DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO., INC.

Facts: This case involves an appeal by certiorari brought by the Director of Lands, where the appealed judgment of
the Intermediate Appellate Court ordered for the land registration in favor of Acme Plymood & Veneer co., Inc, a
private corporation, of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 sq. meters acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel,
members of the Dumagat tribe.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of C.A. No. 141, as amended. The
Director of Lands found reversible error in the applicability of the 1935 Constitution at the matter at hand. He asserts
that Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution is the correct law to be applied in the findings because the
registration proceedings have only commenced on July 17, 1981. Since the provision provides for the prohibition of
the private corporations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not exceeding 1000
hectares, the IAC allegedly erred in issuing a registration in favor of Acme.

Issue: W/N Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., a juridical person, is qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act

Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court.

Acme, although a private corporation, was qualified to apply for the judicial confirmation of its title under Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Act, because the land subject was already a private property at the time it was acquired
from the Infiels on October 29, 1962. Due to the open, continuous, exclusive, notorious occupation of the Infiels
and their ancestors since time immemorial, the lands in question have been converted to private property by the
mere lapse or completion of said period (30 years under the The Public Land Act, as amended). Thus, Acme
acquired a registrable title, considering that there is NO constitutional prohibition against a private
association holding or owning a private land.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically “public” land, despite immemorial possession of the
Infiels and their ancestor, Acme is still granted the right to acquire the subject land because the 1935 Constitution
did not prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already
acquired the “incomplete” or “imperfect” title. The only limitation was that corporations could not acquire, hold, or
lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares.

It is incontestable that PRIOR to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the
land in question had already been fixed and established. The confirmation proceedings brought under the aegis of
the 1973 Constitution was purely an accidental circumstance. The Court held that the Constitution cannot impair
vested rights even before a law took effect or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper.