Lecture 6 – Criminal damage

Criminal Damage Act 1971, s.1 (1)

A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to another
intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to whether any such
property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an offence.”

Actus Reus
 Damage or destruction
 Property
 Belonging to another

Mens Rea
 Intention or recklessness as to the damage or destruction
 Intention or recklessness as to the property belonging to another

Damage or destruction
 Whether property had been damaged is a question of fact and degree to be
determined either by the jury or magistrate, Cox v Riley (1986)
 The jury or magistrate should apply ‘their common sense’ in deciding ‘whether what
occurred was damage or not’, taking into consideration the circumstances of the
case, the nature of the property and how the property has been affected, Roe v
Kingerlee [1986]
 Destruction: property that is permanently damaged beyond repair

Damage
• Need not be severe or permanent, Gayford v Chouler [1898],
• Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary [1986] – showed that
the damage does not have to be extensive to count
• Must be more than trivial, A v R [1978]
• Thus, any significant alteration to property can count as damage, provided it requires
more than a trivial expenditure of time, effort, or money to undo.

Property, s10 (1)

• Property of a tangible nature, whether real or personal, including money and
- wild creatures which have been tamed or are ordinarily kept in captivity, and any
other wild creatures or their carcasses if, but only if, they have been reduced into
possession which has not been lost or abandoned or are in the course of being
reduced into possession;
- but not mushrooms growing wild on any land, or flowers, fruit or foliage of a plant
growing wild on any land.

Belonging to another, s.10 (2) CDA 1971

• Property shall be treated as belonging to any person
- having the custody or control of it;
- having in it any proprietary right or interest (not being an equitable interest arising
only from an agreement to transfer or grant an interest); or
- having a charge on it.
Intention or recklessness as to the damage/ destruction
 Ordinary meaning of intention, Moloney [1985], Mohan [1976], Woollin
[1999]
 Subjective recklessness, G [2004]
 Miller v Jackson [1977]

Intention or recklessness as to the property belonging to another

 Ordinary meaning of intention, Moloney [1985], Mohan [1976], Woollin
[1999]
 Subjective recklessness, G [2004]
 Defendant intends to cause damage
 The prosecution will have to prove that the defendant knew that the property
belonged to another
 Smith (David) [1974] damaged a property and moved cupboards and thought
that he owned the property
 They did not realise that there was someone else property so he did not have
the mens rea but had the actus reus

Aggravated Criminal damage

Criminal Damage Act 1971, s1 (2)
A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property,
whether belonging to himself or another—
(a) intending to destroy or damage any property or being reckless as to
whether any property would be destroyed or damaged; and
(b) intending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of another or
being reckless as to whether the life of another would be thereby
endangered;
shall be guilty of an offence.”

Actus reus
 Damage or destruction
 Property
 Belonging to D or another

Mens rea
Intention or recklessness as to thereby endangering the life of another
• There is no actus reus element of endangering another
 Ordinary meaning of intention, Moloney [1985], Mohan [1976], Woollin
[1999]
 Subjective recklessness, G [2004]
 No requirement for the life to be endangered,
Parker [1993]
 D set fire to his semi – detached house, realising that his neighbourhood lives
may be endangered
 His conviction was upheld notwithstanding that the neighbours turned out to
be away
 The connection between damage/destruction and the danger (“thereby”),
Steer [1986]
 D fired a rifle at the windows of V’s house, both intending to cause damage
and being reckless, whether life would be endangered
 His conviction under s.1 (2) was quashed
 He was reckless whether life would be endangered by the bullets, not by the
damage to the house
 It is enough for D to intend or foresees endangering life by the property
damage that will follow from his actions

Arson- s.1 (3) CDA 1971

 An offence committed under this section by destroying or damaging property
by fire shall be charged as arson.”Not a stand-alone offence, must be charged
alongside s1(1) or s1(2) – e.g., basic arson contrary to s1(1) and (3) CDA 1971
 Note: ‘by fire’ is a component of both AR and MR

Statutory defences
Criminal Damage Act 1971, s. 5
 Two statutory defences: a) belief in owner’s consent and b) belief in the need
to protect the property
 Only apply to s1(1) basic criminal damage offence
Honest belief, s 5(3) CDA 1971
• It needs to protect the property
• The belief needs to be honest
Criminal Damage Act 1971. S.5 (2)(a)
 D believed that the person whom he believed to be entitled to consent to the
destruction of or damage to the property had so consented or would have so
consented to it if they had known of the destruction or damage and its
circumstances.
 Or the owner would have consented to the damage
Denton [1981]
 D set fire to his employer’s cotton mill, causing some £40, 000 worth of
damages to do so, since the business was in difficulty and a fire would “help
its financial circumstances “
 The court of Appeal quashed D’s convictions
 The underlying fraudulent motive was irrelevant, as to a charge of criminal
damage
 D’s belief that he had consent, from someone he thought who had entitled to
give such consent was sufficient to establish a lawful excuse

 Blake v DPP [1993] – listen 28;15

Criminal damage Act 1971, s5 (2)(b)

D destroyed or damaged the property to protect property belonging to
himself or another or a right or interest in property which was or which he
believed to be vested in himself or another, and he believed—
 (i) that the property, right or interest was in immediate need of protection;
and
(ii) that the means of protection adopted or proposed to be adopted were or
would be reasonable having regard to all the circumstances.

Elements of s5(2)(b) defense

 D must believe:
 - that the property belonged to her or another, Cresswell v DPP [2006] – the
defendant destroyed the bucherrs to protect property – listen back to 31
 - that it was in immediate need of protection (objective), Hill and
Hall (1989)
 - that conduct was a reasonable means of protecting the property
(subjective), Chamberlain v Lindon [1998]
 D must act in order to protect the property (objective),
Hunt (1978)
 D was assisting his wife who was deputy warden in a block of old person’s
flats
 He discovered that the fire alarm was not working
 D set fire to some bedding in part of block of flats in order to draw attention
to the defective alarm and to protect the block of flats from the risks posed
by the defective alarm
 The court of Appeal accepted the first purpose but rejected the second:
 The question or whether a particular act of destruction or damage or threat
of destruction was done or made to protect property to belong to another
must be on the true construction of the statute
 His genuine purpose to bolster the protection mechanisms in the block of
flats, the lawful excuse within s.5 was unavailable as the threat was not
immediate