Intelligence Cooperation Practices in The 21St Century: Towards A Culture of Sharing

INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION PRACTICES IN THE
21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS A CULTURE OF SHARING

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Intelligence Cooperation Practices in the 21st Century: Towards a Culture of Sharing, edited by M. Tuzuner, IOS Press, Incorporated,
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Intelligence Cooperation Practices
in the 21st Century: Towards
a Culture of Sharing
Edited by
Musa Tuzuner
Turkish National Police Academy
Ankara, Turkey
Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division
Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Intelligence Practices
Ankara, Turkey
6–8 December, 2007
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Intelligence Cooperation Practices in the 21st Century: Towards a Culture of Sharing v
M. Tuzuner (Ed.)
IOS Press, 2010
© 2010 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.
Preface
This edited volume is the product of a NATO funded workshop that was held in
December 2007 in Ankara, Turkey on the topic of transnational security cooperation
and intelligence sharing. Nearly two years in the planning, the Ankara workshop was
particularly designed to bring together leading international scholars, who presented
papers offering different theoretical perspectives on security cooperation, and
practicing intelligence, military, and police officers, who spoke about their practice-
based observations and experiences with international cooperation. The workshop
provided a unique opportunity for both groups to exchange ideas, reflect on the various
perspectives represented, and all join together in roundtables in which particular issues
and themes running throughout the theoretical and experiential accounts could be
highlighted and discussed.
The premise of the workshop was designed in recognition of the increasingly
accepted idea that intelligence cooperation—domestically between agencies,
internationally between states, and transnationally among states, sub-state and non-state
actors—is essential in order to successfully counter the evolving transnational nature of
security threats. Assuming that the most effective response to transnational threats
should be equally transnational, the workshop focused specifically on the question of
whether there is evidence of a transnationalization in states’ responses to a
transnational security threat like ‘global’ terror.
I would like to thank NATO and Kent University for providing the funds that
supported the workshop and this volume. I would also like to thank Dr. Ersel Aydinli,
Chair of the International Relations Department at Bilkent University for his academic
advising, Dr. Julie Mathews, Director of the MATEFL program at Bilkent University
for her editorial support, and my wife Zehra for her lifelong support.
Musa Tuzuner, Ph.D.

Founding Director of Intelligence Studies Research Center
Ankara, Turkey
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Intelligence Cooperation Practices in the 21st Century: Towards a Culture of Sharing vii
M. Tuzuner (Ed.)
IOS Press, 2010
Introduction
Musa TUZUNER1
Post-9/11 analyses, including the 9/11 Report, have frequently identified the attacks of
2001 as proof of a national intelligence failure—and in particular have pointed fingers
at the various local agencies’ failure to share intelligence that might have averted the
disaster. Looking at 9/11 as simply a failure of local U.S. intelligence is short-sighted.
Given the evolving transnational nature of security threats, 9/11 must be seen as the
sign of not a local, but a global level failure in intelligence cooperation.
Underlying such an assessment is the understanding that we have entered into
an era in which security threats are rapidly evolving, and becoming increasingly
transnational in nature. In other words, the role of states as originators of these security
threats, is shrinking. Sources of transnational security threats such as the smuggling of
arms, humans, or narcotics, the spread of diseases like AIDS, environmental
degradation, or terrorism, may not be entirely divorced from states, but are just as
likely to be individuals, non-state, or sub-state actors. Together with this
‘transnationalizing’ of security threats comes an element of indivisibility (Aydinli,
2010). In other words, no one and no place is entirely safe unless everyone, globally,
has a minimum degree of safety.
Turning to the issue of response to these threats, we can assume that an
effective response to increasingly transnational and indivisible threats must be equally
indivisible and transnational. We may even assume that unless we have a minimum
amount of transnational security cooperation, no national-level countering effort can
ever be fully successful—as it was in the case of the 9/11 attacks.

Security cooperation, be it intranational, bilateral, or transnational, evolves
around the basic idea of some kind of sharing. Information naturally grows when it is
shared, not only as an accumulating of separate parts, but as an evolving, organic body
of knowledge that in turn sparks further knowledge. This sparking is true
philosophically, as people participate in a sharing cycle in which they contribute to,
draw on, reconsider, and once again give back to, a common pool of knowledge. It is
also true when it comes to practical intelligence matters, when the common pool is one
of intelligence understandings and experiences. Since no single person or organization
can have the capacity to reach out everywhere and collect all available information in a
practical and systematic manner, failing to share means that partial knowledge will be
the norm. And since no one entity can see from a 360 degree angle, limitations of
understanding and interpretation must be expected if sharing is absent or deficient. The
best possible solution lies in a sharing of the pieces of information and their varied
interpretations, and constant, subsequent reinterpreting and reconsidering of those
1
Musa Tuzuner: Turkish National Police Academy, Ankara, Turkey; E-mail: musatuzuner@egm.gov.tr
viii
pieces by everyone involved—in a process of recycling and revising of one’s own

understandings and knowledge.
Ideally, sharing also allows for an effective use of varied skills by different
parties, all of which have not only different cultures of getting the job done, but also
different comparative advantages in terms of collecting and processing the rapidly
growing pool of information. While some countries may be superior in, for example,
technology-based intelligence gathering and analysis, others may have the upper hand
in human intelligence. Some countries may excel with operational expertise due to long
histories of dealing with a particular security threat. If shared, these comparative
advantages can again add to the growth of not only the amount of information available
but also to the know-how potential for managing this information. The latter in
particular gains importance in an era in which the countries located in the most crucial
regions for certain new global security threats may not be the countries with the
greatest skills or capacity for collecting and processing the information they are privy
to.
Yet another simple point behind the importance of sharing is that, much of the
time, individual actors collect and classify pieces of information that are not necessarily
of particular importance to themselves (at least at that moment). Yet in a parallel to one
man’s freedom fighter being another’s terrorist, one counter-terrorist’s currently trivial
pieces of information may very well be the key to another’s puzzle. Bearing in mind
the growth potential of shared information, it is not unreasonable to assume that if
everyone throws their own ‘trivial’ information into a pool of jointly possessed
information, benefit may be had by everyone.
Unfortunately, there remains a structural dilemma to all these sharing benefits.
Traditionally, ‘intelligence’ has been treated as something not to be shared, but rather
as a source of power, and a zero-sum-gain process to be carefully guarded. Such a view
is true not only among states at the international level but even within national contexts
as well, among different intelligence organizations of a single national structure. While
the treatment of intelligence as something to be necessarily hidden and preserved is
increasingly being proven unproductive in principle, if not downright harmful, it is not
easy or perhaps even reasonable at this point to dismiss such perceptions. Inter-state
rivalries, geopolitical contexts, and historical enmities, remain prominent, and therefore
at least critical information and intelligence will to a great degree continue to be
collected and preserved unilaterally. A certain amount of intelligence however, that
which falls outside of being considered most critical, can itself be enough to build up a
working international intelligence cooperation against transnational security challenges.
Therefore a new assessment and attitude towards defining what is truly most critical to
preserve for oneself and what could and should be shared, is vital. To do this can only
be possible with a new mindset about intelligence, its value, its function, and most
importantly, the sharing of intelligence.
This volume and the workshop on which it was based, therefore focuses on
sharing. The participants—practitioners representing various institutional and national
cultures—considered the following questions: What are the problems with the current
practices of not-sharing, and what can be done to reorient the intelligence culture into a
sharing one? The volume is divided into two main sections: the first featuring
practitioners’ visions of intelligence cooperation, the second looking at intelligence
from a more conceptual and empirical perspective.
Within the section on practitioners’ visions, the first of two sub-sections
presents the workshop’s keynote speeches by leading figures from the intelligence
ix
sectors of three critical countries in the Middle East. These three speeches, by former
heads of national intelligence in Turkey, Pakistan, and Israel, present these individuals’
personal experiences and views on the nature of 21st century security threats and the
key elements to building up effective transnational responses to these threats. The
second sub-section explores practitioners’ views on three different case studies of
intelligence cooperation. Michael Hermann explores the intelligence cooperation
relationship between the United States and United Kingdom; John Nomikos looks at
both Greece’s own intelligence reform and cooperation overall in the Eastern
Mediterranean region; and retired Colonel Behram Sahukar examines India’s changing
intelligence cooperation relationships over the years.
The second section of the book turns to more conceptual and empirical
investigations into current intelligence practices and the prospects for effective
intelligence cooperation. The first of the four chapters in this section, by practitioner-
scholar Dr. Recep Tayfun, lays out the conceptual groundwork for the rest of section as
it defines such key concepts as information, knowledge, intelligence, and cooperation.
The next chapter, by Dr. David Kessler and practitioner-scholar Dr. Musa Tuzuner,
draws on two forms of local, cooperative-based counter-terrorism practices—
community policing and problem oriented policing—and explores the implications of
these for broader level cooperation on counterterrorism. The last two chapters in the
section are both large-scale empirical studies into different questions involving
intelligence cooperation. The first, by Dr. A.S.M. Ali Ashraf, looks at five pivotal
Muslim nations and explores their potential for contributing to a hybrid counter-
terrorism regime; the second, by Dr. Erkan Sezgin, compares key figures’ views and
interpretations of terrorism in two countries (Turkey and the United States) and, based
on those views, evaluates the feasibility of building up effective intelligence
cooperation between these two countries.
The volume concludes with the summary of a roundtable discussion by
practitioners and scholars—including but not excluded to the authors in this volume—
about the primary questions posed in the workshop and in this volume. Their comments
and questions reflect the conclusions that emerged in the preceding debates and
presentations, and provide insights on the necessity and potential for new sharing
culture in intelligence practices in the 21st century.
Reference
Aydinli, Ersel (2010). “Statist-transnationalism for a security cooperation regime”, in E. Aydinli (ed),
Emerging Transnational (In)Security Governance: A Statist-Transnationalist Approach (London:
Routledge), pp. 1-22.
xi
Contents
Preface v
Introduction vii
Musa Tuzuner
Practitioners’ Visions
Keynote Speeches
International Security Cooperation: Intelligence Practices 3

Sönmez Köksal
Building Transnational Responses to Transnational Terrorism 7

Tariq Parvez
Building Effective Counter-Terrorism Responses 11

Aharon Ze'evi Farkash
Case Studies
Understanding the US-UK Intelligence Partnership 17

Michael Hermann
Intelligence Reform in Greece and Regional Cooperation in the Eastern

Mediterranean Region 21
John M. Nomikos
Intelligence and Defence Cooperation in India 31
Behram A. Sahukar
Towards a New Paradigm in Intelligence Cooperation
A New Paradigm in Intelligence Sharing: International Cooperation (IC) 45

Recep Tayfun
Implications of Community-Oriented Policing and Problem-Oriented Policing

for Terrorism Prevention 65
David A. Kessler and Musa Tuzuner
xii
The Five Pivotal Muslim Nations: Their Critical Role in the Possible
Construction of a Hybrid Counter-Terrorism Regime 77
A.S.M. Ali Ashraf
A Comparative Perspective of International Cooperation against Terrorism 121

Erkan Sezgin
Concluding Thoughts
Conclusions: Towards a Culture of Sharing in Intelligence Cooperation

Practices? 147
Musa Tuzuner
Subject Index 159
Author Index 161

Keynote Speeches
Intelligence Cooperation Practices in the 21st Century: Towards a Culture of Sharing 3
M. Tuzuner (Ed.)
IOS Press, 2010
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-608-9-3
International Security Cooperation:

Intelligence Practices
Sönmez KÖKSAL
Turkish National Intelligence Organization (former Director)
Abstract. A former diplomat and intelligence director reflects on the changing

characteristics of global terrorism, and considers the effectiveness of countering
new security threats with existing intelligence practices.
Keywords. global terrorism, intelligence practices, cooperation
Intelligence is a mysterious word; a subject that attracts attention and generates interest
in every country. But the same confidentiality and secretiveness that make it so
intriguing, can also cause problems. Members of the intelligence community are
generally quite sensitive to what is said and written in public, and it can be difficult to
have a rational discussion in the public sphere. Because of these characteristics--
although they vary from country to country--it is equally hard to carry on an open
discussion about the duties, qualifications, sufficiency, and competence of the
intelligence community, or about the possible need for and ways of restructuring
intelligence practices.
It should be noted that in some countries this discussion is able to be carried
out in somewhat more flexible conditions. For example, in the United States,
particularly after September 11th, issues on intelligence began to be discussed quite

openly and in detail, and this remains so even today. On the other hand, in European
countries, these discussions are generally carried out in a much more limited fashion.
Comparisons like this make it possible perhaps to see the differences between the
cultural approaches of the United States and of Europe towards public affairs and
intelligence. Turkey, as well, is among those countries, where there is not a tradition or
culture of discussing intelligence matters and structures. That this meeting is being held
in Ankara, is especially significant for this reason. Thus, I congratulate the organizers
of this meeting and express my thanks.
In the last 10-15 years, the world we live in has gone through significant
changes: Nations and peoples are increasingly coming closer and becoming dependent
on each other. We owe these developments to the end of the ideological war between
communism and libertarian democracy that marked the end of the Cold War, to the
facilitating effects of globalization--especially in terms of the movement of people,
commodities and money; to the developments in information and communication
technologies; and to the interaction between information, culture and media, which has
acquired a trans-border, transnational impact.
4 S. Köksal / International Security Cooperation: Intelligence Practices
In this period, the following phenomena and tendencies have emerged, with
the potential of affecting the very base structure of the whole international system:
• Growth in information technologies have led to an erosion of state borders,

• The authority of the state in some areas has become a matter of discussion,
• Individuals, NGOs, the media, transnational corporations and other economic
actors have started forming an alternative potential of power.
It is possible to define the current system we are in, briefly, as a “period of turbulence”,
in which different inconsistent processes intersect: While some states are uniting,
others face the threat of disintegration to their national integrity.
In this “turbulence” period, we are experiencing two main problems:
1. First, in a world, where peace and welfare are indivisible, all this movement,
which is increasing and diversifying, needs to be secured. To achieve that,
each territory where the movement emanates from should be secure, and to do
that, there must be an effective State in that territory, which is in charge of
controlling the movement. Last but not least, to that end, this State should
have an open approach to international cooperation.
2. The second problem is the presence of regions, which were prepared and
declared by groups like guerilla fighters or the mafia, and who are able to
change at will the rules in that region. These groups are organizations that feed
organized terror around the transnational trade of drugs, weapons, women and
dirty money. It is these geographical regions in particular that form the
sources of the global threat.
Due to these two phenomena, terrorism has become a continuous problem. We know
that, as long as there exists, AT THE TOP, shelter, logistical support, money, fake
documents, weapons, and diplomatic lenience; and AT THE BOTTOM, social masses
which have weaknesses, terror is able to gain this continuous character.
As we have all experienced, there has been a separation from the past regarding
the historical development and meaning of terrorism. The terror we see now has
changed in form and character: It almost shows a parallel tendency with current
capitalism. Flexible cells come together and separate, or they can wake up all of a
sudden.
The following characteristics of global terrorism as currently identified with the
violent Jihadists are evident:
• GLOBAL: It encompasses the whole world. No state feels secure.

• GLOBAL: They aim at a world-wide jihad, that transcends the borders of the
nation-state and beyond a regime change.
• GLOBAL: The terrorists are, due to the militant structure, of different
countries, uprooted, distorted in their cultural identities, and aspire to give a
new meaning to their lives.
• GLOBAL: The militants can use perfectly the unforeseen information, media,
communication and transmission capabilities.
• GLOBAL: Their origins are from countries like the United States, France,
Germany, the United Kingdom, etc.
S. Köksal / International Security Cooperation: Intelligence Practices 5
On the other hand, it is possible to talk about a “Terror International”: There are
in-group and inter-group relations which operate in gray areas in terms of funding,
intelligence sharing, logistics and education providing, planning and implementation.
In addition, at all levels—countrywide, regional, and global—they cooperate and
provide mutual help with respect to ideas, philosophy, image-personnel, specialization,
intelligence and feedback. Therefore, what we are facing in the current global terrorist
movement is a group, which is alienated from family, society, and national values,
which is adventurous, semi-intellectual, whose roots are destroyed, and which is driven
by a belief that does not have borders—that does not evolve around serving for one’s
own State or for a national organization.
Another important point that global terror as manifested by the global Jihadists
has introduced, is the emergence of the fact that there are fragile points in power
centers as a result of the latest technical developments. What are these fragile points?
• The possibility of easy acquisition/development of WMD (weapons of mass

destruction).
• The fragility of system webs, such as, monetary, trade and energy, etc. related
to information technologies.
• The realization that air, naval and land transportation sytems can easily be
targeted and be rendered dysfunctional.
As a result, unlike the “old terrorists”, the possibility of negotiating a certain demand is
no longer valid for an entity, that acts with a feeling to sacrifice itself. With this entity
we have entered the era of Meta-politics, that is, politics with a mystic character, and
the phenomenon of the unification of politics and religion has emerged. We can see
now how the most backward of ideas and beliefs, ideas that remind us of Medieval
times, could become compatible with the most modern communication and information
technologies.
We also see increasingly that terrorists have become strategic actors. They
carefully observe the weak aspects of state defenses, and choose their targets
accordingly. In this sense, administrators and citizens should correctly understand the
changing strategic phenomena. They should change their conceptual systems of

thinking in parallel to the transformations that international circumstances and
terrorism have gone through. They should internalize the new conditions, and should
align policies and measures to keep up with this transformation.
I would like to continue, by asking two questions:
1. Are the old instruments at the national level sufficient and adequate enough to
address the threats which are expanding, and emerging with new characters
and dimensions? Or, do we need to find solutions in a new structure and a new
series of measures?
2. Is it possible for the tools at hand to be compatible with the new developments
at international level?
In answering these questions, a few points come to mind that speak to the difficulties of
intelligence cooperation between and among nations. First, we know that intelligence is
100% a national product. The instruments and methods for its generation are not only
expensive, but also very difficult and dangerous. As such, intelligence constitutes a
kind of national product, that reflects the sovereign right of a state. As the product of
6 S. Köksal / International Security Cooperation: Intelligence Practices
such a difficult and dangerous product, intelligence is hard to share with others, and it
is preserved with jealousy. This quality is one of the factors that limits cooperation
between states in terms of intelligence.
Another issue concerns the different approaches states have to understanding
and countering terrorism. It is a reality that, for their own short-term interests, states do
not usually want to confront terrorist structures that do not directly threaten them. This
is understandable to some extent, why would they want to expend energy and risk
antagonizing an organization that does not directly threaten them?
But in my opinion, the most important factor that adversely affects
intelligence cooperation between states is the differences of opinion regarding the
quality of terrorism—what constitutes terrorism. If I may, I will give an example from
my country. For many years, Turkey has been struggling against an ethnic based terror
that is separatist, in other words, that targets the integrity of the country. It is not
possible to say that Turkey has received significant support from third countries,
including NATO allies, regarding this fight against terror. Let’s look for example at the
response by the EU. Technically, if the PKK is a terrorist organization--and the EU
does accept it as such—then EU countries should be able to act against those PKK
structures that exist within European countries, and should be open to exchanging
intelligence with Turkey regarding the structuring of the organization and regarding the
movements of its leaders. Even from a position of self-interest, in the final analysis,
they should be able to see that in an extreme scenario of Turkey becoming destabilized
by this problem, the results would affect not only Turkey’s immediate region, but their
own countries as well. With such foresight, they should not allow the leader cadres of
terrorist organizations to move freely in their countries or to allow them to leave their
countries. Unfortunately, as we have all seen, this has not always been the case.
These countries where the terrorist organization find shelter or which turn a
blind eye to them, should see and evaluate the fact that such organizations will create
danger for the public order, and that this danger will only increase in time, because
such organizations inevitably resort to methods like trading and trafficking of drugs and
people, and forcefully gathering money.
In light of these points, we need to ask, is it possible to develop the current
capabilities for cooperation at the international level and even beyond? Clearly,
important steps have been taken at regional, sub-regional, and bilateral levels.
Compared to the past, we see that the doors of cooperation of the exclusive intelligence
world are opening slightly--albeit insufficiently. Terror, with its simplest definition, is a
phenomenon that aims at destabilizing the international system. Whether this terror is
global, or based on ethnicity, the aim of destabilization is the same. Therefore, it is
necessary to both expand the basis of cooperation, and to strengthen the methods to
fight against it.
I sincerely hope that this meeting will be useful to open the doors for new
cooperation models. We have a full agenda before us in order to leave a more secure
world for the next generations. It is time to assume our responsibilities without delay.
M. Tuzuner (Ed.)
IOS Press, 2010
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-608-9-7
Building Transnational Responses

to Transnational Terrorism
Tariq PARVEZ
Federal Investigation Agency, Pakistan (former Director)
Abstract. Former intelligence director reflects on the need to build up

transnational responses to effectively counter transnational security threats. The
chapter emphasizes the lessons that can be learned from experiences in sharing
information among domestic agencies and draws implications from those for
international exchanges.
Keywords. Transnational terrorism, counter-terrorism, international cooperation
We all agree that the greatest threats we now face are transnational in nature, and as
such, demand a transnational response. When it comes to terrorism, it has become clear
that we must look at the problem as one of transnational terrorism vs. transnational
response. If the gap between the two is large, you’re going to lose the war on terror. I’d
like to share with you some of my thoughts about building up transnational response, in
other words, cooperating beyond nations against terrorism, based on my experiences as
Head of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). The FIA is a federal agency in
Pakistan that was created after 9/11 to improve counterterrorism efforts. I’ll focus on
two main things in my talk: 1) the importance of sharing information between agencies
domestically and its implications for the sharing of information internationally; and 2)
various suggestions.
To begin, the best way to change mindsets about intelligence cooperation on

an international level is to start from home. We must first make the different domestic-
level intelligence agencies cooperate and share information with each other. Surprising
as it may seem, it is possible that a particular domestic agency might have a closer
relationship with a foreign agency than with its related domestic agencies, and this is
detrimental to success.
There are certain principles I’ve learned about building up successful
cooperation between local agencies, most of which may carry over to international
cooperation. In Pakistan, the first obstacle we faced was credit taking. At meetings of
the heads of various intelligence agencies, it became evident that people were reluctant
to work for things that they would not get credit for. Reciprocity was also essential.
There will not be cooperation unless everyone’s convinced that it will be a win-win
situation. I never cooperated if I felt it was going to be a one-way effort, and we have
to expect everyone to feel that way. Next is the question of trust. Trust develops when
you know the person on the other end personally. If you don’t know that person and
trust them, even if you have the intelligence in hand, you will not be inclined to share
it. Of course, there are also situations in which you do not actually have the information
in hand, and obviously this too inhibits cooperation. It is important to recognize
8 T. Parvez / Building Transnational Responses to Transnational Terrorism
therefore that capacity building through information technology and so on of the

various agencies is also important. Only in this way will all sides genuinely have
something to contribute. Another important practice to promote further cooperation is
to give feedback on what has been done with previously supplied information. If you
fail to let the first agency know what has been done with the intelligence they provided
you, they will be less likely to help out in the future. Efforts also need to be taken to
eliminate any signs of elitism. Some agencies might feel they are highly qualified and
professional, and therefore don’t need help. They need to understand that this threat is
indivisible—no one knows who has the important information that will help connect
the dots. A constant reminder is necessary to treat one another with respect and as
equals, if we are to work together efficiently and effectively. It almost doesn’t seem
necessary to say it, but extreme caution must also be paid to securing the sources of the
information. Nothing will destroy cooperation faster than a sense that highly valued
information is being treated less-than-carefully by those with whom it is shared. Finally
a cautionary note, just because formal structures for the sharing of information are in
place, it would be dangerously naïve to automatically assume that the sharing of
information is actually taking place.
With respect to our experience in international sharing of information, I would
note that in certain areas, it has worked well. If we look at specifically our efforts again
human trafficking, we have had successes cooperating and working with Iran, Turkey
and Greece. Given that keeping track of individuals’ mobility is key in counter-
terrorism, as in human trafficking, experience with the former can be useful for the
latter.
Turning to some suggestions for improving international cooperation and thus,
a transnational response to terrorism, a few things come to mind.
• First, governments must be willing.

• A culture of sharing must be encouraged.
• We need a system for sharing information and experiences after terrorist
incidents. Whenever there is an incident, all relevant information should be
posted.
• We also need a system for rating intelligence—how credible is it? There must
be a uniform system so that the user knows how much to believe in it.
• Training is very important, and for this countries need to help each other.
Many of the staff members of my organization were trained by the FBI, and
this was very helpful.
• The use of liaison officers is a useful and efficient way to contribute to
intelligence cooperation.
• Regional groupings play an important role, and are relatively easy to set up.
These can be organized around particular issues. Interpol’s fusion task force
is a good model for this type of thing.
Question/Answer period
Q: An earlier participant referred to the desirability of separating politics from

professional intelligence work. The government of your country in recent years has had
a variable reputation in recent years. Can you give us some sense of how you see that
issue. Does the political situation in the country interfere with your agency’s work and
T. Parvez / Building Transnational Responses to Transnational Terrorism 9
with its international cooperation efforts? Do you think your agency succeeds at
maintaining cooperation at a professional level or does politics intrude?
Parvez: We work within the framework formulated by the governments. They are
willing to cooperate with each other, and that’s why we do it.
Q: How much is it politicized?
Parvez: I don’t think that the government is sincere with dealing with terrorism, they
have to allow us to deal with it on a professional basis, not political.
Q: India and Pakistan have a joint mechanism for dealing with terrorism. On the Indian
side we see it as not having much good results. What about from the Pakistani side?
Parvez: With the change in the environment between India and Pakistan…efforts to
cooperate will go together with the overall process of normalization in our relations. I
have personally noted positive evidence of change in the atmosphere when compared
with 15 years ago.
Q: There was mention earlier of 35 suicide bombers this year. It’s difficult for us to
know what they’re killing themselves for. Is it purely a reflection of internal national
politics? Is it some part of a wider crusade against the West? What are their motives?
Parvez: There are a large number of motivating factors. Most of the bombers belong to
the tribal area bordering Afghanistan, and they perceive that the US is the main enemy
and the president of Pakistan is his ally. They are becoming stronger and more
determined in their efforts to destabilize the country. We see greater sophistication in
the bombs they use—bombs that are not available to normal terrorist organizations.
The recent bomb killing 35 ISI people was really high-tech. We had not seen such
things before this.
M. Tuzuner (Ed.)
IOS Press, 2010
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-608-9-11
Building Effective Counter-Terrorism

Responses
Aharon Ze'evi FARKASH
Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate (former Director)
Abstract. Former head of military intelligence reflects on current understandings

of terrorism and, drawing on personal expe.riences from the case of Israel, outlines
the features of effective intelligence agencies and their counterterrorism responses.
Keywords. counter-terrorism, intelligence agencies
I’ll address my talk today to the question of how we, in Israel, are using intelligence to
stop or reduce terror. The Chief of Defense Intelligence in Israel is responsible for this.
He reports to the Prime Minister, to the Cabinet, to the government, to the Minister of
Defense and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is under the direct control of the
Commander of the general staff. The Director of Intelligence has various agencies
under his responsibility. These include various collection units, such as those for
human intelligence and Hatzav for OSINT intelligence. In the rather unique Middle
East environment, it isn’t strange to say that six of the former 14 directors of Defense
Intelligence were not able to finish their job terms in a natural manner—that is,
completing their full term and then moving on. The reason for this is that there have
been a lot of problems, and failures, and it’s easy to point to the Director of Intelligence
as the reason for the failure.
What do people in the Directorate of Military Intelligence or any intelligence

agency do? John McGaffin gave a nice description in his Senate testimony following
9/11. He said that part of our job is to connect dots, and this would imply, if you look at
the results of the 9/11 commission, that people should have connected more dots. But if
you look carefully at the results of the investigation, some people are also saying you
connected too many dots. There is a tension in our business. Frequently what we try to
do here is like putting together the puzzle, but we haven’t seen the picture on the box.
We have to put pieces together and do our best to come to a conclusion. The situation
becomes even more difficult in the case of terrorism, because we have to do all this in a
quick manner. The real art to counter-terrorism is to know beforehand; to figure things
out before they happen; to connect the dots before the event.
I’d like to now make a few general points about current understandings of
terrorism:
• Terror is an asymmetric confrontation. States have tremendous state

capabilities, but they are putting them up against an evasive, hidden enemy,
which is unconstrained by statist norms.
12 A.Z. Farkash / Building Effective Counter-Terrorism Responses
• Terrorists operate in a sympathetic environment, one that includes external

support systems, sometimes even foreign states. Hizbullah gets over 120
million dollars a year in aid and assistance, much of which comes from the
state of Iran.
• Terror is driven by practical ideological goals but we must not ignore that it is
also driven by religious passion.
• Terror threats are diverse, and they change and evolve over time. As part of
the response, you finally start being able to deal with one type of attack, and
then the style or method of attack changes. The terrorists have the time
advantage on their side, as they are a step ahead of the responders.
• Terror organizations are no longer hierarchically structured. They are more
like neuronian networks – very flat, very spread out. This means that we need
to find, monitor, and fight them very differently than we did in the past.
• Terror uses the population as their main target because the population has an
influence on its leaders. Terrorists don’t want normalization of the
environment.
• This will be controversial, but it is important that democratic states have to
build up their ability to act without legitimacy. Such a proposition challenges
democratic values and human rights, but we have to do it. Optimally, we need
to find ways of responding without people knowing what we have done.
• It is very difficult to build effective deterrence against new terror networks,
partly because of the many, many groups and factions involved. For example,
the Palestinian leader may want peace, and may want to build a Palestinian
state alongside Israel. Let’s say that he manages to convince the al Aqsa
brigades to go along with this, and then convince Hamas, say you get all of
them convinced, then you still have to convince the Islamic Jihad, and other
groups. The point is that even if Hamas says OK, there are many other
organizations that will continue the attack.
• The key to all of this is all about the hearts and minds of the people.
Counterterrorism is in essence a struggle to convince people not to join these
groups.
In order to have effective counterterrorism, we need a wide spectrum of responses. We

first need operational and tactical dominance, that is, the intelligence needed to know
about any terror target and find it. We need to know first, understand first, do things in
effective time (minutes/hours/days), if necessary provide shooters with real time
intelligence to strike the terrorist. We need an “intelligence aquarium”, connecting
signal, visual, and human intelligence, connecting all these types of intelligence in the
aquarium, to the shooter. We need to be able to make decisions to do things differently,
and to ask different questions. This was successful in reducing the attacks. Finally, if
we are to be successful in combating terrorism, in addition to operational and tactical
dominance, we need strategic intelligence supremacy, combined with relevant national
intelligence.
Question/Answer
Q: Regarding the point of motivation. What actions has Israel taken to remove some of
the underlying causes of the terror? We (the US) have concluded that we can’t kill
enough terrorists to make terrorism go away, what have you done?
A.Z. Farkash / Building Effective Counter-Terrorism Responses 13
Farkash: To counter terrorism you need a strong leadership. This is one of the problems
for us. There was an interesting research conducted about Iraq and the Palestinian
authority, and it found that because of the lack of power and strong government, people
tend to go back to the family, to revert to religion and to the tribe—things that are
warm and safe for them. We must develop direct ties with the people. In the occupied
Gaza strip the people live on 50 cents a day. We need to help build up local leadership
and then national leadership. We can see a similar thing in Iraq in recent months,
starting with the leaders of the tribes. If you give them assistance, they will build up
their own police and intelligence systems.
Q: No one yesterday mentioned the intelligence profession. Could you speculate on the
ingredients of the intelligence profession. What is the right mix of civilians and
military people to create the right esprit de corps, what makes a good intelligence
organization? What sorts of people are good at intelligence? What are the
distinguishing characteristics?
Farkash: An important part of the mixture is the feeling that we save lives. If we are
better, if we do our job better, only the bad people will be captured. There should be a
mix between the academy and our work. We should develop the idea that we are
serving in special units, and that we are therefore close to the decision makers.
Q: When you were serving, what was your experience in terms of international
intelligence cooperation? Were you satisfied with the cooperation you got from other
countries? If not, why do you think it was not working?
Farkash: I can not complain about the cooperation we got vis-à-vis the US or the UK.
This cooperation is very useful for them because we give them a different way to watch
the situation in the Middle East, because we’re in it, looking from within. The problem
is this: it is difficult to share with other countries. For example, Iran is important, so
maybe we need to share with Georgia to get intelligence on Iran, but what can I do for
Georgia?
Case Studies
M. Tuzuner (Ed.)
IOS Press, 2010
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-608-9-17
Understanding the UK-US Intelligence

Partnership
Michael HERMANN
Nuffield College, Oxford
Abstract. From both academic and practitioner-based perspectives, this piece

outlines the history and characteristics of the intelligence relationship between the
United States and England. It then draws on this past to outline lessons for
effective future counter-terrorism practices.
Keywords. intelligence, counter-terrorism, England, United States
Everyone knows about the close UK-US intelligence relationship, with its origins in the
Second World War and the immediate transition to the Cold War. I will try to set out
its characteristics as I knew them, and the lessons it now offers for counterterrorism
and similar purposes. It is now over twenty years since I retired, so I speak of old
experience.
For both parties this transatlantic relationship was by no means the only
important intelligence liaison, but was one among their patchworks of other links, in
many varied degrees of association. The UK-US club was itself not really a club of
two, since the Commonwealth countries of Canada, Australia and New Zealand were
members from the beginning, even though in some things associates rather than full
members. It was complemented by the important exchanges within NATO and the
many other bilateral and multilateral arrangements outside the military alliance. There
was other collaboration on Soviet espionage and subversion worldwide: collaboration

which was the precursor of the current exchanges on terrorism. But for both the UK
and US the intelligence relationship was indeed 'special', an important element of the
'special relationship' in its wider sense.
One feature of it came from the fact that intelligence in both countries was
(and is) federal and not unitary in its structure. Internal security intelligence, military
intelligence, Humint collection and signals intelligence had their separate institutions,
with fairly loose national coordination of them: in Britain by the Joint Intelligence
Committee (the JIC), and in America by the Director of Central Intelligence (the DCI),
whose role has now been taken over by the Director of National Intelligence. The
intelligence alliance was the sum of the individual relationships between organizations
and their opposite numbers, and not a single centre-to-centre arrangement. A DCI's
attempt in the early 1980s to develop transatlantic strategy and task-sharing from the
centre was seen off by the professionals of both countries.
The agency-to-agency relationships were by no means identical. A former
British Ambassador to Washington wrote in 1996 that “the core of the relationship
remained the continuing exchange of signals intelligence (Sigint) intercepts between
[GCHQ] Cheltenham and the US National Security Agency” (Renwick,1996, p. 121).
18 M. Hermann / Understanding the US-UK Intelligence Partnership
For this the pillar was the formal agreement made in 1946 for complete exchanges in
principle, and from this came a high degree of conformity in common methods and
professional language, task-sharing and joint operations. The two national
organizations operated almost - but not quite - as if they were separate divisions of a
larger international conglomerate.
This was not the case outside Sigint. At the top level of assessment there were
exchanges of papers, and even some US participation in the drafting process of the
British JIC: a remarkable phenomenon, not matched by any involvement of Britain's
European partners. But these exchanges were selective, and not necessarily balanced.
Elsewhere the UK benefited greatly from the power of American photographic
satellites, and other exchanges of defence intelligence were far-reaching but not quite
automatic. In their own fields MI5 and MI6 regarded their transatlantic opposite
numbers as prime collaborators, but by no means on everything. Exchanges had
elements of selection and quid pro quo, rather than completeness.
Nevertheless these varied arrangements reinforced each other as the strands of
the total relationship. Their permanent agency-to-agency character added personal
friendships and obligations from past services to the effects of the shared language.
Thinking in transatlantic terms was an almost unconscious reflex, at least on the British
side. My own organization had a policy branch for dealing with other countries, but not
with the US, since the transatlantic dimension was everybody's business. Significantly,
the same applied within our American opposite number.
Yet the relationship was still a professional bargain and not an exercise in
mutual goodwill. It meant that British governments got the benefit of American
superpower intelligence, with a national intelligence effort that was substantial by
international standards but only perhaps a tenth of its American counterpart. On the
American side I imagine that the British effort was valued for its overall quality, for
some unique contributions it was able to make, and for the sharing of ideas and
professional opinions it offered. Whatever the reasons, the relationship would not have
survived if Washington had not felt it was worthwhile.
Some factors helped to sustain it. One was that Britain worked hard at it,
seeking to maximize its contribution as a matter of deliberate policy, for example in the
exploitation of 'niche' assets at its disposal, such as Hong Kong's position under the
British crown as a window on to China. Throughout the Cold War the territory of the
UK itself had some value as 'real estate' for coverage of the Soviet Bloc, since the
American homeland was too distant from the Euro-Asian landmass for technical
collection against it. Britain was able to recruit scarce foreign language expertise not
easily available to its partner; perhaps its modern polyglot society now provide similar
opportunities in the Middle East and Asian languages needed in counterterrorism.
Linked with this was a determination that, despite the imbalance of resources,
the UK should behave as a partner, if a junior one. It benefited from American
assistance in joint projects, but was never an American-funded dependant. It funded its
own 'critical mass' of resources, quality, modernity and 'world reach' to avoid complete
dependence on US judgement and to remain an independent 'second opinion' in US
eyes. A critical American described the British some years ago as “superb intelligence
diplomats” in “making an extraordinarily astute investment buying into the US system”
(Urban 1996, p.103), and he was not altogether unfair.
Another factor of great importance—almost the bedrock of the alliance—was
the existence of common approaches to the safeguarding of shared intelligence secrets.
A distinctive feature of the post-1945 UK-US-Commonwealth agreements was the
M. Hermann / Understanding the US-UK Intelligence Partnership 19
establishment of precise security criteria and procedures, and the principle of

compatible standards was extended as the Cold War went on. Washington's leakiness
had to be accepted by the British; but against the major threat of Soviet penetration the
two partners had common approaches and had comparable rates of success and failure.
Maintaining effective security was particularly important for the junior partner, and
was one reason for the British reticence over intelligence methods that continue today.
Finally, the alliance was also underpinned by the alignment of British and
American policies at the high political level. Intelligence officers on both sides tended
to regard the relationship as 'above politics', and cited the situation in the British Suez
adventure in 1956 in which the UK continued its sensitive intelligence exchanges with
its US critic, while denying this material to its French ally, and the US supplied Britain
with timely bomb damage assessments of the RAF attacks on Cairo airfields. The
inertia of the regular intelligence exchanges was indeed powerful.
But a wise British liaison officer wrote at the time that the relationship had
survived one Suez adventure but would not survive two, and the influence of politics
was demonstrated in the 1980s when the supply of American reports to New Zealand
was completely cut off in retaliation for that country's refusal of port facilities to
nuclear-equipped American warships. Whether a hypothetical conflict of UK and US
policies might have comparable effects remains a matter of guesswork since every
British Prime Minister after Suez has been an Atlanticist by inclination, with the one
exception, Sir Edward Heath in his 1970-74 government, who gave an unconcealed
priority to Britain's 'European-ness'. But it should not be thought that Washington's
distaste for his policy had no intelligence effects at the time.
This then was the relationship as I knew it: it was 'special' not in any of its
individual features but in their combination and degree. I am confident that those I have
described still apply. After the end of the Cold War UK and US had no common
threats, yet the relationship did not wither; and for the last six years it has deepened by
counterterrorism.
I draw from it three main conclusions for the theme of this conference. First,
cooperation is a matter of bargains and bargaining: the small power has to work harder
than the large. Second, there is the key importance of trustworthiness. All intelligence-
sharing runs a security risk, to be weighed against the benefits of cooperation. Can the
organization – and its government - be trusted to safeguard secrets? A good reputation
is slowly gained, and quickly lost. Finally, relationships once established have
considerable durability, but are not insulated from the high politics that set the ambient
temperature for them, and can intrude upon them directly - especially now that
intelligence liaisons are part of public discussion and value judgments. There are good
professional arguments for improved intelligence cooperation. But will future
American attitudes to it be ideological or pragmatic: and how far will other nations'
policies be driven by anti-Americanism and images of the CIA and its rendition
practices?
References
Renwick, Robin (1996). Fighting with Allies: American and Britain in Peace and War. (New York: Crown).
Urban, Mark (1996). UK Eyes Alpha: Inside Story of British Intelligence. (London: Faber and Faber).
M. Tuzuner (Ed.)
IOS Press, 2010
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-608-9-21
Intelligence Reform in Greece and

Regional Cooperation in the Eastern
Mediterranean Region
John M. NOMIKOS1
Research Institute for European and American Studies
Abstract. This chapter first offers an overview of the Greek Intelligence

Community, and then explores specific problems among the Southeastern
Mediterranean states--human trafficking, illegal immigration, and terrorist
financing of Islamic networks. It proposes addressing such security challenges
through organizations operating based on Open Sources Intelligence (OSINT).
Keywords. intelligence reform, cooperation, Eastern Mediterranean, Greece
Introduction
On 11 September 2001 (9/11), the international community was introduced to a new

type of terrorism, one that was truly global in its organization and its impact. The post
11 September 2001 era has challenged governments, policymakers, religious leaders,
the media and the general public to play both critical and constructive roles in the war
against international terrorism.
The tentative European intelligence cooperation that developed during the
1990s fell short of a shared policy necessary for an effective Common Foreign and
Security Policy and autonomous defense capacity. Likewise, Eastern Mediterranean

intelligence cooperation to date has been hampered by emphasizing national
sovereignty over intelligence sharing. Institutional obstacles also stand in the way of
increased intelligence cooperation. Intelligence organizations generally believe that no
other organization’s analysis is as reliable as their own, which leads them to place more
faith and confidence in their own work. These organizations also tend to view
International Relations as a zero-sum game, and may not agree with a cooperative
approach to security and defense integration.
Today, the Mediterranean region stretches from Southern Europe to North
Africa and the Near East, and includes Greece, Cyprus and Turkey. It is an area often
characterized by instability, underdevelopment along the Southern rim and numerous
sub-regional rivalries. The threats and risks emanating from the Mediterranean region
are primarily of a non-military nature, namely uncontrolled population growth, illegal
immigration, refugee movements, drug trafficking, energy dependence, and dangers of
Islamic extremism and transnational terrorism.
1
John Nomikos: Research Institute for European and American Studies, Kalavriton 1 Str.,
Alimos, Athens 17456 Attiki, Greece; E-mail: rieasinfo@gmail.com.
22 J.M. Nomikos / Intelligence Reform in Greece and Regional Cooperation
The main argument of this chapter is that international terrorism in the Eastern
Mediterranean region will not be solved by unilateral action but with regional
(multinational) intelligence cooperation among the relevant states. Today, the
International Community needs intelligence to be dispersed, not concentrated; it must
be open to a variety of sources, not only limited to secrets; and it must be ready to share
its information and analyses with a variety of would-be coalition partners, including
those from other countries and people outside governments.
This chapter highlights the challenges the Greek Intelligence Community has
to face in the 21st century. The first section describes the intelligence reform bill that
the Greek Intelligence Community must now put into effect, as well as the new tasks of
the National Intelligence Service. In a world threatened by transnational threats, the bill
points out the particular problems among the Southeastern Mediterranean states--
human trafficking, illegal immigration, and terrorist financing of Islamic networks. It
goes further by proposing the strategic significance of a forthcoming Eastern
Mediterranean Intelligence Council, based on Open Sources Intelligence (OSINT),
instrumented by Eastern Mediterranean think-tanks that specialize on national security,
intelligence, organized crime and terrorism studies. Finally, the chapter concludes that
in a world where security is measured by knowledge and not only by numbers of
military weapons, not only every day security needs but also comprehensive security
will benefit from closer ties between specialized Mediterranean think-tanks and
security and intelligence services.
1. Present Developments within the Greek National Intelligence Service

and the International Intelligence Community
As the Intelligence Community inexorably works its way into the 21st century, it faces
an unprecedented array of challenges. The chaotic world environment of the post-Cold
War offers a wide range of issues to be understood and a variety of new threats to be
anticipated. The rapidly developing information age presents advanced and complex
information-technology and methodologies to be mastered and integrated into the
intelligence process (Monthorpe 1998, pp. 103).
Greece, as an industrialized state and active member of the European Union as

well as NATO, demands a higher level of management efficiency, effectiveness, and
economy and employment criteria. This is necessary if we are to create a Greek
Intelligence Community that can master those challenges and successfully continue to
perform its role of supporting national, political, diplomatic, economic and military
decision-makers as well as operational and tactical military commanders.
In the post 9/11 era, intelligence faces an unprecedented array of challenges. The
international environment has been transformed and is more complex compared to the
one that shaped the security and intelligence services during the second half of the
twentieth century. In particular, whereas the Cold War provided a reasonably
predictable and linear framework for the intelligence community, that can not be
argued for the security environment at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
Requirements for providing security and intelligence support have changed
greatly. There is a greater complexity and variety of enemies and threats. The linear
understanding that characterized most of the intelligence issues during the Cold War is
long gone (see e.g. Scott & Jackson 2004; Treverton 2001). Calls for intelligence
reform that occasionally appeared after the end of the Cold War have now become
J.M. Nomikos / Intelligence Reform in Greece and Regional Cooperation 23
imperative. In terms of the literature on intelligence reform in Greece, it remains

widely diverse in terms of focus and methodology, though the main focuses have been
on the organization of the Intelligence Community, the analytic process, the utility of
open sources, the policymaker-analyst relationship, covert operations, and the role of
information technologies.
In Greece, the first attempt to create an intelligence unit began in 1926 with
the establishment of the State Security Branch. This intelligence branch lasted only for
one and half years and reported directly to the president. Ten years later, a new
intelligence branch was formed, the Defense Intelligence Branch. In November 1936 it
was renamed as the General Directorate of Foreign Citizens and, despite its limited
resources, it functioned effectively during the Second World War. In 1946, a new
military intelligence branch was created, the Military Protection Department, which
was in 1949 renamed as the General Directorate of Information. The later laid the
foundation for the establishment of the Central Intelligence Service (KYP) in 1953
(Nomikos, 2004a). The KYP was reformed in 1986 with a new Presidential Decree
1645/1986 and changed its name to the National Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP). Its
mission as defined in Article 2 includes the collection, processing and dissemination, of
information regarding national security, counterintelligence activities and the security
of national communications. As was the case with the KYP, its successor NIS remained
an all-purpose service dealing with both internal (counterespionage, counterterrorism)
and external threats (political and military). The political debate about what kind of
intelligence service Greece needs, whether it should maintain the single service model
or restructure a new service, never took place during the drafting of the Presidential
Decree 1645/1986 (Apostolidis 2007). Since then, the Greek government submitted
and passed in 2007 a new reform bill for the modernization of the Greek Intelligence
Service (NIS).
The new reform intelligence draft bill entails the following: 1) creation of a
sub-directorate for organized crime and transnational terrorism; creation of a training
directorate aimed at modern training, education and the specialization of staff;
founding of a special unit focused on combating cyber-attack in cooperation with the
police; a permanent position for an attorney who will be in charge of permitting special
missions undertaken by the staff of the Greek intelligence service; creation of a “mini
national security council” which will evaluate information from the Ministries of
Interior, Foreign Affairs, National Economy, National Defense, Health, Transportation
and Communication, and Mercantile Marine; designing of a modern web site that will
provide information to the public about the history of the Greek intelligence history as
well as pointing out recruitment policies on line; and finally, for the first time in the
history of the Greek intelligence service, collaboration with specialized research
institutes and universities in Greece and abroad.
In sharp contrast to the previous reform bill, the later draft seems to have a
more ambitious agenda; one could even call it a revolutionary. The reform bill lays the
groundwork for true reform to begin. However, legislation and changes to
organizational structure are only part of a successful reform effort. At the end,
achieving the desired balances between agencies and ministries may require more “art
than science” (Bansemer 2005, p. 114).
2. International Order in a World Threatened by Transnational Threats
Global terrorism has emerged as a horrifying reality and forceful phenomenon of the
21st century. Its rise as a major challenge to the nation-state has occurred in the context
of the post-Cold War international order, characterized by the absence of a major
power rivalry and near unipolarity with the United States as the dominant power. While
no nation state is currently capable of directly challenging the US dominance on a
global scale, the subnational global terrorist networks with asymmetric strategies have
adopted this mantle. This challenge is not an easy one to detect or defeat (Nomikos
2007).
Global terrorism presents, therefore, multifarious problems for the nation-
state. These problems arise from the global reach of terrorist networks, the religious
connection, the ability of terrorists to wreak havoc on key economic centers of the
advanced world, and the asymmetric strategies that they follow, which are difficult to
confront using traditional national security approaches. Any effort to solve the
problem of terrorism purely through a traditional state-centric military approach is
not likely to succeed. The consequences of war are generally unpredictable, this time
in a more profound way, as the nation-state is fighting an invisible enemy who adapts
his asymmetrical strategies continuously and has operational bases spread across the
globe.
Regional intelligence cooperation is the most important weapon in the battle
to contain global terrorism, but its significance is even greater than that. The first few
years of the twenty-first century have witnessed a change in the role of secret
intelligence in international politics. Intelligence and security issues are now more
prominent than ever in Western political discourse as well as the wider public
consciousness. Much of this can be attributed to the shock of the terrorist acts in US
(2001), Spain (2003) and London (2005).
Across a range of post-Cold War issues, globalization has undermined many
of the familiar mechanisms by which states formerly provided their populations with
security. Indeed, organized crime, drug-trafficking, money laundering and illegal
immigration have become securitized precisely because of their increasingly
transnational character. With the erosion of the familiar national border post, states
have turned to more proactive measures to protect their populations, and these efforts
are more intelligence-led. Modern intelligence is a multinational activity. National
intelligence power is a function not only of national capabilities but also of the foreign
cooperation and product they obtain. A government’s intelligence needs are met by
varying mixtures of national and foreign efforts. The international dimension of
intelligence fits the modern patterns of increased international specialist contacts.
The concept of transnational terrorism and organized crime was alien to the
Mediterranean region until the mid-1990s. Given the history and wide ethnic,
political and social diversity of the Mediterranean region, it is not surprising that the
development of multilateral responses to transnational terrorism have been relatively
low. Transnational terrorist and organized crime groups continue to hold the
initiative in terms of their ability to operate across borders, to develop economies of
scale, and to elude national prosecution. Since transnational terrorism is extremely
difficult to be fought unilaterally, a very significant level of cooperation has started
to be more active now among the law enforcement and intelligence services in the
region and is therefore, a notable achievement. It may well be that this level of
cooperation may already have limited the flexibility and effectiveness of terrorist
groups existing in the region, but it could certainly be suggested that should a
sustained level of terrorism emerge in the region, the Mediterranean law enforcement
and intelligence services are probably in a better shape to deal with these threats than
ever before (McFarlane 2003).
In addition to the previous points, it is important to point out that institutional
coordination has proven to be an especially delicate issue in the sphere of intelligence.
Services tend not to share information unless a series of conditions are met, some of
which may include identifying clear-cut objectives that justify the exchange, the
existence of personal relationships between services and operatives, and the perception
on bilateral cooperation that there is a balance between what they give and what they
receive (Herrera-Lasso 2004).
Furthermore, the distrust that exists towards the institutions of other
countries is also present among services within the same country. Structural reforms
of intelligence services in the Mediterranean states have to be undertaken in order to
face transnational threats and improve bilateral cooperation. An efficient system for
the exchange of information must transcend situational changes and be able to draw
on its own human and financial resources, demonstrating the ability to review and
adapt its risk analyses in order to respond to priorities of common interest (Herrera-
Lasso 2004).
As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, the establishment of an
Eastern Mediterranean Intelligence Council (EMIC), based on Open Sources
Intelligence (OSINT) and instrumented by specialized think-tanks in the
Mediterranean region will increase the exchange of information and assist the
intelligence services in the region to confront transnational threats more efficiently,
since they do not have to deal with the zero-sum game environment that exists
among intelligence services. The dissemination and use of validated open-source
intelligence (OSINT) inherently enables information-sharing as it is produced
without the use of sensitive sources and methods (Bean 2007). Open source
intelligence products can be shared with Mediterranean think-tanks because of their
unclassified nature. The EMIC will provide a forum for concentrated information
collection, analysis and policy concept formulation on issues connected with the
region. EMIC intends to play a strategic role for furthering the interests of the region
by having the resources and materials to bring Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan
issues to the forefront of policy-makers’ consciousness.
It is significant that each think-tank appoints an analyst who will be an online
contact with the appointed analysts from the other Mediterranean think-tanks that will
form the Eastern Mediterranean Intelligence Council. In this way, an online exchange
of information data-base has to be created among the think-tanks. Periodically, analysts
who participate in the online system must also have the opportunity to organize
specialized workshops in their own states in order to be acquainted with each other.
This is extremely significant to address human factors and to elaborate further the
efficiency of the online exchange of information data-base. This is a win-win situation
since everyone is gaining by exchanging Open Sources Information (OSINT) by
specialist analysts at their own think-tanks and they do not have to face the formal
bureaucratic mechanisms and the distrust that exists in bilateral intelligence
cooperation. A good example of how such online cooperation can work is the recent
Greek-Turkish Coast Guard cooperation, in which an online database was established
in order to expand the speediness of the exchange of information regarding illegal
immigration and drug trafficking in the Aegean Sea.
3. Transnational Threats in the Southeastern-Mediterranean States
International terrorism remains a vital threat to national and international security

interests in the 21st century. There are a number of reasons why transnational terrorist
threats will continue to grow in the near future, including an existing international
support network of groups and states that facilitates the undertaking of terrorist
activities (Nomikos 2004b). The 9/11 terrorist acts in the U.S., the 11th of March 2004
in Spain and 7th of July 2005 in the U.K. underlined the openings and opportunities
offered to terrorists and criminals due to hesitant or partial intelligence exchange.
Southeastern Mediterranean security and intelligence services need to realize
that this new environment, where bordering Balkan as well as North African states are
known for providing homes for terrorist cells, requires a new security apparatus in
order to confront these transnational networks and to prevent terrorist activities.
Another challenge for the Mediterranean intelligence services relates to human
trafficking and illegal immigration in the Southeastern Mediterranean states—Albania,
the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, as well as Algeria,
Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Libya.
Finally, another significant factor that has to be pointed out is that terror
financiers adapt to the international criminal system and make use of ways of
transferring and managing funds that are difficult for authorities to track, such as
charities (Feiler 2007). Transnational terrorism is a convenient proxy for the strategic
ambitions of rogue states and this gives transnational and Islamic terror a financial
cover. Without the support of states such as Iran, and Syria, it would be much harder
for terrorists to maintain their current scope of business fronts and money transfers
(Feiler 2007). Tackling terrorist financing through legislation represents an effective
tool in reacting to terrorist attacks across the globe, and acts as a deterrent against
future attacks, but is not the solution. Terror financing is not limited to individual terror
groups. It is an international network drawing on every resource in the global economy
and international global jihad network. Therefore, terror financing is intertwined with
money laundering, bogus accounts and skeleton companies. The worlds of terror
financing and international crime are two sides of the same coin. Until an attack occurs,
the practical distinction between terrorists and criminals is slight (Feiler 2007).
Arguably the most significant manifestation of the changing security agenda
in the Mediterranean has been the continuous intensification and expansion of policing
activities in and across the Mediterranean Sea, aimed at curbing irregular migration,
human smuggling and other transnational challenges (Lutterbeck 2006). Many
Mediterranean states have deployed Coast Guard forces as well as military forces to
prevent migration and cross-border crime – as well as an intensification of law
enforcement cooperation between the states north and south of the Mediterranean.
While these measures are often officially justified both on security and on humanitarian
grounds, it seems clear that these efforts have also increased the risks for the would-be
immigrants, in particular by forcing them towards more dangerous routes. Such
humanitarian arguments, of course, also obscure the fact that the very existence of the
phenomenon of “boat people” has been a problem of the Mediterranean countries’ own
making: it has been the consequence of their increasingly strict immigration, visa and
asylum policies, while have left clandestine entry as practically the only possibility to
enter the European Union Member States (Lutterbeck 2006).
At the south-eastern flank of Europe, Greece has long been an entry point for
illegal migrants hoping to reach Italy, France, Britain or other EU states. But as these
countries tighten up, more and more of these individuals are staying in Greece, dodging
arrest and drifting from one low-paying job to another. In one year alone, some
100,000 illegal migrants were picked up across the country, according to former Public
Order Minister Vyron Polydoras. The figure, given in April 2007, marked a break with
earlier official reticence about detailing the extent of illegal immigration. But now,
Greece is seeking assistance.
However, while some of these border enforcement measures along the
European Union’s Mediterranean borders have indeed succeeded in decreasing illegal
migration along certain routes such as the Aegean Sea in Greece and Cyprus, the Straits
of Otranto in Italy and the Straits of Gibraltar via to Spain, they have not had any
substantial impact on the overall volume of illegal migration across the Mediterranean
states, at least as far as Greece, Italy an Spain are concerned.
Conclusion
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, much attention has been devoted to the
effectiveness of United States and European countries’ counterterrorism efforts, with
particular focus on whether the governments have improved their ability to prevent
devastating transnational terrorist attacks. When comparing American and European
counterterrorism efforts, observers on both sides of the Atlantic tend to emphasize the
differences between the two approaches. Many Europeans believe that the United
States has abandoned the rule of law and resorted to almost exclusively military means
in its counterterrorism efforts (Jacobson 2006). For their part, many Americans
perceive Europe as being soft on terrorism and unwilling to take the tough measures
necessary to confront the transnational terrorist threats. European states including the
Eastern Mediterranean countries have become one of the most important battlegrounds
in the global fight against transnational terrorism, and what is happening in Europe can
have – and already has had – a direct impact on U.S. national security (Jacobson 2006).
Europe’s battleground status should not concern only Europeans; intelligence analysts
agree that many of the terrorists living and training in Europe are likely plotting attacks
against European as well as American targets. As the Madrid (2004), London (2005)
and Istanbul (2003) attacks illustrated most vividly, terrorists based in the European
Union member states, undisturbed by European security services, may pose the greatest
threat to Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan security.
Furthermore, Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics has become central in
security terms at a moment of pronounced flux in outlook and policy on both sides of
the Atlantic. The United States has adopted a more forward-leaning but still uncertain
strategy toward the broader Balkans and Middle East, an initiative reflected in some
but hardly all aspects of the European Union’s own strategy toward the Eastern
Mediterranean and the wider European neighborhood. The extent to which European
and American approaches to the region will converge or diverge over the coming years
is a critical, open question shaping the future of the Eastern Mediterranean (Lesser
2005).
Like the Greek National Intelligence Service, most of the Mediterranean
security services have undergone internal changes that could be said to constitute
“modernization” (Nomikos 2004b, p. 81). They have changed the nature and extent of
their recruitment policies; they have tried to ensure that their staffs are more
representative of the population they serve; their personnel policies, in terms of career
paths, complaints procedures, and the like have been brought increasingly closer to the
public service norm (sometimes because of serious personnel problems); their

management practices are beginning to match those in the private sector more closely,
and they have, by and large, also physically modernized, in the sense of having
acquired new facilities. Much of this internal reform has occurred while the security
services have also had to adapt to a new external policy context because of the end of
the Cold War, and while they have all been subjected to a steadily increasing degree of
oversight and accountability. It was under these circumstances that the Greek
government submitted the most recent intelligence reform bill to the Parliament,
because Greece needs a modern and efficient intelligence service that can collect and
process information that is able to plan and carry out operations for the protection of
the national interest.
In addition, today in the current “information age” we are constantly
bombarded by facts, opinions, and speculations from every direction and computers
draw us into an interactive milieu where emails give--and expect in return--ever more
rapid exchanges of information. The cellular telephone assures that a flow of
information will follow us everywhere: into the car, the mall, and the meeting place. In
addition, one should ask what effect has the rising tide of Open Sources Intelligence
(OSINT) – and its secret undercurrents we call intelligence – had on decisions made in
the high councils of government. Foreign policy decisions are preceded in most cases
by the gathering and interpretation of information by government officials about the
costs and benefits that may accrue to their nation from various options.
Finally, intelligence as a profession requires a lengthy period of training and
education. Training and professional education in the field of intelligence are usually
carried out by dedicated institutions belonging to the intelligence services on the
national level. The establishing of an Eastern Mediterranean Intelligence Council
(EMIC) based on Open Intelligence Sources (OSINT) and administered from
specialized think-tanks in the region could help create an organizational culture and
working norms. This so-called “service culture” (Shpiro 2001) influences the way
intelligence professionals perceive the role of their service in society, their attitude
towards political control, and the way they perceive regional and global security issues.
By bringing together young Open Sources Intelligence analysts of different
nationalities from various specialized think-tanks in the Mediterranean region, not only
is future cooperation enhanced but also a “common culture of cooperation” develops,

which is quite difficult to create in the intelligence services. This new ‘culture’ could
assist NATO in reducing its intelligence information gap over the Mediterranean. In the
long term, interpersonal relationships among the young OSINT professionals can play
an important role in maintaining goodwill by sharing security information with each
other in the region. In a world where security is measured by knowledge and not only
by numbers of tanks or aircrafts, both everyday security needs as well as
comprehensive security can benefit from closer ties between specialized Mediterranean
think-tanks and security- intelligence services. The sharing-information gained by these
services provides valuable knowledge for decision-makers who are therefore in a
position to influence policy, directly or indirectly. As intelligence services are moving
away from being weapons of war towards also serving peace, the role of intelligence
cooperation will expand, even as NATO makes plans to face new potential challenges
in the Eastern Mediterranean region.
Ultimately, security analysts in the Mediterranean region should pay attention
to the statement made by the director for defense transformation at the Hague Center
for Strategic Studies, Stephan de Spiegeleire: “today’s rapidly changing world demands
that we all shift our point of view to a capability-based perspective. It is not about
listing threats. It is about defining a framework to plan for uncertainty in whatever form
it takes” (cited in Tigner 2007, p. 13).
The dangers of contemporary, more technologically advanced terrorism
(particularly of its transnational variety), require a strategy very different from the
present one, as well as far-reaching adaptation at the global level and a radical change
in the design of state security structures (reform of security and intelligence services) at
the national level (Bebler 2004/5). The main brunt of preventive and protective
activities would have to be born by civilian agencies (domestic and foreign intelligence
gathering, civil defense, rescue and health authorities, law enforcement, customs,
diplomacy and private contractors). At last today, a tighter inter-governmental
cooperation in the face of challenging transnational threats has been identified as
something of the utmost importance, while at the same time a greater involvement of
the European Union and NATO is seen as providing the impetus for a more secure
regional community around the Southeastern-Mediterranean region.
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IOS Press, 2010
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-608-9-31
Intelligence and Defence Cooperation

in India
Behram A. SAHUKAR1
The United Service Institution of India
Abstract. This chapter explores India’s experiences with intelligence and defence
cooperation, focusing in particular on the country’s relations both pre- and post-
9/11 with the United States, Israel, and Russia. It considers major reforms that
have occurred in India’s intelligence practices and institutions, and traces their
origins to regional causes rather than to global terrorism in the last decade.
Keywords. intelligence cooperation, defence cooperation, counter-terrorism, India
Introduction
Countering terrorism and political violence has been an important aspect of India’s
national security for many years. India has been fighting a protracted battle against
terrorism since its independence in 1947 and much before the September 11, 2001
attacks against the United States.1 It is estimated that over 65,000 persons have been
killed in India as a result of terrorism-related violence and that over 850,000 persons
have been displaced from their homes (figures from Government of India, available
www.satp.org).
Much of India’s counter-terrorism effort follows a comprehensive multi-
dimensional approach which includes interagency cooperation, modernization of its

counter-terrorism forces and the strengthening of its intelligence agencies. In addition,
India’s approach to its national security and to counter transnational threats is based on
independence of action, self sufficiency, international defence cooperation, assertive
diplomacy and intelligence sharing with friendly foreign countries. This chapter will
cover the aspects of intelligence and defence cooperation conducted by India with
various countries in general and with the US, Israel and Russia in particular.
Though the 9/11 attacks and the US-led ‘Global War Against Terror’ have had
a major impact on international security and stability, it was the 1999 Kargil Conflict
launched by Pakistan in the Ladakh region of Kashmir rather than the 9/11 attacks
against America in 2001 that led to a complete review and reform of India’s
intelligence setup in particular, and national security system in general.
1
Behram Sahukar: Research Fellow, The United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, India;
E-mail: ci@usiofindia.org
32 B.A. Sahukar / Intelligence and Defence Cooperation in India
1. The Kargil Conflict and Intelligence Review
Emboldened after it acquired the nuclear bomb in May 1998, Pakistan sent its Army
and mujahideen fighters in May 1999 to occupy the strategic icy heights of eastern
Kashmir in the Kargil sector on the Indian side of the Line of Control (the ceasefire
line which was formalized as ‘inviolable’ after the 1972 Simla Agreement between
Pakistan and India). (See Figure 1 below.)
The Pakistani intrusion by an estimated 3000 infiltrators over a 160km front in
rugged high altitude terrain was conducted in secrecy during icy conditions and took
Indian intelligence agencies and the military by surprise. The intrusion remained
undetected until local shepherds first brought the Pakistani activity to the notice of the
Indian military in the early summer of 1999. By executing this bold military action,
Pakistan sought to raise the stakes against India and internationalize the long–festering
Kashmir issue. It further wanted to test India’s reaction to a military intrusion by a
nuclear-armed Pakistan in this sensitive disputed region (Tellis et al. 2001).
India launched a large-scale costly conventional military response to dislodge
the intruders. It respected however, the sanctity of the Line of Control, and refrained
from launching an offensive into Pakistan or by expanding the conflict to other sectors.
By July 1999, the Indian military successes coupled with international and US
diplomatic pressure forced Pakistan to withdraw its troops and to vacate the Kargil
sector.2
Figure 1. Map of Jammu & Kashmir showing Kargil Sector.

(Source www.indianembassy.org/new/Kargil/J&K_Map.html)
B.A. Sahukar / Intelligence and Defence Cooperation in India 33
2. The Kargil Review Committee
The initial successes and surprise achieved by the large-scale Pakistani intrusion in
Kargil exposed major drawbacks and weaknesses in India’s Intelligence system and
operational preparedness. In July 1999, the Kargil Review Committee was formed by
the government to ‘review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression and to
recommend such measures as are considered necessary to safeguard national security
against armed intrusions.’ The Findings (Subrahmanyan 2000) recorded that there were
grave deficiencies in India’s national security management system. It recommended
that in view of the growing nuclear threat, the end of the Cold War, and continuance of
the proxy war in Kashmir for over a decade, a thorough review of the national security
system in its entirety was needed. There were many recommendations to revamp the
intelligence setup. Amongst them:
• Periodic intelligence briefings to the Cabinet even in times of ‘peace’.

• Improve the indigenous satellite and remote imagery (UAV) acquisition
capability.
• Augment hostile communication interception and electronic intelligence
acquisition capability.
• Establish a single point intelligence agency to group together all
communication and electronic intelligence efforts.
• Improve encryption and decryption skills.
• Examine the need for a Defence Intelligence Agency to integrate the Military
Intelligence Directorates of the Army, Navy and the Air Force under one head.
• Implement measures to improve border security management and security to
prevent movement of terrorists, intercept arms and drug smuggling, and
impede the movement of illegal migrants.
• Develop country and area studies specialization and local area language skills
to reach across the borders. Encourage interaction and exchange of personnel
between think tanks dealing with area studies and the intelligence community.
• Overhaul the intelligence system so that the coordination and interaction
between the consumer and the intelligence acquisition agencies at all levels
was institutionalized. Implement oversight so that there was a properly laid
down procedure to implement intelligence tasking, monitoring and evaluation
of the intelligence agencies and also streamline their functioning.
• Appoint a National Security Adviser and a Head of all Intelligence Agencies
to better coordinate the functions of National Security and Intelligence
Management.
Following the above recommendations, a Group of Ministers was set up in April 2000
to conduct a complete review of the national security system and propose specific
proposals for implementation. The Group of Ministers further established four Task
Forces to look into the following critical areas in detail and recommend specific
measures for implementation:
• India’s Intelligence Apparatus.

• India’s Internal Security.
• Border Management of India’s long land borders, island territories and

coastline.
• Overall Management of Defence.
The Task Forces on Intelligence Apparatus and Internal Security presented their reports
on September 29, 2000. However, the complete chapter on Intelligence Apparatus
overhaul was censored by the government and pages 16-40 were left blank (as
government deletions) for reasons of national security. The complete report titled
‘Reforming the National Security System: Report of the Group of Ministers,’ was
published in February 2001. Many of the changes recommended by the Kargil Review
Committee in 2000 and the Group of Ministers Report are still being implemented.
3. India’s Main Intelligence Agencies
3.1. Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW)
A major intelligence reform took place in 1968 after India’s border war with China in
1962, when the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), was raised as India’s External
Intelligence Agency. Until 1968, the Intelligence Bureau looked after India’s
intelligence needs. R&AW was formed along the lines of the American CIA. Its
primary function is to acquire external strategic intelligence and ensure that foreign
intelligence do not penetrate Indian intelligence agencies. It has close contacts with
the intelligence agencies of the US, Israel, UK, and Russia and there is a free and
authorized exchange of information and intelligence. As per media reports, the present
R&AW Chief has been trained in Israel.
3.2. Intelligence Bureau (IB)
This is India’s main intelligence agency. It operates under the Ministry of Home
Affairs and is responsible for India’s internal security and intelligence needs. It works
closely with the Police and the Paramilitary forces on counter terrorism intelligence. It
works with other agencies on preventive intelligence and analysis of threats in border
areas. It also works closely with military intelligence agencies and helps in cementing
civil-military relations.
3.3. The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)
The DIA was started in March 2002, as a nodal point to coordinate the activities of
Army, Navy and Air Force Intelligence and Defence Attaches abroad. It also is
responsible for gathering intelligence in sensitive trans-border areas, and complements
the work of the R&AW. The head of the DIA is responsible to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff. He also
coordinates military intelligence with the R&AW and the IB so that there are no gaps
in the intelligence structure available to the Defence Forces. In addition, the DIA also
includes the Signal Intelligence Directorate, which monitors and intercepts military
radio links of foreign powers, and the Defence Image processing and Analysis Centre
(DIPAC) which conducts analysis of aerial photos and imagery sent by UAVs from a
military standpoint. In addition, the Defence Ministry set up an Information Warfare
Directorate in September 2007 to monitor and derive intelligence from the electronic
emissions of the enemy while at the same time denying the same capability for the
other countries to interfere with India’s emissions.
3.4. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)
This organization now forms a part of the National Security Council Secretariat. It
coordinates the intelligence inputs at the national level from all intelligence agencies
and presents its independent analysis to the Cabinet Committee on Security.
3.5. Joint Cipher Bureau (JCB)
The JCB works closely with the IB, R&AW and DIA and missions abroad on issues
related to intelligence and crypto-analysis of foreign intelligence and encryption of
sensitive information.
3.6. Multi Agency Centre and Joint Task Force on Intelligence
The setting up of these additional agencies within the IB has been launched in order to
enhance the capability of the domestic Intelligence Agency. The State Capitals will
have a Subsidiary Multi Agency Centre connected to the Centre by high powered
computers to analyze data and assist in better evaluation.
4. Intelligence and Defence Cooperation
For many years, India depended largely on Soviet Russia to meet its security needs for
a well-equipped modern military, though at the same time, India had relatively close
intelligence and defence links with the US and Israel. Today, India’s defence
cooperation (which includes counter-terrorism and intelligence cooperation) with all
three countries—the US, Israel, and Russia—has become an important component of
India’s security policy.
4.1. India and the US
India has always been a leader of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) and as such has
never joined any formal military alliance with any country. It has reserved the right to
pick and choose its friends and partners in the military and defence fields dependent on
its security needs and India’s national interests. After the 1962 Sino-India war in the
Himalayas during which India lost ground to the un-provoked Chinese assault, the US
provided India with cold weather equipment, clothing and arms even though it was
arming Pakistan at the same time as a member of both Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO) and South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) . These were to be used
only against further Chinese aggression. In November 1962 the United States started
emergency arms airlifts to India, and supplied about two hundred tons of hardware,
sixty plane-loads of automatic weapons and ammunitions, and hundreds of spare parts
for planes.
Strategic Cooperation with the US with respect to electronic intelligence
gathering activities against China was established in the early 1960s. In 1962-63 the
CIA funded the construction of an air base at Charbatia which was used for airborne
intelligence operations against China. In early 1964 India agreed to a CIA proposal to
install remotely-operated telemetry intelligence (Telint) devices to spy on China. In
1969 the United States established a large signals intelligence gathering station in north
India to replace a similar station at Peshawar that was closed in July of the same year
by the Pakistanis (Ball 1995). India also agreed to a joint CIA-IB-US proposal to plant
a radio active nuclear powered listening devices in the Himalayas on Nanda Devi,
Nanda Kot, and in the Ladakh region of Kashmir from 1964-67 to spy on Chinese
nuclear tests and to monitor Chinese missile launches (Kohli and Conboy 2003). US –
India relations and defence ties have had a very complex relationship, and it will not be
possible to address all the issues here (for more on this see Burns 2007). Intelligence
and defence cooperation in the past was held hostage to issues like India as a leader of
the NAM, India’s nuclear weapons tests of May 1998, US-Pakistan relations, and
India’s relations with the former Soviet Russia (see Kronstad 2005 and Samuel 2007).
The 1991 Kicklighter proposals made by the US following the break up of the Soviet
Union was a major landmark in US-India defence cooperation. There were many
reciprocal visits by senior military commanders, joint exercises were commenced
between the Armed forces of both countries, and there was participation in the Pacific
Armies Management Seminar series and in 1995, the Defence Policy Group was set up.
Though India was still under US sanctions since 1998 because of its nuclear weapons
tests, there was a common perception of the threat of terrorism. After the 1998 US
Embassy bombings and the 2000 suicide attack on the USS Cole in Yemen by Al
Qaeda leaders based in Afghanistan, the US accepted the fact that the centre of gravity
of terrorism had shifted from the Middle East to South Asia.
In December 1999, an Indian Airlines aircraft (flight 814) with 189 crew and
passengers on board flying from Katmandu to Delhi was hijacked by five Pakistani
terrorists linked to the Harkat ul Ansar. They killed one Indian passenger when the
aircraft was denied re-fuelling by the Indian authorities at Amritsar. The plane was
taken to Dubai and later to Kandahar in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. After a week
of negotiations, three terrorists (Maulana Masood Azhar, Omar Saeed Sheikh, Musthaq
Ahmed Zarqar) were released from Indian jails in exchange for the hostages.3 This
was a significant setback for the Indian intelligence agencies. Though all five hijackers
have been identified and are in Pakistan, not one has been brought to justice in Indian
courts.
Amongst the hostages on IC 814 was a US citizen, Jeanne Moore. This led to
the beginnings of cooperation between the American Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and Indian investigating and Intelligence agencies such as the IB and the Central
Bureau of investigation (CBI). In January 2000, India and the US set up a Joint
Working Group on terrorism, which included counter terrorism intelligence sharing and
cooperation. A common perception that terrorism is a global phenomenon requiring
global cooperation was reiterated by both sides. The Joint Working Group on
Terrorism has been meeting every year and implementing methods of enhancing
counter terrorism cooperation to include training and intelligence sharing.
4.2. Impact of 9/11 on US-India Cooperation
India was one of the first countries to condemn the 9/11 attacks against the US. Mt
Vajpayee, the Indian Prime Minister said that ‘we stand ready to cooperate with you in
the investigations into this crime and to strengthen our partnership in leading
international efforts to ensure that terrorism never succeeds again’ (India’s Response
2001, p. 1371). India also took the unprecedented step of offering the unfettered use of
its military bases and airfields to the US for an attack on terrorist safe havens and
training camps in Afghanistan. India also gave military and material support to the
Northern Alliance fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan.
The suicide terrorist attacks by Islamists based in Pakistan against the Jammu
and Kashmir State Legislature in October 2001 in Srinagar, killing 32, against India’s
Parliament in December 2001 in Delhi, killing 14, and May 2002 in Kaluchak, Jammu
against the family lines of Army soldiers, in which over 34 women and families were
killed, brought India and the US closer on counter terrorism issues. Pakistan was
pressured to withdraw support to Islamist extremists based in Pakistan fighting in
Kashmir, and several of the terrorist groups were put on the US list of foreign terrorist
Organizations.
The US did not support an armed attack by India against Pakistan after the
Parliament attack in December 2001 and the Kaluchak attack of May 2002, fearing a
nuclear war in the region. However, the US extracted a promise from then-Pakistani
leader, General Musharraf, that he would do much more to rein in the terrorist groups
in Pakistan from crossing over into India. The Indian army remained mobilized for war
until October 2002, when it reverted to its peace time deployment.
In November 2001 the US and India agreed that “terrorism threatens not only
the security of the United States and India but also our efforts to build freedom,
democracy, and international security and stability around the world.”4 In May 2002,
India and the US launched the Indo-US Cyber Security Forum to safeguard critical
infrastructures from cyber attack. Referring to India as a “close ally of the US in the
global war on terrorism,” the US continues to cooperate on intelligence sharing, border
management systems and training in an effort to prevent future terrorist attacks
(Terrorism in South Asia 2004). The two countries militaries have continued to work
together to enhance their capabilities to combat terrorism and increase interoperability.
In June 2005, ‘A New Framework for Indo-US Defence Relationship’ was
signed, which gave a big boost to defence cooperation between the two countries.
Some of these exercises include joint training of Special Forces in India and in the US.
These have taken place in Ladakh (Kashmir), the jungles of North East India, and in
the deserts of Western India in the Rajasthan sector. Indian forces have gone to Hawaii,
Alaska and Guam for similar training and exercises. The two Air Forces have also
conducted joint exercises in India and the US. The Malabar series of exercises have
been conducted for a number of years in the Indian Ocean. The 11th such exercise, in
September 2007, also included navies from other countries such as Japan, Australia and
Singapore. The US participated with 14 ships including aircraft carriers. In December
2004 the two navies came particularly close during the relief operations during the
tsunami that caused devastation to a large part of South and South East Asia. Finally,
the US and India have been conducting joint patrols since 2001, to safeguard Sea Lanes
of Communication (SLOC) against maritime piracy and terrorism from the Straits of
Hormuz to the Malacca Straits.
From the above it is evident that close cooperation on counter terrorism and
transnational security was in force between India and the US for many years before
9/11. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the attacks on 9/11 enhanced this
interaction, especially on counter terrorism and related subjects. This cooperation is
strong and is based on mutual respect and shared values.
4.3. India and Israel
India and Israel share a very close defence and counter terrorism partnership. Israel is
India’s second largest supplier of defence-related arms and equipment. In 2000 a Joint
Working Group on Terrorism was signed between the two countries starting a strong
partnership in intelligence cooperation and sharing. Though Ambassadorial level
diplomatic relations were established only in 1992, Israel has been providing defence
equipment and intelligence expertise to India since the 1960s. This included provision
of heavy mortars during the 1962 Sino-Indian War, training and equipping the Special
Protection Group (SPG) for VIP protection in the 1980s, and training of the National
Security Guard in counter terrorism duties.
During the Kargil Conflict of 1999, Israel provided the Indian Air Force with
specialized armaments, precision guided munitions, and avionics. The Phalcon
AWACS system that was sold to India and the Green Pine radars, have enhanced
India’s aerial surveillance and strategic capability. In the field of counter terrorism
cooperation, Israeli ground sensors and radars, as well as UAVs are being deployed
along India’s borders and especially in Kashmir to good effect. Israeli expertise in
fencing the Line of Control to prevent infiltration into Kashmir has proved to be very
effective in reducing cross border terrorism incidents.
There is cooperation between the Mossad and the R&AW, especially with
regards to Islamist groups operating from training camps in Pakistan and within
Kashmir (Saeedi 2009). The present R&AW Chief was trained in Israel. Israeli
weapons and night fighting equipment is also playing a big role in the modernization of
India’s Special Forces and Specialized Counter terrorism units such as the Special
Action Group of the National security Guard. India has also acquired sophisticated
surveillance and communication interception equipment for counter terrorist operations
from Israel. India and Israel have been cooperating on space-based intelligence
acquisition and remote sensing technology and also on anti ballistic missile systems.
However, Israel and India differ on some aspects on their perceptions of Islamist
terrorism, on Iran, and on counter terrorism techniques employed by Israel against the
Palestinians.
4.4. India and Russia
Russia remains India’s largest defence trading partner. India and Russia have enjoyed a
close strategic relationship for decades. For years, Russia has been a reliable partner in
defence cooperation, and in the supplying of advanced technology for India’s weapon
systems. Russia and India have also being cooperating in the field of missile defence
and deterrence Bakshi 2006, Kadakin 2001). Russia is also a big supplier for India’s
civil nuclear programme.
India and Russia signed a Joint Working Group on Combating International
Terrorism in December 2002 and this forms a very important plank of their strategic
partnership. Russia’s role in fighting Chechen terrorism and intelligence sharing on
Pakistani Islamist groups known to have supported the Chechen cause is an important
facet of counter terrorism cooperation. Russia and India also agreed to cooperate on
terrorism and WMD as well as financing of terrorism and in strengthening the UN
system in its fight against International Terrorism.5 In September 2007 joint counter
terrorism training exercises were conducted in Russia.6 These exercise involved
airborne forces and air forces of both countries. Earlier in April 2007, naval exercises
were conducted (named as Indra 07). A similar exercise was held in Agra in October
2005, where Special Forces on both sides conducted counter terrorism drills jointly. 7
Russian intelligence agencies have regular interactions with India’s R&AW on
transnational security and terrorism issues.
4.5. Interaction with Other Countries
India has a similar joint working group on terrorism and intelligence cooperation with
over 25 other countries including the UK, the EU, Turkey, China, and France. In 2006,
India and Pakistan also signed an agreement to work jointly against terrorism (Joint
Anti Terror Mechanism). India has also signed similar cooperative security agreements
with Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, and is a leader in security and terrorism
cooperation with the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). India is also an observer with the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization and has limited defence ties and counter terrorism
cooperation agreements with some Central Asian States.
India also has formal defence cooperation agreements with several countries
in and around India’s immediate neighbourhood and the littoral states including Oman,
the UAE, Iran, Singapore, and Thailand. This relationship extends to several other
countries, including those as far apart as Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Myanmar,
Malaysia, South Korea, Egypt, France, Germany, Chile, Brazil, and South Africa to
mention a few.
5. Individual Joint Training and Security Cooperation in Non-Traditional Ways
India has also been participating in joint training military exercises with many
countries, and also conducts joint training programmes at several Indian training
institutes, like the Defence Services’ Staff College, the Army War College, the
National Defence University, the National Defence Academy, the College of Defence
Management, the Infantry School and the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare
School. Indian Military Training teams have been operating for several years in
Bhutan, Laos, Botswana, Zambia, Lesotho, and the Seychelles. India has also had
similar teams in Iraq and Ethiopia in the past. India has also been sending its military
intelligence and police officers for training to many foreign institutes. These exchanges
have led to confidence building, and knowledge of each others capabilities and
limitations. They also result in long-lasting friendships and form the basis of future
transnational security cooperation and sharing.
Other non-traditional ways of security cooperation by India have been in
cooperation between law enforcement agencies, customs officials and in the field of
checking terrorist financing. In December 2004, India and the US signed a Customs
Mutual Assistance Agreement to enhance counter terrorism efforts and efforts against
the movement of illicit goods, narcotics and fake currency.8 The US and India are also
considering cooperation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the Container
Security Initiative (CSI), as well as the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI)
to boost counter terrorism efforts at sea and in general between the two countries. At
the same time, India recently rejected a US offer to conduct a joint operation against
the Lakshar e Tayyba the Pakistani-based terrorist group responsible for high profile
suicide attacks against India, on the grounds of a potential Muslim backlash and fears
of counter intelligence penetration by US security agencies.9
Conclusion
India had been fighting terrorism and political violence for many years before the 9/11
attacks. It had concluded Joint Working Groups on Countering Terrorism with both the
US and Israel as early as 2000. The 9/11 attacks accentuated the threat of terrorism to
democratic societies, and especially to India, as the world’s largest functioning
democracy.
India offered unconditional help to the US in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.
Terrorist attacks from Pakistan-based terrorist groups against high profile targets only
increased after 9/11. However, when India was poised to attack Pakistan in 2002 in this
regard, India did not receive the backing of the US, even though the Islamist groups
India sought to eliminate by attacking Pakistan are also a terrorist threat to the US and
proscribed by the US Government.
India has had to deal with a paradoxical situation with respect to the US and
Pakistan; on the one hand the US and India are ‘natural allies’ in the fight against
terrorism, while on the other hand the US considers Pakistan a major non-NATO ally
and a frontline state in the Global War Against Terror. Nevertheless, the US has placed
on record that terrorism against India emanates from Pakistan and that Islamist
extremism has taken root in Pakistan.
This situation is problematic as far as intelligence sharing is concerned. For
example, India shares intelligence with many countries, but is naturally wary of
penetration of its own intelligence agencies. Also, it is concerned that intelligence that
is shared with a friendly power, such as the US, which has friendly relations with both
India and its hostile neighbour Pakistan, might in turn be passed on by the US to
Pakistan, thus compromising India’s intelligence sources.
India’s Joint Working Groups on Terrorism with over 25 countries world wide
have enhanced the country’s transnational security component. This might not have
been possible before 9/11. Before this infamous day, most countries looked upon
terrorism in India as a problem that had to be resolved by India alone. Even now every
country looks at its security dimension through it own prism. For example, Israel faces
a problem of Islamist extremist violence and hostile Muslim neighbors. India too is
combating Islamist extremism and terrorism. However Indian and Israeli perceptions
on the threat and response differ. This difference on perception might hinder future
intelligence and security cooperation in other cases as well.
In addition to the traditional forms of security and defence cooperation to
enhance security, India has also resorted to non-traditional forms of cooperation. For
example, India hosts a large number of officers and soldiers at various schools and
colleges; not all of which are military exchanges. Police officers, UN Peace Keeping
Operations, Higher education in National Security where civilians also participate, and
cadet student exchange programmes, all enhance long term associations, strengthen
bilateral ties, and form strong bonds that enhance security in non traditional ways.
India’s National Cadet Corps and Police Academy exchange programme with
the UK, the National Defence College and Defence Services Staff College student
exchange programmes, and Jawaharlal Nehru University Foreign Student Exchange
programme are some examples. The Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School in
India’s Northeast has become one of the leading schools for the training of students and
officers in counter terrorism cooperation. Thailand, the US and the UK are some of the
countries which are sending their troops for interagency interaction at this school.
Overall, the steps taken after 9/11 in the sphere of Intelligence practices to
enhance International Security Cooperation have also enhanced India’s security to face
present-day transnational threats and challenges.
1
Jammu and Kashmir since October 1947 (from 1989 violence has been backed by Islamist groups within
India and also operating from Pakistan), India’s Northeast since 1950s (for many years supported and
armed by China), Punjab from 1981-1995 (aided and abetted by Pakistan and pro Khalistan groups based
in the UK and Canada). The Naxalites, a right wing group with leanings towards Marxism, have been
carrying out acts of domestic terrorism in various states of India (mainly in West Bengal, Bihar, and
Andhra Pradesh) since the 1960s.
2
Indian military casualties were 524 soldiers dead and 1363 wounded. Pakistani casualties estimates vary
from 696 to 2700 quoted by Nawaz Sharif Prime Minister of Pakistan during the Kargil conflict in his
memoirs, (Press Trust of India July 06, 2006). See 1999 Kargil Conflict at http://www.globalsecurity.
org/military/world/war/kargil-99.htm for a concise account of the conflict.
3
Of these, Maulana Azhar formed the terrorist group Jaish e Muhammad, known for its suicide terrorist
attacks against Indians in Kashmir; Omar Sheikh was implicated in the murder of the American Jewish
Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in Pakistan; he also masterminded the kidnapping of three
British and one US nationals in India in 1994; Mushtaq Zargar was thought to have been killed in
2002/03 by Indian security forces in a high profile encounter in Kashmir.
4
Text of the joint statement available at: http://www.indianembassy.org/indusrel/2001/ind_us_js_nov_
9_01.htm
5
See ‘Russia and India to enhance counter-terrorism Cooperation,’ ANI January 26, 2007, Available at
http://in.news.yahoo.com/070126/139/6bj0i.html and India, ‘Russia Agree on Fighting Terrorism’
November 06, 2001. Available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200111/06/eng20011106_
84002.html
6
‘Russia, India set to conduct counter-terrorism exercises in 2007.’ Available at http://www.india-
defence.com/reports-2830
7
‘India, Russia hold joint air exercise’ Oct 14, 2005 Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/
library/news/india/2005/india-051014-irna02.htm
8
‘Customs Cooperation is New Facet of U.S.-India Cooperation’, Business Standard, December 17, 2004.
9
‘India rejects US offer of joint operations against LeT’, Times of India, March 21, 2007.
References
Bakshi, Jyotsna, (2006), “India-Russia Defence Cooperation”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 30(2), pp. 449-466.
Kadakin, Alexander M (2001), “Indo-Russian Relations in the First quarter of the 21st Century”, USI Journal
October-December, pp. 475-486.
Kronstad, K. Alan, (2005), Pakistan -US Relations, Congressional Research Service Brief for Congress,
January 28, 2005.
Samuel, Cherian, (2007), “Indo-US Defence Cooperation”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 31(2), pp 209-236.
Saeedi, Tariq (2009), “Mossad and Indian Spy Agency Team Up, Target Pakistan,” Available at
http://www.pakistanthinktank.org.
Towards a New Paradigm in Intelligence
Cooperation
M. Tuzuner (Ed.)
IOS Press, 2010
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-608-9-45
A New Paradigm in Intelligence Sharing:

International Cooperation (IC)
Recep TAYFUNi
Baskent University
Abstract. To achieve effective international and intranational cooperation on

sensitive matters of intelligence requires, among other things, common
understandings of basic principles. To this end, this chapter provides a broad
background on intelligence definitions and approaches, characteristics of
intelligence, and existing organizations for building up intelligence cooperation.
Keywords. intelligence, cooperation, intelligence cycle
“Peace at home, peace in the world”

K. Atatürk
Introduction
Intelligence is one of the world’s earliest businesses and has played an important role
in the development of human civilization. Ramses II beat prisoners of war to make
them reveal the location of their army. The Hebrews spied out the land of Canaan
before entering it (Gardiner, 1960: 28-30). Sun Tzu wrote, “Now the reason the
enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy wherever they move and
their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge” (Griffith, 1963).
Ancient India’s Machiavellian treatise on kingship, the Arthasastra, declares: “My

teacher says that between power (money and army) and skill in intrigue, power is
better….No, says Kautilya, skill for intrigue is better” (Shamasastry, 1951). In the age
of absolutism, ambassadors paid informants, while specialists in curtained, candle-lit
black chambers slid hot wires under wax seals to open diplomats’ missives – and then
decoded them (Kahn, 2001).
In the modern era, detecting and pre-empting threats to the state and society
have become vital for the preservation of a democratic constitutional state. The
Constitutional State has the obligation to protect the basic rights and freedoms of its
citizens while defending the society and the government from these major threats. In
order to preserve individuals’ rights and improve their standard of living, the
establishment of trust within the society is of utmost importance. The trust relationship
between the citizen and the government has an important effect on the citizens’ quality
of life.
i
Recep Tayfun: International Relations Department, Baúkent University, Ankara, Turkey:
tayfunr@baskent.edu.tr
.
46 R. Tayfun / A New Paradigm in Intelligence Sharing: International Cooperation (IC)
Diagnosis of criminal factors threatening the existence of democratic societies,

and eliminating these activities before they occur, constitutes the basis of security. For
this purpose, dangers to society and government have to be detected and precautions
must be taken to prevent them. The main determinant of this process is the collection of
information and intelligence.
Recent experiences and developments around the world have shown us new
things about intelligence and its importance. First, we’ve seen in recent years how the
development of technology has had a significant influence on intelligence activities and
on the evaluation of the information gathered. It has also brought with it some risks. In
particular the 9/11 attacks created a crisis of confidence in counter-terrorism among not
only Americans but also people around the world. The point is that intelligence can
rarely be perfect and unambiguous, and there are always several reasons why it can be
misinterpreted.
Recent experiences have also indicated that responsibility to ensure security
does not only consist of protecting members of an individual country but also the world
as a whole. More than ever therefore, providing security depends on the collaboration
of different countries and relevant units. Today, countries should be more eager than
ever to cooperate. The threats should be taken care of and controlled by mutual
collaboration, cooperation, and coordination among internal and external intelligence
institutions within and among countries.
1. The Concept of Intelligence
David Kahn (2001) defines intelligence in the broadest sense as information. But what
is the difference between ‘information’ and ‘intelligence’? In this sense intelligence is
like the term “news.” Even though difficult to define, every journalist knows what it is:
when something newsworthy is said in a court or a legislative hearing, all the reporters
start taking notes. If we seek a definition however, intelligence practices can be defined
as collecting, analyzing, delivering and using information derived by private or
governmental authorities, regarding the security issues of a state or an organization
which might be a threatening issue against a different state, political group, party,
military organizations, or any other movement (Cinar, 1997: 105).
‘Intelligence’ – usually interpreted as ‘secret intelligence’ – was a central
element of the Cold War era. On both sides; never before was intelligence so extensive,
institutionalized and prized in peacetime. After the fall of the Berlin Wall global
politics was initially expected to fall back into a more modest place, as part of the
‘peace dividend’; and there was indeed some retrenchment. But it became increasingly
clear in the course of the 1990s that intelligence remained a major element in the new,
turbulent, globalized world of diverse and swiftly changing threats, challenges and
responses: a world increasingly conscious that (as noted in a British intelligence
recruitment brochure) ‘government cannot make the right decisions unless it has the
full picture’ (Herman, 2001: ix).
Since the early days of civilization intelligence has played such an important
role in many aspects of nations that it became a general saying ‘to be forewarned is to
be forearmed’. It is impossible to determine when or how spying began, as there is no
record of any ancient conflict in which spies were not used (Mahoney and Mahoney,
1998). Throughout history, kingdoms have been both created and overthrown by spies.
Unpopular leaders have used spies to remain in power and saviors have led nations and
R. Tayfun / A New Paradigm in Intelligence Sharing: International Cooperation (IC) 47
peoples to new centuries through the work of spies. Therefore, it can be assumed that
spying probably developed from a cave man’s first secret observation of a neighboring
tribe. Of course, this was a modest beginning for a business that today uses very
complicated electronic marvels (Mauer, Tunstall and Keagle, 1985; Mahoney and
Mahoney, 1998).
Today, spies would be nothing without their technical devices such as
computers, satellites, hidden microphones, computer analyses, and chemical reactions.
In order to become “intelligence.” the raw information gathered by whatever means
must be processed, analyzed and properly edited so it is understandable to the
consumer (Mauer et al., 1985). Furthermore, it is very important that the intelligence
gets to a person who can use it in a timely fashion. Spying, therefore, is a coordinated
process. It is not just the romantic notion of stealing vital secrets accompanied by a
bevy of beautiful women (Mahoney and Mahoney, 1998).
The intelligence concept has meant many different things to people. The
discussion about intelligence includes the collecting of information, the processing of
the collected information, and the use of information produced from the processing
component. There must be a continuous direction of the collection effort (Shultz and
Norton: 1973, p.40). Strictly speaking, intelligence can be defined as the product
resulting from the collection (Grau, 1981), evaluation, analysis, integration and
interpretation of all available information which concerns areas of operation which is
immediately or potentially significant for planning (Richelson, 1989).
1.1. Intelligence Approaches
There are two fundamental approaches to intelligence: the traditionalist and the activist
approaches. The traditionalist approach is based upon the intelligence doctrine of
Sherman Kent.i This view contends that there should be a definite boundary between
the domain of the intelligence producer and consumer, the policymaker. Traditionalists
argue that it is not the place of the intelligence producer to become actively involved in
policy decisions, and that policymakers, and intelligence producers must keep their
distance, or suffer the wrath of subjectivity (Heymann, 1985). The traditionalists view
the policy process as a prescribed sequence of events into which the intelligence
community feeds sterile facts arrived at through deductive analysis of surreptitiously
obtained secrets while having no part in the application of those facts to the objectives
(Hilsman, 1956; Hulnick, 1986).
The activist philosophy (based principally on Kendall, 1949) hinges on the
principle of intelligence performing more than just a timely presentation of the facts to
the consumer (Brammer and Hulnick, 1984). The purpose of the intelligence function
in this context is to play an active role in influencing the decision making process by
presenting the decision maker with facts which in a timely manner can enable the
consumer to seize the initiative (Kendall, 1949; Davis, 1992). This approach implies a
relationship between intelligence and policy, with intelligence producers more actively
disposed towards policy objectives and action based upon perceived opportunities
(Laurer, 1985).
While Kent and Kendall differ over the nature of the relationship between
intelligence analysts and policymakers, their doctrines have a fundamental point in
common. This point of convergence is on the importance of getting the relationship
between analysts and decision makers right. Both realize the importance of
communication and interaction between producers and consumers.
Taylor (1987) adds a third school to the Kent – Kendall debate. A new version
of the second school that is a result of sophistication in technology, whose main
concern is predicting future events not only to avoid policy drawbacks and political
mistakes by giving accurate information, but also to plan courses of action for
achieving specific goals and objectives. This approach is the base of international
cooperation.
Intelligence is a field with a wide range of area and perspectives. It is one of
the primary fields in which various changes and reforms take place and subsequently
adapt to those changes frequently. In the context of intelligence, Everything –
Everywhere – Everybody – Always concepts play a crucial role (Girgin, 2003: 130).
These concepts demonstrate that intelligence should be analyzed in a wide range of
areas.
Intelligence has taken an important place among official, technological, and
trade activities. While information intelligence which is based on humans (HUMINT)
was emphasized in the Cold War period, technological intelligence has been rapidly
increasing since the 1980s. HUMINT remains important however in modern
intelligence gathering techniques. As one intelligence official observed: “Human
sources are the bread and butter of counterterrorism; you will never get a terrorist
jumping out of a fiber optic cable” (Chalk and Rosenau, 2004: 45).
HUMINT cannot be completely separated from other intelligence activities
however, because it depends critically on other intelligence efforts. It must be
combined with all other sources of information. According to Betts (2002), a
requirement for good human intelligence is a thorough understanding of the sources of
terrorism. In essence, it is considering that gathering and sharing information is most
important for intelligence at the right place with the right people and the right time.
Timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence provides mission focus, reduces the risk of
surprise, and enhances operational effectiveness (Air Force Intelligence and Security
Doctrine, 1996).
1.2. Characteristics of Intelligence

In terms of enforcement, laws and regulations can be divided into two forms of
combating with crime, one “proactive” and the other “reactive”. The reactive form
consists of police activities after a crime. These activities are important for
apprehension and adjudication to ensure immediate public safety. However, preventing
the occurrence of crimes and maintaining the long-term peace of society are more
important than investigating only current crimes and arresting criminals (Fijnaut and
Marx, 1995: 201). This kind of prevention is possible through proactive methods.
Intelligence gathering plays a very important role in this process, which is defined as a
model “intelligence cycle”.
A primary purpose of intelligence agencies is protecting the society from
criminals and giving enough factual information to the law and policy makers about
crimes or crime trends to enable them to make appropriate and timely policies for
societal stability (Barndt, 1994: 95). Investigations must be more comprehensive if they
are to assess the complete picture of criminal activity to prevent future crime and truly
stabilize society rather than merely provide crisis intervention (Kenney and
Finckenauer, 1995: 140-160).
Intelligence is thus an offensive operation. Early discovery is one of the
primary goals of successful intelligence gathering for preventing crime (Schultz, and
Norton, 1973: 179-180). The concept of ‘crime prevention’ entails any action designed
to reduce the actual level of crime and/or the perceived fear of crime (Lab, 1988: 9).
Brantingham and Faust describe “crime prevention” as probably the most overworked
and the least understood concept in contemporary criminology (Gilling, 1997: 3). In
order to understand crime prevention, we need to understand the intelligence cycle,
which is also very important in cooperation-coordination of the intelligence sharing.
1.3. Intelligence Cycle
The intelligence process is often represented as a cycle (see figure I), which is helpful
in explaining the general relationship of the various components to each other (Frost
and Morris, 1983). It is essential to put the collection and analysis activities conducted
by various intelligence units into proper context, that is, to relate those activities to the
requirements and needs of the decision makers and the use made of the finished
intelligence product. The intelligence cycle is the process by which information is
acquired, converted into finished intelligence, and made available to policymakers
(Richelson: 1995, p.3). Generally, the cycle comprises six steps: planning and
direction, collection, collation and processing, analysis and production, dissemination,
and reevaluation (Johnston and Johnston, 2005). However, these steps should not be
viewed as separate elements but as an interrelated whole.
Planning and
Direction Collection
Reevaluation Collation and

Processing
Production
Dissemination and Analysis
Figure 1. The Intelligence Cycle
Planning, entailing the prioritization of information demands and the allocation of

resources, represents both the first and the last stages. Information is collected from a
variety of sources, processed into useful form, analyzed by drawing upon all available
sources to generate balanced conclusions, and disseminated to the consumers of
intelligence.
1.4. Intelligence Cycle and Communication
Whereas the steps of the intelligence cycle as described usually follow one another in
sequence, the function of communication is ubiquitous and takes place continuously
throughout the process. Communication is the lubricant of the cycle (McCarty, 1998).
Communication not only enables interaction among the separate components of the
intelligence system, but it also provides an essential link between the intelligence
community and its external environment. It conveys intelligence requirements from the
consumer to the intelligence community. After the production process, the intelligence
products are disseminated to the consumer. Communication also provides the decision
makers with information on the impact of their policy initiatives on the external
environment (McCarty, 1998).
Without communication throughout the entire process, no cyclical connection
could exist, “goals would not be well defined, threat perception would be difficult to
conduct and responsive adaptation to the dynamics of the environment would be
dysfunctional” (McCarty, 1998). Communication can therefore be described as the axle
upon which the intelligence cycle rotates (see figure 2, McCarty, 1998: 43).
Figure 2. Communication in the Intelligence Cycle
Communication is very important during processing, analyzing, and sharing the

information gathered. Communication theory explains how a lack of communication
may occur due to some barriers. Firstly, “people want to hear what they want to hear”;
secondly, “denial of contrary information”; thirdly, “use of personalized meanings and
complex channels”; and lastly, “poor organizational climate”, which explains that
highly formal organizations may discourage all but formal and approved
communication among their members. This insistence on formality often promotes an
active, informal grapevine, which in turn creates a suitable climate for gossip
(Stojkovic, Kalinich, and Klofas, 1998: 81). These kinds of issues may create a lack of
communication and result in a lack of cooperation both at the national and international
levels.
1.5. Intelligence and Collection of Information
The second component of the intelligence cycle, the collection of information, is the
principal step for the intelligence person to get precise and sufficient information. Law
enforcement agencies would quite simply be unable to perform their primary mission
without an investigative capability. However, there also seems to be an agreement that
law enforcement agencies should be able, with restrictions, to collect personal
information for intelligence purposes (McAlvey and Cooper, 1985: 95).
Collection involves the gathering of raw data that will produce the finished
intelligence. There are four kinds of collection activity: open source collection,
clandestine collection, human source collection and technical collection (Richelson,
1989: 2). Open source collection can be defined as the acquisition of data that are
publicly available. Clandestine collection includes the acquisition of materials that are
not in the public domain. Technical collection draws on the collection of intelligence
via technical devices, and human source collection results from observations done by
and interactions with individuals (Fert, 2007: 15).
1.6. Intelligence and Analysis of Information
The analysis and production process entails the conversion of basic information into
finished intelligence. It includes the integration, evaluation, and analysis of all
available data and the preparation of various intelligence products (Godfrey and Harris,
1971). Because the raw intelligence that is collected is often fragmentary and at times
contradictory, specialists are needed to give it meaning and significance. Intelligence
analysis is the heart of the intelligence cycle (Taylor, 1987).
To the layperson, intelligence might seem like secret documents produced by
government agencies to run covert operations and overthrow unfair regimes.
Intelligence, however, is primarily a process of collecting raw data, filtering, analyzing,
and finally coming up with some logical conclusions. Analysis is the step in which raw
data is processed and converted into meaningful information (Godfrey and Harris,
1971).Gottlieb, Arenberg and Singh (1994) define intelligence analysis as the
systematic collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and dissemination of

information on targets, especially related to their associations and their identification
with criminal activity.
As noted earlier, the purpose behind the analysis may be stated differently. It
may be ‘traditional’, emphasizing the boundary between intelligence producer and
consumer; it may be ‘activist’, in which the intelligence analyst should play an active
role in influencing the decision making process by presenting the decision maker with
facts which in a timely manner can enable the consumer to seize the initiative (Kendall,
1949; Davis, 1992); or it may be focused on predicting future events not only to avoid
policy drawbacks and political mistakes by giving accurate information, but also to
plan a course of action for achieving specific goals and objectives (Taylor, 1987).
In order to develop reasonable and objective intelligence, one must begin with
sources that provide simple truthful facts. Since an analyst must look at all aspects of
an event or situation, sources are sought which are authoritative, provide varied
perspectives, and are perceptive. Sources from which intelligence is produced must
also be timely and easy to use (Ucak, 2002).
1.7. Intelligence and Dissemination of Information
The final step of the intelligence cycle is dissemination of the finished product to
consumers. It involves the distribution of the finished intelligence to the consumers—
the policymakers and operators whose need triggered the intelligence process. This step
plays an important role in the international sharing of the intelligence.
The heart of information sharing is dissemination of the information. Policies
need to be established for the types of information that will be disseminated and to
whom. Critical to appropriate dissemination of information is understanding which
persons have the “right to know” and the “need to know” the information, both within
the agency and externally. In some cases, there may need to be multiple versions of one
product (COPS, 2008). As these dissemination efforts lead to new requirements for
information, the intelligence cycle begins again.
2. Information versus Knowledge
“Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?

Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?”
T.S. Eliotii
The hierarchy of knowledge which is consisting of data, information and knowledge

are often misunderstood and much of the literature on knowledge management is spent
on emphasizing the concept of “knowledge” and explaining the differences between
data, information and knowledge (Tiwana, 2000; Srikantaiah, and Koenig, 1999;
Krogh, Ichijo, and Nonaka, 2000; Nonaka, and Takeuchi, 1995).
Data is a general term for quantitative or numerically encoded information,
particularly used for information stored in a database. The word is, however, frequently
used in a casual way with a sense not especially different from ‘information’, as, for
instance, in a phrase like ‘biographical data’ (Feather and Sturges, 2003: 120). Data
are collected for individual and organizational purposes, and stored unstructurally
(Dogan and Ibicioglu, 2006: 1-4). Data are raw material that can be collected through
environmental scanning for human needs.
Information can be analyzed after classifying and categorizing the data.
Information is data that has been processed into a meaningful form. Seen in this way,
information is an assemblage of data in a comprehensible form capable of
communication and use; the essence of it is that a meaning has been attached to the raw
facts. The conceptual distinction between information and knowledge is therefore
rather unclear, although the two terms tend to be used in somewhat different contexts.
Increasingly, information is the word that is applied in the broad professional and
technical context represented in such phrases as ‘information technology’ or
‘information management’ (Feather and Sturges, 2003: 224).
Knowledge is information that is evaluated and organized in the human mind
so that it can be used purposefully. In this sense, the term can be equated with
understanding. However, it is generally used in an imprecise way to describe
phenomena to which the term ‘information’ is otherwise often attached.
Information hierarchy shows the differences and relations between these three
concepts. It includes the three-level cognitive hierarchy that moves from data to
knowledge. In relating this hierarchy to the stages of intelligence gathering, we see that
the observation process acquires data about some physical process by the measurement
and quantification of observed variables. The observations are generally formatted into
reports that contain items such as time of observation, location, collector and
measurements and the statistics describing the level of confidence in those
measurements. An organization process converts the data to information by indexing
the data and organizing it in context in an information base for subsequent retrieval and
analysis. The understanding process creates knowledge by detecting or discovering
relationships in the information that allow the data to be explained, modeled, and even
used to predict future behavior of the process being observed. At the highest level,
wisdom is the ability to effectively apply knowledge to implement a plan or action to
achieve a desired goal or end state (Waltz, 1998: 50). The intelligence sharing process
reflects collective wisdom that comes from and is used by different countries.
Two forms of knowledge can appear while creating knowledge: explicit and
tacit knowledge. Both become embedded in an organization’s products, services, and
work processes. Explicit knowledge can be defined as words, diagrams, or photographs
that convey information that can be understood by direct pointing, or demonstrating, or
feeling (Collins, 2001: 71). Tacit knowledge on the other hand, is transferred via the
organization’s products/services and work processes, and this conversion gives rise to
competitive advantages between participants in business units. Often therefore, the tacit
dimension of knowledge is purposely hidden by organizations. Hereby, the basic goal
of knowledge management is to convert an organization’s tacit knowledge to explicit
by following participants’ human and social information processing (Sagsan, 2003: 6).
It is important to identify the quality of knowledge being provided for sharing.
Tacit knowledge can be evaluated not only at an individual but also a national level.
Tacit knowledge is bound to the senses, personal experience, and bodily movement and
is based on human experiences (Johannessen, Olsen and Olaisen, 2001: 7-9). Because it
represents the personal form of knowledge, it is difficult to share (Bloodgood and
Salisbury, 1997: 390-391) or to easily pass on to others (Krogh, Ichijo and Nonaka,
2000: 83). The transfer of tacit knowledge is likely to take substantial time and energy,
and involve a good blend of reflection (Krogh, Ichijo and Nonaka, 2000: 84). Studies
of learning highly complex sequential tasks indicate how hard it is for humans to
deconstruct, analyze, and verbalize even the steps of the complex process (Shanks and
Johnstone, 1998).
2.1. Knowledge Management and Knowledge of Intelligence
“Knowledge is a mine, which increases when it is shared.”

Bhartrihariiii
In accordance with the literature on knowledge management, five basic processes can
be considered: creating, sharing, structuring, using, and auditing. These five processes
of knowledge management have been called the ‘knowledge management life cycle’
model. Knowledge management can be defined as “the activities of knowledge that is
collecting, sharing, creating, structuring and auditing in organizations” (Feather and
Sturges, 2003: 351-352).
There are some similarities between knowledge management and the process
of intelligence evolution. In the context of the intelligence cycle, both are directly
related to the processing stage, which is begun for selective collecting of data. The next
stage enables the analysis and transformation of data into information which is ready
for sharing. After the sharing stage, in order to construct suitable conditions for sharing
information, first it is necessary to transform information into knowledge and second to
build up a knowledge management infrastructure which can easily cycle the
intelligence and prepare the next step of the intelligence processes.
Intelligence knowledge is itself of two overlapping kinds; first, the product of
special, largely secret collections and, second, assessment of those foreign subjects –
mainly bearing on national security – on which intelligence is the national expert. The
common factor to both is some separation between intelligence and policy-making
(Herman, 2001: 203).
2.2. Information Policy
Information policy is an important component in the deliberations of national

governments and international public bodies, yet it is less immediately visible than
other areas of public policy. It is a dynamic process, an interplay between various
stakeholder groups, vested interests and power structures. Policy-making is the result of
a series of choices or bargains negotiated between stakeholders and represents an
essentially chaotic, non-linear, process determined by shifting networks of power and
influence (Feather and Sturges, 2003: 278-281).
Policy-making comprises a series of inputs (people, ideology, expediency,
information, research investment) and outputs (wealth creation, better healthcare,
access to democracy). By conceiving of information policy-making as a set of INPUT-
PROCESS-OUTPUT (I-P-O) activities for organizing our thinking, we shift to the
view that information policy governs a process (such as the storage and transmission of
information) rather than a thing (such as technology). With this I-P-O model it is
possible to describe how data are transformed into information and then knowledge
(Feather and Sturges, 2003). There are similarities between both process I-P-O and the
intelligence cycle to effectively access results.
3. Cooperation and Coordination

“Common sense is not so common”iv
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the fields of intelligence and
internal/external security have rapidly changed. The most important change is that on
time knowledge sharing is now as important as intelligence, which is more crucial than
gathering information. Due to the dominance of a privacy culture in much of modern
society, the basic principle of intelligence emphasizes which information should be
hidden. Recently however, the reason for which information should be shared is
growing increasingly important.
Identifying terrorist groups is extremely difficult. Even though we may be
familiar with their culture, environment, timing, location, and targets, we can not say
that terrorist activities are predictable. It is necessary therefore, to find out new
methods of using intelligence systems instead of traditional intelligence. The
departments which are directly related to dealing with criminal activity are allocating
more time and attention to international cooperation.
Every successful anti-terrorism campaign in history has underlined the
decisive part played by intelligence (Clutterbuck, 1990). This success depends on the
continuation and characteristics of international cooperation. Intelligence is still

directed against states whose standards of behaviour put them beyond the pale, and
here other considerations apply. International society is a society of states bound by
cooperation, or at last toleration; they do not behave as if in a complete state of nature.
The avoidance of inter-state aggression and war remains one of the world’s highest
priorities. Governments’ reticence about intelligence collection and sharing is not
related only to source protection, but also recognizes some conflict with a tacit code of
behaviour between states over information – gathering – albeit a shadowy one
(Herman, 2001).
Cooperation and coordination are one of the most important issues of both
classic and modern intelligence activities. Cooperation must also be obtained from
individuals or agencies that have information or material that is necessary for the
investigation (Barnett, 2001: 36). Again, the intelligence cycle is the simplest way to
understand the relevant intelligence activities. The cycle’s fourth step, which is analysis
and production, is the key step for the coordination and cooperation of intelligence
organizations.
4. International Sharing in Intelligence of Knowledge
Intelligence’s most dramatic impact in recent years has been in support of international
intervention. Since the Gulf War, Iraq has been a classic intelligence target of almost
Cold War difficulty. UNSCOM-IAEA (United Nations Special Commission for Iraq
and the International Atomic Energy Authority) inspections of Iraqi compliance with
the Gulf War peace terms have relied heavily on national intelligence inputs, with as
many as twenty nations contributing data (Herman, 2001: 206).
Iraq may be sui generis, but Bosnia and Kosovo as well as the case of
Afghanistan have pointed to a new pattern of intelligence support for international
intervention of all kinds. All those responsible for such operations, from the UN
Secretary General downwards, have emphasized the importance of good intelligence
(Herman, 2001: 206). Other examples can be noted. Together with the European
Union, NATO has been assisting the African Union since July 2005 in expanding its
peacekeeping mission in Darfur, Sudan, in an attempt to halt continuing violence. The
Alliance has been airlifting African Union peacekeepers and civilian police into the
war-ravaged region and providing training in running a multinational military
headquarters and managing intelligence (NATO, 2006).
The sharing of knowledge collected through international cooperation requires
a great deal of arrangements about the solidarity of participating countries. These
organizations provide us important insights for constructing and maintaining world
peace.
4.1. United Nations – UN
One of the primary purposes of the United Nations is the maintenance of international
peace and security. Since its creation, the United Nations has often been called upon to
prevent disputes from escalating into war, to persuade opposing parties to use the
conference table rather than force of arms, or to help restore peace when conflict does
break out. Over the decades, the United Nations has helped to end numerous conflicts,
often through actions of the Security Council — the primary organ for dealing with
issues of international peace and security.
Thirteen international conventions have been elaborated within the framework
of the United Nations system relating to specific terrorist activities. Member States
through the General Assembly have been increasingly coordinating their counter-
terrorism efforts and continuing their legal norm setting work. To consolidate and
enhance activities, member states opened a new phase in their counter-terrorism efforts
by agreeing on a global strategy to counter terrorism. The strategy, adopted on 8
September 2006 and formally launched on 19 September 2006, marks the first time that
countries around the world have agreed to a common strategic approach to fight
terrorism. The strategy forms the basis for a concrete plan of action: to address the
conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; to prevent and combat terrorism; to
take measures to build state capacity to fight terrorism; to strengthen the role of the
United Nations in combating terrorism.
4.2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO
In the wake of the September 11 attacks on the United States, priority has been given to
efforts such as better sharing of intelligence relating to the threat from terrorism,
strengthening cooperation and partnership with other countries outside the Alliance and
with other organizations across the board but above all in addressing the threat from
terrorism, reinforcing the role of NATO’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Centre in contributing to military preparedness to counter WMD threats and to the
ability to operate in a WMD environment, adapting forces structures, and improving
military capabilities in other relevant areas (NATO, 2006).
After 9/11, NATO leaders agreed to develop high-tech capabilities to protect
both civilians and military forces from terrorist attacks. In addition, agreement was
reached to improve intelligence sharing and to carry out a review of current intelligence
structures at NATO. The mandate given to the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit,
created after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, was made permanent and extended to include
analysis of terrorist threats as a whole, in addition to those more specifically aimed at
NATO countries (NATO, 2006).

An enhanced package of anti-terrorist measures was agreed to at the NATO
Istanbul Summit in June 2004. These measures include improved intelligence sharing
through NATO’s Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit and other means; improving
NATO’s ability to respond rapidly to national requests for assistance in response to a
terrorist attack; helping to provide protection during selected major events, including
the use of NATO airborne early warning aircraft; strengthening the contribution of
NATO-led operations in the Mediterranean, the Balkans and Afghanistan to the fight
against terrorism, increasing cooperation with Partner countries and with other
international and regional organizations; and improving relevant capabilities (NATO,
2006).
4.3. European Union – EU
The European Union (EU) is a supranational and intergovernmental union of twenty-

seven states and a political body. It was established in 1992 by the Treaty on European
Union (The Maastricht Treaty), and is the de facto successor to the six-member
European Economic Community founded in 1957. Since then new accessions have
raised its number of member states, and competences have expanded.
The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on October 2, 1997, and entered into
force on May 1, 1999. It made substantial changes to the Treaty on European Union,
which had been signed at Maastricht in 1992. The Amsterdam Treaty meant a greater
emphasis on citizenship and the rights of individuals, more democracy in the shape of
increased powers for the European Parliament, a new title on employment, a
Community area of freedom, security and justice, the beginnings of a common foreign
and security policy (CFSP) and the reform of the institutions in the run-up to
enlargement.
As more and more Europeans take advantage of their rights to move freely
around the European Union (EU) either for business or personal reasons, the need for
greater co-operation between national police forces, customs services and legal systems
has increased enormously. Similarly, the activities of international terrorist groups and
criminal organisations benefit from and use this freedom. To combat them efficiently,
the EU's national law enforcement agencies must co-operate with their counterparts in
other EU countries on an almost daily basis. Several measures have been put in place to
help them work together quickly and efficiently. Day by day, efforts are developed to
share crucial information and important projects at an inter-government level (Hert,
2004).
In December 2005, the EU decided to focus its efforts in the fight against
terrorism on four main objectives (EU Strategy, 2005). The first of these was
strengthening national capabilities (PREVENT). It refers to using best practice, and
sharing knowledge and experiences in order to improve national capabilities to prevent,
protect against, pursue and respond to terrorism, including through improved collection
and analysis of information and intelligence.
The second effort is facilitating European cooperation (PROTECT). This
entails working together to share information securely between Member States and
Institutions. Establishing and evaluating mechanisms to facilitate cooperation including
between police and judicial authorities, through legislation where necessary and
appropriate. Third, we find developing collective capability (PURSUE). This effort
ensures EU level capacity to understand and make collective policy responses to the
terrorist threat, and making best use of the capability of EU bodies including Europol,
Eurojust. Finally, there is promoting international partnership (RESPOND). This effort
entails working with others beyond the EU, particularly the United Nations, other
international organisations and key third countries, to deepen the international
consensus, build capacity and strengthen cooperation to counter terrorism.
4.4. The Council of the European Union
A “Terror Summit” was held by the European Council on March 25, 2004 in Brussels.
At the end of the meeting a “Declaration on Combating Terrorism” was published,
which included a chapter on “Intelligence sharing” (EU Council, 2004). Underlining
the importance of more efficient intelligence cooperation and improved threat
assessment, in this declaration, the European Council calls upon Member States to
improve mechanisms for cooperation and the promotion of effective systematic
collaboration between police, security and intelligence services. The flow of terrorism-
related intelligence to Europol should be improved. The further development of the
relationship between Europol and national level intelligence services will also be taken
forward.
4.5. TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, Violence International)
An additional consequence of the persistence of nationality in international police work

(Deflem, 2002a) is the fact that international terrorism has mostly remained a matter
regulated, policed, and prosecuted at the national level or on a more limited multilateral
scale. This accounts for the development of many international anti-terrorist initiatives
that are independent from Interpol. In Europe, for instance, counter-terrorist efforts
date back to the 1970s, when the TREVI Group (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism,
and International Violence Group) was founded in the European Community (Benyon,
1997; Rauchs and Koenig, 2001).
The Group was explicitly founded because “Interpol was not considered
suitable for such discussions because of distrust of its ability to handle sensitive
information” (Gammelgard, 2001: 238). Since the formation of the TREVI Group,
Europe’s unified nations have created additional cooperative arrangements against
terrorism. In 1993, the TREVI Group was, along with other European judicial,
customs, and immigration organizations, united in a new structure specified by the
Treaty of European Union. Since 1998, an anti-terrorist unit, the ‘Task Force
Terrorism,’ has been set up in the European Police Office (Europol) to take the role of
TREVI.
4.6. Police Organization for the European Union (Europol)
Europol has it origins in TREVI, a forum for internal security cooperation amongst
interior and justice ministers created in 1975 and active until the Maastricht Treaty
came into effect in 1993. It tabled a surprise proposal to establish a European Police
Office to the European Council meeting in Luxembourg in June 1991. By that
December, the Intergovernmental Conference was coming to an end and the member
states had pledged themselves to establishing Europol through Article K.1(9) of the
Maastricht Treaty. Europol was given the modest role of establishing ‘a Union-wide
system for exchanging information’ amongst EU police forces.
Unlike the police services of the member states, Europol does not have
executive powers. It cannot detain individuals; nor can it conduct home searches. Its
task is to facilitate the exchange of information, analyse it and coordinate operations
involving multiple member states. As part of police cooperation between the member
states, Europol is particularly concerned with facilitating the exchange of information
between the member states; collating and analyzing information and intelligence.
Three different levels of cooperation are possible within Europol. The first one
is technical co-operation or to provide training. The next step is strategic co-operation
aimed at exchanging general trends in organised crime and how to fight it and the
exchange of threat assessments. The top level of cooperation includes the exchange of
personal data and requires the fulfillment of Europol's standards in the field of data
protection and data security.
4.7. Schengen Information System
The EU also operates the Schengen Information System which provides a common
database for police and immigration authorities (Hall and Bhatt, 1999: 30). During the
1980s, a debate opened up about the meaning of the concept of free movement of
persons. Some member states felt that this should apply to EU citizens only, which
would involve keeping internal border checks in order to distinguish between citizens
of the EU and non-EU nationals. Others argued in favour of free movement for
everyone, which would mean an end to internal border checks altogether. Since the
member states found it impossible to reach an agreement, France, Germany, Belgium,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands decided in 1985 to create a territory without internal
borders. This became known as the "Schengen area". The name was taken from that of
the town in Luxembourg where the first agreements were signed. This
intergovernmental cooperation expanded to include 13 member states in 1997,
following the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam.
The first agreement between the five original group members was signed on
14 June 1985. A further convention was drafted and signed on 19 June 1990. When it
came into effect in 1995, it abolished checks at the internal borders of the signatory
states and created a single external border where immigration checks for the Schengen
area are carried out in accordance with identical procedures. Common rules regarding
visas, right of asylum and checks at external borders were adopted to allow the free
movement of persons within the signatory States without disrupting law and order
(Penelope, 2001: 193).
Accordingly, in order to reconcile freedom and security, this freedom of
movement was accompanied by so-called "compensatory" measures. This involved
improving cooperation and coordination between the police and the judicial authorities
in order to safeguard internal security and in particular to tackle organised crime
effectively. With this in mind the Schengen Information System (SIS) was set up. SIS
is a sophisticated database used by the authorities of the Schengen member countries to
exchange data on certain categories of people and goods (Cansevdi, 2002: 20).
4.8. International Police Organization (Interpol)
Sensitive political or intelligence information can not be easily trusted to all other
countries. Interpol is the 183-member state organization created in 1923, which
facilitates cross-border police co-operation, and supports and assists all organizations,
authorities and services whose mission is to prevent or combat international crime
(www.interpol.int, 02 February, 2008). Information sharing in this organization is
basically contributing to the crime solving process, and plays an important role in
effective cooperation against crime.
An online available Interpol fact sheet on ‘The Fight Against International
Terrorism’ summarizes the key elements of Interpol’s current policy against
international terrorism (Interpol website). It specifies that in the aftermath of a terrorist
act, member agencies are expected to inform Interpol headquarters of the particulars
concerning the incident and its investigative developments, such as details about
individuals arrested and information concerning organizations on whose behalf the
terrorist act was conducted. The Interpol offices in Lyon can then issue international
notices for fugitive terrorists whose arrest is sought by a member agency. Since 1998, a
formal set of ‘Interpol Guidelines for Cooperation in Combating International
Terrorism’ more explicitly addresses the relationship of terrorism to Article 3 of

Interpol’s Constitution, which forbids Interpol from undertaking matters of a political,
military, religious or racial character. The key aspect is that terrorist incidents are
broken down into their constituent parts, the criminal elements of which can then be
identified and subjected to police investigations (Anderson 1997:95).
As a modern bureaucratic police organization, Interpol typically institutes
efficient procedures of information exchange and intelligence gathering. In the wake of
September 11, Interpol drastically modernized some of its technical apparatus and
further built on the communications facilities it has been developing over the decades
among a growing number of member agencies. Yet a key problem remains the tension
between the emphasis placed in Interpol on efficiency of international police work and
communications, on the one hand, and the politically sensitive nature of counter-
terrorist objectives, on the other. By criminalizing terrorism, Interpol seeks to develop
counter-terrorist programs that can be participated in by police institutions from
countries across the world irrespective of the ideological justifications of and
sentiments about terrorist activities. The treatment of terrorism in Interpol as a purely
criminal matter reflects the impact of a professionalized police culture across nations. It
remains undetermined, however, how this de-politicized approach to terrorism as a
crime will blend or clash with the political response to international terrorism as a
matter of international diplomacy, law, and war (Deflem and Maybin, 2005).
Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated that there are two fundamental approaches to understanding
the purpose and function of intelligence: the traditionalist approach and the activist
approach. The traditionalist approach contends that there should be a boundary
between the intelligence producer and policymaker. Accordingly, the intelligence
producer should not be actively involved in policy decision-making. On the other hand
the activist approach implies a relationship between intelligence and policy, with
intelligence producers more actively disposed towards policy objectives and acting
based upon perceived opportunities. Taylor (1987: 165-175) adds a third approach—a
new version of the activist school that is a result of sophistication in technology, whose
main concern is predicting future events, not only to avoid policy drawbacks and
political mistakes, by giving accurate information; but also to plan a course of action
for achieving specific goals and objectives.
Traditionally, intelligence communities have faced challenges resulting from
operating a large, complex organization effectively, from changes in technology,
changes in society as a whole and changing terror events conditions. In recent years, all
of these have been true, in particular perhaps, a change in the nature of terrorism from
domestic to global. Recent events demonstrate that the concepts of terrorism and
security have been globalized and have taken a transnational dimension (Eralp, 2002:
54; Aribogan, 2002: 232). As the world became smaller due to ease of communication,
transportation and decision mechanisms (Kongar, 2002: 239), the international borders
have been lifted and the world flattened (Friedman, 2005). This change has turned
intelligence-sharing into a crucial one among defence methods.
In combating global terrorism, improving international cooperation is
essential. Threats should be controlled both through the efforts of the national
intelligence units and through cooperation with the intelligence services of allies.
Issues have to be resolved not through palliative approaches, but through permanent
and concrete solutions. The future will be secured with the efforts of those countries,
whose intelligence services analyze efficiently and share the information they gather.
Efforts on this front can be seen in the signing of various international agreements to
combat terrorism. All these initiatives are taken by countries, which, through collective
wisdom, agree on a safer and more peaceful world. This process will develop and
continue in the future.
Global terrorist activities have caused a significant change in the basic
methods of information gathering and sharing that had been practiced for many years.
Recently, countries have been focusing on what kind of information should be shared,
instead of the kind of information that should be kept secret. Information sharing
requires a description of that information. Description and classification of information
have a critical role in determining what information is to be shared. Appropriate
legislative background should be prepared to govern decisions about what kind and
under what conditions the information-sharing will take place. Such legislation will
ease a country’s domestic and international relations. In light of this, the state’s concept
of “secret” should be defined and regulatory adjustments and additions should be made.
Collecting and evaluating intelligence requires expertise. The people who will
specialize in this area should be trained accordingly and with special care. In the
training of intelligence personnel, emphasis on knowledge management, knowledge
sharing and the legal dimensions of cooperation will help to establish a stable
cooperation culture.
A positive example we can look to in the past couple of years, is the
cooperation efforts made by the US and Turkey. The two countries have been
cooperating efficiently against terrorist activities. Thanks to the current well-
functioning intelligence-sharing mechanism provided by American officials against the
targets of the terrorist organization, successful operations have been taking place. This
is a striking example of a cooperative and determined effort to combat against
terrorism. Other countries also get their inspiration and encouragement form this
application of intelligence-sharing.
It can be argued that in the twentieth century intelligence played a crucial role
in helping to defeat Hitler, in preventing the Cold War from turning into a nuclear war,
and in keeping the superpower arms race from getting totally out of hand. The impact
that international cooperation will have in the next century cannot now be determined,
but it can be said that intelligence in the hands of those who prefer to avoid war or have
a legitimate need to defend themselves can help prevent wars or at least increase the
probability that aggressors are defeated. If one searches for the keyword “war” on
Googlev, around three times as many results as for “peace” can be found. For a safer
and better world, it is necessary to enhance cooperation and solidarity.
i
Sherman Kent, (December 6, 1903 - March 11, 1986), was a Yale University history professor who
during World War II pioneered many of the methods of intelligence analysis.
ii
Thomas Stearns Eliot (1888–1965) was an English poet, dramatist, and literary critic, born in the United
States. From the poem ‘The Rock’.
iii
Dogan, and Ibicioglu, (2006); Bhartrihari is the name of a 6th or 7th century Sanskrit grammarian, and of
a Sanskrit poet of the same period.
iv
Francois Marie Arouet – Voltaire (1694-1778): “Common sense is not so common” Voltaire wrote in
Dictionnaire Philosophique.
v
927,000,000 for ‘war’ [definition], http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=WAR; 305,000,000 for
‘peace’ [definition], http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=peace.
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IOS Press, 2010
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-608-9-65
Implications of Community-Oriented
Policing and Problem-Oriented Policing
for Terrorism Prevention
David A. KESSLER1
Kent State University
Musa TUZUNER2
Abstract. This chapter draws on experiences and scholarship surrounding two

forms of local, cooperative-based counter-terrorism practices—community
policing and problem-oriented policing—in order to explore their implications for
broader level cooperation on international counter-terrorism practices.
Keywords. community policing, problem-oriented policing, counter-terrorism
Introduction
In December of 2000, after a presentation to the Turkish National Police Academy on

community policing, members of the audience asked two questions that seemed
puzzling at the time. The first was how the United States responded to terrorism. At
that time, our most eventful experiences had been the first attempted bombing of the
World Trade Center in New York City and the more recent Oklahoma City Federal
Building bombing. These were rare events and, when they happened, they were dealt
with through the criminal justice system (e.g., the prosecution of Timothy McVey for
the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building).
The second question was whether or not the United States would remain a
world power. At the moment, it seemed inconceivable that the United States would not
remain a world power in the foreseeable future (i.e., within our lifetimes). Who could
challenge our technology, which included nuclear weapons, smart bombs and bunker
busters? But the question continued to haunt me. What was behind the question? What
did the person know that motivated him to ask this question?
Nine months later, 19 people dramatically demonstrated that nuclear power
and smart bombs were irrelevant when, armed only with knives and mace, they
hijacked three commercial airliners to destroy the headquarters of the world’s
commerce and damage the military headquarters of the supposedly most powerful
nation in the world. How could this happen? How could knives and mace defeat smart
bombs? Part of the answer is that the United States attracts challenges because we are
1
David Kessler: Kent State University, Kent, Ohio; E-mail: dkessler@kent.edu
2
66 D.A. Kessler and M. Tuzuner / Implications of Community-Oriented and Problem-Oriented Policing
powerful. Power does not necessarily protect us; it gives others a reason to attack us.
Mexico was not attacked. Australia was not attacked. Peru was not attacked. The
United States were attacked because they were the center of economic and military
power in the world. The targets of the 9/11 attacks were symbols of our economic and
military power. That made America the target. The United States is an attractive target
for international terrorism. Suicide bombers cannot be deterred by technological
superiority. America cannot retaliate with nuclear bombs or smart bombs. The terrorists
overcame all of America’s strengths. What brought the US down was human ingenuity.
Ingenuity is not a desirable trait in an enemy. It introduces unpredictability and
complexity into our decision-making process. In order to respond effectively to this
type of threat, it is critical to understand the human beings involved, their motivation
and capabilities, and their ways of thinking. Rather than relying on technology,
information must be obtained through the establishment of human relationships.
It has been argued that on September 11, 2001, everything changed. The
thinking of September 10, 2001, no longer applies. Old approaches to security are no
longer considered relevant. This mentality has resulted in overlooking lessons learned
from the past that could help to prevent future attacks. Our strategy for solving
problems has been to rely on increasingly more sophisticated technology when instead
we need low technology human relationships. Research on law enforcement
effectiveness should not be ignored, and policies should not return to approaches that
have been found to be ineffective in the past because of one frightening event.
Research findings are not specific to time and place. While the attacks of September 11
were horrific, there have been other experiences with terrorism from which lessons can
be learned. Other countries have had experiences with terrorism from which to learn.
Lessons of research, history, and other countries can be helpful in formulating effective
policies to respond to the current threat.
Terrorism presents a serious challenge to the security and safety of society.
The random injury and death of citizens undermine the confidence in the capacity of
government to maintain the safety of its citizens. The random selection of victims also
makes it difficult to predict and prepare for an attack. Whether the terrorism is a
relatively new threat as posed by Al Qaeda and the 9/11 attack or a historical threat
such as that posed by the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, or Kurdish Worker’s
Party) in Turkey, the challenge to the government is daunting. The prevention of
terrorism requires credible information on the intentions, plans, methods, targets, and
schedule of future attacks. The required information is difficult to obtain because those
who have it do not want those who need it to prevent the attack to have that
information. Often, the information is needed within a short time frame, before it is too
late to save lives and prevent injuries. The problem of terrorism can generate fear
because of the potential for a terrorist attack to inflict such extreme harm to its victims.
While terrorism generates intense fear, it is not the only security problem that
concerns citizens. Terrorism is one type of crime and, statistically, a person is far less
likely to be a victim of a terrorist attack than a victim of crime. The problem of
preventing terrorist attacks shares similar issues with the problem of preventing crime.
It is unfortunate that, as the United States was making progress in reducing crime, the
terrorist attacks of 9/11 resulted in a reaction by factions of the government
administration to overlook the lessons of law enforcement that could be helpful in
addressing the terrorist problem as well. Many of the questions arising from the threat
of terrorism have been questions dealt with in community-oriented policing and
problem- oriented policing as well, and the lessons of community policing and
D.A. Kessler and M. Tuzuner / Implications of Community-Oriented and Problem-Oriented Policing 67
problem-oriented policing may have some insights to an effective response to

terrorism.
1. Community-Oriented Policing and Problem-Oriented Policing
Community-oriented policing evolved as a way to improve the effectiveness of law

enforcement by working in cooperation with the community. It evolved in response to
the ineffectiveness of law enforcement. From the 1900s to the 1960s, the guiding
theory of police administration was the idea of professionalism, which gave priority to
crime control and control of corruption by minimizing contact with the people in the
community through the use of a quasi-militaristic management style. In the 1950s,
tensions were emerging between the police and the public (Radelet, 1986). It was
assumed that the police were professionals who could protect the community through
its own technology. The strategies included random patrols to deter crime, rapid
response to calls to apprehend offenders, follow-up investigations to catch offenders,
and the development of cases for convictions. It was assumed that law enforcement
was comprised of experts who, through its own expertise, could protect the
communities without the need to collaborate with citizens.
By the 1950s and climaxing in the 1960s, law enforcement in the United
States confronted severe tensions with the community. Reports of brutality emerged,
and civil unrest from civil rights and antiwar demonstrations were not managed
consistently with democratic principals (Kerner Commisison, 1968). In the late 1960s
and early 1970s, researchers began to examine the underlying assumptions of the
professional approach to policing. Studies found that most police work is not about
crime control; preventive patrol has no effect on deterring crime (Kelling, Pate,
Dieckman and Brown, 1974); rapid response to calls for service has little effect on
arrests, witness availability, seriousness of injury, or citizen satisfaction (Board of
Police Commissioners, 1979). Investigators processed cases but rarely added new
information that resulted in arrests or convictions of suspects (Greenwood and
Petersilia, 1975). Reactive policing had little effect on crime; new approaches were
needed (Sparrow, Moore and Kennedy, 1990).

Information is essential to law enforcement. The primary source of
information is the community’s citizens. Citizens provide the information on the
occurrence of crime, the identity of suspects, and the locations of suspects, and they
provide testimony in court that is essential to obtain convictions. Cases were solved by
information that field officers obtained from victims and witnesses rather than by
investigators (Greenwood and Petresilia, 1975).
When information on crime locations and repeat offenders was provided to
field officers, the results were more effective and efficient than traditional patrol (Pate,
Bowers, and Parks, 1976). The information had the greatest advantage when it was
distributed to field officers rather than to specialized units. Skogan and Antunes (1979)
pointed out that because police obtain most of their information from citizens, if they
can learn to obtain more of the knowledge that citizens have, they may improve police
productivity. The issue then is how to increase information-sharing with citizens. There
are two dimensions: (1) How can officers obtain more information, and (2) Is the
information they receive actionable (i.e., can they use it)?
The Kerner Commission (1968) report suggested that the professional model
inhibited cooperation between the police and the community. Philosophically, the
professional model discouraged contact between officers and citizens but, without
contact, information exchange is limited. Car patrols were impersonal, limiting casual
contacts that would allow citizens to pass on information to officers informally.
Aggressive patrolling, such as with field interrogations, antagonized the community.
By inhibiting officer contact with citizens, the contacts that did occur tended to be
antagonistic, and the professional model limited the kind of informal information
exchange that could warn of crime and allow preventive actions by the police.
If law enforcement takes a similar approach to immigrant minorities, it may
alienate them just as prior aggressive tactics alienated African-American communities.
Muslim-Americans may contribute more information about possible Al Qaeda
activities, but, unless they have confidence in fair and responsible treatment by law
enforcement, they may withhold vital information that could help prevent future
terrorist activities.
To increase the information exchange, opportunities for non-antagonistic
interactions must be increased. Where it is feasible, foot patrols can provide
opportunities for informal encounters through which citizens may share information.
Making contacts with businesses provides opportunities for information sharing. One
of the highest payoffs is for field officers who attend community meetings; these
meetings tend to be one of the most productive sources of information. The earliest
study of community-oriented policing found that officers who carefully profiled their
beats acquired more information about the area’s socio-demographic characteristics, its
physical structure, citizens’ problems, community resources, and criminal activity
(Boydstun and Sherry, 1975, p.3).
In Birmingham, Alabama, officers intent on closing an open-air drug market
went door-to-door to notify citizens of forthcoming actions only to learn that the drug
dealers had gone door-to-door threatening any residents who reported them or
cooperated with the police (Kessler and Borella, 1997). This information would not
have been obtained without the personal contacts. The lesson is that contact encourages
information sharing between the police and the public.
Community-oriented policing has shown that when police establish rapport
with the people in the community, citizens give the police officers information, the
information is actionable, and they can use the information that they obtain from the
community. Uniformed officers who spend time talking with residents and business
people and attend neighborhood meetings and get to know citizens by name report
obtaining more information, that the information is useful to them, and that they are
able to act on that information. The impersonal policing of the bureaucratic model
alienated people and created difficulties in eliciting cooperation to solve crimes,
identifying suspects, and testifying in court. Where it has been conscientiously
implemented, community-oriented policing has proven its ability to overcome
resistance and elicit to assistance from citizens.
If community-oriented policing increases the amount of information that
officers are able to elicit from the community, a related issue is how to process the
information to apply it effectively. As conceptualized by Herman Goldstein (1979,
1990), Problem-oriented policing provides a methodology for deeper analysis of
problems confronting police. Rather than react to incidents that are reported through
calls for service, police need to look at the underlying causes that generate the incidents
that result in those calls for service. If police officers can influence the causes of these
problems, they may reduce the incidents or even eliminate them completely. Problem-
oriented policing increases the demands on the information processing capabilities of
police departments. At the most elementary level, police departments need to be able to
identify the locations where problems seem to occur repeatedly. Problems may not be
identified simply by repeat calls from specified locations. Problems may generate
incidents at multiple locations. The task of problem solving is to take a deeper look at
the problems, implement responses, and evaluate the effectiveness of those responses.
Analysis may include studying offenders, social conditions and mores, or economic
relationships that may be contributing to the problems. The SARA model (Scanning,
Analyzing, Response, and Assessment) is a popular acronym that serves as a
reasonable guide for the methodology of problem- oriented policing (Eck and Spelman,
1987). Nevertheless, one study of the problem-solving efforts within a community-
policing context found that the most common source of information with which to
identify problems came from citizens (Kessler, 1999).
Problem-oriented policing applied new theoretical perspectives of crime
control. While the professional approach to law enforcement relied almost exclusively
on deterrence theory (i.e., deterring motivated offenders by apprehension and
punishment), Problem-oriented policing is more eclectic in its theoretical approach.
Situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1992) and routine-activities theory (Cohen and
Felson, 1979) offer other variables on which to focus attention. According to routine-
activities theory, crime occurs when there is an attractive target, a motivated offender,
and the absence of an effective guardian. While deterrence theory focuses on deterring
a motivated offender, routine-activities theory also directs attention toward the target
and the effectiveness of the guardian. In addition to incapacitating motivated offenders,
crime might be controlled by making targets less attractive and guardians more
effective.
Community-oriented policing and problem-oriented policing both require
greater responsibility by the field officers. Initially the traditional bureaucratic
management structures of police agencies created barriers to implementation. Two
major management models have evolved to address management issues. The New
York City Police Department implemented Comstat to create accountability at the
managerial level for the effective reduction of problems (Ratcliffe, 2008). Comstat
makes use of crime statistics mapping to prioritize crime problems geographically, and
to hold periodic meetings during which managers are required to report on the
strategies and progress toward the reduction of those problems. Intelligence-led
policing was developed by the Kent Constabulary in the United Kingdom to address a
rising crime problem (Ratcliffe). It is based on the assumption that a few offenders are
responsible for most of the crime. Targeting these chronic offenders results in crime
reduction. Intelligence-led policing places emphasis not only on the collection and
analysis of information, but also on using that information to develop strategies and
tactics to address crime problems. While improved management is needed for
community-oriented and problem-oriented policing, the Comstat and Intelligence-led
policing management models did not evolve with the faithful commitment to these
philosophies their implementation without modifications risk undermining the tenets
especially of community-oriented policing. What is critical to remember is that
information begins in the community, that it comes to the attention of police through
the field officers, and that the management model must be designed to make the most
value from that information in order to develop effective strategies and tactics for
responding to security threats.
When community-oriented policing is implemented in police agencies, it is
frequently integrated with problem-oriented policing, community-oriented policing
and problem-solving (COPP). Community-oriented policing places emphasis on

responding to citizens’ concerns and mobilizing community resources to assist with an
effective response to those concerns. Problem-oriented policing provides a
methodology for a more in-depth response to problems identified by citizens. Both
approaches place a high degree of responsibility on field officers. For police service to
become more effective, field officers must be empowered to interact with citizens,
learn their concerns, decide how to respond, mobilize resources for those responses,
evaluate their effectiveness, and persist until successful solutions are found. It is likely
that the information that field officers receive from the community will be the most
important factor in resolving problems and preventing crime.
2. Implications for Terrorism
The lessons of community-oriented policing and methodology from problem-oriented

policing are applicable to terrorism. These lessons include avoiding practices that are
antagonistic to the communities on which they are dependent, establishing rapport with
the community, encouraging the reporting of actionable information to field officers,
empowering officers to act on that information, and encouraging officers to share that
information with others who can provide resources with which to support more
thorough solutions to the fundamental problems that erupt into terrorist attacks. In a
sense, terrorism is another problem that requires the same methodology as other
crimes.
As the history of policing found a militaristic approach to crime control is not
effective, a militaristic response to terrorism also may not be the most appropriate one.
The enemy is not a nation state; it is not managed by a hierarchical military structure
that can be overpowered with military force. It is a cell structure of organization that
appears to operate without central coordination. Capturing one cell or several cells
leaves others free to act independently in retaliation. The way to deal with such an
organizational structure is by obtaining information from informants who are aware of
the cells’ existence and yet are loyal enough to report it to the authorities. An
aggressive and punitive approach such as the practices found in the Kerner
Commission report runs the risk of alienating the communities on which authorities are
most dependent for information, thereby cutting off sources of information. In Lodi,
California, for example, two Imams, a father and son, were tried and the son was
convicted of attending a terrorist training camp. As one reporter discovered, “In the
long run, experts on terrorism agree that cooperation from the Muslim community in
the United States is probably the single most important thing to preventing the next
attack, but in some areas, including Lodi, Muslim community leaders say that the way
the prosecutions have been handled have actually made it less likely that Muslims will
call if an extremist shows up in their midst” (Shane, 2006).
Furthermore, the more militarized the response, the more that idealistic young
people may be inspired to join cells and become committed to their concept of “jihad.”
“Public opinion surveys of Muslims in the Middle East and West suggest the difficulty
of countering the message of violent extremists to those who hate the United States and
the West for perceived oppression against Muslims” (Dyer, et al., 2007). The
antagonistic approach provides intellectual support for recruitment to the terrorists’
cause. Violations of civil liberties undermine the legitimacy of law enforcement
agencies. Vigilante actions by citizens against minority groups (such as the vandalism
of a mosque) further alienate people whose cooperation is badly needed. Instead, law
enforcement agencies would be more effective by reaching out to these communities to
recruit members of the community into law enforcement agencies and to encourage
citizens to report suspicious activities from within their midst. Conscientious
investigation of any hate crimes against these groups helps to maintain loyalty. Respect
for civil liberties is essential. More fundamentally, law enforcement agencies should
reach out to individuals who might be vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist
organizations to challenge the ideology that provides the gateway into terrorist
operations. Agencies may work with the community to prevent individuals from
acquiring the interests or motivation to engage in terrorist actions.
Law enforcement resources are limited, and officers may not have
the intimate community knowledge to detect subtle indicators when
an individual moves toward terrorist action. Only people who reside
near potential extremists can provide this capability….Law
enforcement agencies must first build trust with individuals in these
areas and then create a link for communities to share issues of
concern (Dyer et al., 2007, pp. 7-8).
The events of September 11, 2001, forced the realization that it is not enough to
examine patterns of prior events to identify problems and initiate the problem-solving
process. Terrorism has the potential to create such horrific harm that law enforcement
agencies must attempt to anticipate its occurrence in time to prevent that harm. Beyond
response to incidents or understanding underlying problems, it is necessary to try to
anticipate where harms to society may occur and be prepared to prevent them before
they occur. Risk-based policing attempts to assess the risk that incidents may occur,
assess the harm that may occur from an incident, and prioritize targets based on the
expected harm of the event.
After September 11th, it became increasingly clear that the

community input and assistance is even more critical to
counterterrorism investigations then it was to traditional

investigations focused on guns, drugs, and violent crime. In
traditional investigations, law enforcement is aided in its work by the
existence of a crime scene and/or a focus on a specific criminal
object, e.g. a weapon or narcotics. In contrast, terrorism
investigations focus on information and nuanced analysis of that
information. Further, the primary goal of a counterterrorism
investigation is to prevent, detect, and deter crime before it occurs.
Both the relevant cultural information and the linguistic expertise
needed for accurate analysis reside predominantly in the Arab,
Muslim, and Sikh communities in this country; therefore, a
community-based approach is not only beneficial to counterterrorism
investigations, it is an essential component for success. (Ramirez,
O’Connell, and Zafar, 2004, p. 5)
In order to acquire this capability, law enforcement agencies need to be able to identify
potential targets of attack (i.e., attractive targets), identify those individual groups or
cells that might initiate operations against such targets (i.e., motivated offenders), and
develop methods of target-hardening to protect vulnerable locations (i.e., effective

guardian). An initial step is for police officers to conduct community profiles including
analysis of the community infrastructure that may be possible targets, the
sociodemographic characteristics of the citizens (Boydstun, 1975). Field officers have a
central role to perform, and they must be empowered to do it well.
More importantly, “Law enforcement leaders must be able to identify
individuals with the most potential to effect immediate harm, thereby controlling the
operating environment and designating time to address the larger issues underlying
violent Islamic extremism” (Dyer, McCoy, Rodriguez, and Vanduyn, 2007, p. 4).
Identification of the individuals or groups that may potentially initiate terrorist actions
requires information from sources external to the agency. Such information requires
establishing rapport with members of the community. It will be the local field officers
who are in a position to create that rapport and elicit the pertinent information. “Law
enforcement agencies must first build trust with individuals in these areas and then
create a link for communities to share issues of concern” (Dyer et al., p. 5).
The importance of citizen informants was apparent in the review of the
investigations of the September 11, 2001 attacks.
Although traditional investigative tools have been useful in achieving

a quick and thorough response to September 11th, law enforcement
needed enhanced tools to effectively prevent future acts of terror.
Specifically, September 11th reinforced the idea that for law
enforcement agencies to effectively prevent future acts of terrorism,
it would require the cooperation and assistance of the American,
Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities. Embedded within these
communities are the linguistic skills, information, and cultural
insights necessary to assist law enforcement in its efforts to identify
suspicious behavior. (Ramirez, et al. 2004, p. 2)
Within the United States, the 9/11 Commission found that prior to the actual attacks,
the information on the September 11, 2001 attacks also came primarily from the
community.
…The only information that actually referred to a hijacking in this

period was a walk-in at an FBI office in the United States who
mentioned hijackings among other possible attacks. The source was
judged to be a fabricator. FBI report Daily UBL/Radical
Fundamentalists Threat Update, ITOS Threat Update Webpage, Aug.
1, 2001, (9/11 Commission Report, note 37, p. 535).
Information on the unusual students attending flight schools as relayed in the Phoenix
memo originated from informants. The information on the unusual interest of Zacarias
Moussaoui in Minneapolis (Minnesota) was the result of a combination of informant
information and the knowledge of the field agents. More generally, the 9/11
Commission noted:
It is also notable that virtually all of the information regarding

possible domestic threats came from human sources. The information
on overseas threats came mainly from signals intelligence. Officials
believed that signals intelligence was more reliable than human

intelligence. Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004) [9/11
Commission Report note 43, p. 535].
While there may be difficulty with the reliability of human intelligence, one lesson
learned from the 9/11 Commission is that it should not be discounted too quickly.
3. The Turkish Experience
It is always risky to make inferences from a local context of one culture to the
international arena of many cultures. Nevertheless, if human nature does have universal
characteristics, then we can hypothesize that the best intelligence on the international
scale will still be obtained through human contact by establishing rapport with people
who have the type of information that can be of use to international security and who
are willing to share it. Other countries and cultures have had similar experiences.
In 2004, a former counterintelligence officer defended his master’s research
paper on community policing and neighborhood watch groups. During his defense, he
talked about how he had applied the ideas, that are now considered part of the
Community-policing philosophy, during his experience as a counterintelligence officer
in Turkey. By going into his community openly and introducing himself to the citizens
in the community, he established rapport, and when known terrorists came to the town,
people would inform him of who they were, where they were staying, and what they
intended to do. As a result, he was able to prevent a number of incidents from
occurring.
His human understanding also enabled him to convert a budding terrorist
away from that life. He discovered one young woman was working with terrorists
because she thought she was in love with one of the members. He began to undermine
the relationship and to educate her about the implications of the choices she was
making. Eventually, she broke off the relationship and withdrew from the organization.
In a class on contemporary policing, another Turkish counterintelligence officer
reported on his experience. He specialized in the PKK. He interviewed members of the

PKK who were apprehended. He read what they read during the conversion and
indoctrination processes and tried to learn how they think. When terrorists’ incidents
occurred in Turkey, he could tell from the modus operandi of the incident whether or
not it was likely to have been conducted by the PKK. He was able to do this by his
immersion in the human nature of the members of the organization.
Turkey’s approach to the PKK in the 1990s should be given more careful and
extensive study for its application to contemporary international problems. The
investigation of the terrorism attacks in Istanbul (Turkey) found that as many as 400
people in the community were aware of the plan. Many of these people lacked the
ideological commitment to the organization behind the attacks, and any one of these
people might have been sources of information to discover the attacks in advance if law
enforcement had been sufficiently connected with the community to provide
opportunities for discreet reporting (McGarrell, Freilich, and Chermak, 2007, p. 151).
In addition, the Turkish National Police consulted with religious leaders, and
when terrorists were apprehended, the police engaged them in discussions to persuade
them that the religious tenets they were using to rationalize their terrorist activities
were not consistent with the true teachings of their religion. The Turkish National
Police was able to convince some of the apprehended terrorists to defect from their
organizations.
4. Challenges for International Intelligence Cooperation
If we are going to reestablish security, we are going to need to understand the human
beings who are the threat and their ways of thinking. There are three challenges: (1)
How do we establish the human networks to help gather the information we need in
order to know what the terrorists are planning and for us to be able to understand the
threats they pose; (2) How do we collect and collate individual pieces of information
from diverse sources; and (3) How do we analyze and summarize the potentially
overwhelming quantity of information to comprehend the whole picture that is needed
to create an effective response? These problems have proven difficult within a single
country where the 9/11 Commission essentially identified bureaucratic constraints as a
reason for delays in identifying the threat but then proposed a more elaborate
bureaucracy to solve the problem. There was no detail on how to empower the street-
level employees who comprise the first line of defense, who were the first to have the
primary sources of information, and who had the most contexts from which to interpret
the results.
The complexity is exponential when we must establish networks in countries
with languages and cultures that are different from our own, and it will be most
valuable in countries that are most antagonistic and non-cooperative. It will be a
challenge to establish the connections to obtain it. Sharing that information also is a
challenge. It is difficult enough through the best of bureaucratic processes, but it is
further complicated by the needs of various sovereign nations. The information is most
valuable as it is most complete; the more it is shared, the more complete it will be. But
participant nations also have some incentive to withhold information. Information is
power. Alliances can shift, friends today may not be so tomorrow, and so there is an
incentive to hold back information, or distribute it on a “need-to-know” basis, which
undermines its value (because it remains incomplete to some.)
Organizations tend to emerge from informal groups that become formal

groups within which informal groups form again. The September 11, 2001 attacks may
have improved informal cooperation among intelligence agencies. The development of
formal structures may assist in the more efficient and effective information sharing
among the various agencies. The development of regional information sharing centers
known as fusion centers for Intelligence-led policing is an example of the beginning of
this process (Ratcliffe, 2008). Other examples are the National Intelligence Sharing
Plan (NISP), the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (GJISI), the Regional
Information Sharing Systems (RISS), and the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF)
[Carter, 2004]. Problems remain to be resolved, but the formation of these groups is a
beginning (Clarke and Newman, 2007). The critical factor that will determine the
success is providing an incentive for street-level officers to obtain and share
information that may be critical to the identification of potential threats and to have
established systems for analyzing the volumes of information that become available.
Conclusions
The events of September 11, 2001, awakened the world to the reality that there is a
serious threat from groups that are willing to use terrorist tactics to achieve their
religious and political objectives. While this threat is serious and unique in a number of
ways, it is not the first time the world has faced serious threats. Responding to that
threat should not be made in an intellectual vacuum. There is substantial research and
experience to guide our responses to this threat. The lessons of Community- and
Problem-oriented policing can provide helpful guidelines to address this threat.
The key to success of terrorist prevention is a good relationship between
governments and their constituents. Diversified communities have subcultures that may
harbor persons who are alienated and as a result may be vulnerable to recruitment
efforts by terrorist organizations. These communities also have more people who
benefit from the opportunities of society and who will not support such actions. If they
trust the legitimacy of the authorities, they will report the identity of suspected
terrorists and their activities, and they will support actions to prevent them from
executing their operations. Law enforcement officers need to exam the potential targets
of terrorist operations within their jurisdictions and work with citizens to establish
effective protection of potential targets. Officers also can reduce the terrorist threat by
reaching out to the community with counter-recruitment efforts to prevent vulnerable
individuals from succumbing to the radicalization of extremist organizations. Overly
aggressive reactions, violations of civil liberties, and rude and harsh treatment by law
enforcement agencies will undermine the agencies’ legitimacy among these supporters
who feel they are targeted without cause, and they will withhold information that is
essential for effective prevention. If law enforcement has connections with these
communities, they will be more likely to elicit the cooperation they need to prevent
terrorists’ actions before they can do any harm.
Law enforcement must establish rapport with the local communities. It must
establish trust so that citizens will share information. In turn, law enforcement officials
must share that information with the appropriate people who are affected by the
potential threats, distribute the information as precisely as possible, and act on the
information. Developing this capability will be a challenge, but the threat requires the
challenge to be met.
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M. Tuzuner (Ed.)
IOS Press, 2010
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-608-9-77
The Five Pivotal Muslim Nations: Their

Critical Role in the Possible Construction
of a Hybrid Counterterrorism Regime
A.S.M. Ali ASHRAF1
University of Dhaka
Abstract. This chapter explores the emerging dynamics of a global

counterterrorism regime and the role of “pivotal Muslim nations” in that security
regime. The list of pivotal Muslim nations may be long; however, for conceptual
rigor and brevity, this chapter investigates the role of five major Muslim nations:
Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. In particular, it looks at the
roles of both non-state and state actors in the formation of such a counter-terrorism
effort.
Keywords. counter-terrorism, regime, muslim nations
Introduction
Proponents of the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis suggest that cultural differences

between Islam and the West represent a critical security concern in the post-Cold War
era (Huntington 1996). In recent years the incidence of several high profile terrorist
attacks, perpetrated by transnational radical Islamist groups and targeted mostly against
western civilian populations in general, appears to provide some evidence for the
civilizational clash theory.i In its simplest form, the civilizational clash thesis equates
terrorism as a form of cultural clash; and does not predict any prospect for cooperation
between nation-states with different (if not rival) civilizational backgrounds.
In contrast to the advocates of the ‘clash of civilizations,’ a new generation of
security experts suggests that international cooperation on counterterrorism, whether in
Afghanistan, Iraq, the Middle East, or other conflict zones, would significantly help
curb the radical Islamist groups and other transnational terrorist threats around the
world ii (Bensahel 2006; Cordesman 2006a, 2006b; Monar 2007; Rabasa et al 2004;
Rosand 2007). Security cooperation with the oil rich Middle Eastern countries, the
Muslim majority South and Southeast Asian nations, and countries located near the
geo-strategic hot-spots of the global war on terrorism are regarded to be particularly
important in this context (Cook and Sherwood-Randall 2006; Cordesman 2006a,
2006b; D’Souza 2006; Gunbeyi and Gundogdu 2007; Khan 2002; Rabasa 2003;
Reveron 2006; Zuhur 2007).
Against this backdrop, this chapter seeks to explore the emerging dynamics of
a global counterterrorism regime and the role of key Muslim nations in that security
regime. The term “pivotal Muslim nations” refers to those predominantly Muslim
1
A.S.M. Ali Ashraf: University of Dhaka, Bangladesh; E-mail: delwar@duir.ac.bd
78 A.S.M.A. Ashraf / The Five Pivotal Muslim Nations: Their Critical Role
nations which have demonstrated the strategic ability and willingness in partnering
with their western allies and institutions in the fight against terrorism.
The list of pivotal Muslim nations may be long; however, for conceptual rigor
and brevity, this chapter investigates the role of five major Muslim nations: Egypt,
Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey (listed alphabetically). iii The five
countries together represent about 60% of the world’s estimated one billion Muslim
population.
The five nations studied in this chapter share some common features. First,
they are all very prominent members in the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC) - a political association of the world’s Muslim nations.iv Second, among the OIC
members, they belong to the top 12 countries with at least 85% of Muslim population,
and the top seven Islamic countriesv with the largest GDP purchasing power per capita.
Third, among their total Muslim population, in each country, at least 75% are followers
of the Sunni Islamic tradition.
While their populations are largely Sunni Muslim, the five countries differ
significantly in terms of their geographic location, ethnic composition, economic power,
political system, and their geo-strategic role in world affairs. They also differ in terms
of their critical role in the fight against terrorism—both domestic and international.
Understanding the varied level of their counterterrorism cooperation with the West and
offering plausible explanations for such variations is a major aim of the study.
As the country case studies suggest, the key areas of Muslim nations’
counterterrorism cooperation are: joint military exercise and military support in the
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and the Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF); participation in the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq; intelligence
sharing and law enforcement cooperation; defusing regional conflicts in the Middle
East and South Asia, cooperation on combating terror financing, participation in the
covert rendition program, and the battle of ideas against radical Islamist ideology.
The scope of the chapter is modest. It is analytical rather than judgmental. It
does not endorse any position of the political regimes in the countries under study, but
aims to test the assertions against available evidence. It uses various secondary data,
published articles, and web information from credible sources. Although the chapter
does not take a side or any particular position, it recognizes the fact that some of the
available literatures are, in many instances, self-interested.
1. Counterterrorism Cooperation: Conceptual Understanding
In recent years, the issue of bilateral and multilateral cooperation on counterterrorism

has drawn considerable attention from the scholarly and policy community (Bensahel
2003, 2006; Chow 2005; Cordesman 2006b; Deflem 2007; Cortright et al 2004; Gallis
2002; Rees 2006, 2007; Rosand 2007; U.S. Department of State 2004, 2007). Such
cooperation is often conceptualized as joint actions, coalition operations, multilateral
efforts, regional measures, and global actions against terrorism etc. The areas of such
cooperation are broad and include both a criminal justice model and a national security
paradigm of counterterrorism. While the criminal justice model emphasizes using the
civilian law enforcement and judicial apparatus to deal with terrorism, the national
security paradigm highlights the importance of taking military actions against terrorist
threats.
A.S.M.A. Ashraf / The Five Pivotal Muslim Nations: Their Critical Role 79
RAND security specialist Nora Bensahel (2003, 2006) presents a lucid

analysis of international counterterrorism cooperation between the U.S. and other
global actors. Bensahel conceptualizes cooperation as “coalitions” of nations engaged
in combating terrorism on multiple fronts: military, financial, law enforcement,
intelligence, and post war reconstruction (in areas of war on terror).
Bensahel’s formulation of counterterrorism cooperation is similar to that of the U.S.
government policy on counterterrorism. The U.S. State Department Office of the
Counterterrorism Coordinator releases a yearly report on terrorism and
counterterrorism around the world. One such report, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003,
identifies five major instruments in the fight against international terrorism: diplomacy,
law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and military.vi
The counterterrorism literature is also rich with discussion on how different
national and municipal police and law enforcement agencies create formal and informal
networks to deal with the evolving nature of terrorism and organized crime (Deflem
2006; Andreas and Nadelmann 2006; Nussbaum 2007). The creation of EUROPOL,
INTERPOL, and their liaison activities with various partner nations and agencies (e.g.
the FBI) are the prime focus of such cooperative measures. vii The growing
internationalized role of various metropolitan police agencies (e.g. the NYPD) is also
illustrative of the changing dynamics of counterterrorism cooperation.
In recent years, various regional and multilateral efforts to deal with terrorism
have also drawn the attention of academics. Rees (2006) provides a comprehensive
account of the state of transatlantic security cooperation between the U.S. and its
European partners. In a similar fashion, Gieuseppe Nesi (2006) maps out the various
regional and international efforts to combat terrorism.
Responses to combating terrorism at the multilateral institutional level often
focus on the capacity of the United Nations. Rosand (2007) insists that multilateral
efforts to combat terrorism remain a key to the success against the radical Islamist
threat. In his view, an effective multilateral response to terrorism must focus on the
battle of ideas, viii cooperation between the national, regional, international, and
functional efforts, and finally streamlining the UN bodies to deal with terrorism.
In summary, national capabilities are critical to fight contemporary terrorism.
However, international cooperation has emerged as an important component in dealing

with today’s diffuse, complex, and evolving terrorist threats. The areas of such
internationalized cooperation are: law enforcement and intelligence sharing, military
actions, measures against terrorism financing and money laundering, judicial
cooperation on extradition, extrajudicial cooperation on rendition, post war
reconstruction, and ideological campaigns against radical Islamism. The participants
involved in such counterterrorism cooperation are diverse: States, sub-State actors, and
non-State actors.
2. Linking the Literature to the Empirical Evidence: A Hybrid (International/

Transnational) Counterterrorism Regime in the Formation?
The preceding discussion on counterterrorism cooperation leaves two questions

unanswered. What is the nature of the contemporary global counterterrorism regime? Is
it transnational (with non-state actors playing a substantial role, compared to their
Statist counterparts) or international (with states exercising the central role in dealing
with terrorism)? The following discussion suggests the emergence of a hybrid form of
counterterrorism regime, with features of both internationalized and transnationalized

cooperation.
Security regimes constitute an important feature in the study of International
Relations (IR) (Jervis 1982). According to Stephen Krasner, a leading regime theorist,
regimes represent a set of “ implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of
international relations” (1982: 186).
The important role played by non-statist actors has long been the pre-
occupation of regime theorists and the liberal internationalist paradigm in IR. It
challenges the state-centric realist paradigm and argues that non-state actors play
significant a role in a transnationalized world.
Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane (1971a, 1971b) popularized the term
‘transnational relations.’ In the words of Nye and Keohane (1971a: 331), “transnational
relations [refers to the] contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that
are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments. It treats the
reciprocal effects between transnational relations and the interstate system as centrally
important to the understanding of contemporary world politics.” Two features are
important in the Nye-Keohane formulation of transnationalization of international
cooperation: (a) a decreasing role for the State; and (b) reciprocal relations between
state and non-state actors.
Can the existing pattern of counterterrorism cooperation around the world be
termed as ‘transnational’? How do the various statist, sub-statist, and non-statist actors
interact in their effort to combat terrorism? Is there any evidence for a decreasing role
for the state, and a simultaneous reciprocal interaction between the various actors?
Critics have mixed response to these questions. According to Bensahel (2006),
Burchill (2005), Rosand (2007), Stevenson (2003) and Zimmerman and Wenger (2007),
states remain the primary actors in dealing with terrorism. However, they contend, non-
state and sub-state actors continue to play an important but subsidiary role.
For Bensahel (2006), the transnational nature of contemporary terrorism has
necessitated that states create and participate in various forms of internationalized
counterterrorism frameworks. The task of intelligence sharing, law enforcement and
military cooperation are predominantly a Statist discourse. In contrast, the task of

dealing with terrorism financing and post war reconstruction requires the participation
of various non-state actors. For instance, the central banks and their interaction with
various multilateral financial institutions, such as the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) play an important role in dealing with terror financing; while various local and
international NGOs play a critical humanitarian role during post war reconstruction.
Proponents of the sub-statist actors argue that states are not the unitary actors,
and formal and informal cooperation among various sub-statist actors form an integral
part of the global counterterrorism agenda. As Yon (2009) discusses, the role of police
liaison officers assigned overseas job stations are a glaring example of such sub-Statist
practices of security cooperation. In contrast to Yon, this chapter argues that members
of the security and law enforcement agencies would be conceptualized as “statist
actors” when they act at the command of the central authority; and as “sub-statist
actors” when they report to any local, community, or county level authority.
Based on the available evidence, the statist, non-statist, and sub-statist
practices in counterterrorism cooperation can be conceptually summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Mapping the International/Transnational Cooperation on Counterterrorism.
Areas of Major Actors International

Counterterrorism vs
Cooperation Transnational
State Sub-State Non-State
Military √ International
Cooperation (DoD, MoD)
Intelligence & Law √ √ International
Enforcement (DHS, FBI, CIA, (NYPD,
Cooperation MoHA) LAPD
personnel)
Judicial √ International
Cooperation (Department of
Justice, Ministry
of Law; National
courts)
Extra-judicial √ International
cooperation (CIA, domestic
(Rendition) law enforcement
and intelligence
agencies)
Financial √ √ Transnational
cooperation (Federal Reserve, (FATF,
Ministry of MENATAF,
Finance; Central APG,
Banks, FIUs) MONEYVAL)
Ideological √ √ Transnational
Campaign against (Ministry of (NGOs, Civil
Terrorism Communications, Societies; Local,
Cultural Affairs; independent, &
State-controlled community radio,
media) and newspapers

etc))
Post-war √ √ Transnational
reconstruction (DoD, MoD) Local NGOs,
(Humanitarian, International
Nation-building) NGOs (BRAC,
Red Cross), IFIs
(ADB, IMF,
UNDP, World
Bank)
Notes on abbreviations: DoD: U.S. Department of Defense; DHS: Department of Homeland Security;
MoD: Ministry of Defense; CIA: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency; FBI: U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation; APG: Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering; FATF: Financial Action Task Force; FIU:
Financial Intelligence Unit; MENATAF: Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force;
MONEYVAL: The Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Money Laundering; BRAC: Bangladesh
Rural Advancement Committee; ADB: Asian Development Bank
As is suggested in Table 1, the existing level of global counterterrorism efforts

displays an interesting feature of a hybrid security regime: it is both international
(constructed by both the state and sub-state actors) and transnational (constructed by
both state/sub-state and non-state actors). State and sub-state actors appear to play the
dominant role in four of the seven major counterterrorism areas: military, law
enforcement and intelligence sharing, judicial, and extrajudicial cooperation. In
contrast, non-state actors play a significant role in three issue areas: financial
cooperation, ideological campaign, and post-war reconstruction.
Using this framework of a hybrid security regime, the remainder of the
chapter explores what role the pivotal Muslim nations play in this global
counterterrorism regime.
3. Pivotal Muslim Nations and their Counterterrorism Policies: In Search

of International Cooperation
There is a growing body of literature on counterterrorism cooperation. However, the

existing literature is rich with the discussion on how the war on terrorism is being
executed and what role the western nations play in the fight against terrorism. Muslim
nations’ counterterrorism policies and their level of cooperation (or lack thereof) with
the western partners is a relatively unexplored area. The following discussion seeks to
address this research gap.
For analytical purposes, the discussion will focus on the role of five major
Muslim nations in seven critical areas of counterterrorism: law enforcement and
intelligence cooperation, military support, measures against terror financing and money
laundering, criminal and judicial prosecution of terrorism, extrajudicial rendition
program, ideological campaign against terrorism, and post war reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
Each case study has three sections. The first maps out the status of
counterterrorism cooperation. The second offers some tentative hypotheses explaining
the level of cooperation. The third revisits the Statist vs. non-Statist debate in
facilitating counterterrorism cooperation.
4. Egypt
4.1. Mapping the state of Egypt’s Cooperation on Counterterrorism
Egypt has a mixed record of cooperation on counterterrorism. As a key actor in the

Middle East, it is committed to both multilateral and bilateral efforts to combating
terrorism. Cairo’s stance on multilateralism is evident in the fact that it is party to 11 of
the 13 international conventions and protocols on counterterrorism, and it cooperates
with the various multilateral and global institutions in dealing with terrorism. On the
other hand, Egypt’s policy on bilateralism is well-established, for instance, in the
framework of the joint Egypt-U.S. security and counterterrorism measures.
Cairo maintains extensive bilateral security cooperation with Washington. The
U.S.-Egypt strategic partnership spans all the major areas of counterterrorism discussed
before. Among them, four areas are most important: military cooperation, extrajudicial
rendition, counter-terror financing, and post-war reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Military cooperation takes various forms: providing over-flight permission to

U.S. aircrafts, expedited transit access to U.S. navy ships, joint military exercise, and
using military resources to combat tunnel smuggling along Egypt-Gaza borders.
According to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), “Egypt provided
over-flight permission for all U.S. and coalition forces.”ix A GAO report provides more
specific data: Between 2001 and 2005, Egypt “provided over-flight permission to
36,553 U.S. military aircraft through Egyptian airspace…[and] granted expedited
transit of 861 U.S. naval ships through the Suez Canal during the same period and
provided all security support for those ship transits” (GAO 2006: 17).
In addition to over-flight and transit access, cooperation takes place in the
form of the Egypt-U.S. joint military exercise ‘Bright Star.’ The ‘Bright Star’ continues
to be the largest biennial coalition exercise, hosted by Egypt. It aims to ensure
interoperability, introduce modernization among participating troops, and guarantee the
U.S. “regional involvement in pursuit of improved security and defense capabilities.”x
It is hard to estimate the direct effect of ‘Bright Star’ on the global war on terrorism.
However, indirect effect can be inferred from the participating nations, whose security
forces play an active role in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—both of which are
considered critical theaters in the war on terrorism. Foremost among the participating
nations in the ‘Bright Star’ are France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Pakistan,
and Turkey. Critics contend that the U.S. CENTCOM attempts to restructure the
‘Bright Star’ to fit the needs of the global war on terrorism.xi
In addition to hosting this joint coalition military exercise, Egypt also uses U.S.
military aid to combat the illicit flow of smuggled arms into the Gaza strip of Palestine,
albeit under pressure from U.S. and Israeli policy makers. In January 2008, Egypt
decided to spend $23 million of U.S. aid to purchase sophisticated tunnel detection
equipment. xii Both Israeli and U.S. officials stress that the equipments be used for
border policing and controlling smuggling tunnels along the Egypt-Gaza border.
Securitizing the tunnels is considered important for the security of Israel, the closest
U.S. ally in the Middle East. It is widely believed that arms smuggling at the tunnels
are used to equip the Palestinian resistance group Hamas, which is a U.S.-designated
foreign terrorist organization.
The U.S.-Egypt Strategic Dialogue xiii and Joint Counterterrorism Working

xiv
Group are also important steps toward strengthening security ties between the two
nations. While the forum of strategic dialogue was convened in 1998 to consolidate the
strategic partnership of about two decades, the Working Group on Counterterrorism is
a post-9/11 phenomenon. The Working Group is more focused on the operational
aspects of combating terrorism. xv This includes facilitating coordination on law
enforcement and judicial affairs (U.S. Department of State 2004: Egypt).
As stated before, cooperation on counterterrorism can be framed both within
the existing norms of international law and outside the purview of the international
legal system. Extra judicial rendition is one such controversial area where Egypt
appears to be a trusted partner of the U.S. According to Amnesty International USA
(2007), “Egypt has been a key destination in the U.S.-led global ‘war on terror.’ Many
Egyptian nationals, suspected of terrorism, have been deported from abroad by the
United States, European and Arab governments despite the risk of torture, and have
then been detained and tortured. The fate of some, who were victims of unlawful
‘renditions’ by the United States, remains unknown. Their identities have never been
disclosed, nor why they are being held or where.” xvi Such extraordinary rendition or
extrajudicial transfer of criminal/terrorist suspects are aimed at disrupting a terrorist
activity or extracting intelligence from the suspects. However, the global human rights
community is very critical of such practices because rendition often involves torture,
illegal detention, and even enforced disappearances of suspects.xvii
Egypt’s role in combating terror financing was recently enhanced with the
formation of a financial intelligence unit. The Egyptian central bank and its money
laundering unit (EMLCU) have partnered with the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Paris-
based Financial Action Task Force to consolidate the country’s measures against terror
financing.xviii
Data on Cairo’s cooperation on judicial, post-war reconstruction, and
ideological campaign are hard to locate. According to the U.S. Country Report on
Terrorism 2006, Egypt has signed the mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT).xix There
are also periodic reports of Egypt providing assistance on anti-terrorism trials in the
U.S. According to the U.S. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 report, “The Egyptian
Government has agreed to provide assistance in an important terrorist trial scheduled to
take place in New York in May 2004” (U.S. Department of State 2004: Egypt).
On post-war reconstruction, Egypt appears to play an active role in both
Afghanistan and Iraq. Such humanitarian and nation-building assistance includes the
provision of medical services, security sector reform, and training for civil service
personnel. For instance, in Afghanistan, Egypt partners with various actors in
maintaining a military hospital in the Bagram Air Base. xx The hospital provided
medical services to about 100,000 people (GAO 2006: 17). In the Iraqi context, Egypt
is partnering with other nations in providing training to Iraqi national police, civil
servants, and diplomats (GAO 2006: 17; German Federal Foreign Office 2008). For
instance, in 2004, Egypt reportedly “trained 250 Iraqi police and 25 Iraqi diplomats”
(GAO 2006: 17).
When it comes to fighting the battle of ideas against radical Islamists, Egypt
has a dubious record. For instance, it is too early to assess the implications of Muslim
Brotherhood as the strongest political opposition (with 88 seats) in the Egyptian
Parliament.xxi Critics point out that the political strength of Brotherhood can signal a
true and pro-democracy opposition to Mubarak’s autocratic rule, while destabilizing
the world through its continued support for the Palestinian resistance group Hamas, and
other transnational radical Islamist groups like Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (Crane
2005; Williams 2006).
The issue of ideological campaigns appears to be further complicated when
the government conflates moderate ideas with a threat to regime stability. The stance of
the Egyptian state against the Egyptian moderate Islamist preacher Amr Khaled is
worth noting. Khaled is widely regarded for teaching an alternative and tolerant version
of Islam. However, he was expelled from the country as his ideas were perceived to be
a threat to the government.
In contrast to such a pessimistic scenario on the battle of ideas, there are cases,
in which Egyptian religious leaders appear to publicly denounce Islamist extremism.
For instance, Egyptian grand mufti Dr. Gomaa, in a speech at Cambridge University,
U.K., publicly criticized the ill trained Islamist clerics for preaching a distorted version
of Islam and inciting radicalism (The Times 2007). The importance of such public
criticism of radical Islamism in the U.K. is significant, given the fact that the U.K. has
recently been the targets of several high profile terrorist attacks (e.g. July 7, 2005
London bombings) by radical Islamists.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, Egypt has a varied level of cooperation
on counterterrorism. Appendix 1 provides a brief overview of Egypt’s counterterrorism
cooperation. An obvious question is: what explains such cooperation? The following
section briefly touches on this.
4.2. Explaining Egypt’s Counterterrorism Cooperation
Three factors help explain why Egypt has a strong incentive to maintain counterterror
cooperation with the U.S.: Egypt’s shared concerns about the radical Islamist groups;
Egyptian interest in maintaining the inflow of U.S. foreign aid; and the United States’
strategic goal of keeping Egypt engaged in the Arab-Israeli peace process.
First, Egypt’s international counterterrorism measures have an intrinsic
relation with the country’s experience with domestic and transnational terrorism.
Radical Islamist groups are perceived to be a common threat to both Egypt and the U.S.
Among them, at least six major terrorist groups were proscribed by the international
community.xxii The concern over terrorism is legitimate as Egypt has been the target of
several high profile terrorist attacks in recent years. Between 1997 and 2006, there
were at least eight significant terrorist incidents, which killed approximately 190
people and injured over 300 people. The terrorist victims included innocent civilians
and tourists. What makes the terrorism scenario more difficult to combat is the use of
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) to execute suicide attacks.
Second, the inflow of U.S. military and economic aid acts as a catalyst for
having Egypt on board of counterterrorism cooperation. Since 1979, Egypt has
received an estimated $ 2 billion foreign aid as economic and military assistance (Sharp
2006). Recently, Egypt has been under pressure to bolster its security measures against
tunnel smuggling across the Gaza strip; otherwise the U.S. threatened to withdraw its
$1.3 billion in military aid. xxiii Egyptian policy makers recognize that the country’s
defense against transnational terrorism and other security threats would be jeopardized
if the inflow of U.S. foreign aid is disrupted. Thus, the Egyptian participation in U.S.-
led joint military exercises, rendition programs, and other measures against terrorism
can be well understood within the framework of bilateral relations with the U.S.
Egypt’s efforts toward counterterrorism are recognized by the U.S. civilian
and military leaders. The U.S. CENTCOM sums up the Egyptian role in global
counterterrorism:
The Arab Republic of Egypt remains a key US ally in the fight against
extremism in the region. It strongly supports the Middle East peace process and has
deployed forces to preserve stability in the aftermath of the Israeli withdrawal from the
Gaza Strip. Egypt has been a moderating voice in discussions with Syria, Lebanon,
Fatah, and HAMAS, and was among the first regional countries to send humanitarian
supplies to Lebanon and to volunteer assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Its
position as protector of the Suez Canal and gateway to the Middle East has contributed
greatly to Coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hundreds of Suez Canal transits
and thousands of overflights have expedited US military operations in CENTCOM's
Area of Responsibility.xxiv
4.3. Revisiting the Statist vs. non-Statist debate in Egypt’s Counterterrorism

Cooperation
As the CENTCOM note suggests, Egypt plays a critical role in creating and enforcing a
global counterterrorism regime. However, the extent of such cooperation varies across
issue areas. For instance, Egyptian military support to the U.S.-led coalition forces,
civilian and military reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and law
enforcement-judicial cooperation in hosting “rendered” terrorist suspects are relatively
more significant, compared to other issue areas.
Obviously, in this case the statist and non-statist actors do not play a similar
role in facilitating cooperation. The Egyptian state apparatus appears to play an
assertive role in almost all counterterrorism areas, except for the battle of ideas. Major
partner nations in counterterror cooperation discussed in this section are the U.S., and
the U.K. The case of the U.K. was cited in only one instance, in which the Egyptian
grand mufti offered a lecture on Islamism, during his U.K. visit. The remaining section
mostly tackles the extent to which the state apparatus in Egypt and the U.S. creates a
form of partnership in dealing with terrorism.
The non-state actors were cited in only three issue areas: financial cooperation,
post-war reconstruction, and ideological campaign. On the financial front, Egyptian
state (central bank) and sub-state actors (financial intelligence unit) interact with the
multilateral financial institutions (FATF, MENAFATF) in combating terror financing.
On post war reconstruction, the Egyptian military hospital deals with local translators
in providing medical services to the Afghan people. Lastly, some of Egypt’s religious
leaders have partnered with foreign actors (for instance, University of Cambridge, UK)
in denouncing terrorism and preaching a tolerant version of Islam.
In sum, the Egyptian case suggests that the state has an overwhelming role in
creating and sustaining major policy actions in dealing with international terrorism.
Nonetheless, there are a few areas where non-statist actors have some measures of
participation. Given the fact that Egyptian statist, sub-statist, and non-statist—all actors
participate in global counterterrorism efforts, it can be described as a hybrid
(international-transnational) form of security regime.xxv
5. Indonesia
Like Egypt, Indonesia is recognized by the U.S. and its allies as an important partner in
the war on terrorism (The White House 2006). The geo-strategic importance of
Indonesia in the global war on terrorism is evident in several ways. First, it is located
near the strategic chokepoint of the Malacca Strait, which controls more than a quarter
of the world’s oil shipments. Second, in recent years, the political leadership in Jakarta
have partnered with other nations in prosecuting and investigating the terrorist acts of
the Bali bombings and other high profile terrorist incidents. Third, Indonesia’s strategic
partnership in combating terrorism has focused on some key areas, including law
enforcement and intelligence sharing, counterterror financing, extrajudicial rendition
and the battle of ideas against radical Islamist groups.
5.1. Mapping the State of Indonesia’s Cooperation on Counterterrorism
Despite the growing recognition of Indonesia’s partnership in combating terrorism,

there are some areas, where Jakarta’s official stance provides a gloomy picture of its
international commitment to counterterrorism—at least compared to the stance of Cairo.
For instance, while Egypt is party to 11 of the 13 international counterterrorism
conventions and protocols, Indonesia is party to only six of them. The six conventions
to which Indonesia is a party deal with the security of aircrafts, diplomatic personnel,
hostages, and nuclear material. In contrast, the major counterterrorism conventions,
neither signed nor ratified by Indonesia focus on terrorist financing, maritime security,
terrorist bombings and explosives. Interestingly, as the following discussion shows,
these are some of the key areas where, in recent years, Indonesia has made an
increasing commitment to fighting terrorism.
Compared with Egypt, military cooperation between the U.S. and Indonesia
remains one of the weakest areas in Indonesia’s counterterrorism policy. This is due to
a ban on U.S. military assistance to Indonesia from 1992 to 2005.xxvi The fourteen year
long ban was lifted in 2005, in the aftermath of the Indonesian commitment to
cooperate with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on the investigation into
a terrorist act. The terrorist incident killed one Indonesian and two American mine
employees in Timika, West Papua.xxvii Critics argue that the lifting of the ban would
enable both Indonesia and the U.S. to consolidate their strategic partnership in the war
on terror.
Counterterrorism cooperation between Indonesia and its international partners
appear to have improved in recent years, ostensibly in the aftermath of the Bali
bombings of 2002. The Bali bombings killed 88 Australian tourists (out of 202
casualties), and injured 209 persons—all innocent civilians.
In recent years, the major thrust of western nations’ law enforcement cooperation
appears to be capacity building for Indonesian law enforcement personnel. Members of
the Indonesian National Police (INP) and the Australian Federal Police (AFP)
partnered in creating joint investigations after the 2002 Bali bombings and the 2003
Marriot bombings. Other than joint investigative efforts, cooperation took place in the
form of financial aid to enhance Indonesian law enforcement capability.
Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. are the major donors in counter-terrorism
assistance. Australia offers some US$ 7-8 million as annual aid. With an estimated
US$27 million Australian aid for over five years, Indonesia is establishing the Jakarta
Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC). xxviii Besides, the U.K. provides
assistance in training and governance sector reform in Indonesia.
The U.S. anti-terror assistance program (ATA) for Indonesia mainly focuses
on capacity building for the civilian anti-terror force. The ATA program assisted the
Indonesian National Police (INP) to create the nation’s first counterterrorism task
force—“Detachmnet 88.” xxix The effect of such law enforcement cooepration is

noteworthy: members of the “Detachmnet 88” demonstrated tremendous success in
capturing or killing several Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members, reportedly responsible for
their involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings and other high profile terrorist attacks
(Dillon 2006).
Like the law enforcement area, the issue of dealing with terrorist financing has
emerged as an important front, where Indonesia has partnered with its neighboring
countries and other international actors. This is evident in the Indonesian membership
in the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) and the Egmont Group. The
Bank of Indonesia claims to be voluntarily following the Basel Committee’s Core
Principles on Banking Supervision. The Indonesian financial intelligence unit (the
PPATK) has memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with Asia Pacific countries
(Australia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand) and Romania. The effect of such
collaborative efforts is significant, For instance, in recent years there is a marked
increase in the filing of the suspicious transaction report (STR). In addition to this, the
flow of foreign currency and remittances has been brought under increasing
surveillance of the central bank (U.S. Department of State 2006b: Indonesia).
Despite such regional and international efforts to modernize and strengthen

the Indonesian financial regime, the U.S. Country Report on Terrorism 2006 notes that
the Indonesian financial sector remains weak (U.S. Department of State 2007). The
Report also notes that the USAID is partnering with the Indonesian authority in
creating a strong financial system. Such cooperation is considered critical to forming a
transnational regime with the dual purpose of fighting both money laundering and
terrorist financing.
Judicial cooperation on criminal investigation and prosecution, search and
warrant are critical component of counterterrorism. As stated in the Egyptian case, the
signing of MLATs offers an important channel in facilitating such judicial cooperation.
Currently, Indonesia has bilateral MLATs with Australia, China and South Korea. It
has also a regional MLAT with ASEAN members (U.S. Department of State 2006b:
Indonesia). Although Indonesia has not signed any MLAT with the U.S., the prospect
of doing so is high, as mentioned in the 2006 Joint Statement between the U.S. and
Indonesia (The White House 2006). In addition, as stated before, the Indonesian
authorities have supported the U.S. in the investigation and prosecution of the 2002
Timika incident, which killed one Indonesian and two American mine employees in
West Papua (The White House 2006).
Indonesia also appears to cooperate with the CIA-led rendition program. In
January 2002, the Indonesian security forces arrested Egyptian citizen Muhammad
Saad Iqbal Madni, and later sent him to Egypt on a secret CIA flight. Madni was an Al
Qaeda suspect; and earlier the CIA had placed a formal request for his detention and
extradition from Indonesia.xxx The Madni case illustrates an important contrast between
the Indonesian and Egyptian policy on rendition. While the former acts as a country of
origin, the latter is a country of destination for rendered persons.
The battle of ideas against religious extremism appears to be high on the
agenda in Indonesia’s security policy. And, both the Statist and non-Statist actors and
civil society members in Indonesia play a critical role in partnering with various
international actors in denouncing Islamist extremism and promoting inter-faith
dialogues. In recent years, various inter-faith dialogues have been organized by
Indonesia in collaboration with Australia and the U.K.
The first such dialogue was held in 2004 in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. It was co-
sponsored by Australia and attended by members of the ASEAN regional grouping,
including Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and East Timor.xxxi The second
dialogue was held in Bali and co-sponsored by the U.K. Participants at the Bali
dialogue, mostly nations from Asia and Europe, condemned the London bombings of
October 2002, and July 2005. They also expressed the goal of creating a “culture of
peace and a total rejection of violence in the name of religion.”xxxii
The role of Indonesian civil society and political groups in opposing the
extremist ideology is recognized by foreign leaders. In the words of Australian
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, MP: “Indonesian political and religious
leaders are increasingly speaking out against radicalism – recognizing the need to
combat the terrorist ideology. And Indonesian scholars are taking up the fight,
arguing that radicalism destroys culture and that violence has no place in
religion” (Downer 2006).
Among all the areas of security cooperation, post war reconstruction in
Afghanistan and Iraq, appears to be the weakest area, where Indonesia does not appear
to have any significant contribution. For instance, a close look at the UNDP list of
donor contributions in Afghanistan for the years 2002-2007 suggests that Indonesia has
not made any aid commitment to post war Afghan reconstruction (UNDP 2008).xxxiii
Similarly, the Donor Assistance Database (DAD) 2007, prepared by the Iraqi Ministry
of Planning and Development and sponsored by the UNDP, indicates that Indonesia
does not have any significant role in post war reconstruction in Iraq (Iraq Ministry of
Planning and Development Cooperation 2007).
In sum, the foregoing discussion suggests that Indonesia maintains a varied
level of counterterrorism cooperation with various international actors. Appendix 2
provides a snapshot of the Indonesian case of counterterrorism cooperation.
5.2. Explaining Indonesia’s Counterterrorism Cooperation
At least four factors help explain why Indonesia maintains strong security ties with
some western nations and institutions in combating terrorism. These are: common
threat perceptions; the continuing need for foreign assistance; international pressure;
and the changing nature of terrorist threats.
First, the rise of Jemaah Islamiah (JI), its network and support bases in
Indonesia, and the neighboring Asia Pacific region appears to be a serious security
concern for Jakarta and its western allies, especially Australia. JI was held responsible
for the 2002 Bali bombing, which killed 202 people, including 88 Australians.
Subsequent high profile terrorist attacks in Indonesia targeted westerners in general and
Australians in particular. Evidence includes the 2003 terrorist attack on the J.W.
Marriot Hotel and the 2004 terrorist attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.
Recurring terrorist attacks required a multilateral response, and in this context,
Indonesia partnered with Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. in modernizing its law
enforcement capabilities to fight against terrorism.
Second, modernization of Jakarta’s counterterrorism capabilities requires a
sustained inflow of foreign assistance. For the donors, law enforcement assistance
would not only enable Indonesia to fight the Islamist terrorists, but also introduce
democratic ethos and good governance in Indonesia’s security sector.
Third, international pressure often acts as an important factor in promoting
cooperation between agencies dealing with terrorism and other forms of crime. For
instance, the FATF policy on including Indonesia in the list of “non-cooperating

countries” appears to have had a positive effect. It compelled Jakarta to create strong
institutional mechanisms to deal with money laundering and terror financing; and to let
the central banks and the financial intelligence unit work closely with the FATF and
other international bodies.
Finally, the changing nature of transnational radical Islamist groups—for
instance the Jemaah Islamiya (JI) in Indonesia and the radical Islamist diaspora
networks in the U.K.—are widely considered to be a serious security concern.
Combating such security threats requires more than intelligence sharing and law
enforcement cooperation, and a strong participation of the civil society groups. Hence,
the role of the Indonesian civil society and religious institutions in the battle of ideas,
and the partnership of Australia and western nations in organizing interfaith dialogues
appear to be significant steps.
5.3. Revisiting the Statist vs. Non-Statist Debate in Indonesian Counterterrorism

Cooperation
Like the Egyptian case, the State apparatus in Indonesia appears to play an assertive
role in three major areas of counterterrorism cooperation: law enforcement and
intelligence sharing, judicial cooperation on the investigation and prosecution of
terrorism, and extrajudicial rendition of terrorist suspects. Major partner nations
discussed here include Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. Among them, Australia’s
strategic location in the Asia-Pacific region makes it a very important actor in the
Indonesian counterterrorism coalition.
What is the future of statist military cooperation between the U.S. and
Indonesia? Although the U.S. has lifted its ban on military assistance to Indonesia, the
state of military partnership between Jakarta and Washington will never match the
scale and level of partnership evident between Cairo and Washington. This is due to the
greater geo-strategic importance accorded to Egypt as a broker of the Middle East
peace process. Furthermore, whereas the current Egyptian military cooperation on
counterterrorism is directed to mostly external threats, such as the threat of tunnel
smuggling at the Gaza-Egypt borders, any strong ties between the Indonesian and U.S.
military would either result in an Indonesian military crackdown against domestic
sources of terrorist or secessionist groups or the deployment of Indonesian military
resources for international peace keeping missions (such as in Lebanon).
Non-state actors were cited in only two issue areas: financial cooperation and
ideological campaign. On the financial front, the Indonesian state bank (central bank)
and sub-state actor (financial intelligence unit) interact with various multilateral
financial institutions (such as the FATF and APG) in combating money laundering and
terror financing. On the battle of ideas, members of the civil society from Indonesia
partner with their peers from other Asia-Pacific nations and European countries.
In summary, the Indonesian case is sharply different from the Egyptian case in
two major areas. First, there is a lack of any visible Indonesian military cooperation on
counterterrorism. Second, there is also a lack of any substantial Indonesian role in post
war reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite such differences, the
Indonesian case parallels the Egyptian one, when it comes to a strong statist security
role in cooperation in law enforcement, judicial, and rendition programs. The two
nations also exhibit a similar pattern in the areas of financial sector and ideological
campaigns on terrorism. In both areas of counterterrorism, the sub-statist and non-
statist actors play a prominent role.
6. Pakistan
In contrast to Egypt and Indonesia, Pakistan is arguably one of the most important and
most controversial partners of the U.S. in the war on terrorism. The importance of
Pakistan derives from the critical role it plays as a major “non-NATO” ally; while the
controversies derive from Islamabad’s failure to stop the rejuvenation of Al Qaeda and
the Taliban on its own soil (Tellis 2007). The Pakistani authorities tackle such criticism
in the following words:
Pakistan remains committed to fighting international terrorism and extremism.
In this endeavor, the focus must always remain on cooperation instead of questionable
criticism. In this context, we have noted the positive statement by head of international
security assistance force (ISAF) yesterday that Pakistan’s help has been crucial in
containing insurgency in Afghanistan and ISAF has been the beneficiary of strong
actions taken by Pakistan (Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, DC 2007).
6.1. Mapping the state of Pakistan’s Cooperation on Counterterrorism
Like Egypt and Indonesia, Pakistan is an active participant in various international

instruments in dealing with terrorism. It is currently party to 10 out of the 13
multilateral protocols and conventions on terrorism. Membership in these international
instruments indicates Pakistan’s global commitment to combating terrorism. Critics
observe that Pakistan’s record of bilateral counterterrorism cooperation is also
noteworthy and the level of such cooperation has increased in recent years.
Pakistan’s central role in the global war on terror (GWOT) can be grouped
into three categories: combating the Al Qaeda and the Taliban along the Afghan-
Pakistan borders; reducing the support to the various Kashmiri non-state
armed/militant groups; and intelligence sharing with its western counterparts. Critics
argue that Pakistani President Musharraf’s declining legitimacy and his infamous
deal with the tribal leaders in 2006 in the federally administered tribal areas (FATA)
have failed to combat the jihadi elements. As a result Pakistan is fighting a losing
war on terror in its tribal region bordering Afghanistan. In order to enhance the
capacity of the Pakistani paramilitary Frontier Corps, the U.S. is providing various
non-lethal equipments (such as helmets and vests) and planning to provide Pakistan
with special military training.
Pakistan’s military cooperation in the war on terror has several interesting
features. First, it does not have any direct military deployment either in Afghanistan or
in Iraq. Second, Pakistan’s recent efforts to combat the Taliban and Al Qaeda militants
have emphasized militarizing the Afghan-Pakistan border. Islamabad has deployed its
military and paramilitary forces along the Afghan-Pakistan borders. This is aimed at
combating the existing Taliban forces and al Qaeda radicals from regrouping and
inflicting terrorist attacks.
Third, in addition to the militarized border policing, Pakistan also maintains
joint military exercise with its western partners. Two such military exercises are worth
mentioning: (a) the U.S.-Pakistan joint maritime military exercise ‘Inspired Union;’
and (b) the Egypt-U.S. joint military exercise ‘Bright Star.’ The “Inspired Union” is
aimed at denying “international terrorists use of the maritime environment as a venue
for attack or to transport personnel, weapons or other material.xxxiv Similarly, as stated
above in the Egyptian case, the operation ‘Bright Star’ is designed by the U.S.
CENTCOM to fit into the paradigm of the global war on terrorism.
Next to the military level, law enforcement cooperation and intelligence
sharing are considered a critical area where Pakistan can contribute most. Unclassified
data suggest that Pakistan’s record of intelligence sharing has led to the arrest of
several high profile Al Qaeda terrorists,xxxv including Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, an
Al Qaeda operational planner of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
One major aspect of actionable intelligence is to foil a terrorist attack before it
is executed. In August 2006, Pakistan’s intelligence sharing with the U.S. and U.K
foiled a terrorist plot to attack the London Heathrow airport. Media reports claim that if
successfully executed, the terrorist plot could have committed a “mass murder of an
unimaginable scale,” by inflicting damage on as many as 10 airplanes and their
passengers on the transatlantic flights. xxxvi Thus, compared to the Egyptian and
Indonesian cases, Pakistan appears to have a stronger role in partnering with the
western nations (especially the U.K. and the U.S.) in facilitating cooperation on law
enforcement and intelligence sharing.
In contrast to military and law enforcement cooperation, data on judicial
cooperation was hard to locate. However available evidence suggests that Pakistan has
several anti-terror tribunals, which prosecute only terrorism related cases. The
prosecution of terrorists associated with the murder of journalist Daniel Pearl; the arrest,
prosecution, and extradition of several 9/11 terrorist suspects can all be defined as
some important areas of judicial cooperation. Despite such measures, Pakistan does not
have any MLAT with the U.S. Perhaps this is why Islamabad appears to be one of the
strongest American allies in the CIA-led rendition programs.
On cooperation in combating terror financing, Pakistan has reportedly
achieved some progress. The U.S. Country Report on Terrorism 2004 notes that, in
pursuant of the UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (on terror financing) the
Pakistani government has consolidated its efforts in dealing with terrorist financing.
For instance, in 2001 the Pakistani authorities froze $300,000 assets in connection with
potential terrorist financing. The Central Bank of Pakistan has also bolstered its
measures to combat money laundering, and with the assistance of the U.S., it is
creating a financial intelligence unit. Thus, compared to the Egyptian and Indonesian
cases, Pakistan has a weaker record of cooperation on the financial sector.
Despite having a weaker financial regime to combat terror financing, Pakistan
appears to be very consistent in its cooperation with the CIA-led extraordinary
rendition program. There are several well-documented cases in which Pakistan arrested
foreign nationals with suspected involvement in terrorism and then transferred them to
the U.S. authorities. xxxvii Some of them were later detained at the Guantanamo Bay
prison.xxxviii In other instances, Pakistani citizens arrested abroad as terror suspects were
deported to Pakistan and faced secret detention upon their return. xxxix Here the
distinctions among Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan are clear: while the former is a
country of destination for many of the rendered terrorist suspects, the latter two are
mostly the countries of origin for the rendered persons.
Regarding the ideological campaign against terrorism, the Egyptian and
Indonesian cases highlighted the importance of interfaith dialogues in promoting

religious harmony and denouncing radical Islamism. In contrast, the ideological
campaign in Pakistan is taking a different shape. It involves reforming the country’s
religious education system or the traditional Madrassa (Islamic seminary) curricula
system. Critics note that any concrete Madrassa reform project would require
introducing secular subjects—such as English, general science, and mathematics—and
bringing the country’s more than 10,000 madrassasxl under some form of monitoring
and supervision.
At the same time the general (non-Madrassa) primary and secondary
education system needs to undergo reforms and modernization. Currently, the USAID
and the Japanese governments are actively involved in education reform programs in
Pakistan. Such reform initiatives focus on building new schools, providing technical
assistance and infrastructure in Pakistan (Curtis 2007: 2).
However, critics argue that Pakistan has failed to introduce practical reform in
its Madrassa education system (Lakshman 2007). Such failures are attributed to the
Madrassa leaders’ resistance to secularize and de-Islamize the Islamic education
system as part of a western conspiracy (Lakshman 2007).
The fight against extremist elements in the tribal FATA region has emerged as
a critical challenge for Pakistan. According to Pakistan’s Ambassador to the U.S.,
Islamabad has taken both diplomatic and military measures in dealing with the FATA
region. On the diplomatic front, it signed a pact with the tribal leaders to defuse
tensions, militancy, and attacks on government security forces. On the military front,
U.S.-Pakistan joint security measures have apprehended hundreds of Al Qaeda
operatives, including local and foreign terrorists in the FATA region.xli
The foregoing discussion suggests that Pakistan is supportive of the U.S.-led
war on terror. However, the level of cooperation between Pakistan and the U.S. is not
unidirectional. Washington provides critical training and equipments to enhance the
capability of Pakistani security forces. According to a White House fact sheet, the U.S.
is “helping equip Pakistan’s paramilitary Frontier Corps; funding the construction of
more than 100 border outposts; providing high-tech equipment to help Pakistani forces
better locate terrorists attempting to cross the border; and funding an air wing with
helicopters and fixed wing aircraft.”xlii
As a bordering nation and with historical influence in Afghan affairs, Pakistan
can play a critical role in postwar Afghan reconstruction. So far, Pakistan appears to
have three types of role in Afghanistan. First, Pakistan offers an estimated $300 million
aid to Afghanistan.xliii Second, an estimated 90,000 Pakistani military and paramilitary
forces are deployed in the Afghan-Pakistan borders to control the flow of radical
Islamists and to stop re-Talibanization of Afghanistan. Third, and most importantly,
Kabul and Islamabad have launched peace jirga or a formal dialogue of traditional
Pashtun leaders from two countries to discuss the outstanding issues of security
concerns, including Taliban and Al Qaeda threats. xliv
In sum, Pakistan plays all the cards it has in dealing with the Taliban, Al
Qaeda, and the Kashmiri mujahideens. Still the re-emergence of the Taliban and Al
Qaeda in Pakistan is considered to be a critical concern. However, Pakistan is not
solely responsible for such a development. According to Ashley Tellis (2007), the new
Afghan government’s “political failure” and the Pakistani military’s “ineptitude”
further complicated the problem of radical Islamists rejuvenation. What is the way out?
For Tellis, the answer lies in further improving the existing level of counterterrorism
cooperation among Afghanistan, Pakistan, the U.S. and NATO (Tellis 2007: 7). This
would mean systematic targeting of the Taliban leaders and their sanctuaries in
Pakistan and increased vigilance over the Afghan-Pakistan border crossing.
6.2. Explaining Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Cooperation
How important is Pakistan as an ally in the U.S.-led war on terrorism? Hilali (2005)
contends that “Pakistan’s support to the United States was vital and decisive against the
war to overthrow the Taliban regime, to eliminate terrorism and the Al Qaeda network
in Afghanistan, which was one of the biggest sources of terror in recent times.”
In recent years, Pakistan appears to have reduced its support for the Kashmiri
militants. It has also proscribed several Islamist organizations. The list of banned
groups include Lashkar e Tayyiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Sipah-e-Sahaba
(SS), Tehrik-e-Jafria (JJP)m and Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Mohammadi (TNSM).
It is interesting to note that Pakistan has traditionally been the strongest
supporter of both the Kashmiri and Taliban groups. However, Pakistan’s post-9/11
security policy demonstrates a paradigm shift—a decline in the support for the
Kashmiri militants, and partnering with the U.S.-led war on the Taliban.
What explains the apparent changes in Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy? As

a major non-NATO ally of the U.S, it appears that Pakistan has no other option but to
support the U.S. led military intervention in Afghanistan. There are two explanations
hypothesizing Pakistan’s collaboration against the radical Jihadists: “the carrot” and
“the stick.”
Critics argue that the U.S. provides a huge amount of foreign aid—roughly
US$1 billion in economic and military assistance each year—to Pakistan to have it as
an ally in the war on terror (Hilali 2005: 251; Jones and Gordon IV 2007). Others
contend that if the Pakistani government does not extend its cooperation against Al
Qaeda and Taliban militants, it might face international sanctions and other coercive
punishments imposed by the U.S. and its allies.
Two other factors might have some effects on Pakistan’s changing policy on
counterterrorism: one domestic and the other external. On the domestic front, Pakistan
has experienced several high profile terrorist attacks, including a rise in suicide terrorist
attacks, in urban areas.xlv In addition to these, Shia-Sunni sectarian violence is a major
disturbing trend which the Pakistani government is trying to contain.
On the external front, Pakistan appears to be serious about normalizing its relations
with India. One of the preconditions for improving relations between these two South
Asian archrivals, as New Delhi insists, is the withdrawal of Pakistani state support to
various non-state armed groups in Pakistan. These non-state armed militias are often
implicated in terrorist incidents in India, e.g. the 2001 attack on Indian Parliament
premises.
6.3. Revisiting the Statist vs. Non-Statist debate in Pakistan’s Counterterrorism

Cooperation
Like the Egyptian and Indonesian cases, the state apparatus in Pakistan appears to be
more assertive in partnering on global counterterrorism measures. This is evident in
four major issue areas of counterterrorism: military, intelligence and law enforcement,
extra-ordinary rendition and judicial. On the other hand, non-state actors play important
roles in three issue areas: financial, ideological, and post-war reconstruction. The
participation of both the statist and non-statist actors in the Pakistani case provides
further evidence for the emergence of a hybrid form of counterterrorism regime.
7. Saudi Arabia
Like the three Muslim-majority states discussed above, Saudi Arabia is one of the most
important Muslim majority nations with the potential to extend counterterrorism
cooperation with the U.S. and other western actors. Saudi efforts to combat terrorism
are nicely summarized in the following words:
Since September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia has questioned more

than 1,500 individuals, arrested hundreds of suspects, and
succeeded in extraditing Al Qaeda members from other
countries to face justice. The Kingdom has audited its
charities and enacted strict financial control measures to
ensure that evildoers cannot take advantage of the generosity
of our citizens. Bank accounts of suspected individuals have
been frozen and some of the most stringent banking

regulations implemented. Saudi Arabia today has some of the
toughest counterterrorism laws and regulations in the world.
(Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, DC, 2008)xlvi
7.1. Mapping the state of Saudi Arabia’s Cooperation on Counterterrorism
As the Saudi Embassy memo suggests, Saudi counterterrorism strategy and its global
posture demonstrates that Riyadh has taken several important measures in combating
terrorism. As a member of the Afghan reconstruction committee, Saudi Arabia has
made significant monetary contributions. In recent years, Riyadh has also reformed its
internal security strategy, by creating a financial intelligence unit, modernizing the anti-
money laundering regime, introducing government control over the flow of charitable
donations, and partnering with the U.S. on intelligence sharing.
At the global level, Riyadh is party to nine of the 13 counterterrorism
conventions and protocols. Although this is an impressive number, compared to the
Indonesian case, which is party to only six conventions and protocols, Saudi Arabia
is yet to be a party to some of the important instruments. The list includes:
conventions on plastic explosives (1998), terrorist bombings (2001), and terror
financing (2002).
At the bilateral level, the U.S.-Saudi relationship is critical to understanding
Riyadh’s partnership in combating terrorism. Unlike the Egyptian case, where the U.S.
provides huge military aid, military cooperation between Riyadh and Washington is
mainly confined to two areas: Saudi defense procurement from the U.S., and combined
military exercise between the U.S. and Saudi security forces. While military
procurement from the U.S. is largely aimed at defending Saudi national security, the
joint military exercises are important steps in defending the Gulf region from the twin
threats of conventional terrorism and WMD proliferation. According to U.S. Navy
Commander Admiral William J. Fallon, military cooperation with the Saudi Kingdom
will “promote multilateral security efforts and counterproliferation initiatives in the
Arabian Gulf area. These are aimed at deterring destabilizing influences and protecting
our friends and US interests from aggression.”xlvii

In contrast to military cooperation, law enforcement and intelligence
cooperation appear to be more intensive between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. It is
noteworthy that intelligence sharing between Riyadh and Washington predates the 9/11
terror attacks.xlviii Saudi-U.S. intelligence and law enforcement cooperation appeared to
further improve following the May 2003 Riyadh compound bombings, which killed 26
people, including 9 Americans. Following the terrorist incident, a joint Saudi-U.S.
intelligence task force began investigating the perpetrators.
In addition to the joint task force, the United States’ FBI and Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) launched a program to assist the Saudi government to create a
counter-terror financing (CTF) center.xlix The objective of the CTF center is to track
down bank accounts, computer records, and financial data of criminal and terror
suspects. l In order to bolster the capacity building of Saudi financial regime,
members of the FBI and IRS have organized special training programs on terror
financing for the Saudi officials. li Thus, much of the U.S.-Saudi counterterror
cooperation was aimed at intelligence sharing and capacity building for Saudi
internal security system.
Saudi cooperation on combating money laundering and terrorist financing is

an important aspect of the country’s commitment toward a global counterterrorist
regime. According to the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the
government of Saudi Arabia has given access to the FATF and the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) to investigate its financial practices. Saudi membership in the Middle
East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) is also believed to
be significantly improving the multilateral initiatives in combating money laundering
and terrorist financing.
On the judicial front, Riyadh does not have any MLAT with Washington, thus
limiting the scope for any formal channel of judicial cooperation. However, Saudi
Arabia has created special anti-terrorism courts, designed to prosecute only terrorism
related cases. In addition, the Saudi government appears to take tough security
measures after the occurrence of any high profile terrorist incident. For instance,
according to the U.S. Country Report on Terrorism 2005, Saudi security forces cracked
down on the suspected terrorists in the aftermath of the 2004 terrorist attacks on the
U.S. Consulate in Jeddah and the Saudi Ministry of Interior (U.S. Department of State
2006a: 143). These security operations reportedly resulted in the killing of several Al
Qaeda terrorists.
Despite the killing of suspected Al Qaeda operatives, there are many
allegations that Al Qaeda terrorist networks and their global cohorts take advantage of
this financial source to fund and operate their clandestine activities, recruit and
indoctrinate people to wage ‘jihadi’ attacks.lii
In order to address the pressing concerns over the money flow via Saudi
charities, the Saudi authorities have taken several measures. Charitable institutions
must maintain one main account, and may have subsidiary accounts. They are not
allowed to use cash transactions. Identification of donors will be strictly enforced.
Charitable institutions can not obtain any ATM card or credit card. Opening a bank
account for a charitable organization requires two basic identifications (ID): a license
from the ministry of Labor or Social Affairs or the Ministry of Islamic Affairs; and a
letter from the chairperson of the charitable society.liii
On rendition, Saudi Arabia is one of the partner countries receiving the
rendered terror suspects from the U.S. (Priest and Eggen 2005). Top CIA officials have
recognized the cooperation of Saudi interrogators in providing information related to
terror suspects held in Saudi custody. Former CIA director George Tenet claimed that
“The Saudis are proving increasingly important support to our counterterrorism
efforts—from making arrests to sharing debriefing results” (Priest and Gellman 2002).
The Saudi-based Joint Intelligence Task Force (JITF), composed of officers from the
CIA, FBI, and other U.S. law enforcement agencies, and Saudi Arabia, are reportedly
in charge of deciding the future of some hard core terror suspects detained in Saudi
Arabia (Priest and Stephens 2004).
When it comes to the question of radical Islamist ideology, Saudi Arabia is
widely criticized for preaching and exporting a radical interpretation of Islam. However,
in recent years, the Saudi state apparatus and members of the Saudi religious bodies
appear to have begun playing an active role in promoting tolerance, and discouraging
extremism. This might be due to the fact that the Kingdom itself has come under some
very high profile terrorist attacks, including an attack on the Ministry of Interior
premises, and its oil facilities. Thus, an effective Saudi counterterrorism strategy must
focus on battling radical Islamism.
The Saudi efforts in the battle of ideas against radicalism include: reforming
the Saudi curriculum and text books, avoiding provocative statements in the name of
Islam, reaching out to the national media to denounce terrorism, and partnering with
various nations in promoting interfaith dialogue etc (The Indonesian Embassy,
Islamabad, Pakistan 2008; U.S. Department of State 2006a: 144). Despite such
moderation efforts, radical religious clerics reportedly make, albeit to a lesser extent
compared to previous years, provocative statements in Friday prayer sermons (U.S.
Department of State 2007).
Postwar reconstruction in Afghan is a challenging job. In 2002, Saudi Arabia
partnered with the EU, Japan, and the U.S. in co-chairing the Afghan reconstruction
conference in Tokyo, Japan. At the conference, Riyadh pledged a modest $220 million
aid in Afghan reconstruction. According to Saudi authorities, “This contribution is
consistent with the Kingdom’s commitment to the Afghan people and it comes on the
heels of large-scale donations of food, medicine and clothing that has helped alleviate
the suffering of the innocent victims in Afghanistan” (Embassy of Saudi Arabia Press
Release 2002).
7.2. Explaining Saudi Counterterrorism Cooperation
To summarize, several factors explain the growing Saudi commitments to counter-

terror cooperation with the U.S. and other multilateral actors. First, the changing nature
of terrorist threat perception has necessitated a tough counterterrorism regime. Saudi
Arabia has recently been the target of several high profile terrorist attacks. Between
1995 and 2006, the country was host to at least 12 major terrorist attacks, which killed
more than 110 people and injured approximately 800 others. Out of the 12 incidents
profiled in this study, three incidents claimed more than half of the total casualties.
These are the 1996 Khobar Tower bombing (which killed 19 U.S. military personnel),
the 2003 Riyadh compound buildings (which killed 26 people, including 9 Americans),
and the 2004 Al Khobar massacre (which killed 24 hostages, including 19
foreigners).liv
Second, counterterrorism cooperation between the U.S. and the Saudi
regime appears to be a necessity grown out of Saudi security vulnerability. Critics

argue that the 2003 Riyadh bombings and subsequent terror attacks in Saudi Arabia
reveal the vulnerability of Saudi regime to terror networks.lv It can also be argued
that joint actions between the two nations have enabled the Saudi government to
address its capacity gap in intelligence, investigation, and prosecution of terrorism
related cases.
Third, increasing international pressure on transparency in the Saudi financial
sector and allegations of Saudi funding support for terrorist attacks have had some
positive results.lvi The creation of a government agency to control and monitor the flow
of charitable donations, the launching of the financial intelligence unit, and the freezing
of various terrorism related funds are all some positive indications in the war on terror
financing.
Fourth, Saudi reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan can broadly be defined as
the nation’s role in promoting the Islamic Ummah, and standing by the Afghan people.
During the Afghan war against the Soviet invasion, Saudi Arabia played an important
role in funneling money to the Afghan mujahideens. Thus, the reconstruction role of
the Saudi government in Afghanistan appears to be a continuation of the nation’s

strategic role in Central and South Asia.
7.3. Revisiting the Statist-Non-Statist Debate in Saudi Counterterrorism Cooperation
As discussed in the previous cases (Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan), the state security
apparatus, especially the military and civilian forces and the intelligence services play a
dominant role in promoting Saudi counterterrorism cooperation. In contrast, several
non-statist actors play important roles in promoting cooperation in the fields of
counterterror financing, ideological campaign, and postwar reconstruction in
Afghanistan. Thus the Saudi counterterrorism measures also provide evidence for the
emergence of a hybrid form of counterterrorism regime, with central roles for both state
and non-state actors.
8. Turkey
8.1. Mapping the state of Turkey’s Cooperation on Counterterrorism
Turkey is an active participant in various intergovernmental efforts to combat terrorism.

It has signed 12 of the 13 international conventions on counterterrorism. Currently, it is
one of the staunchest U.S. allies in the global war on terror (Cook and Sherwood-
Randall 2006). Turkish cooperation in the areas of military, law enforcement and
intelligence sharing, and postwar reconstruction are noteworthy.
Among the five Muslim-majority countries studied here, Turkey has the
strongest military role in the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq. In
Afghanistan, Turkish security forces have twice commanded the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF). As of February 2008, an estimated 675 Turkish troops were
deployed in Afghanistan. In addition to troop contribution in Afghanistan, Turkey has
also provided critical logistics support to the U.S. troops in Iraq. This has reportedly
saved an estimated $60 million per year. In addition, the Turkish Incirlik Air Base is
being used for the OIF and OEF purposes.

Despite such an assertive military role in the war on terror, there are at least
two areas of concern, where the Turkish government is yet to take tougher actions:
dealing with narco-trafficking and controlling the flow of money channeled through
alternative remittance systems. According to the International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report 2006, Turkey is a major regional financial center, and a transit route
for global drug trafficking networks in Central Asia and Europe. Narco-trafficking and
remittance transfers are considered critical concerns as the financial transactions related
to narco-trafficking are reportedly channeled in Afghanistan and Pakistan via the
United Arab Emirates and other Gulf states. lvii Thus, bolstering Turkish efforts to
combat drug trafficking and alternative remittance would reduce the likelihood that
such transnational organized crime contribute to fueling terrorist activities in
Afghanistan and the neighboring countries.
When it comes to intelligence sharing, Turkey can benefit from obtaining
intelligence from the U.S. Ankara has long demanded that the U.S. should provide
Turkey with actionable intelligence on the Kurdish insurgent group PKK. Of late the
two nations have decided to form a joint intelligence center. The purpose of the
intelligence center is to share timely and actionable intelligence on the PKK leadership,
their strategic locations, and training facilities, etc. According to one media report, the
U.S. has already provided Turkey with actionable intelligence. In addition, the border
posts between Turkey and northern Iraq have been reduced to control the movement of
key PKK leadership (Hyland 2007). In addition to intelligence sharing, Turkey also
appears to maintain law enforcement cooperation with its western partners. For
instance, media reports indicate that members of the London counterterrorist police
team joined their Turkish counterparts in investigating the deadliest 2003 Istanbul
bombings, which killed a British consul general, and several British citizens.
Among the five countries discussed in this chapter, only Turkey is party to the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 2002. In
recent years increasing international concerns about the issue of terrorist financing and
domestic experience with terrorist incidents have impacted the Turkish anti-money
laundering and counter terror finance regime.
In 2006, in a bid to modernize its financial system, Turkey reorganized its
anti-money laundering agency, and enacted laws that made terror financing a criminal
act. The FATF periodically monitors and evaluates the status of the country’s
compliance with global measures to combat terror financing. According to a recent
FATF report, between 2002 and 2005, the number of suspicious transaction reports
(STR) submitted to the Turkish FIU MASAK has increased threefold, however
compared to the size of the Turkish financial sector, “the level of STR reporting is
low” (FATF 2007: 3).
The Turkish judiciary plays an important role in prosecuting terrorism related
cases. In February 2007 the higher court ruled that the Turkish Council of Ministers
preserve the authority to order the asset freezing of UN-designated terrorist suspects
(U.S. Department of State 2007). During the same period, the Turkish criminal court
trials handed down life sentences to most of the terrorist suspects for their involvement
in the 2003 Istanbul bombings (U.S. Department of State 2007).
Extrajudicial rendition is another important area where Turkey appears to
cooperate with the U.S. However, there is one major difference between Turkey and
other Muslim nations discussed here. While Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Saudi
Arabia are either a country of origin or destination for most of the rendered persons,
Turkey is a “staging post” for many of the CIA-led rendition efforts (Edwards 2008).
Media reports also claim that CIA secret rendition flights used the Turkish military
airbase Incirlik, in addition to other European airspaces, as a transit point for
transporting the terror suspects to Guantanamo Bay (Grey 2007). According to one
report, “At lest 170 …prisoners flew over Spanish territory, more than 700 crossed
Portuguese space, and more than 680 were transshipped at Incirlik” (Rendition Watch
2007). Thus, although extraordinary rendition is widely recognized as unacceptable,
Turkey and its European neighbors have offered critical support as transit points for
secret CIA flights carrying terrorist suspects.
Turkey is widely recognized as a secularized Muslim-majority state. Hence,
the battle of ideas takes a distinct place in Turkey. This is evident in the recent vibrant
debate over lifting a ban on the women’s headscarf and the holding of several interfaith
dialogues. While the headscarf issue is apparently a domestic affair, it has an
international dimension as Turkey is awaiting membership in the EU. In contrast, the
interfaith dialogues, attended by international religious and political leaders, bear
importance in promoting tolerance and moderation among the country’s Muslim
population.
In recent years, Turkey hosted several interfaith dialogues, in an attempt to

promote dialogue of civilizations among Islamism, Christianity, and other religious
beliefs. Some of these interfaith dialogues were marked by the visit of high profile
international leaders, including Pope Benedict. Pope Benedict described the goal of his
2006 Turkey visit as a step to promote “dialogue, brotherhood, a commitment to
understanding between cultures, between religions, for reconciliation.” lviii In another
interfaith dialogue held in 2005, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan called for building
“an alliance of civilizations.” The dialogue was attended by around 2,000 delegates
from the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim communities (Christian Today 2005).
Ankara plays an active role in the post-war reconstruction process in both
Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan Turkish reconstruction efforts focused on the
building of schools and hospitals. According to a UNDP document, as of June 2007,
Turkey contributed US$ 100,000 to Afghan reconstruction. lix As part of its Iraqi
reconstruction mission, Turkey provides headquarters to the NATO Police Training
Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). Compared to its Afghan aid contribution, Turkey has a
substantial aid commitment to Iraq reconstruction. By January 2007, Turkey pledged
an estimated US$ 50 million, and allocated about US$ 1.3 million in Iraq
reconstruction.
8.2. Explaining Turkey’s Counterterrorism Cooperation
Several factors may explain Turkey’s strong role in the war on terror and its level of
partnership with the U.S. The list includes a strong military in NATO; reciprocal
security ties with the U.S.; and common threat perceptions about the PKK and radical
Islamist groups.
First, compared to the four countries discussed above (Egypt, Indonesia,
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia), Turkey has a stronger role in the NATO-led military
combat and post-war reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Turkey’s central position in
NATO as well as its strategic relations with the U.S. is critical to understanding such a
strong role (Bal 2004: 136). Since 1952, Turkey has been a strong and dedicated
member of NATO, serving “as the organization’s vital eastern anchor, controlling the
straits leading from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and sharing a border with Syria,
Iraq, and Iran” (U.S. Department of State 2008). Currently, Turkey holds the second
largest army in NATO after the U.S.; and Turkish armed forces in NATO have
historically participated in several critical security missions, including the NATO-led
IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, the Turkish military role in the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) appears to be a continuation of its
security commitment to peace and stability in world affairs and to transatlantic
partnership.
Second, as stated above, Turkey not only provides critical military logistics
support to the U.S.-led war in Iraq; but also offers staging posts for facilitating the
transportation of extrajudicially rendered persons arrested abroad. Such military
cooperation can be broadly understood as the historical security ties the two nations
have maintained over the years (Cook and Sherwood-Randall 2006: 3). Currently, a
“shared vision” and a framework of “strategic dialogue” between Ankara and
Washington dictates the security relations, which puts due emphasis on “countering
terrorism including the fight against the PKK and its affiliates” (Embassy of the United
States 2006).
Third, perceptions over the threat of the PKK and radical Islamists have
often shaped the nature and dimensions of counterterrorism cooperation between the
U.S. and Turkey. On the question of the Kurds and the PKK, Ankara and Washington
appear to follow a dual strategy. Such a strategy is premised on assisting the Iraqi
civilian Kurds while fighting the armed PKK (Cook and Sherwood-Randall 2006: 7).
The critical U.S. intelligence support reportedly played a crucial role in arresting
PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan from Kenya in 1999 (Cook and Sherwood-Randall
2006: 7).
Despite such a soft U.S. support in the fight against the PKK, Washington
appears to be reluctant in taking a hard stance and a militaristic approach against the
PKK, as this might destabilize northern Iraq. And, this is the context in which
Ankara is wary of the U.S. commitment to fight the PKK and insists on more
concrete U.S. actions rather than “empty words” in combating the PKK (McGregor
2007). The lesson from such differences over dealing with the PKK is clear: Ankara
and Washington lack a common perspective on the gravity of the threat from the
PKK.
While the PKK poses a secessionist threat to the Turkish state, Al Qaeda poses
a threat to the Turkish political regime and its secular ideals. The threat from Al Qaeda
was magnified in the 2003 Istanbul bombings, which killed 61 people, including the
British consul general in Turkey. Faced with a common enemy, the counterterrorism
unit of the London police joined the Turkish law enforcement agencies in partnering on
the investigation of the terrorist attack.
8.3. Revisiting the Statist-Non-Statist Debate in Turkish Counterterrorism Cooperation
Turkish counterterrorism cooperation offers a striking similarity with the four cases
discussed above: both the Statist and non-Statist actors participate in facilitating
cooperation. While the state actors work on hard security areas, such as, military, law
enforcement and intelligence, judicial, and extrajudicial rendition; the non-state actors
play critical role soft areas, such as, combating terror financing, post-war
reconstruction, and fighting a battle of ideas against Islamist radicalism. Thus, the
Turkish case of counterterrorism cooperation provides evidence for a hybrid security

regime with both the Statist and non-Statist cooperation.
9. Theoretical and Policy Implications
Table 2 summarizes the varied level of counterterrorism cooperation between the key
Muslim nations and their western allies. As the preceding discussion suggests, such
cooperation has important theoretical and policy implications. On theoretical grounds,
it provides evidence for the emergence of a hybrid counterterrorism regime, in which
the pivotal Muslim nations cooperate with their western partners in combating
terrorism. Three implications of such cooperation are worth discussing here.
First, cooperation between the Muslim nations and their western counterparts
defies the civilizational clash thesis, and offers an alternative paradigm that cooperation
and coordination can be possible among nations and institutions, representing diverse
(both Islamic and non-Islamic) cultural-religious backgrounds.
Second, contrary to the transnationalist discourse of cooperation, which sees a

declining role for states in international affairs, this chapter finds that state remains a
critical actor in mobilizing resources to fight against terrorism.
Third and most importantly, the emerging counterterrorist regime is
categorized as hybrid because both statist and non-statist actors are critical
participants in the regime. However, as the case studies suggest, statist and non-
statist actors appear to form two distinct but inter-related components of a global
counterterrorism regime. These two components can be labeled as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’
issue areas of counterterrorism. The hard areas of cooperation are military combat
and support role, law enforcement cooperation and intelligence sharing, and judicial
and extrajudicial cooperation. In contrast, the soft issue areas are measures against
terror financing, the battle of ideas against radical Islamism, and humanitarian role in
post-war reconstruction. While the statist military-security apparatus plays a critical
role in hard areas, the sub-statist and non-statist actors play a dominant role in soft
security areas.
On the policy domain, this chapter identifies that the task of counterterrorism
involves wide-ranging policy actions—both military and non-military. In general, the
military force is the first line of defense against any external threat, whereas the civilian
law enforcement agencies are the first defenders against any internal threat. However,
the transnational nature of contemporary threats (such as Al Qaeda, the Jemaah
Islamiyah and the Taliban) has made the internal-external distinction quite obsolete.
The policy implication in dealing with such a transnationalized threat is clear: military
troops of a country are deployed in a mission where upholding the coalition interest
appears to be greater than any narrow national interest. Turkey’s troop contribution in
NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) is illustrative
in this case.
In contrast to the Turkish case of troop contribution, the Egyptian and
Pakistani cases illustrate that militarization of the border areas can be an important area
of counterterrorism cooperation. Despite military force deployment in selected cases,
law enforcement and intelligence agencies are the most important actors in
investigating and prosecuting terrorism related cases. Interestingly with the exception
of the Egyptian case, in all the countries discussed above, the threat of an immediate
terrorist attack or the incidence of a high profile terrorist attack catalyzed law
enforcement cooperation and intelligence sharing between Muslim nations and their
key western allies. Evidence includes, for instance, post-Bali bombings (2002)
cooperation between Indonesian and Australian police agencies; or the post-Riyadh
bombings (2003) cooperation between Saudi and American security and intelligence
agencies.
On judicial cooperation, it was found that national courts had tried
terrorism related cases, and in some instances, special anti-terrorism courts were
created to prosecute terrorist suspects. On the question of the extradition of
terrorist suspects, the provision of a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) did not
appear to have any effect. It was interesting to find that all the five countries
investigated here participated in the CIA-led extrajudicial rendition program. The
implication of such rendition practices is that when there is a tension between
security and civil liberties, states tend to ignore the provision of civil liberties in
the fight against terrorism.
Table 2. Summing up: The Five Pivotal Muslim nations and their Counterterrorism cooperation.
Egypt Indonesia Pakistan Saudi Arabia Turkey

Major Threat/ Tunnel Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda,
Security smuggling Jemaah Taliban, flow of PKK
Concerns across Gaza- Islamiyah Kashmiri charitable
Egypt border; (JI) mujahideens donations
Al Qaeda and
other radical
Islamist
groups
Key Areas of cooperation
Global CT Party to 11 Party to 6 out Party to 10 Party to 9 out Party to 12
Conventions/ out of 13 CT of 13 CT out of 13 CT of 13 CT out of 13 CT
Protocols conventions conventions conventions conventions conventions
Military Joint military Lifting of Joint maritime Defense Troop

(Major partner: exercise with U.S. ban on exercise with procurement deployment
U.S.) U.S., military U.S. “Inspired from U.S.; in
militarizing assistance, Union”; joint military Afghanistan
Gaza-Egypt IMET participation exercise; with
border; over in “Bright commanding
flight Star”; role in
permission to militarizing NATO;
U.S. aircrafts Afghan- providing
for OIF Pakistan logistics
borders; support for
U.S. invasion
of Iraq;
Law Joint Australian Intelligence Joint London
enforcement & Counterterror police sharing with intelligence police CT
intelligence ism Working cooperation U.K. and task force to branch
sharing (Major Group on joint U.S.—foiling investigate cooperation
partner: U.S., investigation of terror Riyadh after Istanbul
U.K., Australia) of Bali attack compound bombings;
bombings; bombings; Intelligence
U.S. partnership sharing with

cooperation with CIA, U.S. on
on the FBI, Federal PKK;
creation of Reserve etc’
the
Detachment
88
Judicial (Major MLAT with No MLAT No MLAT No MLAT MLAT with
partner: U.S.) U.S. with U.S.; with U.S.; with U.S.; the U.S.
MLAT with role of anti- Anti-terrorism
Australia, terror courts courts
China, S. in prosecuting functioning
Korea, terror related
ASEAN cases
Extrajudicial Destination Origin for Mostly origin Mostly origin Providing
for rendered rendered for rendered for rendered transit points
people people persons persons for rendition
flights
Counter-Terror Cooperation FIU U.S. Introducing Party to the
financing & with U.S. collaboration assistance in new control 2002 TF
money Federal with FATF, creating FIU, measures over convention;
Laundering Reserve and APG; asset freezing charitable FIU

FATF increasing of terror donations; cooperation
STR, suspects partnership with FATF;
surveillance with FATF,
over MENAFATF,
remittance GCC
flow
Battle of ideas Public Interfaith Dubious Problems with Headscarf
denouncemen dialogue record of the radical debate;
t of Islamist partnered Madrassa wahhabi Interfaith
radicalism with foreign reform; Japan ideology; dialogue
nations and USAID- curricula attended by
sponsored reform Pope and
education high level
reform participants
Postwar Training for No Humanitarian Co-chairing Humanitaria

reconstruction Iraqi police significant aid; peace Afghan n aid to
contribution jirga; and reconstruction Afghanistan;
border committee; training for
policing humanitarian Iraqi police;
relief support reconstructio
for n aid for Iraq
Afghanistan
Overall effect Muslim JI still a Problems with Radical Turkey
Brotherhood threat the re- Ideology and offering
and its emergence of charitable more than
influence on Taliban and donations getting less
Hamas Al Qaeda major
problems
On combating terrorist financing, there was a common pattern in almost all

cases. The central banks and national financial intelligence units (FIUs) partnered with
regional and international financial bodies in tracking the flow of money. Here, the U.S.
appeared to play a critical role in providing assistance in the creation of FIUs or

providing training to central bank officials in selected countries.
On the battle of ideas, western nations appeared to forge partnerships in
facilitating interfaith dialogue or introducing reform in the Madrassa curriculum. Here
the non-state actors in the Muslim nations, especially, the religious leaders and political
parties appeared to play an important role in denouncing terrorism and recognizing the
value of cultural diversity in maintaining a culture of peace and tolerance.
Finally, post war reconstruction involved the critical tasks of disarming,
demobilizing, and re-integration (DDR) of the Taliban militia in Afghanistan, and
creating a new security force in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Here the statist actors
played the most important role. However, in areas of infrastructure development and
service delivery, the NGOs and humanitarian agencies played a critical role.
Conclusion
In sum, two central research questions guided this study. The first explored if there is
any evidence for the emergence of a global counterterrorism regime; and the second
investigated the extent to which pivotal Muslim nations partner with their western
counterparts in the creation and persistence of that regime.
In approaching these questions, this chapter offers some insights on security
cooperation. First, it posits that national capabilities are important in fighting terrorism;
however cooperation on various issue areas has become a central feature in the war on
terrorism. Second, the five critical Muslim nations—despite their different geo-
strategic locations, political ideology, and regime stability—appear to participate in the
construction of a global counterterrorism regime. Third, both statist and non-statist
actors appear to play distinct role in the formation of a hybrid counterterrorism
regime. lx Fourth, in some instances, the patterned behavior of counterterrorism
cooperation discussed in this chapter appears to be ad hoc, rather than permanent.
Hence, it is the challenge of the global community to institutionalize the existing level
of counterterrorism cooperation, where the active partnership of key Muslim nations
would prove to be a critical resource in fighting the “sovereign-free”lxi radical Islamists,
their transnational networks, and other evolving transnational threats.
Appendix 1
106
Title of the Convention/ Major focus Signed/ Entered into Status Five Pivotal Muslim-Majority Nations and their position on
Protocol force (Year) (Number International Conventions/Protocols on Terrorism
Adopted
of parties)
(Year)
Egypt Indonesia Pakistan Saudi Turkey

Arabia
1. Convention on Offences and Aviation security 1963 1969 180 √ √ √ √ √

Certain other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft
2. Convention for the Aviation security 1970 1971 181 √ √ √ √ √

Suppression of Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft
3.Convention for the Suppression Aviation security 1971 1973 183 √ √ √ √ √

of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation
4. Convention on the Prevention Security of 1973 1977 159 √ √ √ √ √

and Punishment of Crime against Diplomatic
Internationally Protected Persons, personnel
including Diplomatic Agents
5. International Convention Hostages 1979 1983 153 √ √ √ √ √

Against the Taking of Hostages
A.S.M.A. Ashraf / The Five Pivotal Muslim Nations: Their Critical Role
6. Convention on the Physical Nuclear security 1979 1987 116 √ √ √ √ √

Protection of Nuclear Material
7. Protocol for the Suppression of Aviation security 1988 1989 156 √ √ √ √
Unlawful Acts At Airports
(Done in
Serving International Civil
Aviation, Supplementary to the
Convention for the Suppression 1971)

of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation
8. Convention for the Maritime security 1988 1992 134 √ √ √ √

Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation
9. Protocol for the Suppression of Maritime security 1988 1992 123 √ √ √ √

Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Fixed Platforms Located on
the Continental Shelf
10. Convention on the Marking Explosives 1991 1998 123 √ √ √

of Plastic Explosives for the
Purpose of Detection
11. International Convention for Terrorist 1997 2001 145 √ √

the Suppression of Terrorist bombings
Bombings
12. International Convention for Terror financing 1999 2002 150 √

the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism
13. International Convention for Nuclear security 2005 100

the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism
A.S.M.A. Ashraf / The Five Pivotal Muslim Nations: Their Critical Role
Total conventions/protocols 11 6 10 9 12
signed/ratified
Table 1. Selected Muslim Nations’ Commitment to International Conventions and Protocols on Terrorism
Source: U.S. Department of State. 2007. Country Reports on Terrorism. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/83238.htm
107
Appendix 2
Areas of Major Actors Areas of

Counterterrorism Counterterrorism
Cooperation Cooperation
Cooperation (U.S.-Egypt Joint Military
Exercise [Bright Star];
U.S. Army Corps Engineer
support against arms
smuggling tunnels)
Intelligence and √ International
Law (U.S.-Egypt Joint
Enforcement Counterterrorism Working
Cooperation Group; US-Egypt Strategic
Dialogue)
Financial √ √ √ Transnational
cooperation (Federal Reserve, Central (Egyptian (FATF,
Bank of Egypt) Money MENATAF,
Laundering EMLCU)
Combating
Unit, EMLCU
-FATF)
Cooperation U.S.-Egypt Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty (MLAT)
cooperation (CIA, domestic law
(Rendition) enforcement and
intelligence agencies)
Campaign State-controlled media Non-violence

against philosophy
Terrorism preached by
reformed Al-
Gama’at Al-
Islamiya (IG)
leadership
Post-war √ √ √ International
reconstruction (Training Iraqi security German Local NGOs,
(Humanitarian, forces; Maintenance of a Vocational Translators,
Nation-building) hospital in Afghanistan, Institutes International
German Federal Ministry NGOs (BRAC,
of Economic Cooperation Red Cross), IFIs
and Development) (ADB, IMF,
UNDP, World
Bank,)
Table 2. Egypt: Cooperation on Counterterrorism
Appendix 3
Areas of Major Actors International vs

Counterterrorism Transnational
Cooperation
Cooperation (U.S. and Indonesian
Navy Joint
Counterterrorism
Exercise)
Law (Australian support
Enforcement for Law Enforcement
Cooperation Training Center; U.S.
ATA training for
Detachment-88)
Cooperation (U.S. assistance for ((FATF, APG;
Counterterror USAID, Indonesian
Finance program in Financial Transaction
Indonesia; USAID, Reports and Analysis
Indonesian Financial Center/PPATK)
Transaction Reports
and Analysis
Center/PPATK)
Judicial
Cooperation
cooperation (CIA-Indonesian
(Rendition) State Intelligence
Agency)
Campaign Government of (Scholars, political,
against Indonesia, religious leaders;
Terrorism Government of Nahdlatul Ulema &
Australia, Muhammadiyah,
Government of UK Local & Intl Media)
Post-war √ Transnational
reconstruction International
(Humanitarian, conference of Islamic
Nation-building) leaders on
reconciliation in Iraq
Table 3. Indonesia: Cooperation on Counterterrorism
Appendix 4

Cooperation
Cooperation (Pakistani military and
paramilitary deployment
across Afghanistan
borders; U.S. military
assistance, joint
exercise; )
Law (Pakistan, U.S., U.K
Enforcement intelligence sharing foils
Cooperation London-Heathrow terror
plot)
cooperation (U.S. assistance for the
creation of a FIU w/ the (FATF, APG)
Central Bank of
Pakistan )
Cooperation (Prosecution of terrorists
associated with the
murder of journalist
Daniel Pearl; arrest,
prosecution, and
extradition of several 9/11
terror suspects )
cooperation (CIA, MI6, Pakistani
(Rendition) security forces)
Campaign (Pakistani Madrassa (Scholars, political,
against reform project, USAID and religious
Terrorism support, Japanese govt leaders; Local &
support) International
Media)
reconstruction (Pakistani assistance to Peace conference
(Humanitarian, Afghanistan $300 million of Pashtun leaders
Nation-building) since 2001)lxii from Afghanistan
and Pakistan)
Table 4. Pakistan: Counterterrorism Cooperation
Appendix 5

Cooperation
Cooperation
(Military Working
Group, Combined
Military Exercises)
Law
Enforcement (Saudi and U.S.
Cooperation intelligence sharing,
joint task force)
cooperation
(U.S. FBI, U.S. IRS, (FATF, GCC,
Saudi central bank, MENATAF)
FIU, Saudi Higher
Authority for Religion
and Charity)
Cooperation
(Special court created to
prosecute terrorism-
related cases)
cooperation
(Rendition) (CIA, FBI, Saudi law
enforcement)
Campaign
against (reforming the text (Scholars, political, and
Terrorism books, discouraging religious leaders; Local
provocative statements & International Media)
by religious leaders, )
reconstruction
(Support for OEF in (INGOs, UNDP)
(Humanitarian, Afghanistan, co-
Nation-building) chairing Afghan
reconstruction
committee)lxiii
Table 5. Saudi Arabia: Counterterrorism Cooperation
Appendix 6

Cooperation
Cooperation (U.S., NATO, Turkey)
Law
Enforcement (New initiative to
Cooperation create joint intelligence
center)
cooperation (Turkish anti-money
laundering (FATF, GCC,
agency/financial MENATAF)
intelligence agency—
MASAK)
Judicial International
Cooperation
cooperation
(Rendition) (CIA, FBI, Turkish law
enforcement)
Campaign
against (upholding secular (Scholars, political,
Terrorism ideas and symbols, and religious leaders;
debate over women’s Local & International
headscarf ) Media)
reconstruction
(Humanitarian, (Support for OEF in (INGOs, UNDP)
Nation-building) Afghanistan, co-
chairing Afghan
reconstruction
committee)lxiv
Table 6. Turkey: Counterterrorism Cooperation
i
A short list of such high profile terrorist incidents include the attacks on the New York World Trade Center
twin towers (September 2001), Bali nightclub (October 2002), Madrid commuter train system (March 2004),
and London transport system (July 2005) . Apparently, all of these terrorist attacks were perpetrated by
radical Islamist groups, and their transnational networks. In most cases, western civilians constitute the bulk
of the victims.
ii
Some radical groups and individuals often attack their domestic government and other domestic targets, too.
iii
In an address to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley
recognized the efforts of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt as the “key allies in the war on terror.” See: The
White House, Office of the Press Secretary. 2005. “Remarks by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley
to the Council on Foreign Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations New York, October 18.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051018-6.html accessed November 4, 2007.
iv
For details on the OIC, its member states, and political role in world affairs, see: http://www.oic-
oci.org/oicnew/home.asp accessed February 6, 2008.
v
This paper uses the terms “Muslim nations” and “Islamic countries” interchangeably.
vi
Subsequent reports, released with the title Country Report on Terrorism, also recognize these five major
elements of counterterrorism cooperation between the U.S. and other partner nations.
vii
For a detailed discussion on Interpol and its counterterrorism activities see: http://www.interpol.int/ accessed
February 1, 2008; For Europol related information, see http://www.europol.europa.eu/ accessed February 1,
2008.
viii
The importance of the battle of ideas is also recognized by American officials. See: Crawley, Vince. 2006.
“Battle of Ideas” Critical in Fighting Terrorism, Says State’s Fried. http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2006/April/20060406163426MVyelwarC0.7918817.html accessed February 5, 2008.
ix
http://www.centcom.mil/en/coalition-countries/egypt/2.html accessed February 10, 2008.
x
See: Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/bright-star.htm accessed February 9, 2008.
xi
See: http://www.codenames.org/additions.html accessed February 9, 2008.
xii
The Kuwait Times. 2008. Egypt to Use US Military Aid to Counter Arms Smuggling. January 8.
http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.php?newsid=MTI2MzU5NzY0Mw== accessed February 1, 2008.
xiii
The strategic dialogue provides a mechanism to discuss diverse security issues of concern between the U.S.
and Egypt. The first strategic dialogue was convened in 1998. See: Transcript: Albright, Egyptian Fomin
Moussa Remarks, 7/10 (Secstate and Fomin inaugurate US-Egypt strategic dialogue), July 10, 1998.
http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/press/state/archive/1998/july/sd1713.htm accessed February 25,
2008.
xiv
The Joint Counterterrorism Working Group held its first meeting in July 2003. See: Al-Ahram Weekly. 2004.
US Egypt Aid Debated. http://www.weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2004/696/eg4.htm accessed February 25,
2008.
xv
Ibid.
xvi
In other instances, foreign nationals and terror suspects were transferred to Egypt, where they faced torture,
extrajudicial detention, and harsh interrogation. See: Dana Pries and Dan Eggen 2005. Terror Suspec Alleges
Torture. The Washington Post January 6. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A51726-
2005Jan5.html. accessed February 21, 2008.
xvii
Amnesty International. 2006. The Secretive and Illegal US Programme of ‘Rendition.’ http://www.
amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/feature-stories/secretive-and-illegal-us-programme-of-endition-20060405
accessed February 21, 2008.
xviii
See: http://www.pfe-mena.org/print_reports.htm accessed February 6, 2008.
xix
The Egypt-U.S. MLAT entered into force on November 29, 2001. See: U.S. Department of State. Bureau of
Consular Affairs. Mutual Legal Assistance (MLAT) and Other Agreements. http://www.travel.state.gov/
law/info/judicial/judicial_690.html# accessed February 28, 2008.
xx
Some of the non-state actors reportedly involved are humanitarian agencies and translators working around
the Bagram Airbase. The Statist actors are mostly American armed forces personnel.
xxi
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was barred from running in the 2005 national elections. However, members
of the MB ran in the election as independent candidates.
xxii
The six major terrorist groups are: Egypt’s Islamic Revolution, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Moroccan Islamic
Combatant Group, Takfir Wa al Hijra, Al Gama aal Islamiya, and Al Qaeda. Most of the Islamist groups in
Egypt are opposed to the rule of President Husni Mubarak and his pro-western foreign policy toward the
Middle East. Countries and entities outlawing them are: Australia, Canada, the EU, Russia, the U.K. and the
U.S.
xxiii
The Kuwait Times. 2008. Egypt to Use U.S. Military Aid to Counter Arms Smuggling. January 8.
http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.php?newsid=MTI2MzU5NzY0Mw== accessed February 1, 2008.
xxiv
The United States Central Command (CENTCOM), http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/egypt/2.html
xxv
Appendix 1 provides a snapshot of Egypt’s various actors and their role in global counterterrorism
cooperation.
xxvi
The ban came to be effective after the Indonesian military was implicated in the massacre of the East
Timorese. See: Isenberg 2005.
xxvii
In 2002 The military-style terrorist ambush killed the mine employees in the Indonesian province of West
Papua.
xxviii
International Crisis Group. Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security Strategy. Asia Report No 90,
Jakarta/Brussels, 20 December 2004, p. 21.
xxix
United States Department of State. 2004. The Antiterrorism Assistance Program: Report to the Congress for
Fiscal Year 2003. Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, p.
4; Dilon 2006.
xxx
Cooperative Research History Commons. Profile: Muhammad Saad Iqbal Madni. http://www.
cooperativeresearch.org/entity.jsp?entity=muhammad_saad_iqbal_madni accessed February 10, 2008;
Cobain, Ian, Stephen Grey and Richard Norton-Taylor. 2005. CIA Terror Flights: Destination Cairo Human
Rights Fears over CIA Flights. The Guardian September 12. http://www.guardian.co.uk/
humanrights/story/0,,1567896,00.html accessed February 10, 2008.
xxxi
Joint Media Release: Australia-Indonesia Joint Media Statement: International Dialogue on Interfaith
Cooperation: Yogyakarta. Available at http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2004/joint_yogyakarta_
061204html accessed February 19, 2008
xxxii
Bali Interfaith Dialogue, July 21-22, 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/asem/asem_process/
bali_declar.pdf accessed February 19, 2008.
xxxiii
The UNDP list of donor contribution to Afghanistan, updated as of June 2007, however, includes Malaysia,
Saudi Arabia, and Turkey as important donors in Afghan reconstruction process.
xxxiv
Embassy of the United States, Pakistan. 2006. Press Release: U.S. and Pakistani Maritime Forces Conduct
Joint Exercise ‘Inspired Union.’ http://usembassy.state.gov/pakistan/h06090601.html accessed February 8,
2008.
xxxv
The list includes Abu Zubaidah, Ramszi Binalshibh, and Khalid Sheikh Muhammad. Among them, Abu
Zubaidah was a key Al Qaeda operational leader responsible for Al Qaeda recruitment. Ramszi Binalshibh
was a key suspect of the 9/11 terror attack, and Khalid Sheikh Muhammad was a key planner of the 9/11
terror attack.
xxxvi
BBC News. 2006. Airlines Terror Plots Disrupted. August 10. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/4778575.stm accessed November 5, 2007; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism. 2007. Country Report on Terrorism, chapter two: Country Report: South and Central Asia
Overview.
xxxvii
Amnesty International. 2006. The Secretive and Illegal US Programme of ‘Rendition.’ http://www.
amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/feature-stories/secretive-and-illegal-us-programme-of-rendition-20060405
xxxviii
In one instance, a British citizen, Mr. Habashi was arrested in Pakistan, where he was interrogated by
Pakistani officials and the British MI6 security personnel, before he was handed over to the U.S. authority
and sent to the Guantanamo Bay prison. See: Colin Brown. 2005. Rendition Victim Was Handed Over to the
US by MI6. The Independent December 14. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/politics/rendition-victim-
was-handed-over-to-the-us-by-MI6-519413.html accessed February 21, 2008.
xxxix
Reuters. 2007. ‘Rendition’ man in custody in Pakistan rights group. http://www.reuters.com/
article/latestCrisis/idUSL18109615 accessed February 21, 2008.
xl
The 10,000 figure for the Madrassas comes from an International Crisis Group Report. See: International
Crisis Group. 2002. Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military. Asia Report No. 36, July 29, 2002.
xli
“Pakistan’s Contribution in Counterterrorism,” Remarks by Ambassador Mahmud Durrani at RAND,
February 22, 2007. Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Washington, DC. http://www.pakistan-
embassy.org/news246_b.php accessed February 18, 2008.
xlii
The White House. 2006. Fact Sheet: Afghanistan and Pakistan: Strong Allies in the War on Terror.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060929-2html. accessed February 21, 2008.
xliii
The Pak Tribune. Pak, Afghanistan agree to settle issues through peace jirga. http://www.
paktribune.com/news/print.php?id=164959 accessed February 21, 2008.
xliv
For details on the ‘peace jirga,’ see: Mufti, Shahan. 2007. Karzai, Musharraf Try to Reconcile at ‘Peace
Jirga:’ Pakistani and Afghan Leaders Discussed Security Sunday at a Tribal Meeting in Kabul. August 13.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0813/p10s01-wosc.html accessed February 21, 2008.
xlv
Some of the suicide terrorist attacks have deliberately targeted members of the Pakistani security forces. In
November 2006, a suicide terrorist attack killed 43 army personnel and 40 others at a military training
facility in the Northwestern Frontier Province (NWFP). See: U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 2007. Country Report on Terrorism 2006. Pakistan: Overview.
Washington, DC.
xlvi
“War on Terrorism,” Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, DC, http://www,saudiembassy.net/
Issues/Terrorism/IssuesTer.asp accessed February 18, 2008.
xlvii
U.S. Central Command. 2007. Saudi Arabia. http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/saudi-arabia/5.html
xlviii
To be more specific, intelligence sharing between Riyadh and Washington became an important priority in
the aftermath of the 1996 Khobar Tower terrorist attack, which claimed the lives of 19 Americans.
xlix
The effect of such bilateral cooperation on intelligence and law enforcement is very positive. According to
FBI director Robert Mueller: “Through this partnership, we have access to the bank records, biographical
information, travel histories, telephone records, criminal backgrounds, and employment histories of
numerous known or suspected terrorists.” See: Remarks by Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, National Academy Associates European Retrainer Edinburgh, Scotland, September 27,
2005. http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/mueller092705.htm accessed November 4, 2007
l
Prados, Alfred B. and Christopher M. Blanchard. 2005. Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues. CRS
Report for Congress, Updated March 1, 2005, pp. 20-21.
li
Testimony of Mr. Thomas Harrington, Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI Counterterrorism Operational
Support Branch, cited in Prados and Blanchard (2005: 23)
lii
Saudi Arabia is one of the major sources of charitable donations worldwide. According to Jonathan Winer,
former U.S. State Department official, the annual size of Saudi charitable donations is estimated to be $3 to
$4 billion, of which 10%-20% is disbursed abroad. Another estimate suggests that about $100 million Saudi
charities were donated in the United States in the last decade. However, there is no credible evidence on how
much Saudi charity were used for terror financing. See: Jonathan Winer was Deputy Assistant Secretary for
US DOS from 1994 to 1999. See: Jonathan M. Winer, Congressional Testimony before the Committee on
Senate Government Affairs, 31 July, 2003. http://www.senate.gov/~govt-aff/index.cfm?Fuseaction=
Hearings.Testimony&HearingID=106&WitnessID=370, accessed April 17, 2006.
liii
Saudi Arab Monetary Agency (SAMA), “A Report on Initiatives and Actions taken by Saudi Arabia to
combat Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering,” 2004: 7-8.
liv
Recently, the Kingdom’s oil facilities became the target of terrorist attacks. In February 2006, two vehicle-
borne improvised explosives attacked Saudi Aramco’s oil facilities near Dammam. This was reportedly the
first significant terrorist attack on the country’s oil infrastructure. Prior to the Dammam incident, terrorists
have targeted American and British servicemen, U.S. diplomatic facilities, foreign workers’ housing
complex, and Saudi government buildings, etc.
lv
Bronson, “Rethinking Religion: The Legacy of the U.S.-Saudi Relationship,” p. 125-16
lvi
Council on Foreign Relations (2002)
lvii
U.S. Department of State. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2006. Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, DOS, Released March 2006, pp. 376-377.
lviii
Interfaith Cultural Organization of Athens. News: Pope Seeks Christian-Muslim Dialogue in Turkey.
http://www.interfaithathens.org/news/news_28_november_2006.asp accessed February 22, 2008.
lix
The financial contribution appears to be a negligible. But it should be noted that Turkey has substantial
military role in Afghanistan. UNDP Afghanistan. 2007. Donor Contributions. http://www.undp.org.af/
Funding/index.htm accessed February 22, 2008.
lx
Following the discussion of Krasner, this paper considers the evolving counterterrorism regime as an
intervening variable, between actors interests and power and the outcome of their patterned behavior.
lxi
The concept of “sovereign-free” actors is borrowed from Rosenau. For a detailed discussion, see: Rosenau,
James. 1997 Along Domestic–Foreign Frontiers. Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World. Cambridge,
MA: University of Cambridge Press.
lxii
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf accessed February 6, 2008.
lxiii
lxiv
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M. Tuzuner (Ed.)
IOS Press, 2010
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-608-9-121
A Comparative Perspective of International

Cooperation against Terrorism
Erkan SEZGIN
Turkish National Police
Abstract. This chapter reports on a study carried out to compare the effect of
cultural differences—both ethnic-based and professional ‘cultures’—on
perspectives of international cooperation against terrorism. In doing so, it explores
potential opportunities for international cooperation by measuring subjective
interpretations of professionals from different organizations in charge of counter-
terrorism practices.
Keywords. International cooperation, counter-terrorism, culture, Turkey, United

States
Introduction
“Terrorism” as a concept was not coined at the time of the attacks of September 11,
2001; on the contrary, it has a long history, and there have been many states in the
world that have been dealing with it for some time. The significance of September 11
was that the whole world was able to observe the magnitude and the cross-national
characteristic of terrorism. It became quite obvious that terrorist attacks may be carried
out anytime, anywhere, and by any person regardless of his/her nationality. The
September 11 attacks made it clear that terrorism is not a problem of a single country,
but rather an issue requiring cooperation among many nations.
The most important explanation for the varying incidence of cooperation in
international relations is the pattern of interests at stake, and the likelihood of
cooperative behavior depends on the degree of compatibility among the goals of the
states involved (Putnam and Bayne, 1989, p.3). This point also explains the standpoints
of states towards international cooperation against terrorism. The acts considered by
different states to constitute terrorism vary in level of violence, innovativeness, choice
of targets, actors and effectiveness (Crenshaw, 1989). So far, states have been unable to
adopt a common definition of terrorism, and hence they lack a common ground on
which they may all agree on what they are fighting against. This lack of common
definition of terrorism as a concept has been the focus of many scholarly studies, inter-
state relations and international organizations, and defining terrorism has turned out to
be one of the most controversial issues in the contemporary international legal and
political arena (Koufa, 2001). Similarly, Spencer (2006) writes of terrorism as one of
the most disputed concepts in social sciences, while Webel (2004) views it as contested
as it is open.
122 E. Sezgin / A Comparative Perspective of International Cooperation against Terrorism
Some argue that an inability to reach a common definition of terrorism may

have been the high political risks involved in the task of defining such a concept
(Lambert, 1990). Variations in interpretations might also be due to terrorism’s social,
legal and political implications. The varied opinions regarding terrorism are clearly
underscored in the UN Report of the Commission on Human Rights about Terrorism
and Human Rights (2001), which states “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom
fighter.” This expression is symbolic of the problems encountered at the stage of
defining terrorism be it before or after September 11. States are not willing to adopt an
extensive definition that does not fit within their political and social values. As
Kastanidou (2004) argues, “[t]errorism is a phenomenon pertaining to social and
political life, and its definition within the framework of criminal law cannot be
disassociated from its social and political milieu” (p.18).
Cultural values play an important role in constructing the definition of a
concept as well as in its interpretation, and implementation. Due to the cultural
particularity of defining most concepts, including terrorism, international cooperation
has not been very effective in producing a unified definition or understanding. States
aiming at developing definitions of terrorism often produce ones that parallel their
domestic and international concerns. However, because of the subjective character of
the concept of terrorism, states tend to only adopt definitions that comply fully with
their cultural values.
The variance in the definition of terrorism is even more complex than
complying with cultural values. Often in numerous states there is more than one set of
cultural values. There are also a number of subcultures within the diverse organizations
that fight terrorism in any one country. Such differences in organizational cultures beg
the question whether within one country there can be a shared understanding of
terrorism. To complicate issues further the perception across professions regarding
terrorism can vary as well. Hence the perceptions of politicians who deal with the issue
at the legislative and diplomatic levels could be different from those of police officers
who are often at the front line of the confrontation. Similarly, the judiciary whose
issues are about due process, justice and deterrence might have a different
understanding from the politicians or police. While governments make their decisions
in the name of the entire country, they often do not reflect the opinions of all sectors
and groups in the societal and political structures.
1. Purposes of the Study
As opposed to aiming to establish and propose a common definition of terrorism, the

study reported on in this chapter offers a method taking cultural differences, as well as
variations in interpretations based on professions, into account, as opposed to the
current efforts of fighting terrorism by gathering all the states under one common
definition. It proposes to explore opportunities of international cooperation by
measuring subjective interpretations of professionals from different organizations in
charge of struggling against terrorism. However, this is not a straightforward task to do.
First of all, any method of collecting data to be used in such a study requires clarity to
some extent of the concept being studied. In the case of terrorism, the concept does not
have many common points according to which the author prepares his questions to
collect data. The author has overcome this obstacle by including as many possible
types and components of the concept of terrorism as possible into the study.
E. Sezgin / A Comparative Perspective of International Cooperation against Terrorism 123
2. Methodology
The main focus of this study is comparing different perceptions of terrorism. It aims
to discover how perceptions of people living in different countries vary regarding the
concept of terrorism. The researcher claims that understanding similarities and
differences in perception of what constitutes terrorism cross-nationally or
comparatively may increase the opportunities for international cooperation and can
contribute to countering such acts of violence. In particular, the study focuses on
perceptions of members of different professions dealing with counter-terrorism in
different states, since these groups of professionals are responsible for making
decision in favor of or against international cooperation, and for implementing such
decisions.
The concept of terrorism is interpreted differently at different levels, such as
individual, professional and national. This study focused on finding out about different
interpretations of the concept among several alternatives; and therefore, required a
methodology that focused on subjectivity. Q methodology, utilizing factor analysis and
interviewing, is a mixed methodological approach and is interested in subjectivity. In
this method of analysis participants are presented with a set of statements about a topic
and asked to order them from “most agree” to “most disagree” (Brown, 1980 and
1986). This method allows the researcher to collect people’s points of view regarding a
particular issue in a manner which is subject to statistical summary, description and
comparison (Brown, 1993). Since the participants’ responses are based on their own
judgments and opinions, Q methodology appeared to be well-suited for the purposes of
this particular study.
The Q methodology research design employs factor analysis for quantitative
analysis (Stephenson, 1953). It begins with an examination of “concourse of
communication” (Stephenson, 1978), and the concourse serves as the source for the
statements. In this study the concourse consisted mainly of historical events and
different opinions obtained from different sources, which are allegedly related to
terrorism.
The concourse from which the Q sample of statements emerges includes major
indicator/data level dimensions and types of terrorism as the researcher determined for
the purposes of this study. Adding more statements increases their number but makes
no consequential difference in the analysis.
2.1. Population and Participants (P set)
A group of participants in Q methodology is referred to as a P set. Since this is a

comparative study, two countries were the basis for establishing the P set: Turkey and
The United States. Furthermore, within each country the study aimed to measure
perceptions regarding the concept terrorism of three professional groups: politicians,
law enforcement officers, and judges/prosecutors. Other than the professions of the
participants, their individual characteristics were not used as a criterion in their
selection, since the main purpose was to better understand possible differences cross-
nationally among groups of professionals who are decisions makers on counter
terrorism about their perception of the meaning of terrorism.
The author interviewed the Turkish participants of this study in Turkey in
March 2007, and the American participants in Ohio, USA in April 2007. Table 1
presents the details of the survey participants with their selection criteria.
Table 1. Survey participants with their selection criteria.
Nationality Categorized as Profession Participants

Turkish Politician Parliament Member 2
Turkish Politician Advisor to Parliament 3
Member
Turkish Legal Affairs Prosecutor (Ret.) 2
Turkish Legal Affairs Lawyer 3
Turkish Law Enforcement Police officer 5
American Politician City Mayor 1
American Politician County Commissioner 1
American Politician State Senator 1
American Politician Attorney General 1
American Politician State House Member 1
American Legal Affairs Prosecutor 5
American Law Enforcement Police officer 5
30
Having been assured of the confidentiality of the survey, each participant was surveyed
privately. After receiving the oral and signed consent of each participant, the author
explained the characteristics of Q studies in general and the way he/she was required to
sort the statements.
2.2. Materials and Procedure
The Q sample consisting of 57 statements that made up the Q sort was based on
philosophical examination of the concept of terrorism. The researcher developed the
logical structure, according to which the contents of the statements were determined.
The logical structure consists of two main effects (major indicator/data level
dimensions and controversial types of terrorism) and their components (see table 2).
The first main effect focused on the indicator/data level dimensions of terrorism as a
concept, and comprised the seven most controversial in the literature. The second main
effect centered on the types of terrorism and involved nine of those types around which
most debates generate. While writing the statements the researcher benefited from
different sources, both academic and popular including the Internet, books and
magazines. After the study on the development of the Q sort was completed, the
researcher translated the statements into Turkish.
Table 2. Main Effects and Components.
Main Effects Components N

A. Major indicator/data a. against social values
level dimensions b. against human-beings
c. target: civilians
d. target: non-combatants
e. target: combatants
f. overthrowing system
g. destabilizing system 7
B. Controversial types of h. regime (government) terrorism
Terrorism i. international state terrorism
j. state sponsored terrorism
k. vigilante terrorism
l. social revolutionary
m. religious
n. separatist
o. single-issue
p. freedom-fighting dilemma 9
Q sample (N) = [(Main effects) (Replications)] – n (dropped statements) =

[(A) (B) (m)] – n (dropped statements)
(A)(B) = (7) (9) = 63 combinations
Replication for each combination = 1
N (dropped statements) = 6 (dh, eh, ek, fk, do, eo)
N = [(7)(9)(1)] - 6 = 57 statements in the Q sample (in Appendix A)
Although there should have been (7 X 9 = ) 63 statements in the Q sort, the

researcher found out that six statements had to be dropped because they did not
make any sense and only 57 were utilized. For example, the combination of “eh”
requires a statement about a government’s struggle against its own combatant
forces. Although a reverse maneuver (military vs. legitimate government) could be
thought of, it does not look logical for a government, which lacks physical
combating power itself, to struggle against its own military. Similarly, the
combination “fk” requires the existence of some vigilante acts committed for the
purpose of overthrowing the current government. That also does not make any
sense, since vigilante acts are committed against other people whom the perpetrator
considers guilty and would like to punish. For similar reasons, no statements were
prepared for the combinations dh, eh, ek, fk, do and eo (six in total). Then each
statement was assigned a random number from 1 to 57. The list of the Q sample is
found in Appendix A.
The 57 statements were printed on white 2 by 4 cards. In addition, the

researcher prepared a ruler-like piece of paper on which he printed 11 numbers
ranging from - 5 to +5 to represent the necessary ranks. In this system -5 rank
represented statements with which the participants most disagreed, +5 rank
represented those the participants most agreed with, and 0 rank represented
statements about which the participants had no opinion or felt neutral. After the
necessary explanations, the participants were asked to sort the cards under the
ranks.
The greatest obstacle that the participants encountered was the obligation to
place a predetermined number (by the researcher) of statements under each rank.
This issue, the forced distribution of the Q sample by the P set, is typical of Q sort.
The forced distribution procedure makes participants indicate their degree of
agreement or disagreement with each statement.
According to the procedure followed for this study, the participants were
asked to place two cards under -5 and two cards under +5; three cards under -4 and
three cards under +4; four cards under -3 and four cards under +3; six cards under -2
and six cards under +2; eight cards under -1 and eight cards under +1; and 11 cards
under 0.After the data from all participants from both of the countries were collected,
they were entered in the computer using the computer program PQMethod for factor
analysis.
3. Analysis of Data
Being the variables of the study (McKeown and Thomas, 1988), each participant
served as an operant depiction of his/her opinion regarding the concept of
terrorism. The standard procedure for the analysis of the Q sorts starts with
establishing a correlation matrix. A factor analysis can proceed if correlations are
above the calculated standard error. The formula that we use for calculating the
standard error is 1/(SQRT(N)), where N is the number of statements (57 in this
case) and SQRT is the square root. Therefore, the value is 1/(SQRT(57)) = 1/(7.55)
= 0.13. Regardless of the sign of the standard error, any correlations are considered
significant if they are at least 2.58 times of the standard error (p<.01). Therefore, in
this study correlations greater than (0.13) X (2.56) = 0.33 are significant at p<.01.
Then the PQMethod software factor analyzed the correlation matrix using Centroid
factor analysis to determine different factors. Each one of the factor loadings was
examined to determine whether it was significant at p<.01. Regardless of the sign,
any factor loading greater than .33 was considered significant for that particular
factor at the .01 level. Table 3 illustrates the Factors Loadings provided by this
analysis.
Table 3. Factor Loadings.
code A B code A B
TJ5 (85) -05 AJ2 19 (73)
TP3 (82) 03 AP4 01 (66)
TJ2 (81) 17 AL3 24 (66)
TP4 (77) -01 AP5 03 (64)
TJ3 (76) 20 AJ4 03 (64)
TJ4 (71) 05 AL5 01 (61)
TL5 (69) 35 AL4 04 (60)
TL1 (68) 06 AJ1 05 (58)
TL2 (67) 04 AP2 -22 (55)
TL3 (66) -06 AP1 35 (54)
TP1 (58) -14 AJ5 12 (53)
TJ1 (58) 12 AJ3 10 (42)
TP2 (52) 18
TL4 (51) 28
AP3 (43) 08
TP5 19 04
AL1 01 15
AL2 20 13
code= participant code number

A, B=the two factors
(_)= defining factor loadings to two decimal points
Factor analysis through utilization of Q Methodology was conducted to see whether

there are significant differences between citizens of different states, and also among
members of different professional groups within a state. Since the professional groups
did not cluster for each of the states or cross-nationally, but established a mixed and
common picture for the entire nation to which they belong, professional differences in
the perceptions of the concept of terrorism will not be the focus of this analysis.
Instead, the emergent factors will constitute the balance of discussion.
Two strong significant factors emerged from the factor analysis. One of the
factors (Factor A) was supported by 15, while the second factor (Factor B) was
supported by 12 defining sorts. The indication of this result is that among the
participants of the study there were two different clusters of views regarding the
perception of the terrorism concept.
The data analysis also revealed some important characteristics of the factors.
Therefore, the researcher assigned a label for each of the factors to reflect the overall
perception of the factor regarding the concept of terrorism: “conformist” for Factor A
and “permissive” for Factor B. Although labeling is not a methodological requirement,
it focuses attention on the major perceptions of the factors. Nevertheless, the researcher
acknowledges that a one-word label is far from representing the complexity of the
whole factor. Those labels especially indicate the statements which distinguish the
factors from one another.
Since the focus of the study had been on the perceptions of people whose
responsibilities were to fight terrorism, no demographic information about the
participants was used in addition to the Q sorts. This is justified by the fact that the
participants were selected from certain professional groups; namely politicians, law
enforcement and legal affairs. It is assumed that all individuals form those groups have
gone through the necessary stages of education and training for those professions,
hence creating them into a class of professionals more than a socio-demographic or
economic class. Their races, ethnicities, gender, and socioeconomic backgrounds were
assumed not to have a significant effect on their perceptions about terrorism.
3.1. Factor A
Fifteen out of 30 participants loaded on Factor A. Fourteen of those were Turkish

citizens, while the remaining one was from the US. Among the Turkish citizens there
were five police officers, three lawyers, two retired prosecutors, two parliament
members and two advisors to parliament members. The only US citizen in this factor
was a mayor. Although the only US participant is in this factor, she has the lowest
possible factor loading in the factor. For clarification, Table 4 was prepared by the
researcher to show factor loadings and characteristics of the participants in Factor A.
Table 4. Factor Loadings, Nationality Profession of Participants in Factor A.
Code A B Nationality Profession

TJ5 (85) -05 Turkish Lawyer
TP3 (82) 03 Turkish Parliament Member
TJ2 (81) 17 Turkish Prosecutor (Ret.)
TP4 (77) -01 Turkish Adviser to Par. Member
TJ3 (76) 20 Turkish Lawyer
TJ4 (71) 05 Turkish Lawyer
TL5 (69) 35 Turkish Police Officer

TL3 (66) -06 Turkish Police Officer
TP1 (58) -14 Turkish Adviser to Par. Member
TJ1 (58) 12 Turkish Prosecutor (Ret.)
TP2 (52) 18 Turkish Parliament Member
AP3 (43) 08 US Mayor
Code = participant code number
(_) = defining factor loadings to two decimal points
The analysis of data will begin with a review of the composite Q sort, during which the
overall attitude of the participants in Factor A will be discovered. For that purpose the
statements that were placed by the participants from –5 to +5 will be analyzed. As
indicated before the statements placed under +5, +4 and +3 represent most strongly
agreed statements by the participants, while –5, -4 and –3 most strongly disagreed
ones. In other words, those statements represent most agreed and most disagreed
opinions, respectively, of the participants regarding the concept of terrorism. Those
statements are first examined, and then an overall analysis of the factor is presented.
With the exception of one participant, all of the members in Factor A are Turkish
nationals; therefore, it can be said that this factor clearly reflects opinions of the
Turkish participants. This statement can be made more assuredly since the loadings of
the study’s only remaining Turkish participant did not fit in the other factor, either.
Participants of Factor A agreed with those statements and ranked them as +5
“most-agreed:”
# 21 By providing logistics, shelter, and training to the PKK, or

by failing to recognize it as a terrorist organization, many Western
states sponsor the PKK, and can therefore be considered as
engaging in state-sponsored terrorism.
# 24 No truly-interpreted religion allows civilians’ lives to be the
target of political gains.
The following statements were ranked as +4:
#7 Targeting human beings is not the sine qua non of

terrorism. The destruction of public facilities and transportation
systems (e.g., as committed by the PKK) are also terrorist
incidents.
# 20 Systematic and intentionally violent acts by Israel against
Palestinian civilians are a sort of terrorism.
# 53 States that aim to undermine other states or governments
by sponsoring terrorist organizations in those countries should
themselves be considered terrorist.
Since the vast majority of Factor A consisted of the Turkish participants, it would be
useful to present a brief context regarding Turkey and the Turkish people, including
terrorist activities in that country. Such a background would permit those “most
agreed” statements to be better understood and interpreted. Ninety-nine percent of the
Turkish people are Muslim; however, Turkey is a secular and democratic state. Turkey
has experienced several episodes of terrorism for about 40 years. Among those acts, the
PKK separatist organization has caused the most casualties. Approximately 35,000
people were killed over a period of 15 years of violence that started in 1983 (Aydiner,
2007). Although the activities of the PKK in Turkey were minimized, the organization
is still active and occasionally attacks Turkish targets. It is thus assumed that Turkish
participants completed their Q sorts with memories regarding the PKK still fresh.
Out of five statements that were ranked +4 or +5, three statements are about
state terrorism. The participants clearly recognize state terrorism (state-sponsored
terrorism and government terrorism). They believe that some Western states supported
the PKK organization in several ways, and think that all states sponsoring terrorist
organizations in other countries should themselves be considered terrorist.
The focus of statement #20 is “state terrorism,” because it indicates a
government as the perpetrator, and civilians as the target. The participants of Factor A
clearly label such acts as terrorism.
Statement #24 rejects “religious terrorism.” However, due to the condition

placed in the text of the statement, the participants who most-agreed with this statement
would accept that violence that seems to be resulting from religions in fact stem from
misinterpretation of their teachings.
Statement #7 agrees that property belonging to the public can also be a target
of terrorism. Since the PKK organization’s attacks against property are given as an
example in the statement, the focus of the participants in Factor A is expected to be on
those specified attacks. Clearly, the Turkish participants agree that attacks against
public facilities and transportation systems qualify as terrorist acts.
The following statements were ranked as -5, “most-disagreed” in the Factor A
composite array:
#6 Al Qaeda’s fight against Western values are based on

Islamic principles, hence cannot properly be regarded as terrorist.
# 33 Recitation of religious words during executions of foreign
soldiers and civilians by beheading is evidence that some religions
permit terrorist events.
The participants in Factor A ranked the following statements as -4:
# 11 States like Israel in Palestine and the USA in Afghanistan

are not responsible for civilian casualties when civilians are used
as human shields to cover strategic targets. Such states cannot be
accused of terrorism.
# 15 Regardless of the part of the world in which actions occur,
there are religions that justify attacks against innocent human
beings.
# 38 If there are some terrorist activities carried out in country
A against country B, country B’s fight against these activities in
the territory of country A without declaring war can be defined as
state-terrorism.
The general view of the most-disagreed statements in the Factor A composite array
depicts some interesting results that can be connected to some of the most-agreed
statements in the same array. Out of five statements ranked as -5 and -4, three
statements are related to “religious terrorism” (#6, #33 and #11), and two statements
(#11 and #38) are about “international-state terrorism.”
The statements regarding religious terrorism clearly reject the fact that
ideologies of terrorists could be based on religious values. In two of the statements
explicitly (statement #6) and implicitly (statement #33) participants deny that Islam
allows terrorism. In addition to Islam, the participants believe that no religion in the
world allows violence against innocent victims (statement #15). This issue also
correlates with the participants’ belief that no truly-interpreted religion allows civilians
to be the target of terrorist act (statement #24), which was ranked as +5 of the same
array. As a result, it can be stated that religions themselves are not the sources of
terrorism, only their misinterpretations can be. However, it is not clear from the
statements whether misinterpretations are done on purpose or as a result of ignorance.
The remaining two statements in this group (statements #11 and #38) should
be assessed together with statement #20, which was ranked as +4 in the same
composite sort. In the light of those three statements the participants’ understanding
regarding international-state terrorism emerges. For the participants, what qualifies as
terrorism is a state’s actions in another state’s territory that the targets civilians. On the
other hand, a state’s use of force against terrorist organizations whose target is that
particular state, but operating in another state’s territory is not considered terrorism
(international-state terrorism) by the participants of Factor A. As a result, the criterion
that renders terrorism is the target factor of the actions. The participants’ answers also
indicated that human casualties used as human shields to conceal the state’s ultimate
target qualify as terrorism. It is clear for the participants that wherever there are
civilian casualties the action is identified as terrorism.
The participants ranked the following statements as +3:
#9 It is unjust to consider people fighting the occupation

forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as terrorists or insurgents simply
because they are against the social values imposed by the
occupiers.
# 16 Although separatist movements may address their
messages to the government, it is human beings that are affected
by their actions, and this is what qualifies those groups as
terrorists.
# 49 The use of Islamic teachings to justify political overthrow
has, in fact, no other meaning than the misinterpretation and
misuse of those teachings in support of the organization’s
ideology.
# 50 As long as they are illegal, all separatist movements are
terroristic by nature since they aim at overthrowing the
sovereignty of states.
The following are the statements that were ranked as -3 by the participants of Factor A:
# 17 In terms of sending a message to the government by

committing acts against people, there is not much difference

between a violent environmental activist group and an illegal
separatist movement.
# 25 If the target of a separatist movement is military or security
personnel, then the attacks are considered guerilla activities.
However, if the target is civilians, then they are terrorist acts.
# 39 A state should be able to support groups operating against
another state’s political system as long as the supported group’s
target is government forces and not civilians.
# 41 Revolutionary groups may target state forces, but their
action is actually in response to government terrorism.
Seven out of eight statements in this group are about one single broad topic:
“indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation.”i The only remaining
statement (statement #49) is about religious terrorism, and it states that Islamic
teachings are misinterpreted and misused in favor of terrorist organizations’ ideologies.
The researcher views this last statement as supportive to the discussion of Factor A
participants’ beliefs about religious terrorism discussed above, and relates its inferior
ranking to the “forced distribution” of statements in Q Methodology.
In terms of the state’s indivisible unity, the participants do not distinguish
between their own states and other states: the state is “divine” (the author’s labeling),
and should be protected from all kinds of confrontations against its presence and unity.
Statement #39 shows this belief of participants regarding other states and governments.
According to Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States (1933), "state" means a geographic sovereign political entity with a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government. The “state” is based on
existence of all of those four components at the same time. However, acts such as
revolutionary and separatist movements, or foreign occupation threaten both the
components and the state. An evaluation of the statements ranked as +3 and -3 in
Factor A reveals that the participants consider all acts targeting the state’s components
as terrorism. For the participants, all separatist (statement #50) and revolutionary
(statement #41) movements are terrorism, since they target the sovereignty of
governments and the unity of the territory. Since military or security personnel are also
considered a part of the “state” like civilians (the people) attacks against those
personnel are also regarded as terrorism (statement #25).
The participants do not justify violence against a government even if its
activities are perceived as unjust. Any revolutionary movements against the state
depending on that perception are acts of terrorism (statement #41). This understanding
may stem from the perception of “divineness” of the state, which means that the state is
given priority over individual interests.
Evaluation of statements #16, #25 and #50 jointly makes more sense than
evaluating them independently. Overall, the pattern of the fit of these statements shows
that all separatist movements are considered terrorism regardless of the immediate
target (civilians or security forces) or the ultimate target (the government). Although
this last issue (bifocality of terrorist acts) resembles violence by environmentalists,
participants of Factor A do not consider such acts to be as important as those by
separatists in terms of labeling them as acts of terrorism.
Finally, participants in Factor A consider that citizens have the right to defend
their states (statement #9). The participants do not think that people fighting against
foreign invasion deserve being labeled as terrorists or insurgents since they are
resisting social values imposed by occupiers of their states.
The remaining statements in the composite factor array (model Q sort for
Factor A) are also important in the evaluation of the entire composite array due to their
positions relative to the other statements that were assigned higher rankings. In general,
obedience to the government is observed; freedom fighting is supported, but terroristic
acts emanating from either entity are not. Vigilante acts and single-issue violence
(attacks targeting abortion clinics, those by environmentalists and animal rights
activists, etc.) are not considered terrorism as strongly as (accepting the “state” as
perpetrator of terrorist acts; denial of truly-interpreted religious teachings as source of
terrorism; consideration of attacks against unity of the state as terrorism; and support
for the concept of freedom-fighting) other issues discussed above.
The evaluation of the highly-ranked statements in the composite factor array
for Factor A’s unified and coherent attitude mainly focused on the acceptance of “state
terrorism” as a term and rejection of the idea that truly interpreted religions justify
terrorism. In light of the coherent theme, the theme that distinguishes the factor
perspective, the researcher preferred to label Factor A “conformist.” Although this
label may have negative connotations, the intention of the researcher is to illustrate that
for the participants in factor A the “state” has the highest priority both in domestic
affairs and in the international relations when it comes to defining terrorism. There are
three sub-themes that helped determine the overall coherent theme.
The first sub-theme demonstrated that participants of Factor A strongly
believed that no religion sanctions violence against civilian targets unless it is
misinterpreted. Statements #6, 15, 24, 33 and 50 support this theme.
The second sub-theme for Factor A is involves the issue of state terrorism.
While the participants of the factor believe that there is such a thing as state terrorism
and its several manifestations (international state and state-sponsored terrorism) they
nevertheless disapprove of it. Statements #11, 21 and 39 support this theme.
The third sub-theme relates to the unity of the state. This theme shows the
participants’ strong conviction of the “divineness” of the state, and their condemning
attitude towards all acts of terrorism against the unity of the state. The participants’
label acts threatening either divineness, or unity of the state terrorism. This theme
rejects any separatist and revolutionary movements against the state, and requires
resistance against such acts. Statements #9, 16, 17, 25, 38, 41 and 49 support this
theme.
3.2. Factor B
Out of 30 participants, 12 participants, all of whom were US citizens, loaded on Factor

B. Those 12 participants consisted of five prosecutors, three police officers, one county
commissioner, one state house member, one Attorney General and one state senator
(see Table 5).
Table 5. Factor Loadings, Nationality Profession of Participants in Factor B.
code A B Nationality Profession

AJ2 19 (73) US Prosecutor
AP4 01 (66) US State Senator

AL3 24 (66) US Police Officer
AP5 03 (64) US County Commissioner
AP2 -22 (55) US State House Member
AP1 35 (54) US Attorney General
Code = participant code number
(_) = defining factor loadings to two decimal points
Just as Factor A was almost uniquely represented by the Turkish participants, this
factor is uniquely represented by the US participants; hence, it reflects the opinions of
the participants from the United States. The factor loadings of the two remaining US
participants did not fit in any factors within the framework of this research.
Participants of Factor B agreed with the following statements and ranked them
as +5 “most-agreed:”
# 18 It is not the ideology of freedom fighters that qualifies

them as terrorists, but their inhumane acts.
# 26 Bombing an abortion clinic is a violent activity against
people and property. The action itself has an ideology and
therefore should be considered terrorism.
The following statements were ranked as +4:
#7 Targeting human beings is not the sine qua non of

terrorism. The destruction of public facilities and transportation
systems (e.g., as committed by the PKK) are also terrorist
incidents.
# 34 The Al-Qaeda attack against the USS Cole would suffice
for the organization to be called terrorist, since the ship was not
involved in combat at the time of the incident.
# 54 Nationalist, ethnic, religious, cultural or economic
revolutionary groups gain the status of terrorist groups when they
employ terrorism as a strategy to weaken current legitimate
political systems.
No dominant themes emerged here in these most-agreed statements as did among those
in Factor A. The participants of Factor B accept different facts as components of
terrorism in those statements. For example, the existence of a political ideology
(statement #26), violence against social values (statement #7) or noncombatants
(statement #34) and weakening of legitimate political systems as purpose of terrorist
acts (statement #54). In addition, the participants differentiate between terrorism and
freedom fighting, and support the idea that what labels freedom-fighters as terrorists is
their involvement in inhumane acts (statement # 18). Since participants of Factor B are
US citizens they probably have experienced terrorism to a lesser extent than the
Turkish citizens of Factor A. This explains the fact that the most-agreed statements do
not cluster under one or two topics since the issue of terrorism is a theoretical one as
opposed to those in Factor A who have experienced terrorism repeatedly in reality.
The following statements were ranked as -5, “most-disagreed” in the Factor B
composite array (model Q sort for Factor B):
#4 Since they aim to punish those who oppose social values,

vigilante acts should not be considered as terrorism.
#6 Al Qaeda’s fight against Western values is based on
Islamic principles, hence cannot properly be regarded as terrorist.
The participants in Factor B ranked the following statements as -4:
#9 It is unjust to consider people fighting the occupation

forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as terrorists or insurgents simply
because they are against the social values imposed by the

occupiers.
# 27 Chechen fighters’ acts against innocent civilians were
insufficient to justify a change in label from “freedom fighters” to
“terrorists.”
# 42 Hezbollah’s attacks against Israeli troops during Israel’s
invasion into South Lebanon were based on religion and should
therefore not be considered terrorist.
In this group, statement #27 shows consistency with statement #18 (ranked as +5) in
terms of changing the label of freedom-fighting to terrorist. The essence of the
statements is that it is the terrorist tactics that cause freedom-fighters to be labeled
terrorists. However, the participants do not accept people of Iraq or of Afghanistan who
fight against the occupiers as freedom-fighters, but view them as terrorists (statement
#9).
The participants in this factor accept both Hezbollah (statement #42) and Al-
Qaeda (statement #6) as terrorist organizations. However, it is not clear by examining
only those two statements whether the participants believe in religious terrorism or
simply regard the actions of those organizations as terrorist-like. This issue should also
be evaluated with the participants’ attitudes towards statements making more emphasis
on religion as a source of terrorism.
In addition, vigilante acts were given the highest ranking (+5) by the
participants (statement #4). Since in the examined group there is no other statement
showing participants’ perceptions towards the state, it is not reasonable to evaluate this
statement alone. However, depending on the rankings on other statements the
researcher may confer to this statement.
The participants ranked the following statements as +3:
#11 States like Israel in Palestine and the USA in Afghanistan

are not responsible for civilian casualties when civilians are used
as human shields to cover strategic targets. Such states cannot be
accused of terrorism.
# 14 Regardless of the state policies that they may dislike, the
main target of revolutionary groups is people, and for this reason
they can be categorized as terrorist groups.
# 17 In terms of sending a message to the government by
committing acts against people, there is not much difference
between a violent environmental activist group and an illegal
separatist movement.
# 24 No truly-interpreted religion allows civilians’ lives to be
the target of political gains.
The following are the statements that were ranked as -3 by the participants of Factor B:
#5 In today’s world, states have their own social values and

legitimate ways for changing those values. Any other methods
used for this purpose are clearly acts of terrorism.
# 12 Terrorism is used as a kind of warfare between states in

today’s world. This is a new rule of international relations, and it
is not just or ethical for states to be called terrorist for that.
# 29 If two neighboring states, say India and Pakistan,
occasionally attack each other’s military facilities and border
monitoring stations, these are clearly acts of terrorism.
# 41 Revolutionary groups may target state forces, but their
action is actually in response to government terrorism.
The main theme emerging from this group of statements is that terrorism is not seen as
an international phenomenon. Rather it is seen as mainly as referring to domestic
issues. In that connection, three statements (#5, 14 and 41) support the idea that
governmental regulations should be respected and all other acts should be considered
terrorism. When conflicts spill over to the international arena, the participants in Factor
B do not perceive them as acts of terrorism, and refer to them with some other terms
(statements # 12 and 29).
In domestic politics single-issue terrorism is paid as much importance as
separatist movements. Evaluated together with statement #26 (ranked as +5), violence
against abortion clinics and violence by environmentalists (statement #17) are clearly
considered as acts of terrorism.
From a number of statements in this group the researcher infers that the US
participants have respect for the concept of “state” and its authority to make its own
rules in international relations, at least from the vantage point of terrorism. As in the
example of statement #29, clashes between two states against each other’s
noncombatant targets are not considered terrorism. Similarly, during an invasion of a
country, civilian casualties caused by the invading state are not considered as a pretext
for the act to be named as terrorism.
The general attitude of factor B’s participants towards religious terrorism is
contradictory. In statement #24 the participants do not accept that truly-interpreted
religions allow civilians’ lives to be the target of political gains. On the other hand, the
participants also support that there are some religions in the world that justify attacks
against innocent human beings (statement #15 ranked as +2). The discrepancy may
stem from the fact that the participants evaluate religions as a whole, with all of their
interpretations and the actions that seem to be resulting from those religions. The
remaining statements that were assigned relatively lower rankings do not divert from
the general picture established by the participants’ perceptions about the state and
religion, which was drawn by the other statements as discussed above.
The examination of the highly-ranked statements in the composite factor array
for Factor B to investigate the factor’s unified and coherent attitude allowed the
researcher to label the factor “permissive,” as opposed to the label “conformist” for
Factor A. This was the case due to the participants’ general understanding of the
“state,”ii Three sub themes prevalent in the data supported this overall coherent theme.
The first sub-theme is the respondents’ emergent belief in the rightful actions
of the state both domestically and internationally. Therefore, for these participants the
state cannot be a terrorist, and even causing civilian casualties is not an exception to
this general rule (statement #11). Whatever is done against the state could be
considered terrorism, even if those counter-actions are taken by local people fighting
against the occupying state (statement #9). In addition, all vigilante acts are considered
terrorism since, basically it might show lack of confidence in the state’s provision of
justice (statement #4).
The second emergent sub-theme is that the country’s being subject to
separation by terrorist attacks, and the power of government that may appear in form of
terrorism are not much of a concern for the participants of this composite factor array.
On the other hand, revolutionary movements against the state are highly condemned
and considered acts of terrorism (statement #14, 41, 54).
The third sub-theme correlates with single-issue terrorism. The participants
highly ranked the statements regarding violence against abortion clinics and violent
acts perpetrated by environmentalists as terrorism (statement #26, 17). This
understanding of terrorism can be traced back to the pre-September 11, 2001 period. At
that time terrorism was explained by an emphasis on “political motivation” versus post-
September 11, 2001 focus on religions as motivators or states as perpetrators.
Due to the coherent theme shared by the participants of each group, the
researcher labeled each factor to describe the characteristics/themes of each group’s
perception. The labels are “conformist” for Factor A, and “permissive” for Factor B.
More information about the labels and emergent themes will be presented for each
factor separately. Since detailed results of the Q sort were already discussed separately
for each factor in the previous paragraphs, the following summarizes the highlights of
the significant findings.
3.3. Factor A (Conformist)
The state and religions are given the highest priority by the participants of Factor A.
For those participants, no religions justify attacks against civilians, but religions are
also shown to be sources of terrorism through misinterpretation of their teachings.
States, on the other hand, are involved in terrorism, both domestically and through
perpetrating terrorist acts in other countries and sponsoring terrorist organizations
struggling against foreign governments. State could be targets of terrorism by citizens
who are involved in separatist or revolutionary movements. However, the participants
of Factor A are not supportive or approving of such terrorist activities. The researcher
observed that the participants of Factor A towards both religion and the state are one of
conformity. Their belief in all religions is strong and they argue that religions properly
interpreted have nothing to do with terroristic violence. The research results show
unwavering respect of and belief in religions and the state’s benevolence, as well as
respect for the state’s authority separate from the people.
In Turkey the state is referred to as “the father,” and the country as “the
mother.” While the father symbolizes authority, the mother is the symbol of affection.
In Turkish society, the father is both revered and traditionally able to act more
independently (with less accountability) than the other members of the family. These
perceptions comply with the findings of the Q sort regarding the state and its terrorism
actions with the Turkish group. The state is as highly revered as religion, and its
authority is not questioned—even if it misuses it through violence. As a result, while
the state may get involved in terrorist acts, revering its unity and authority makes it
over an above any rapprochement (in the form of attack on state symbols). Hence
retaliation against the state for any reason is strongly condemned by this group.
3.4. Factor B (Permissive)
Unlike Factor A, no common themes emerge among Factor B, and no clear pattern of
answers emerges from the participants’ views about whether religions could be sources
of terrorism. Terrorism is not seen as an international phenomenon, but as an issue that
relates mostly to domestic affairs. For the participants states cannot be actors of
terrorism; when they are involved in disputes with other states or people of other
countries their involvement is different from terrorism. Both domestically and
internationally all actions of the state are right, and all governmental regulations should
be respected. Therefore, all revolutionary movements are considered terrorism (since
they are against the state), as well as all vigilante acts (since they deny mediation of the
“fair” state in disputes). Due to the general attitude of the participants towards the state,
the researcher labels Factor B “permissive.” Compared to the participants in Factor A,
those of Factor B are indifferent to and have less respect to the authority of the state.
4. Convergence among the Two Factors: The Conformist and the Permissive
There are several types of terrorism that relate to either domestic or international
issues, or both. For example, vigilante acts could be considered a domestic problem,
while state sponsored terrorism is directly related to international relations. Similarly, a
revolutionary movement could be considered a domestic issue, unless it is supported by
foreign actors. The important point in this discussion is that any effort to provide
international cooperation against terrorism must first clarify the status of the particular
“terrorist” act in terms of being domestic or having international extensions. For
example, US citizens may have no role in helping the Turkish people against local
revolutionary movements in Turkey (with no foreign support of any kind). Similarly,
the Turkish citizens have no grounds for assisting the US people against local vigilante
acts, even though many people of both national groups may agree that vigilante acts are
terrorist-like.
From that perspective (domestic vs. international), the data analysis revealed
that in general there are two issues that can be the focus of international cooperation
against terrorism: state and religious terrorism.
As discussed above, opinions of the participants of Factor A about religion as
a motivator of terrorism is much clearer than that of the participants of Factor B. In
other words, the Turkish participants distinguish between truly interpreted religions and
their misinterpretations in terms of being motivators of terrorist acts. To illustrate,
while the participants were asked about a particular terrorist organization’s (Al-Qaeda)
reliance on religious teachings and being a terrorist organization, they regarded it as a
terrorist organization in both factors. The implication of this finding could be that
participants from different nationalities should be asked more specific questions.
Instead of being asked about all religions, they should be asked about certain
organizations or events.
With regard to the issue of “state terrorism,” the analysis of the data revealed
that the participants’ perceptions towards that type of terrorism are deeply rooted in
their regard and attitude toward the state. The researcher does not consider it likely
that, generalizing the findings of the Q sort, the Turkish people, who view the state as
an authoritative and independently-acting entity, could easily cooperate on state
terrorism with the Americans, who do not have much concern about the role of the
state international affairs.
Conclusion
The overall finding of the analysis was that “nationalities” play a significant role in
shaping people’s understandings of the terrorism concept, while the researcher did not
observe any significant variation among the understandings of people from different
professions.
The related literature does not reveal many efforts in the field of counter-
terrorism that address different professions differently. Besides, the findings of this
particular study support this trend. However, the differences in the factor loadings of
the participants from different professions may implicate the possibility of difference in
perceptions of the concept among different professions. More focused research is
needed to provide more conclusive results regarding the commonalities and differences
about the meaning of terrorism according to professional variation.
Appendix A
(Q Statements)
1- In acts of violence by the government, individual guilt is less important than

collective obedience, and this encourages feelings of injustice among people.
2- It is a mistake to label as terrorism some countries’ actions against people in other
countries. Those are not acts of terrorism, but clashes of civilizations.
3- Since they supported the Marxist government of Afghanistan—which opposed
conventional values, came to power by a coup, and was involved in acts of
terrorism—the Soviets could also be considered terrorist.
4- Since they aim to punish those who oppose social values, vigilante acts should not
be considered as terrorism.
5- In today’s world, states have their own social values and legitimate ways for
changing those values. Any other methods used for this purpose are clearly acts of
terrorism.
6- Al Qaeda’s fight against Western values are based on Islamic principles, hence
cannot properly be regarded as terrorist
7- Targeting human beings is not the sine qua non of terrorism. The destruction of
public facilities and transportation systems (e.g., as committed by the PKK) are also
terrorist incidents.
8- The existence of institutions (e.g., schools, abortion clinics, stock markets, etc.)
reflects people’s social values. Any illegal act against those institutions should
therefore be considered an act of terror.
9- It is unjust to consider people fighting the occupation forces in Iraq and Afghanistan
as terrorists or insurgents simply because they are against the social values imposed
by the occupiers.
10-When directed against human beings to change their behaviors towards the
government, random arrests (e.g., during Stalin’s administration) are acts of
terrorism.
11- States like Israel in Palestine and the USA in Afghanistan are not responsible for
civilian casualties when civilians are used as human shields to cover strategic
targets. Such states cannot be accused of terrorism.
12- Terrorism is used as a kind of warfare between states in today’s world. This is a
new rule of international relations, and it is not just or ethical for states to be called
terrorist for that.
13- When people take the law into their own hands, as in vigilante groups, they are
concerned with creating justice, which is political in nature. But in this way they
resemble terrorist organizations and their struggle against the state, and should
therefore be considered terrorist.
14- Regardless of the state policies that they may dislike, the main target of
revolutionary groups is people, and for this reason they can be categorized as
terrorist groups.
15- Regardless of the part of the world in which actions occur, there are religions that
justify attacks against innocent human beings.
16-Although separatist movements may address their messages to the government, it is
human beings that are affected by their actions, and this is what qualifies those
groups as terrorists.
17- In terms of sending a message to the government by committing acts against
people, there is not much difference between a violent environmental activist
group and an illegal separatist movement.
18- It is not the ideology of freedom fighters that qualifies them as terrorists, but their
inhumane acts.
19- Dictators are terrorists since they act against their own people—e.g., Cambodia’s
Pol Pot, Uganda’s Idi Amin Dada, and Sudan’s Omar Al-Bashir.
20- Systematic and intentionally violent acts by Israel against Palestinian civilians are a
sort of terrorism.
21- By providing logistics, shelter, and training to the PKK, or by failing to recognize it
as a terrorist organization, many Western states sponsor the PKK, and can
therefore be considered as engaging in state-sponsored terrorism.
22- It is inappropriate to label the Ku Klux Klan’s acts as “hate crimes.” It is a terrorist
organization.
23- Revolutionary acts of violence are aimed at the state’s ideology or structure, and
they can be justified as long as they are not committed against civilians.
24- No truly-interpreted religion allows civilians’ lives to be the target of political
gains.
25- If the target of a separatist movement is military or security personnel, then the
attacks are considered guerilla activities. However, if the target is civilians, then
they are terrorist acts.
26- Bombing an abortion clinic is a violent activity against people and property. The
action itself has an ideology and therefore should be considered terrorism.
27- Chechen fighters’ acts against innocent civilians were insufficient to justify a
change in label from “freedom fighters” to “terrorists.”
28- Limiting fundamental freedoms is an act of terrorism (e.g., what Saddam Hussein
did after he became Iraq’s president in 1979), since acts such as these are directed
against the current political system.
29- If two neighboring states, say India and Pakistan, occasionally attack each other’s
military facilities and border monitoring stations, these are clearly acts of
terrorism.
30- There may be some situations in which a country is under occupation and some
local organizations attack the military facilities of the invader in that country.
Those attacks should be seen as guerilla warfare (not terrorism), and so it is not
fair to call other states that assist those organizations sponsors of terrorism.
31- I see no reason for people like Dirty Harry to be called terrorists. Although what he
did was against the law, he did it for the good of the people he was serving.
32- The purpose of peacekeeping forces is the furtherance of the peace process. In the
light of this humanitarian purpose, therefore, all acts against peacekeeping forces
by local revolutionary groups should be considered as terrorism.
33- Recitation of religious words during executions of foreign soldiers and civilians by
beheading is evidence that some religions permit terrorist events.
34- The Al-Qaeda attack against the USS Cole would suffice for the organization to be
called terrorist, since the ship was not involved in combat at the time of the
incident.
35- Attacks against social institutions of any kind—banks, schools, abortion clinics,
etc.—necessarily have a political character, and since those attacks place pressures
on governments to change their policies, attacks such as these constitute a type of
terrorism.
36- Hostile acts against humanitarian UN peacekeeping forces are examples of
terrorism.
37- A government’s action that destabilizes the state, in all its complexity, should be
considered terrorism unless the attempts to change remain within the limits of
democracy.
38- If there are some terrorist activities carried out in country A against country B,
country B’s fight against these activities in the territory of country A without
declaring war can be defined as state-terrorism.
39- A state should be able to support groups operating against another state’s political
system as long as the supported group’s target is government forces and not
civilians.
40- Although vigilante groups are not against the legitimate government, their acts
ultimately cause destabilization of the system, therefore are not different from
other types of terrorism.
41- Revolutionary groups may target state forces, but their action is actually in
response to government terrorism.
42- Hezbollah’s attacks against Israeli troops during Israel’s invasion into South
Lebanon were based on religion and should therefore not be considered terrorist.
43- Although they predominantly attack military personnel, the IRA and the ETA
should be considered terrorist organizations.
44- Policies such as those regarding the environment, gender preferences, or animals
reflect a country’s socio-political system. Activities within the context of issues
such as these and that are committed outside legal boundaries are acts of terrorism
since they aim to weaken the state’s socio-political system.
45- Chechens who fight Russian combatants in Chechnya are best considered freedom
fighters rather than terrorists.
46- There is little difference between a national terrorist organization’s struggle to

overthrow a legitimate government and the assignment of a friendly puppet
government by another state.
47- Ayatollah Khomeini’s statement that “We must strive to export our Revolution
throughout the world” meant that Iran would sponsor terrorist activities against
legitimate governments in other countries.
48- Since they aim to overthrow legitimate movements with the threat and/or
employment of extranormal forms of political violence, coup d’etats, such as those
in some Latin American, African and Asian countries, are a type of revolutionary
terrorism.
49- The use of Islamic teachings to justify political overthrow has, in fact, no other
meaning than the misinterpretation and misuse of those teachings in support of the
organization’s ideology.
50- As long as they are illegal, all separatist movements are terroristic by nature since
they aim at overthrowing the sovereignty of states.
51- In terms of defending territory, there is no difference between Afghan resistance
against the Soviets in the 1980s and against the U.S. today.
52- A good example fitting the criteria of state terrorism was the US government’s
policy to aid anti-Castro guerilla forces, which ended up with the Bay of Pigs
invasion aimed at destabilizing the Cuban government.
53- States that aim to undermine other states or governments by sponsoring terrorist
organizations in those countries should themselves be considered terrorist.
54- Nationalist, ethnic, religious, cultural or economic revolutionary groups gain the
status of terrorist groups when they employ terrorism as a strategy to weaken
current legitimate political systems.
55- In a secular state, freedoms granted for religious practices are predetermined.
Consequently, armed or unarmed acts outside the limits of those freedoms weaken
the state’s authority and may be considered terrorist in nature.
56- Most separatist movements have nothing to do with protecting the rights of a
particular subgroup of the population. They are simply terrorist groups since their
ultimate goal is to weaken the state by destabilizing the political system.
57- Being labeled a freedom fighter or terrorist depends on the orientation of the person
doing the labeling. We cannot simply label a group by looking at its action in
relation to the destabilization of the political system.
References
Aydiner, G. (2007). Terrorism in the World and in Turkey. Retrieved May 2, 2007 from the World Wide
Web: http://www.tipsonline.org/news/content/terrorism-in-the-world--in-turkey.html
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Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
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Lewis-Beck (Eds.), New Tools for Social Scientists (pp. 57-76). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Brown, Steven R. (1993). A Primer on Q methodology. Operant Subjectivity, 16, pp. 91-138.
Crenshaw, Martha. (1989). Terrorism and International Cooperation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Kantanidou, E. (2004). Defining Terrorism. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice,
12(1), 14-35.
Koufa, Kalliopi, (2001). Terrorism and Human Rights. United Nations Economic and Social Council,
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31.
Lambert, Joseph (1990). Terrorism and Hostages in International Law. UK: Cambridge.
McKeown, Bruce F. & Thomas, Dan B. (1988). Q Methodology. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Putnam, Robert D. & Bayne, Nicholas (1989). Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-
Power Summits. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Spencer, Alexander (2006). Questioning the Concept of ‘New Terrorism’. Peace Conflict & Development,
8(February), 1-6.
Stephenson, William. (1953). The Study of Behavior: Q-technique and Its Methodology. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
Stephenson, William. (1978). Protoconcursus: The Concourse Theory of Communication. Operant
Subjectivity, 9(April), 73-96.
Webel, Charles. (2004). Terror, Terrorism, and The Human Condition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
i
The phrase is taken from the terrorism definition in the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act.
ii
Governmental regulations must be respected; states can mostly be targets of revolutionary terrorism: states
are involved in terrorist acts neither against their own people nor other governments nor other nations.
Concluding Thoughts
M. Tuzuner (Ed.)
IOS Press, 2010
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-608-9-147
Conclusions: Towards a Culture of Sharing

in Intelligence Cooperation Practices?
Musa TUZUNER1
Abstract. This chapter provides the wrap-up discussion from the workshop that
inspired the chapters in this volume. The discussion addressed the primary issues
of whether or not there is an emerging transnational cooperation regime, and
whether—and if so, how—states are adapting to meet transnational security
challenges. Highlighted are issues such as informal alliances and the idea of
informality in general as a characteristic of new intelligence cooperation practices.
Keywords. intelligence cooperation, transnational cooperation regime, informality
To conclude this volume, and to highlight the key questions raised and common themes
emphasized throughout the workshop from which the contents of the volume emerged,
the discussions of a final roundtable discussion are offered here. In this chapter, not
only the comments of the authors represented in this volume but also those of other
primary participants are given as they all, as a whole, constitute the broad conclusions
that served as the foundation for the preceding chapters. The roundtable discussion was
led off by a series of questions by the moderator, Ersel Aydinli. Each participant was
then given a chance to both respond to his questions and add his or her own comments.
Ersel: at this session I want us to discuss a few key questions that came up during the
workshop. One of the questions was, are we moving towards a transnational
cooperation regime? After what we have heard here, do we see the signs of new
patterns of international security cooperation specifically with respect to security
intelligence cooperation? Do we see new things taking place in the post 9/11
environment? We realize that States are trying to adapt to the new environment. Does it
qualify as something new or is it simply old politics, interest-based state-to-state
politics? That was the primary goal of this workshop, to identify new patterns if they
exist, or if they don’t exist, why don’t they? If we can’t come up with new ways of
cooperation, why is that? If we all think that the new nature of the threat is
transnational and we’re still acting state-to-state, what are we going to do about this? I
think Derek said, the strongest power can only deal with states, so what do we do if the
threat is not coming from states? The question is real: Are we adapting? If we’re not
adapting, who’s going to govern this new territory from which all kinds of challenges
are emerging?
1
148 M. Tuzuner / Conclusions: Towards a Culture of Sharing in Intelligence Cooperation Practices?
There were key, related issues that emerged again and again in our talks:
• Informal alliances
• Informality
• Individual Cooperation
Can the new informal alliances that were talked about considerably here, qualify as
signs of a new regime or are states not learning?
Richard Mansbach: as an outsider looking in, I heard evidence that there were some
different patterns being exhibited in police work, but nothing struck me as new in
intelligence exchange. What you’re describing has been the rule of exchange. There are
two problems: First, you’re confronted with classic collective goods dilemmas. It’s not
that we don’t learn, but when you’re confronted with collective goods dilemmas, it’s
very hard to get out of them. Second, we didn’t discuss much about what IS new. When
you stick with a classic definition of national security, we don’t see much change.
Clearly in terms of the classic limited definition of national security (violence and war)
the instances of cooperation are very much the same that we could have talked about in
WWII.
The dilemma is that the problems we’re discussing now affects everybody and
we’d all like to see it solved, but the incentives to do so are not yet there. There’s an
attitude of ‘let the USA do it’, and in the US, unfortunately, there’s an attitude of ‘just
let us do it’. The American military find that the other countries get in the way. The
other countries don’t have technologies and high tech weaponries. My own sense is
that many of the generals were happy it was an Anglo-American operation in 2003.
Gustavo Diaz Matey: We need to identify and create and adopt a different mechanism
to face 21st century threats, but we have to keep in mind that the intelligence struggle
between different intelligence services that we know from the Cold War era is still
paramount. When two different intelligence services try to cooperate against terrorism
or against any transnational threats, we have to keep in mind that the other side (with
whom they’re cooperating) tries to achieve things as well. They are not only
cooperating against terrorism but at the same time competing against each other.
Ersel: Are you saying that even though there is a new security environment, the old is
not gone? The political mechanism has been the driving force of the old system, and it
can not transform immediately into the new one? At best, this is a transition period, but
the old is still prevalent, struggling to adapt?
Gustavo: the point of departure here should be that even with the transformation of the
different issues in the international security arena, we are still living in a system created
in the Westphalian era. States are the actors providing security. Intelligence services
are a manifestation of a state’s power, and therefore intelligence services compete with
each other.
Richard: I agree, with the caveat that states are less and less capable of handling it.
Hasan Yon: My presentation was on the police liaison officer system. I argued that
there are new developments and new structures in police liaisonships. A couple of
M. Tuzuner / Conclusions: Towards a Culture of Sharing in Intelligence Cooperation Practices? 149
these main new developments are exactly what you refer to as the emerging themes of
the discussion. When you refer to informality, there is definitely evidence that it is
affecting the PLO system, and it is changing the way intelligence cooperation works.
When you send a PLO to another country, where he is making face-to-face interaction
on a daily basis, it makes things work better. Cooperation works better. When it comes
particularly to terrorism, the fact that PLOs see terrorism as a crime may make it easier
to deal with it in a cooperative manner.
Otwin Marenin: We all agree that the world is changing. We’ve made a pessimistic
overview that made us all feel very bad. The real question for me is that, OK, the world
is changing, and people will adapt anyway. NGOs etc., they will change, but first, I
wish we’d said more about private contractors, and other new things that have
emerged. So much of security is now done privately. We talked about the state, which
is only half of the picture. The other thing that might have been interesting to talk about
is border regions. There are emerging patterns of cooperation that ignore borders.
Borders are seen simply as nuisances that must be worked around. Lastly, is there a
new regime? Yes. In the police world this regime emerged naturally. The question I
have is, can such a regime emerge naturally in the intelligence field or do you have to
make it happen? Clearly it needs to happen in order to have an effective response to
new security issues, but can it happen naturally?
Ersel: Why do you think it happened naturally in the police world?
Otwin: Because the police talk to each other differently than intelligence agencies do.
They have a very defined and less contentious object. As Hasan mentioned a few
minutes ago, the goal is crime control, which is easier to define than terrorism control.
An interesting question though is whether crime and terrorism are a continuum or a
dichotomy? If it’s a continuum, then police ways of dealing with crime will have a lot
to say about how we’ll deal with terrorism. If it’s a dichotomy, then crime is a legal
definition and terrorism is a political definition and it’s going to be very hard to cross
that divide.
Anonymous Egyptian liaison officer: Two points. First, I’d like to stress the importance
of reaching agreement on standards for defining what constitutes a terrorist
organization. I think there needs to be a fixed definition before cooperation can work.
Second, on the issue of informal exchange. The example you have just mentioned, I
believe you’re right, I might not be able to release a document on a formal basis
because I might be violating local laws, but I can release it on an informal basis.
Ersel: So my question would be, do you see an increase in such informal activities?
Eqyptian liaison: Yes, I do.
Brian Nussbaum: The first thing I wanted to do, you asked why this evolved among
police agencies and not among intelligence agencies, and I think a lot of it had to do
with what Gustavo said earlier, it’s about the goals of the agencies. The reason there’s
this cop culture internationally is that they’re interested in protecting life and property,
whereas when you get to intelligence services, you’re much more concerned with a
national interest idea, and that’s where you get the problem of a developing a spook
culture.
Ersel: So if we were to envision the global peace as a single property and life maybe
we would have a better chance?
Brian: I suppose so. The other thing I’d like to say, I’d like to mirror what Otwin just
mentioned, and I would take it a bit further, going beyond the contractors involved,
which is that nobody really discussed here the role of corporations. I think that it is in
the private sector that you’re really seeing a lot of innovative intelligence sharing. If
you think about what’s going on in the Niger Delta, where governments might not have
great information, but a lot of the corporations operating there are going to be more up-
to-date on the militants. That’s not true only for terrorism but for other transnational
threats as well.
Ersel: That’s really interesting. A friend of mine, who works for an oil company, told
me he saw a report that attests to what you’ve just said. Apparently his oil company has
a report, an intelligence assessment, on areas that governments can’t possibly have
access to.
Tariq Parvez: The most important fall-out of the 9/11 incident was the realization of
the importance of terrorism. It has brought about greater sharing of intelligence at
different levels, no longer just state to state but also sub-state to sub-state. This has
grown up only after 9/11. The second development has been that frequent interaction
has led to greater sharing of intelligence between individuals. I don’t think I’d call it
exactly informal alliances, I’d prefer to use the term personal interaction and personal
rapport between individuals and actors in the sub-state organizations. The posting of
liaison officers has been a big help and it can be considered a new development in the
sharing of intelligence. Progress has been on this front. I believe that the basic
requirement in the sharing of intelligence is trust, and number two is reciprocity. Both
of these elements need time to develop. More interaction leads to more trust. You learn
to use the same language, the same evaluative system, there is capacity building, and
with all this, you get more reciprocity. If there is reciprocity, then the sharing of
intelligence will be more durable. We are on the right path, and there has been
progress.
Ersel: In international politics, there is an idea that reciprocity has a homogenization

effect. If there are more and more reciprocal relationships, the actors involved start
acting and thinking more and more in the same way. Those are the early signs of an
emerging regime. In your experience, is today’s reciprocity significantly different than
it was in the past?
Tariq: Certainly. It is greater in magnitude and greater in nature. We are receiving

more information. More information is being exchanged, and we’re exchanging more
diverse forms of information…information about different things than in the past.
Ersel: OK, so it’s different in quality and nature, do you see that homogenization
effect? Do you see people getting closer in thinking? In mentality? In pursuing local
threats as part of a global threat?
Tariq: If you share the perception of the threat and the response, only then you will
cooperate. That’s a consequence of being on the same frequency as far as the need for
common response.
Ersel: Not just about terrorism?
Tariq: It’s in other areas also, for example, in human trafficking.
Offer Baruch: What I learned from this workshop is that there is a vacuum and need for
global sharing and interaction to share information between ourselves and it should be
informal. Once we get government involved, we freeze the whole process. There is a
great opportunity to do so by starting with standardization. Industry has the ISO9000, if
you don’t answer to these standards you can’t be a player. We should put the standards
into gathering intelligence, keeping records, protecting civil rights, sharing this
intelligence in a way that everyone will have common ground and will benefit. On the
other hand, I heard skeptical notes. I heard that it’s difficult to do it with intelligence
agencies but we have to start somewhere. We should find a common formula, and for
this, networking is important.
Ersel: Richard brought up the collective goods problem. What you’re offering is linked
to that. Who’s going to pay for it? If it’s public good, who’s going to pay for it? You
can’t tax globally…
Offer: Private institutes can pay. The SITE institute is one. They claim a $7000
membership fee, which is required payment for being allowed access to the group, and
they have a lot of customers. You can pay with money or with information. We should
find a way to finance it, and the government sector is an important part of this, both
because of the budget issue and also because of all the information they can provide.
Behram Sahukar: Cooperation can only be there if there is a commonly seen threat.
Common threat must also affect the countries in the same way. Otherwise there isn’t
going to be much sharing if the threat perceptions are different. Another point, hard
intelligence in quick time, requires going back to your boss. It doesn’t come about in
informal ways. Informal contact only serves to break red tape and perhaps speed up the
timeline, but ultimately you have to go back to your boss and ask permission. A friend
I had met at a course, from a friendly country, was later appointed as a PLO in India,
and I was in the intelligence services. And one day I needed some information so I
called him up and he said, well, I’ll have to talk to my boss, and then that same day my
boss called me and said, why are you calling that embassy? So much for him being my
friend. A couple of suggestions though, I still think it is useful to encourage liaison
officers, not just among the police but also to develop the role of the military liaisons.
Also, a last point, drawing on army contacts/exercises as an example. In the military,
we arranged formal war games and brainstorming scenarios, and bring together
military people from different countries to carry them out. Through these types of
exercises I got to know my counterparts in the army/police and so, and in our
discussions we gradually came to share similar threat perceptions and for solving a
particular situation, we started thinking along the same wavelengths. This might be
useful in other areas as well.
Ali Ashraf: There was a paradigm shift after the Cold War. I have seen that intelligence
people are discussing human trafficking, transnational organized crime, environmental
problems, and I think this alone is a sign that there has been this paradigm shift, and
that there is recognition of this shift. States are recognizing the fact that non-traditional
threats are important. States need to be a part of the discussion. Before coming to
Turkey I met with a friend who is a member of the security services here, and I asked
him, as a practitioner, do you have any experience with intelligence sharing? And he
said, Ali, you know what? All the effective intelligence sharing is taking place along
informal channels, though there are state sanctioned policies for sharing that
information. For example, he told me how he, in his work, when he has information
about drug trafficking or international crime that is important for his Dutch colleagues,
he calls the guy and gives it to him, and if the other guy has useful information for the
Turkish side, he calls and gives it. There are personal connections, but at the state level
there are also Turkish and Dutch policies to facilitate this passing of information. My
understanding was that state formal policies help facilitate informal interactions. A
second point, based on the secondary literature, I’ve also read about states sharing
information. I’ve read for example how the US, the UK and Pakistan, cooperated to
successfully prevent terrorist attacks. So obviously sharing of information is
happening, but it’s important to understand that not all countries are sharing equally.
They categorize the rank of potential cooperating countries, and prioritize, who is the
most valuable customer of my information? If you look at the EU and the most
powerful countries, Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Spain, you see that they are
very jealous of sharing information with non-G5 countries. So sharing takes place, but
it is based on the positions of the customers and of the clients.
Tariq: you make two important points, of course when the sub-state contact takes
place, it does so within the framework of overall state policy. We know our state’s
policy, and the priority of the other state. We know which information is to be given, to
whom, and to what extent. There are standards, and these differ from country to
country.
Peter Gill: trying to address your question about the nature of the regime. I am also
trying to respond to Richard’s tour de force. The issue that arises is neo-feudalism. If
there is going to be a transnational regime, it’s not going to be a world government, it’s
going to be neo-feudal. The use of that concept means that it will include private
corporations, communities, tribes, militias, NGOs, some are good guys, some are bad,
but they’ll be involved in governance. Governance will take place in neo-feudalism via
networks. Implicitly in Jim’s paper too, the question was raised, how do you secure
compliance with a regime when defection is so very possible? The only way collective
action can work involves trust. It must have rules, but ultimately it involves trust and
legitimacy. Imposed rules don’t work. No regime has ever survived on the basis of
rules but no trust. They just collapse, sooner or later. How do we get that trust? I would
suggest we get that only through some political or legal framework. What we’ve had
here are two existing frameworks discussed: first, the policing framework for
cooperation, second the military framework. I want to mention a third, also implicit in
what we’ve been discussing. Both the police and military frameworks for cooperation
are based on law. Within nations, police work on the basis of criminal law, and that
gives us some mechanism for democratic oversight. Within nations, the military are
based on a different notion of law, between nations there is some weak international
law for war—the Geneva Convention. So even though weak, again, we have some kind
of oversight structure there. The third strand is those intelligence agencies and groups
that aren’t strictly police or military, but operate in another sphere. MI5 types for
example. These people do counter-insurgency, sometimes traveling under the guise of
counter-terrorism. The point about many intelligence operations is that there is no law.
They are out with law. These operations are planned to be outside of law and therefore
to be outside of oversight. Any contemplation of international regime in terms of
security cooperation has to deal with the idea of legalizing something outside of the
current legal structure.
Aharon Zeevi-Farkash: I would like to address your question and be practical. I think it
is very important to ask what is to be done, but also to ask how to do it. To summarize
what I got from our discussions here, I see two basic vectors that will influence our
lives in this century: the mega-metropolitan development and terror. I see the police
and the military together. The camera that monitors a crime can monitor a terrorist and
vice versa. This means that homeland security alone is not enough. I don’t believe in
government. They will not allocate enough budget for such a thing. I’m sad to see this.
They will respond to things that directly threaten their share. I believe terror is a
different threat than the military one. We don’t have the knowledge needed to deal with
this. Here is a crucial point for the academy: it has to assist the military and the police
to understand the nature of terror. We are running very hard to solve the problem with
the military, with power, but when we do this we often accelerate the problem, but
we’re not solving it. To develop knowledge is crucial. We have to know more and
understand more to be able to deal with symmetric and asymmetric challenges. The
deterrence is strong for symmetric war, but not yet for asymmetric. I believe we can go
to global from national. By this I mean we have to develop knowledge on the national
level. On the national level every country must strengthen cooperation and
interoperability between own agencies, to build what I mentioned—the aquarium of
knowledge. This is a challenge because it deals with our ego. It’s very easy to break
one’s ego. To close the circle between this national aquarium, and the shooters. Next,
every state must define their needs and define what can be achieved independently.
Which kind of intelligence can we get without needing any other country’s help, what
kinds of intelligence can we only get through cooperation? What kind of accurate
intelligence is needed, and who can give it to me? Then I have to go decide the rules
for opening up this cooperation. After defining these rules, I need to open the channels
that are acting between these agencies. But first we need the rules. If we have rules, we
will know what to do.
Ersel: It seems like you’re suggesting that we fix what we’ve got first? That’s what
we’ve been trying to do, no? Every country has been looking at their intelligence
service and trying to fix what they’ve got at home, so we would expect them to work
better, but isn’t the argument also made that that hasn’t really been working?
Aharon: This is of course not enough. But since we don’t have a global government, it
is very difficult to begin this top down. It is better to start this bottom up, to go from the
national to global. To go back to what I was saying, the next thing I think is important
is that we have to be modest, we will not deal with offensive actions. No one will give
us authority to deal with offensive actions. Let’s begin with defensive actions, and
concentrate on how to defend ourselves better. Let governments deal with offensive
actions. This is a guideline.
Ersel: What’s your own experience, have you seen a significant qualitatively different
type of security cooperation in the post 9/11 environment?
Aharon: Yes, absolutely. And I can say that prevention and protection can be done only
by cooperation.
Ersel: I can already see that practitioners seem to be saying there has been a qualitative
difference. It seems like we have a bit of a divide. Practitioners are saying there has
been a qualitatively different cooperation. Some scholars, including me, are reluctant to
acknowledge it and qualify it as such significantly different, conceptually.
Glen Segell: I’d like to address my response to NATO, so half of my answer is for
allied command transformation, and the other half for allied command operations. For
allied command transformations, we have to tell them that intelligence is no longer ‘in
area’, but also ‘out area’. It looks globally. This is both the physical area of NATO, as
well as the area of agreement of defense and security. Intelligence is global as well as
NATO. In area, intelligence is not only defense it is also security. Intelligence is not
only about capabilities, it is about intent. This is a matter of allied command
cooperation to consider emphasis and necessity. If there’s a necessity for a new regime,
it will be created. Looking at the evolution of NATO, there is no difficulty in creating a
new command structure specifically for intelligence on terrorism and organized crime.
Generally NATO can do this. To understand this, one need only look at the rapid
reaction force, created in less than five years. For allied command operations, the big
question is, are we dealing with extremist politics or radical militarism when
addressing terrorism? Does terrorism have relevance for NATO? If we are dealing with
extremist politics, history shows that we have numerous ways of changing people from
using terror to using some other means of communicating their message. Terrorists,
leaders of terrorist movements, have become successful leaders of countries. If we’re
looking at radical militarism (where terror is for the sake of terror), then we see a need
for NATO to take action. We must understand that we’re looking at individuals. Who
is recruited as a terrorist and why? Who becomes a criminal? How does organized
crime develop? Ultimately, the solution is not to go head to head against these issues,
the solution is social issue, whether local or global. A person does not turn to crime if
he has a good job. The London terrorists, were financially middle class, college
educated, 18-25, not someone you’d expect to be a terrorist. These individuals did the
operation for less than $200,000. We have to really think about allied command
transformation/operations, and really think, is this an issue for NATO?
Ersel: Let me ask the question I’ve been asking everyone, do you think there has been a
significant change or not?
Glen: Well, no. Sherlock Holmes had a French counterpart, and they did very well
getting on together without any form of a regime.
Jim Walsh: I’d like to make a couple of brief comments. First, about theory and
practice. There is a feeling that they work across purposes, and I think that is
fundamentally flawed. Theory and practice can reinforce each other. Theoreticians
need facts to govern their theories or else they’re not very useful. People in policy
operate with implicit theories about how things work. It’s a good idea to put those ideas
out on the table and subject them to scrutiny to see how valid they are. The second
thing I want to say is about intelligence sharing and the role of trust. The argument is
that if two states trust each other a lot, they’ll cooperate. That does happen, but that is
not the only source or cause of cooperation. We cooperate all the time with those
whom we don’t trust. We heard about other mechanisms, e.g. cooperation in the police
organization (where police culture helps facilitate cooperation), also institutions can be
constructed to facilitate cooperation. So trust is an important source of cooperation but
it is not the only one, and I think a useful venue for future research would be to develop
further those other ideas.
Anonymous Russian Liaison Officer: I don’t see problems for cooperation against
terrorism, I see problems in cooperation between nation states in the Global War on
Terrorism. In recent years there has been no confidence among the intelligence
communities. So the solution and intelligence sharing lies on a higher level, on the
level of politicians/state leaders. We can not disregard the issue of trust, but how do we
develop this trust and confidence in each other? I don’t think it can be done globally,
for example, by a UN resolution that all countries sign and then are supposed to meet
their obligation. But, I think it is possible to have a regional convention, for example,
Ukraine-Turkey-Russia, or the Black Sea states, maybe under the umbrella of NATO.
States will sign regional conventions saying, for example, that we’re not going to use
radical means, e.g. terrorism between each other. This will be the beginning to sharing
information regarding terrorist activities. For example, Russia should provide Turkey
with information on the PKK, as a goodwill gesture, as a confidence building measure,
and Turkey will then give information on radical terrorist organizations working in
Crimea. I would say this is more practical intelligence sharing, and would make a kind
of regional regime.
John Nomikos: Javier Solana invited people in to establish an intelligence service. They
came up with open sources intelligence. The point is that without trust, nothing is going
to happen, even within the EU. Confidence and trust is necessary. So…how do we trust
each other? I’m not that optimistic that things can happen, but may be we can start by
educating a new generation of specialists, and leaving aside the bureaucracy.
Michael Hermann: We believe in trust in this corner. First a general comment: what we
haven’t done here I believe, is given sufficient attention to international organizations
and the amount of intelligence exchange that goes on through them. The UN, NATO,
EU, regional organizations. I see no problem with advocating increased intelligence
cooperation on a joint track basis, partly through nation to nation, agency to agency, IO
to IO. So what is the obstacle? Trustworthiness. Do you trust your potential partner?
There are various reasons for lack of trust. You may mistrust because a) he’s no good
anyway, or b) because of ethical considerations (you ask yourself, is he the sort of
government our government wants to be associated with?); and then c) because of
source protection. This last one is most important I would say. In intelligence you need
to protect your sources, and you need to trust that the people you’re cooperating with
will give equal importance to protecting your sources. Yes, the current literature
basically says that intelligence agencies have to grow up and be more reasonable. This
is easy to write, but when you’ve had an intelligence source blown by someone else,
you feel quite strong about it. I can give the example of the bombing of the Berlin
nightclub in 1986. Cipher coding showing Libyan backing for it, which led to the US
bombing of Tripoli. The release of this information was given to various governments,
including to the then West German government, and it was blown by one of the
politicians. What’s the answer to this problem? My impression is that intelligence
agencies try to keep secrets, but the politicians and governments leak. Interestingly, the
threat faced is no longer the KGB, it’s the press. Solving these problems only comes by
education about intelligence and the realities about intelligence. There is so much
nonsense thought about by people. They have wild fantasies. Academics have a
genuine role to educate the public, the government, and the journalists about the
realities of the intelligence world. What do academics achieve by studying
intelligence? They should learn that intelligence exists to defend the liberal state. We
should be more trusting.
Mathieu Deflem: When you asked the question are there any fundamental changes, the
difficult word is not change, but fundamental. The world is continually changing. The
world has changed in 10,000 years. Both can be proven true, depending on how you
define the dimensions of change, and the nature of change. Some of the disagreements
you see here evolve around that. One of the changes now is not that there is suddenly
now police cooperation, but that now more people are aware of the need for police
cooperation. Scholars now recognize that there are sub-state and non-state actors.
Ersel: Classical realism used to talk about sub-state actors, but disciplines tend to
forget to some extent what went on before. There is a ‘cutting-edgeness’ problem,
where we get excited about something that seems new, and forget what had been said
before.
Mathieu: An interesting example of that is what I found when writing my dissertation.

Some of my main sources were dissertations from the 1920s, which wrote about “the
new criminal is a criminal that defies borders”.
Anyway, the final qualification I’d like to make is that from the police point of view,
most crime is local. It occurs person to person. Yes, the transnational/international is
taking up more space, but it’s still relatively very small. Has anything fundamentally
changed? I would still say no, but the scale and nature has changed, not only on
terrorism but in other areas. What has changed is the recognition of the need for
cooperation. There are indications that there is a third development going on: police
cooperation and intelligence sharing and then cooperation in the military. Are these
various functional cooperation efforts starting to operate cross-functionally? We said
here that it’s easier for police to cooperate with other police, more so than police to
share intelligence with different agencies within a country. But it looks like we might
be starting to see police-intelligence cooperation even across borders. Why? Because
terrorism is distinct, with police dimensions, military dimensions, and political ones.
For this reason we need, and are starting to see, cross-functional alliances. Still, I
would say ‘not yet’ in response to your question. Not yet because terrorism is neither a
crime nor war, and because there are connections between crime and terrorism. The
connecting of the crimes might bring about the fusion of the response. Sometimes
crime is approached militarily. For example in Mexico, and for border controls. Or take
the war on drugs—sometimes there is military involvement. There are strong reasons to
think this approach could continue, because it is good business if you can make the
connection. Durkheim said that there will always be crime. If we all stop killing, then
maybe lying will become a crime. We also have the politicization of war. For example,
we now have police involvement in Iraq, and we see out-servicing. They have formal
police officials acting on behalf of the US. The point of all this is, that if you have
cross-functional alliances taking place, it would make a real difference.
Derek Reveron: Are there new patterns? Yes. Beginning after 9/11? No. if you look at
NATO since Bosnia, they’ve forced the idea of sharing intelligence, all the way
through to Kosovo and Afghanistan. Look at the US/UK relationship, as an example,
‘supernet’ was opened up to the Brits. That was a huge change. I like the idea of the
‘politicization’ of the military. The military is now concerned with chains of evidence,
for example, 9/11 has also given opportunity to revive old relationships, e.g. the US’s
relationship with Pakistan.
Anonymous Turkish Intelligence agent: I have two quick notes. First, why is it harder
for international intelligence cooperation than police cooperation? Because there is
more secret information to be considered. To what degree secret? Well, to give an
example, a policeman who gets involved with a foreign girlfriend only gets punished. If
an intelligence person gets into such a relationship, he might get taken to court. If you
ask me, this is the case, and in the near future nothing much is going to change.
David Kessler: On that note, I’m not sure we’ve reached any conclusions, but we’ve
opened a lot of grounds for thought and discussions. Thank you Musa for organizing
this workshop, and thank you to all of the participants.
M. Tuzuner (Ed.)
IOS Press, 2010
Subject Index
community policing 65 intelligence agencies 11
cooperation 3, 21, 45 intelligence cooperation 31, 147
counter-terrorism 7, 11, 17, 31, intelligence cycle 45
65, 77, 121 intelligence practices 3
culture 121 intelligence reform 21
defence cooperation 31 international cooperation 7, 121
Eastern Mediterranean 21 muslim nations 77
England 17 problem-oriented policing 65
global terrorism 3 regime 77
Greece 21 transnational cooperation regime 147
India 31 transnational terrorism 7
informality 147 Turkey 121
intelligence 17, 45 United States 17, 121
M. Tuzuner (Ed.)
IOS Press, 2010
Author Index
Ashraf, A.S.M.A. 77 Parvez, T. 7
Farkash, A.Z. 11 Sahukar, B.A. 31
Hermann, M. 17 Sezgin, E. 121
Kessler, D.A. 65 Tayfun, R. 45
Köksal, S. 3 Tuzuner, M. vii, 65, 147
Nomikos, J.M. 21

Intelligence Cooperation Practices in The 21St Century: Towards A Culture of Sharing

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INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION PRACTICES IN THE

21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS A CULTURE OF SHARING

A. Chemistry and Biology Springer Science and Business Media

Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 71

Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

© 2010 The authors and IOS Press.

ISBN 978-1-60750-607-2 (print)

Distributor in the USA and Canada

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

Musa Tuzuner, Ph.D.

ever be fully successful—as it was in the case of the 9/11 attacks.

pieces by everyone involved—in a process of recycling and revising of one’s own

culture in intelligence practices in the 21st century.

International Security Cooperation: Intelligence Practices 3

Building Transnational Responses to Transnational Terrorism 7

Building Effective Counter-Terrorism Responses 11

Understanding the US-UK Intelligence Partnership 17

Intelligence Reform in Greece and Regional Cooperation in the Eastern

Towards a New Paradigm in Intelligence Cooperation

A New Paradigm in Intelligence Sharing: International Cooperation (IC) 45

Implications of Community-Oriented Policing and Problem-Oriented Policing

A Comparative Perspective of International Cooperation against Terrorism 121

Conclusions: Towards a Culture of Sharing in Intelligence Cooperation

Subject Index 159

Author Index 161

International Security Cooperation:

Abstract. A former diplomat and intelligence director reflects on the changing

Keywords. global terrorism, intelligence practices, cooperation

particularly after September 11th, issues on intelligence began to be discussed quite

• Growth in information technologies have led to an erosion of state borders,

• GLOBAL: It encompasses the whole world. No state feels secure.

• The possibility of easy acquisition/development of WMD (weapons of mass

changing strategic phenomena. They should change their conceptual systems of

Building Transnational Responses

Abstract. Former intelligence director reflects on the need to build up

Keywords. Transnational terrorism, counter-terrorism, international cooperation

To begin, the best way to change mindsets about intelligence cooperation on

therefore that capacity building through information technology and so on of the

• First, governments must be willing.

Q: An earlier participant referred to the desirability of separating politics from

Q: How much is it politicized?

Building Effective Counter-Terrorism

Abstract. Former head of military intelligence reflects on current understandings

Keywords. counter-terrorism, intelligence agencies

What do people in the Directorate of Military Intelligence or any intelligence

• Terror is an asymmetric confrontation. States have tremendous state

• Terrorists operate in a sympathetic environment, one that includes external

In order to have effective counterterrorism, we need a wide spectrum of responses. We

Understanding the UK-US Intelligence

Abstract. From both academic and practitioner-based perspectives, this piece

Keywords. intelligence, counter-terrorism, England, United States

was other collaboration on Soviet espionage and subversion worldwide: collaboration

establishment of precise security criteria and procedures, and the principle of

Intelligence Reform in Greece and

Abstract. This chapter first offers an overview of the Greek Intelligence

Keywords. intelligence reform, cooperation, Eastern Mediterranean, Greece

On 11 September 2001 (9/11), the international community was introduced to a new

Security Policy and autonomous defense capacity. Likewise, Eastern Mediterranean

1. Present Developments within the Greek National Intelligence Service

Greece, as an industrialized state and active member of the European Union as

imperative. In terms of the literature on intelligence reform in Greece, it remains

2. International Order in a World Threatened by Transnational Threats