PHILOSO

PHY 244
–
PHILOSO
PHY OF
RELIGIO
N

Notes on: The introduction to the Philosophy of

Religion, The Cosmological Argument as well as the
Ontological Proof

Theme One – Introduction to Philosophy of religion

Pages 2-6 class notes

Contextual information:
o Various context – focus on the origin and nature of the cosmos and existence

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

 o First engagement with cosmological questions – why? who? where does this
come from? we still don’t have a definite answer.

o Ancient Greece – (Plato / Aristotle) we have surviving material from this context – can’t
take these ideas and origins as gospel!
o Plato was a dualist, between good and bad and his attempt to reconcile –
speculative account and was a likely story = THE TIMIUS
o Ancient Greeks didn’t believe we came from nothing – nothing comes from
nothing
o Relationship between religion and morality – is what is loved by the gods, holy or
what is holy, holy because its loved by the gods. Do we exist outside the gods?
are we independent.
o Metaphysics – Aristotle, various argument in regard to the origin of the cosmos.
An ultimate Cause = final cause.

o Middle Ages – Philosophy = theology | Gods such as Zeus, gods seemed to be petty and
conducted themselves as human beings.
o What defined knowledge, no critical engagement and thought outside Religion.
Wanted to reconcile Plato with Christianity.

o 17th Century (Ralph Cudworth- Cambridge Lecturer, identified themes that are still
looked at: Religious Pluralism, Human evil and the problem of evil)

o 20th century – Logical Positivism: analytical philosophy. Fundamental idea – has to be

true / regarded as a knowledge claim it has to be verified by sensory observation.

o Wittgenstein (Language Game theory)- any Domaine of life has their own internal logic

Philosophy of Religion:
o No single, clearly delineated meaning
o More than just “camouflaged apologetics” – convince someone why they should believe
in GOD
o Also, not merely “natural theology” or and “entrance hall to faith” – come from existing
faith and construct arguments in rational faith.
o Reveal Theology – further truths and insights that aren’t arrived at by natural faculties.
God is true but can’t rationalize that God is more than one person; 3 people in one –
DEEPLY RELIGIOUS PEOPLE. Praying in tongues etc.

Definition - Philosophy of religion is philosophical reflection on religion

o Not religious education
o Also Practices by agnostics and atheists
o Branch or philosophy, not theology

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

Lecture Three – Friday 8 a.m.

Accordingly, something concerning differences between theology and p.o.r:

o Theology: faith searching for understanding
o Theology asks questions which function WITHIN the assumptions and practices of
religion, e.g. “why was it necessary for God to become human?”.

Note the assumptions made within the latter question, as it is not necessarily shared by
philosophers.
o Philosophy asks about religion
o Are “God” and “human/evil” reconcilable concepts?

o Does the proclamation: “God’s love for man is demonstrated through sacrifice of Jesus,
His son, on the cross” communicate knowledge? If not, what then? If yes, how, in
comparison with other knowledge assertions?

o Philosophy of Religion seeks to analyze concepts such as God, faith, miracles,

omnipotence, dharma (duty customs and rules by which we chose to live our lives),
Brahman, salvation etc.

Note Rowe’s definition of p.o.r on page 2 of his book

Hicks definitions of the concept of ‘religion” on p.2 of his book:

o Phenomenology – The human recognition of a superhuman controlling power and
especially of a personal God or gods entitled to obedience and worship
o Psychology – Feelings, acts and experiences of an individual persons who in their
solitude view themselves as standing in some relation to whatever they may consider to
the divine
o Sociology – a set of beliefs, practices and institutions which human beings have evolved
in various societies
o Naturalism – A body of scruples which impede the free exercise of our faculties
o Religion – Religion is the recognition that all things are manifestations of a Power which
transcends our knowledge.

Problem – as definitions they are all stipulative: prescribe rather than describe

Concept “religion” does not have only one valid definition; it is rather an umbrella term used to
describe a series of a different phenomenon which display partial similarities and differences,
analogous to “family resemblance”.

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

 o Hick explains the latter by using Wittgenstein’s analysis of the concept game: there is no
single, defining characteristics for everything we can call “games”; at most partial
similarities and differences.

o Similarities between rugby, soccer, tennis, golf, swimming, chess, Monopoly, Trivial
Pursuit, poker, strip-poker, playing with dolls. Common denominator?

WEEK TWO

o Also, family-resemblance; two brothers don’t look like each other, and yet, in the
company of their parents you can recognize family resemblances.

o Thus, for Hick, similarities between religions are …” a question of degree within a widely
spreading network of resemblances and differences”

o In spite of the aforementioned analysis, Hick maintains that there is one characteristic
of religions which is fairly general (although not completely universal).

o Idea of salvation: transformation from imperfect / unsatisfactory / sinful / incomplete

condition to one of perfection and contentedness

Exception to this?

Provisional definition of “religion” as phenomenon (with consideration for difficulty of finding a

single definition.

Religion is….
o Events or encounters which include humans in the totality of their existence
o Leads to total and all-encompassing life-commitment
o Encounter with what? The Fundamental mystery of our existence; the attempt to find
answers in this respect.

What is this mystery:

Mysterium tremendum et fascinans – a fearful and fascinating mystery

o Being passively gripped as well as active directedness
o Religion is the striving for salvation; whole existence in which necessities of life are
overcome and spiritual fulfillment is achieved.

Religion is an expression of the human-being’s ultimate concern: that which matters to him in
the final instance

Manifestations of religious engagement with the mystery of existence:

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

 1. Life attitudes – (praise, trust, awe, dedication)
2. Action-patterns (rituals)
3. System of convictions (mythical stories and/ or educating tradition)

Religion is a personal, but never an individualistic concern.

Philosophy of religion is not the only discipline that studies religion:

Examples of others –
o Psychology of religion
o Sociology of religion
o History of religion
o Phenomenology of Religion

Philosophy of Religion as attempt to answer conceptual questions, investigates religion not

empirically, but logically; it investigates what makes sense to say within religion, and how it
makes sense.

TIPS – Can be tested, how to define religion? Discuss extended analogy.

Philosophy 244
Term 3 Philosophy of Religion

Theme Two – Arguments for the existence of God

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes
The Cosmological Proof
Other famous proofs –
o The Ontological Proof
o Teleological Proof

The Cosmological Argument – the attempt to justify belief in the existence of God by using
deductive arguments based on our experience of (things in) the world.

Proofs for Gods existence takes 2 forms:

A priori proof – use reason and logic alone e.g. Ontological Proof
o “from what comes before” – before experience

A posteriori proof – use empirical observation, experience e.g. Cosmological Proof and
Argument from Design / Theological Proof
o “from what comes later’ – after experience

Historical Origins:
o Plato/Aristotle
o Islamic Philosophy (e.g. Kalām argument, 9th -12th centuries: Al Ghazali & Ibn
Rushd/Averroes)
o Aquinas (1224-1274)
o 18th Century
o Proponents – Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), Samuel Clarke (1675-1729)
o Critics: David Hume (1711-1776)

St Thomas Aquinas: Quinque Viae

5 arguments for the existence of God
We note 4:

1. The Argument from a First Mover

2. The Argument from a First Cause
3. The Argument from a Necessarily Existent Being
4. The Argument from Design

*HINT HINT* ESSAY _ FULLY DISCUSS COSMOLOGICAL PROOF – POTENTIAL ESSAY QUESTION-
focus on 18th Century, will be discussed in next few lectures. DON’T waffle on about the
above^
Self- Existence
o Self-existence (Aseity – ‘a se esse’ – being from oneself)
o Self-sufficiency / self-explained

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

 o Ontological independence; nothing is able of constituting or destroying God
o Eternal/infinite existence
o “God is “being itself” not ‘a being’ (Tillich)
o Anselm: self-existence does not mean bringing oneself into existence
o Fire analogy, the closer you move to the fire the hotter you will feel – e.g. the rock is hot
as its near to the fire, why is the fire hot? The nature of the fire is to be hot. The heat
they generate is internal to the fire itself.

Relevant concepts:
Different possible beings (Anselm)
a) Dependent beings – explained by one another has some external cause e.g. your
parents’ reproductive activities to make you
b) Self-existent beings – explained by themselves, accounted for by its own nature and has
an internal explanation
c) Beings with no explanation
Last possibility isn’t acceptable

The Proof

Premise One – every being (that exists or ever did exists) either a dependent being or a self-
existent being

Premise Two- Not every being can be a dependent being

Conclusion – there exists a self-existent being

The CP is deductively valid

NB deductive validity of argument does not guarantee truth of conclusion
For example, next argument

We saw that the 18th century version of the CP is a valid argument

Premise One – every being that exists or ever did exist is either a dependent being or a self-
existent being

Recall Anselm’s possibilities:

o Dependent beings
o Self-existent beings
o Beings with no explanation

Is the First Premise true?

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

 o Note: it is not being claimed that every being is either a dependent being or NOT a
dependent being (not explained by other things)
o It is implicitly claimed that only beings who possess an explanation for their existence
can exist (beings with no explanation for their existence are not possible)
o Why not?

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)

“Nothing exists of which it cannot be asked, what is the cause (or reason) why it exists” -
Spinoza
“And that of sufficient reason, by virtue of which we consider that we can find no true or
existent fact, no true assertion, without there being a sufficient reason why it is thus and not
otherwise, although most of the time these reasons cannot be known to us” - Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz (1646–1716)

There must be an explanation for:

a) The existence of every being that exists or has existed
b) Any/ every positive fact that may be conceived

PSR justifies the first premise of CP: why?

Because every/any being requires an explanation for its existence: excludes the possibility that
there are beings that are explained by nothing

IF PSR is true, then the first premise is true (which seems reasonable prima facie)

Is the second premise true?

Premise Two- Not every being can be a dependent being
But why not?
o Could the series of dependent beings not be infinite, thereby rendering the second
premise false?
o The supporters of the 18th century CP claim that not every being can be a
dependent being, BUT not for the reason that any series must have a first being
(first cause) to have started it (this is a mistaken assumption regarding how the
argument works) /

Conclusion – therefore there exists a self-existent being

PSRA- everything/ being that exists or has ever existed has/must have an explanation
PSRB – every factual state of affairs/everything that is has an explanation as to why and how it
is / came to be

Four criticisms of the second premise

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes
 1. The supporters of the argument are in a sense treating the series of dependent beings
as if it were itself a dependent being which therefore requires an explanation for its
existence
This is an error in that the series of dependent beings is NOT itself a dependent being any
more than a collection of stamps itself is a stamp

Response to criticism 1
- It would definitely be an error to treat the series of dependent beings as a dependent
being itself but are the supporters of the CP actually doing this?
- It seems not. PSRb: there must be an explanation for any/every positive fact in the
world.
- This criticism is therefore not valid

Second criticism
2. The supporter of the CP is committing a mistaken inference by arguing that because
each member of the collection of dependent beings has a cause, the collection itself
must have a cause.
Russel: it is mistaken to infer that because each of us have a mother the human race as
a whole must have a mother.

Response to criticism 2:
- The assumption that because every member of a series has a cause the series itself must
have a cause is, of course, mistaken.
- It is a similar error to assuming that because one marble is light in weight a collection of
1000 marbles will be light in weight (other possibility, again, is valid!) Sometimes works,
sometimes doesn’t.
- But the CP need not make this mistaken inference to claim that not every being can be a
dependent being
- PSRb: There must be an explanation for any/every positive fact in the world /

Week 4 –

Third Criticism

o Supporters of the CP do not realize that if an explanation has been provided for each
member of a collection of beings, this means that an explanation has also been provided
for the collection as a whole
o This criticism is therefore stating that the two explanations are, in fact, the same (Hume)
o “Did I show you the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty particles
of matter, I should think it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me what the
cause was of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of
the parts” – Hume

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

Response to criticism three:
o Is this criticism reasonable?
o This is the claim that PSRa = PSRb
o Supporters of the CP do not see the two explanations as identical
o PSR: there must be an explanation for:
a) The existence of every being that exists or has existed
b) Any/ every positive fact in the world
o His criticism is resting on an error
o Pg. 24-26 BE CAREFUL NOT TO MISUNDERSTAND THIS SECTION
o Thought experiment; is there a case we can think of when PSRa = PSRb or the
explanation of each member of a series = explanation for the series itself?

Fourth Criticism:
PSRb – has been used as a rebuttal and has invalidated all three criticisms of the second
premise but why must we accept PSR itself?

Why must everything have an explanation? Are brute, unexplained facts not a possibility in the
world?

In response to the question regarding why we must accept PSR, supporters argue that:
1. It (PSR) is intuitively true (but is it? What about very bright people who don’t see it?)
2. It is a presupposition of reason (but it may nevertheless still be false)

Unless we can show PSR to be true the CP fails

A fifth overriding criticism:

The CP commits the fallacy of begging the question/ circular argumentation/ petition principii
Note our presuppositions: when we ask about the causes of things in the world. Are the same
presuppositions valid when we ask about the causes of the world as such?

CP in a nutshell – how to prepare for an essay question

o Contextual information
o The Proof
o Deductive Validity
o PSR – (reformulation of Anselm’s ideas)
o PSRa supports Premise 1
o PSRb supports Premise 2 (rejection of an infinite series)
o 4 criticisms and their rebuttals and counter arguments
o Overriding criticism of circularity

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

Theme 2: Rational Grounds for the belief in the existence of God
The Ontological Proof for the Existence of God

Introduction:
o Name of this proof given by Immanuel Kant (18th Century)
o First developed – St Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, 11th Century, in his Proslogion
o Ontological Proof
o Apriori – doesn’t draw on any empirical support
o Cosmological Proof relies on empirical support

Important Distinctions
1. Concepts / thought structures
The things they refer to (that ‘instantiate’ concepts)

2. Concepts can refer to:

o Things that exist – Table Mountain, cats, South Africa, numbers, love, truth
o Things that don’t exist – Unicorns, Harry Potter

All of the above of contingent:

The things that exist happen to exist, (but their nonexistence is logically conceivable) and the
things on the right do not existence, (but their existence is logically conceivable)
In other words, all of the above are possible things

o Along with concepts that refer to contingent (possible) things we can also identify
logically contradictory concepts. That is concepts which refer to/are instantiated by
impossible things (things which are inconceivable and cannot exist), eg. Square circles,
cubical spheres.

If there are impossible things there may also be logically necessary things, that is, things that, if
they exist, must exist or could not but exist

Possible things:
o Contingent things – things which exist things which don’t exist but could
o Necessarily existing beings – things which couldn’t but exist
Impossible things
o The referents of logically contradictory concepts (i.e. things that violate the law of
non- contradiction)

CONCEPTS = EXISTING/NON- EXISTING THINGS + POSSIBLE THINGS

LOGICALLY CONTRADICTORY CONCEPTS = IMPOSSIBLE THINGS
NECESSARY CONCEPTS = NECESSARY EXISTING THINGS

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

Distinguish between:
o Existence in reality (“in re”)
o Existence in the mind (“in intellectu”)

Something of which the existence is denied “in re”, must exist “in intellectu” otherwise we do
not know what it is that we are denying the existence of “in re”; cf. Psalm 14:1

o Anselmus thinks of God, not as the greatest being exist, but as the greatest
conceivable/thinkable being. (The greatest being that there is, exists necessarily!)

The Ontological proof is essentially a conceptual analysis of the notion of “God”. Therefore, it
starts with a definition of “God”

Definition of “God’ for Anselm:

Aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest

o Something greater than which nothing can be thought/conceived

o “Great” in this proof refers not to physical size, but to value
o St Anselm – “existence” is a “great making quality”: to exist, is more perfect than to not
exist

EXISTENCE
- IN RE OR IN INTELLECTU
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN GREATEST EXISTING BEING

Two versions of the proof

Version One:

1.1 God is a being greater than which nothing can be conceived (BGNC). Even an atheist can/
must think of this concept when he rejects the existence of God.

1.2 Our concept of a being “greater than which nothing can be conceived”, exists in the mind of
human beings (in intellectu)

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

1.3 The question is whether such a being can also exist in reality outside the mind of man (in
re). The proof that the latter is indeed the case, is for Anselm the following:

1.4 To exist in reality (in re) as well as to exist in the mind (in intellectu) is greater or more
perfect than only to exist in the mind

1.5 If a being exists only as a concept in the mind, it can therefore not be a being “greater than
which nothing can be conceived”. Because then one could conceive of a still greater being –
one which exists both in the mind and in reality.

1.6 Therefore, God exists (as the being of which the definition is that He is the greatest being
which can be conceived – BGNC) not only in the mind, but also in reality.

Version Two:
In his second version of the proof, Anselm does not only direct the argument towards the
existence of God as such, but towards His necessary existence. God is defined in such a way that
it is impossible that He could not necessarily exist.

2.1 According to St. Anselm it is possible to think of a being with the characteristic of
aseitas, (that is perfect self-sufficiency and autonomy), in the sense that It is self-
explaining, is not dependent on anything, its existence has neither beginning nor end
and it therefore exists necessarily. NB A being is therefore conceivable of which the non-
existence is inconceivable. That being is BGNC]

2.2 If it is possible to think of the non-existence of BGNC, then BGNC is not the same as
BGNC, because it does not exist. For precisely the same considerations as for the
previous argument, a non-existent thing is per definition not that greater-than-which-
nothing-can-be-conceived, because it then is possible to think of an even greater being –
one that also exists!

2.3 To claim that that-greater-than-which-nothing-can-be-conceived (BGNC) does not exist,

is a logical contradiction of the same order as claiming that X is not equal to X and is
therefore absurd.

2.4 A being greater-than-which-nothing-can-be-conceived, exists in such a manner that its

non-existence is logically inconceivable. Therefore, such a being must exist.

Part Two – The critical discussion of the proof in the tradition

• Discussion starts in St. Anselm’s lifetime, with a response to Proslogion by the monk
Gaunilo (book: On behalf of the fool (Psalm 14: 1))

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

 • Reductio ad absurdum argument: Gaunilo claims he can use Anselm’s line of
argumentation to prove the existence of a PILAND, “an island greater than which
nothing can be conceived”!
• If Gaunilo is right, does this mean the existence of “the greatest conceivable anything”
can be proved?

St. Anselm’s response to Gaunilo

• St. Anselm’s response focuses on God’s necessary existence (second version of the
proof)
• Reductio argument - only valid with regard to contingent beings
• Note the problems we encounter the moment we start trying to think about finite,
contingent beings with infinite capabilities:
• e.g. a rugby player/100 meter athlete greater than which nothing can be conceived”!
• Is such a being possible or impossible?
• This problem does not arise in the case of a necessary being (e.g. God)
• St Anselm’s proof implies that God’s existence includes the element of necessary
existence: if He exists, he exists necessarily, i.e. He cannot but exist!
• Remember: if he does not exist, He is not a being “greater than which nothing can be
conceived” or BGNC!)
• However, the reductio ad absurdum argument raises the possibility that Anselm might
be talking about an impossible being, like the “athlete greater than which nothing can
be conceived”.
• St. Anselm only grants this point if he has to concede that he is indeed talking about a
contingent being.
• However, he insists that he is not talking about a contingent being, but about a
necessary being.
• While the idea of the most perfectly conceivable island might be incoherent – possibly
even impossible – the idea of God as an infinite, self-existent being who exists
necessarily is not discredited by Gaunilo’s critique.

Something to think about in the meantime:

• This criticism introduces what will become the overall question regarding the proof,
namely, whether God is a possible being
• Centres on the question of greatness/perfectness
1. Is God great in the same of way as “the positive integer than which none greater is
possible”? (no intrinsic maximum)
OR
2. Great in terms of degrees of greatness akin to the degrees of an angle which can be
always be greater but cannot exceed 360°(has an intrinsic maximum)?
• If 1) then God might be an impossible being, if 2) then God is a possible being

The list of impossible things grows…..

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

Possible things
• Contingent things:
o All things which exist
o All things which don’t exist but could
• Necessary things
o Things which couldn’t but exist (with greatness akin to all possible angles)

Impossible/incoherent things
• Logically contradictory things
• Finite/contingent objects/beings which possess concrete qualities with no intrinsic
maximums
• (God, if his greatness is akin to integers)

Second phase of discussion: Is existence a predicate?

• Second phase of discussion - introduced by Descartes (1596-1650)
• Like St. Anselm, Descartes regards existence as a predicate (a defining characteristic of
something, alongside other characteristics)
• Existence is, for Descartes and Anselmus, one of God’s characteristics (in the same way
that a characteristic of a triangle is that the sum of its three angles is equal to two right
angles)

Like St. Anselm, Descartes infers God’s necessary existence from an analysis of the concept
“God”: the most perfectly conceivable being must exist, otherwise He is not the most perfectly
conceivable being.
Another way of making the same claim:
God’s essence implies His existence – differently from what is the case with contingent beings.

• Critical question to Descartes: is existence indeed a predicate, i.e. a characteristic like

“strong” or “brown” or “hard”?
• When we normally define things, we do not add that they also exist: “A brother is a
male sibling that exists ”!
• Kant, Moore and Russell disagreed with Descartes (and Anslem)
• Existence is not a predicate.
• We do not add anything to our understanding of any defined entity by pointing out that
it also exists.

An imaginary R100 note is the same amount of money (conceptually) as an existing R100 note

• To claim that X exists, is not to add anything to our understanding of what X is, but
simply to make the concept of X applicable to the world, i.e. to instantiate the X.

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

 • Russell - Existence may be a grammatical predicate (it makes sense to claim “Cows
exist”), but it is not a logical predicate. “Cows exist” simply means: “There are cows in
the world, in such a way that to claim ‘cows exist’ is to speak the truth” Same goes for
“unicorns do not exist”.
• Russell – when we say that “cows exist” and “unicorns do not exist”, we are not making
statements about cows and unicorns, but statements about the concept “cows” and the
concept “unicorns”. They are merely statements about whether these concepts are
instantiated in the real world.

Kant & Russell’s argument:

• It generally seems as if existence is not a predicate (note previous examples)
• We seem to assume that things exist when we define them/talk about them
• Thus: If we say “dragons don’t exist”, we first assume that dragons exist and then
immediately deny it – a contradiction!
• If we then say “tigers exist” this is then a redundancy, because we first assume that they
exist
• When we treat existence as a predicate we are left with the weird situation in which the
former example is a contradiction and the latter is a redundancy
However, we know that is not the case; “tigers exist” and “dragons don’t exist” are neither
redundant nor contradictory which means we don’t treat existence as a predicate

• Rowe in response: Do we always presuppose the existence of whatever we talk about,

whether it exists or not?
• Example of Dr Doolittle: we talk, and know, a lot about him (e.g. knows he is an animal
lover; talks to animals), yet we know that he does not exist (and we don’t ever assume
that he exists)!
• We can talk about many things and award predicates to them, whether they exist or
not.
• From this it is clear that, in view of the rebuttal of Anselm’s argument, it is not sufficient
to claim that we presuppose the existence of something when we attach predicates to
it.
• There are many phenomena to which we can attach predicates that do not exist or the
existence of which we need not (and do not) assume.
• Whether existence is a predicate is thus, in spite of Kant and Russell’s argument, a
matter that cannot already be conclusively decided.

For argument’s sake: What happens when ‘existence’ is regarded as a characteristic of entities
in definitions?
Rowe’s thought experiment:
• A magican is an existing magician (e.g Harry Houdini or David Copperfield)
• A magico is a non-existing magician (Merlin)

1. [In both definitions existence/non-existence is a predicate.]

2. [While it is true that Merlin is a magician, it is not true that he is a magican.]

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

 3. While it is true that Houdini is a magician, it is not true that he is a magico.

Similarly
• A unicorn is an existing unicorn
• A unico is a non-existing unicorn
• Note that a unicarn refers to an impossible thing (because we know they don’t exist)

From this we can derive a fundamentally important conclusion:

o If we regard “existence” as part of the definition of a concept or as a defining
characteristic of a concept, then no non-existing thing can instantiate or exemplify that

concept in the world. And if we regard non-existence as a defining characteristic of a

concept, then no existing thing can instantiate that concept.

The implication of this for Anselm’s argument is:

• Not that the existence of God can be derived from the way in which he has defined God,
but merely that no non-existent thing can be called God. The statement “there is a non-
existent thing which we call God” can therefore not be true. Only something which exists
can instantiate or exemplify his concept of God. What cannot be derived, is that because
only an existent thing can instantiate Anselm’s concept of God, that that thing indeed
exists in reality

If we regard “existence” as part of the definition of a concept, no non-existent thing can

instantiate that concept (or: if we regard non-existence as part of the definition of a concept,
no existing thing can instantiate that concept).

What about necessary Existence?

Anselm’s proof only shows that
o if we use the concept God, we are talking about something which necessarily must
exist.
o “Existence”, we could therefore say, is part of the meaning content of the concept
“God”.
o This is not to say that the concept is instantiated by something in the real world.
o All that can be said, is that that which instantiates the concept God, if it refers to
something real, must be a necessarily existing being.

- Until now we have shared Anselm’s assumption that God is a possible being. The
question is whether this is a valid assumption.
- What are all the possibilities of “impossible beings”? Are impossible beings limited to
the referents of logically contradictory concepts (e.g. “square circles”)?
- No - the concept “magican” (defined as an existing magician) in a situation where there
are no magicians in the world refers to an impossible thing, although we can still form a
coherent idea thereof, other than of a square circle

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

Other example: Similarly, a “unicarn” defined as an existing unicorn is an impossible thing, since
it can only refer to a unicorn that exists, and we know that unicorns do not exist.

- The moment a concept is defined in such a way that “existence” is a necessary part of its
definition, the possibility arises that the concept refers to something which is not
possible.

Implication: If we define “God” so that “existence” is part of His definition (as Anselm does),
then the possibility arises that the concept refers to something which is impossible, resp. that
“God” is an impossible thing, even though we can still form a conception of Him.

Complicating factor emerging from assumption that God is a possible being – note: If God is a
possible being, He can either exist or not exist. Remember earlier distinctions

Cf. again point earlier made: The concept “God” cannot refer to a non-existent thing. If God is a
possible being, the concept MUST therefore refer to an existent being! It again appears as
though Anselm has proved the existence of God

REMEMBER ASSUMPTION FROM THE BEGINNING

We agreed with Anselm’s assumption that God is a possible being:

• Being placed in the category of possible beings means the thing either exists or doesn’t
exist
• BUT
• We have just observed that the concept “God” cannot refer to a non-existent thing. If
God is a possible being, the concept MUST therefore refer to an existent being!
• It again appears as though Anselm has proved the existence of God

If we concede three things:

1. Anselm’s definition of God
2. His assumption that existence is a predicate (and also a “great-making quality”)
3. His assumption that God is a possible being
Then his argument is successful, and God exists

Problem cannot lie with premise 1 or 2; must therefore lie with 3

• Conclusion: We therefore grant too much to Anselm when we concede that God is a
possible being.
• If you assume the conclusion of an argument at
the outset, you commit the fallacy of petitio
principii (circular reasoning; “begging the
question”).

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

 • To grant to Anselm from the outset that God is a possible being, is, in an important
sense, to concede the validity of his argument

The Updated List:

Possible things
• Contingent things:
o All things which exist
o All things which don’t exist but could
• A being which has existence as part of its definition which (we know actually) exists

Impossible things
• Logically contradictory things
• Finite/contingent things (and necessary things!) which possess qualities with no intrinsic
maximums
• Non-existing beings which have existence as part of their definition – i.e. God as Anselm
defines him if he doesn’t exist

IMPORTANT TIPS + THE ELEMENTS OF THE ARGUMENT

1. Important distinctions and clarifications
2. Two versions of the proof
3. Gaunilo’s criticism and Anselm’s response (other kinds of impossible beings)
4. The question of whether existence is a predicate (defining characteristic of God)
5. The implications of granting that existence is a predicate (thought experiments)
6. More kinds of impossible beings
7. Why the question of whether God is a possible being is crucial to the proof

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

The Problem of Evil

Our Problem –
How do we reconcile the reality of evil in the world with the theistic confession (occurring in all
three “religions of the book”) that God is both omnipotent and perfectly loving?

- If God is omnipotent , He can always stop evil , and if he is perfectly loving , he always
wants no evil. Yet evil is there! Can we therefore say both of God?
- Here the Problem of evil is presented as a logical problem

Different ways of trying to resolve the problem of evil

- Offering a theodicy – an argument , reason or defence given as a means of explaining or
justifying why evil and God’s attributes (existence) are not incompatible
- Giving up one/more of God’s attributes (benevolence or omnipotence) or the existence
of evil/ suffering

The Argument re Freedom of the Will

- This is an argument presupposed by/occurring within both theodicies that we will
discuss later
- Origin of evil has to do with human freedom and responsibility
- To be human, means to be a person , and the latter implies the possibility of (non-
coerced) choice between right and wrong. A person is a being whose behaviour is not
predictable
- God could have created us as puppets that would always do as He wishes us to do , but
then we would not be “persons”. He also wants us to be bearers of his image, i.e. to be
free to obey Him because we want to, and not because we have to.
- Evil is therefore a logical necessity if we are to be free persons as God meant us to be.
Evil is the risk that God (has to) run(s) in order to create us in his image of Free
Persons.
- The latter claim is challenged by Mackie:

Mackie’s response: Evil and Omnipotence 1995

“If there is no logical impossibility of man’s freely choosing the good on one, or on several
occasions, there cannot be a logical impossibility in his freely choosing the good on every
occasion. God was not, then, faced with a choice between making innocent automata and
making beings who, in acting freely, would sometimes go wrong: there was open to him the
obviously better possibility of making beings who would act freely but always go right. Clearly,
his failure to avail himself of this possibility is inconsistent with his being both omnipotent and
wholly good.” (Mackie: “Evil and Omnipotence”)

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

God therefore could have made people who are perfectly free, and yet will always choose the
good. That He did not do that, shows that He is either not omnipotent , or not wholly good.

Evil as a logical problem vs evil as an evidential problem

- The specific nature and profundity of evil in the world – pointless evil – seems to provide
rational support for atheism
- Theodicies generally provided to address the evidential problem of evil
- They therefore attempt to fasten on some good and argue that achieving that good
would justify an omnipotent benevolent being in permitting evils to occur

The Augustinian Theory

- Best known, and in ecclesiastical orthodoxy , most influential theodicy , although
philosophically less interesting because of the theological nature
- Developed by St Augustine
- Holds negative view of evil: not something in itself but absence of the good (as blindness
is absence of sight). Evil originates when creation starts missing its goal. Evil is an
unforeseen by-product of the derailment of the originally good and perfect creation.
- Evil occurs as an unforeseen by-product of a world originally created to be good.

God created everything good and according to His perfect will, therefore evil can never be
regarded as having been created by God.

Evil is nothing other than the derailment of a creation created inherently good.

So, where did evil start then, St Augustine?

 Augustine traces the origin back to where the angels and people operate.
o There was a “fall” from grace among the angels, who, in turn, led people to sin and be
disobedient to God.

  In turn, amoral evil (disease, earthquakes, floods...) is the result of punishment for the
evil caused through sin.
  Augustine also claims that moral evil is punished by hell, while those who accept
God’s offer of salvation in Jesus Christ receive eternal life.
  “Evil is the consequence of the punishable abuse of the freedom given to creation as
manifested in a tragic act with cosmic implications of humankind.

The Important Points of Critique:

Point One – Schleiermacher: “How the hell is God so perfect and give us free will and all these
cool things and yet, STILL it all goes downhill?!”

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

He basically agrees with Mackie.

Point Two – Can we even take the story seriously that people were first perfect, and then
ruined all that perfection by plunging themselves and the whole of creation into decay and
suffering?

Science tells a completely different story. Evolution, yo. What is “perfection” even?
Also: How can suffering be the result of human disobedience? People are a recent
phenomenon; much “evil” occurred in the world before people were around. Earthquakes and
diseases existed even before we did.

Point three - The whole idea of hell as eternal punishment for sin doesn’t really fit nicely with
Augustine’s idea of the restoration of moral balance in the world. It undermines its own aim.
- Since the punishment of hell would (apparently) continue into eternity, its constructive
purpose is unclear.
- “As long as hell is burning”, the problem of evil will remain unresolved, because it would
mean that both the moral sin of the judged, as well as the non-moral evil of their
suffering are built into the permanent structure of created reality.

The Irenaean Theodicy-

1. So obviously this theodicy was developed by church father Irenaeus, who lived even
before St Augustine.

The Irenaean Theodicy offers an eschatological justification of evil-in-spite-of-a-loving-

omnipotent-God.

 This theodicy denies that man originally (just after creation) lived in a paradise
of perfect happiness and godliness and then “fell” out of it.

 According to Irenaeus, the process of creation was not completed within an

instant, but rather a process of development that is happening over time and
which is headed towards a final goal of perfection.

 The “imperfections” of the world of our experience form the necessary

resistance and stimuli for the on-going process of “soul-making”.

o This “resistance” causes suffering, but is meant to make us strong.

 By "soul-making" Irenaeus (and Hick) mean the acquisition over time of the
most

perfect possible state of moral maturity and the godliness that goes with it –
“children of God”.

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

  In this respect, according to Rowe, the Irenaean theodicy achieves that which
all theodicies strive for: “...to fasten on some good (real or imaginary) and argue
that achieving it would justify an omnipotent being in permitting evils...”.

According to this argument, evil is therefore justified vis-á-vis (face to face with) an omnipotent
and perfectly benevolent God, because this evil provides the impulse for the realisation of
advantages so great that their realisation justifies the reality of evil - benefits which would be
unrealisable without evil being a possibility or even a reality in the world.

Irenaeus distinguishes between the creation of people in God’s image (but still
imperfect/incomplete) and their growth towards a likeness to God (an ongoing process over
time).

So, why were people not created perfect from beginning? Hmmm? Irenaeus emphasizes the
positive value of human freedom. He suggests two

considerations in support of his claim.

1. We have an intuitive belief that human virtue, resulting from free and responsible moral
choices made in situations where those choices were difficult and involved temptation,
has significantly more value than virtue accorded to a moral agent at birth without
his/her acquiring it through active participation in resistance of evil.
2. Think about it. Which is better?
o Having a perfect boyfriend from the get-go, does everything right, can’t do anything
wrong, stays loyal to you since he’s so perfect? OR
o Having a not-so-perfect boyfriend who experiences all the temptations from all the
girls on the polls in Catwalk, and still stays loyal to you through thick and thin?
o It is then clear that the second version of the boyfriend has more value than the
first one who has it easy.
3. If people were created to be in the presence of, and in perfect harmony with God from

the outset, there wouldn't be much question of a genuine, spontaneous freedom behind
the "choice" to live a life that is pleasing to God. In order to be able to be real persons
and therefore morally free agents (i.e. perfect "children of God"), people were thus
created at a distance from God. This does not refer to a spatial distance but rather an
epistemic distance, that is, a distinction with regards to the knowledge of God.

 Evil is a necessary condition for the creation of humankind at an epistemic distance from
God, in circumstances in which created man has true freedom in relation to his/her
Creator in order to react by choice to the non-imposing presence of God, and to grow
morally and spiritually towards the perfection of a true child of God.

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

Without the possibility of moral evil, moral and religious growth is not possible. Okay but, why
is there a-moral evil in the world?

1. a) Not all evil in the world can be ascribed to God.

2. b) The"godlypurposeofcreation"cannotbeachievedinaworldwhichoffersno

resistance to the fulfilment of happiness (i.e. in a "hedonistic paradise", that is, a world

in which unhappiness/suffering does not occur in any form)

3. c) In support, he offers the scenario of the “counter-factual hypothesis”: Imagine a

world in which no form of suffering is possible! No bullets! Just POOF!

In such a world, no science (because there would be no structure with consistent characteristics
and patterns that could be studied) and no morality would be possible: We could not do
anything bad but we could also not do anything good. Because we need bad(ass)ness for
goodness to exist!
So, to be quite frank, for Irenaeus (and Hick) this would not be the best, but rather the worst of
all possible worlds

Implication? What implication?

Of course, there would be an implication about the Irenaean Theodicy... Let’s see.

 The argument gives rise to belief in life after death. How does it do that? Well...

1. “Soul-making” would remain fragmentary and incomplete if life ends in the graveyard. I
mean, what would be the point if it’s all going to come to an end anyways.
2. The enormity of human suffering and pain in this life must be justified by something so
great and wonderful that it would all be worthwhile in the end. Because again, what
would the point be?
3. All people must eventually inherit “salvation”, since the goal of creation would remain
unattained as long as pain and suffering occur.

Critical remarks on Irenaeus and Hick

We can, according to Rowe, agree with Hick in that significant moral and spiritual

development or growth is hardly conceivable in a world which is a pain-free paradise.

The question is, however, whether in the world in which we live does in fact promote this kind
of growth and development? Are we seeing a world which follows God’s goals?

→ Well, it sure doesn’t look like it, huh.

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes

→ There is so much evil and wickedness in the world - it’s desensitising our moral sensibilities,
rather than urging us to grow morally and spiritually!

We can concede that moral and spiritual growth cannot take place without resistance.
But is so much suffering and evil really necessary to make us better people? “Okay,
okay,” Hick says. “What if all the pain and all the suffering were only experienced by
people who really deserve it?” And, I mean, who’s gonna be the judge of that?

i. We would resist evil and believe in God from fear, and not from conviction and actually
wanting to.
ii. We would lose sympathy with such people. We are sympathetic and helpful to sufferers
precisely because we are fundamentally convinced of the fact that most suffering is
undeserved.

Rowe grants Hick these two things:

a) There cannot be much question of moral and spiritual growth if there is no real suffering
in the world, and if this evil does not strike people
in an apparently undeserved way.

b) Peoples ‘environment must function in accordance with universally valid, predictable and
reliable laws. It is only on the basis of such laws that a person can engage in purposeful
decision-making that is required for a rational and moral way of life.

To CONCLUDE

 In the light of these two assumptions, it is understandable prima facie (accepted as correct
until proven otherwise) why an omnipotent and benevolent being might be morally justified in
permitting moral and amoral evil.

 According to Hick, it is furthermore important that it’s not apparent to us why all instances of
evil and suffering are necessary for our moral and spiritual growth.

o If we knew why, we’d be so discouraged to grow morally and spiritually, that we’d just stop
trying to avoid or prevent those instances of evil that are actually within our control.

o The problem with this argument is that it doesn’t solve the problem of specific instances of
evil

The problem with Hick’s argument is that it supports an ‘all-or-nothing’ position in terms of the
evil in the world: either there is no evil and suffering in the world or the world must like exactly
the same as our existing world.

Jenna Richter – Philosophy Notes