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MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XV, NO. 3, FALL 2008
A VISION OF OMAN: STATE OF THE SULTANATE
SPEECHES BY QABOOS BIN SAID, 1970-2006
Joseph A. Kéchichian
Dr. Kéchichian is the author of Oman and the World: The Emergence of an
Independent Foreign Policy (1995) and Political Participation and Stability
in the Sultanate of Oman (2006).
O
ratory by a head of state
positions a leader in his time.
Speeches occasionally alter
circumstances: defining a
mandate, declaring war or divulging
stratagems to protect and serve a nation.
While most are relegated to academic
tomes or the dustbin of history, many are
recalled for their erudition, foresight and, in
rare circumstances, their ability to define
the character of a speaker.1 Like Charles
De Gaulle, who wrote that he had “a
certain idea of France,” Qaboos bin Said
has aimed to “restore the past glories” of
the Sultanate of Oman (p.14).2 He pro-
posed to reinvent a nation that was once a
mighty empire, and his words elevated the
spirit of a hapless population that had
drifted from past accomplishments. Start-
ing in 1971, Qaboos delivered 35 annual
speeches defining his vision, presenting
policies to the nation and setting the course
for internal stability. What were the origins
of these statements; how have they
influenced Omani behavior; and what do
they reveal about the author?
© 2008, The Authors
112
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Qaboos bin Said is the only Arab
leader to have created a written record
through his annual “State of the Sultanate”
orations to his nation.3 No other Middle
Eastern head of state has gone through this
ritual, itself an indication that he had given
the idea some thought before acceding to
the throne and, equally important, realizing
its ultimate value both as a communication
technique as well as a permanent record of
his positions. Of course, most Arab and
Muslim leaders have excelled in oratory
presentations, harangues and other forms
of popular interactions. Gamal Abdul
Nasser of Egypt or Yasser Arafat of
Palestine were masters of the word as
they galvanized their followers. Others,
including King Faysal bin Abdul Aziz Al
Saud of Saudi Arabia, mobilized millions
throughout the Muslim world by delivering
impromptu remarks during their travels or
by advising foreign delegations on policy
differences. Yet, no Arab head of state
before Qaboos had engaged in a system-
atic annual accounting to his subjects for
his decisions and actions. His presenta-
tions were widely discussed, sometimes
Journal Compilation © 2008, Middle East Policy Council

disparaged, but always acknowledged for
adding value to the Omani body politic.
They were made available to Omanis in
print form and, more recently, electronically
on the Internet, for evaluation.
Given that the Sultanate has experi-
enced profound sociopolitical changes
during the past 35 years, Qaboos’s apprais-
als were not only educational, but also
revelatory. Young Omanis who were not
even born when their ruler acceded to the
throne found food for thought as their
country faced immense nation-building
challenges. Most were first exposed to
Qaboos’ views in school as history classes.
Many empathized with the difficulties their
own families, tribes or regions had endured
and became aware of development
projects that were catapulting the Sultanate
into the modern era. Younger Omanis
were given a vision of the future in a
country that was open to diversity in a part
of the world that was not particularly
amenable to foreign ideas. The 35
speeches under review reveal a conscious
long-term effort to empower Omanis,
foster a climate in which the creation of
wealth was possible, and provide security
and stability to the nation.
Qaboos’s annual speeches between
1971 and 2006 total more than 50,000
words. They vary in length from 3,038
words to 401 words, and average around
1,500 words. The first 30 were “National
Day” addresses; the last five were talks to
the Council of Oman. Most were deliv-
ered in Muscat, the capital city; others in
Salalah, Sohar, Nizwah, Sur and Ibri. All
were in Arabic.
These presentations covered both
domestic and international topics and often
anticipated events or identified regional
trends. Qaboos often elucidated key
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KECHICHIAN: A VISION OF OMAN
matters when doing so was not popular
within Arab circles. As discussed below,
he used the term “terrorist” in 1971, when
the notion was neither well understood in
the context of contemporary politics, nor
accepted as an urgent concern. Still, his
prose was never condescending. He
obviously knew that poverty was a reality
in Oman, and he did not remind his subjects
of their dire condition. Rather, he proposed
to implement specific programs to address
their core concerns and improve their
circumstances. He also did not insist on
their allegiance but emphasized the patrio-
tism. Not surprisingly, “Oman” and
“country” (dawlah) were cited often, but
nation (watan) was the term used most
often. Certain terms, including wealth,
loyalty, burden, patience, steadfast, poverty
and allegiance, were used sparingly. These
were essential to Qaboos’s vision, but too
sensitive to unload on a traditional people.
The ruler preferred to talk about action
rather than rely on lofty words when it
came to basic social needs.
CONTENT ANALYSIS
Starting in 1971, Qaboos took pains to
explain his domestic and foreign-policy
principles and repeatedly explained his
motives. His primary objective from 1970
was the Omani citizen, the “human indi-
vidual.” His goal, Qaboos underlined, was
“to ensure happiness … [and] to give the
best of his talent” (p. 25). He recognized
that Omanis had rights and obligations and
called on each citizen to “take as much as
he gives of his efforts, sweat, sincerity and
loyalty to his dear land” (p. 27). Attentive
to subtleties, the ruler never sought loyalty
to the Crown, but underscored duty
towards country. For Qaboos, land was
“sacred” and people were “noble,” espe-
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XV, NO. 3, FALL 2008
cially when they were ready to work for
their “country’s glory, honor, progress and
prosperity” (p. 41). Even if the Sultan was
an absolute monarch, he was alert to his
traditional and religious norms.4
Domestic Concerns
In his first address to Omanis, Qaboos
recognizes that the “country in the past
was famous and strong” and would revive
that “glorious past” to “take a respectable
place in the world” (p. 8). While he never
wavered from this objective, even when
the going was not trouble-free, the Sultan
calls on his countrymen to “bear the
burdens with patience and continue our
work with steadfastedness and determina-
tion” (p. 12). This is reminiscent of John F.
Kennedy’s call to his fellow Americans to
“ask not what your country can do for you
— ask what you can do for your country.”
In numerous presentations, Qaboos
stresses the sense of duty in the face of
major challenges to “share the burden of
responsibility,” and to roll up one’s sleeves
to get to work. His focus is not to simply
add material gains or record social im-
provements, though those were certainly
necessary and sorely lacking, but to do so
without neglecting the country’s traditions.
For the Omani monarch, prosperity, as
defined in the tenth anniversary speech,
means harvesting “Omani culture and the
teachings” of Islam (p. 80).
Because Qaboos covered a vast
amount of information in these annual
presentations, especially during the first
decade, when he reported on progress in
various domestic and foreign fields, it is
useful to decipher them under more
specific categories. His major internal
preoccupations were education, training,
health issues, infrastructure, agriculture and
114
industry. He also addressed the creation of
wealth and the role of young Omanis in
tackling domestic challenges, while defining
the Sultanate’s oil policy as a burden to
manage with the utmost care. Finally, the
Omani leader spoke about the military’s role
in ensuring domestic tranquility, largely based
on the experiences of the Dhuffar War.
Each of these categories deserves scrutiny.
Education and Training
With hardly any schools or teachers,
education was the most difficult challenge
that faced the young ruler when he as-
sumed authority. The fact that in 1970
there were a mere three schools for 900
students spoke volumes about Sultan Said
bin Taymur’s priorities. Within a year of
his accession, Qaboos saw to it that 13
additional schools were established for a
total of 7,000 pupils (rising to 45 institutions
for 15,000 in 1972). This was not easy.
Oman lacked qualified teachers, but
somehow managed.5 The young ruler
refers to early efforts in this field with a
phrase that is often repeated: “provide
education opportunities even under the
shadow of trees” (p.14). Year after year,
Qaboos lists significant accomplishments:
new schools established, teachers hired and
students enrolled. If these numbers were
low in 1973 (100, 1,300 and 38,000), by 1974,
after allocated funds jumped from 1 million
Omani riyals (OR) ($3 million) to OR9.4
million ($20 million), a 20-fold increase, the
numbers quickly rose. By 1975, there were
176 schools catering to over 50,000 students,
with another 50 schools, 1,000 teachers and
10,000 new students coming on board every
year that passed. Within a decade, by 1980,
over 100,000 Omani children were receiving
basic education.

Taking stock of 25 years of progress in
1995, Qaboos returns to his earlier empha-
sis on the human being as the ultimate
source of “power, the instrument and the
ultimate aim of national development” (p.
234). As in other countries with limited
natural resources, the Omani head of state
understood that the government must care
for its citizens at this most basic level, to
develop skills and provide a majority with
the technological tools for domestic and
international challenges. He accepted that
Omanis possessed “innate abilities” that
required care and concluded that providing
such assistance was one of the state’s
fundamental responsibilities. Although
Qaboos and his government sorely needed
qualified Omanis to fill technical positions,
it soon became apparent that the country
would also require expatriates — men and,
over time, women — to form the backbone
of an emerging workforce. Still, Muscat
embarked on a vocational training program
as early as 1972 to avoid dependence on
foreign labor for unskilled work. Towards
that end, the first 70 young Omani men were
recruited to undergo vocational training;
dozens were sent to neighboring Arab
countries for basic social-services training.
The ruler revisited the critical vocational-
training question in 1992 to encourage all
Omanis to add their capabilities to the
workforce. It was “a national duty, even at
the most basic levels,” he declared, to create
thousands of working opportunities that did
not require advanced degrees (p. 193).
Over time, however, Qaboos appreci-
ated the need for more sophisticated and
technical training that could only be deliv-
ered following intensive education at the
university level. He announced in 1980 the
creation of a national university, originally
expected to be located in Nizwah, the
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KECHICHIAN: A VISION OF OMAN
historic education capital of Oman (p. 80).
An imposing facility, known as the Sultan
Qaboos University (SQU), was inaugu-
rated on November 9, 1986, when the
monarch invited his “daughters and sons”
to assume their responsibilities and “work
wholeheartedly” to acquire desirable
scientific degrees.6 Though ultimately
located in the Al Khod valley near the
capital, the venue presented no impedi-
ment; thousands flocked to enroll. More
recently, and with full government approval,
several private colleges and institutes have
been established to meet a growing demand,
although the country’s premier center for
higher learning retains the highest standards
for admission and graduation.
Health Issues
Even more significant than the lack of
educational opportunities was Oman’s
health deficit, the result of poverty and
neglect. A mere 10 dispensaries and nine
health centers in 1970 served a population
of around 750,000, spread over a geo-
graphical area as large as Britain. Within a
year, Muscat funded the establishment of
12 new hospitals and increased the number
of dispensaries to 25 by 1972. Lacking
physicians (12 for the entire country in
1970), Muscat turned overseas to fill its
requirements, but quickly established a
school for nurses, to meet growing local
needs (p. 15).
Year after year through most of the
1970s, Qaboos proudly reported on the
progress made in establishing new hospi-
tals, clinics and health centers. In 1973, he
listed 16 hospitals and 55 clinics with 67
physicians and 10 specialists (p. 20). A
year later, he listed 90 hospitals and health
units with 1,200 beds (there were 12 beds
in 1970) (p. 27). These early construction
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XV, NO. 3, FALL 2008
projects were quickly supplemented with a
massive immunization program to control
and prevent infectious diseases. By 1977,
even the country’s most remote locations
were equipped with basic health facilities,
as the 24-bed hospital on Masirah Island
attested (p. 61). If Qaboos stopped his
annual reports of recent additions after
1980, he nevertheless was proud to an-
nounce in 1988 that the new Royal Hospi-
tal and the Teaching Hospital at Sultan
Qaboos University would ensure an unprec-
edented level of available care (p. 133).
Infrastructure/Housing
Isolated for so long from the rest of the
world, the sultanate was devoid of modern
basic infrastructure, which severely limited
the movement of goods and services.
Construction of roads, ports and airports —
a visible legacy today that will outlive
Qaboos — was tackled with vengeance.
Construction projects throughout Oman
started shortly after 1970. First, the
government funded the building of roads:
Muscat-Sohar on the coast, Sohar-
Khaturat-Malaha, and Nizwah-Seeb were
started in 1973 and completed two years
later (p. 20). The roads between Bidbid
and Sur, Musanah and Rostaq, and Sohar
and Al-Buraimi were all laid down in 1974
(p. 27). Second, Muscat funded the
development of three ports: Mutrah (near
the capital), Raysut (near Salalah)7 and Sur
(jutting out into the Indian Ocean). Third, a
brand-new airport was started at Seeb in
1972 to replace the old British airstrip near
Bayt al-Falaj closer to the city. Although a
seafaring nation with a 2,092-kilometer
coastline, Oman was linked to the rest of
the world by Seeb Airport, as several
bilateral air transportation accords were
signed with Britain, Egypt, Lebanon and
116
Jordan (p. 15). When the airport opened in
1972, four flights landed each day on
average; that figure would reach 148, with
five million passengers per year in 2006.8
Immediately after these basic projects
were finished, Muscat authorized the
creation of an industrial complex, starting in
1973 with a cement factory with a million-
ton capacity (p. 20). This was the first major
industrial undertaking in a very long time.
Oman was also in need of public
housing, and one of the first new depart-
ments established was that of Land
Affairs, which would eventually become
the Ministry of Housing, Electricity and
Water. Starting in 1971, the Land Affairs
Department quickly initiated a sustained
effort to allocate 760 residential and 35
commercial plots within the capital area.
Naturally, a planned effort necessitated
careful apportioning, with choice vistas
reserved for leading families, but, over the
years, every Omani who wished to avail
himself of a residential dwelling managed
to receive one (p. 15). Low-income
housing was not neglected either; the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor
initiated various schemes to meet the need.
By 1975, the government had allocated
resources in its first five-year plan to
finance the construction of 500 houses in
Muscat and Mutrah, 500 in Nizwah, Sohar
and Sur, and 500 in Salalah and Buraimi,
all for low-income Omanis. In addition,
thousands of plots of land were demar-
cated and distributed on a hardship basis
(p. 41). These building efforts could not
develop without water and electricity.
Oman slowly emerged from the dark, as an
electrical grid was painstakingly erected on
its coasts, wadis and mountains. By 1974,
electricity had reached 36 megawatts, and
by 1977, Omani power stations were

producing 77 megawatts of power. Ap-
proximately 6 million gallons of fresh water
were also distributed that year (pp. 27, 40).
As gargantuan efforts were deployed
to improve basic living conditions, Qaboos
and his advisers realized that Oman needed
serious multi-year planning and, towards
that end, adopted five-year plans. These
stressed self-reliance and diversification
and, as funds were allocated to specific
projects, coordination was introduced to
avoid duplication and waste. Targeted
sectors received special attention as the
economy’s building blocks were assembled
to satisfy a new economic agenda.9 More
important, these plans ensured that re-
sources and projects were distributed
throughout the Sultanate rather than being
concentrated in the capital city, even if the
Muscat-Ruwi-Seeb area’s population
growth merited a disproportionately higher
share. Still, what was valuable in these
plans was the methodical approach of
ministries and specialized agencies to
encourage growth. As frequently dis-
cussed by the ruler, they concentrated on the
development of human and natural resources
and, over time, forged a partnership between
the public and private sectors.
Agriculture
It was within successive five-year
plans that the agriculture sector received
special attention. Qaboos declared 1988
the “Year of Agriculture” to encourage this
vital sector of the national economy, which,
along with fisheries, employed the largest
number of Omanis. There was a require-
ment to focus “on the exploitation of
[Oman’s] rich land resources and the
traditional abilities of … people” but,
because he was not satisfied with initial
results, Qaboos extended this focus for
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KECHICHIAN: A VISION OF OMAN
another year (1989) (p. 140). He stressed
the need for “additional dams, maintenance
of the aflaj [plural of falaj, the country’s
extensive irrigation system] and wells, and
the role of Agricultural Guidance Centers
in the service of farmers” (p. 141). Inas-
much as agriculture was a principal
consumer of scarce water, Qaboos called
for the promotion of strict efforts at
prudent water conservation. He declared
that this “national wealth” be “used eco-
nomically,” relying on modern irrigation
methods. Realistically, the ruler extended
his plan over a 10-year period, aware that
long-term investments were required to
bring the sector up to standards as well as
to sustain it.
He revisited the sultanate’s water
situation in 1991, when he declared: “Of all
the gifts with which God has blessed us,
water is the greatest. It must be cherished
and husbanded” (p. 182). “If extrava-
gance is forbidden by Islam,” he continued,
“it is even more applicable to water.”
Conservation became a cause célèbre in
the Sultanate long before industrialized
countries mobilized to preserve scarce
water resources, amid a re-awakened
interest in the protection of the environ-
ment. Qaboos frequently discussed water
shortages as well as preservation, remind-
ing Omanis of their responsibilities towards
their land.
Industry and Tourism
If agriculture was an early priority, the
monarch was advised to look into other
areas of economic development as well,
including industry, even if the country
lacked both know-how and manpower. As
1991 was designated the “Year of Indus-
try,” Qaboos opened his annual speech
with a detailed assessment of the
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XV, NO. 3, FALL 2008
Sultanate’s industrial policy. He empha-
sized that the goal was to gain self-reli-
ance: “A strong industry capable of per-
forming its national role in social progress
and prosperity, is a necessary strategy” (p.
181). While maintaining careful attention
to the environment, he called for the
adoption of new technologies to boost
industrial output. When his original goals
were not met in a single year, he extended
the Year of Industry through 1992, to
further encourage government officers to
launch appropriate schemes.
With a limited population and natural
limits to agricultural and industrial produc-
tion, Muscat opted to boost the tourism
industry in 1999, when the ruler singled it
out as a sector worthy of expansion and
support. He declared that tourism had
“great potential for growth and for making
an effective contribution to economic
diversification, since [Oman] possesse[d]
splendid touristic assets such as its historic
heritage, natural beauty, perfect environ-
ment, folklore and traditional industries,” all
enjoying full security (p. 267).
Creation of Wealth
Qaboos believed that Omanis should
participate in the creation of wealth and,
starting in 1972, offered incentives for
private concerns to purchase shares in
various state schemes. The country’s first
cement factory, for example, started
operating in 1973 and Omanis could
purchase shares in it. By 1991, the Year of
Industry, Qaboos’s views had evolved:
wealth was not to be pursued just for its
own sake — owning shares in a company
— but to encourage active citizen partici-
pation (p. 182). A decade earlier, Qaboos
had identified self-reliance as an objective
for Omanis, as they planned for the future.
118
For the first time, he uttered the critical
words that dependence on a single source
of income (oil) ought to be reduced, and he
vowed to pursue sound industrial policies
(p. 79). He referred to work as a “noble”
effort that made “life positive and useful,”
warning Omanis that they would “never be
able to reduce … dependence on foreign
labor in most of the unskilled professions
unless,” they “show[ed] interest and
capacity to take over” (pp. 127-128). At
one point, Qaboos even used the term
“Omanization,” as calling for the steady
replacement by national labor of foreign
workers (p. 142). Year after year, he
implored youth not to “disdain” any profes-
sion. “No matter what the work is” he
declared in 1988, Omanis must “be truly
devoted to proving their excellence and
demonstrate their worthiness” (p. 142).
Nothing could be shunned and no Omani
who respected himself would refuse an
opportunity, no matter how limited.
Qaboos bluntly declared in 1989: “Our
people must never be ashamed to carry out”
manual labor, because such work was
honorable. Moreover, he phrased his
assessment as a duty in the service of
country, stating: “It is shameful to permit
false pride to provide an excuse that such
work is beneath one” (p. 149). Even if
heavy-handed, the admonition from the
“guardian” was honest, for Omanization
would only occur when Omanis dirtied their
hands. The honesty of the message paid off,
albeit gradually, as Qaboos painstakingly
created a link between work and welfare.
The Sultan revisited Omanization in
1992, beseeching the private sector to
exert more energy in serving Oman’s
national interest (p. 193). Likewise, he
admonished Omani youth not to waste their
energies waiting for a government position,

because so many more opportunities
existed in the private sector. “Your country
calls upon you to perform your duty with
faith and discipline,” he told his listeners.
Oman is a “society that is used to hard
work and it is not our style to be lazy or
negligent, but to responsibly and honestly
carry out our obligations” (p. 193). Even
more forcefully, he admonished his subjects
not to “depend on others, no matter how
close,” and opt instead for discipline and
work. “The true Muslim must be a pro-
ductive force in the service of society,”
concluded the monarch (p. 194).
To channel the government’s collective
outlook on economic matters, the Sultanate
drafted a new plan in 1995, Vision 20/20, to
prepare for the post-oil period. Qaboos
repeatedly called on his subjects to look at
themselves as the solution and not to be
afraid of change:
As you know, we aim, guided by this
vision, to prepare ourselves for the
twenty-first century in enabling the
Omani economy to achieve its
strategic evolution. Thus our
economy will no longer be dependent
on government expenditure, oil
resources and foreign workers, but it
will enter a better and more compre-
hensive phase, based on private
initiative, nationally trained workers,
and sustainable established resources.
This will result, with God’s permission,
and in a definite period, in improving
the standard of living of Omani
citizens, in guaranteeing their welfare,
wherever they are, based upon this
vigorous development in every field
(p. 243).
Youth
From the early 1980s, the ruler focused
on young Omanis. He understood that the
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KECHICHIAN: A VISION OF OMAN
country’s welfare depended on his ability to
harvest their energies. Towards that end,
1983 was declared “Omani Youth Year,” as
was 1993 a decade later. Qaboos dedi-
cated his “work to bring up [Omani] young
people and provide them with the inherent
strength of the knowledge that [the mon-
arch] cared for them” (p. 100). He called
on young Omanis to prepare themselves
“in the educational and cultural fields and
to set an example in shouldering the
responsibilities of the future.” Nothing
would be achieved “without hard work and
dedication,” he reminded them. He further
warned of “fanaticism, intolerance, …
disregard and disrespect for the rule of
law.” If Omanis were to avoid violence
and oppression, he concluded in 1983, it
was imperative that they use their “imagi-
nation, expectation and hope … to carry
out their national obligations” (p. 101). It
was vintage Qaboos, relying on the bully
pulpit to elevate the discourse.
In 1993, when the year-long effort was
repeated, Qaboos aimed to “provide a
clarion call to all responsible members of
government and the private sector to pay
more attention to the needs of [the] Omani
people” (p. 201). He concluded that youth
represented the hope of the nation. While
this was not a discovery, he sensitized a
largely traditional and paternalistic society
to alter its ways and welcome innovation.
He invited those who applied for leadership
positions, especially within the private
sector, to include young Omanis in their
blueprints for socioeconomic success.
Remarkably, this message was uttered
even as he called on young Omanis to “roll
up their sleeves with the utmost energy,”
and insisted that in a partnership, those with
the most should give the most (p. 202).
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XV, NO. 3, FALL 2008
Oil Policy
The second objective of Vision 20/20
was to gradually reduce the government’s
dependence on oil income. Aware of its
vital role as the single most important
source of income for the state, and without
joining the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) or its Arab
counterpart, the Organization of Arab
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC),
Qaboos nevertheless agreed to “follow a
sound oil policy in conjunction with a united
Arab oil policy” (p. 28). Time and again,
he reiterated that the Sultanate’s “re-
sources belong[ed] to its people,” as
Muscat gradually purchased Petroleum
Development Oman (PDO) assets to gain
firm control over this intrinsic source of
wealth (p. 43). By 1975, the government
had acquired 60 percent of all PDO assets,
and by 1999, 100 percent.
In his 1995 Jubilee address, Qaboos
underlined why Omanis should not depend
on oil income to meet their needs:
Oil is a finite resource, and its age is
limited. Therefore, it is necessary not
to depend on it solely to finance
development. From the beginning, we
have stressed this truth, and our
efforts have been notably successful.
However, oil is still the main resource,
and the fluctuation of its price is of
great concern to everyone. Thus
there is no other course but to
diversify the sources of our national
income more widely, in order to make
oil revenues only a minor element of
this income. This leads us to call
upon all citizens to save, invest,
pursue business interests, develop
industry, tourism and agriculture, and
utilize mineral resources, fisheries,
livestock and other sources of
revenue. It is essential that the Omani
120
private sector be more active, roll up
its sleeves and prove its efficiency
and ability to compete. The govern-
mental administrative system must
react to, and co-operate with, the
private sector. It must not allow
bureaucracy and routine to hinder its
good performance (p. 235).
In 1996, Qaboos spoke of Oman’s
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project in
Sur, where export terminals were under
construction. He perceived this sector as
adding income to the treasury that would
allow critical disbursements where needed
(p. 244). He alerted his citizens, however,
that oil income was nothing to pin a
country’s hopes on. Two years later, in
1998, he concluded that it was “not wise,
nor good policy, to be dependent on oil as a
sole resource to finance” Oman’s develop-
ment (p. 258). This message was repeated
on numerous occasions to sensitize Omanis
to the promotion of the private sector as
capitalism was further promoted to create
wealth for the welfare of the majority.
When oil prices recovered somewhat
towards the end of the twentieth century,
the Omani ruler warned his subjects “not to
rely on this recent improvement in oil
prices,” but to stand with him “to follow
prudent financial and economic policies, the
most important of which are reduction of
expenditures, and guidance and awareness
in order to encourage saving” (p. 266). He
cautioned Omanis not to fall into the trap of
consumerism but to develop a savings
philosophy for rainy days.
Military
If the Omani ruler’s words encouraged
his subjects to believe in themselves and
excel, his carefully tailored prose was
almost always supplemented with unwa-

vering support for members of the armed
forces. He knew they stood by him to
defend Omanis as well as the Sultanate
and to preserve its system of government.
Qaboos singled out the military in every
speech — the only group to be so honored
— not only because of his own military
training but also because he understood
that the security services guaranteed
Oman’s legitimacy. Starting in 1972,
Qaboos identified the armed forces as the
backbone of the nation, calling on Omanis
to “appreciate sacrifices made to preserve
unity and defend the country from all foes”
(p. 14). Year after year, he saluted their
heroism and loyalty in the Dhuffar war. In
1975, he celebrated that victory by recog-
nizing achievements on the battlefield that
“recorded with honor and pride true
heroism and sacrifice” (p. 33).
In 1977, Qaboos delivered his speech
in Salalah, and first addressed the heroism
of the military in winning the war and
gradually pacifying the Dhuffar Province.
He was confident that the sacred duty of
the military to defend Islam, preserve
Oman’s freedom, and protect its people
was in good hands (p. 58). At the tenth
anniversary he vowed “to always remem-
ber” the armed forces’ “defiant resolution
in the face of the enemy, their willingness
to give their lives in the defense of the
country” (p. 179). A year later he cau-
tioned those who would “contemplate
aggression against” the Sultanate to “know
that they would be met by a nation in
arms” (p. 90). Starting in 1983, the
monarch introduced a subtle nuance in his
customary praise of the armed forces.
True that the Sultanate enjoyed a great
many friendly allies that were ready to rush
to its assistance, he intoned, yet it was up
to the Omani military “first and foremost
121
KECHICHIAN: A VISION OF OMAN
[to] rely upon” itself. At a time when
over-the-horizon schemes were frequently
discussed at the highest levels in the Arab
Gulf governments, which wished to avail
themselves of the support of Western
military forces, the Omani leader’s empha-
sis was particularly sharp. Qaboos under-
stood that real security could only be had
when one relied on oneself. “To do
otherwise,” declared the battle-tested ruler,
“would be the grossest folly” (p. 104).
Dhuffar War
The long Dhuffar War, which mobilized
Omanis for close to two decades, shaped
Qaboos’s military views. “We have
brothers and sons there who are being
subjected to coercion, terrorism and danger
— a result of being dominated by alien
elements; that is to say, by opportunists,
mercenaries and atheists” (p. 12). The use
of the word terrorism (irhab) was itself
remarkably foresighted, given the dramatic
developments that unfolded several de-
cades later (p. 24).10 Inasmuch as he
perceived the uprising against his father’s
(and his own) government as coordinated
efforts to topple the monarch, Qaboos
affirmed that the Dhuffar Province was
worth a full-fledged campaign: it was an
integral part of the Sultanate. In 1971, he
declared that he was ready to “pay a high
price” and “sacrifice lives” to restore
security and peace in the area (p. 12,
Arabic version). A year later he affirmed
that Omanis were “waging a sacred and
armed battle against the enemy of Islam
and the country, supported by Marxist
Aden” (p. 17, Arabic version). An avowed
anti-communist, Qaboos did not shy away
from tackling the largest threat to the
Sultanate and, in 1972, underlined that
“active international communism” was
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XV, NO. 3, FALL 2008

“working [in Aden] to achieve its ambition to loose faith in their masters, who drove
in the Arab Peninsula to transform it into a them into launching their terrorism against
huge Communist camp” (p.17, Arabic innocent people” (p. 25, Arabic version).
version). In 1973, he warned of “strange “Communism knows no religion,” he
winds” blowing in the region, from those pronounced. “We fight the enemies of God
who had “sold themselves to the devil,” because they deny the existence of God
and cautioned against factionalism.11 and do not recognize his teachings that call
Again in 1973, he identified how his for brotherhood, love and peace” (p. 23,
firqats, the armed groups that were Arabic version). Among the 35 annual
formed in 1972 to fight “against the terror- speeches, only one, the fifth, was devoted
ism of the communist gangs in the moun- to a single subject: Oman’s struggle against
tains of Dhuffar,” were determined to communist subversion.12 Qaboos reiter-
prevail (p. 19, Arabic version). He added a ated his determination to oppose commu-
religious dimension to the struggle, declar- nists in the Dhuffar and throughout the
ing that Omanis were waging a war Arab and Muslim worlds, linking his logic
“against atheism,” “a sacred duty” that to Quranic exhortations to oppose unbeliev-
Islam imposed. ers. This particular address closed with an
Still, even in 1973, he extended a hand admonition to watch for hypocrites who
to those who were willing and ready to pretended to be what they were not (p. 35,
express their Arabic version).
loyalty to Oman. The Omani ruler
Qaboos was willing identified an
to forgive, while In 1994, the Omani ruler unbridled Soviet
vowing to remain warned about religious expansionism as
steadfast against extremism, after an Islamist a genuine threat
those who opted on November 18,
for confrontation. challenge to the regime, 1979. That
In an interesting especially as its protagonists speech, delivered
twist, he associated included members of the less than a month
the need to safe- before the
Sultanate’s intellectual
guard Oman’s invasion of
“honor” against community. Afghanistan, was
subversives and prescient (p. 72,
communists (p. 20, Arabic version).
Arabic version). In 1981, Qaboos
He devoted a good deal of attention to the went further, declaring that in Afghanistan
war in his 1974 speech, placing Oman’s Muslims raised “their voices” and insisted
sacrifice in the Dhuffar confrontation on their rights by maintaining a “tenacious
within the “Arab sphere of the battle,” opposition to the Soviet invaders of their
comparing enemies that plot to “undermine homeland … which should command the
religion, wealth and national prestige.” He respect and admiration of the whole
displayed confidence in his government to Islamic people” (p. 89, Arabic version).
defeat the enemy, as “the terrorists … began

122

When Qaboos used the word terrorism
in 1971, the context was the uprising in the
Dhuffar and the communist support that
extended through the former People’s
Democratic Republic of Yemen. In 1994,
however, the Omani ruler warned about
religious extremism, after an Islamist
challenge to the regime, especially as its
protagonists included members of the
Sultanate’s intellectual community.13 Left
unattended, he argued, extremism threat-
ened society as a whole: “Extremism,
under whatever guise, fanaticism of
whatever kind, factionalism of whatever
persuasion would be hateful poisonous
plants in the soil of [the] country that will
not be allowed to flourish” (p. 210, Arabic
version). For Qaboos, Islam was suitably
equipped to adapt to modernity, and while
he acknowledged a lapse in recent times,
he nevertheless called on his brethren to
“renew and revise [their] thinking to nip
fanaticism in its cocoon.” The latter, he
opined, was “based on a lack of knowledge
among Muslim youth about the correct facts
of their religion” (p. 210, Arabic version).
International Concerns
Qaboos used his annual speeches to
highlight Oman’s Arab identity and under-
score its links to the ummah. He consid-
ered such unity to be the Sultanate’s
destiny. He frequently praised fellow
leaders who expressed support and identi-
fied major issues that affected Omani ties
with key powers. Occasionally, he thanked
a leader by name, including the late King
Hussein of Jordan, first in 1977 for assist-
ing Oman in the Dhuffar war and again in
1984, after Amman restored diplomatic
relations with Cairo (p. 104, Arabic ver-
sion). He commended him once again in
1994 for his unrelenting efforts to reach a
123
KECHICHIAN: A VISION OF OMAN
peace settlement with Israel, and calling on
him to “take steps on the Syrian and
Lebanese side to bring about a full with-
drawal from the Golan Heights and South-
ern Lebanon” (p. 21, Arabic version). In
1985, in a rare reference to superpowers
enmeshed in yet another episode of the
Cold War, the Omani monarch singled out
U.S. President Ronald Reagan and First
Secretary of the Soviet Union Mikhael
Gorbachev as the two met on November
19 to reduce international tensions and
foster détente (p. 118, Arabic version).
Qaboos expressed his esteem for Saudi
Arabia in 1979, acknowledging its generous
financial assistance in the early 1970s and
recognizing King Fahd’s leadership in 1990
as the Saudi authorized the deployment of
over a half million foreign troops on its soil
to help liberate Kuwait (p. 176, Arabic
version). The Omani ruler commended
Afghanistan and Chad in 1981 for standing
up to Soviet occupation and for opposing
foreign expansionism. He referred to the
crises in Lebanon on four separate occa-
sions — 1988, 1989, 1994 and 1995 — as
he called for reconciliation among warring
factions (p. 89, Arabic version).14
The Arab-Israeli Conflict
Of all the international issues that
preoccupied Qaboos, however, the one that
stood out was the Palestinian problem. He
rejected ambiguity on this core Arab
question. Although his views evolved over
the years, he maintained that lack of justice
for the Palestinians was the paramount
reason that a permanent settlement had not
been reached.
After the landmark 1973 Arab-Israeli
War, Qaboos focused on two aspects of
the conflict: territorial issues and the
suffering imposed of the Palestinians. In
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XV, NO. 3, FALL 2008
his 1974 address, he was proud that Oman
had stood with Arab forces that “humbled
the arrogance of the Zionist enemy” when
they “crossed the barriers into victory,”
which was a reference to the Egyptian
army’s significant breach of the so-called
Bar-Lev fortification in the Sinai (p. 24,
Arabic version). A determined ally of
Anwar Sadat, Qaboos digested the Egyp-
tian accomplishment in terms of divine
grace, quoting scripture: “If you support
God, He will support you and strengthen
your position” [Sura 47:7] (p. 24, Arabic
version).15 Yet the Omani also welcomed
the 1978 Camp David accords and the
1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, even if
he considered it only “a first step.” What
was necessary, he said, was a “complete
redress of the wrongs and suffering that
ha[ve] been inflicted on the Palestinian
people” (p. 72, Arabic version). In 1985,
he affirmed that it was
vital to overcome the present stagnant
situation, which is conducive to Israeli
attempts to perpetuate the present
situation. We support the Jordanian-
Palestinian endeavors and all Arab
and international endeavors to seek a
permanent and honorable peace. We
call on all international forces friendly
to Israel to accept their responsibilities
and exert their full influence to put an
end to Israeli intransigence, so as to
provide an opportunity for positive
progress towards reaching a solution
which will restore the legitimate rights
of the Palestinian people and guaran-
tee justice and peace for all (p. 116,
Arabic version).
In 1989, he flatly called for the establish-
ment of an independent Palestinian state, but
he saw merit in the 1993 Oslo accords
between the Palestinian Authority and Israel.
124
Qaboos expressed the desire to witness “a
comprehensive and just peace between the
Arabs and the Israelis, a peace which
secures the rights and interests of all” (p.
203, Arabic version). If he expressed
impatience in 1992 with indifference to
Palestinian agony, he insisted that Omanis,
like all Arabs, were “awaiting the outcome of
the Middle East peace negotiations, and we
call for the swift alleviation of the plight of
the suffering of the Palestinian people” (p.
197, Arabic version). He pointed to his
“solidarity” with “Arab brothers” and was
proud that “the people of Oman showed a
genuine spirit in standing against Zionist
aggression, [to] support the Arab fight in
restoring all Arab territories which the
enemy has occupied by force, treachery
and terrorism”(p. 21, Arabic version). Yet
in 1994, Qaboos welcomed Israeli Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin to Muscat to
discuss regional developments in the
aftermath of the Oslo accords.16 He
repeated the call to create a “sovereign,
viable Palestinian state” in 2003, and again
in 2004 (p. 302; p. 305, Arabic version).
Gulf Security and the Gulf Cooperation
Council
In one of his most colorful presenta-
tions, Qaboos tackled the super-sensitive
Gulf security dilemma in 1979, when
regional tensions were high and both Iran
and Iraq were poised for war:
No doubt you have heard a lot about
the Strait of Hormuz, which as you
know is part of our national waters
and one of the most important sea
lanes of the world, through which
passes a huge proportion of the
world’s oil supplies. Should the
present instability in the Middle East
result in an interruption of this flow,

the results would be disastrous; not
only would immense hardship be
caused to millions of people, but the
economies of many countries,
countries whose own strength and
stability is indispensable to the
defense of freedom, would be gravely
damaged. Oman is pledged to defend
the right of all peaceful shipping to
pass through this Strait. This is not
only our duty under international law,
it is also our duty to humanity and to
our friends in the free world. Should
the Strait be exposed to danger, Oman
will not hesitate to act in defense of
our national sovereignty and the
safety of international navigation. We
believe it is the responsibility of all
countries that are beneficiaries of this
traffic, oil producers and consumers
alike, to contribute to the protection of
this vital waterway against the
dangers of terrorism or other forms of
aggression, and urge them to do so.
Oman does not call for the interven-
tion of foreign forces for this purpose;
given the means, the Sultanate is fully
capable of undertaking necessary
measures, but the means must be
provided (pp. 72-73, Arabic version).
This declaration clarified that the
Sultanate was determined to keep all
traffic lanes that crossed its territorial
waters open, and was asking friendly
countries to provide it with the military
wherewithal for such a task. In anticipa-
tion of a defense agreement that would be
signed with the United States in 1980, he
further identified the protection of the
waterway as a joint goal.
This experience and the complex
negotiations over the Facilities Access
Agreement prompted Qaboos to propose
serious cooperative initiatives to his fellow
Arab Gulf monarchs. Although Kuwait
125
KECHICHIAN: A VISION OF OMAN
was the initiator of talks that led to the
1981 creation of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), many of the preparatory
meetings were held in Muscat under close
Omani guidance. In fact, during one of
these preliminary foreign-ministers sessions
in 1976, Qaboos underscored Oman’s
strategic location and its commitment to
defend the Arabian Peninsula (p. 55,
Arabic version). By 1977, the Omani ruler
had elevated the security of the entire Gulf
region to fall within Omani national-
security policy, acknowledging that it was
“vital” that the states of the region “as-
sume responsibility for [their] own secu-
rity” (p. 59, Arabic version). He devoted a
good portion of his 1979 speech to the
defense of the Straits of Hormuz and to the
establishment of Soviet and Cuban military
bases in South Yemen. While he rejected
all foreign bases in the Indian Ocean area,
he nevertheless called for material assis-
tance to defend critical waterways, the
jugular veins of industrialized economies.
Frustrated with lackluster responses from
fellow conservative Arab Gulf monarchies,
he chastised his “brothers” to help Oman
preserve the stability of the area. That is
why, Qaboos underlined, Oman “had no
other choice than to seek the assistance of
those who w[ould] provide … the means to
defend” itself (p. 81, Arabic version).
Of course, he meant the United States
and the 1980 Facilities Access Agreement,
which effectively aligned the Sultanate
with Western preferences more forcefully
than at any previous time. Although he
perceived Oman in the developing world’s
orbit, Qaboos nevertheless insisted that
self-preservation was an even higher
obligation. He considered the 1981 cre-
ation of the GCC “a positive achievement
of the efforts of its member-states for the
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XV, NO. 3, FALL 2008
prosperity of the region and its people,” and
hoped that various accords would “contribute
to the creation of a better climate for Arab
solidarity,” aware of “foreign attempts to
divide” them (pp. 88-89, Arabic version).
Increasingly, he saw the GCC as a funda-
mental source of political and economic
strength, while retaining Oman’s exclusive
national-security interests.
A week before his fifteenth anniver-
sary speech, Qaboos hosted the sixth GCC
summit, where critical regional issues —
led by the bloody Iran-Iraq War — preoc-
cupied Arabian Peninsula rulers. It was
not surprising that he opened his annual
address with a particularly strong refer-
ence to the GCC, an ideal avenue to
regional security. Qaboos called on both
belligerents to accept Islamic mediation “to
reach a permanent settlement guaranteeing
the rights of both parties,” and regretted
that the belligerents were entrenched in
their narrow views (p. 116, Arabic version).
If, in 1987, he expressed his “sorrow” at the
ongoing war, by 1988, he “welcome[d] the
courageous and wise step taken by the
leaders of Iraq and Iran to begin direct
negotiations to settle their dispute by peaceful
means” (p. 143, Arabic version).
As much as the Iran-Iraq War con-
cerned Oman, the August 1, 1990, Iraqi
invasion and occupation of Kuwait devas-
tated Qaboos as he reaffirmed “the
necessity to reach a peaceful settlement to
the Gulf crisis, based on international
resolutions and to return the State of
Kuwait to its legal authority” (p. 176,
Arabic version). Muscat was on record,
and thus committed, to the military libera-
tion effort that started a few weeks later.
Without gloating, Qaboos simply noted
in 1991 that “the Sultanate ha[d] performed
its duties” towards the deliverance of
126
Kuwait and congratulated the Al Sabah
leadership and their people “on the resump-
tion of normal life,” but he carefully linked
this key event to necessary progress on the
Arab-Israeli front. Even as he praised the
Madrid Peace conference, he underlined
the need to solve the Palestinian Question
and end an “occupation [that lasted] for
almost half-a-century” (p. 184-185, Arabic
version). While his choice of words
included “all States of the region,” meaning
with Israel, Qaboos differentiated the
power of an established sovereign entity
with “the legitimate rights of the struggling
Palestinian people.” In his view, a clear
linkage existed between the Gulf and the
Levant, even if that linkage was routinely
denied by major powers with narrower
objectives. Oman was committed to the
GCC to guarantee stability and security, but
was not willing to forgo other obligations,
especially those owed to the downtrodden.
Existing linkages notwithstanding, Qaboos
cautioned his countrymen and all Arabs to
appreciate the value of Gulf energy re-
sources to the major industrialized powers,
and warned them about potential actions the
latter might take to defend their perceived
interests. GCC states must be careful “not
to provoke the international community,”
announced Qaboos in 1996, “either by
threatening its interests or by interfering in
the affairs of others, no matter for what
reasons” (p. 246, Arabic version). This was
one of the most cogent descriptions of large
power influences on GCC rulers and how
delicate the relationships were within the
international community. It was also vintage
Qaboos, alerting his countrymen to the
pressures on GCC governments, and the
wise steps required by savvy rulers to
withstand them. In 2004, after the Ameri-
can-led occupation of Iraq had toppled the

Saddam Hussein regime, Qaboos called for
“security and stability” in Mesopotamia (p.
305, Arabic version). Remarkably, this was
all he opted to state in public about the U.S.
invasion, although Omanis demonstrated
against the American intervention.
Indian Ocean
Omani leaders looked towards Asia as
often as they looked to the Arab world and
Western countries. In 1996, Muscat
became a founding member of the Eco-
nomic Bloc of Indian Ocean countries to
facilitate commercial exchanges and
economic integration, promote tourism,
encourage direct investments, develop
human resources and share technology.
Qaboos acknowledged that “the Indian
Ocean ha[d] always been the main gate-
way for Omanis, who explored its shores
and traveled beyond as they established
long-term ties” (p. 245, Arabic version).
A VISION FOR OMAN
Taking stock of six years of accomplish-
ment, Qaboos asked in 1976 what the future
held for his country. He answered that it
would be bright with promise, provided
Omanis remained steadfast in their determi-
nation to work together and cherish their
freedoms (p. 53, Arabic version). He
renewed his own pledge to dedicate his life
to the service of his “dear people and
country.” On the tenth anniversary, the ruler
underlined that Omanis “were poor in
everything except in the[ir] strength,” relied
on their “traditions” and on their “determina-
tion to succeed in spite of all obstacles.” He
listed what was lacking and reiterated how
faith allowed Omanis to overcome shortfalls.
Confident, he reminded his subjects that they
would not fail, and that their hardships “were
not in vain” (p. 78, Arabic version).
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KECHICHIAN: A VISION OF OMAN
Qaboos acknowledged that his vision for
the Sultanate “was very clear from the
beginning,” which helped him “to formulate
ideas for the building of a new society, …
authentic … with its own methods of
thought.” The monarch affirmed that he did
not mimic anyone or any system of govern-
ment and, assessing his record in 1998,
expressed satisfaction that sound planning
protected the country “from the folly of
irrational decisions” (p. 257, Arabic version).
Maturation of Views
If the first few speeches were an
attempt to report on the progress that the
Sultanate had achieved in education, health
and many other areas of concern to
Omanis, a maturation process was clearly
detected in later years as the monarch’s
self-assurance grew. Three years into his
accession, the ruler had spoken of a
reinvigorated “nation” that would surely
take its “place in Oman’s history” (p. 19,
Arabic version). He commended Omani
determination and drive and exhibited a
willingness to forgive that was nothing
short of revolutionary. In 1974, he stressed
that the Sultanate expected all of its
citizens “to be loyal and obedient to her
cause” because his aim was “to forget the
past,” and to forge a new nation with all
available talent (p. 27-28, Arabic version).
“A modern state,” declared the ruler, was
possible without neglecting Oman’s “glori-
ous heritage” (p. 203, Arabic version). He
was confident that the combination of the
sultanate’s traditions with various modern-
izing initiatives was an agenda worth
promoting.
Starting in 2001, Qaboos changed the
date of his annual address, from November
18 to the gathering of the Council of
Oman. In 2001, the address was delivered
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XV, NO. 3, FALL 2008
on September 25, in 2002 on November 4,
in 2003 on October 21, in 2004 on October
12, and in 2005 on October 1. This was a
significant switch, because the annual
“State of the Sultanate” on November 18
celebrated his accession to the throne and
was a time for reflection. After 2001, the
process was institutionalized; the sovereign
appeared in front of Oman’s representa-
tives, including those who were popularly
elected. Speaking to such a gathering sent
a powerful message, for it acknowledged a
social maturation and acceptance of
sophisticated political mechanisms, even if
these were still not fully developed. Often
portrayed as a traditional potentate, Qaboos
demonstrated that, on the contrary, he was
an architect of political emancipation in a part
of the world lacking both. If he covered
similar topics as in his earlier speeches, he
nevertheless spoke to Omanis through
institutions and representatives that supple-
mented his annual tours of the sultanate.
Personality
In one of the few personal remarks in
the 35 annual speeches under analysis,
Qaboos discussed how the renewal of
ideas applied to him as well as to others,
and how he was careful to avoid falling
into the trap of acquired power (p. 208,
Arabic version). Speaking at Nizwah, the
historical “home of great leaders and the
sanctuary of intellectuals, scholars, poets
and men of literature,” he emphasized
intrinsic values (p. 207, Arabic version):
We have maintained and preserved
our identity and intellectual inherit-
ance, and we have adopted every
means for development and modern-
ization. It has been very clear to us
that our heritage is not only repre-
sented by forts, castles and ancient
128
buildings, but by spiritual customs
and traditions, by science, art and
literature, transmitted by one genera-
tion to another. The real preservation
of heritage will not be accomplished
unless we understand this, and
cherish it (p. 208, Arabic version).
Qaboos celebrated his jubilee, 25 years
on the throne in 1995, proud that his rule
delivered Omanis “from the bondage of
isolation, ignorance and backwardness” (p.
233, Arabic version). He thanked God for
having bestowed on him “a great armory of
knowledge, skill and experience, which
[was] acquired through hard work and
practice.” He also stated that it was
critical to apply this reservoir of intelligence
with “wisdom and competence, to ensure …
future success” (p. 234, Arabic version).
The Strength of Institutions
As an early objective, the ruler of
Oman committed his reign to “establish
just, democratic rule [hukm dimuqrati] …
within the framework of [the] Omani Arab
reality, the customs and traditions of [the]
community, and the teachings of Islam,
which always light our path” (p. 12; p. 24,
Arabic version). He did not make false
promises to pursue a parliamentary democ-
racy when it was not possible to do so, but
recognized that a participatory form of
government was a long-term objective
compatible with Islamic teachings. As
identified by an astute observer, the
principles of consultation and free elections
for leaders, which would be akin to con-
sensus and contract in contemporary
traditions, were practices of genuine
democracy. According to Hussein
Ghubash, the Ibadhi Imama “may be held
to be the longest democratic experience in
the history of mankind.”17 It was clear

that Ibadhi leaders, from the Grand Mufti
to local shaikhs, were fully meshed in the
nation-building fabric of Omani society —
another illustration of the compatibility
between Islam and democracy.
Qaboos used his annual speeches to
announce the establishment of various
institutions. In 1972, for example, he
revealed the formation of a Council for
Economy and Development, followed by a
Higher Council of Economic Development
in 1974 (p. 15; p. 28, Arabic version). Year
after year, various additions were made, as
the ruler explained changes in ministries
and their responsibilities toward the citi-
zenry. For example, in 1975, he discussed
the various departments within the Ministry
of Commerce and Industry (then a single
unit), to eliminate improvisation and pursue
clearly defined trade policies. If the trade
volume was a mere 8 million riyals [less
than $20 million] in 1970, it shot up to 3.6
billion riyals [about US $12 billion] in 1974,
phenomenal growth (p. 42, Arabic version).
In 1980, Qaboos announced the
establishment of the State Consultative
Council, which he conceived of as forming
“the framework of a joint effort between
… government and citizens in all develop-
ment fields” (p. 88, Arabic version).
Celebrating his twentieth anniversary on
the throne, Qaboos announced on Novem-
ber 18, 1980, the establishment of a Majlis
al-Shurah (Consultative Council), with
representatives from all 59 governorates
(p. 174, Arabic version). It was, as he put
it, “a further step on the road of participa-
tion which will serve the aspirations and
ambitions of the citizens throughout
Oman.” The Majlis was a qualitative
addition to previous efforts.
Pleased with the steady institutional
progress in the Sultanate that “contribut[ed]
129
KECHICHIAN: A VISION OF OMAN
to the making of national State decisions,”
Qaboos announced in 1996 that he had
“decided to take further steps to enlarge
the area of consultation … with the
establishment of a new … State Council.”
Coming immediately after the Basic
Statute of the State, which was akin to a
Constitution, the newly appointed Upper
House consisted of senior Omani political
figures. According to Qaboos, the Basic
Statute “provided the blueprint for the
system of governance, the principles for
the direction of policies, public rights and
duties, and the responsibilities and authority
of the Head of State, the Cabinet and the
Judiciary” (p. 246, Arabic version). This
constitutional initiative imparted the basis of
stability, a huge leap in purely political
terms in a monarchy.
Elaborating on the Basic Statute’s
provision that the law’s supremacy shall be
the basis of governance in the Sultanate,
Qaboos stressed that such a provision
necessitated the organizing of the judiciary
(p. 250, Arabic version). Courts and legal
procedures would be further developed, he
declared, and in 2003 informed the Council
of State that “from the very beginning, it was
[his] wish to see Oman embark upon its own
enterprise in the field of democratic action in
which its citizens built, brick by brick, on firm
foundations based on the realities of Omani
life and the conditions of the age in which we
live” (p. 300, Arabic version). His step-by-
step approach resulted in the right to vote for
all Omanis above 21 in 2000. These initia-
tives were revolutionary by Arab Gulf
standards, as the Sultanate adopted the
legitimizing instruments of governance.
The Omani Man
For the better part of 35 years, Qaboos
believed in training his cadres, not only
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XV, NO. 3, FALL 2008
young men and women receiving basic or
advanced education, but also tribal shaikhs
and other administrators, who were
expected to shoulder additional burdens of
authority. Towards that end he initiated a
program to train 20 walis (governors) and
deputy walis in 1975, to impart skills in
administrative concepts and improve local
representation (p. 44, Arabic version).
This first experiment was followed by
successive batches of high-ranking officials
who gained the type of professional
education previously accumulated through
years of trial and error. A Home Affairs
Department, which eventually became the
Ministry of Interior, coordinated with the
growing number of municipalities, starting in
the mid-1970s, on hygiene in markets and
homes, as the installation of indoor plumbing
was accelerated, which, in turn, required
more sophisticated waste management.
Numerous other programs requiring sophisti-
cated administrative techniques were
routinely bestowed on traditional cadres.
Always proud of his fellow citizens,
Qaboos deepened his appreciation of the
Omani, who possessed a “vibrant energy
and active spirit that c[ould] carry him
forward to the furthest horizons.” Even if
part of an annual pep talk, it was neverthe-
less rewarding for citizens to hear a head
of state declare that “nothing c[ould]
deter” an Omani, as he instilled pride in
accomplishments and hope in capabilities
(p. 208, Arabic version). Speaking at Sur,
Oman’s historic seafaring capital, Qaboos
declared in 1996 that his people added
value to mankind by reaching out to others,
developing healthy trade contacts, and
fostering a culture of openness. He further
reminded young Omanis that their chal-
lenge to withstand globalization’s storms
was no different from the risks faced by
130
their forefathers when they took to the high
seas. In the past, Qaboos recapitulated to
his subjects, Omanis had achieved much
through “diligence, hard work, patience,
persistence and sustained effort.” This
generation, he continued, “was called upon
to believe … that productive work, no
matter how [trivial], [wa]s a key element in
the structure of the nation,” and that each
was mandated to do his share (p. 242,
Arabic version). Omanis who regularly
heard their head of state express such
positive views of their innate capabilities
could not but find solace in their struggles,
even if few reaped quick benefits.
Invocations and Religious Views
Beyond the opening of the Holy Quran,
which all Muslim leaders invoke in their
pronouncements, the 35 State of the
Sultanate speeches implored God to help
the ruler and illuminate his people. Qaboos
peppered his texts with quotations from
scripture, beseeching the Lord for assis-
tance, giving thanks for His bounty, and
seeking solace in His guiding wisdom (pp.
236-237, Arabic version). The monarch
referred to the Omani renewal under his
leadership as a modern Renaissance and,
recent criticisms notwithstanding, was
reluctant to take exclusive credit. If he
identified himself with the abrupt break he
had made with his father, he nevertheless
called on Omanis to judge for themselves.
Speaking in Salalah in 1997, he acknowl-
edged that significant gains in all fields of
life had been achieved, but underlined this
declaration with an “as you know and see,”
inviting Omanis to bear witness to what the
1970 change of leadership had actually
meant (p. 249, Arabic version). Qaboos
acknowledged that whatever was accom-
plished was the hard work of Omanis, and

he encouraged them to “go ahead, with
God’s blessing, for your own prosperity”
(p. 250, Arabic version)!
Qaboos delivered one of his shortest
speeches in 2000 to celebrate his thirtieth
anniversary on the throne, praising the
armed forces and greeting Omanis, satis-
fied that his rule was peaceful as well as
prosperous for all (pp. 288-289, Arabic
version).
Qaboos sprinkled all of his 35 presen-
tations with Quranic verses, carefully
underlining the Omani understanding of
faith as the backbone of society. He
rejected atheism (and communism) and
opposed Godless ideologies; such was a
requirement of the believer. He frequently
quoted the word of God, beseeching his
brethren to appreciate their ruler’s motiva-
tion in undertaking specific policies, com-
bining faith with rationality. Time and
again, the ruler emphasized the Omani
people’s attachment to, and pride in, Islam
and support for the work of the Ministry of
Awqaf (endowment) and Islamic Affairs
(pp.43-44). In this context, and in another
illustration of Qaboos’ tolerance and
pragmatism, it is important to note that the
Ministry of Awqaf formally changed its title
in 1996 from Shuun Islamiyyah [Islamic
affairs] to Shuun Diniyyah [religious
affairs].18
As early as 1975, Muscat established a
Ministry of Justice, with deed-registration,
litigation and rulings departments. While
true to sharia law in religious affairs, the
government demonstrated foresight, as
circumstances necessitated a separation
between criminal and social justice. A
Court of Appeals was also created to
improve transparency. If the 1996 Basic
Statute called for the implementation of a
separate judiciary, a precedent was set in
131
KECHICHIAN: A VISION OF OMAN
1975, when the putative separation be-
tween legislative authority and the execu-
tive occurred, necessitating the empower-
ment of individuals to adjudicate disputes.
In 1975, when it was almost nonexistent,
the principle was specifically articulated, in
recognition of its intrinsic value to such
separation (p. 45, Arabic version). The
monarch also realized that laws required
trained judges to interpret them. Towards
that end and as early as 1977, Qaboos
identified the necessity to educate “those
who [we]re to be the future religious
leaders of our country….Their training
must enable them to understand the
pressures and problems of modern life in
order that they may exercise their leader-
ship in a constructive and effective man-
ner,” he declared. Moreover, he ordered a
“review of the work of the Islamic Center
at Wattayah,” to improve “curricula,
notably the inclusion of secular subjects,
which w[ould] produce mature teachers of
Islam, familiar with the ways of modern
society and well qualified to provide our
people — and especially our young people
— with the moral and spiritual guidance
they must have” (p. 60, Arabic version).
This was revolutionary: the ruler was
calling for an update of an age-old training
institution long before sectarianism and
extremism settled in contemporary Muslim
societies.
In 1994, Qaboos took a major step at
this level with the establishment of a
College of Jurisprudence and Law to equip
the country with uniform religious legal
training rather than multicultural efforts
that confused far more than they eluci-
dated. Parallel to this, to encourage the
empowerment of an independent judiciary,
he proposed the creation of a Higher
Institution in Nizwah to train university
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XV, NO. 3, FALL 2008

graduates in jurisprudence to become
officers of various courts. The diploma
that graduates earned certified them as
“members of the Judiciary” (p. 209, Arabic
version). These individuals were empow-
ered to apply shariah law when necessary
and nonreligious regulations when appli-
cable, both adapted to contemporary
conditions and norms.
CONCLUSION
“When one is young,” declared
Qaboos, “one must think and plan with
ambition for the future.” He called on
young Omanis to use their imagination,
have high “expectation and hope,” without
wasting any time in carrying out “their
national obligations” (p. 101, Arabic
version). His statement that “work is
noble, and it makes life positive and useful.
Moreover, it is a sacred duty of the citizen
towards the motherland,” will surely be
remembered for a very long time (p. 127,
Arabic version). But, because the Sultan-
ate of Oman was a modest oil producer,
the Omani monarch’s caution to his
subjects that they not grow dependent on
its income echoed even louder. “It is not
wise, nor good policy, to be dependent on
oil as a sole resource to finance our
development,” declared Qaboos (p. 258,
Arabic version). These were not the types
of speeches that conservative Arab Gulf
monarchs uttered, and it is to the Omani
leader’s credit that he honestly addressed
a fundamental concern.
Qaboos bin Said has mobilized his
people. History may also well recall his
vigilance: “Extremism, under whatever
guise, fanaticism of whatever kind, faction-
alism of whatever persuasion would be
hateful, poisonous plants in the soil of our
country which will not be allowed to
flourish” (p. 210, Arabic version).

1
Simon Sebag Montefiore, Introduction to Speeches That Changed the World: The Stories and Transcripts of
the Moments That Made History (London: Smith Davies Publishing Ltd., 2005).
2
The opening sentence of De Gaulle’s war memoirs reads as follows: “Toute ma vie, je me suis fait une
certaine idée de la France” [All my life I have had a certain idea of France]. See Charles De Gaulle, Mémoires
de Guerre: L'Appel 1940-1942 (Paris: Plon, 1954), p. 1. In 1972, Qaboos opened his annual address with
these words: “Our principal aim is to restore the past glories of our country.” See “Speech of His Majesty
Sultan Qaboos bin Said on the Occasion of the 2nd National Day, November 18, 1972,” in Ministry of
Information, The Royal Speeches of His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said, 1970-2005 (Muscat, 2005). His
Majesty’s annual speeches are available in print in various languages. They are also readily accessible online
at the Ministry of Information web page. See http://www.omanet.om/english/hmsq/hmsq3.asp?cat=hmsq for
English text, and http://www.omanet.om/arabic/hmsq/hmsq11.asp?cat=hmsq&subcat=hmsq2 for Arabic.
Hereafter, page references in text refer to English version unless otherwise noted.
3
Between 1970 and 1999, the speeches were officially designated as His Majesty’s “National Day” addresses
and were delivered on November 18 to celebrate the transformation that occurred on that day in 1970.
Starting in 2000, both the date and venue changed, as the speech was delivered at the opening ceremony of the
Council of Oman meeting, at various times during the year. Although a thirtieth anniversary allocution was
made on November 18, 2000, Qaboos preferred to speak to the Majlis Oman, the premier institutional forum
of the Sultanate. It is partly for this reason that the term “State of the Sultanate” is used in this essay. The
reference is to the sum total of the ruler's annual reports because of a gradual evolution.
4
Hussein Ghubash, Oman — The Islamic Democratic Tradition, translated from the French by Mary Turton,
(Routledge, 2006), pp. 2-12. For a critical background study, see Humayd Ibn Rustaq, Al-Fath al-Mubin fi

132
 KECHICHIAN: A VISION OF OMAN

Sirat al-Bu Saidiyyin [History of the Imams and Sayyids of Oman] (Muscat, 1856, 1977). Also available in
English under an Anglicized author’s name as Salil-Ibn Razik, History of the Imams and Seyyids of Oman,
translated by the Reverend George Percy Badger (Hakluyt Society, 1871; reprinted by Kessinger Publishing,
2004).
5
Detailed education data is available in several publications with up-to-date figures spanning the 1970-2004
period. See Sultanate of Oman, Educational Statistical Yearbook, Issue 34 (Academic Year 2003-2004)
(Muscat: Ministry of Education, September 2004). See also Sultanate of Oman, Education in the Sultanate of
Oman: Preparing Our Students for Tomorrow (Muscat: Ministry of Education, 2004); and Sultanate of
Oman, The Renaissance of Education in the Sultanate of Oman: The Fulfillment of a Promise (Muscat:
Ministry of Education, 2002).
6
When the university opened its doors in 1986, it was equipped with six colleges: medicine, engineering,
sciences, agriculture, education and Islamic studies. A College of Arts was added in 1987, followed by a
College of Commerce and Economics in 1993. Add details.
7
In 1996, the Raysut port started a major expansion, with the addition of international container facilities.
8
Statistics from the Oman Airports Management Company web site at http://www.omanairports.com/
seeb_trafficstatistics.asp.
9
Joseph A. Kéchichian, Political Participation and Stability in the Sultanate of Oman (Dubai: Gulf Research
Center, 2006), pp. 57-73, especially, pp. 68-70.
10
“Khitab Sahib al-Jalalah bi Munasabat al-’Id al-Watani Oula, 23 July 1971” [Speech of His Majesty on the
Occasion of the occasion of the 1st National Day, 23 July 1971,” in Ministry of Information, Khutab Wa
Kalimat Hadrat Sahib al-Jalalah al-Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Muazam, 1970-1990 [The Royal Speeches of
His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said, 1970-1990] (Muscat, Oman, 1990).
11
Ibid., p. 19.
12
In 1975, Qaboos delivered two speeches within eight days, the second one (19 November 1975) “addressed
to the People,” perhaps to illustrate major foreign-policy interests from internal concerns that dealt primarily
with development details.
13
Kéchichian, op. cit., pp. 28-34.
14
For the references on Lebanon, see pp. 143, 151, 211 and 235.
15
Another translation of this verse reads: “Believers, if you help God, God will help you and make you
strong,” in The Koran, translated with notes by N. J. Dawood (Penguin Books, 1999), p. 357.
16
Joseph A. Kéchichian, Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy (RAND,
1995), pp 253-55.
17
Hussein Ghubash, p. 6.
18
This was a subtle yet significant alteration whose message was unmistakable. Today, the ministry’s formal
title is Wazirat al-Awkaf wal-Shuun Diniyyah [Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs].

133