Historical Development of the Law

2. Convicts:
¨ At common law, persons who had previously been
convicted and sentenced for certain infamous crimes
were not allowed to testify.
¨ The incompetence of convicts was modified by the Civil
Rights Act 1828 and abolished by the Evidence Act 1843.
3. Persons Interested in the Outcome of Proceedings:
¨ At common law, persons who had personal pecuniary or
proprietary interest in the outcome of legal proceedings
were incompetent to testify in such proceedings. The
incompetence was abolished by the Evidence Act 1828.
 Historical Development of the Law

4. The Parties & their Spouses:

¨ Parties to legal proceedings were incompetent to
testify at common law, in both civil and criminal
proceedings. In criminal cases, the incompetence
of the accused person to testify was justified on
the risk of his being compelled to incriminate
himself.
¨ The spouse of a party to either civil or criminal
proceedings was also incompetent to testify at
common law, whether the evidence in question
related to events which occurred before or
during the marriage.
 Historical Development of the Law

¨ The incompetence of spouses was justified on (inter

alia) the following assumptions:—
¨ the spouse of a party to legal proceedings had an
interest in the outcome of the proceedings;
¨ a spouse would tend to be biased in favour of the
other spouse;
¨ the harshness of compelling one spouse to give
evidence against the other;
¨ allowing spouses to testify would disturb marital
harmony; and
¨ the theoretical unity of the spouses (it being assumed
that they were one and the same person, the
husband).
 Historical Development of the Law

¨ A spouse’s incompetence survived the termination

of the marriage in so far as the evidence in
question related to events which occurred during
the marriage.
¨ The disability of parties to testify in legal
proceedings was abolished by the Evidence Act
1851 and the Evidence Further Amendment Act
1869.
 Historical Development of the Law

¨ The disability of spouses to testify in civil proceedings was

abolished by section 1 of the Evidence Amendment Act 1853.

¨ The rule as to the incompetence of spouses to testify in

criminal proceedings was modified by the Criminal Evidence
Act 1898, which made distinctions between the spouse of
the accused person giving evidence for the defence and for
the prosecution.
¨ Section 1 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (which seems to
be pari materia with section 127 of the Kenyan Evidence Act)
made the accused’s spouse competent (but not compellable)
as a witness for the accused and for any person jointly
charged with the accused subject to the consent of the
accused.
 The Modern Law: General Rule as to Competence &
Compellability of Witnesses
¨ Progressive developments over the years (mostly in the form
of statutory interventions) have wilted down most of the
common law exclusionary rules that tended to disqualify
many people from giving evidence.
¨ Today, broadly speaking, there are two general rules on
competence and compellability of witnesses:
¨ the first (which relates to competence) is that any person
is a competent witness in any proceedings (see section
125 (1) of the Evidence Act).
¨ the second (which relates to compellability) is that all
competent witnesses are compellable.
¨ The ensuing parts of this presentation will explore the
modern law on the competence and compellability of
selected categories of persons.
 The Modern Law: General Rule as to Competence &
Compellability (sections 125 (1) and 128 of Cap. 80)
¨ Section 125 (1) of the Evidence Act sets out the
following general rule as to the competence of
witnesses:
¨ “all persons shall be competent to testify unless the
court considers that they are prevented from
understanding the questions put to them, or from
giving rational answers to those questions, by
tender years, extreme old age, disease (whether of
body or mind) or any similar cause.”
¨ Section 128 of the Evidence Act, on the other hand,
provides the following general rule as to the
compellability of witnesses:
 The Modern Law: General Rule as to Competence &
Compellability (sections 125 (1) and 128 of Cap. 80)
¨ “A Witness shall not be excused from answering any
question as to any matter relevant to the matter in
issue in any suit or in any civil or criminal proceeding
upon the ground that the answer to such question
will incriminate, or may tend directly or indirectly to
incriminate, such witness, or that it will expose, or
tend directly or indirectly to expose, such witness to a
penalty or forfeiture of any kind, but no such answer
which a witness is compelled to give shall subject him
to any arrest or prosecution, or be proved against
him in any criminal proceeding, except a prosecution
for giving false evidence by such answer”
 Modern Law: Parties & Spouses

⧫ In Kenya, the modern law on the competence

and compellability of parties and their spouses
is set out in section 127 of the Evidence Act.
⧫ For criminal cases, some additional and
important rules are also to be found in Article
50 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010.
⧫ Section 127 (1) of the Evidence Act states that:
“In civil proceedings the parties to the suit, and
the husband or wife of any party to the suit,
shall be competent witnesses.”
 Modern Law: Parties & Spouses

• Section 127 (2) of the Evidence Act states that :

– “In criminal proceedings every person charged

with an offence, and the wife or husband of the
person charged, shall be a competent witness
for the defence at every stage of the
proceedings, whether such person is charged
alone or jointly with any other person.”
 Modern Law: Parties & Spouses

⧫ Under section 127 (3) of the Evidence Act, the accused

person’s spouse is a competent and compellable
witness for the prosecution, without the accused’s
consent, in cases where the accused is charged with—
⧫ bigamy;
⧫ offences under the Sexual Offences Act; or
⧫ an act or omission affecting the person or property
of the spouse or the children of either of them.
⧫ In all other cases, according to the second paragraph
to the proviso to section 127 (2), the accused person’s
spouse can only be called as a witness upon the
application of the accused person.
 Modern Law: Parties & Spouses

¨ In summary, today—
1. any party to civil proceedings may give evidence himself
and, if he wishes, compel any other party to those
proceedings to give evidence.
2. an accused person and his spouse are now competent,
but not compellable, witnesses for the defense (see
section 127 (2) of the Evidence Act).
3. an accused person’s spouse is generally not a competent
witness for the prosecution, save for cases where the
accused is charged with any of the offences listed in
section 127 (3) of the Evidence Act. For the cases listed
under section 127 (3), the accused’s spouse is both a
competent and compellable witness for the prosecution.
 Modern Law: Parties & Spouses

⧫ NB:
1. paragraph (iii) of the proviso to section 127 (2) of the
Evidence Act states that the failure of the accused
person or his/her spouse to testify shall not be made
the subject of any comment by the prosecution
2. under Article 50 (2) (i) of the new Constitution, an
accused person has the right to remain silent and not
to give evidence at the trial.
3. Where a party or his spouse elects or is compelled to
give evidence, they are liable to be cross-examined by
the adversary just like any other ordinary witness.
 Modern Law: Parties & Spouses

4. At common law, and contemporary English law, the

word “spouse” for purposes of any rules as to
competence and compellability of witnesses is
normally understood to refer to a wife or husband of a
monogamous and de jure (as opposed to de facto)
marriage (See R v Khan (1986) 84 Cr App Rep 44, CA).
The rules in section 127 of the Kenyan Evidence Act as
to the competence and compellability of spouses,
however, apply to spouses of both monogamous and
polygamous marriages, as well as spouses to a party
married under native or tribal custom (for a
controversial pre-independence decision on this on
this, see R v Amkeyo).
 Modern Law: Accomplices

⧫ At common law, an accomplice (that is a person who

participates criminally in the commission of the crime
charged) was a competent witness for the prosecution, subject
to the requirement that their evidence be corroborated.
⧫ The common law requirement for corroboration n of
accomplice evidence was based on the assumption that the
accomplice would almost inevitably tailor the evidence to
exonerate himself.
⧫ In Kenya, the modern law on the competence of accomplices is
set out at section 141 of the Evidence Act.
⧫ Section 141 of the Evidence Act provides that an accomplice
shall be a competent against an accused person, and a
conviction shall not be illegal merely because it proceeds upon
the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice.
 Modern Law: Accomplices

⧫ NB: Although section 141 allows a court to convict on

the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice,
appellate courts will normally overturn a conviction
solely or substantially based on such evidence.
⧫ In Mwangi v Republic [2008] 1 KLR 1134, the appellants
were jointly charged with the offences of robbery with
violence and rape contrary to sections 296 (1) and 140
of the Penal Code respectively.
⧫ A woman who had been arrested and charged with
robbery in connection with the occurrences of the
material night testified that the second appellant had
told her that he had a plan and asked her to find out if
the complainant’s husband was present.
 Modern Law: Accomplices

⧫ The trial magistrate took into account the

woman’s evidence as that of a reliable witness.
⧫ Held (on second appeal):
1. The trial court should have treated the woman’s
evidence as that of an accomplice, and it had been a
serious misdirection to treat her evidence as that of a
reliable witness;
2. The woman’s evidence should have been held to be
untrustworthy for the reason that she was likely to
swear falsely in order to shift blame from herself and
being a participant of the crime, she could easily
disregard the sanctity of the oath to tell the truth.
 Modern Law: Children

⧫ At common law, the competence of children to give

sworn evidence depended on “the sense and
reason they entertain of the danger and impiety
[i.e. sinfulness or wickedness] of falsehood” (see
Adrian Kean 4th Edition at p. 110).
⧫ The requirement that at section 19 of the Oaths
and Statutory Declarations Act that children of
tender years be shown to understand “the nature
of an oath” before they can give sworn evidence
(see ensuing slides), therefore, is arguably
informed by the religious importance attached to
an oath in the common law days.
 Modern Law: Children

⧫ In England, the courts have recognized that contemporary

societies may not attach much divinity to the oath. In R v
Hayes [1971] WLR 234, for instance, it was held that the
important consideration is not whether the child
understood the nature of an oath but rather—
⧫ “whether the child has sufficient appreciation of the solemnity of the
occasion and the added responsibility to tell the truth, which is
involved in taking an oath, over and above the duty to tell the truth
which is an ordinary duty of normal social conduct.”
⧫ In England, the requirement that a child witness should be
shown to understand the duty to speak the truth is also now
understood to mean the duty to tell the truth as a matter of
normal social conduct rather than the duty to tell the truth
as a matter of piety (see Adrian Kean, 4th Edition at p. 111).
 Modern Law: Children

⧫ The modern law on the competence and

compellability of children is set out in
sections 124 and 125 (1) of the Evidence Act
as read with section 19 of the Oaths and
Statutory Declarations Act.
⧫ In summary, the effect of the above sections
is that:-
 Modern Law: Children

1. A child of tender years who is incapable of

understanding the questions put to them or
giving rational answers thereto is not a
competent witness (s. 125);
2. Where any child of tender years called as a
witness does not in the opinion of the court
understand the nature of an oath, his evidence
may be received if, in the opinion of the court,
the child is possessed of sufficient intelligence to
justify the reception of the evidence, and
understands the duty of speaking the truth (s. 19
of Cap. 15).
 Modern Law: Children

3. Where the unsworn evidence of a child of tender

years is admitted (under s. 19 of Cap. 15), the
accused shall nonetheless not be convicted on
such evidence unless it is corroborated by other
material evidence in support thereof implicating
him (s. 124);
4. Where in a criminal case involving a sexual offence
the only evidence is that of the alleged child victim
of the offence, the court shall receive the evidence
and proceed to convict the accused person if, for
reasons to be recorded in the proceedings, the
court is satisfied that the alleged child victim is
telling the truth (proviso to s. 124);
 Modern Law: Children

 In Oloo v Republic [2009] KLR 416, trial magistrate had

convicted the appellant on a charge of robbery with
violence contrary to section 296 (2) of the penal code.
 The trial magistrate had relied, in arriving at the
convicted, on the evidence of three child witnesses aged
between 13 and 17 years.
 The Appellant appealed to the High Court. The state
counsel appearing for the prosecution conceded the
appeal in the High Court, stating in part that the evidence
against the appellant was inadequate and suspect.
 The High Court nonetheless disagreed with the appellant
and the state counsel and dismissed the appeal,
prompting the appellant to file a second and final appeal
to the Court of Appeal.
 Modern Law: Children

 The second appeal was based partly on the

contention that both the trial magistrate and
the High Court had erred in convicting him on
the uncorroborated evidence of a child.
 Held (by the Court of Appeal):
1. The Children Act at section 2 defined a child of
tender years as a child under the age of ten;
 Modern Law: Children

2. Section 19 of the Oaths and Statutory Declarations

Act provided that the evidence of a child of tender
years called as a witness, who in the opinion of the
Court did not understand the nature of an oath,
could be received if in the opinion of the Court
such a child was possessed of sufficient
intelligence to justify the reception of the evidence
and understands the duty of telling the truth.
 Modern Law: Children

3. The trial court should have, out of caution, formed an

opinion on a voire dire examination whether the child
understood the nature of an oath before she could be
sworn. Failure to do so could have occasioned a
miscarriage of justice had that been the only witness
on the issues that were before the Court.
4. Where a witness who did not understand the nature
of the oath was made to swear, her evidence would
have higher probative value than if the same evidence
was given unsworn.
5. Corroboration of the evidence of a child of tender
years was only necessary where such a child gave
unsworn evidence (Johnson Muiruri v Republic [1984]
KLR 445).
 Modern Law: Children

6. In law, the evidence of a child of tenders years

given on oath after a voire dire examination
required no corroboration but the court had to
warn itself that it should in practice not base a
conviction on it without looking and finding
corroboration for it.
7. The evidence of a child of tender years not given
on oath had, in law, to be corroborated.
8. Even if the evidence of one of the children was
inadmissible, there was still evidence from the
other witnesses. Accordingly, the appeal would
be dismissed.
 Modern Law: Children

⧫ The combined effect of the case law, section 119 of the

Oaths and Statutory Declarations Act and sections 124
and 125 of the Evidence Act, therefore, is that:
1. an ordinary child (i.e. a child other than one of tender
years and who in the opinion of the court is possessed
of sufficient knowledge to understand the nature of an
oath) is a competent witness, to be sworn like any
other ordinary witness. No corroboration is required
in respect of the evidence given by such a child;
 Modern Law: Children

2. a child of tender years who is not possessed of sufficient knowledge to

understand the nature of an oath is a competent witness if in the opinion
of the court he is possessed of sufficient intelligence to justify the
reception of his evidence, and understands the duty of speaking the
truth. Such a child is to give unsworn evidence, but their evidence
requires corroboration if a conviction is to be entirely founded on it;
3. a child of tender years who (i) is not possessed of sufficient knowledge
to understand the nature of an oath; (ii) is not possessed of sufficient
intelligence to justify the reception of his evidence; and (iii) does not
understand the duty of speaking the truth is not competent as a witness;
4. Except in the case of sexual offences, an accused person cannot be
convicted solely on the unsworn evidence of a child witness. As regards
sexual offences, an accused person can be convicted on the
uncorroborated evidence of a child victim “if, for reasons to be recorded
in the proceedings, the court is satisfied that the alleged victim is telling
the truth.”
 Modern Law: Children

⧫ In practice, courts determine, at the earliest possible

moment, whether a child is possessed of sufficient knowledge
to understand the nature of an oath or to justify the reception
of their evidence by asking the child preliminary questions
(e.g. “How old are you?” “Do you go to church?” “Do you go to
school?” “What class/grade are you in?” etc.).
⧫ Normally, a trial judge/magistrate will record that he has
examined the child and formed the view that the child is
possessed of sufficient knowledge to justify the reception of
their evidence, understands the nature of an oath or the duty
to speak the truth and is telling the truth. Where this is not
done, an appellate court will most likely overturn the
decision reached by the trial judge/magistrate if the decision
is solely or largely based on the child’s evidence.
 Modern Law: Matters to Note on Corroboration

⧫ NB: although the modern law of evidence requires

that certain types of evidence be corroborated,
the general rule is that there is no requirement for
corroboration of evidence.
⧫ The general rule that corroboration of evidence is
not necessary is implicit in section 143 of the
Evidence Act, which provides:
⧫ “No particular number of witnesses shall, in the
absence of any provision of law to the contrary,
be required for the proof of any fact”
 Modern Law: Persons of Unsound Mind

⧫ At common law, the proper test of the

competence of a mentally handicapped
person is whether that person has a sufficient
appreciation of the seriousness of the
occasion and a realisation that taking the
oath involves something more than the duty
to tell the truth in ordinary day to day life
(see Adrian Kean, 4th Edition at p. 114).
⧫ Lunacy or mental handicap/illness will not,
therefore, necessarily make a person
incompetent as a witness.
 Modern Law: Persons of Unsound Mind

⧫ An interesting question might arise with regard to

the competence of a witness persons who is not
medically ill or permanently insane but whose
mental capacity is temporarily impaired by drink
or drugs.
⧫ According to Adrian Kean (4th Edition, p. 114), a
witness whose intellect is temporarily impaired by
reason of drink or drugs (and thereby rendered
unable to understand the nature of the oath) may
become competent after an adjournment of
suitable length (to permit the effect of the drink or
drugs to wear off).
 Modern Law: Persons of Unsound Mind

⧫ In Kenya, the rule on the competence of

lunatics as witnesses (which appears to be
based on the common law) is to be found at
section 125 (2) of the Kenyan Evidence Act,
which provides that:-
⧫ “A mentally disordered person or a lunatic
is not incompetent to testify unless he is
prevented by his condition from
understanding the questions put to him and
giving rational answers to them”
 Modern Law: Persons of Unsound Mind

⧫ In R v Hill (1851) 2 Den 254 (discussed at p. 114

of Adrian Kean, 4th Edition), a lunatic, labouring
under a delusion that he had a number of spirits
about him which were continually talking to him,
but with a clear understanding of the obligation
of the oath, was held competent to give evidence
for the prosecution on a charge for
manslaughter.
 Modern Law: Persons of Unsound Mind

⧫ The case of R v Hill (1851) 2 Den 254 (discussed at p. 114 of

Adrian Kean, 4th Edition) established the following three
principles with regard to the competence of persons of
unsound mind to give evidence:
1. if in the opinion of the judge a proposed witness, by reason
of defective intellect, does not understand the nature and
sanction of an oath, he is incompetent to testify;
2. a person of defective intellect who understands the nature
of an oath may give evidence and it will be left to the jury
to attach such weight to his testimony as they see fit; and
3. if the evidence of a person of defective intellect is so
tainted with insanity as to be unworthy of credit, the jury
may properly disregard it.
 Modern Law: Foreign Sovereigns, Diplomatic Agents
and Consular Officials
⧫ Generally, heads of foreign sovereign states
and diplomatic officials enjoy immunity from
criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction
of receiving states. The immunity, however,
can be waived by the sending state.
⧫ As a general rule, heads of foreign sovereign
states and diplomatic officials are competent,
but not compellable, to give evidence.
 Modern Law: Foreign Sovereigns, Diplomatic Agents
and Consular Officials
⧫ In Kenya, the rules as to the competence and
compellability of diplomatic officials is to be
found in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (c.f. section
4 and the First Schedule to the Privileges and
Immunities Act, Cap. 179).
⧫ The rules as to the competence and
compellability of of consular officials, on the
other hand, are to be found in Articles 41-44 of
the Vienna Convention of Consular Relations (c.f.
section 5 (1) and the 2nd Schedule to Cap. 179).
 Modern Law: Foreign Sovereigns, Diplomatic Agents
and Consular Officials
⧫ Article 31 (1) and (2) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations provides for diplomatic immunity as follows:
⧫ “1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving state. He shall also enjoy immunity
from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
⧫ (a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated
in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of
the sending State for the purposes of the mission;
⧫ (b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent
is involved as executor , heir or legatee as a private person and not
on behalf of the sending State;
⧫ (c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his
official functions.
⧫ 2. A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness.”
 Modern Law: Foreign Sovereigns, Diplomatic Agents
and Consular Officials
⧫ Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations provides for waiver of diplomatic immunity in
the following terms:
⧫ “1. The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents and of
persons enjoying immunity under Article 37 may be waived by the
sending State.
⧫ 2. The waiver must always be express.
⧫ 3. The initiation of proceedings by a diplomatic agent or by a
person enjoying immunity from jurisdiction under Article 37 shall
preclude him from invoking immunity from jurisdiction in respect
of any counter-claim directly connected with the principal claim.
⧫ 4. Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in respect of civil or
administrative proceedings shall not be held to imply waiver of
immunity in respect of the execution of the judgment, for which a
separate waiver shall be necessary.”
 Modern Law: Foreign Sovereigns, Diplomatic Agents
and Consular Officials
⧫ Article 43 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, on
the other hand, provides for immunity of consular officers and
employees:
⧫ “1. Consular officers and consular employees shall not be
amenable to the jurisdiction of the judicial or administrative
authorities of the receiving state in respect of acts performed
in the exercise of consular functions.
⧫ 2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not,
however, apply in respect of a civil action either:
⧫ (a) arising out of a contract concluded by a consular officer
or a consular employee in which he did not contract
expressly or impliedly as an agent of the sending State; or
⧫ (b) by a third party for damage arising from an accident in
the receiving State caused by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft.”
 Modern Law: Foreign Sovereigns, Diplomatic Agents
and Consular Officials
⧫ Article 44 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(titled “liability to give evidence”) provides as follows:
⧫ “1. Members of a consular post may be called upon to attend as witnesses
in the course of judicial or administrative proceedings. A consular
employee or a member of the service staff shall not, except in the cases
mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Article, decline to give evidence. If a
consular officer should decline to do so, no coercive measure or penalty
may be applied to him.
⧫ 2. The authority requiring the evidence of a consular officer shall avoid
interference with the performance of his functions. It may, when
possible, take such evidence at his residence or at the consular post or
accept a statement from him in writing.
⧫ 3. Members of a consular post are under no obligations to give evidence
concerning matters connected with the exercise of their functions or to
produce official correspondence and documents relating thereto. They
are entitled to decline to give evidence as expert witnesses with regard to
the law of the sending State.”
 Modern Law: Oaths and Affirmations

⧫ The general rule in both civil and criminal cases is

that the evidence of any witness should be sworn, the
only major exception being the evidence of children-
which may be received unsworn (see section 17 of the
Oaths and Statutory Declarations Act).
⧫ A witness is sworn by taking either an oath or an
affirmation.
⧫ An affirmation is normally made by a witness who
objects to be sworn, either because they do not have
a religious belief or because their religious belief
forbids them from taking an oath (see section 15 of
the Oaths and Statutory Declarations Act).
 Modern Law: Oaths and Affirmations

⧫ The format of an affirmation is prescribed at

section 16 of the Oaths and Statutory
Declarations Act in the following terms:
⧫ “I, A.B., do solemnly, sincerely and truly
declare and affirm that….,”
⧫ An affirmation is, for all intents and
purposes, of the same effect as an oath (see
section 15 of the Oaths and Statutory
Declarations Act).
 Oaths and Affirmations: General Matters to Note

1. At common law, a witness called only to produce a document

may give unsworn evidence provided that the identity of the
document is either not disputed or can be established by other
witnesses. Also, counsel acting for one of two parties who have
reached a compromise may give unsworn evidence of its terms;
2. Save for the limited exceptions where witnesses are allowed to
give unsworn evidence, a conviction or judgment founded on
unsworn evidence may be set aside as a nullity (see Adrian
Kean, 4th Edition at p. 115).
3. A witness who having taken an oath or affirmation willfully
makes a statement material to the proceedings in question
which he knows to be false or does not believe to be true
commits the offence of perjury. Under section 108 of the Penal
Code, however, one may still be charged with the offence even
where the false evidence is not given on oath.
 Oaths and Affirmations: General Matters to Note

4. Witnesses usually take the oath upon such holy

book as is appropriate to their religious belief.
5. Although the requirement of the oath at common
law was based on religious assumptions as to its
effect on a witness’ conscience, the validity of the
modern oath is not affected by absence of
religious belief. Put differently, once a witness
accepts to take the oath, and proceeds to take it,
it remains valid notwithstanding that the witness
who took it had no religious belief (see section 21
of the Oaths and Statutory Declarations Act).
 Oaths and Affirmations: General Matters to Note

6. In England, it has been held that the validity of an oath

does not depend on the intricacies of the particular
religion which is adhered to by the witness but on
whether the oath is one which appears to the court to
be binding on the conscience of the witness and, if so,
whether it is an oath which the witness himself
considers to be binding on his conscience.
Accordingly, in R v Kemble [1990] 3 All ER 116 CA,
where a Muslim had taken an oath using the New
Testament, the oath was held valid notwithstanding
that under the strict tenets of Islam no oath taken by a
Muslim is valid unless taken on a copy of the holy
Koran in Arabic.