GT Lecture5

Game Theory: Mixed Strategies
Assoc. Prof. Ayman Ghoneim
Operations Research and Decision Support Department

Faculty of Computers and Artificial Intelligence, Cairo University
Contact Email: a.ghoneim@fci-cu.edu.eg
Game Theory ((DS414/DS411)) - 2024
Ayman Ghoneim (FCAI - Cairo University) Game Theory: Mixed Strategies Spring 2024 1 / 26
Mixed Strategies - Recall
Figure: Mixed Strategy Geometry.
Dominance - Recall
A pure strategy can be strictly dominated by a mixed strategy without being

dominated by any pure strategy.
Example: Consider a two-player game with payoff matrix for player 1 with
three pure strategies. The third pure strategy x1 = e31 is not weakly dominated
by any of her other two pure strategies.
Dominance - Recall
Player 1 obtains a higher payoff by randomizing uniformly over the other

pure strategies.
Formally, let y1 = (1/2, 1/2, 0) ∈ 41 . Then
1 = u1 (x1 , z2 ) < u1 (y1 , z2 ) = 3/2 for all z2 ∈ 42 , so y1 strictly dominates x1 .
Compute the expected utility for player 1 for x1 = [0.3, 0.3, 0.4] and
z2 = [0.5, 0.5].
Mixed Strategy Settings - Best Reply
Notation: We write (xi , y) for the strategy profile in which a player plays
strategy xi ∈ 4i , while all other players j play according to the profile
y ∈ Θ−i .
A pure best reply for player i to a strategy profile y ∈ Θ−i is a pure strategy
si ∈ Si such that no other pure strategy available to the player gives her a
higher payoff against y.
This defines the ith player’s pure-strategy best-reply correspondence
βi : Θ−i → Si which maps each mixed strategy profile y ∈ Θ to the nonempty
(finite) set
βi (y) = {h ∈ Si : ui (ehi , y) ≥ ui (eki , y), ∀k ∈ Si }

of pure best replies for player i to y.
Every mixed strategy xi ∈ 4i is a convex combination of pure strategies.

Given the previous, no mixed strategy xi ∈ 4i can give a higher payoff to
player i against y ∈ Θ−i than any one of its pure best replies to y.
βi (y) = {h ∈ Si : ui (ehi , y) ≥ ui (xi , y), ∀xi ∈ 4i }
A mixed best reply for player i to a strategy profile y ∈ Θ−i is a strategy

xi ∈ 4i such that no other mixed strategy gives a higher payoff to i against y.
Moreover, by linearity of ui (xi , y) in xi , any convex combination of pure best
replies is a mixed best reply.
Accordingly the ith player’s mixed-strategy best-reply correspondence
βi : Θ−i → 4i maps each mixed-strategy profile y ∈ Θ−i to the face 4i
which is spanned by the pure best replies to y:
βi (y) = {xi ∈ 4i : ui (xi , y) ≥ ui (zi , y), ∀xi ∈ 4i }
The best-reply set | βi (y) ⊂ 4i | to a single-strategy profile y ∈ Θ−i is always

nonempty, closed, and convex (ranging from a singleton in case there is only
one pure best reply, for player i, to the whole simplex in case all pure
strategies in Si are best replies).
The combined pure-strategy, best-reply correspondence β : Θ−i → S of the
game is defined as the cartesian product of all players’ pure-strategy
best-reply correspondences
β(y) = ×i∈I βi (y) ⊂ S

and the combined correspondence β : Θ → Θ
β(y) = ×i∈I β i (y) ⊂ Θ
Mixed Strategy Settings - Dominance and Best Replies
Think about the following:

A pure strategy that is a best reply to some mixed-strategy profile cannot,
of course, be strictly dominated.
A pure strategy that is not strictly dominated is necessarily a best reply to
some mixed-strategy profile
A pure strategy that is a best reply to some completely mixed-strategy
profile is undominated.
An undominated pure strategy is a best reply to some completely mixed
strategy profile
Mixed Strategy Settings - Mixed Nash Equilibrium
In terms of best Replies:

x ∈ Θ is a Nash equilibrium if x ∈ β.
Rock-paper-scissors:
Figure: Rock-paper-scissors.
No pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) and (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
Matching pennies:
Figure: Matching pennies.
No pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is (1/2, 1/2) and (1/2, 1/2).
Battle of the sexes:
Figure: Matching pennies.
What is the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium ?
How to compute mixed Nash equilibrium ?

Step 1: Guess the supports of the mixed strategies for both players.
Step 2: Assume the mixed strategy for wife is (p, 1 − p). Wife should make
husband indifference between his two actions, why ?
Husband is playing a mixed strategy and it is an equilibrium (i.e., husband is
playing a best response), he must be indifferent between the two actions. If
not (say movie is better), he should increase the probability of movie and
reduce the probability of match. To an extent of reaching (0, 1).
Mixed Strategy Settings - Nash Equilibrium
Thus,
uHusband (Match) = uHusband (Movie)
2p + 0(1 − p) = 0p + 1(1 − p)
p = 1/3
Similarly,
uWife (Match) = uWife (Movie)
q + 0(1 − q) = 0p + 2(1 − q)
q = 2/3
A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is (2/3, 1/3) and (1/3, 2/3).
What if we got q > 1 ? My initial guess (step 1) is wrong and i can’t get an
equilibrium using these supports.
Mixed Strategy - Interpretations
Mixed strategy interpretations:

Confuse your opponent.
There is uncertainty about others’ actions, so randomize.
Describes a population dynamics in evolutionary game theory.
Mixed Strategy Settings - Nash Equilibrium Recall
In terms of best Replies:

x ∈ Θ is a Nash equilibrium if x ∈ β.
Let ΘNE ⊂ Θ be the set of Nash equilibria in a game.
Theorem (Nash 1950)

For any finite game ΘNE 6= φ.
Example: Matching Pennies
β1 = {U, D}
β2 = {L, R}
No dominated strategies and no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
How does player 1 react to the randomization of player 2 ?

Player 1 will play U when
uU > uD
q + q − 1 > −q + 1 − q
q > 1/2
Player 1 will play D when q < 1/2.

Player 1 is indifferent between playing U or D when q = 1/2.
Let’s plot the best response (also known as reaction function/correspondence)

of player 1:
By symmetry, player 2 will:
play L when p < 1/2
play R when p > 1/2
indifferent when p = 1/2
The best response of player 2:
Plotting the best response for both players:
Generalizing the previous example:
Assume Player 2 will play R with a probability of p.
uu = (1 − p)a + pb
.
Mixed Strategy Settings - Strict Nash Equilibrium Revisited
A Nash equilibrium is called strict of each component strategy xi is the unique

best reply to x.
Definition (Strict Nash Equilibrium)
x = (xi , x−i ) is strict Nash equilibrium if for each i and all xi0 6= xi :
ui (xi , x−i ) > ui (xi0 , x−i ).
Nash equilibrium criterion requires that no unilateral deviation should be

profitable, while strict Nash equilibrium requires that all such deviations be
costly.
Can a strict Nash equilibrium involve randomization ?
No, if so, there would exist some player for whom at least two pure strategies
give the same maximal payoff to her. Thus every strict equilibrium is a
pure-strategy profile. Thus, xi = si is a pure strategy.

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Game Theory: Mixed Strategies

Assoc. Prof. Ayman Ghoneim

Operations Research and Decision Support Department

Game Theory ((DS414/DS411)) - 2024

Figure: Mixed Strategy Geometry.

A pure strategy can be strictly dominated by a mixed strategy without being

Player 1 obtains a higher payoff by randomizing uniformly over the other

βi (y) = {h ∈ Si : ui (ehi , y) ≥ ui (eki , y), ∀k ∈ Si }

Every mixed strategy xi ∈ 4i is a convex combination of pure strategies.

βi (y) = {h ∈ Si : ui (ehi , y) ≥ ui (xi , y), ∀xi ∈ 4i }

A mixed best reply for player i to a strategy profile y ∈ Θ−i is a strategy

βi (y) = {xi ∈ 4i : ui (xi , y) ≥ ui (zi , y), ∀xi ∈ 4i }

The best-reply set | βi (y) ⊂ 4i | to a single-strategy profile y ∈ Θ−i is always

β(y) = ×i∈I βi (y) ⊂ S

β(y) = ×i∈I β i (y) ⊂ Θ

Think about the following:

In terms of best Replies:

No pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

Figure: Matching pennies.

No pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

Battle of the sexes:

Figure: Matching pennies.

What is the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium ?

How to compute mixed Nash equilibrium ?

Mixed strategy interpretations:

In terms of best Replies:

Theorem (Nash 1950)

How does player 1 react to the randomization of player 2 ?

Player 1 will play D when q < 1/2.

Let’s plot the best response (also known as reaction function/correspondence)

Plotting the best response for both players:

Assume Player 2 will play R with a probability of p.

A Nash equilibrium is called strict of each component strategy xi is the unique

Nash equilibrium criterion requires that no unilateral deviation should be

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