Unit 7 Workbook – Deadline: Monday 30th October. No Full Draft Review.

You may have your adversary task diagrams (Task 7.1a) reviewed by the coach if you request by no later than 15 th October.

Level 6 Accredited Diploma for Certified Security Management Professionals (CSMP®) Unit 7 – Protecting Buildings
1

For Candidate Use For Official Use

LUIS VICENTE RODRIGUEZ PEREZ First Assessor Name Robbie Nelson CSMP® F.ISMI
0545SP SPAIN Internal Verifier Name Robbie Nelson CSMP® F.ISMI
17/MAR/2024
Oct 23
Candidate Declaration
In submitting this work for assessment, I hereby declare:

1. I have read the Unit text in full.

2. This is my own, individual work.
3. I have not copied the work of other student(s) or engaged another person to write the answers for me.
4. I have not sought assistance from any party other than the ISMI® nominated coach for this unit.
5. Where I have used additional sources (Internet, reference books etc) I have referenced these and not presented them as my original thought.
6. I have not worked together with other student(s) to produce shared answers in whole or in part.
7. I have not shared my answers, verbally or otherwise, in whole, part or draft, with any other student.
8. If I have saved this assignment to a shared drive, I have encrypted the retained copy after sending for assessment.

I have read the Academic Discipline Policy and the Course Terms and Conditions and I understand that the standard penalty for students who violate the rules
on academic misconduct is disqualification.

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 Unit 7 Workbook – Deadline: Monday 30th October. No Full Draft Review.
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For Official Use

Assessor [Assessor name] Dates

Has the candidate met all of the Exceeded/Met/Referred/Fail
assessment criteria? Note:
1. Fail grades awarded to incomplete submissions.
2. Late submissions eligible for met/fail grades only.
Overall assessment comment. Assessor Aide Memoire
7.1a SRA, Checklist, ATD
7.1b Comparative Analysis
7.2a Specific C/measures
7.2b Crime & C/measures
7.2c Multi-tenant
7.3a/b BIDS
7.3c Diagnostics
List any task numbers that have not
met the assessment criteria.
Summary of required remedial
action(s) and resubmission
deadline.
Remedial actions log.
Final assessment comment (if
referral).
Internal Verifier Robbie Nelson CSMP® F.ISMI
Overall assessment comment.
External Verifier Robbie Nelson CSMP® F.ISMI
Observations.
Actions Arising from External
Verification
Final Result [competence evidenced/competence not evidenced]

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 Unit 7 Workbook – Deadline: Monday 30th October. No Full Draft Review.
You may have your adversary task diagrams (Task 7.1a) reviewed by the coach if you request by no later than 15 th October.

Unit Outcome 7.1 Be able to develop security vulnerability analysis models.

Assessment Criteria 7.1a Produce a security vulnerability analysis process for a building’s context
7.1b Compare and contrast inherent security vulnerabilities in different kinds of structures

For Candidate Use

The following task is designed to meet one assessment criterion, 7.1a.

Task 7.1a

You are provided (right) with a Security Risk Part 1: Security Risk Analysis
Analysis (SRA) for the Lakeside Gallery (see Risk descriptor Probability Impact IRV Control S Priority
accompanying case-study document), Theft of high-value exhibits 2 5 MODERATE Base MEDIUM
highlighting the management security concerns during quiet hours by an
relating to the building. organized criminal syndicate.
Theft of high value exhibits 3 5 HIGH Base MEDIUM
Part 1: during quiet hours by tenant.
Theft of exhibits during 3 3 MODERATE Barely MEDIUM
Complete the IRV and priority values within the opening hours by an adequate
SRA matrix. opportunistic visitor.
Robbery of entrance fee booth 2 4 MODERATE Barely MEDIUM
Part 2: by local criminals. Appropriate
Damage/vandalism of gallery 3 4 HIGH Barely HIGH
You are a security consultant and you have been spaces by visitors attending an adequate
asked to complete a survey of the gallery evening event.
Theft of goods from a souvenir 4 2 MODERATE Barely MEDIUM
building.
shop by local youths. adequate
Taking into consideration the risks described in

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the SRA opposite and the information/images

provided (in the accompanying case-study
document), devise a vulnerability checklist tool
specific to this building for completion during
your on-site visit.

A good response will identify at least 20 points

under at least four physical security headings.
Be sure to reference the Unit Textbook.

Part 3:
RN: The priority values in the SRA of Half is incorrect. There is no such value. Study again Unit 1, p25.
Produce an Adversary Task Diagram for one of
the risks identified that incorporates at least
three adversary paths with an AND gate and Part 2: Vulnerability Checklist
three adversary paths with an OR gate.

Be sure to see the example provided in the No Caption Vulnerability questions Referee
Indicative Content/Common Mistakes document 1 External environment How does landscaping influence the creation of ISMI (U7,p
and review Background Notes 5.2 and 5.4 in the potential hiding places or means of access to roofs or 17)
Extranet Library for extra tuition for this task. other access points?
2 External environment What is the effectiveness of outdoor lighting in ISMI(U 7,p
discouraging unwanted activities and facilitating 27)
surveillance through CCTV systems?
3 External environment What alternative security measures have been ISMI (U7,p
considered to compensate for the absence of 19)
perimeter fencing in the external area?
4 External environment How does the presence of nearby trees affect ISMI (U7,p
visibility for natural surveillance and CCTV systems? 19)
5 External environment What are the possible implications of the elevation in ISMI (U7,p
the eastern area, especially in the services and 17)

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parking area, in terms of blind spots and

unauthorized access?
6 building structure To what extent does compartmentalization ISMI (U7,p
contribute to security, avoiding risks or generating 43)
areas conducive to concealment and potential
danger?
7 building structure How have the various uses and areas been ISMI (U7,p
considered when determining the necessary security 43)
measures?
8 building structure What measures have been taken to avoid annoying ISMI (U7,p
false alarms generated by the presence of sensors in 47)
glass areas?
9 building structure How important is the detection of the opening of ISMI(U7,p.45)
doors and windows within the security system for
the gallery?
10 building structure How does solar exposure affect the operation and ISMI (U7,p
performance of security sensors, especially those 48)
located in the southern area?
11 building structure To what extent does security technology ensure the ISMI (U7,p
allocation of permissions and access to tenants 59)
beyond their designated areas?

12 doors What is the feasibility of securing all doors with locks ISMI (U7,p
to prevent unauthorized access attempts? 31)
13 doors How is unauthorized entry at doors effectively ISMI (U7,p
monitored and detected by control or alarm 31)
systems?
14 doors What is the resistance of exterior doors to guarantee ISMI (U7,p
the security of the facility? 31)
15 doors What specific measures have been implemented to ISMI (U7,p
prevent attempts to cut the locks, such as security 31)
bolts or other elements?

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16 doors How do doors and their frames meet the standards ISMI (U7,p
necessary to be considered certified security 19)
elements?
17 doors How do doors and their frames meet the designated ISMI (U7,p
safety standards to be considered safe doors and 60)
frames?
18 doors Have alarm systems been installed at emergency ISMI (U7,p
exits to ensure security and prevent unauthorized 60)
access?
19 Glazed What is the resistance of the glass areas to delay ISMI (U7,p
areas/windows intrusion attempts? 17)
20 Glazed What interior reinforcements have been ISMI (U7,p
areas/windows implemented, such as vestibules with doors and solid 17)
walls, to reinforce security against possible
intrusions?

RN: Your vulnerability checklist above requires a review as some of the questions are multiple questions
within one and some also require detailed narrative rather than yes or no at this stage.
RN: Your logic diagram below offers the same adversary path. The requirements is for three different
adversary paths. Study again the task requirements.

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 Unit 7 Workbook – Deadline: Monday 30th October. No Full Draft Review.
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Part 3: Adversary Task Diagram

Damage/Vandalism
ADVERSARY PATH/TASKDIAGRAM
Damage/vandalism of gallery spaces by
visitors Attending a late evening event

Enter the exhibition Avoid detection by Commit acts of

area during the night security and vandalism in specific
event. surveillance areas of the gallery.

Damage/Vandalism
ADVERSARY PATH/TASKDIAGRAM
Damage/vandalism of gallery spaces by
visitors Attending a late evening event

Identify less guarded or Wait for discrete Carry out acts of

less trafficked areas opportunities to vandalism in the
within the gallery. commit acts of selected areas.
vandalism.

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 Unit 7 Workbook – Deadline: Monday 30th October. No Full Draft Review.
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Damage/Vandalism
ADVERSARY PATH/TASKDIAGRAM
Damage/vandalism of gallery spaces by
visitors Attending a late evening event

Attend the night event Wait for the event to Look for opportunities
as a regular visitor. end and security to be to commit acts of
reduced. vandalism in crowded
areas of the gallery.

Damage/Vandalism
ADVERSARY PATH/TASKDIAGRAM
Damage/vandalism of gallery spaces by
visitors Attending a late evening event

Enter the exhibition Identify alternative Evaluate options for

area from the exterior access points through committing acts of
during the night event. the perimeter. vandalism once inside
the gallery

Damage/Vandalism
ADVERSARY PATH/TASKDIAGRAM
Damage/vandalism of gallery spaces by
visitors Attending a late evening event

Enter the exhibition Identify alternative Evaluate options for

area from the exterior access points through committing acts of
during the night event. the perimeter. vandalism once inside
the gallery

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Damage/Vandalism
ADVERSARY PATH/TASKDIAGRAM
Damage/vandalism of gallery spaces by visitors
Attending a late evening event visitors Attending a
late evening event

Evade security at the Look for less guarded Commit acts of

main entrance of the or less trafficked areas vandalism in the
gallery during the night within the gallery. selected areas.
event.

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 Unit 7 Workbook – Deadline: Monday 30th October. No Full Draft Review.
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For Official Use

Task 7.1a Assessor Comments

Grade Exceeded/Met/Referred/Fail (highlight as appropriate)

Comments

Remedial actions by candidate (if required)

Comments after remedial actions

Unit Outcome 7.1 Be able to develop security vulnerability analysis models.

Assessment Criteria 7.1a Produce a security vulnerability analysis process for a building’s context
7.1b Compare and contrast inherent security vulnerabilities in different kinds of structures.

For Candidate Use

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 Unit 7 Workbook – Deadline: Monday 30th October. No Full Draft Review.
You may have your adversary task diagrams (Task 7.1a) reviewed by the coach if you request by no later than 15 th October.

The following task is designed to meet one assessment criterion, 7.1b.

Task 7.1b

Select another building with which you are familiar

and provide a brief description and image. Based
on a thorough assimilation of the Unit Textbook,
complete a comparative analysis of the main
physical security vulnerabilities between the Unit
case study (Lakeside Gallery) and your chosen
building.
Own building: Brief description
The Swissport Cargo headquarters in Madrid occupies a strategic position on Avenida del Aeropuerto,
number 25, in the Airport Zone of the Barajas Airport Madrid Spain. This location ensures optimal
accessibility from the region's main transportation routes and facilitates efficiency in air logistics
operations.

A good response will detail at least ten points and
identify:
 Strengths/vulnerabilities in inherent
architectural design
 Strengths/vulnerabilities in any building
modifications
 Strengths/vulnerabilities in the building
shell
Be sure to apply and reference the Unit Textbook.
Construction and Distribution Features:
The building, built in 2012, stands out for its specific design for the efficient management of loading
and unloading operations. It consists of five floors that house specialized areas for handling goods,
administrative offices and spaces designed to optimize airport logistics.
Advanced Infrastructure:
The Swissport Cargo headquarters has an advanced infrastructure that includes three loading
platforms, designed with state-of-the-art technologies to ensure efficiency and safety in the handling
of merchandise. In addition, an internal goods transportation system has been implemented that
adapts to the specific needs of the products handled, guaranteeing an agile logistics flow.
Comprehensive Security:
Safety is a top priority at Swissport Cargo headquarters. An advanced access control system, operated
by magnetic cards, ensures that only authorized personnel have access to specific areas of the
building. This system extends to the elevators, strictly controlling internal mobility. The installation of
CCTV cameras covers key areas such as loading docks and administrative offices, providing constant
and effective surveillance.

Security Personnel and Surveillance Shifts:

During daytime operations, two security officers, working 12-hour shifts, comprehensively supervise
the building. One officer is in charge of the main reception, handling access control and searches,

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while the second makes regular rounds, inspecting critical areas and ensuring compliance with
security procedures. During the evenings, a security officer remains at the main reception, managing
access and making rounds as necessary.

Access Control and Monitoring System:

Access control is managed using magnetic cards, assigned to both permanent staff and temporary
visitors. Elevators, essential for logistics, are only activated with authorized cards. The CCTV
monitoring system provides complete coverage, with a viewing center in the main reception and NVR
recording equipment with six months' storage capacity.

Safety and Emergency Procedures:

Swissport Cargo headquarters has meticulously developed security procedures supervised by the
complex's security coordinator. These procedures range from access control to aerial handling of
merchandise, entry and exit of suppliers, and respond to emergency situations. Constant supervision
ensures effectiveness and compliance with these procedures in all daily operations.

This detailed description offers a complete view of the Swissport Cargo headquarters building in
Madrid, highlighting its characteristics, infrastructure, security systems and logistics operations in the
Barajas Airport Zone. Currently I work here as Air Safety Coordinator with the company Securitas,
lines below attached image.

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Swissport Cargo Madrid Airport Headquarters Building Spain (It is my workplace)

Case study building: Own building: Compare and Contrast Analysis

Strengths/vulnerabilities
Building Environment: The
gallery is located in an open
area that has extensive areas of
surrounding vegetation, offering
ample green spaces. This
environment could facilitate the
camouflage of possible
adversaries. During nighttime
hours, identifying individuals
hidden among the trees and
vegetation surrounding the
building becomes especially
complicated. This factor poses
additional challenges for threat
detection in the area
Strengths/vulnerabilities
Building Environment: The
building is strategically located
in the airport area of Madrid,
occupying a prominent place on
a main artery. This location
ensures optimal lighting thanks
to the surrounding
infrastructure and maintains a
constant flow of vehicles and
people until late at night. The
construction shares boundaries
with significant aerial zone
structures. These adjacent
buildings not only enhance the
importance of the area, but also
In the comparison analysis
between the Lakeside Gallery
and the Swissport Cargo
Building in Madrid, it is
highlighted that both
constructions share the
vulnerability related to the
probability of concealment from
adversaries, due to the presence
of large green spaces and large
trees. However, the divergences
are evident in the location and
use of space. While the Lakeside
Gallery is located in a natural
environment away from cities,

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surrounding the building.
ISMI( U7, P19)
Roof: The roof design is
characterized by its flat shape,
incorporating skylights that shed
light to the first level. Notably,
from the periphery near door
#8, reserved for the entrance of
tenants, a potentially delicate
circumstance is observed. The
exterior constructions adjacent
to Office #1 could offer climbing
14
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act as a solid defence, dedicated to art and culture,
considerably minimizing the risk Swissport Cargo is located in the
of concealment or unauthorized Madrid airport area, a more
access attempts in the vicinity of urbanized location oriented
the Swissport Cargo towards airport logistics
headquarters in Madrid. operations. The Lakeside
ISMI( U7, P19) Gallery, immersed in a wooded
environment, highlights the
concern about the risk of
concealment, highlighting the
need to issue specific security
recommendations. In contrast,
the Swissport Cargo Building
presents an extremely low
probability of concealment,
given the absence of significant
green spaces around it, adapting
to a more controlled and urban
environment. Consequently,
security measures and risk
assessments vary, focusing on
mitigating the particularities of
each environment.
Roof: The roof design on the As the textbook points out, ISMI
Swissport Cargo Madrid (U7,p19 ), flat roofs will always
headquarters building, a 5-story represent an opportunity for the
building, stands out for its determined and trained
comprehensive approach to adversary, especially when the
safety. The unique roof building is a few stories high, as
configuration provides structural is the case with the Lakeside
strength. Access to the terrace is Gallery, which has with a very
meticulously governed through wide ceiling that could allow
an automated system integrated various types of actions to be
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opportunities to determined
individuals, allowing them to
reach the roof. This scenario
raises the possibility of these
individuals seeking refuge on
the deck, with the subsequent
intention of clandestinely
accessing the facilities. ISMI (U
7,p 19 )
15
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with the elevators,
strengthening control measures.
Emergency stairs, equipped with
alarms and magnetic locks,
represent another strength by
preventing unauthorized access
from the inside. Although the
terrace is not rented, a possible
vulnerability could be the need
to assess risks associated with
climbing from adjacent
buildings, requiring additional
considerations to ensure full and
continuous protection. ISMI (U
7,p 27)
carried out by adversaries.
The comparison between
Swissport Cargo and Lakeside
Gallery reveals significant
divergences in terms of the
vulnerabilities associated with
their flat roofs. While the
Lakeside Gallery, with its
extensive roof and multiple
skylights, presents itself as a
potential unauthorized access
point, Swissport Cargo, despite
having only 5 floors, shows a
more robust configuration and
location as an air cargo hub in
the airport area, mitigating the
probability of threats from the
roof. This analysis highlights the
importance of considering both
the architectural design and the
specific function and location of
each building when evaluating
its security vulnerabilities and
strengths.
In summary, the Lakeside
Gallery stands out for its greater
potential vulnerability from the
roof, while Swissport Cargo
presents a more robust security
profile, derived from its
specialized function and
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Design : The architectural
conception of the building,
which was designed in an
isolated area on the outskirts of
the city in 1970, did not consider
the current increase in crime
rates in its risk assessment. In
particular, the windows on the
ground floor, hinged and
oriented towards the side with
less pedestrian traffic (North
and East), which represent a
vulnerability by allowing their
opening and potential intrusion.
ISMI (U7, p15). This design,
conceived decades ago,
highlights the need to update
security strategies in the face of
current challenges.
16
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Architectural Design : The
architectural design of the
Swissport Cargo building,
conceived with a modern
perspective and adapted to
contemporary risks in its airport
zone location, is distinguished
by its completely glazed façade
from the Ground Floor to the
fifth floor. Equipped with a
central air conditioning system,
it dispenses with traditional
windows, presenting only small
openings in the upper part of
each office to facilitate
ventilation. This specific design
seeks to minimize the risk of
unauthorized entry from the
outside, reflecting a proactive
approach to security. ISMI (U7,
p15).
strategic location in the Madrid
airport environment.
Based on the comparison and
contrast analysis between the
Lakeside Gallery and Swissport
Cargo, fundamental differences
are highlighted in terms of the
vulnerability associated with the
windows and their influence on
the security of both structures.
In isolated environments, such
as the Lakeside Gallery, the
windows on the Ground Floor
become critical risk points,
located towards the most
secluded area of the building,
surrounded by vegetation that
provides cover for possible
intrusions. This configuration
highlights the need for specific
measures to mitigate potential
risks.
In contrast, Swissport Cargo's
design reflects a more advanced
and secure architectural
strategy. With only five floors,
the building adopts a mostly
glass façade, reducing the
presence of conventional
windows and eliminating
vulnerable points compared to
the Lakeside Gallery. This choice
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CPTED: Within the scope of
CPTED (Crime Control
Environmental Design) theory,
the Lakeside Gallery stands out
for its exceptional maintenance,
both in its interior and exterior
spaces. This meticulous care
creates an immediate
impression of security, deterring
potential adversaries by
conveying the idea of an area
under constant and well-
maintained surveillance. The
attention dedicated to keeping
spaces in optimal condition
eliminates any sign of neglect or
abandonment, acting as an
effective deterrent against
potential criminals. ISMI ( U2,p
26)
17
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CPTED: Within the framework of
the CPTED (Crime Control
Environmental Design) theory,
the characteristics of the
surroundings of the Swissport
Cargo headquarters building in
the Madrid airport area reflect
an appearance of security.
Strategically located in this area,
the building benefits from its
proximity to airport facilities and
the active presence of police
forces. Constant police
surveillance in the area and
proper maintenance of the
building contribute to creating
the perception of a safe
environment. This apparent
security image acts as a
deterrent to potential
adversaries, requiring careful
planning on their part to carry
out any criminal action against
the Swissport Cargo building.
ISMI ( U2,p 26)
of closed design, combined with
its location in a more controlled
and specific air zone for
logistical activities in the airport
area, suggests greater foresight
in the face of possible threats
and greater strength in terms of
security.
The broken windows theory
ISMI ( U2, p 16) clearly explains
how a neglected environment or
an abandoned building, in a
poor state of maintenance, can
give the impression that it is not
monitored or has optimal
security conditions due to the
carelessness of its owners and
this can encourage adversaries
to commit any criminal act.
Analyzing and contrasting
Lakeside Gallery and Swissport
Cargo from the perspective of
CPTED theory and Broken
Windows Theory, key
similarities and differences are
evident. Both structures, by
maintaining an excellent state of
maintenance, project a feeling
of security that acts as a
deterrent against possible
criminal acts. The careful
appearance of these
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Parking: Regarding the parking
area, at the Lakeside Gallery, the
parking lot intended for visitors
is located at a certain distance
18
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Parking: Regarding parking at
the Swissport Cargo Madrid
headquarters, there are two
designated areas: one for
environments, along with the
dedication of resources to
maintenance, suggests to
potential adversaries that they
are under constant surveillance
and that any attempted illicit
activity would face significant
difficulties.
In particular, Swissport Cargo,
located in the Madrid airport
area, stands out for its strategic
location and proximity to airport
facilities. The constant police
presence in this area reinforces
the feeling of security.
Furthermore, both buildings, by
avoiding the appearance of
neglect or abandonment,
eliminate the possibility that
adversaries perceive optimal
conditions to carry out criminal
actions. Together, these factors
suggest that both Lakeside
Gallery and Swissport Cargo
have implemented effective
measures to create safe
environments and deter
potential criminal threats.
The parking area at any facility
always represents a critical point
for security, as both vehicles and
their owners can be targets for
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from the main building,
requiring visitors to park their
vehicles and travel on foot for a
distance of around 600 meters.
meters to the gallery. Although
there have been no reported
incidents of theft from both
pedestrians and vehicles, this
provision could provide an
opportunity for potential
criminals. This design could
affect the perception of security
of potential buyers or tenants,
since the parking lot is remote,
surrounded by dense vegetation
and lacks the presence of a
dedicated security officer, which
could result in delayed
responses to any criminal
eventuality. ISMI (U 7,p 20)
19
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visitors on the Ground Floor,
with access from the main
avenue and controlled by the
security guard on duty, and
another for employees in the
underground, regulated by non-
transferable magnetic cards and
an automated gate. All parking
areas are equipped with a CCTV
camera surveillance system. This
design seeks to guarantee
effective and safe parking
control, contributing to
adequate protection and
supervision for both visitors and
employees . ISMI (U 7,p 20)
criminals, increasing the overall
risk. In the case of the Gallery
parking lot, vulnerabilities are
observed that could impact the
decision of potential buyers or
tenants, given that it is located
far from the main building,
surrounded by dense vegetation
that could lead to the
concealment of adversaries and
lacks a Security Officer. assigned
security, which could cause
delays in responding to an
incident.
In contrast, Swissport Cargo
demonstrates strengths in both
parking areas. The visitor space
is under the direct supervision
of the Security Officer at the
Main Reception, who, after
recording the data and verifying
the identity of the visitors,
controls the opening of the gate.
This place has CCTV cameras
and adequate lighting. Likewise,
the employee parking has a
separate entrance with
magnetic card reader and CCTV
cameras, numerical allocation of
spaces per office, CCTV coverage
on all levels with access to the
elevator with access control for
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Access Control: The Gallery
assessment reveals a potential
vulnerability in the access
control system, where the
opportunity for an adversary to
gain entry by bypassing security
protocols is identified. By
studying the plans in detail, it is
evident that it is feasible to
enter the cafe from the main
entrance hall and, later, to the
kitchen, and then exit through
the door that leads to the
internal hall, where the
exhibition stands are located,
thus avoiding Check-in at the
main reception and bypass the
pedestrian access turnstiles. This
scenario raises the possibility of
entry without proper
identification and without going
through the usual controls of
the access system. ISMI (U 7,p
43)
20
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Access Control: The access
control system of the Swissport
Cargo headquarters building in
Madrid demonstrates significant
solidity by having three entry
points, namely: the visitor
parking lot, the main reception
and the parking lot for
employees. These accesses are
rigorously controlled and
monitored 24 hours a day, 7
days a week, helping to
effectively mitigate the risk of
unauthorized entry. This
comprehensive approach
provides a robust procedure for
facility access control, greatly
reducing the chances of
someone entering undetected.
ISMI (U 7,p 43)
each floor and optimal lighting
In all areas.
The importance of the Access
Control system in the PPS
Protection and Security Plan of
any installation is undeniable,
being a priority function for the
security team. In the specific
case of the Lakeside Gallery, a
vulnerability is identified in the
possibility of entering the
facilities without registering at
the Main Reception. When
examining the Ground Floor
plan in the case study, it is
observed that by following the
route of doors 9, 10 and 11,
once inside the Café, there is the
possibility of accessing the
kitchen through a rear door and
exiting through the door located
inside the Gallery, thus evading
the control of the Main
Reception and the turnstiles. It
is recommended that this
vulnerability be addressed and
remediated in relevant
activities.
Swissport Cargo headquarters
building in Madrid demonstrates
a robust and well-designed
Access Control system,
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Emergency Doors: Door #2
presents a vulnerability as it is
made of glass, which requires
the implementation of
preventive measures to ensure
that unauthorized entry does
not occur through this
emergency exit. It is essential to
take all necessary precautions to
ensure safety and prevent any
unauthorized access through
this emergency door. ISMI (U
7,p 32)
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Emergency Doors: The
emergency doors in the
Swissport Cargo headquarters
building in Madrid have been
designed as internal, secured
with magnetic locks that
prevent access from the stairs to
the interior of the building. In
addition, to reinforce security,
closed circuit television (CCTV)
cameras have been installed in
the internal corridors leading to
the emergency stairs. This
approach guarantees greater
protection and access control,
offering an effective response in
emergency situations, as
detailed in the corresponding
report. ISMI (U 7,p 32)
evidencing solid security criteria
to prevent any adverse event or
unauthorized entry. Detection,
delay and response elements
are effectively implemented in
the PPS, which contributes to
maintaining rigorous control
over access to the facilities.
Emergency doors represent a
sensitive element in the security
of many buildings, where,
sometimes, the focus on
security-oriented design can be
lost in favor of aesthetic and
safety criteria. In the specific
case of the Gallery, emergency
exit door #2, designed with
glassy material for aesthetic
reasons, introduces a
vulnerability that requires
careful management. You need
to reinforce your locks,
incorporate magnetic contacts
and motion sensors connected
to CCTV cameras in the same
area. Although it should not be
locked, since it is an emergency
door, a solid reinforcement plan
can be implemented to improve
its level of protection.
In contrast, the Swissport Cargo
headquarters building
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Design of entrance door with
limited level of protection: It is
necessary to implement
effective security measures to
adequately protect the blind
that gives access to the cellar on
the Ground Floor, since it
represents a vulnerability in
case of not having adequate
protection systems. support and
monitoring.
Given the configuration of the
shutters, a potential weakness is
identified in the absence of
additional protection and
monitoring systems, especially
considering the type of closing
22
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Entrance door design with
limited level of protection: In
the specific context of Swissport
Cargo in Madrid, it is observed
that the design of the entrance
doors, especially the access
shutter to the warehouse on the
ground floor, has been planned
with measures of appropriate
protection. The importance of
safeguarding the integrity of the
facilities is recognized, and
adequate security, backup and
monitoring systems have been
implemented to mitigate any
possible vulnerability and there
are no doors that present a low
level of protection. ISMI (U7,
demonstrates strengths on all its
floors, evidencing a
comprehensive design in its PPS
Protection and Security Plan. As
for the emergency doors, a
complete system has been
implemented with detection
and notification devices in case
of intrusion attempts, supported
by CCTV cameras for effective
verification. These measures
ensure robust security in
emergency situations,
highlighting the difference
between both buildings.
Considering the level of
protection on doors is a crucial
factor when designing any
space, as it must align with the
specific function of each area. In
the case of the Gallery, the use
of blinds on the warehouse door
has been chosen, which,
although it may offer a certain
vulnerability, is especially
highlighted due to the absence
of a night security guard.
Emphasis is placed on the need
to address these vulnerabilities
with high priority, implementing
effective corrective actions to
ensure a high level of
protection, especially
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mechanism used. It is
recommended to ensure that
the padlocks are placed
internally and the installation of
a zoned magnetic contact to
detect any unauthorized
opening, activating the
corresponding signal for an
immediate response. ISMI (U7,
P34).
Potential risk of sabotage of the
Power Plant: The Gallery has
designated a specific space on
the Ground Floor to house its
backup Power Plant. This room,
reserved exclusively for the
backup team, is protected by a
solid double-leaf door with a
robust closing mechanism. It is
important to note that this
enclosure does not allow access
to the interior of the building,
thus providing an additional
layer of security for the Power
Plant. ISMI (U 7,p 20)
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P34).
Potential risk of sabotage to the
Electrical Plant : The backup
electrical installation in the
Swissport Cargo building is
located in the visitor parking
area, specifically on the Ground
Floor level, within the airport
area. However, significant risk
exposure is identified as the
backup equipment lacks physical
barriers to access. This
vulnerability could be exploited
by an adversary who, upon
entering through the parking lot,
can approach without
restrictions and carry out
sabotage actions, thus
generating a potentially critical
impact, given the strategic
importance of the Power Plant
considering the value of the
assets present in the facilities.
In contrast, the Swissport Cargo
building in Madrid exhibits
notable strengths in this regard,
where the comprehensive
design of the Protection and
Security Plan (PPS) has carefully
considered security conditions
and provides a solid level of
protection in all areas used to its
construction and design.
Emergency generators play a
critical role in most buildings as
they are essential to ensure the
continuity of operations during
emergency situations, and their
inclusion is contemplated in all
business continuity plans. The
Gallery has implemented
appropriate measures to protect
its generator, housing it in a
closed room that has no direct
connection to the interior of the
building. In addition, it has
ensured that the access door
has adequate locks and is
strategically located to supply
electricity to the Gallery's
priority spaces and systems.
In contrast, the Swissport Cargo
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in an airport environment. It is building shows vulnerabilities in

recommended to implement
additional protective measures
to safeguard this crucial asset in
contingency situations. ISMI (U
7,p 20)
terms of the protection of its
electric generator, as it is
located on the Ground Floor
level, within the space intended
for visitor parking. Although it
has a metal roof for protection
against inclement weather, its
location exposes the generator
to possible sabotage actions,
making it a critical asset in high-
profile office buildings. The
necessary recommendations
should be considered to
improve the safety and security
of this generator, given its vital
role in providing electrical
supply in contingency situations
for all office areas.

Task 7.1b Assessor Comments

Grade Exceeded/Met/Referred/Fail (highlight as appropriate)

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Comments

Remedial actions by candidate (if required)

Comments after remedial actions

Unit Outcome 7.2 Be able to apply physical protection to buildings.

Assessment Criteria 7.2a Synthesise the key elements of buildings security to create an integrated whole
7.2b Analyse crime opportunities to create specific countermeasures
7.2c Critically analyse special protective standards for multi-tenant buildings

For Candidate Use

The following task is designed to meet one assessment criterion, 7.2a.

Task 7.2a

You will understand from this Unit and earlier Part 1

textbooks that vulnerabilities generally fall into two
categories: a) vulnerabilities in security systems and
b) vulnerabilities inherent to the operation and its
processes.
Part 1:
Analysis of operational activities in the Lakeside Gallery that may attract additional risk.
The Lakeside Gallery is a complex in its daily operations with many different activities complicating
security arrangements and is a unique venue for functions such as weddings, birthdays and Christmas
parties, including a fully licensed bar. These often occur after the gallery has closed for the night, causing
confusion as to the regimes of the building and increasing times of insecurity. ISMI (U7,p 21)

Produce a detailed analysis of the operational

activities in the Lakeside Gallery that may attract The Gallery: The risks inherent to the cultural and tourist activity in the Lakeside Gallery, associated with

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additional risk.
Recommended word count 300-500 words.
Part 2:
List the elements of physical security that should
be a consideration in this facility and evaluate the
application in context of each of these elements
(no more than 100 words for each element).
A good response will evaluate at least eight
elements of physical protection.
26
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the opening of a public access center, focus mainly on the free access of visitors to the works of art
exhibited in galleries 1 and 2, as well as in the special gallery ISMI (U7,p 21). These risks, common in
museums and exhibition halls, include both potential damage and theft of the works on display. In this
context, it is identified that the most frequent risk comes from direct contact with the works, this being
particularly problematic due to the transfer of grease, dirt and sweat from the hands, which can cause
long-term deterioration.
Furthermore, the prolonged outdoor exposure, the lack of an anti-intrusion system, limited surveillance
and the presence of a closed circuit television (CCTV) system of undetermined nature contribute to a high
level of vulnerabilities in the Lakeside Gallery. Door #2, with its glass composition, amplifies the risk of
unauthorized intrusions, especially by criminals with illicit intent. This situation is aggravated by the
possibility that the door houses works of art of considerable value, thus increasing the risk of theft,
especially outside the established opening hours ISMI (U7,p 23 ). These circumstances highlight the need
for additional security and surveillance measures specifically at Lakeside Gallery to mitigate identified
risks and preserve the integrity of the artworks displayed in this particular space.
Shop and Cafe: The shop and cafe present a potential vulnerability for Lakeside Gallery, as a cunning
adversary could strategically enter from the Main Entrance Hall to the cafe. Subsequently, he could
advance towards the back door that leads to the kitchen and reach the back, finally exiting through the
kitchen door that leads into the hallway in front of door 4. This approach would allow the adversary to
avoid paying the entrance fee and evade registration at the Main Reception, creating a favorable scenario
to carry out dishonest or unauthorized actions inside the establishment. Additionally, this route could be
used to exit without going through the turnstiles and main reception, adding a discrete escape
component to the situation.
Identification of this potential unauthorized access route highlights the need to strengthen security in
linked areas, implementing measures such as close surveillance, enhanced access controls and effective
coordination between main reception and in-store and cafe surveillance. These measures will help
mitigate the risks associated with the identified vulnerability, strengthening the integrity of Lakeside
Gallery's security system.
Office Rental : Office rental, with uninterrupted access 24 hours a day, poses a significant risk to Lakeside
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Gallery, as detailed in the case study. The main concern lies in the possibility of accessing restricted areas
during the closure of the Gallery for cultural events from the offices. This unlimited access increases
vulnerability to theft in the store and café, as well as theft or damage to displayed artwork, and also
opens up the possibility of property damage.

A key vulnerability lies in limiting the security guard to acting only during gallery opening hours and some
specific events. Full tenant access to the premises significantly increases the risks for Lakeside, and
criminal opportunity, as highlighted in ISMI (U 7,p 23) , becomes an influential factor in this context.
Renting offices with 24/7 access creates additional risks:

24-hour security guard makes it difficult to establish strict access control for tenants. The possibility of
accompanied entry increases the likelihood of damage to furniture, conference rooms, equipment and
exhibits in Display Cases.

2. Threats and kidnappings: The possibility of 24-hour entry allows an informed adversary to take
advantage of the situation to hide and wait for a tenant to arrive during nighttime hours. This could lead
to threats, kidnappings or criminal actions in the Gallery.

3. Unsupervised Entry and Exit: Unrestricted 24-hour tenant access involves entry and exit of material
without proper records or controls. This lack of oversight could complicate investigations in the event of
theft, creating potential legal complications for Lakeside Gallery.

To mitigate these risks, a review and strengthening of the security system is required, implementing
measures such as expanded monitoring, detailed access logs and greater coordination with tenants to
ensure the integrity and security of the Gallery facilities.

Conferences and Events: Hosting conferences and events at Lakeside Gallery presents a number of
challenges and risks that demand attention and appropriate mitigation measures, as highlighted in the
case study. The occasional failure to hire a security guard for festive events, where alcohol is consumed
and run into the wee hours of the morning, raises the risk of negative incidents at Lakeside. Risks such as
vandalism, property damage, theft and even the possibility of fire increase in likelihood with potentially
high impact if effective security measures are not implemented ISMI(U7, p21,22,23).

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A clear vulnerability is evident in the absence of clear and mandatory procedures for events and parties at
Lakeside ISMI (U 7,p 22). The lack of specific guidelines could compromise safety and risk management in
these contexts. Additionally, events that qualify as prestigious suggest the existence of basic security
measures, but their applicability depends on Lakeside's hiring policies, highlighting the importance of
clarifying and standardizing such policies.

In the case of large-scale events in the conference room, where attendance is considerable, several
categories of risks arise:

1. Risks for attendees:

- The long and unguarded journey from the Gallery to the parking lot, especially in the early hours of the
morning, presents the risk of assaults due to the lack of security and the presence of wooded areas that
facilitate the concealment of possible adversaries.
- Parking without permanent guard, poor lighting and lack of access control increase the risk of vehicle
theft.

2. Risks to Gallery assets:

- The attendance of minors at celebrations such as birthdays and Christmas events increases the
probability of unauthorized entry to spaces with sensitive assets.
- Celebrations with alcohol consumption, such as weddings and birthdays, increase the risk of damage to
assets, spaces and equipment due to the presence of drunk people.

3. Reputational risk:
- Possible accidents during the celebrations, with factors such as alcohol consumption and the massive
attendance of children, could have a significant impact on the Gallery's reputation.
- The Gallery could be considered jointly responsible in the event of accidents with serious injuries or
significant damage to attendees or their belongings.

Addressing these risks requires a thorough review of security procedures, implementation of event-
specific measures and effective coordination with service providers to ensure a safe and controlled
environment during celebrations at Lakeside Gallery.

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Cleaning Services: Data protection, as mentioned in ISMI (U 7,p 23) , becomes a critical aspect when it
comes to cleaning services at Lakeside Gallery. The potential risk of theft or criminal activities, especially
in the presence of high-value pieces of art, is directly related to the measures taken during the
contracting of this service. Proper awareness and training of cleaning employees is crucial, as inadvertent
actions such as leaving windows or doors open can significantly increase vulnerability.

On the other hand, the possibility of cleaning staff entering before opening hours without human
supervision or CCTV systems presents a tangible threat. The presence of deterrent measures, such as
visual supervision or electronic surveillance, is essential to prevent dishonest acts. Furthermore, it is
highlighted that cleaning services could be used to infiltrate personnel into facilities that house critical
assets, such as valuable works of art. In the context of an Art Gallery, this adds an additional layer of risk,
as artworks can become targets for potential adversaries or organizations with illicit intentions.

It is important to note that the Gallery has only one security guard who performs multiple functions,
which makes it difficult for him to exclusively dedicate himself to supervising the cleaning staff during
their work. This condition, therefore, represents a potential risk in case an adversary is involved. To
mitigate these risks, it is essential to review and strengthen hiring policies, implement effective oversight
measures, and ensure safety awareness among housekeeping staff to maintain the integrity of Lakeside
Gallery.

Part 2
Physical security elements Application in relation to the case study. Referee
INFRARED BARRIER The implementation of an Infrared Barrier ISMI (U 7,p 47)
emerges as an essential protection
component, especially designed for works of
art of exceptional value or interest at Lakeside
Gallery. This sophisticated system plays a
crucial role by issuing an immediate alert
signal upon detecting any transfer in its
coverage area, which covers incredibly fine
and specific areas. Beyond being a mere

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deterrent and alarm element, the Infrared

Barrier acts as an effective safeguard by
speeding up the response to any attempted
unauthorized delivery in the sensitive area of
the work of art.

The infrared technology used in this barrier

not only provides an advanced level of
detection, but also adds an additional layer of
security by identifying any movement or
intrusion in the vicinity of valuable works of
art. This immediate response not only deters
potential infringers, but also allows for quick
and efficient action to prevent damage or
loss. The Infrared Barrier thus stands as a vital
component within the Lakeside Gallery
security system, contributing not only to the
physical protection of the works of art, but
also to tranquillity and confidence in the
integrity of the cultural space.
INTRUSION DETECTION IN The implementation of an Intrusion Detection ISMI ( U 7,p 43)
BUILDINGS system in buildings becomes a cornerstone of
security at Lakeside Gallery, seeking a
comprehensive approach that encompasses
shell protection, volumetric and targeted
detection. The design of these Intrusion
Detection Systems (BIDS) will be carried out
with strategic zoning, adjusted to the access
requirements and risk levels in specific areas.

The primary objective of this system is to

establish a network of intrusion and detection
alarms that provides precise information

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about unauthorized presence at unauthorized

times and places, especially after closure,
when the cultural space is left without direct
supervision. This proactive approach not only
serves as a deterrent measure, but also allows
you to quickly identify and respond to any
individuals who may seek to hide or
perpetrate a crime.

The zoning system becomes essential to

establish areas with specific restrictions,
ensuring that tenants and visitors remain
within the assigned boundaries. Likewise, the
inclusion of alarms on doors, windows and
glass areas contributes to a complete system,
providing early warnings of any attempted
unauthorized intrusion at vulnerable points.

Ultimately, this comprehensive Intrusion

Detection system not only strengthens the
physical security of Lakeside Gallery, but also
provides a valuable tool for effective access
management and proactive prevention of
unwanted situations, ensuring the integrity
and protection of valuable cultural heritage at
all times.

CCTV installation The installation of a Closed Circuit Television ISMI ( U 7,p 53-55)
(CCTV) system at Lakeside Gallery is a
cornerstone in establishing effective and
preventive protection in both the indoor and
outdoor environments. Choosing an
appropriate system is essential, and its

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functionality extends from safeguarding high-

value art exhibitions to international
surveillance.

In the field of protection of works of art, the

implementation of a Video Motion Detection
(VMD) system with artificial intelligence
makes it possible to delimit critical areas near
the works, where unauthorized presence
translates into an immediate alarm signal. .
This redundant approach is complemented by
photoelectric barriers, guaranteeing
comprehensive protection throughout the
installation. This advanced technology not
only acts as an effective deterrent but also
provides crucial forensic evidence in the
event of incidents.

At an international level, the CCTV system

offers an early view of any unforeseen event,
accelerating the response capacity to
unexpected events. VMD functionality and
intelligent video analytics are applicable both
locally and abroad, providing an additional
layer of security in any location.

The integration of the lighting system crucially

complements CCTV, ensuring optimal visibility
in all conditions. CCTV functions at Lakeside
Gallery range from forensic evidence and
security guard support to intelligent
surveillance, effective deterrence, alarm
verification and a significant reduction in

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response time. This comprehensive approach

not only reinforces gallery security, but also
maximizes investment efficiency, supporting
the integrity and protection of the cultural
space at all levels.
SECURITY GUARDS The presence of security personnel is ISMI ( U7, p59)
revealed as an essential component in the
Lakeside Gallery security chain, acting as a
complementary human factor to the
technological measures implemented. For
events outside of normal opening hours, the
availability of security guard services becomes
imperative, providing an additional layer of
protection.

One of the situations that generates special

attention is the management of prolonged
events, such as parties that last until the early
hours of the morning. In this scenario, the
cost associated with security services during
these events should be passed on to the
organizers to ensure effective and fair
coverage.

In the context of exhibition protection, the

recommendation to have a room assistant for
each exhibition space, depending on the value
of the works, is a prudent measure. These
assistants play a crucial role in informing and
preventing possible damage caused by
touching or other gentle actions against
artworks. Their presence not only reinforces
physical security, but also adds an interactive

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and educational component for visitors,

enhancing the cultural experience at Lakeside
Gallery.

In summary, the integration of security

WINDOWS AND GLAZED AREAS
personnel not only fulfills a preventive and
deterrent function, but also adapts to the
specific needs of different situations,
contributing to the maintenance of the
integrity and cultural experience in the gallery
space.
Security at Lakeside Gallery is challenged by ISMI (U7, p39-40,
the windows and glazed areas, especially in 45)
the glass doors and the events and
conference area, where the transparency of
the perimeter is evident. Although the
windows of offices 1 and 2 also raise
concerns, they are considered a lower priority
compared to the protection of already
fortified interior sectors.

The investment in changing windows and

glass for reinforced versions, although it could
be significant, is evaluated based on the
return on investment. The importance of not
compromising added value is highlighted, and
it is suggested to reinforce security at door #3
as a more effective and profitable alternative.
Additionally, the introduction of seismic and
breakage sensors in the glazing and window
areas is proposed as an additional measure to
provide early warnings and improve the
response capacity to possible threats.

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DOORS, LOCKS AND FRAMES
COMPARTMENTALIZATION
The strengthening of security measures at ISMI ( U7, p31-38)
Lakeside Gallery focuses on improving doors,
locks and frames, both in the entrance areas
of the building and in the compartmentation
of the lake side. The focus is on the main glass
door, No. 9, although it is recognized that
reinforcing it could involve a large
investment. Consequently, it is proposed to
direct efforts towards Gate No. 10 as a more
viable alternative. Doors #1 and #6 are also
identified as critical points requiring effective
door and frame systems to delay potential
unauthorized intrusions. Internally, the need
to provide doors with adequate security
systems is highlighted, including efficient
frames and locks.
The compartmentalization strategy at ISMI ( U7, p15)
Lakeside Gallery is based on the
implementation of a comprehensive system
involving motion detection, door and window
opening monitoring, enhanced CCTV, and
strengthening of doors and locks. The main
objective is to divide the interior of the facility
into functional compartments that are not
only utilitarian, but also contribute to overall
security.

In high-risk areas, such as the kitchen,

cafeteria and store, where cash is handled
and products are stored, the creation of an
isolated space is proposed. This space will not
only deter potential threats, but will also
trigger alarms, delay any unauthorized access

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attempts, and allow for an efficient response.

For tenants, it is suggested to establish a
specific area starting with door #8, limiting
their access to their designated space and
protecting doors #13 and #15.

Likewise, when the facility is used for events

and parties outside of normal hours, the need
to delimit and protect spaces not contracted
for such events is emphasized. Each sensitive
door that delimits a sector will require a
secure opening system, whether by key,
personal code, fingerprint, biometric
recognition or card, guaranteeing effective
access control at each critical point.
Lightning The implementation of the lighting system ISMI ( U7. p 27,53-
plays a crucial role in Lakeside Gallery's 54)
security strategy, encompassing both indoor
and outdoor areas. Following the lessons
learned in Topic 6, establishing effective
perimeter lighting not only delineates the
perimeter, but also enhances the functionality
of the CCTV system by improving deterrence
and alarm control capabilities.

Inside the facility, especially during hours

closed to the public, the implementation of
automatic and random lighting in specific
areas proves to be an effective tactic to deter
potential threats. This strategic lighting not
only serves a deterrent function, but also
generates a sense of ownership and
occupation, factors that contribute to

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reinforcing the general security of the place.

Furthermore, it is highlighted that adequate

interior lighting effectively complements the
CCTV system, although current technological
advances allow day/night systems to be
effective with low lux levels. The combination
of smart lighting and CCTV technology
supports a comprehensive security strategy at
Lakeside Gallery.

Task 7.2a Assessor Comments

Grade Exceeded/Met/Referred/Fail (highlight as appropriate)

Comments
Remedial actions by candidate (if required)
Comments after remedial actions
Task 7.2a your analysis identifies many of the operational activities in the Lakeside Gallery that may
attract additional risk and you make some relevant recommendations for mitigation. A number of
countermeasures however relate to shell protection which is unlikely to mitigate operational issues due
the adversary in these instances entering the building legitimately (i.e. as a visitor, staff, guest, tenant
etc.). This point has been highlighted in the Chatroom Transcript which you should make best use of.

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Unit Outcome 7.2 Be able to apply physical protection to buildings.

Assessment Criteria 7.2a Synthesise the key elements of buildings security to create an integrated whole
7.2b Analyse crime opportunities to create specific countermeasures
7.2c Critically analyse special protective standards for multi-tenant buildings

For Candidate Use

The following task is designed to meet one assessment criterion, 7.2b.

Task 7.2b
Crime statistics based on National Crime Rate for the country.
See opposite
crime statistics for National rate per Rate at Lakeside Rating in terms of national
the locality of the 1000 people Gallery Locality per average
Lakeside Gallery in 1000 people
relation to the Knife crime 0.6 0.1 0.17
National Crime Theft 55 50 0.91
Rate for the Criminal damage 53 50 0.94
country. This is a Vehicle-related crime 18 7 0.38
suitable indicator Burglary non-dwelling 3 5 1.66
as to the Antisocial behaviour 32 31 0.97
likelihood of crime Stealing goods from a shop while 7 11 1.57
types to be pretending to be a customer
expected at the Weapon-related crime 0.7 0.2 0.30
case-study site. Drug-related crime 2 1.6 0.80
Robbery (Business property) 0.8 0.9 1.20
Where the rating
in terms of the
Analysis of crime data.
national average

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is above 1.0, this Based on the crime statistics presented, we see a significant increase in Burglary non-dwelling, Stealing goods
means the from a shop while pretending to be a customer and Robbery Business property. As it is imperative that LakeSide's
prevalence of this Director of Physical Security prioritize strategically to address these challenges, below is a detailed analysis of the
type of crime is statistics regarding these crimes.
greater in the
region of the Now, these statistics presented offer alarming indicators that must be considered at a general level and
Lakeside Gallery specifically, in the context of the Gallery. Although our analysis will focus mainly on the three crimes with a higher
than nationally. rating, which indicate a greater probability of occurrence in our facilities: Burglary non-dwelling , Stealing goods
from a shop while pretending to be a customer and Robbery Business property ; We cannot ignore those crimes
Your task is to with a rating close to one, such as criminal damage, theft, social behavior and drug-related crimes.
analyse this data
and then identify In this sense, it is imperative to understand that, in general terms, crime rates should be a cause of concern for
the specific the authorities, since, if corrective measures are not taken, there is a natural tendency for them to increase over
countermeasures time. We observed a low incidence of crimes committed with weapons and knives, as well as against vehicles. This
you would add to low incidence could be interpreted as a preference of criminals for crimes that do not involve direct violence or
augment those confrontations.
already identified
in Task 7.2a. In the context of the Gallery, we must keep in mind that creating an easily readable and safe environment for
business owners, employees and legitimate visitors is essential. The lack of a clear definition of space can facilitate
In your crime and antisocial behavior. Now, let's delve into the three crimes identified:
countermeasures
you should 1. Burglary non-dwelling: At an alarming 66% above average, this crime involves an adversary entering a building
consider without authorization or surreptitiously for the purpose of committing burglaries. It is likely that the adversary has
architectural carried out a prior study of the site, evaluating security measures , delays and response capacity. In the case of
design, our Gallery, works of art are the main targets, especially due to their value on the black market.
deterrence,
surveillance, 2. Stealing goods from a shop while pretending to be a customer : At 57% above average, this modus operandi
detection and generally occurs in large stores with a large influx of people, making it easier for the criminal to camouflage
assessment, himself among legitimate customers. Although some individuals may perform these acts out of illness or emotion,
delays and others may do so in defiance of the security of the premises. In our case, days with a high influx of visitors or
response (suggest events can be times of greater risk.
you use these
categories as 3. Robbery Business property: At 20% above average, this type of robbery involves the presence of the victims on

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subheadings) in the scene and may involve some level of violence from the criminals. Generally, this crime is the result of a
relation to the planned action by organized groups. Although it is the least likely of the three in our Gallery, we must be prepared
crimes identified. to prevent it and respond effectively if it occurs.

In completing your In this sense, it is crucial to strategically address each of these crimes to guarantee the security of our Gallery.
analysis, think Implementing appropriate safety measures, collaborating with local authorities, and raising staff awareness are
back to how you essential steps to maintaining a safe environment and protecting both our community and our facilities.
have approached
these kinds of
tasks previously –
First, provide a
theoretical base.
Second, describe
and analyse the
current situation. Architectural design
Finally, make your Theoretical Basis: Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a widely recognized approach that
recommendations. focuses on the design of physical environments to prevent crime and promote safety. This approach is based on
Ensure to page several fundamental principles, including natural access control, natural surveillance, natural territorial
reference from reinforcement, management and maintenance, and compartmentalization (ISMI U2, P26).
the Unit Textbook
and make use of Description and Analysis of the Current Situation:
the wider
reference  Burglary non-dwelling : Burglary non-dwelling is a significant threat to the Gallery. The lack of maintenance in
materials in the the surrounding green areas has created blind spots and areas conducive to hiding potential criminals.
ISMI® Library. Furthermore, electronic security in high-value areas, such as galleries and the warehouse, is insufficient to
detect and deter intrusions. This has led to an increase in cases of theft at the Gallery, affecting both the
assets and reputation of the establishment.

 Stealing goods from a shop while pretending to be a customer : The Gallery also faces the risk of theft of
products from the store by posing as a customer. The current layout of the store's interior space, with shelves
and furniture that create dead spots and dark corners, makes it easier for potential criminals to hide.
Additionally, the lack of trained security personnel during peak customer periods contributes to the lack of
effective surveillance and the ease for criminals to commit thefts undetected.

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 Robbery Business property: The absence of a guardhouse and vehicle access control systems leaves the
perimeter of the Gallery vulnerable to unauthorized intrusions. This is exacerbated during periods of low
surveillance, when criminals can take advantage of the lack of supervision to perpetrate direct burglaries of
commercial property. These perimeter security vulnerabilities represent a significant threat to the integrity of
the Gallery and its assets.

Recommendations/Countermeasures :

 Burglary non- dwelling:

o Implement a regular maintenance plan for green areas to clear obstacles and improve visibility. This
includes regular pruning of bushes and trees that could serve as hiding places for criminals.
o Strengthen electronic security in high-value areas with advanced and redundant detection systems,
such as high-resolution cameras and motion sensors. This will allow for early detection of intrusions
and rapid response by security personnel.

 Stealing goods from a shop while pretending to be a customer:

o Reorganize the interior design of the store to maximize visibility from all points and eliminate dark
corners. This could involve relocating shelving and installing additional lighting to improve visual
clarity throughout the space.

o Hire non-uniformed security personnel during peak customer periods to improve surveillance and
detection of suspicious activity. These guards could be trained to identify criminal behavior and take
preventive measures to prevent theft. (ISMI U2, P26).

 Robbery Business property:

o Install a surveillance booth equipped with vehicle access control systems and camera monitoring to
supervise the perimeter 24 hours a day. The visible presence of security guards at the booth will
deter criminals and provide a quick response to any intrusion.
o Implement a vehicle access control barrier at the main entry point to restrict unauthorized access

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and improve perimeter security. This barrier could be controlled by security personnel in the
guardhouse, who could authorize or deny access as necessary.

By focusing on each of these risks individually and aligning specific measures with CPTED principles, the Gallery
will not only be able to strengthen its security, but will also be able to significantly reduce its vulnerability to
criminal activity. By implementing a comprehensive plan that addresses identified vulnerabilities, the Gallery can
create a safer and more secure environment for its visitors, employees and assets. This strategy will not only help
deter criminals, but will also allow for early detection of any intrusion attempts or suspicious activity, facilitating a
quick and effective response by security personnel.

By promoting a safe and welcoming physical environment, the Gallery will be able to enhance its customers'
experience and strengthen its reputation as a trusted and protected destination. Additionally, by reducing the risk
of criminal incidents, the Gallery can also mitigate the costs associated with asset losses, property damage, and
deterioration of brand image. In summary, by taking proactive measures to improve safety in line with CPTED
principles, the Gallery can build a solid foundation for its long-term success and ensure a calm and safe
environment for all involved.

Deterrence
Theoretical Basis: Deterrence is an essential component in crime prevention in commercial environments. It is
based on the idea of implementing measures that potential criminals perceive as costly or undesirable, which may
deter them from committing criminal acts. Deterrence theory suggests that potential adversaries evaluate the
cost, time, difficulty, and surveillance capability before attempting to defeat a facility's security measures (ISMI
U2, P21).

Description and Analysis of the Current Situation:

 Burglary non-dwelling : The Gallery faces the risk of non-residential burglary due to the lack of effective
deterrent measures. The absence of a visible security booth and vehicular entry barriers before access to the
visitor parking lot reduces the perception of security and increases the vulnerability of the place to
unauthorized intrusions. The lack of clear deterrent signs on the way to the main entrance also decreases the
perception of risk for potential criminals.

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 Stealing goods from a shop while pretending to be a customer: Inside the store, the lack of visible security,
such as security tags and anti-theft arches, allows criminals to feel less exposed to detection when trying to
steal products by posing as customers . The absence of signs indicating the presence of CCTV also reduces the
perception of surveillance and deterrence.

 Robbery Business property: The lack of a visible guardhouse and vehicular access control systems leaves the
Gallery perimeter vulnerable to unauthorized intrusions. The absence of clear deterrent signs could make
criminals perceive the place as an easy and low-risk target, thus increasing the risk of theft.

Recommendations/Countermeasures:

 Burglary non- dwelling:

o Install a visible security booth with vehicle entry barriers before access to the visitor parking lot to
increase the perception of security and deter potential criminals.
o Place visible illuminated signs on the path to the main entrance of the Gallery warning of the
presence of security and active surveillance systems to increase the perception of risk for criminals.

 Stealing goods from a shop while pretending to be a customer:

o Implement anti-theft arches at the store entrance and security labels on products to deter theft and
increase the perception of risk for criminals.
o Place signs inside the store indicating the presence of CCTV to increase the perception of surveillance
and deterrence.

 Robbery Business property :

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o Build a visible guardhouse at the main entrance to the Gallery, along with vehicle access control
systems, to deter criminals and increase the perception of security.
o Install physical barriers and clear vehicular access control signs at the property perimeter to indicate
that access is restricted and supervised, thereby deterring unauthorized intrusions.

By carefully applying these deterrent measures, founded on the solid theoretical foundation of crime deterrence,
the Gallery will not only increase the security of its facilities, but will also significantly decrease the likelihood of
being the target of criminal activity. The visible presence of deterrent security measures, such as a guardhouse,
vehicle access barriers and information signs, will send a clear message to potential criminals that the location is
protected and actively monitored. This increase in the perception of risk for criminals will help deter them from
committing criminal acts in the Gallery.

Furthermore, strengthening security through these deterrent countermeasures not only protects the Gallery's
assets, but also safeguards the integrity of visitors, employees and owners. By feeling safer in the Gallery
environment, potential users will be more inclined to visit the location and engage in commercial activities, which
can increase economic activity and business profitability. In short, by taking a proactive, crime deterrence-based
approach, the Gallery not only strengthens its security, but also promotes a more prosperous and welcoming
environment for all its stakeholders.
Surveillance
Theoretical Basis: Effective surveillance is an essential pillar in the protection of any environment, especially in
facilities with valuable assets. Based on security principles, surveillance is based on the implementation of
monitoring systems and supervision techniques that allow detecting and proactively responding to any suspicious
activity or security violation (ISMI U7, P46).

Description and Analysis of the Current Situation:

 Burglary non- dwelling : The Gallery currently faces challenges in its surveillance due to limited coverage in
outdoor areas. This creates security gaps that could be exploited by intruders. Additionally, the lack of
advanced detection technologies makes it difficult to identify potential threats early, thereby increasing the
risk of unauthorized intrusions.

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 Stealing goods from a shop while pretending to be a customer: Surveillance inside the store is insufficient to
prevent theft by fraudulent customers. The absence of covert security personnel and the lack of effective
communication systems between security personnel contribute to the vulnerability of the establishment. This
situation increases the risk of losses due to product theft.

 Robbery Business property: Surveillance of the exterior spaces of commercial property has significant
deficiencies, leaving areas vulnerable to intrusion. Furthermore, the lack of coordination between fixed and
mobile surveillance points makes it difficult to detect and respond in a timely manner to any detected threat.
This increases the risk of theft and damage to commercial property.

Recommendations/Countermeasures:

 Burglary non- dwelling :

o Integrate video motion detection (VMD) capability into CCTV cameras to identify and record any
suspicious activity early. ISMI U7, P46).

o Extend CCTV coverage to the Gallery's exterior spaces to expand surveillance and deter intrusion.

 Stealing goods from a shop while pretending to be a customer:

o Implement covert surveillance by assigning plainclothes security guards during peak customer
periods.
o Place megaphones in strategic areas to broadcast warning messages in case of suspicious behavior by
customers, thus deterring possible robbery attempts.

 Robbery Business property:

o Extend CCTV coverage to the exterior spaces of the commercial property to ensure complete
surveillance and reduce blind spots.

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o Install CCTV monitoring screens at fixed guard posts to facilitate coordination between security
teams and ensure a quick and effective response to any detected threats. This will help deter
criminals and protect Gallery assets.

Implementing effective surveillance measures is essential to ensure security in the Gallery. Periodic assessments
of the security infrastructure should be performed and systems updated as necessary. Additionally, it is essential
to train security personnel in the use of emergency response equipment and protocols. Maintaining a proactive
approach to surveillance will ensure the protection of assets and the safety of visitors and employees.

On the other hand, during closing hours, the focus is on remote monitoring. The ability to view in real time from
an external location ensures a quick response to any suspicious activity. This proactive approach, supported by
advanced technology, strengthens security during hours when the physical presence of security personnel may be
limited.
Detection and Evaluation
Theoretical Basis: An effective Protection and Security Plan (PPS) is based on the early detection of threats to
prevent criminal incidents. The priority is to avoid these unwanted events rather than simply reacting to them. To
achieve this, it is crucial to have detection devices that send alerts to an evaluation system, such as an alarm
monitoring company, for immediate action. This strategy is based on the theory that criminals evaluate the cost
and probability of being caught before committing a crime (ISMI U5, P22 ).

Description and Analysis of the Current Situation: The Gallery faces several security risks, including non-
residential theft, shoplifting by impersonating a customer, and theft of commercial property. The lack of a Control
Center highlights the need to have an alarm monitoring company to manage the detection and evaluation of
these crimes.

 Burglary non- dwelling : The absence of detection equipment in critical areas such as evacuation routes and
the lack of integration of video motion detection into CCTV cameras increases vulnerability to intrusions.
Early warning capability is vital to enable immediate response and reduce potential damage.

 Stealing goods from a shop while pretending to be a customer : The lack of detection devices inside the
store, such as magnetic pins and anti-theft arches, increases the risk of theft. Additionally, the presence of
non-uniformed guards can increase detection capabilities, especially during periods of high visitor influx.

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 Robbery Business property : The installation of panic buttons in various spaces of the Gallery and the use of
monitoring systems such as the BMS on the cellar shutter are essential to detect intrusions and activate an
immediate response. This helps minimize reaction time in emergency situations and reduce potential
damage.

Recommendations/Countermeasures:

 Burglary non- dwelling :

o Install motion detection equipment in critical areas such as evacuation routes to identify early
intrusions.
o Integrate video motion detection into CCTV cameras for more effective surveillance and rapid
response to threats. ISMI (U 7,P 44 ).

 Stealing goods from a shop while pretending to be a customer :

o Implement magnetic pins and anti-theft arches inside the store to detect attempted product
theft.
o Employ non-uniformed guards during peak visitor periods to increase security presence and
deter potential criminals. ISMI (U 7,P 59 ).

 Robbery Business property:

o Install panic buttons in various spaces in the Gallery to allow quick activation of emergency
response.
o Use monitoring systems such as BMS in critical areas to detect intrusions and activate alarms
effectively. ISMI (U 7,P 45 ).

Implementing screening and assessment measures at the Gallery will strengthen its security and protect both its
assets and those who visit it. These measures, which include the installation of motion detection devices, such as
active infrared beam, and the integration of motion detection technology into CCTV cameras, will improve early
warning capability for unwanted intrusions, thereby reducing the risk of robberies and other crimes. In addition,

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the presence of systems such as anti-theft arches and panic buttons, together with the hiring of non-uniformed
guards on days of high influx of visitors, will reinforce deterrence and response capacity in emergency situations,
ensuring a safe environment for all those who frequent the Gallery.
Delays
Theoretical Basis : The protection-in-depth principle states that each security layer in a protection system acts as
a delay for potential adversaries. This means that if one layer fails, subsequent layers must contain the
adversary's action. This theory, based on the idea of Reason's Swiss Cheese, recognizes that each security layer
may have vulnerabilities, but together they form an effective defense (ISMI U7, P24).

Description and Analysis of the Current Situation:

 Burglary non- dwelling : Lakeside Gallery faces the risk of non-residential burglary, which can occur in areas
such as the parking lot and peripheral accesses. The lack of effective security measures in these areas
increases the location's vulnerability to unauthorized intrusions. The absence of a visible security booth and
vehicle access control systems facilitates the access of unauthorized persons to the parking lot, which can
result in vehicle theft or attempts to enter the interior of the gallery.

 Stealing goods from a shop while pretending to be a customer : Theft of store goods is a significant concern
for Lakeside Gallery, especially when criminals try to go unnoticed as a customer. The current arrangement of
products in the store, without additional protective measures, allows criminals to easily access displayed
items and steal them without attracting attention. This lack of effective security within the store increases the
risk of inventory loss and financial damage to the gallery.

 Robbery Business property : The risk of commercial property theft at Lakeside Gallery involves the theft of
artwork or other valuable assets stored in specific areas, such as warehouses or exhibition rooms. The lack of
adequate security measures in these areas, such as the absence of alarm or surveillance systems, increases
the vulnerability of the location to organized theft or acts of vandalism. The lack of physical barriers or access
control devices also facilitates unauthorized access to these areas, which can result in significant losses for
the gallery.

Recommendations/Countermeasures:

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 Burglary non- dwelling :

o It is recommended that a guard booth with vehicle access control be installed at the main
entrance to the Lakeside Gallery. This booth will serve as the first layer of protection, delaying
any unauthorized entry attempts. The visible presence of the guardhouse can also deter
potential criminals.
o In addition, to further strengthen security in vehicular access, the implementation of a control
barrier with CCTV cameras and integrated intercoms is suggested. This barrier will provide a
second level of delay as it will require an additional interaction to allow access, making any
attempted vehicle theft difficult.

 Stealing goods from a shop while pretending to be a customer :

o To address the risk of product theft within the store, it is recommended that all items for sale be
placed inside counters or display cases. This measure will not only protect items from potential
theft, but will also create a physical barrier that criminals must overcome, delaying their theft
attempts and providing more time for security personnel to intervene.

 Robbery Business property:

o In order to protect the gallery's commercial property, it is proposed to install bollards controlled
from the Main Reception. These bollards will act as an additional physical barrier, preventing
vehicles from approaching vulnerable areas where artwork or other valuable assets are stored.
o In addition, the guardhouse and the vehicle control barrier at the main entrance can also be used
as additional delay elements for this type of theft. By restricting access and increasing security
visibility, these measures will help deter and delay criminals, providing more effective protection
for the gallery's commercial property.

Implementing effective delay measures at Lakeside Gallery is crucial to addressing identified risks and
strengthening its overall safety. These measures provide defense in depth, creating multiple layers of protection
that act as obstacles to potential criminals. By introducing additional physical barriers and control procedures, you
significantly hinder adversaries' ability to carry out criminal actions, increasing the likelihood of detecting and

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deterring any theft or intrusion attempts.

Furthermore, the presence of these delay measures can have a deterrent effect in itself, demonstrating the
gallery's commitment to safety and deterring potential offenders from attempting criminal acts. Ultimately,
implementing these measures not only protects the gallery's assets and property, but also provides peace of mind
to employees, visitors and customers by creating a safe and secure environment.

Answer
Theoretical Basis: The security principle, as established by ISMI U5, P26, dictates that the time the adversary
needs to penetrate security defenses (TP) must be greater than the sum of the detection time ( Td ) and the
response time ( Tr ). This TP > Td + Tr principle underlines the importance of an efficient and timely response to
any security incident to prevent the adversary from achieving its objectives.

Description and Analysis of the Current Situation: At Lakeside Gallery, security is challenged by the lack of
preventive considerations in its original design and the internal layout of its spaces, along with current business
hours. This situation makes it difficult to establish adequate defense in depth to address the specific risks of non-
residential theft, theft of store products by impersonating a customer, and theft of commercial property.

 Burglary non- dwelling : Burglary non-dwelling represents a significant threat to the gallery, as adversaries
may attempt to enter to steal artwork or other valuables. The lack of effective access control and adequate
surveillance at the main entrance increases the gallery's vulnerability to these types of incidents.
Furthermore, the internal distribution of spaces does not facilitate the implementation of effective delay
measures. This translates into the urgent need to establish physical barriers and stricter access protocols to
deter and delay potential intruders.

 Stealing goods from a shop while pretending to be a customer : Theft of products from the store, where
criminals pose as customers, is another important risk to consider. The proximity of the store door to the
main entrance poses an additional challenge, as thieves could attempt to quickly leave with stolen items
before an appropriate response is triggered. The lack of a specific response protocol for this situation and the
need to involve store personnel in security add complexity to managing this risk.

 Robbery Business property: Theft of commercial property, which may involve violence or risk situations for
visitors, represents an additional concern. The presence of clients and visitors in the gallery during business

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hours increases the possibility of such incidents occurring. A rapid and coordinated response involving local
law enforcement is crucial to ensure the safety of everyone in the gallery. In addition, the installation of panic
buttons and a comprehensive training program for personnel are essential measures to improve response
capacity in the event of an emergency.

Recommendations/Countermeasures:

 Burglary non- dwelling :

o It is suggested to hire an alarm monitoring company in order to improve the response capacity to
possible intruders. This measure would allow continuous monitoring of the installed sensors and
immediate action in the event of alarm activation, guaranteeing rapid intervention by the
authorities.
o Additionally, it is crucial to develop a detailed response protocol to detect unauthorized entries.
This protocol should take full advantage of the capabilities of the security team, including
notification of relevant authorities and implementation of containment measures.

 Stealing goods from a shop while pretending to be a customer :

o To address this risk, it is proposed to establish a specific response protocol for situations in which
the magnetic pin detector arc is activated. This protocol should involve store personnel for a
coordinated and effective intervention.
o Additionally, it is important to coordinate the response between the parking lot security guard
and the entrance guard booth staff to ensure quick and coordinated action in the event of a
store theft.

 Robbery Business property:

o It is recommended to involve local law enforcement authorities in the response capacity for
situations involving violence or risk to visitors. This would ensure an effective response and
greater safety for everyone present in the gallery.
o The installation of panic buttons in different areas of the gallery would be an additional measure
to improve emergency response capacity. These devices must be linked to a well-defined
response protocol coordinated with the contracted monitoring company.
o It is essential to implement a comprehensive training program for all personnel, including guards

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and administrative staff, to ensure an effective and coordinated response in emergency

situations. This would ensure the protection of gallery visitors and assets at all times.

Lakeside Gallery faces several challenges in its current security strategy, especially in response to potential
incidents. Although improvements have been proposed, it is clear that a more comprehensive approach is needed
to ensure effective safety management in emergency situations. This includes a thorough evaluation of each
proposed measure to ensure its long-term viability, whilst maintaining a sustainable financial balance for the
gallery. It is essential that the implementation of new security measures does not compromise the economic
stability of the establishment. Therefore, careful consideration of available resources and prudent management
of budgets allocated for this purpose are required. Additionally, working closely with local law enforcement
authorities and developing specific response protocols are critical steps to strengthening the gallery's ability to
respond to potential security threats.

RN: You have not accurately identified the three most prevalent crimes and moreover, use different terms when describing it. Please study the
chatroom transcript for guidance. Then the analysis is underdeveloped and should be expanded on. The response would be stronger if you
follow the Theory-Application-Analysis layout and to analyse each of the 3 risks separately under each of the sections, before going into
recommendations. Address each of the three crimes separately and for each, offer analysis and recommendations specific to each crime. See
Indicative Content and Chatroom Transcript.

Task 7.2b Assessor Comments

Grade Exceeded/Met/Referred/Fail (highlight as appropriate)

Comments

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Remedial actions by candidate (if required)

Comments after remedial actions

Unit Outcome 7.2 Be able to apply physical protection to buildings.

Assessment Criteria 7.2a Synthesise the key elements of buildings security to create an integrated whole
7.2b Analyse crime opportunities to create specific countermeasures
7.2c Critically analyse special protective standards for multi-tenant buildings

For Candidate Use

The following task is designed to meet one assessment criterion, 7.2c.

Task 7.2c

The tenanted workspaces within the Lakeside City of Nocester, March 2024
Gallery were originally let out at discounted rates
to local artists to encourage the development of
new local talent.
Dear Commercial Director of Lakeside Gallery
However, the newly-appointed Commercial Present. -
Director of the gallery has decided to renovate Subject: Concerns and Recommendations Regarding Change of Use of Tenant's Space
Reference : ISMI (U7,p 59 Appendix A)
the tenant space and create a small business
centre that generates viable income and
contributes to the overall profitability of the site.

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Part 1:
In the capacity as security manager for this
building, write a management briefing to the
Commercial Director identifying your concerns
about how this change in use of tenant space
will increase vulnerabilities and complicate the
maintenance of security.
Part 2:
Provide recommendations for inclusion in the
tenant contract that will help minimise the risks.
Reference should be made to Annex A on page
59 of the Unit 7 Textbook.
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SECURITY MANAGEMENT REPORT
GENERAL OBJECTIVE
The main objective of this report is to communicate to the Commercial Management of Lakeside Gallery
the security concerns identified by the Physical Security management in relation to the modification in the
use of spaces by tenants. The fundamental purpose is to ensure the overall integrity and security of the
facilities in the face of the implementation of new business processes aimed at generating additional
income and expanding the Gallery's activities. This strategic shift seeks to position Lakeside Gallery as a
growing Business Center, and the report presents key observations to address and mitigate potential risks
associated with these new business operations.
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES
 Current Security Situation: A thorough assessment of the existing infrastructure and security
protocols at Lakeside Gallery will be conducted. This analysis covers aspects such as access control,
surveillance systems, and emergency measures to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the
current situation.
 Impact of New Commercial Activities: How the introduction of additional commercial activities will
impact the physical security of the Gallery will be explored in detail. We consider key aspects such
as the increase in the influx of people, the diversification of space uses and the need to adapt
existing security measures.
 Identified Vulnerabilities: A number of vulnerabilities will be identified and carefully analyzed in
relation to the proposed new business activities. These include potential gaps in access control, lack
of knowledge about tenant profiles, and challenges in adapting infrastructure to meet security
standards.
 Environmental Threats: Detailed information will be provided on threats present in the surrounding
environment of Lakeside Gallery. This ranges from possible extreme weather events to emergency
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situations and external factors that could compromise the safety of the facility.

 Recommended Countermeasures: A series of specific recommendations and countermeasures

designed to mitigate the risks associated with new business activities will be presented. These
measures include physical security improvements, technology upgrades, tenant management
protocols, and preventative measures to address specific threats.

 Conclusions and Future Perspectives: In our conclusions, we highlight the importance of proactively
implementing the suggested recommendations to guarantee a safe environment adapted to new
business dynamics. We consider future perspectives, underlining the need for continuous security
management and preparation for possible evolutions in the risk environment.

INTRODUCTION

The Lakeside Gallery, with a deep history since its inauguration in 1970, has been a fundamental pillar in
the promotion of local artistic talent, recognized for housing works of art of various kinds and holding
temporary exhibitions by renowned artists at a national level, the Gallery is It has stood out as the main
exhibition center in the city. However, in response to growing economic challenges and rising
maintenance costs, there is a need to diversify its operations by incorporating new business activities.

Now, following the decision of the Lakeside Gallery Council to rent spaces to local businessmen and
artists, as those responsible for the security of the installation, it is necessary to take a photograph that
reflects what the current security situation is and what the pros and cons of installation. We must carry
out an analysis of what risks we face, what our vulnerabilities are and make risk mitigation
recommendations based on the following vectors to take into account: Physical, Procedural and
Contractual Points. This report addresses the essential considerations for the transition to a business
center, ensuring comprehensive risk management and the preservation of facilities, assets and security of
those participating in this new stage.

BACKGROUND AND CURRENT SITUATION

Lakeside was not conceived as a Business Center facility and the structure, access, security and

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emergency measures are not adequate for this new assignment. This report attempts to shed light on
what the Department of Security's recommendations are in the face of its new challenges. In the event's
history, office space users have been found wandering into restricted spaces during Gallery closing hours.
The first concern is that renters are not where they should be or when they should not be. Other concerns
respond to the duty to know adequately. to the tenants we will have for at least a year. Need to know:
ISMI (U7 Appendix A)

 Activity
 How can your activity influence the rest of the uses and activities of the Gallery?
 Staff with access to your office
 Use of dangerous elements/products
 Normal activity hours.
 How the office will be used during closing hours of the rest of the Facility.
 What emergency and safety planning does each tenant have?
 Your security and emergency planning can be integrated into the Gallery.
 What type of security technology will be available in each office.
 What use will they give to the goods receipt?
 What access and visit control procedures you will have with your employees, clients and
suppliers. And for vehicles of employees, clients and suppliers.
 What energy use will they make? Its activity requires abnormal use of the electrical system.
 They are going to make some modifications to the structure of the doors and windows.
 What is your password and access permission policy: codes, codes.
 What type of activity and rental insurance do you have?

ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF NEW COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES ON PHYSICAL SECURITY AT THE LAKESIDE
GALLERY

The introduction of new commercial activities at Lakeside Gallery poses a significant impact on the
physical security of the facility. With the prospect of becoming a Business Center, the Gallery faces
substantial changes in security dynamics. The increase in the number of tenants, with potential 24-hour
access, introduces challenges in access control and facility management. Additionally, the constant flow
of people and varied activities will require a thorough review of existing safety protocols to adapt to

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changing needs.

Furthermore, this change in the nature of operations implies a comprehensive re-evaluation of security
systems and a possible investment in more advanced technologies. The presence of tenants from various
commercial sectors introduces a wider range of potential activities and risks. From a physical security
perspective, consideration should be given to implementing specific measures to address diverse
scenarios, such as the safe handling of dangerous products, the prevention of unauthorized access, and
the effective integration of individualized security plans for each tenant.

VULNERABILITIES

Firstly, Lakeside was not conceived as a Business Center and in terms of security, the vulnerabilities to
new challenges are the following according to these questions: ISMI (U 7,p 14)

1) Who are the other tenants? Do they have any illegal and risky activities? Are your clients in
conflict? It is necessary to know the profile of tenants that Lakeside Gallery may have. (Annex A
P59).
2) Access control for all tenants is adequate to the needs of the Gallery: access control for staff,
suppliers, visitors, maintenance. (Annex A P59). A single access control for a single tenant can
destroy the minimum level of security of the facility.
3) All tenants are aware of and follow the package, mail and material delivery procedures contained
in the Lakeside Safety Plan. (Annex A P59).
4) Tenants must know and accept the Security and Emergency plan. It is a critical aspect of avoiding
liability to Lakeside property. (Annex A P59)
5) Do tenants have different work schedules? Is there a time limit to stay in the building? (Annex AP
60)
6) Emergency exits are armed and secure. Do they use emergency exits to let people in? Do they
use the emergency exit to smoke? (Annex A P60)
7) They know the key management policy. How are unauthorized copies of keys controlled? (Annex
A P60)
8) What are the individual insurances for each tenant? Individual insurance faces Lakeside property
insurance.

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9) The security policy must be understood and assumed by tenants. (Annex A P60)
10) The cleaning staff of each tenant, if they are external to the building, must assume the access
control and opening hours policy. (Annex A P60)

ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS:

As we assess the Lakeside Gallery environment, a concerning trend emerges in crime rates, specifically
the likelihood of robberies. An increase is observed in cases of entry into commercial facilities, robberies
perpetrated by individuals pretending to be clients, and robbery situations in the presence of visitors.
These threats pose a substantial risk to the security of the Gallery, especially after identifying the
previously mentioned vulnerabilities. To counter these threats, it is essential to implement measures that
strengthen the current security design of the facilities.

On the other hand, the materialization of a theft on the premises would not only compromise the
integrity of the Gallery, but would also have significant consequences on the confidence of potential new
tenants. The resulting loss of confidence could drastically decrease the probability of closing new business
or contracts on advantageous terms, directly affecting income potential. Considering these risks, specific
recommendations are presented to address the identified threats and ensure comprehensive protection
of the Lakeside Gallery from the growing concerns of the criminal environment.

RECOMMENDED COUNTERMEASURES ISMI (U 7,P 59 Annex A) :

Physical Points:

 Thorough review of access and security systems: Given the need to guarantee the integrity of the
facilities, a thorough evaluation of all access will be required during the closure of the premises.
This review should include the inspection of locks, windows and any vulnerable points that could

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be exploited by intruders. Additionally, the installation of additional access control systems, such
as surveillance cameras and motion sensors, is recommended to strengthen perimeter security
(ISMI, U 7, P 59 Annex A).

 Electrical Infrastructure Improvements: Given the increase in electrical load caused by new
business activities, it is crucial to evaluate the impact of these activities on existing electrical
infrastructure. Improvements should be made if necessary to prevent potential technical or
security issues. Furthermore, it is suggested to investigate the feasibility of upgrades to the
electrical infrastructure to guarantee a stable and secure supply of energy, especially to security
systems (ISMI, U 7, P 59 Annex A ).

 Review of Physical Security and Detection Systems: To maintain effective protection of exhibits
and activities within Lakeside Gallery, a complete review of physical security and intrusion
detection systems is recommended. This involves verifying the proper functioning of surveillance
cameras, intrusion alarms and any other security device implemented, ensuring their
effectiveness and ability to respond to possible threats (ISMI, U7, P 12-43)

Procedural Points:

 Identification and access control procedures: It is essential to establish clear procedures to

identify tenants and regulate their access to the premises. It is recommended to assign exclusive
doors for certain tenants and establish regulated work hours and access. Additionally, strict
access controls, such as smart card readers, must be implemented to ensure that only authorized
persons can enter the building (ISMI, U 7, P 60 Annex A).

 Development of a comprehensive emergency plan: Each tenant must be prepared to respond

appropriately to emergency situations. Therefore, it is suggested that each develop their own
emergency plan, aligned with Lakeside Gallery's general emergency plan. This plan must include a
thorough analysis of potential risks and mitigating measures to ensure the safety of all building
occupants in the event of an emergency (ISMI, U 7, P 60 Annex A).

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 Implementing safety training: It is vital to provide regular safety training to all tenants and gallery
staff. These educational sessions should address topics such as evacuation procedures,
emergency management, and safety equipment management. By ensuring that everyone is
properly trained, a proactive safety culture is promoted and preparation to face various
eventualities is increased (ISMI, U7, P 60 Annex A).

Contractual Points:

 Contractual security clauses: To ensure compliance with security policies, specific contractual
clauses must be included in lease agreements. These clauses should address aspects such as key
management, the implementation of security measures and the obligation to maintain civil
liability insurance. In addition, clear consequences must be established in case of non-compliance
with these clauses (ISMI, U7, P 60 Annex A) .

 Obligations of external cleaning staff: External cleaning personnel must also comply with
established safety policies. Therefore, it is recommended to include specific contractual clauses
to ensure compliance, which may include access restrictions and specific procedures for materials
handling and waste treatment (ISMI, U 7, P 60 Annex A).

 Responsibility in the disclosure of information: A contractual clause must be established that

stipulates the responsibility of tenants in the disclosure of information relevant to the security of
the gallery. This may include communicating changes to business operations or notifying
potential risks identified by tenants themselves. Adequate disclosure will contribute to more
effective risk management and a faster response to emergency situations (ISMI, U7, P 60 Annex
A).

CONCLUSIONS:

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Importantly, proactive implementation of the recommendations outlined in this report is essential to

safeguard the overall security of Lakeside Gallery in its new role as a business center and exhibition
venue. By adopting these measures in a timely manner, not only will the assets and people involved be
protected, but it will also strengthen the reputation and trust in the facility as a safe and reliable place for
the development of commercial and artistic activities. The adoption of these measures will not only result
in the physical protection of assets and people, but will also foster an environment conducive to growth
and innovation, thereby facilitating the flourishing of new commercial and artistic opportunities.

In conclusion, Lakeside Gallery's Physical Security Management has demonstrated a clear commitment to
the organization's business objectives, aligning its actions with the new activities planned by
management. In addition, it recognizes the importance of maintaining a proactive approach to crime
trends in the environment, establishing a work plan with short, medium and long-term objectives that
reflect the highest standards of budgetary efficiency and security. Through this combination of preventive
measures and planned management, the gallery is well positioned to maintain its position as a leading
landmark in the city of Nocester, not only in terms of art and culture, but also in terms of comprehensive
security and protection.

I appreciate your attention and remain cordially available to discuss any aspect of this report in the
corresponding detail.

Sincerely,

Luis Vicente Rodríguez Pérez

Director of Physical Security
Lakeside Gallery

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RN: On the right track but the recommendations would be better set out under subheadings of Physical,
Procedural and Contractual points as discussed in the Indicative Content and Chatroom Transcript. Study
these documents again and revise accordingly.

Task 7.2c Assessor Comments

Grade Exceeded/Met/Referred/Fail (highlight as appropriate)

Comments

Remedial actions by candidate (if required)

Comments after remedial actions

Unit Outcome 7.3 Be able to select appropriate electronic protection for buildings.
Assessment Criteria 7.3a Differentiate between different detection and monitoring systems for specific purposes
7.3b Produce a conceptual design for electronic detection and surveillance systems
7.3c Diagnose problems in the application of specific intrusion technologies

For Candidate Use

The following task is designed to meet two assessment criteria, 7.3a and 7.3b

Task 7.3a/7.3b

Part 1:

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Building on the response to Task
7.1a (survey vulnerability
checklist), produce an outline
concept for a BIDS installation
suitable for the Lakeside Gallery.
Your design concept should be
commensurate with the risks
identified, the general building
layout and in harmony with the site
operations.
Part 2:
Add detail to your design concept
in relation to each of the following:
 Shell Protection
 Volumetric Protection
 Target Protection
 CCTV Alarm Assessment
Your recommendations, which are
to be based on the principle of
ALARP, should be supported by a
rationale (business case). Strong
answers will include example ROI
metrics.
Part 3:
On the plan provided superimpose
your design concept, identifying
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Part 1: Outline concept-level description of your BIDS design
The design of the Integrated Intrusion Detection System (BIDS) for Lakeside Gallery is based on creating a robust
and adaptable security environment that protects the gallery's critical assets and ensures the integrity of its
operations at all times. The BIDS is conceived as an interconnected network of sensors, surveillance devices and
response systems designed to detect, deter and respond effectively to any threat or intrusion. The primary
objective of the BIDS is to provide comprehensive, scalable coverage that is tailored to the specific needs of
Lakeside Gallery, addressing both previously identified operational and physical vulnerabilities.
However, to design a complex and effective security plan for Lakeside Gallery, it is essential to thoroughly analyze
existing operational and physical vulnerabilities, as well as consider exposure outside of opening hours and the
presence of tenants with continuous access to the building. Based on these considerations, a comprehensive
protection scheme is proposed that guarantees the security of critical assets and gallery spaces at all times. It is
essential to consider several key aspects that have been previously identified to guarantee comprehensive and
effective protection:
1. Critical Gallery Assets: Lakeside Gallery's most valuable and critical assets are concentrated in the exhibition
areas, which include Galleries 1 and 2, as well as the Special Gallery where the most notable works are presented.
In addition, the Storage Warehouse is essential, since it houses the works of art that are prepared for delivery to
clients.
2. Operational and Physical Vulnerabilities: Both operational and physical vulnerabilities have been previously
identified in Lakeside Gallery. These weaknesses can range from inadequate security procedures to a lack of
physical protection in certain areas of the gallery.
3. Exhibition outside of Opening Hours: Since the Gallery will rent space on the first floor for a Business Centre,
there is continuous exhibition outside of normal opening hours. This can increase the risk of intrusions and
unauthorized activity, especially if a contract is not in place to hire 24-hour security guards.
4. Need for Security outside of Opening Hours: The lack of presence of security guards 24 hours a day can leave
Gallery spaces vulnerable outside of opening hours. This vulnerability is further exacerbated during high-traffic
events, such as parties or weddings, which may take place outside of regular operating hours.
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the location of all the
recommended devices with an
associated key/legend.
Part 4:
Analyse the options for
Monitoring, Assessment and
Response (Target word count 250
words).
NOTE: The numbers on the plan
are to assist with navigation and
clarity of discussion; they are not
an indication of where devices
should be located.
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5. Risk Associated with Glass Structures: The presence of glass structures, such as the façade in the event room and
a glass emergency door, represents a significant risk. These areas may be vulnerable to attempted intrusion or
vandalism, requiring additional security measures.
With careful consideration of Lakeside Gallery's security features and needs, a comprehensive protection scheme
has been designed that addresses every critical aspect of the facility. This scheme, based on the combination of
Intrusion Detection Equipment (BIDS) and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) systems, has been structured to ensure
complete protection of the gallery at all times, following the considerations:
 Doors: Doors, being key access and exit points, will receive special attention in terms of security. Housing
sensors will be deployed on the external glass doors to detect any intrusion attempts, while the roller shutters
will be protected with a Barrier Barrier Monitoring system (BMS) integrated with the CCTV for effective
verification. In addition, Access Control systems and electromagnetic locks will be installed on internal doors
that connect critical areas.
 Windows: Aware of the vulnerability that windows represent, especially on the ground floor, glass breakage
sensors will be installed in all of them. This system will immediately alert security personnel in the event of any
attempt to break or tamper with the windows, thus guaranteeing a quick and effective response to possible
threats.
 Roof: Skylights and skylights, being possible access points from the outside, will be protected with housing
sensors to prevent any attempted intrusion from the roof. This additional layer of security ensures complete
protection of the gallery against intrusions from any direction.
 Glass Walls and Facades: Facade areas composed of glass will be equipped with intrusion sensors connected to
the CCTV system. This will allow for early detection and rapid response to any suspicious activity near these
vulnerable areas, providing effective protection both during the day and at night.
 Internal Corridors: Full coverage of intrusion sensors will be implemented in internal corridors, especially
exhibition stands and those leading to areas with high value assets. These sensors, together with detection and
CCTV systems, will ensure continuous surveillance and an immediate response to any potential threat.
The proposed protection scheme for Lakeside Gallery is based on a comprehensive analysis of its operational and
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physical vulnerabilities. Critical areas such as doors, windows, ceilings, glass walls and internal hallways are
addressed through the strategic combination of Intrusion Detection Equipment (BIDS) and Closed Circuit Television
(CCTV) systems. Installing housing sensors at main entrances and vulnerable areas provides early detection of
intrusions or suspicious activity, supported by a CCTV system for quick and accurate visual verification.

Additionally, access control measures and restricted access systems are recommended, to ensure that only
authorized personnel have access to specific areas, minimizing the risk of unwanted intrusions. This comprehensive
approach is not only limited to the gallery's opening hours, but also addresses exhibition outside of these hours, by
activating alarms in internal corridors and continuous surveillance via CCTV. In conclusion, the proposed protection
scheme is specifically tailored to the needs of Lakeside Gallery, offering a comprehensive and effective solution to
safeguard its assets, ensure the safety of its visitors and maintain the integrity of the facility at all times.

Part 2
A holistic and meticulous approach to protection is presented for Lakeside Gallery, focused on safeguarding the
integrity of its accesses and windows. This plan details a strategic deployment of advanced intrusion sensors at
each vulnerable point, seeking to deter any potential threats and ensure the effective safeguarding of the gallery
and its critical assets. Through careful selection and placement of these sensors, the aim is to create a
comprehensive defense barrier that strengthens perimeter security and minimizes vulnerabilities. This measure not
only seeks to prevent unauthorized intrusions, but also to protect the valuable artistic heritage and guarantee the
peace of mind of visitors and gallery staff.

SHELL PROTECTION

DOOR SENSORS ( ISMI U7, p44):

 Rented Area : Balanced magnetic sensors (BMS) will be implemented on all doors of rented offices to
detect any unauthorized opening. Emergency door number #7 will have a continuous alarm 24/7, being
inaccessible from the outside. Two strategic windows will be equipped with glass break sensors, activating
when the building is idle.

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 Conferences and Events: Balanced Magnetic Sensors (BMS) will be installed on all doors. The emergency
doors will remain alarmed 24/7 and will be inaccessible from the outside. To prevent glass breakage in the
glazed area, the installation of glass break sensors will be recommended. In addition, infrared barriers will
be placed on the access staircase to the upper floor during events, generating an alert if someone
unauthorized attempts to climb.

 Shop and Cafe : Balanced magnetic sensors (BMS) will be used on all doors, providing information on their
status. The emergency door will remain alarmed 24/7 to prevent unauthorized openings, especially during
events.

 Exhibition Area : Balanced Magnetic Sensors (BMS) will be present at all doors in the exhibition area. The
emergency doors will remain alarmed continuously, ensuring inaccessibility from the outside.

 Storeroom Roller Shutter: The roller shutter, being a vulnerable entrance due to its access from the
outside, will require robust protection. BMS sensors will be implemented strategically placed in the frame
and at the lower end of the door. This configuration will ensure reliable detection of any attempted
tampering or unauthorized opening. Furthermore, activating a continuous alarm in the event of an
intrusion will effectively deter potential adversaries.

 Emergency Exit Doors : Safety in critical situations is of utmost importance to Lakeside Gallery. Therefore,
all emergency exit doors will be equipped with BMS sensors installed at the top of the doors and in the
frame. This measure will ensure that these doors remain alarmed 24/7, ready to issue an immediate signal
in the event of any unauthorized opening, thus ensuring a quick and effective response to emergencies.

 Kitchen Doors: Security in the cafeteria and kitchen areas is essential to avoid unauthorized access and
possible risks to the integrity of the gallery and its visitors. BMS sensors will be placed on the top frame
and top edge of both doors, ensuring complete protection of these sensitive areas. This measure will help
prevent possible intrusion scenarios, especially during events or periods of lower activity.

The implementation of door sensors at Lakeside Gallery represents a significant step towards improving its
security. These devices provide constant surveillance and early detection of any unauthorized access attempts in
critical areas such as rented offices, conference and event areas, shops, exhibition areas and other key facilities. By

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keeping emergency doors and other accesses alarmed 24/7, sensors ensure a quick and effective response to any
security threat. Furthermore, its strategic installation at vulnerable points such as glazed windows and emergency
exit doors ensures comprehensive protection of the gallery's assets, minimizing the risks of intrusion and property
damage.

WINDOW SENSORS (ISMI U7, p45):

 Windows of Offices 1 and 2 (Ground Floor): Given their location and accessibility, the windows of offices 1
and 2 on the ground floor require special protection. An advanced detection system will be installed that
will include an active glass break sensor and a PIR sensor. This configuration will allow accurate and
reliable detection of any intrusion attempts, while minimizing false alarms. Additionally, this measure is
tailored to the specific needs of Lakeside Gallery, where physical security presence may be limited during
certain hours.

 Gallery Windows: Given the high-value exhibitions they house, windows in galleries will require special
protection. The installation of dual technology PIR and microwave sensors is recommended for complete
protection of these critical areas. This combination of sensors will ensure early and reliable detection of
any attempted unauthorized access to the galleries, thus preserving the integrity and security of the
artworks on display.

 Windows in Common Areas: For comprehensive perimeter protection, glass breakage sensors will be
installed in all windows in common areas and passageways. This measure will ensure early detection of
possible intruders, thus ensuring security throughout the building. The installation of these sensors is
based on the need for constant surveillance and rapid response to any potential threat.

This door and window protection strategy is based on the combination of advanced technologies and security
measures specifically tailored to the needs of Lakeside Gallery. The implementation of these systems will provide
comprehensive perimeter protection and an effective response to any unauthorized access attempt, thus
guaranteeing the security and tranquillity of the gallery and its visitors, in addition to these volumetric protection
measures, detailed in ISMI (U 7, p 47-51 ), guarantee comprehensive coverage in each area of Lakeside Gallery,
minimizing false alarms and ensuring early detection of possible threats or intrusions. The combination of
technologies adapted to each space reinforces security throughout the gallery.

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ISMI VOLUMETRIC PROTECTION (U 7,p 47 ):

PIR sensors

 Rented Area : A passive infrared (PIR) sensor will be installed in each office due to the reduced space,
ensuring effective coverage. The internal emergency door will also have PIR protection and the area of
doors #8 and #13 will be protected with dual PIR and microwave sensors.

 Conferences and Events : The glass area, prone to false alarms, will be protected with curtain sensors
during inactivity hours. Additionally, dual PIR and microwave volumetric sensors will be implemented in
the space between doors #4, #3 and #5. The non-glazed room will be covered with two PIR + MW dual
technology sensors. Door #5 will be protected with a PIR from the inside to emergency door #1.

 Shop and Cafe : In the commercial and cafeteria area, 2 PIRs will be installed, suitable for small spaces. The
kitchen emergency door will be protected with a PIR from the inside (kitchen).

 Exhibition Area: Each exhibition space will have dual-technology PIR and microwave sensors. The
emergency doors will be protected with PIR from the inside. Except for emergency door #2 for false alarms
in the glass area, the area after door #10 will be secured with a dual PIR and microwave sensor. The
installation of dual PIR+MW sensors will be considered in stands and showcases to detect suspicious
movements, providing an additional layer of security.

Microwave Sensors:

 Internal Gallery Corridors: The use of microwave sensors in the internal corridors of the gallery will provide
an additional layer of security, especially in areas where exhibition stands and sample cases are located.
The ability of these sensors to penetrate certain surfaces increases the probability of detecting possible
intruders, minimizing blind spots and improving the effectiveness of the security system.

 Main Galleries: Main galleries, where high-value artworks and assets are displayed, require an exceptional

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level of protection. Installing microwave sensors in these critical areas will ensure early and reliable
detection of any attempted intrusion, thereby preserving the security of the gallery's artworks and
heritage.

This comprehensive volumetric protection strategy is based on the combination of advanced technologies and
detailed consideration of Lakeside Gallery-specific vulnerabilities. The implementation of these detection systems
will provide optimal security, ensuring effective protection of the gallery and its assets at all times.

PROTECTION OF OBJECTIVES

 High Value Special Works: To protect works of art of important importance and value, the implementation
of infrared barriers is recommended. These barriers act as an early warning system by warning of any
movement in the vicinity of the work of art. This measure, detailed in ISMI (U 7,p 52 ), offers an additional
layer of security, guaranteeing an immediate response to possible threats.

 VMD System and Artificial Intelligence Technology: In the field of special protection of works of art, the
Video Motion Detection (VMD) system is used together with artificial intelligence. This combination
provides a detailed analysis of visitor behavior patterns, identifying actions that may represent risks to the
exhibited works. Documented in ISMI (U 7,p 55 ), this advanced approach allows for constant monitoring
and proactive detection of potentially dangerous behavior.

The synergy between infrared barriers and VMD (video motion detection) technology with artificial intelligence
represents a significant milestone in the protection of works of art in the Lakeside Gallery exhibition area. By fusing
the precise detection capability of infrared barriers with the sophistication and adaptability of SCV, a robust and
highly effective security system is established. These measures not only strengthen security across the board, but
also offer specific and personalized protection for each work of art, safeguarding its integrity and value in the
cultural and tourist context of the gallery. The combination of these technologies allows an immediate response to
any suspicious activity, minimizing the risks of damage or theft and thus guaranteeing the preservation of the
gallery's artistic heritage for present and future generations.

CCTV CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION ALARM EVALUATION (ISMI U 7,p 53-55) , The evaluation of CCTV alarms at

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Lakeside Gallery is carried out meticulously and strategically, covering different key areas of the facility to ensure
comprehensive protection . Below, each of the monitored spaces is detailed in greater detail and how they
contribute to strengthening security in the gallery:

 Rented Spaces : In this space, dome cameras are implemented in the common areas and passage areas of
the protected area. They function both as alarm control and for presence detection. The main entrance
and door #8 have identification cameras to obtain essential physical data on people's entry. This approach
not only provides security, but also makes it easier to identify authorized persons.

 Conferences and Events: For this key area, dome cameras are used in common areas and hallways within
the protected area. These cameras act as alarm control and presence detectors. The main entrance,
especially in the area between doors #9 and #10, has identification cameras that capture physical
information for check-in. In addition, a detection system is implemented in the glass area, ensuring
comprehensive coverage during events and conferences.

 Shop and Cafe: In these commercial spaces, dome cameras are used strategically located in each room,
ensuring effective alarm control and presence detection. Special attention is paid to monitoring cashier
areas to avoid possible theft or suspicious activity.

 Exhibition area : Dome cameras are deployed in common areas and passage areas within the exhibition
area. These cameras fulfil a double function, serving as alarm control and presence detectors. Its strategic
location guarantees effective coverage for the protection of the works of art and the general security of
the space.

 Perimeter: To reinforce perimeter security, an additional CCTV system with Video Motion Detection (VDM)
ISMI (U 7,p 53-55 ) and intelligent video analysis is implemented. This system provides valuable
information from the outside, focusing on access to the gallery and the loading and unloading area.
Detects any suspicious activity outside the gallery and allows alarms to be evaluated in the external
environment of the installation. This proactive approach improves the ability to respond to potential
external threats.

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Part 3:
Ground Floor

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First Floor

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Part 4: Monitoring, Assessment and Response Arrangements

In the context of Lakeside Gallery, comprehensive provisions are established for the monitoring, evaluation and
response to possible threats, with the aim of ensuring the security of the facilities, the works of art and their visitors.
These agreements are structured around a combination of advanced technologies and efficient procedures.

1. Monitoring:
 Advanced CCTV System: Lakeside Gallery has a closed circuit television (CCTV) system that covers both the
interior and exterior of the premises. This system uses video analysis and motion detection (VMD)
technology to identify unusual patterns and events.
 Infrared barriers and intrusion sensors: Deploying infrared barriers and intrusion sensors in critical areas
provides an additional layer of active monitoring. These devices generate alerts against any unauthorized
access attempt.

2. Evaluation:
 Remote command and control center: A remote command and control center will be established that
operates externally to the facilities. This center receives the alerts generated by the CCTV system, allowing
an immediate evaluation of the situation.
 External Video Surveillance: In the event of an alert, the control center uses the images provided by the
CCTV system to carry out a visual evaluation. This approach makes it easier to differentiate between false
alarms and genuine risk situations.

3. Answer:
 Coordination with Security Services: The remote control center is connected to external security services. In
real situations, this center coordinates directly with security services and, when necessary, with local
authorities for a rapid and effective response.
 False alarm reset: In cases of false alarms, the control center has the ability to reset the system and cancel
invalid alerts, avoiding unnecessary interventions.

This comprehensive Monitoring, Assessment and Response approach ensures that Lakeside Gallery has a proactive
ability to identify threats, assess their validity and trigger accurate and opportunistic responses. The combination of
modern technologies and remote coordination optimizes security effectiveness, protecting the assets and integrity of

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the gallery at all times. It is important to note that although Lakeside Gallery currently has a daytime security guard
during opening hours, the additional security measures described are essential to ensure complete protection,
especially during periods of late-night downtime and special events.

RN: In the 1st part, you should firstly identify the operational and physical vulnerabilities. Then offer a set of baseline
measures, rather than specific sensor placement. In the 2nd part, you then need to identify all the possible adversary
paths, with specific focus on the prevalent risks and vulnerabilities as identified earlier. Then in the 2nd part, offer analysis
of all the types of sensors, select a best fitting shell/volumetric/target sensor and layer these along the various adversary
paths. Depict these clearly on the two drawings and ensure the narrative and drawings align.

For Official Use

Task 7.3a/b Assessor Comments

Grade Exceeded/Met/Referred/Fail (highlight as appropriate)

Comments

Remedial actions by candidate (if required)

Comments after remedial actions

Unit Outcome 7.3 Be able to select appropriate electronic protection for buildings.
Assessment Criteria 7.3a Differentiate between different detection and monitoring systems for specific purposes
7.3b Produce a conceptual design for electronic detection and surveillance systems

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7.3c Diagnose problems in the application of specific intrusion technologies

For Candidate Use

The following task is designed to meet one assessment criterion, 7.3c

Task 7.3c

Part 1: Part 1

Referencing the Unit Textbook, advise what sensor Script Sensor Reason
you would use in the given scenario (see table You need a volumetric device to cover the glass Microwave The need for redundancy in
right) and why. vestibule and provide redundancy for the BMS ISMI(U 7,p 47) glass doors is addressed by the
installed on the main entrance doors. proposal to incorporate a
Part 2: volumetric device, specifically
using microwave technology.
Diagnose and solve the problems as indicated in This approach relies on the
the Part 2 table, recommending a solution. microwave's ability to pass
Be sure to page reference. through glass doors, effectively
covering the hallway.
Hint: In answering this task you may find Furthermore, the versatility of
Background Briefing Note 7.1 – Selecting Internal this technology allows it to not
Sensors – of considerable use. only address space coverage,
but also detect the cause of
activation of the Building
Management System (BMS)
through glass doors.

On the other hand, by opting for

the microwave, a
comprehensive solution is
achieved that fulfills both

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essential functions. The ability

to penetrate glass doors
facilitates accurate event
detection, providing valuable
information to the BMS about
possible intrusions or
anomalous events in the lobby.
In this way, security is improved
while ensuring the redundancy
necessary for the optimal
functioning of the building
management system.

You need a suitable sensor to protect the glass of Dual PIR + Glass The combination of Dual PIR
roof skylights. This must be alarming at all times Break Acoustics. technologies and acoustic glass
and resistant to birds perching or walking on the ISMI(U 7,p 47) break detection has been
skylights. carefully selected to optimize
the safety of roof skylights. By
using Dual PIR, it focuses on the
identification of human
movements, reducing the
possibility of false alarms caused
by the presence of birds.
Simultaneously, acoustic
technology responds to specific
glass breaking sounds, offering
an additional layer of
protection. This strategic
synergy provides comprehensive
and precise coverage,
addressing the particular
challenges of the environment
and minimizing unwanted

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interference, such as the entry

of sunlight or bird activity in the
area.

Furthermore, the selection of

these technologies not only
ensures efficient detection of
genuine threats, but also
strengthens resistance against
possible unauthorized events,
thus contributing to the
robustness of the security
system in the roof skylight
environment.
You want to tag and make sure that specific Active RFID Adopting Active RFID technology
exhibits don't leave the gallery. ISMI (U 7,p 52) for gallery display monitoring
offers an advanced and multi-
functional approach. Through
the ability to establish
geofences and virtual
checkpoints, this system not
only generates immediate alerts
should an exhibit move from its
designated location, but also
provides the ability for accurate
real-time tracking. This
functionality allows for
continuous and efficient
surveillance, giving security
managers the ability to monitor
the location and movement of
each exhibit in detail.

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Now, Active RFID technology is

not only limited to preventing
possible losses or theft, but also
becomes an integral tool for
inventory management and
exhibition planning. By
facilitating accurate tracking,
operational efficiency is
optimized, ensuring each exhibit
is in its designated location and
contributing to the preservation
and security of the pieces
displayed in the gallery.

Part 2

Problem Possible cause Recommended solution

A microwave sensor installed on Gypsum sheet wall ISMI To mitigate nuisance alarms at
an internal plasterboard wall in (U7,p49) does not provide the the microwave sensor, a
the glassed-in event and necessary firmness. This more comprehensive solution is
conference area suffers from delicate and vibration-prone proposed that involves the

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excessive nuisance alarms
during stormy weather.
A PIR installed in Tenant Space
6, an east-facing office, suffers
from frequent nuisance alarms
in the mornings.
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surface can generate false
alarms, exacerbated by the
sensor's location in the glass
event area, where storms
directly impact the glass.
The combination of sensor
sensitivity to wall vibrations and
exposure to adverse weather
conditions significantly
contributes to the likelihood of
unwanted activations. The need
for a stronger foundation and an
approach that considers area-
specific environmental factors
becomes evident to mitigate
this problem and improve the
reliability of the security system.
The propensity of the passive
infrared (PIR) sensor to generate
nuisance alarms is attributed to
interference from external
installation of a passive infrared
(PIR) sensor along with a Y-gate,
strategically placed near the
existing microwave sensor. This
combination offers greater
detection accuracy by
addressing interference caused
by gypsum wall vibration and
improving human motion
identification. The Y-gate acts as
a coordination device, allowing
cross-validation of sensor signals
before activating an alarm,
minimizing the likelihood of
false alarms, especially in the
glassed-in event area subject to
adverse weather conditions.
Importantly, this comprehensive
strategy not only optimizes
system reliability by addressing
specific environmental
challenges, such as storms
impacting glass, but also
improves the overall efficiency
of the security system by
reducing unwanted activations
and providing a more accurate
response to genuine events.
The proposed solution involves
the strategic relocation of the
passive infrared (PIR) sensor in
Tenant Space 6. It is suggested
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factors, such as strong sunlight
entering through windows or
the presence of reflective
objects in the protected area, as
indicated by the ISMI (U 7,p48).
These elements disrupt the PIR's
ability to distinguish between
relevant movements and
unwanted heat sources, leading
to incorrect activations of the
security system.
A BMS installed in the middle of The vibrations generated by the
the warehouse rolling door movement of the rolling door
generates many annoying can cause intermittent opening
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to position the PIR at an angle
that avoids direct reflection of
light entering through the
window. This measure seeks to
mitigate interference caused by
morning sunlight and reduce the
possibility of incorrect
activations of the security
system.
By repositioning the PIR so that
it does not directly reflect
incident sunlight, the aim is to
improve the sensor's ability to
discern between relevant
motion and unwanted heat
sources such as light reflections.
This specific setting has the
potential to significantly reduce
nuisance alarms in the morning,
thus optimizing the
effectiveness of the security
system in Tenant Space 6.
Additionally, by directly
addressing the identified cause,
it seeks to establish a practical
and effective solution to
improve reliability. and accuracy
of the PIR in this particular
environment.
The proposed solution involves
strategically moving the Building
Management System (BMS)
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alarms, especially when it is
windy.
A microwave sensor that has
been installed adjacent to door
12 to detect activity through
personnel/entrance (door 8) is
not activated by movement
through its detection field.
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of the circuit between the two
pieces of the Building
Management System (BMS), as
indicated in ISMI (U7P45) . With
fixed attachment points located
at the ends of the door, the
flexible door configuration
allows gusts of wind to generate
movement, affecting the
stability of the BMS. This
situation can lead to momentary
disconnection of the circuit at
inopportune times, triggering
false alarms in the security
system.
Reversing the position of the
microwave (MW) sensor to
detect lateral movements from
left to right or vice versa, as
established in ISMI (U 7,p 47-
48), poses a specific challenge in
its installation near Gate 13 The
current orientation of the sensor
directs its detection area
towards the warehouse,
resulting in a lack of coverage
towards the end of the rolling
door. It is suggested to place
one magnet on the frame and
another on the end of the door,
securing it firmly to the floor.
This measure seeks to
counteract the effects of wind
gusts, which will continue to
move the door in the middle,
while ensuring that the BMS
remains stationary at the end
and in the frame.
Likewise, this configuration aims
to maintain the stability of the
BMS, reducing the possibility of
intermittent openings of the
circuit and, therefore,
minimizing false alarms caused
by unwanted vibrations and
movements of the door.
It is proposed to strategically
relocate the microwave sensor
to the internal hallway to cover
the entrance through Door 8.
The current orientation of the
sensor, located near Door 13
and with its detection area
directed towards the
warehouse, limits its coverage
towards Door 8. By moving the
sensor to the internal hallway,
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towards Door 8. In addition, the we seek to optimize its ability to

outward opening of Door 8
minimizes the generation of
vibrations towards the internal
hallway when it is opened. ,
which reduces the effectiveness
of the sensor in detecting
movements in that specific area.
detect lateral movements in the
area of interest, providing more
effective coverage in the
entrance area through Door 8.
This relocation will allow the
sensor to better fit the specific
layout and characteristics of
Gate 8, maximizing its
effectiveness in detecting
movements in that sector.
Additionally, by focusing on the
key internal hallway location,
the sensor's ability to capture
relevant events and reduce
potential false alarms is
improved, which will contribute
to the overall efficiency of the
security system at Gate 8 entry.

Do now proof read your work prior to submission to ensure that every task response has been correctly and comprehensively page-referenced to sources as per
the Student Handbook, Indicative Content and www.ismi.org.uk/resources/learning-zone/page-referencing-in-assignments.aspx This is important not only in
the theoretical sections but also the application and analysis sections.

Unreferenced content cannot be accepted as valid for assessment at this advanced level of study and may constitute “plagiarism by omission”.

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For Official Use

Task 7.3c Assessor Comments

Grade Exceeded/Met/Referred/Fail (highlight as appropriate)

Comments
Remedial actions by candidate (if required)
Comments after remedial actions
In Task 7.3c you diagnose most of the scenarios well, although in the 1st part, here are better fitting
sensors for example 1, such as Dual technology (PIR and microwave) or possibly PIR. As the foyer area is
glass, a microwave is unsuitable due to signals often penetrating glass and picking up movement outside.
PIR may be activated by sun penetrating the glass foyer. Most suitable option would be dual technology.
Be sure to page reference the analysis sections.

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