Available online at www.sciencedirect.
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ScienceDirect
Ideologies that justify political violence
David Webber1, Arie Kruglanski2, Erica Molinario2 and
Katarzyna Jasko3
Abstract
The present review identifies a variety of tactics that are often
employed by ideologies to promote and/or justify political
violence. The review builds on a social psychological
framework that identifies important existential and epistemic
needs that motivate individuals to become ideological
extremists and discusses the mechanisms through which
ideological narratives that promote political violence can serve
these needs. We end the review by discussing two broad
variants of ideology (religious and conservative) that should be
particularly apt at implementing these tactics.
Addresses
1
L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs, Virginia
Commonwealth University, 923 W. Franklin St., Richmond, VA 23284,
United States
2
Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, Biology/
Psychology Building, 4094 Campus Dr., College Park, MD 20742, United
States
3
Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, ul. Ingardena 6, 30-060
Krakow, Poland
Corresponding author: Webber, David (dwebber@vcu.edu)
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:107–111
This review comes from a themed issue on Emotion, motivation,
personality and social sciences *political ideologies*
Edited by John T Jost, Eran Halperin and Kristin Laurin
For a complete overview see the Issue and the Editorial
Available online 18th February 2020
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.01.004
2352-1546/ã 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Throughout history, all manners of ideologies have pro-
moted and justified acts of political violence perpetrated by
non-state actors. Religious ideologies such as Christianity
(e.g. the Crusaders), Islam (e.g. al Qaeda or ISIS), Judaism
(e.g. the Zealots of the 1st Century), Buddhism (e.g.
969 Movement in Myanmar), and even Odinism (e.g.
right-wing terrorism, including the 2011 Norway attacks),
for instance, have been used as justification. The same is
true of non-religious ideologies on both the left and the
right of the political spectrum, for example, fascist beliefs
held by white nationalist extremists and the environmen-
talist views held by eco-terrorists. The purpose of the
present review is to understand the characteristics of
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ideologies that facilitate violence. We begin the review
by looking at a definition of political ideologies to under-
stand, at the most basic level, what an ideology must
accomplish to promote non-state forms of political vio-
lence. The review then focuses on two psychological
needs—existential and epistemic—that an ideology likely
serves if it is to motivate individuals to take on the mantle of
political violence. We end by discussing two broad variants
of ideology—religion and conservatism—that should be
particularly adept at addressing these psychological needs.
Political violence against the system
Political violence perpetrated by non-state actors is a means
of advancing a political or ideological cause, and represents
an attempt to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian
population to effect a desired social change. In this form,
political violence is a case of asymmetric conflict wherein
the protagonist has severely lesser fighting capabilities,
resources, and personnel than their opponent (cf. [1]).
Viewed from this perspective, political violence includes,
among others, insurgencies, revolutions, riots, violent pro-
tests, and terrorism. Terrorism, for instance, represents a
specific form of political violence where the protagonists
primarily attack noncombatant populations, and exploit the
psychological impact of these attacks in their efforts to
bring about change to the current political system.
In the present discussion, we consider all forms of substate
political violence because of the fundamental similarities in
ideologies that promote them. At a minimum, these ideol-
ogies must accomplish two tasks, related to the essential
components that define a political ideology, and their
channeling into political violence. Our point of departure
is the definition of political ideology as ‘a set of beliefs about
the proper order of society and how it can be achieved’ [48].
The first half of this definition states that an ideology
contains a set of principles about the appropriate order of
society. The second half identifies a means of bringing
about such an order. To promote political violence, an
ideology must advocate a change in the current societal
order for the sake of its political goals. Individuals prone to
embracing such an ideology are likely to score low on the
psychological constructs of system justification, social dom-
inance orientation, and right-wing authoritarianism, all of
which represent attitudes supportive of perpetuating
(rather than subverting) the current system, including its
authorities, norms, and social hierarchies (e.g. [2–5].
Indeed, individuals high on these dimensions disavow
political violence that targets existing social authorities.
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:107–111
108 Emotion, motivation, personality and social sciences *political ideologies*
Past research has found a negative relation between these
constructs and a willingness to engage in and support
political protest against the current system [6,7,49], and
a willingness to support acts of terrorism [8]. In contrast,
these constructs are related positively to protecting the
current system from political violence. This includes sup-
porting violence [9,8] and policies that restrict civil liberties
(e.g. [10,11]) as tools to counter terrorism. Together, this
research tells us that ideologies that promote substate
political violence are likely to avoid content that promotes
the current system as this would resonate with individuals
who wish to protect rather than dismantle the status quo.
As already noted, ideology must also explain how to
achieve the desired social order. Thus, to promote and
justify violence, an ideology must prescribe violence as an
effective means for subverting the system. This simply
acknowledges that violence is often avoided because it is
viewed as an inappropriate means of goal achievement.
To promote violence, an ideology must portray (or pref-
erence) violence as a means through which a political goal
is likely to be achieved.
The motivational substructure of violence-
justifying ideologies
Simply prescribing violence as an acceptable means,
however, is often insufficient to motivate one to under-
take violence as their personal obligation. Indeed, the
adherents of violence-justifying ideologies who sit idly on
the sidelines far outweigh those who act on behalf of the
cause [12]. Engagement in political extremism requires
both sufficient motivation and ability [13]. Some indi-
viduals who support the idea of violence never proceed to
violence because they lack the capabilities (or belief in
their capabilities) to perpetrate a successful violent
attack. Ideologies are limited in their capacity to address
ability deficits.
Others never progress to violence because they are insuf-
ficiently motivated. Ideologies can therefore promote
violence by speaking to specific motives that drive politi-
cal extremism. Previous work has examined what was
termed the functional or motivational substructure of an
ideology, which refers to the psychological needs, goals,
and motives served by the contents of a political ideology
[14]. In the remaining pages of this review, we focus on
two key components of the motivational substructure of
ideologies that justify political violence. To do so, we
build on a social psychological framework that has iden-
tified important needs and motives that drive individuals
to extreme behavior, including political violence [13].
We specifically focus on existential and epistemic needs,
as research has linked both to political violence.
Existential needs
Extremism results from a motivational imbalance [13].
Unlike moderate individuals whose behavior is
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:107–111
constrained by trying to simultaneously fulfill multiple
need states, political extremists are singularly focused on
achieving one need. Thus, extremists’ behavior is
directed toward means that can potently fulfill a dominant
need, regardless of whether those means might under-
mine other concerns, as these other concerns have
receded in importance and no longer constrain behavioral
options. Research spearheaded by our team has consis-
tently found that political extremism is motivated by the
need to feel significant (aka respected and valued; [15]).
Thus, suicide bombers were found to perpetrate high
casualty attacks [16] and domestic extremists were more
likely to use violence (versus nonviolence; [17]) when
there was stronger evidence that they were questing for
significance. Experimental manipulations of the signifi-
cance need and self-reported feelings of insignificance
were also related to the endorsement of political extrem-
ism (e.g. [18]). Likewise, activists were more willing to
sacrifice for a political cause if they felt engagement in the
movement provided them with significance [19].
Ideologies, then, can promote violence if they associate
political goals with the need to feel significant. We use
regulatory focus theory [20] to organize our discussion of
the various ways that this is likely to occur. Regulatory
focus theory identifies two ways—a prevention focus and
promotion focus—in which goals are construed and pur-
sued. We address each of these in turn.
A promotion focus involves a primary concern with
achievement and growth. Promotion-focused individuals
are most likely to initiate goal pursuit when they perceive
that the expectancy of success is high, as is the boost to
significance that success brings. Thus, to resonate with a
promotion focus, ideologies could emphasize the glory
that violence against the enemies of one’s group provides,
and the realistic expectation that one’s political goals are
achievable through violence [21,22]. In other words,
narratives can promise some form of special status—for
example, heroism, notoriety, martyrdom—to violent per-
petrators. This includes narratives that promote specific
forms of violence (i.e. gun violence) as a means of
attaining personal empowerment [23].
A prevention focus involves concerns with safety and
fulfilling responsibilities. One way to resonate with this
orientation is to portray violence as the remedy for the
grievance(s) that caused an individual’s motivational
imbalance. The motivational imbalance is often induced
by negative circumstances like discrimination or a state of
(relative) deprivation of one’s group. These circum-
stances create a discrepancy between one’s desired sense
of significance, and his or her actual significance [13].
These circumstances are also likely construed as security
threats (e.g. [50]), thus resonating with prevention-
focused individuals. It follows that ideologies can pro-
mote violence by weaving a narrative that portrays
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political violence as serving these security needs [21] and
that addresses the state of deprivation [24].
A second way to resonate with a prevention orientation is to
link political violence to endangered moral values [22,25].
Ideologies can increase extreme behavior on behalf of a
political ideology by portraying a political cause (and vio-
lence in service of the cause) as serving important moral
values. For instance, participants who moralized the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict were more polarized in their beliefs
regarding the acceptability of civilian life as collateral
damage and support of violent retribution [26]. Other
research has related the moralization of political values
to a greater willingness to engage in political action [27],
lesser respect for authorities of the status quo [28], and
greater support of violence when faced with actions or
attitudes at odds with one’s moral values [29]. Furthermore,
moral rhetoric on social media is predictive of violence
perpetrated during a political protest [30]. Taken together,
this research shows that highlighting moral values associ-
ated with an ideological cause might increase willingness to
use violence to act on behalf of those values.
Epistemic needs
Political extremists think in absolutist, dogmatic, and
certainty affording ways. For instance, individuals who
reside on the poles of the political continuum have a
tendency to reject opposing ideological beliefs as inferior
[31], and to conceptualize political issues in clear,
homogenous categories [32]. Moreover, the more impor-
tant a political issue is to an individual, the more likely
that individual is to conceptualize that political issue in
simplistic terms [33]. Equally important, the need for
cognitive closure (e.g. [34]) has been linked to the support
of violence, for instance, through research demonstrating
that the need for closure promotes ingroup glorification
and support for extreme measures against one’s enemies
[35]. Other findings have shown that the endorsement of
ideological extremism increases when the need for clo-
sure is activated via feelings of uncertainty (e.g. [36]) or
insignificance [18].
It follows that ideologies foster political violence through
representing their content in ways that will appeal to
these individuals’ closure needs. This includes represent-
ing political values and goals in simplistic manners, por-
traying the ideology as incontrovertible truth (and thus,
suggesting that alternate ideologies are false), presenting
violent means toward goal attainment as the only solution,
dichotomizing the world and its inhabitants into clearly
delineated groups, or utilizing charismatic figureheads
(that individuals high in need for closure tend to follow)
to spread beliefs.
Statements about specific ideologies
The previous sections highlighted tactics that can be
employed by ideologies to promote political violence.
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Ideologies that justify terrorism Webber et al. 109
This includes presenting violence as an appropriate
means through which political change can be achieved,
and portraying these concepts (i.e. political goals and
violence on behalf of these goals) in ways that resonate
with the epistemic need for closure and the existential
need for significance. Armed with this understanding, it is
possible to identify specific ideologies that might be more
capable at promoting violence than others. The argu-
ments that follow rely on evidence pertaining to terrorism
as a specific form of political violence.
Whereas most terrorist attacks result in zero fatalities [37]
casualties associated with attacks vary across instances. It is
thus possible to examine whether followers of certain
ideologies are more likely to use fatal violence, relative
to, for instance, property or infrastructure crimes that do not
cause deaths. Ideologies that more capably address
individuals’ needs should be more ‘successful’ at causing
fatalities. Past research specifically suggests two candidate
ideologies that are likely to be effective: ideologies on the
political right (versus left) and religious (versus secular)
ideologies. Analyses of terrorist attacks committed
between 1998 and 2005 revealed that organizations sub-
scribing to religious ideologies were the most likely to
engage in lethal attacks and were responsible for a greater
number of deaths [38,39]. ‘Leftist’ groups were signifi-
cantly less likely to kill than religious groups, and anarchist
groups were the least likely to engage in lethal attacks. Eco-
terrorists were responsible for zero lethal attacks during this
period, so they were excluded from analyses. Religious
ideology has also been found to increase the lethality of
suicide attacks [40], whereas attacks perpetrated in US
regions known for propagating a ‘culture of honor’ were
more deadly than attacks perpetrated in other regions [41].
Why might this be the case? Conservatives are more
likely to see the world in absolutist, dogmatic, and closure
affording ways than are liberals [42]. Conservatives are
also more likely than liberals to moralize values that
effectively promote violence. Conservatives value loy-
alty, authority, and sanctity [43]. This is important, as
research has further found that the sacralization of loyalty
was positively related (whereas the sacralization of other
values was either unrelated or negatively related) to the
justification of violence [44]. This suggests that conser-
vative ideologies should have an easier time moralizing
political violence than liberal ideologies.
Religious ideologies are similarly suited to addressing the
previously outlined needs. Religious ideologies can pro-
vide greater certainty than secular ideologies because
they rest on the authority of God. In addition, through
the promise of a blessed afterlife to those who act as
prescribed by the ideology, religion offers a potent ave-
nue to significance that is unavailable to secular ideolo-
gies. Religion can more naturally moralize political
values, as interpretations of Holy Scripture can
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:107–111
110 Emotion, motivation, personality and social sciences *political ideologies*
convincingly link violent means to religious values and
provide convincing rationale for acting on behalf of those
injunctions. Furthermore, because religious ideologies
cannot be directly verified, people are more reliant on
social validation to demonstrate the correctness of their
beliefs [45]. Consequently, religious individuals tend to
be collectivistic and are more prone to derogate and act
with hostility toward adherents of other ideologies.
Finally, religious fundamentalism—the form that reli-
gious ideology is likely to take among extremists—is
positively related to the need for cognitive closure that
foments group-centrism, and this relationship partially
explains the derogation of outgroup members [46].
Conclusions
In closing, the present review suggests that through
understanding the various psychological needs that are
pertinent to those engaging in extreme forms of political
violence it is possible to understand how ideologies can
appeal to these needs through their motivational sub-
structure. This enables an understanding of how any
ideology can frame its contents in ways that promote
violence, but also demonstrates how some ideologies may
have substructures that are more effective at promoting
violence, and therefore might inspire more lethal terrorist
attacks than other ideologies. It should, however, be
noted that not all ideologies that successfully serve exis-
tential and epistemic needs are conducive to violence.
Often, subgroups within the same movement will sub-
scribe to similar overarching ideologies but disagree on
the acceptability of violence. For instance, the animal
rights movement encompasses peaceful groups that raise
awareness through education and violent groups that
destroy laboratories conducting research on animals.
Future research should investigate how different ideolo-
gies (and groups who appeal to them) frame their goals
and link those goals to violent versus non-violent means.
In other papers we proposed that these relationships
crucially depend on social context [13,47], but research
should investigate the role of other additional factors.
Conflict of interest statement
Nothing declared.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
David Webber: Conceptualization, Writing - original
draft. Arie Kruglanski: Writing - original draft. Erica
Molinario: Writing - original draft. Katarzyna Jasko:
Writing - original draft.
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