1.1.

Constitutional Law revisited

Preamble, 1987 Consitution:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society,
and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve
and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and
democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and
promulgate this Constitution.
Constitution, defined:

- It is a written instrument by which the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined,
and by which the powers are distributed among several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the
benefits of the people. (MPH vs GSIS).
- It is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation.
- It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates.
- It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.

Types of Constitution

a. Written Constitution- A kind of which constitution whose provisions are all contained in a single document.
(such as the Philippine Constitution)
b. Unwritten Constitution- A kind of constitution where the provisions are not contained in a single document
but rather in different documents which are considered as part of the fundamental law of the land.
c. Rigid or inelastic Constitution- one which cannot be easily amended unless such amendment is provided
for by the Constitution itself.
d. Flexible or Elastic Constitution- One which can easily be changed anytime.

Parts of Constitution

a. Constitution of Government- those provisions which set up the governmental structure. (Art II, Sec 1; Articles
VI, VII, VIII, IX and X)

Art II Section 1. The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
Art VI. Legislative Department
Art VII. Executive Department
Art VIII. Judicial Department
Art IX. Constitutional Commissions
Art X. Local Government

b. Constitution of Liberty- provisions which guarantee individual fundamental liberties against governmental
abuse. (Articles III, IV, XII, XIII, XIV and XV)
c. Constitution of Sovereignty- those provisions which outline the process whereby the sovereign people may
change the Constitution. (Article II, Sec. 1; Articles V, XI and XVII)

Art II Section 1. The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution is thus a conventional/enacted, written, and rigid/inelastic constitution.

Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

If a law or contract violates any norm of the Constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and
without any force and effect.

Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written
in every statute and contract. (MPH vs GSIS)

The Philippine Constitution

- took effect of February 2, 1987, the date of the plebiscite for its ratification and not on the date its ratification
was proclaimed. (De Leon vs Esguerra)

1.2. Constitutional Law 2

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
Inherent Powers of the state:
- (1) Police power and (2) taxation, along with (3) eminent domain, are inherent powers of sovereignty which the
State might share with LGU by delegation given under a constitutional or a statutory fiat. They are considered
inherent because they belong to the very essence of the government without which the government cannot exist.
- All these inherent powers are for a public purpose and legislative in nature.
Police Power- The power to make laws, rules and regulation and ordinances, the purpose of which is to provide
general welfare.
Eminent Domain- The power to confiscate private property for public use with payment of just compensation.
Taxation Power- The power to raise revenues for the support of the government.
Illustrative cases
1. Secretary Justice v Lantion
Facts:
The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522
containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States, who, appears
to be charged in the United States with violation of the following provisions of the United States Code.

On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of
attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069.

Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote
a letter addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government,
as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the
request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the
proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.

In response to private respondent, it denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons:

1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting documents from the
United States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the extradition documents
submitted in accordance with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law.

2. The United States had to secure orders from the concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to
disclose certain grand jury information to Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose
of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United States
District Courts.

3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request.

Private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition
against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, for mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition with an application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.

The Trial Court, through Honorable Ralph C. Lantion rendered decision in favor of the respondent Mark
Jimenez, by ordering petitioner from refraining from conducting further proceedings in connection with the
request of the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner.

Subsequently, petitioner filed with the court the instant proceedings, within which Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr., ordered Lantion to cease and desist from enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued
by public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.

Issue:
Would private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings
constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty?

Held:
No, a citizen's basic due process rights must be upheld over the government's ironclad duties under a
treaty.

The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law,
requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. Under the doctrine of incorporation,
rules of international law form part of the law of the and land no further legislative action is needed to make such
rules applicable in the domestic sphere.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of the local state.

In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule
of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in
all circumstances.

The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are
given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex
posterior derogat priori takes effect — a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states
where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.

In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En
contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pined against each other. There is no occasion
to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a
prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted,
after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the
rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is
silent as to these rights.

Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the
evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition request and the
supporting documents.

In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic
twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the
Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. In fact, in interstate
extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the
extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the
same becomes a demandable right.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property
or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The
convergence of petitioner's favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent's
liberty is easily comprehensible.

The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private
respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional
guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees
against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our
Constitution is premised.

Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and
government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward
course be laid.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Pursuant to PD 1609 extradition is defined as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object
of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."

2. City Government of Quezon City v Ericta

Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No 6118 requires that at least 6% of the total area of a memorial park cemetery
shall be set aside for charity burial. For several years, the section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city
authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution
directing the City Engineer to stop selling memorial park lots where the owners thereof have failed to donate the
required 6% space for pauper burial.
Respondent reacted by filing with the CFI a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the
same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised
Administrative Code. The Court declared the Section 9 null and void.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police
power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further
argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power. On the
other hand, respondent contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the ordinance
permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives
the owner of all beneficial use of his property.

Issue:
WON Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondents. The Court held that there are three inherent powers
of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent
domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of
sovereignty.

Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment
of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy
in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for
injury sustained in consequence thereof. The police power being the most active power of the government and
the due process clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of
government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.

It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere
regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not
involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to
confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium
and firearms.

Here, the court examined an ordinance from Quezon City that required private cemeteries to set aside at
least six percent of their land for charity burials of deceased paupers. The court found that this ordinance
exceeded the city's authority, as it amounted to an outright confiscation of private property without due process
or compensation. The ordinance did not align with the city's charter or relevant laws, and it did not serve the
public interest in promoting health, morals, or general welfare. Unlike regulations on subdivisions, which serve
clear public safety and convenience purposes and are paid for by developers, this ordinance lacked legal basis
and unfairly burdened private cemetery owners. The court concluded that the ordinance's justification under the
general welfare clause was insufficient, especially since it was enacted after the affected cemetery had already
been established and operating legally.

2.2 Similarities among the State powers

The three inherent of the state are similar in the following respects:

1. They are inherent in the state and maybe exercise by it without need of express constitutional grant.
2. They are not only necessary but indispensable. The state cannot continue or be effective unless it is able
to exercise them.
3. They are methods by which the state interferes with private rights.
4. They all presuppose an equivalent compensation for the private rights interfered with.
5. They are exercise merely by legislature.

2.3. Differences among the State powers

The three inherent powers of the state differ from each other in the following ways:
 1. The police power regulates both liberty and property. the power of eminent domain and the power of
taxation affect only property rights.
2. The police power and power of taxation maybe exercise only by the government. The power of eminent
domain maybe exercises by private entities.
3. The property taken in the police power is destroyed because it is noxious or intended for noxious purpose.
The property taken under the power of eminent domain and the power of taxation is intended for a public
use or purpose and is therefore wholesome.
4. The compensation of the person subjected to the police power is the intangible altruistic feeling that he
has contributed to the several welfares. The compensation involved in the other powers is more concrete,
to wit, a full and fair equivalent to the property expropriated or protection and the public
improvement for the taxes paid.

A. POLICE POWER

Police Power, defined:

- Police Power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
- This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme
law). (Social Justice Society vs Atienza)

Scope of Police Power

- The scope of Police Power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all matters affecting
health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the community.
- Police Power is essentially regulatory in nature and power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if
exercised for regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. (Acebedo Optical
Company, Inc. vs CA)

CHARACTERISTICS
(a) cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or contract (Stone v Mississippi)
(b) may use taxing power as its implement (Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board)
(c) may use eminent domain as its implement (Assoc. of Small Landowners vs Sec. of Agrarian Reform)
(d) could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts (police power
prevails over contract)
(e) dynamic, not static, and must move with the moving society it is supposed to regulate

Superiority of Police Power

- Police Power cannot be barred by the invocation of Contract, Treaty or Property Rights.

POWERS OF EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION AS IMPLEMENTS OF POLICE POWER

Association of Small land owners v. Secretary of DAR

In this case, the mandated confiscation of all covered lands held beyond private retention limits is compensable
as it partakes the nature of expropriation. This is for the benefit of the entire Filipino nation and the foreseeable
future. It is for this reason that the exercise of eminent domain becomes an implement of police power.

Lutz v Araneta
In this case, it held that Power of Taxation may be used as an implement of Police Power when the tax is levied
for a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened sugar industry.
Sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, its promotion, protection and advancement,
therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare.

Two essential elements: (Agan, Jr vs Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.)

1. It is an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property;

2. The power is exercised for the benefit of the common good.

General welfare clause, defined:

- The general welfare clause within police power grants governments the authority to enact laws and regulations
aimed at promoting the well-being of society as a whole.
- This includes measures to protect public health, safety, morals, and overall quality of life.
- The clause serves as a guiding principle for governments to balance the common good with individual liberties,
aiming to achieve a just and dynamic social order that benefits all members of society.

Impairment clause, defined:

- The impairment clause within police power restricts the government from unjustly diminishing certain rights,
such as contractual or property rights, through legislative or regulatory action.
- It ensures that any impairment of these rights is justified by a compelling public interest and accompanied by
fair compensation to affected parties.
- This clause aims to strike a balance between government authority and individual rights, safeguarding legal
stability and protecting against arbitrary interference.

Illustrative cases
3. Binay v Domingo
Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial
assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are
to be taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission
approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the
implementation of the program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the
disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the resolution has no
connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government
funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause since it will only
benefit a few individuals.
Issue:
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare clause.
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose.
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause.

Held:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitoners, stating that Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of police
power.

1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with
civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi
est suprema lex.” Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the
people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which
is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.

In the present case, municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause.
Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as
may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as
shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace
and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and
the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.”

2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but
not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience
as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense
includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects,
and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare
of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out
of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to
everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed
inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons.
As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation
geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social
justice as well as human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as
a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of
the common good.

3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different
groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is
the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled,
emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-
enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our
government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete.
The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially
burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay
'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent,
or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs
for motives political or otherwise. (Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991).

4. Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

Facts:
Rubi, a Mangyan, filed for habeas corpus for himself and for other Manguianes in Mindoro. Petitioner
alleges that they are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials since the said officials
implemented a segregation of the Mangyans and confined them to a certain area. The government defended
their stance saying that their enacted policies are based on the Administrative Code provisions that seem to
delegate to the provincial government the power to establish “Non-Christian” sites and penalize the “Non-
Christians” who would not comply with the relocation. The petitioner contends that they are being deprived of
liberty and due process, and are being discriminated against based on religion. Aside from that, the petitioner
also contended that the mentioned provisions constituted an undue delegation of power of the Legislative.

Issue:
W/N there was a valid action by the provincial board

Held:
YES. It was a valid exercise of police power by the legislative pursuant to the State program of civilizing
the uncivilized. The recognized public policy is a valid justification for the exercise of this power. The court is
basically kind of saying that it is a POLITICAL QUESTION. The judiciary should be wary before overturning the
legislature. Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that
the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great
malady requires an equally drastic remedy.

“We can see objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question
that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by
differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior
case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best
promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle. But public policy is not a
thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must
be made from time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."

Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians has
been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines
from early days to the present. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the
highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in
intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile
regions must be developed. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a
view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must
be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.

5. U.S. v. Ling Su Fan

Facts:
The defendant, Ling Su Fan was accused of the offense of "exporting from the Philippine Islands
Philippine silver coins," in a complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. That on or about
the 12th day of December, 1906, the said Ling Su Fan was found to have unlawfully concealed and hidden
20,600 pesos worth of Philippine silver coins on board the steamship Taming, where he served as freight clerk
and supercargo in charge of all shipments of freight and was then about to depart from the port of Manila to the
port of Hongkong. Upon discovering the coins, Ling Su Fan initially claimed ignorance but later stated that the
coins were brought aboard by unidentified Filipinos for transport to Hongkong. The coins were not listed on any
manifests, and their discovery led to Ling Su Fan's arrest. His actions are said to be contrary to the provisions
of Act No. 1411 of the Philippine Commission.
The defendant then filed a demurrer arguing that said complaint does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form, (2) That the fact charged do not constitute a public offense, and (3) That the said complaint is
contrary to the provisions of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America and
also contrary to paragraph 1 of section 5 of the act of Congress of the United States of America. The demurrer
was dismissed by the lower court and Ling Su Fan was found guilty of the offense.

Issue:
W/N Act No. 1411, which prohibits the exportation of Philippine silver coins is constitutional.

Held:
Yes. The Court held that Act No. 1411 is constitutional and a valid exercise of the police power of the
state. It is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The Court
reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit the enactment of laws by the legislative department
of the Philippine Government that deprive persons of life, liberty, or property. It simply provides that laws shall
not be enacted which shall deprive persons of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The Court
further explained that "due process of law" means that the law must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must have
a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. In this case, Act No. 1411 was
enacted by the Civil Commission in accordance with express permission given by the Congress of the United
States in order to regulate the exportation of Philippine silver coins.
Notwithstanding the limitations upon the power of the Commission, there are certain powers which
legislative departments of Government may exercise and which cannot be limited. These are known as the police
power of the state. The police power of the state has been variously defined. It has been defined as the powers
of government, inherent in every sovereignty; the power vested in the legislature to make such laws as they shall
judge to be for the good of the state and its subjects; the authority to establish such rules and regulations for the
conduct of all persons as may be conducive to the public interests. Here, Act No. 1411 which was aimed at
preventing the exportation of Philippine silver coins to maintain the stability of the local currency clearly fell within
the permissible limits of this power.

2.4 Basis of Police Power

1. Salus populi est suprema lex – the welfare of the people is the supreme law;
2. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas – a person must use his own property so as not to injure another

Illustrative cases
6. JMM Promotion and Management vs CA

Facts:
Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President Corazon C. Aquino
ordered a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations. The
ban was, however, rescinded after leaders of the overseas employment industry promised to extend full support
for a program aimed at removing kinks in the system of deployment. In its place, the government, through the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently issued Department Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment
Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing certification
and deployment of performing artists abroad.
 The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP for brevity) filed a class
suit on January 27, 1995 assailing that the said Department Order No. 3 which establishes various procedures
and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and
deployment of the former and other related issuance, principally contending that the said orders,
1.) violated the constitutional right to travel;
2.) abridged existing contracts for employment; and
3.) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law.
FETMOP also averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal
and in gross violation of the constitutional right to life liberty and property. FETMOP prayed for the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction against the orders.
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM) and Kary International, Inc. (Kary) filed a motion for
intervention in the civil case which was granted by the trial court on February 15, 1995. However, on February
21, 1995, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed
the compliant. An appeal was made to the trial court regarding its decision but it was also however, dismissed.
As a consequence, ARB requirement was issued. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision and
concluded that the said issuance constituted a valid exercise of Police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power.
RULING:
Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the
Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of Police Power by the State.
The proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate
subject of a valid exercise of police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution
of a legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public
morals.
According to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property in such a fashion so as to
not disturb others) it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and
manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates
due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to
the practice of various trades or profession. Professional leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and
practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. It is not claimed that these requirements pose
an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as professionals and
other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.
7. U.S. v. Pompeya
Facts:
This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo, charging
Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo for willfully, illegally, and criminally and
without justifiable motive failing to render service on patrol duty, required under Executive Order No. 1, series of
1914, based on section 40 (m) of the Municipal Code.
 Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the acts charged in the complaint do not
constitute a crime and that the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional for being repugnant to the Organic Act of
the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the ordinance upon which said complaint was based (paragraph "m" of section 40 of the
Municipal Code) which was adopted in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 1309 is constitutional and a
valid exercise of police power.
Held:
1. Yes. The right or power conferred upon the municipalities by Act No. 1309 falls within the police power
of the state. The Philippine Legislature has power to legislate upon all subjects affecting the people of the
Philippine Islands which has not been delegated to Congress or expressly prohibited by said Organic Act.
The police power of the state includes not only the public health and safety, but also the public welfare,
protection against impositions, and generally the public's best interest. It so extensive and all pervading, that the
courts refuse to lay down a general rule defining it, but decide each specific case on its merits. The police power
of the state has been exercised in controlling and regulating private business, even to the extent of the
destruction of the property of private persons, when the use of such property became a nuisance to the public
health and convenience.
In this case, the court upheld the constitutionality of Act No. 1309, recognizing it as an exercise of the
state's police power. The law authorized municipalities in the Philippines to call upon (1) able-bodied male
residents, (2) between the ages of 18 and 55 for certain services, but only under specific conditions.
Moreover, the persons liable for the service mentioned in the law cannot be called upon at the mere whim
or caprice of the president. There must be some just and reasonable ground, at least sufficient in the mind of a
reasonable man, before the president can call upon the the persons for the service mentioned in the law. The
law does not apply to all persons. The law does not apply to every condition. The law applies to special persons
and special conditions.

2.5. Police Power as justification for governmental acts

- Police Power, in justifying governmental acts, such as the enactment of laws or regulations, authorities often
invoke police power as the legal basis for their actions. This justification asserts that the government's actions
are necessary to safeguard the well-being and interests of the public, and that any limitations imposed on
individual rights or freedoms are justified by the broader societal benefits they entail.
Illustrative cases
8. Roxas & Co., Inc. v CA
Facts:
This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the
acquisition of these haciendas by the government under Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988. Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three
haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu,
Batangas. Hacienda Palico is 1,024 hectares, Hacienda Banilad is 1,050 hectares in area and Hacienda
Caylaway.
The events of this case occurred during the incumbency of then President Corazon C. Aquino. In February 1986,
President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 promulgating a Provisional Constitution. As head of the provisional
government, the President exercised legislative power "until a legislature is elected and convened under a new
Constitution." In the exercise of this legislative power, the President signed on July 22, 1987, Proclamation No.
131 instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and Executive Order No. 229 providing the
mechanisms necessary to initially implement the program.
This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The
Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988. Before the law's effectivity,
on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to
the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition
by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.
Despite petitioner's application for conversion, respondent DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two
Haciendas. The LBP trust accounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by respondent DAR
with cash and LBP bonds. On October 29, 1993, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No.
32484. It questioned the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and the denial of due process in the
acquisition of its landholdings. Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of the three haciendas was denied by the
MARO on November 8, 1993.
Issue:
Whether or not the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas were valid and in accordance with law
Held:
No. The acquisition proceedings over the haciendas were nullified due to the DAR's failure to observe
due process. Petitioner's allegation of lack of due process goes into the validity of the acquisition proceedings
themselves. Before we rule on this matter, however, there is need to lay down the procedure in the acquisition
of private lands under the provisions of the law. Executive Order No. 229 does not lay down the operating
procedure, much less the notice requirements, before the VOS is accepted by respondent DAR. Notice to the
landowner, however, cannot be dispensed with. It is part of administrative due process and is an essential
requisite to enable the landowner himself to exercise, at the very least, his right of retention guaranteed under
the CARL.
We stress that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the
acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA's already issued to the farmer
beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular
course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition
proceedings.
E.O. 229, like Section 16 of the CARL, requires that the land, land owner and beneficiaries of the land
subject to agrarian reform be identified before the notice of acquisition should be issued. Hacienda Caylaway
was voluntarily offered for sale in 1989. Respondent DAR, on the other hand, avers that surveys on the land
covered by the four titles were conducted in 1989, and that petitioner, as landowner, was not denied participation
therein, the results of the survey and the land valuation summary report, however, do not indicate whether notices
to attend the same were actually sent to and received by petitioner or its duly authorized representative. To
reiterate, Executive Order No. 229 does not lay down the operating procedure, much less the notice
requirements, before the VOS is accepted by respondent DAR. Notice to the landowner, however, cannot be
dispensed with. It is part of administrative due process and is an essential requisite to enable the landowner
himself to exercise, at the very least, his right of retention guaranteed under the CARL.
9. Executive Secretary vs. CA

Facts:

Respondent ARCO-Phil, prior to the effectivity of RA 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, assails the validity of the pertinent provisions of the said law specifically Section
2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9
and 10, on the grounds that its members are exposed to the immediate and irreparable danger of being deprived
of their right to a livelihood and other constitutional rights without due process, on its claim that a great number
of duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended their operations for fear that (a) their officers
and employees would be prosecuted under the unjust and unconstitutional penal provisions of Rep. Act No.
8042 and meted equally unjust and excessive penalties, including life imprisonment, for illegal recruitment and
large scale illegal recruitment without regard to whether the recruitment agencies involved are licensed and/or
authorized; and, (b) if the members of the respondent, which are licensed and authorized, decide to continue
with their businesses, they face the stigma and the curse of being labeled "illegal recruiters."

The petitioners, on the other side, contended that (a) the respondent has no cause of action for a
declaratory relief; (b) the petition was premature as the rules implementing Rep. Act No. 8042 not having been
released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of the Constitution; and, (d) the law was
approved by Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State.

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the herein respondents which issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the following provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the police power of the State can regulate a business, profession or calling.

Held:

Yes, as held in the case of JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court held
that A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One
cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights,
the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong. Nevertheless, no
right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as
a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects
either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and
welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be
within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use
his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the
due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to
the practice of various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written
and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. It is not claimed that these requirements
pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as professionals and
other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.

The Court thereby affirmed the validity of the assailed penal and procedural provisions of Rep. Act No.
8042, including the imposable penalties therefor. Until the Court, by final judgment, declares that the said
provisions are unconstitutional, the enforcement of the said provisions cannot be enjoined.

10. Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service

Facts:
Remman et al. have raised concerns regarding the provisions of RA 9646, which aim to professionalize
the real estate service sector in the Philippines through licensing, registration, and supervision of practitioners.
They argue that these provisions are unduly oppressive and constitute a deprivation of property without due
process of law. Specifically, they contend that real estate developers are burdened with the requirement to
employ licensed real estate brokers for marketing and selling their properties, leading to decreased control over
their business operations and additional expenses. However, while compliance with regulatory requirements
may indeed pose financial challenges for real estate developers, such regulations serve the public interest by
ensuring professionalism, competency, and ethical standards in the industry. Moreover, the government has the
authority to regulate professions and industries to protect consumer welfare and maintain market integrity.

Furthermore, Remman et al. assert an issue regarding the Equal Protection Clause (EPC) concerning
Section 28 of RA 9646. They argue that the specific mention of real estate developers as exceptions to the
exemption provided in Section 28 unjustifiably treats them differently from other exempted persons who also
own properties and seek to sell them. However, the differential treatment of real estate developers may be
justified by legitimate governmental interests in promoting public welfare and market integrity. Real estate
developers often engage in large-scale commercial activities involving multiple properties, necessitating
additional regulatory oversight to protect consumers and ensure fair competition. Therefore, while the
contentions raised by Remman et al. warrant consideration, the regulatory framework imposed by RA 9646 is
likely to withstand legal scrutiny as long as it is applied reasonably and does not unduly burden individuals or
violate constitutional rights.

Issue:

1. Whether or not RA 9646 is a valid exercise of police power.

2. Whether or not it violated EPC
Held:
1. Yes, the validity of RA 9646 as an exercise of police power is affirmed, emphasizing that property rights
must yield to the primacy of police power when conditions demand it for the general welfare. The implementation
of the law does not constitute a deprivation of property, as it does not restrict the use and enjoyment of property;
rather, it introduces reasonable regulatory measures. The regulation of professions and businesses has
consistently been upheld as a legitimate exercise of police power, particularly when it serves governmental
functions, public health and welfare, and public morals. Licensing and accreditation requirements are well-
established practices under the umbrella of police power, ensuring competence and ethical standards.
The legislature recognized the necessity of professionalizing real estate practitioners to enhance competence
and ethical standards, acknowledging the susceptibility of real property transactions to manipulation and
corruption. Moreover, the legislation aimed to maximize the real estate sector's potential contribution to the gross
domestic income and overall national progress, highlighting the vital role of real estate practitioners.
2. No. Regarding the Equal Protection Clause (EPC), it is determined that there is no violation. The
classification established by RA 9646, which imposes licensure requirements on all real estate service
practitioners, including those working for real estate developers, is deemed reasonable and relevant to its
legitimate purpose. Real estate developers engage in regular business transactions involving the sale of
properties, unlike individuals with isolated property transactions. Thus, the classification between ordinary
property owners exempted under Section 28(a) and real estate developers is supported by substantial
distinctions and serves the legislative intent of promoting consumer protection and market integrity.
11. Southern Luzon Drug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and Development

Facts:
Southern Luzon Drug Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of drugstore
operation in the Philippines, filed a petition against the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP), the Department of Finance (DOF) and the
Bureau of Internal Revenue on the implementation of Section 4(a) of RA No. 9257 (Expanded Senior Citizens
Act of 2003) and Section 32 of RA No. 9442 (Magna Carta for Disabled Persons) on the granting of 20% discount
on the purchase of medicines by senior citizens and persons with disability (PWD) and treating them as tax
deduction on gross income rather than as tax credit.
 Section 4(a) of RA No. 9257, an amendment of RA No. 7432, provides the grant of 20% discount in the
purchase of medicines by qualified senior citizens anywhere in the country. Section 32 of RA No 9442 also
provides at least 20% discount for the purchase of medicines in all drugstores for the exclusive use and
enjoyment of persons with disability. RA No. 7432 provided that covered establishments may claim the amount
given as discount to senior citizens and disabled persons as tax credit which can be applied against their income
tax due.

The change on tax treatment of the discount did not sit well some drug store owners and corporations
including the petitioner. They assailed that Section 4(a) of RA No. 9257 and Section 32 of RA No. 9442 are not
constitutional on the ground that it amounts to taking of private property without payment of just compensation.
They also assailed that it is confiscatory in the sense that the State takes away a portion of its supposed profits
which could have gone into its coffers and utilizes it for public purpose.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 4(a) of RA No. 9257 and Section 32 of RA No. 9442 are unconstitutional.

Held:
No. Section 4(a) of RA No. 9257 and Section 32 of RA No 9442 are constitutional. The law is the
legitimate exercise of police power.

Police power is the power of the State to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property. It is the duty of the State, the community and even private entities, to care for the elderly as
they reach the point in their lives when the vigor of their youth has diminished and resources have become
scarce.

The Court held that the granting of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines to senior citizens and
persons with disability is a valid exercise of the State’s police power for the promotion of their welfare.
Furthermore, the change on tax treatment is also a legitimate exercise of police power by regulating on the
realization of profits of the covered establishments. The Court also held that it is not the law per se causes the
losses in the covered establishments but rather it is due to bad business judgement and inappropriate business
strategies.

12. Zaval v Duterte

Facts:
President Duterte ordered the shutting down of Boracay in a cabinet meeting held on April 4, 2018. This
was confirmed by then Presidential Spokesperson Harry L. Roque, Jr. in a press briefing the following day
wherein he formally announced that the total closure of Boracay would be for a maximum period of six months
starting April 26, 2018. Following this pronouncement, petitioners contend that around 630 police and military
personnel were readily deployed to Boracay including personnel for crowd dispersal management. They also
allege that the DILG had already released guidelines for the closure. Petitioners claim that ever since the news
of Boracay's closure came about, fewer tourists had been engaging the services of Zabal and Jacosalem such
that their earnings were barely enough to feed their families. They fear that if the closure pushes through, they
would suffer grave and irreparable damage. Hence, despite the fact that the government was then yet to release
a formal issuance on the matter, petitioners filed the petition on April 25, 2018 praying that a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction shall be immediately issued to restrain
the respondents from enforcing closure or banning entry to Boracay Island, and a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction to allow unimpeded entry and exit to/from Boracay Island.
On May 18, 2018, petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition stating that the day following the filing of their
original petition or on April 26, 2018, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 475 formally declaring a state
of calamity in Boracay and ordering its closure for six months from April 26, 2018 to October 25, 2018. Thus, in
addition to what they prayed for in their original petition, petitioners implore the Court to declare as
unconstitutional Proclamation No. 475 insofar as it orders the closure of Boracay and ban of tourists and
nonresidents therefrom.

Issue:
W/N Proclamation No. 475 must be upheld for being in the nature of a valid police power measure.

Held:
Yes. Proclamation No.475 must be upheld for being a valid police power measure.
Police power, amongst the three fundamental and inherent powers of the state, is the most pervasive
and comprehensive. "It has been defined as the 'state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. “As defined, it consists of (1) imposition or
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good."
That the assailed governmental measure in this case is within the scope of police power cannot be
disputed. Verily, the statutes from which the said measure draws authority and the constitutional provisions which
serve as its framework are primarily concerned with the environment and health, safety, and well-being of the
people, the promotion and securing of which are clearly legitimate objectives of governmental efforts and
regulations. The motivating factor in the issuance of Proclamation No. 475 is without a doubt the interest of the
public in general. The only question now is whether the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
One of the root causes of the problems that beset Boracay was tourist influx. Tourist arrivals in the island
were clearly far more than Boracay could handle. Certainly, the closure of Boracay, albeit temporarily, afforded
the government the necessary leeway in its rehabilitation program. In any case, the closure was only for a definite
period of six months, i.e., from April 26, 2018 to October 25, 2018. To the mind of the Court, this period constitutes
a reasonable time frame, if not to complete, but to at least put in place the necessary rehabilitation works to be
done in the island. Indeed, the temporary closure of Boracay, although unprecedented and radical as it may
seem, was reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive under the circumstances. It was the most practical
and realistic means of ensuring that rehabilitation works in the island are started and carried out in the most
efficacious and expeditious way. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, unreasonableness,
arbitrariness or oppressiveness, the Court will not disturb the executive determination that the closure of Boracay
was necessitated by the foregoing circumstances. Undoubtedly, Proclamation No. 475 is a valid police power
measure.

13. Ermita- Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc v City Mayor of Manila

Facts:
On June 13,1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760 after which the
petitioners detailed several grievances against the said ordinance, to wit:
(i) The ordinance exceeded the authority of the Municipal Board by regulating motels, which were not
referenced in the city's revised charter or other laws.
(ii) Section 1 of the ordinance was unconstitutional, particularly its imposition of high annual fees for
motels.
(iii) There are provisions requiring detailed guest registration, including personal information, in a manner
they deemed unconstitutional for its invasion of privacy and violation of due process.
(iv) Classification of motels into two classes and the imposition of specific facilities for each class, as
these are arbitrary and unreasonable.
(v) Vague and arbitrary restrictions on admitting individuals under 18 years old and leasing rooms more
than twice every 24 hours.
(vi) Penalty for subsequent violations would cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the
offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, which
would be a transgression of the due process clause.

Issue:
W/N the enacted Ordinance No. 4760 is a valid exercise of police power.

Held:
Yes. Ordinance No. 4760 of Manila regulating the operation of hotels, motels and lodging houses, is a
manifestation of police power measure, specifically aimed to safeguard public morals. As such, it is immune from
such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold
otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the
great public needs." Police power is that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society. There is no question that the challenged ordinance
was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals.
The explanatory note included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming increase in the
rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which
"provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven
for prostitutes and thrill seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring
of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration
form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times. Moreover, the increase in the licensed
fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at
the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of
facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a
municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of
authority. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It
provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. What should be deemed unreasonable and what
would amount to be an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of
the state of public morals.

2.6. Requisites for valid exercise of Police Power

(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference
of the State, and;
(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
Lawful Subject (Welfare of the people is the supreme law)

- The subject of the measure is within the scope of the police power.
- Activity or property sought to be regulated affects public welfare.
• OBJECT: Public welfare; SUBJECT OF REGULATION must be related to the object; then it is a lawful subject.
Examples:
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila v. Board of Transportation (Old taxis case): Taxicabs more than 6 years old
must be phased out as a police measure to protect the public and promote their comfort and convenience.
Bautista v. Junio (Trucks case): Prohibition of heavy and extra-heavy vehicles to use public streets on a weekend
is for energy conservation purposes.
Lawful Means/Methods

- Must concur with lawful subject. Lack of one, police measure will be struck down.
- The lawful objective must be pursued with a lawful method. Both the end and means must be legitimate.
- Means employed must pass the test of reasonableness so as to conform with the Bill of Rights for the
protection of private rights. Failing this, the law will be annulled for violation of the second requirement.

Examples:
In cases of Rape. The punishment is life imprisonment to death (which is now amended limiting the punishment
to imprisonment). There is equivalence in the offense and penalty. If, for example, the penalty becomes
castration of the rapist, valid? It is not because of the guaranty by the due process of law to respect the integrity
of the person’s body.

Community Cleanliness. An ordinance may be enacted requiring litter to be deposited in trash bins and
non-compliance will induce punishment. Such ordinance, however, will become invalid if it prohibits, for
example, distribution of bills in public places in the belief that people will scatter them on the streets after
viewing. Invalidity is due to the violation of the distributor’s rights to articulate and disseminate ideas as
guaranteed under the freedom

Illustrative cases
14. DESAMA vs Gozun
FACTS:
In 1987, Pres. Aquino rolled out EO 279 which empowered the DENR to stipulate with foreign companies
when it comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act.
In 1994, Pres. Ramos signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with Arimco
Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 hectares of land
in Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its
implementing Rules and Regulations (RR). Didipio petitioned to have the law and the RR to be annulled as it is
unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its
implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942
and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust “taking” of private property for
private purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private property
shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert that
public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its
own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just compensation.
Traversing petitioners’ assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a taking provision but a valid
exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulation
involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use
or economic exploitation of private property. Public respondents concluded that “to require compensation in all
such circumstances would compel the government to regulate by purchase.”
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the the FTAA is a valid exercise of the police power of the state?

Held:
1. Yes, the Court held that in the exercise of its police power regulation, the state restricts the use of private
property, but none of the property interests in the bundle of rights which constitute ownership is appropriated for
use by or for the benefit of the public. Use of the property by the owner was limited, but no aspect of the property
is used by or for the public. The deprivation of use can in fact be total and it will not constitute compensable
taking if nobody else acquires use of the property or any interest therein.
 Public respondents are inclined to believe that by entering private lands and concession areas, FTAA
holders do not oust the owners thereof nor deprive them of all beneficial enjoyment of their properties as the said
entry merely establishes a legal easement upon surface owners, occupants and concessionaires of a mining
contract area.

Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious purpose; Hence,
no compensation shall be paid. Likewise, in the exercise of police power, property rights of private individuals
are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.

A thorough scrutiny of the extant jurisprudence leads to a cogent deduction that where a property interest
is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare, or where property is
destroyed because its continued existence would be injurious to public interest, there is no compensable taking.
However, when a property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is compensable
taking.

15. Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego

Facts:
Under MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take
the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth
time.

The respondent, who was a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science
in Zoology, took the NMAT three times but flunked, when he would like to re-take, the petitioner rejected his
admittance in view of the above-stated rule.

The Respondent, raised the issue via a petition for mandamus at the RTC which he first invoked his
constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education and later through an amended petition,
challenged the constitutionality of the afore-stated rule. The Judge, in her Decision, held that the petitioner had
been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary
exercise of the police power.

Held:
No, the Respondent had not been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary
exercise of the police power.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure
intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their
competence and preparation for a medical education.
In the instant case, the respondent’s failure for more than three times, in view of the rule, which in effect,
barred him to take the NMAT exam does not ipso facto constitute a violation of his Constitutional right to
academic freedom and quality education. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools
and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. There would
be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have
also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is
validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment
of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The subject of the
challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility
of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily
entrust their lives and health.
Hence, the petition must be Granted and the decision of the Respondent court must be reversed.

2.7. Limitations on police power

1.) Due Process Clause- no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
2.) Equal Protection Clause- no person shall be denied the equal protection of laws. [Art. 3, Sec. 1]

Although inherent and indispensable, the fundamental powers of the state are not without restrictions-
as ours is a government of limited powers, even these prerogatives may not be exercise arbitrarily, to the
prejudice of the bills of rights. The presumption in libertarian societies is in favor of private rights and against
attempt on the part of the state to interfere with them, " Constitutional provision for the security of persons and
property should be liberally construed."

Hence, the exercise of these fundamental powers is subject at all times to the limitation and
requirements of the constitution and may in proper cases be annulled by the courts of justice.

2.8. Delegability of police power

Who may exercise Police Power

- It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature.
- It cannot be execised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power.
- The National Legislature, however, may delegate his power to the President and administrative boards as
well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. (MMDA vs Bel – Air Village
Association)

Exception: When the Legislature delegates this power to the President, administrative boards as well as
lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, agents can exercise
only such powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. In other words, limited.

Requisites for Valid Exercise of Police Power by the Delegate

1.) Express grant by law;
2.) Must not be contrary to law;
3.) Within territorial limits of LGUs.

Test for Valid Delegation

1.) Completeness Test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it;
2.) Sufficient Standard Test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running out.

o Delegation to the President

◦ Section 23 [2] Article 6 of the Constitution.
▪ Delegation of emergency powers to the president can only be made in cases of war or national
emergency. This is because the president can quickly respond to such situations unlike congress
which still needs to convene.
◦ Congress determines the existence of a state of war by a vote of 2/3 of its members voting separately.
▪ Congress is vested with such prerogative because this involves the passing of a law
 delegating emergency powers to the president so that the president can prosecute the war.
Like for example disbursement of public funds. Funds are needed to be able to fund the war effort.
In order that funds might be used, there should be proper authority to disburse which is lodged
with congress. If emergency powers is no delegated to the president during the war, congress will
still need to pass a law in order to disburse funds, by that time we are already invaded.
◦ The president is never precluded from declaring war being the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP.
◦ The declaration of the state of war is for the purpose of granting emergency power to the President.
▪ Illustration: In the case where the Constitutionality of the declaration of state of national
emergency pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 1102 was questioned, the petitioners thought
that it should be the Congress who should declare the state of national emergency as a condition
precedent to the grant of emergency powers but the Supreme Court held that the
President is the best person to know in what state the country is in considering that
the Armed Forces is under his command.
◦ David, et al vs. Ermitta
▪ “The president has the power to declare State of National Emergency being the Chief
Executive and the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP.”
◦ Lacson case & Perez case:
▪ A declaration of State of Rebellion was in question and the Supreme Court sustained that such
declaration is in consonance with the Constitution.
◦ Can the President exercise emergency power if a state of emergency is already declared?
▪ Sec. 23, Art. VI is very clear that it is only upon express grant of law that the Congress may
authorize the President to exercise powers necessary & proper to carry out a declared
national policy.
◦ Can the President make any laws once emergency power is granted?
▪ Yes if it is allowed by law delegating the emergency powers to the president, also known as the
declared national policy. The power granted is subject to restrictions prescribed by Congress and
for limited time only. In fact, it can be withdrawn by Resolution, if not, such power shall cease
upon the next adjournment. Such grant is limited because it is not a plenary power of the
President; it is only delegated to him for the purpose of promoting the public welfare.

Delegation of Police Power to Administrative Bodies

o No one knows better or best than those who are expert in the field. (E.g. for financial matters- Dept. Of
Finance)
o limited to rule execution rather than law making.
o ‘Power of Subordinate Legislation’
o The authority conferred to administrative bodies to pass rules and regulations to implement the
laws made by the legislative bodies.
o Implementing Rules and Regulations may not be laws but they have the force and effects of laws.
o It is also essential that if police power is delegated to the administrative bodies, the implementing rules
and regulations should be signed by the department head.
o Illustration: In Echegaray vs. Sec. Of Justice, a manual on how to enforce lethal injection was
questioned by Echegaray’s lawyer because it was not signed by the head of the department of
the Bureau of Corrections which is under the Department of Justice and the signatory is only the
Director of the Bureau.

Delegation of power to the local government units

o Police power is not inherent in the local government
o Therefore, in order to express the power of local government, there should be an express grant of police
power to LGU, for they cannot legislate for the promotion of general welfare of the locality.

Such as: delegation of power R.A. 7160 - local gov code - gen welfare, armm, provinces, cities, sanguniang
bayan of the municipality
o sanguniang pangbarangay - exercise legislative power under gen welfare clause - exercising police power
o Because the power is delegated by congress to LGU, it is understood that the exercise of the power is limited
in the sense that the they cannot create laws contrary to the constitution and against existing laws - laws
passed by congress because they cannot rise above the source of that created them, must be in accordance
with the constitution and laws passed by congress

o LGU cannot prohibIt the trade or acitivity, that is if it is allowed by existing laws
o cruz vs paras - midnight clubs for public safety and morals, order of closure. does the lgu pass laws
to prohibit? no law prohibiting passed by congress...hence lgu cannot prohibit but only regulate
o magtajas vs - casinos, law by PAGCOR allowing the activity, contrary to morals, cagayan de oro
cannot prohibit
o acebedo case - clinic and business, no busness permit, lgu, he complains that lgu cannot prohibit
him from practice of his profession, “closure of my store is tantamount of prohibiting me from practice
of my profession” lgu can - by the ordinance... business vs profession
o pangasinan or pampanga case - prohibiting big busses to go inside the city so not to cause traffic

Illustrative cases

16. Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. v. The Public Service Commission

Facts:
Petitioner Pangasinan Trasnportation Co. Inc, engaged for the past twenty years in the business of
transporting passengers, filed with the Public Service Commission an application for authorization to operate ten
additional new Brockway trucks on the ground that they were needed to comply with the terms and conditions of
its existing certificates and as a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law.
Public Service Commission granted the application with 2 additional conditions which was made to apply
also on their existing business.
Pantranco, discontented, filed a motion for reconsideration with the Public Service Commission but was
subsequently denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contended that:
1. That the legislative powers granted to the Public Service Commission by section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 454, without limitation, guide or rule except the unfettered discretion and judgment of the Commission,
constitute a complete and total abdication by the Legislature of its functions in the premises, and for that reason,
the Act, in so far as those powers are concerned, is unconstitutional and void.

2. That even if it be assumed that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, is valid delegation of
legislative powers, the Public Service Commission has exceeded its authority because: (a) The Act applies only
to future certificates and not to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939, when said Act
took effect, and (b) the Act, as applied by the Commission, violates constitutional guarantees.

Respondent Public service Commission invoked Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended
by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 which provides that, "no public service shall operate in the Philippines
without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as "certificate
of public convenience," or "certificate of convenience and public necessity," as the case may be, to the effect
that the operation of said service and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper
and suitable manner." Furthermore, the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by
any instrumental thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable depreciation,"
The violation of any of these conditions shall produce the immediate cancellation of the certificate without the
necessity of any express action on the part of the Commission.
Issue:
Whether or not the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission is unconstitutional and void because
it is without limitation and constitutes undue delegation of powers.
Held:
Yes, the power granted to Public Services Commission are valid and constitutional because it is a proper
delegation of legislative power, so called “Subordinate Legislation”.
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward
the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the court.
The petitioner is mistaken in the suggestion that, simply because its existing certificates had been granted
before June 8, 1939, the date when Commonwealth Act No. 454, amendatory of section 15 of Commonwealth
Act No. 146, was approved, it must be deemed to have the right of holding them in perpetuity. In support thereof,
the law and the constitution provides that, "no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or
corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National
Assembly when the public interest so requires."
Statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of its police
power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to
those already established and in operation.
Nor is there any merit in petitioner's contention, that, because of the establishment of petitioner's
operations prior to May 1, 1917, they are not subject to the regulations of the Commission. Statutes for the
regulation of public utilities are a proper exercise by the state of its police power. As soon as the power is
exercised, all phases of operation of established utilities, become at once subject to the police power thus called
into operation.
Obviously the power of the Commission to hear and dispose of complaints is as effective against
companies securing their operative rights prior to May 1, 1917, as against those subsequently securing such
right under a certificate of public convenience and necessity.
The business of a common carrier holds such a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is
superinduced upon it the right of public regulation. When private property is "affected with a public interest it
ceased to be juris privati only." When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an
interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public
for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created.
Indeed, this right of regulation is so far beyond question that it is well settled that the power of the state
to exercise legislative control over public utilities may be exercised through boards of commissioners.
(Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship Company)
This right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded upon the police power, and statutes for the
control and regulation of utilities are a legitimate exercise thereof, for the protection of the public as well as of
the utilities themselves.
Such statutes are, therefore, not unconstitutional, either impairing the obligation of contracts,
taking property without due process, or denying the equal protection of the laws.
However, the Court held that the decision of the Public Service Commission should be reversed and the
case remanded thereto for further proceedings because on the On the matter of limitation to twenty five (25)
years of the life of its certificates of public convenience, there had been neither notice nor opportunity given the
petitioner to be heard or present evidence. The Commission appears to have taken advantage of the petitioner
to augment petitioner's equipment in imposing the limitation of twenty-five (25) years which might as well be
twenty or fifteen or any number of years.
 There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The
first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. As held in Morgan vs. Us, "the liberty and property of the
citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play."
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity, at least when directly attacked. (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle
emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the
vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity, at least when directly attacked. (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle
emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the
vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the Public Service Commission
for further proceedings in accordance with law and this decision.

17. Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita

Facts:
In this case, the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337, also known as the Revitalized Value Added Tax Law,
is being questioned by petitioner ABAKADA GURO Party List. They argue that the law, particularly Sections 4,
5, and 6, which amend Sections 106, 107, and 108 of the National Internal Revenue Code, was not duly enacted.
The controversy arises from the insertion of provisions during the Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC)
stage, allowing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%.

ABAKADA GURO Party List contends that this provision violates Congress's exclusive authority to fix tax
rates, as outlined in the Constitution. They argue that VAT is distinct from tariffs and that the lack of clear
standards for the Secretary of Finance's recommendation undermines the law's validity. They further assert that
the President effectively wields the decision-making power, rendering the Secretary of Finance's
recommendation a mere formality.

Respondents cite the Enrolled Bill Doctrine, exemplified by the Tolentino case, which holds that the
signing and certification of a bill by legislative leaders are conclusive evidence of its due enactment. They argue
that R.A. No. 9337 enjoys a presumption of constitutionality and that courts cannot scrutinize its internal
processes.

ABAKADA GURO Party List, however, insists on abandoning the Tolentino precedent.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI, Section
26 (2) of the Constitution.
(2) Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1
and 2 of the Constitution.
(3) Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of
the Constitution.
Held:

(1) No. R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions.
 The revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its
constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No.
1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of
the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be
introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.

Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law, but the revenue bill which is required by the
Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives, but Senate has the power not only to
propose amendments, but also to propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the
Constitution to originate in the House. The Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff
or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come
from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the
House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators,
who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views
are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

(2) No. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a
law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when
it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex
economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.

In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature
so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.

(3) No. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons shall
be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place
and in like circumstances.” The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the
purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property,
the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the
State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power
absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.

2.9. Police power delegated to LGUs

(see above discussion on delegability of Police Power)

2.10. Requisites for valid ordinance

1. It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute

2. It must not be unfair and oppressive
3. It must not be partial and discriminatory
4. It must not prohibit, but may regulate, trade
5. It must not be unreasonable
6. It must be general in application and consistent with public policy

Illustrative cases

18. City of Batangas v. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corp

Facts:
In furtherance of the mandate of Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD 87) to promote the discovery and
production of indigenous petroleum, the Department of Energy (DOE) executed Service Contract No. 38 (SC 38)
with SPEX under which SPEX was tasked to explore and develop possible petroleum sources in North Western
Palawan. 13 SPEX's exploration led to the discovery of an abundant source of natural gas in the Malampaya field
off the shores of Palawan, which thereafter gave rise to the Malampaya Project. The Malampaya Project required
the construction of a 504-kilometer offshore pipeline for the transport of natural gas from Malampaya field to
Batangas, for treatment in PSPC's Tabangao Refinery.

In connection thereto, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Batangas enacted Ordinance No. 03 which
mandates all heavy industries operating along Batangas Bay to use seawater in the operation of their respective
facilities, and install desalination plants for this purpose. Failure to comply with this mandatory requirement would
have the effect of precluding continuous operation, and exposing noncompliant parties to penal and
administrative sanctions.

On May 23, 2006, PSPC filed against Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity (PSPC Petition) before the RTC praying that the Assailed Ordinance be declared null and
void.

For its part, PSPC averred that the Assailed Ordinance constitutes an invalid exercise of police power as
it failed to meet the substantive requirements for validity. Particularly, PSPC argued that the Assailed Ordinance
contravenes the Water Code of the Philippines (Water Code), and encroaches upon the power of the National
Water Resources Board (NWRB) to regulate and control the Philippines' water resources. PSPC alleged that
the Ordinance unduly singles out heavy industries, and holds them solely accountable for the loss of water and
destruction of aquifers without basis, resulting in the deprivation of their property rights without due process of
law.25

Batangas City, on the other hand, contended that it has the legal authority to enact ordinances in the
exercise of its police power for the purpose of promoting the general welfare of its inhabitants. Thus, it asserts
that it has the power to regulate PSPC's and SPEX's right to use ground water, as continued use would be
injurious to public interest.

Further, Batangas City insisted that there was factual basis to justify the enactment of the Assailed
Ordinance. As testified to by barangay captains Joel Caaway and Calixto Villena, a gradual change in the quality
and quantity of ground water had taken place due to the increase in the number of industrial plants along
Batangas Bay.67 According to Batangas City, these testimonies should be given more weight, since they are
based on "actual facts and experience."

RTC resolved the First Gas Petition by issuing a Decision declaring the Assailed Ordinance null and void.
The CA, likewise, denied petitioners argument by affirming the Decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not EO NO. 3 is a valid exercise of police power.

Held:

No, EO No. 3 is not a valid exercise of police power, hence, null and void for being contrary to existing
law, and for lack of evidence showing the existence of factual basis for its enactment.

The requisites for a valid ordinance are well established. Time and again, the Court has ruled that in
order for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the concerned LGU to enact,
but must also be passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Moreover, substantively, the
ordinance (i) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (ii) must not be unfair or oppressive; (iii) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (iv) must not prohibit, but may regulate trade; (v) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (vi) must not be unreasonable.70

Batangas City claims that the enactment of the Assailed Ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of its
police power. This claim is erroneous.
 Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order, safety, and general welfare of the people. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty, police power primarily
rests with the State. In furtherance of the State's policy to foster genuine and meaningful local autonomy, the
national legislature delegated the exercise of police power to local government units (LGUs) as agents of the
State. Such delegation can be found in Section 16 of the LGC, which embodies the general welfare clause.

Since LGUs exercise delegated police power as agents of the State, it is incumbent upon them to
act in conformity to the will of their principal, the State. Necessarily, therefore, ordinances enacted pursuant
to the general welfare clause may not subvert the State's will by contradicting national statutes.

In this Petition, the Court is called upon to determine whether the control and regulation of the use of
water may be made subject of a city ordinance under the regime of the Water Code - a national statute governing
the same subject matter.

Conversely, the power to modify, suspend, cancel or revoke water permits already issued also rests with
NWRB.82

Accordingly, the Assailed Ordinance mandates all heavy industries operating along Batangas Bay to use
seawater in the operation of their respective facilities, and install desalination plants for this purpose. Failure to
comply with this mandatory requirement would have the effect of precluding continuous operation, and exposing
noncompliant parties to penal and administrative sanctions.

There is no doubt, therefore, that the Assailed Ordinance effectively contravenes the provisions of the
Water Code as it arrogates unto Batangas City the power to control and regulate the use of ground water which,
by virtue of the provisions of the Water Code, pertains solely to the NWRB. By enacting the Assailed Ordinance,
Batangas City acted in excess of the powers granted to it as an LGU, rendering the Assailed Ordinance ultra
vzres.

2.11. Cases

Illustrative cases

19. Lozano v. Martinez

Facts:
This is a consolidated case; the petition arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the BP
22 also known as Bouncing Check Law. The defendant in these cases moved seasonably to quash the
information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional.
The motions were denied by the respondent trial court, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R No.
75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely
affected have come to the court for remedy. Those who question the constitutionality of the said statute insist
the following ground:
Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, one is the alleged conflict between the statute
and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contended that the statute runs counter to
the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll
tax." Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-
payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than
a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is
claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under the threat of penal sanction
Issue:
W/N BP 22 is repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

Held:
No. The Court held that the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished
by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation
for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions,
the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but
an offense against public order.
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of a debt
ex contractu. But certainly, it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed
pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act
may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it
inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this
in the exercise of its police power.
The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of
powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is a power
not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state and plenary. The enactment of BP
22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless
check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not
only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand-fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

20. Tablarin v. Gutierrez

Facts:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988.
However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and administered by the
private respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). The petitioners sought to stop the Secretary
of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement
from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of
1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from
administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on
20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
The petitioners invoked a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution that they claim are violated by
the assailed statute and administrative order such as "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens
to quality education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. " (Sec. 1,
Art. 14) and "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements." (Sec. 5, Art. 14).

Issue:
W/N prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical
schools in the Philippines, constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
Held:
No. The Court held that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a
condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
The legislative and administrative provisions impugned by the petitioners constitute, to the mind of the Court, a
valid exercise of the police power of the state. The police power is the pervasive and nonwaivable power and
authority of the sovereign to secure and promote the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order
— of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and
well-being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental
effort and regulation.
The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also
well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine
first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power.
In the case at bar, it is the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as
noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical
quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the
medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting,
among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical
studies and eventually for medical practice.
The Court ruled that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means
for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into medical schools" and of "improving
the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests, the
Court considered itself entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area. That end is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects
of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or
trauma.

21. Del Rosario v. Bengzon

Facts:
The case involves a class suit filed by officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the national
organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their professional brethren who share similar
views or beliefs. They questioned the constitutionality of some provisions of the Generics Act of 1988 (RA 6675)
and its implementing Administrative Order No. 62.
The questioned provisions include Section 6, Pars. (a) and (b) of the Generics Act, which mandate the
use of generic terminology in transactions related to drugs and medicines by government health agencies and
personnel, as well as by medical, dental, and veterinary practitioners, both government and private. These
provisions allow for the inclusion of brand names in prescriptions if desired. Furthermore, the provisions of
Section 4 of Administrative Order No. 62, Series of 1989, issued by the Secretary of Health, regulates violative,
erroneous, and impossible prescriptions where the generic name is omitted, illegible, or improperly presented
as well as those where the brand name is indicated with instructions such as "No Substitution," which may hinder
proper generic dispensing.
The petitioner’s main argument is the alleged unequal treatment of government practitioners and those
on the private practice. It is because the former is required to use only generic terminology in the prescription
while the latter may write the brand name of the drug below the generic name. It is allegedly a specie of invalid
class legislation.
The respondent points out that the institution of generics in the Philippines will compel physicians to
prescribe drugs based on their therapeutic or "active ingredient," instead of their well-known brand names.
Patients with limited means will be able to buy generic drugs that cost less but possess the same active
ingredients, dosage form, and strength as brand names, many of which are priced beyond the reach of the
common people.

Issue:
W/N the Generics Act is constitutional as to the exercise of police power by the government.

Held:
Yes, the Generics Act is constitutional and is a valid exercise of police power. The Court has been unable
to find any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It implements the constitutional mandate for the State "to
protect and promote the right to health of the people" and "to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost" (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution).
The purpose of the Generics Act is to “promote and require the use of generic drug products that are
therapeutically equivalent to their brand name counterparts”. The effect of the drug does not depend on its brand
but on the active ingredients which it contains.
The alleged unequal treatment of government physicians, dentists and veterinarians on one hand and
those in the private practice in the other, is simply a misinterpretation of the law by the petitioner.
The prohibition against the use by doctors of "no substitution" and/or words of similar import in their
prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent the circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to
choose between the brand name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both the generic
and the brand name in his prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a brand-name drug with "no
substitution," the patient's option to buy a lower-priced, but equally effective, generic equivalent would thereby
be curtailed. The law aims to benefit the impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the population in a still
developing country like ours, not the affluent and generally healthy minority.

22. Velasco v. Villegas

Facts:
The herein respondent issued Ordinance No. 4964 which prohibits any operator of any barber shop to
conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber
shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the
operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person.”

In view of the issued Ordinance, petitioner assailed the constitutionality of the latter because, according
to them, it amounts to of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of
law. However, despite such plea, the lower court dismissed the same. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not EO No. 4964, is a valid city ordinance.

Held:

Yes, EO No. 4964 is a valid city ordinance, being a police power measure.

Under the General Welfare Clause, "it delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. As
above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the
particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the
progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence."

Here, the purposes of which the ordinance were promulgated was to prohibit the operator of any barber
shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said
barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the
operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person."

Henceforth, as there is no a clear showing of the unconstitutionality of such ordinance, it remains valid
and in legal force and effect.

23. Dela Cruz v Paras

Facts:
The Ordinance No. 84, enacted by the Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan, prohibiting operation of night
clubs, cabarets or dance halls being the principal cause in the decadence of morality and because of their
adverse effects within the jurisdiction of the municipality.

The petitioners posit that the ordinance is null and void as municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful
business, occupation or calling. They also argue that the ordinance is violative of their right to due process and
equal protection of the law, as the license previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial
hearing.

Other arguments are that petitioners had invested large sums of money in their businesses; That the
night clubs are well-lighted and have no partitions, the tables being near each other; That the petitioners
owners/operators of these clubs do not allow the hospitality girls therein to engage in immoral acts and to go out
with customers; That these hospitality girls are made to go through periodic medical check-ups and not one of
them is suffering from any venereal disease and that those who fail to submit to a medical check-up or those
who are found to be infected with venereal disease are not allowed to work;. That the crime rate there is better
than in other parts of Bocaue or in other towns of Bulacan.

Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 84 is a valid exercise of police power and can prohibit the exercise of a lawful
trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses.

Held:
Yes, the Ordinance No. 84 is an invalid exercise of police power.

Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows: "General power of council
to enact ordinances and make regulations. - The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."

In the cases of United States v. Abendan and United States v. Salaveria, the courts established criteria
for the validity of ordinances in the Philippines. An ordinance is deemed valid unless it contradicts fundamental
law, legislative acts, public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, discriminatory, or against common rights. The
general welfare clause allows municipalities to enact ordinances necessary for carrying out their powers and
duties, as well as those promoting health, safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, convenience,
and property protection. However, ordinances must be reasonable, consistent with municipal powers, and not in
conflict with state laws or policies.

If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test
of validity. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under
the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a
measure that does not encompass too wide a field. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained
by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
 Therefore, Ordinance No. 84 of the Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and unconstitutional.

24. City of Manila v Laguio Jr.

Facts:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate
which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. MTDC filed
a Petition with the lower court, praying the Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is
not a valid exercise of police power and it constitute a denial of equal protection under the law.

Enacted by the City Council, on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993,
the said Ordinance is entitled–

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES

PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE
ERMITA, MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.

In the decision rendered by Judge Laguio declared the Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of 1993, of the City
of Manila null and void. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issues:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of due process.
2. Whether or not the City of Manila validly exercised police power.
3. Whether or not there was a violation of equal protection clause.

Held:
1. No, the constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Consitution – No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate
reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to
whether there is a sufficient justification for the government’s action. Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells
us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used.

For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due process
is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict
scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet substantive due
process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. The police
power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the
people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily
or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and
regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and
property.

2. No, The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since the requisites for a valid exercise of police
power are not met. The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the
social and welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual diseases in Manila. It is baseless and insupportable to bring
within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs,
discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. These are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive
to the moral welfare of the community. It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the
achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a
person’s fundamental right to liberty and property.

3. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently,
so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee means that no person
or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in like circumstances. The “equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.” It
limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as
their property is concerned.

In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid
as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as
it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the
Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if
located outside the area.

WHEREFORE, all considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs
personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement
of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance
and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.