LAST-MINUTE TIPS

JURISDICTION
Q: Define jurisdiction over the subject matter.
A: It refers to the power of a particular court to hear the type of case that is then before it [1
Riano 71, 2014 Bantam Ed., citing Black’s Law Dictionary 767, 5th Ed.]. It is the power to hear
and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong [Reyes v.
Diaz, G.R. No. L-48754 (1941)]

Q: How is jurisdiction over the subject matter CONFERRED? How is it DETERMINED?

A: Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of action [Medical Plaza Makati Condominium v. Cullen, G.R.
No. 181416 (2013)]

Q: Define jurisdiction over the person.

A: It is the legal power of the court to render a personal judgment against a party to an action or
proceeding [1 Riano 94, 2014 Bantam Ed., citing Black’s Law Dictionary 767, 5th Ed.]

Q: How is jurisdiction over the person acquired?

A: Courts acquire jurisdiction over a party plaintiff upon the filing of the complaint [Regner v.
Logarta, G.R. No. 168747 (2007)]

Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired

(1) By his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority; or
(2) By service of summons
[Sec. 20, Rule 14; Macasaet v. Co, G.R. No. 156759 (2013)]

Q: Define jurisdiction over the issues.

A: The issue being tried and decided by the court be within the issues raised in the pleadings
[Reyes v. Diaz, G.R. No. L-48754 (1941)].

Q: Define jurisdiction over the res and enumerate how it may be acquired.
Jurisdiction over the res refers to the court’s jurisdiction over the thing or the property which is
the subject of the action [1 Riano 104, 2014 Bantam Ed.]. It may be acquired
(1) By seizure of the thing under legal process whereby, it is brought into actual custody of the
law (custodia legis); or
(2) From the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power
of the court over the property is recognized and made effective (potential jurisdiction of
over the res)
[Biaco v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, G.R. No. 161417 (2007); El Banco Español-Filipino
v. Palanca, G.R. No. 11390 (1918)]

DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL
Q: When does estoppel bar a question assailing jurisdiction?
A: The general rule is that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to
bar a litigant from asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in
exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy (raised for the first time
in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been
rendered, only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals) [Figueroa vs.
People, G.R. No. 147406 (2008)].

CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE

Q: How does the doctrine of unclean hands bar recovery?
A: Among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity, and (2) he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is
also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies
that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue
[Toledo v. Hydenu, G.R. No. 172139 (2010)].

LAW OF THE CASE

Q: What is the “law of the case” doctrine?
A: The law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means
that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between
the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue
to be the facts of the case before the court [Philippine Ports Authority vs. Nasipit Integrated
Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc., G.R. No. 214864 (2017)].

MOOT AND ACADEMIC

Q: What is a moot and academic case?
A: A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value [David
vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396 (2006)].

Q: How do courts deal with moot and academic cases?

A:
GENERAL RULE: Courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of
mootness.

EXCEPTION: Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review [David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396 (2006)].

STARE DECISIS
Q: What does stare decisis et non quieta movere mean?
A: "To adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established." Under the
doctrine, when this Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially
the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same [Dela Cruz vs. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 219683 (2018)].

Q: What is the basis of stare decisis as compared to res judicata?

A: The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon the legal principle or rule involved and not upon
the judgment, which results therefrom. In this particular sense, stare decisis differs from res
judicata, which is based upon the judgment [Dela Cruz vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 219683 (2018)].
DUE PROCESS
Q: Distinguish the two aspects of due process.
A: Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. In order that a particular
act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must be compliance with
both the substantive and the procedural requirements thereof. Substantive due process refers to
the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to his property. Procedural
due process, on the other hand, means compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods,
prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on
the part of those who are called upon to administer it [Alliance for the Family Foundation,
Philippines, Inc. vs. Garin, G.R. No. 217872 (2017)].

PAUPER LITIGANT
Q: How should the court act on the application of a pauper litigant for exemption from legal
fees?
A: If the applicant for exemption meets the salary and property requirements under Section 19
of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the
application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application should not be denied
outright; instead, the court should apply the indigency test under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use
its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption [Algura vs. City of
Naga, G.R. No. 150135 (2006)].

Section 19, Rule 141 states: “INDIGENT LITIGANTS (A) WHOSE GROSS INCOME AND THAT
OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY DO NOT EXCEED AN AMOUNT DOUBLE THE MONTHLY
MINIMUM WAGE OF AN EMPLOYEE AND (B) WHO DO NOT OWN REAL PROPERTY WITH
A FAIR MARKET VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OF MORE
THAN THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM
THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES.

The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent
litigant unless the court otherwise provides.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and
his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, nor they own any real
property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person
attesting to the truth of the litigant's affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be
attached to the litigant's affidavit.

Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss
the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever
criminal liability may have been incurred.”

Section 21, Rule 3 states: “A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as
an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is
one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic
necessities for himself and his family.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of
transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of
the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on
any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise
provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is
rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as
an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other
lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within
the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice to
such other sanctions as the court may impose.”

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
Q: How should the Rules of Court be construed?
A: These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding [Sec. 1, Rule 6].

PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES

Q: What are the rules regarding the payment of docket fees?
A:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings,
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond
its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading
and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court,
the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fee [Rizal vs. Naredo, G.R. No. 151898 (2012)].

CLASS SUIT
Q: What are the requirements for a class suit?
A: When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many
persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the
court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all
concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to
intervene to protect his individual interest [Sec. 12, Rule 3].

INTERVENTION
Q: Who may intervene in a civil action?
A: A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave
of court, be allowed to intervene in the action [Sec. 1, Rule 19].

Q: What should the court consider in allowing or denying a motion to intervene?

A: The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may
be fully protected in a separate proceeding [Sec. 1, Rule 19].

PRE-TRIAL
Q: Compare pre-trial in civil versus criminal cases.
A:
Civil [Rule 18] Criminal [Rule 118]
After arraignment and within 30 days
after the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused [Sec.
1, Rule 118]

After the last pleading has been Under the Revised Guidelines, it is
When set served and filed [Sec. 1, Rule within 10 calendar days from the
18] court’s receipt of the case in case of
a detained accused, and within 30
calendar days from the date the
court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of a non-detained accused.
[Section 8(a), A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC]
After the arraignment, the court
Within five (5) days from date of
shall set the pre-trial conference
filing and serving of the last
within thirty (30) days from
pleading joining the issues (or
arraignment [A.M. No. 03-01-09-SC]
the expiration of time to file such
pleading without it having been
Under the Revised Guidelines, the
filed), the plaintiff must promptly
court shall set the arraignment and
Who moves to move ex parte that the case be
pre-trial on the same day, within 10
set set for pre-trial conference.
calendar days from the court’s
receipt of the case in case of a
If the plaintiff fails to file said
detained accused, and within 30
motion within the given period,
calendar days from the date the
the Branch Clerk of Court shall
court acquires jurisdiction over the
issue a notice of pre-trial [A.M.
person of a non-detained accused.
No. 03-01-09-SC]
[Section 8(a), A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC]
Mandatory Yes Yes
All admissions and agreements shall
Not required to be signed by be reduced and writing and signed
Agreements and
both party and counsel. The by both the accused and counsel;
admissions in
minutes may be signed by either otherwise they cannot be used
the pre-trial
party or counsel [Riano] against the accused. [Sec. 2, Rule
118]
 Civil [Rule 18] Criminal [Rule 118]

Failure of a plaintiff to appear

results to the dismissal of the
case with prejudice unless Failure of the counsel of the accused
otherwise ordered by the court or the prosecutor to appear without
Effect of failure an acceptable excuse results to
to appear Failure of the defendant to sanctions and penalties on the
appear shall be cause for the counsel/prosecutor [Sec. 3, Rule
plaintiff to present evidence ex 118].
parte and obtain judgment based
thereon [Sec. 5, Rule 18].

Specifically required [Sec. 6,

Rule 18]. Failure to file pre-trial
brief has same effect as failure
to appear

Pre-trial brief In addition to the Pre-trial Brief, Not specifically required.

the Judicial Affidavit Rule now
requires the submission of the
judicial affidavits of the parties’
respective witnesses five (5)
days before the pre-trial.

ACTION ON CONTRACTUAL MONEY CLAIMS

Q: What happens when the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or
implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action
was pending at the time of such death?
A: It shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment.
A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially
provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person [Sec.
20, Rule 3].

FORUM SHOPPING
Q: What are the rules on certification against forum shopping?
A: The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading asserting a claim for relief or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and
(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.

The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein
shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative
and criminal actions.

If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt,
as well as a cause for administrative sanctions [Sec. 5, Rule 7].

DEFAULT
Q: Lay down the rules on default.
A:
(1) If the defending fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon
motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure,
declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render
judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court
in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence
may be delegated to the clerk of court.
(2) A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take
part in the trial.
(3) A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file
a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure
to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has
a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms
and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
(4) When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several
defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try
the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence
presented.
(5) A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be
different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.
(6) If the defending party in action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists if there is no collusion,
to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricate.
[Sec. 3, Rule 9]

SUMMONS
Q: How may substituted service of summons be effected?
A: If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected:
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or
(b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof
[Sec. 7, Rule 14].
Q: May substituted service of summons be effected if the guard refused twice to allow the sheriff
to enter the subdivision where the defendant’s residence is located on instructions of the
defendant whenever the latter is out?
A: Yes. While the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly,
faithfully, and fully and any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is
considered ineffective, the Supreme Court frowns upon an overly strict application of the
Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural rules, that governs.

Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or substituted service of summons
upon the defendant [Robinson vs. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584 (2006)].

INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES
Q: When may interrogatories be filed and served against any adverse party?
A: Under the same conditions specified in section 1 of Rule 23, any party desiring to elicit
material and relevant facts from any adverse parties shall file and serve upon the latter written
interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or private
corporation or a partnership or association, by any officer thereof competent to testify in its
behalf [Sec. 1, Rule 25]

Please note that in Duque v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 125383 (2002)], service of the request
to counsel and not to the party litigant is not a sufficient compliance with the Rules. The general
rule that service to counsel is service to the party cannot apply where the law expressly
provides that notice must be served upon a definite person. In such cases, service must be
made directly upon the person mentioned in the law and upon no other in order that the notice
be valid.

Sec. 1, Rule 23: By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or
over property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been
served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or mot, may be taken, at the instance of
any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of
witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions
shall be taken only in accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a person confined in
prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.

Q: How should the answer to interrogatories be made?

A: The interrogatories shall be answered fully in writing and shall be signed and sworn to by the
person making them. The party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall file and
serve a copy of the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within fifteen (15) days
after service thereof, unless the court, on motion and for good cause shown, extends or
shortens the time [Sec. 2, Rule 25]

Q: What are the rules on objections to interrogatories?

A: Objections to any interrogatories may be presented to the court within ten (10) days after
service thereof, with notice as in case of motion; and answers shall be deferred until the
objections are resolved, which shall be at as early a time as is practicable [Sec. 3, Rule 25].

Q: How many written interrogatories may be served to the same adverse party?
A: Only one set may be served. No party may without leave of court, serve more than one set of
interrogatories to be answered by the same party [Sec. 4, Rule 25].

Q: What is the scope and use of interrogatories?

A: Interrogatories may relate to any matters that can be inquired into under section 2 of Rule 23,
and the answers may be used for the same purposes provided in section 4 of Rule 23 [Sec 5,
Rule 25].

Sec. 2, Rule 23: Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by section 16 or 18 of this
Rule, the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject of the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge
of relevant facts.

Sec. 4, Rule 23: At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any
part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against
any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice
thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:

(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching
the testimony of deponent as a witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an
officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or
association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any
purpose if the court finds:
(1) that the witness is dead; or
(2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from
the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his
absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or
(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment; or
(4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of
the witness by subpoena; or
(5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it
desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of
presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to
be used; and
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may
require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party
may introduce any other parts.

Q: What is the effect of the failure to serve written interrogatories?

A: Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of
justice, a party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse
party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal [Sec. 6, Rule 25].

ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY

Q: What are the rules on a request for admission?
A: At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any other party a
written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant
document described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and relevant
matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the
request unless copies have already been furnished [Sec. 1, Rule 26].
Q: What are the rules on implied admission?
A: Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless,
within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after
service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom
the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn
statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting
forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters [Sec. 2,
Rule 26].

Q: When should objections to a request for admission be filed?

Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by the party requested
within the period for and prior to the filing of his sworn statement and his compliance therewith
shall be deferred until such objections are resolved, which resolution shall be made as early as
practicable [Sec. 2, Rule 26].

Q: What is the effect of an admission?

A: Any admission made by a party pursuant to such request is for the purpose of the pending
action only and shall not constitute an admission by him for any other purpose nor may the
same be used against him in any other proceeding [Sec. 3, Rule 26].

Q: May a withdrawal of a request for admission be made?

A: The court may allow the party requesting an admission under this Rule, whether express or
implied, to withdraw or amend it upon such terms as may be just [Sec. 4, Rule 26].

Q: What is the effect of failure to file and serve request for admission?
A: Unless otherwise allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of
justice, a party who fails to file and serve a request for admission on the adverse party of
material and relevant facts at issue which are, or ought to be within the personal knowledge of
the latter, shall be not be permitted to present evidence on such facts [Sec. 5, Rule 26].

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

WRIT OF KALIKASAN
Q: When is a writ of kalikasan available as a remedy?
A: The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law,
people's organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited
by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to
a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces [Sec. 1, Rule 7, Rules of Procedure in Environmental Cases].

Q: Where should a petition for writ of kalikasan be filed?

A: The petition shall be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of
Appeals [Sec. 3, Rule 7, Rules of Procedure in Environmental Cases].

Q: What reliefs may be granted by the court under the writ?

A:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting
the performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental
destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to
protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to
monitor strict compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to
make periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the
award of damages to individual petitioners
[Sec. 15, Rule 7, Rules of Procedure in Environmental Cases]

Q: Does the filing of a petition for writ of kalikasan bar other actions?
A: No, the filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing
of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions [Sec. 17, Rule 7, Rules of Procedure in
Environmental Cases].

Q: What is the Writ of Continuing Mandamus?

A: It is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing the respondent, i.e., any
agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof, to perform an act or series of acts
decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied, requiring
respondent to perform an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant
such other reliefs as may be warranted resulting from the wrongful or illegal acts of the
respondent. The court shall require the respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the
progress and execution of the judgment, and the court may, by itself or through a commissioner
or the appropriate government agency, evaluate and monitor compliance. The petitioner may
submit its comments or observations on the execution of the judgment. [Rule 1 Section 4(c),
and Rule 8, Sections 1 and 7, Rules of Procedure in Environmental Cases]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

AMNESTY
Q: What does the Constitution provide regarding amnesty?
A: The President shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress [Sec. 19, Article VII, Constitution].

NOTE: The Constitution does not provide for revocation of amnesty. Note however that an ex
post facto law is one which, among others, deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty [In Re Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., G.R. No. L-32485
(1970)].

JURISDICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES

Q: Delineate the jurisdiction of first-level courts vis-à-vis Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases.
A: Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of
the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
 (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances
committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
[Sec. 32, B.P. 129, as amended]

Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within
the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively
taken cognizance of by the latter [Sec 20, B.P. 129].

COMPLAINT AND INFORMATION

Q: Compare and contrast a complaint and an information.
A: The complaint or information shall be in writing, in the name of the People of the Philippines
and against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved [Sec. 2, Rule
110].

A complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the
offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law
violated [Sec. 3, Rule 110]. An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an
offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court [Sec. 4, Rule 110].

Q: When is a complaint or information sufficient?

A: A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of
the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed. When an offense is committed by more than one
person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information [Sec. 6, Rule 110].

WHO MUST PROSECUTE CRIMINAL ACTIONS

Q: State the rules on who must prosecute criminal actions.
A:
GENERAL RULE: All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall
be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor.

EXCEPTIONS:
(1) In case of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor, or in the event of lack of public
prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the
Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the
approval of the court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private
prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial even in the
absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
(2) However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor
assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offended party, any peace officer, or
public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case.
This authority shall cease upon actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon elevation of
the case to the Regional Trial Court.
 (3) The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including the guilty parties, if both are alive, nor, in any case, if the
offended party has consented to the offense or pardoned the offenders.
(4) The offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents or
guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by any of them.
If the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she can file the complaint,
and she has no known parents, grandparents or guardian, the State shall initiate the
criminal action in her behalf. The offended party, even if a minor, has the right to initiate
the prosecution of the offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness
independently of her parents, grandparents, or guardian, unless she is incompetent or
incapable of doing so. Where the offended party, who is a minor, fails to file the
complaint, her parents, grandparents, or guardian may file the same. The right to file the
action granted to parents, grandparents, or guardian shall be exclusive of all other
persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided, except as
stated in the preceding paragraph.
(5) No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of any of the offenses
mentioned above shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint filed by
the offended party.
(6) The prosecution for violation of special laws shall be governed by the provisions thereof.
[Sec. 5, Rule 110]

INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTIONS

Q: What are the rules for the institution of criminal and civil actions?
A:

GENERAL RULE: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action

UNLESS the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party
a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the
complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information,
the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual
damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action [Sec. 1, Rule 111; See also OCA Circular No. 54-2018 re payment of filing
fees in civil actions instituted with the criminal actions].

Q: What are the rules as regards B.P. 22 cases?

A: The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the
filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on
the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may
be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If
the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of
the Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions [Sec. 1, Rule 111].

SUSPENSION OF CIVIL ACTION

Q: What are the rules regarding the suspension of the civil action?
A: After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall
be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The
suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before
judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the
offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In
case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed
automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution
to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the
parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried
and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil
action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be
tolled.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However,
the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist [Sec. 2, Rule 111].

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

Q: When may a civil action proceed independently of the criminal action?
A: In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
[Sec. 3, Rule 111].
Article 32, Civil Code: Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following
rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of
grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet
the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one’s self, or from being forced
to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such
confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is
imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant’s act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate
and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission
constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

Article 33, Civil Code: In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.

Article 34, Civil Code: When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to
render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer
shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily
responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

Article 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.

Q: What are the rules for an independent civil actions?

A: The independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action [Sec. 3, Rule 111].

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Q: What is a preliminary investigation?
A: Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial [Sec. 1, Rule 112].

Q: When is a preliminary investigation required?

A: Except as provided in Section 6 of Rule 112 (arrest without warrant), a preliminary
investigation is required to be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an
offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day without regard to the fine [Sec. 1, Rule 112].

Q: How does a preliminary investigation take place?

A: The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to
establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents,
plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or
unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally examined the
affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss
it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent
attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and document.

The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant
which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is
voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present
against the respondent, and these shall be made available for examination or copying by the
respondent at his expense.

Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination,
copying or photographing at the expense of the requesting party.

Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits
and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and
other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be
subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies
thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a
motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.

If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits

within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the
evidence presented by the complainant.

The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are such facts and issues to be clarified from
a party or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine
or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may
be asked to the party or witness concerned. The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from
submission of the counter-affidavits and other documents or from the expiration of the period for
their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days.

Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine whether or
not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial [Sec. 3, Rule 112].

Q: What procedure shall be taken if an accused is arrested without a warrant?

A: When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a
preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need
of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules.
In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the
offended party or by a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of
the offended party or arresting officer or person.

Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding
the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15)
days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the
accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in Rule 112
[Sec. 6, Rule 112].

Q: What are the rules regarding cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by
the Rule on Summary Procedure?
A: If the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor involving an offense punishable by an
imprisonment of less than four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, the procedure
outlined in section 3(a), Rule 112 shall be observed. The prosecutor shall act on the complaint
based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant within ten
(10) days from its filing.

If the complaint or information is filed with the Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court for an offense covered by this section, the procedure in section 3(a) of Rule 112 shall be
observed. If within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint of information, the judge finds
no probable cause after personally evaluating the evidence, or after personally examining in
writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions
and answers, he shall dismiss the same. He may, however, require the submission of additional
evidence, within ten (10) days from notice, to determine further the existence of probable cause.
If the judge still finds no probable cause despite the additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10)
days from its submission or expiration of said period, dismiss the case. When he finds probable
cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had already
been arrested, and hold him for trial. However, if the judge is satisfied that there is no necessity
for placing the accused under custody, he may issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest.
Section 3(a), Rule 112: The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be
accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting
documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are
respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn
to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits.

WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
Q: When may a warrantless arrest be effected?
A: A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

Q: What procedure shall be taken if an accused is arrested without a warrant?

A: When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a
preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need
of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules.
In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the
offended party or by a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of
the offended party or arresting officer or person.

Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding
the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15)
days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the
accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in Rule 112
[Sec. 6, Rule 112].

RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Q: What are the rights of persons under custodial investigation under R.A. 7438?
A:
(a) Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted
by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests,
detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in
a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be
allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be
provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer,
provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or
detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to
him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the
language or dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such
investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or
in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder
brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school
supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such
person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no
effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or
conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or
religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his
counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the
Commission on Human Rights or by any international non-governmental organization duly
accredited by the Office of the President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his
or her spouse, fiancé or fiancée, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild,
uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.
As used in R.A. 7438, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation"
to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law [Sec. 2,
R.A. 7438].

BAIL
Q: When is an offense non-bailable?
A: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. (section 13, Article III, 1987 Constitution).

The rule is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable,
unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Thus, no person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution [Sec. 7, Rule 114, Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847 (2015)]
Q: What are the rules on bail regarding non-bailable offenses?
A:
At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of
an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has
the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either
party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead,
outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify [Sec. 8, Rule 114].

Q: How should the amount of bail be fixed?

A: The judge who issued the warrant or granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount of
bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the following factors:
(a)Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b)Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d)Character and reputation of the accused;
(e)Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g)Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h)Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.

Excessive bail shall not be required [Sec. 9, Rule 114].

INVERSE TRIAL
Q: When does a reverse trial occur?
A: When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but
interposes a lawful defense [Sec. 11, Rule 119]

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED DURING TRIAL

Q: What are the rights of the accused during trial?
A:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings,
from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive
his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his
presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence
of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be
considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody
escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent
trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed
to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly
protect his rights without the assistance of counsel.
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters
covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.
 (f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may
utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or
cannot with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to
testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same
parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine
him.
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and
production of other evidence in his behalf.
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law
[Sec. 1, Rule 115; most of the rights enumerated also appear in Secs. 14 and 17, Article III,
Constitution]

MOTION TO QUASH
Q: What are the grounds for a motion to quash?
A:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various
offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification;
and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or
the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
[Sec. 3, Rule 117]

Q: What are the rules regarding amendment of the complaint or information in the case of a
motion to quash?
A: If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which
can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution
shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall
be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still
suffers from the same defect despite the amendment [Sec. 4, Rule 117].

Q: What is the effect of the failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor?
A: The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the
same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of Rule 116.

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
Q: What are the rules on demurrer to evidence in criminal cases?
A: After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to
be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.

If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the
accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of
the evidence for the prosecution.

The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and
shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case.
The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its
receipt.

If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to
evidence within a similar period from its receipt.

The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer
itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment [Sec. 23, Rule 119].

Note that under the Revised Guidelines, after the prosecution has rested its case (which is after
the court orally resolves the prosecution’s oral offer of evidence), the accused may orally move
for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence, and the court shall orally resolve the same
[Sections 13 (c) and (d), A.M. 15-06-10-SC].

Q: What are the rules on demurrer to evidence in civil cases?

A: After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move
for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted
but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence [Sec. 1, Rule 33]

JUDGMENT
Q: What is a judgment in a criminal case?
A: Judgment is the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense
charged and the imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any. It must be
written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him
and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which it is
based [Sec. 1, Rule 120].

Q: What are the contents of the judgment?

A: If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state
(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused
and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission;
(2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or
accessory;
(3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and
 (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from
the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist [Sec. 2, Rule 120].

Q: What is the rule regarding judgment for two or more offenses?

A: When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused
fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged
and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings
of fact and law in each offense [Sec. 3, Rule 120].

Q: What is the rule regarding judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof?
A: When there is variance between the offense charge in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged,
or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved [Sec. 4, Rule 120].

An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter [Sec. 5, Rule
120].

Q: State the rules on promulgation of judgment.

A: The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of
the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment
may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent
or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place
of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court
promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve
the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the
accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail
can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.

The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or
warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the
accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him
shall be served at his last known address.

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite
notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and
serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court
shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall
state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen
(15) days from notice [Sec. 6, Rule 120].

Q: When may a judgment be modified?

A: A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it
becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a
judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation [Sec. 7, Rule 120].

DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF JUDGMENT

Q: State the rule on finality of judgments.
A: Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act
which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.

The doctrine admits of certain exceptions, which are usually applied to serve substantial justice,
particularly in the following instances: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc
pro tuncentries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision, rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable [Sps. Valarao vs. MSC and Company, G.R. No. 185331 (2016)].

APPEAL
Q: How are appeals in criminal cases taken?
A:
(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be by notice of
appeal filed with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. The must be taken within fifteen (15)
days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42. The
petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be
reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time
after judgment.
(c) The appeal in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or where a lesser penalty is imposed for offenses committed
on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the
more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed, shall be by notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals in
accordance with paragraph (a).
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed the
death penalty. The Court of Appeals shall automatically review the judgment as provided
in Section 10 of Rule 122.
[Secs. 3 and 6, Rule 122]

HIERARCHY OF COURTS
Q: Discuss the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and the exceptions thereto.
A: The doctrine states that where courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a subject matter, a
case must be filed before the lowest court possible having the appropriate jurisdiction. The
principle of hierarchy of courts requires that recourse should be made to the lower courts before
they are made to the higher courts. The exceptions to this doctrine are as follows:
1) Where there are special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition;
2) When dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy;
3) When demanded by the broader interest of justice;
4) When the challenged orders are patent nullities;
5) When analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances call for and justify the
immediate and direct handling by the Court
[Republic v. Caguioa, G.R. No. 174385 (2013)]

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Q: What is a search warrant?

A: A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines,
signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before the court [Sec. 1, Rule 126].
Q: Where should the application for search warrant be filed?
A: An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or
any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the
court where the criminal action is pending. [Sec. 2, Rule 126].

Q: What may be searched and seized pursuant to a search warrant?

A: A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
[Sec. 3, Rule 126].

Q: What are the rules for issuing a search warrant?

A:
(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere
in the Philippines [Sec. 4, Rule 126; Sec. 2, Article II, Constitution].
(2) The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements, together with the affidavits submitted [Sec. 5, Rule 126].
 (3) If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based or
that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which
must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules [Sec. 6, Rule 126].

Q: What may an officer do if if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving
notice of his purpose and authority?
A: He may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or
anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him
when unlawfully detained therein [Sec. 7, Rule 126].

Q: What are the rules for enforcing a search warrant?

A:
(1) No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of
the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality
[Sec. 8, Rule 126].
(2) The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that
the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a
direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night [Sec. 9, Rule
126].
(3) The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same
to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were
made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in
the place in which he found the seized property [Sec. 11, Rule 126].
(4) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the
warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath. Ten (10) days
after issuance .of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has
been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and
require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge
shall ascertain whether section 11, Rule 126 has been complied with and shall require
that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a)
hereof has been complied with. The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept
by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of
the return, the result, and other actions of the judge. A violation of this section shall
constitute contempt of court [Sec 12, Rule 126].

Q: How long is a search warrant valid?

A: A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter, it shall be void
[Sec 10, Rule 126].

Q: What is the extent of a search incident to lawful arrest?

A: A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant
[Sec. 13, Rule 126].

Q: Where may a motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence be filed?

A: A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be
filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal
action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the
search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is
subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court [Sec. 14,
Rule 126].

EVIDENCE

JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Q: How are judicial admissions made?
A: An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof [Sec. 1, Rule 129].

Q: How is a judicial admission contradicted?

A: The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made [Sec. 1, Rule 129].

OBJECT EVIDENCE
Q: What is object evidence?
A: Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is
relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court [Sec. 1,
Rule 130].

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Q: What are documents as evidence?
A: Documents as evidence consists of writings or any material containing letters, words,
numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of their
contents [Sec. 2, Rule 130].

BEST EVIDENCE RULE

Q: State the rules embodied in the “Best Evidence Rule”.
A:
GENERAL RULE: When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself,
EXCEPT in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.
[Sec. 3, Rule 130].

Q: What is considered the original of a document?

A:
(a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with
identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
 (c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from
another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally
regarded as originals
[Sec. 4, Rule 130]

Q: How may secondary evidence be admitted when the original is unavailable?

A: When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated [Sec. 5, Rule 130].

Q: How may secondary evidence be admitted when the original document is in adverse party’s
custody or control?
A: If the document is in the custody of under the control of the adverse party, he must have
reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence,
he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its
loss [Sec. 6, Rule 130].

Q: How may the contents of an original document which is a public record be proved?
A: When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof [Sec. 7, Rule 130].

Q: Is a party who calls for a document bound to offer it?

A: A party who calls for the production of a document and inspects the same is not obliged to
offer it as evidence [Sec. 8, Rule 130].

PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

Q: What are the rules embodied in the “Parol Evidence Rule”?
A: When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing
all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after
the execution of the written agreement.

The term “agreement” includes wills [Sec. 9, Rule 130].

INTERPRETATION ACCORDING TO CIRCUMSTANCES

Q: What may be shown before the judge for the proper construction of an instrument?
A: For the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made,
including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the
judge may be placed in the position of those whose language he is to interpret [Sec. 13, Rule
130].
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
Q: Generally, who may be a witness?
A: all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others,
may be witnesses. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction
of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification [Sec. 20,
Rule 130].

DEAD MAN’S STATUTE

Q: Who are disqualified from testifying by reason of death or insanity of adverse party?
A: Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case if prosecuted,
against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a
person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person
or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before
the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind [Sec. 23,
Rule 130].

TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEDGE AND HEARSAY

Q: What can a witness testify to?
A:
GENERAL RULE: A witnesses can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception,
EXCEPT as otherwise provided in the Rules [Sec. 36, Rule 130]

DYING DECLARATION
Q: When is a dying declaration admissible?
A: The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death,
may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the
cause and surrounding circumstances of such death [Sec. 37, Rule 130].

CHILD WITNESS
Q: How shall a child witness be examined?
A: The examination of a child witness presented in a hearing or any proceeding shall be done in
open court. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different
mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.

The party who presents a child witness or the guardian ad litem of such child witness may,
however, move the court to allow him to testify in the manner provided in this Rule [Sec. 8, Rule
on Examination of a Child Witness].

Q: What aids are available to a child witness?

A: The Rule on Examination of a Child Witness allows:
(1) Interpreter for child [Sec. 9]
(2) Facilitator to pose questions to child [Sec. 10]
(3) Support persons [Sec. 11]
(4) Testimonial aids [Sec. 16]
(5) Emotional security item [Sec. 17]

Q: What are the alternatives to examination in open court of a child witness?

A: The Rule on Examination of a Child Witness allows:
(a) Live-link television testimony in criminal cases where the child is a victim or a witness
[Sec. 25]
 (b) Screens, one-way mirrors, and other devices to shield child from accused [Sec. 26]
(c) Videotaped deposition [Sec. 27]

BURDEN OF PROOF
Q: Define burden of proof.
A: Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law [Sec. 1, Rule 131].

AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS

Q: How may handwriting be proved?
A: The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be
given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge [Sec. 22, Rule 132].

Q: How are notarial documents proved?

A: Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be
presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie
evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved [Sec. 30, Rule 132].

OFFER OF EVIDENCE
Q: What are the rules on offer of evidence?
A: The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
which the evidence is offered must be specified [Sec. 34, Rule 132].

It must be noted, however, that in People vs. Napat-a [G.R. No. 84951 (1989)], the Supreme
Court ruled that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be admitted against the
adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has
itself been incorporated in the records of the case.

Q: When may objection to offer of evidence be made?

A: Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.

Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be
made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.

An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer
unless a different period is allowed by the court.

In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified [Sec. 36, Rule 132].

TENDER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE

Q: How may excluded evidence be tendered by the offeror?
A: If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have
the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror
may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the
substance of the proposed testimony [Sec. 40, Rule 132].
WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Q: What is the burden of proof in civil cases?
A: In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of
the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the
probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may
also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number [Sec. 1, Rule 133].

Q: What is the burden of proof in criminal cases?

A: In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind [Sec. 2, Rule 133].

Q: When is circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove guilt?

A: Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
a. There is more than one circumstance;
b. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
[Sec. 4, Rule 133].

Q: What is the burden of proof in administrative cases?

A: In cases tiled before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact maybe deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion [Sec. 5, Rule 133].

*****tips end here*****

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Q: WHAT ARE THE LIMITATIONS OF THE RULE-MAKING POWER?

A: The Rules shall:
1. provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases;
2. be uniform for the courts of the same grade; and,
3. not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
[Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution]

Q: WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE OR DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL

STABILITY?
A: No court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of
concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction [Cabili v.
Balindog, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225 (2011)]
The doctrine does not apply where a third party claimant is involved [Santos v. Bayhon, G.R.
No. 88643 (1991)]. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction – a court
that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its
judgment, to the exclusion of all other courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to
control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this
judgment [De Leon v. Hon. Salvador, G.R. No. L-30871 (1970)].

Q: DISCUSS THE DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS AND THE EXCEPTIONS

THERETO.
A: The doctrine states that where courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a subject matter, a
case must be filed before the lowest court possible having the appropriate jurisdiction. The
principle of hierarchy of courts requires that recourse should be made to the lower courts before
they are made to the higher courts. The exceptions to this doctrine are as follows:
1) Where there are special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition;
2) When dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy;
3) When demanded by the broader interest of justice;
4) When the challenged orders are patent nullities;
5) When analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances call for and justify the
immediate and direct handling by the Court
[Republic v. Caguioa, G.R. No. 174385 (2013)]

JURISDICTION

Q: WHAT COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER DRUG-RELATED OFFENSES UNDER R.A.

9165 ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED BY A PUBLIC OFFICER OCCUPYING A
POSITION CLASSIFIED AS GRADE 27 OR HIGHER IN RELATION TO OFFICE?
A: The RTC has jurisdiction over such offenses. Section 4(b) of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A.
10660, is the general law on jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses
committed by high-ranking public officers in relation to their office; Sec. 90, RA 9165 is the
special law excluding from the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction violations of R.A. 9165 committed
by such public officers. In the latter case, jurisdiction is vested upon the RTCs designated by the
Supreme Court as drugs court, regardless of whether the violation of R.A. 9165 was committed
in relation to the public officials' office.
[De Lima v, Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781 (2017)]

Q: SANDIGANBAYAN JURISDICTION
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where the information alleges
damage to the government or bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions or acts in
an amount exceeding One million pesos (₱l,000,000.00)

Source: RA 10660 states that the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
where the information: (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b)
alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions or
acts in an amount not exceeding One million pesos (₱l,000,000.00).
Q: DOES THE FILING OF PLEADINGS SEEKING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEFS CONSTITUTE
VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE?
(k) A: Yes. Seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent
submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court. However, pleadings whose prayer is
precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court only leads to a special appearance.
These pleadings are
1. In civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included;
2. In criminal cases , motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused; and,
3. Motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
(l)
The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it
is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that
is the very issue [Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763 (2006)].

Q: CAN JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER BE WAIVED?

A:
General Rule: No, it cannot be waived [Sec. 1, Rule 9]
Exception: In cases where the other party is barred by estoppel by laches [Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450 (1968)].

Q: IN JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER, IS TENANCY RELATIONSHIP

PRESUMED?
A: Tenancy relationship is not presumed and it is not enough that it is alleged. There must be
evidence to prove that it exists and that all its elements are established [Salmorin v. Zaldivar,
G.R. No. 169691 (2008)]

Q: WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION?

A: Courts will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge and experience of said tribunal in
determining technical and intricate matters of fact [Villaflor v. CA, G.R. No. 95694 (1997)].

Q: WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF ANCILLARY JURISDICTION?

A: It involves the inherent or implied powers of the court to determine issues incidental to the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction.

Under its ancillary jurisdiction, a court may determine all questions relative to the matters
brought before it, regulate the manner in which a trial shall be conducted, determine the hours
at which the witnesses and lawyers may be heard, and grant an injunction, attachment or
garnishment.

Q: WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF ADHERENCE OF JURISDICTION OR CONTINUITY OF

JURISDICTION?
A: Under this doctrine, once jurisdiction has attached, it cannot be ousted by subsequent
happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first instance. The court, once jurisdiction has been acquired, retains that
jurisdiction, until it finally disposes of the case [Padlan v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321 (2013)].
Even the finality of the judgment does not totally deprive the court of jurisdiction over the case.
What the court loses is the power to amend, modify, or alter the judgment. Even after the
judgment has become final, the court retains the jurisdiction to enforce and execute it [Republic
vs. Atlas Farms, G.R. No. 141975 (200)].

Q: WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE THAT OBJECTIONS TO JURISDICTION

OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER MAY BE RAISED AT ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
AND EVEN FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL?
A:
1. Estoppel by laches. SC barred a belated objection to jurisdiction that was raised only after an
adverse decision was rendered by the court against the party raising the issue of jurisdiction
and after seeking affirmative relief from the court and after participating in all stages of the
proceedings [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450 (1968)].
2. Public policy. One cannot question the jurisdiction which he invoked, not because the
decision is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but because it cannot be tolerated by
reason of public policy [Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Dumlao, G.R. No. L-44888 (1992)].
3. A party who invokes the jurisdiction of the court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponents cannot repudiate or question the same after failing to obtain such relief [Tajonera
v. Lamaroza, G.R. Nos. L-48907 & 49035, January 19, 1982].

Q: HOW IS JURISDICTION OVER THE RES ACQUIRED?

A: It is acquired either by:
1. The seizure of the property under legal process;
2. As a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is
recognized and made effective
[Banco Español Filipino v. Palanca, G.R. No. L-11390 (1918)]
3. The court by placing the property of thing under its custody (custodia legis.) Example:
attachment of property; and,
4. The court through statutory authority conferring upon it the power to deal with the property
or thing within the court’s territorial jurisdiction. Example: Suits involving the status of the
parties or suits involving the property in the Philippines of non-resident defendants (Riano,
2011)

Q: WHEN IS THE TOTALITY OR AGGREGATE RULE NOT APPLICABLE?

A: The totality rule is not applicable if the claims are separate and distinct from each other and
did not arise from the same transaction. In Flores v. Mallare Philips, G.R. No. L-66620 (1986)],
the SC did not apply the totality test where there are two claims filed by Flores - the first cause
of action was against Ignacio Binongcal and the second was against Fernando Calion for
allegedly refusing to pay an amount representing cost of truck tires.

Q: WHEN IS A CLAIM FOR DAMAGES DETERMINATIVE OF THE JURISDICTIONAL

AMOUNT?
A: If the main action is for the recovery of sum of money and the damages being claimed are
merely the consequences of the main cause of action, the same are not included in determining
the jurisdictional amount.
However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the
causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of
the court [Albano, 2010].
Q: HOW ARE APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OF QUASI-JUDICIAL
AGENCIES MADE?
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be
brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and
conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule
of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies [Philips Seafood v. Board of Investments,
G.R. No. 175787 (2009)].

Q: WHERE ARE APPEALS INVOLVING ORDERS ARISING FROM ADMINISTRATIVE

DISCIPLINARY CASES AND CRIMINAL CASES ORIGINATING FROM THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN FILED?
1. Administrative cases – before the CA under Rule 43
2. Criminal cases – before the SC under Rule 65

There are two instances where a decision, resolution or order of the Ombudsman arising from
an administrative case becomes final and unappealable: (1) where the respondent is absolved
of the charge; and (2) in case of conviction, where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary. In
these cases, the proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of
Appeals, and not a petition for review under Rule 43. [Dagan v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 184083,
(2013)]

Sec. 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art.
VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC [Fabian
v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742 (1998)].

That the decisions or findings of the Ombudsman are appealable only to the Supreme Court
[Sec. 14(2), R.A. 6770] was already declared unconstitutional [Carpio-Morales v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27 (2015)].

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Q: SAM FILED A COMPLAINT FOR A SUM OF MONEY AGAINST GAIL, A FILIPINO

CITIZEN RESIDING AT CANADA. SAM SOUGHT TO COLLECT A DEBT INCURRED BY
GAIL DURING HER VACATION IN MANILA. PURSUANT TO A MOTION FOR LEAVE OF
COURT TO SERVE SUMMONS EXTRATERRITORIALLY, THE RTC DIRECTED THAT
SUMMONS BE SERVED BY PUBLICATION IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL
CIRCULATION. GAIL, THROUGH COUNSEL, FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE
GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER HER PERSON. SAM OPPOSED THE
MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND THAT PUBLICATION IS A MODE OF
EXTRATERRITORIAL SERVICE UNDER SEC. 15, RULE 14. WHO IS CORRECT AND WHY?
A: Gail is correct. Sec. 15, Rule 14 applies only in an action that affects the personal status of
the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; or in which the relief demanded
consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property
of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines. It does not apply to actions for
collection of a sum of money, which Sam filed against Gail.
Q: GINO FILED A PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO
ELLEN ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. THE COURT RULED
AGAINST GINO, FINDING THAT HIS CLAIM WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. GINO THEN FILED ANOTHER PETITION FOR THE
SAME PURPOSE, THIS TIME ALLEGING THAT THE MARRIAGE WAS NULL AND VOID
DUE TO THE LACK OF A VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE. ELLEN FILED A MOTION TO
DISMISS ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA. GINO COUNTERS THAT THERE IS NO
RES JUDICATA SINCE THE CAUSES OF ACTION BETWEEN THE TWO PETITIONS WERE
DIFFERENT. ELLEN ARGUES THAT THE SECOND PETITION INVOLVES THE SAME
ISSUE RESOLVED IN THE FIRST CASE, THAT IS, THE VALIDITY OF THEIR MARRIAGE.
SHOULD THE MOTION TO DISMISS BE GRANTED?
A: Yes, the motion to dismiss should be granted. In Mallion v. Alcantara [G.R. No. 141528
(2006)], which involved the same set of facts as this case, the Supreme Court ruled that a party
cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or
adopting a different method of presenting his case In this case, Gino is simply invoking different
grounds for the same cause of action. In both petitions, Gino has the same cause - the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Ellen. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of
action is predicated.

Q: A COMPLAINT TO RECOVER A COMPUTER ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN STOLEN WAS

FILED AGAINST JEN. AFTER THE PLAINTIFF FINISHED PRESENTATION OF HIS
EVIDENCE, JEN FILED A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, ON
THE GROUND THAT THE EVIDENCE AGAINST HER WAS INSUFFICIENT. THE TRIAL
COURT DENIED THE MOTION FOR LEAVE, YET JEN FILED HER DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE. THE COURT DENIED JEN’S DEMURRER, RULED THAT SHE HAD WAIVED
THE RIGHT TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN HER FAVOR, AND RENDERED JUDGMENT
AGAINST HER. JEN FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THE GROUND THAT
THE CASE AGAINST HER WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND
THAT THE RULING VIOLATED HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN
HER FAVOR. RULE ON JEN’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
A: The MR should be denied. Rule 119, Section 23 of the Rules of Court provides that when the
demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, and such demurrer is denied, the accused
waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution. The Supreme Court held that if the accused demurs without prior
leave of court, or after her motion for leave is denied, she waives her right to present evidence
and submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution [Bernardo v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119010 (1997)]. Hence, there is no violation of Jen’s constitutional
right to adduce evidence in her favor when she filed her demurrer to evidence despite the denial
of her motion for leave.

Q: THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSED CORAZON’S ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE
BUS COMPANY THAT DAMAGED HER CAR IN AN ACCIDENT ALONG EDSA. THE
GROUND CITED WAS LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER.
CORAZON DOES NOT WANT TO FILE A NEW ACTION AND INSISTS THAT THE TRIAL
COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER HER ACTION. WHAT IS HER RECOURSE AGAINST
THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL?
A: An appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 is the proper remedy, not an appeal, in
accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 41, since the granting of a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter is not a bar to the refiling of the same action, according to
Sec. 5, Rule 16.
 Q: JERRY WAS THE DEFENDANT IN A CIVIL ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION
OF A HOUSE AND LOT. HE LOST IN THE RTC, THUS HE APPEALED TO THE CA. THE CA
RULED AGAINST HIM, SO HE FILED A RULE 45 PETITION BEFORE THE SC. HE
ALLEGED THAT THE RTC ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES OF
WITNESSES HE ADDUCED IN THE TRIAL COURT STATING THAT HE WAS IN PEACEFUL
POSSESSION AND THAT THE PLAINTIFFS WERE NEVER SEEN IN THE DISPUTED
PROPERTY. HOW WILL THE SC RULE IN HIS ARGUMENT?
A: The SC will rule against Jerry’s contention. According to Sec. 1, Rule 45, a verified petition
for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law. What Jerry raises is a question of fact
concerning the appreciation of evidence by the trial court.

Q: COMPARE AND CONTRAST A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE

45 AND A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65.
A:
Certiorari as a mode of appeal [Rule 45] Certiorari as a special civil action [Rule 65]
A continuation of the appellate process over
An original action and not a mode of appeal
the original case
May be directed against an interlocutory order
of the court or where no appeal or plain or
Seeks to review final judgment or final orders
speedy remedy is available in the ordinary
course of law
Raises questions of jurisdiction, i.e. whether a
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without
Raises only questions of law
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction
Filed not later than 60 days from notice of
Filed within 15 days from notice of judgment
judgment, order, or resolution sought to be
or final order appealed from, or of the denial
assailed. In case a motion for reconsideration
of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration or
or new trial is timely filed, the 60-day period is
new trial.
counted from notice of said denial.
Extension of 30 days may be granted for Extension granted only under exceptional
justifiable reasons. cases (infra).
Does not require a prior motion for Motion for reconsideration is a condition
reconsideration precedent, subject to exceptions
Does not stay the judgment or order subject
Stays the judgment appealed from
of the petition, unless enjoined or restrained
Parties are the original parties with the
The tribunal, board, or officer, exercising
appealing party as the petitioner and the
judicial or quasi-judicial functions is impleaded
adverse party as the respondent, without
as respondent
impleading the lower court or its judge
May be filed with the SC, CA,
Filed only with the SC
Sandiganbayan, or RTC
Certiorari as a mode of appeal [Rule 45]
Review by the SC is discretionary and will be
granted only when there are special or
important reasons [Sec. 6, Rule 45]
[1 Regalado 612, 2010 Ed.]
Certiorari as a special civil action [Rule 65]
If the order is sufficient in form and
substance:
• The RTC shall:
(1) order respondents to comment, then
(2) (a) hear the case or (b) require the
parties to file memoranda.
• But the SC/CA may require a comment
before giving the petition due course.

Q: JUSTICE MAYPAGASA WAS FORMERLY AN UNDERSECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PRIOR TO HIS APPOINTMENT AS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT. FIVE YEARS LATER, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL OBTAINED
CERTIFICATIONS STATING THAT HIS STATEMENTS OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES, AND NET
WORTH (SALN) WHILE HE WAS AN UNDERSECRETARY WERE NOT ON FILE WITH HIS
FORMER OFFICE. CITING THE LACK OF INTEGRITY DUE TO NON-FILING OF SALN, THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL FILED A PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO WITH THE SUPREME
COURT AGAINST JUSTICE MAYPAGASA. THE LATTER ARGUED THAT HE WAS AN
IMPEACHABLE OFFICER AND THUS HE CAN ONLY BE REMOVED BY IMPEACHMENT
AND THAT THE PETITION WAS FILED BEYOND THE ONE-YEAR PERIOD PROVIDED FOR
UNDER SEC. 11, RULE 66. IS THE PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO PROPER?
A: The petition for quo warranto filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is proper. First, as the
SC ruled in Republic v. Sereno [G.R. No. 237428 (2018)], an act or omission committed prior to
or at the time of appointment or election relating to an officials qualifications to hold office as to
render such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition,
provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are present. Contrawise, acts or
omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but
nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected
official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may
either be impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission
constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if
otherwise. Second, the basic principle that “prescription does not lie against the State” [Art.
1108(4), CC] applies in petitions for quo warranto filed by the Solicitor General. Here, the
petition for quo warranto involves omissions (failure to submit SALN) before appointment as
Associate Justice of the SC and was filed by the Solicitor General. Thus, Justice Maypagasa’s
arguments have no merit.

Q: COMPARE AND CONTRAST AN ACTION FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND AN ACTION

FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
A:
Forcible entry (detentacion) Unlawful detainer (desahucio)
Possession is inceptively lawful but it
Possession of land by defendant is unlawful
becomes illegal by reason of the termination
from the beginning as he acquires possession
of his right to possession of the property
by force, intimidation, strategy, threat, or
under his contract (express or implied) with
stealth (FISTS) [Dikit v. Ycasiano, G.R. No. L-
the plaintiff [Dikit v. Ycasiano, G.R. No. L-
3621 (1951)]
3621 (1951)]
No previous demand for defendant to vacate
Demand is jurisdictional [Sec. 2, Rule 70;
the premises is necessary [Sec. 2, Rule 70;
Medel v. Militante, G.R. No. 16096 (1921)].
Medel v. Militante, G.R. No. 16096 (1921)]
Plaintiff must prove that he was in prior
physical possession of the premises until he Plaintiff need not have been in prior physical
was deprived thereof by defendant [Pharma possession [Pharma Industries, Inc. v.
Industries, Inc. v. Pajarillaga, G.R. No. 53788 Pajarillaga, G.R. No. 53788 (1980)]
(1980)]
Period is counted from the date of last
The 1-year period is generally counted from demand [Sarona v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-
date of actual entry on land. 22984 (1968)]] or last letter of demand [DBP
v. Canonoy, G.R. No. L-29422, (1970)]
[1 Regalado 872-873, 2010 Ed.]

Q: LENDER EXTENDED TO BORROWER A P100,000.00 LOAN COVERED BY A

PROMISSORY NOTE. LATER, BORROWER OBTAINED ANOTHER P100,000.00 LOAN
AGAIN COVERED BY A PROMISSORY NOTE. STILL LATER, BORROWER OBTAINED A
P300,000.00 LOAN SECURED BY A REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE ON HIS LAND VALUED
AT P500,000.00. BORROWER DEFAULTED ON HIS PAYMENTS WHEN THE LOANS
MATURED. DESPITE DEMAND TO PAY THE P500,000.00 LOAN, BORROWER REFUSED
TO PAY. LENDER, APPLYING THE TOTALITY RULE, FILED AGAINST BORROWER WITH
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC) OF MANILA, A COLLECTION SUIT FOR
P500,000.00. AT THE TRIAL, BORROWER'S LAWYER, WHILE CROSS-EXAMINING
LENDER, SUCCESSFULLY ELICITED AN ADMISSION FROM THE LATTER THAT THE
TWO PROMISSORY NOTES HAVE BEEN PAID. THEREAFTER, BORROWER'S LAWYER
FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE ON THE GROUND THAT AS PROVEN, ONLY
P300,000.00 WAS THE AMOUNT DUE TO LENDER AND WHICH CLAIM IS WITHIN THE
EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT. HE
FURTHER ARGUED THAT LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER CAN
BE RAISED AT ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. A.) DID LENDER CORRECTLY
APPLY THE TOTALITY RULE AND THE RULE ON JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION? B.)
SHOULD THE COURT DISMISS THE CASE?
A:
a) Yes, Lender correctly applied the totality rule and the rule on joinder of causes of action.
Under the rule on joinder of causes of action, a party may in one pleading assert as many
causes of action as he may have against an opposing party. Under the totality rule, where
the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. Here, the causes of action by Lender are
all against Borrower and all the claims are principally for recovery of money. Hence, the
aggregate amount claimed, which is P500,000.00, shall be the test of jurisdiction and
 thus, it is the RTC of Manila which has jurisdiction. Although the rules on joinder of causes
of action state that the joinder shall not include special civil actions, the remedy resorted to
with respect to the third loan was not foreclosure but collection. Hence, joinder of causes
of action would still be proper.
b) No, the court should not dismiss the case. The Supreme Court has held that subject-
matter jurisdiction is determined by the amount of the claim alleged in the complaint and
not the amount substantiated during the trial [Dionisio v. Sioson Puerto, G.R. No. L-
39452 (1974)]. Here, the amount claimed was P500,000.00. Even if the claim
substantiated during the trial was only P300,000.00, said amount is not determinative of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Hence, the argument that lack of subject matter jurisdiction can
be raised at any time is misplaced since the RTC has jurisdiction.

Q: CIRCE FILED WITH THE RTC A COMPLAINT FOR THE FORECLOSURE OF REAL
ESTATE MORTGAGE AGAINST SIBLINGS SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS, CO-OWNERS OF
THE PROPERTY AND CO-SIGNATORIES TO THE MORTGAGE DEED. THE SIBLINGS
PERMANENTLY RESIDE IN ATHENS, GREECE. CIRCE TIPPED OFF SHERIFF PLUTO
THAT SCYLLA IS ON A BALIKBAYAN TRIP AND IS BILLETED AT THE CENTURY PLAZA
HOTEL IN PASAY CITY. SHERIFF PLUTO WENT TO THE HOTEL AND PERSONALLY
SERVED SCYLLA THE SUMMONS, BUT THE LATTER REFUSED TO RECEIVE SUMMONS
FOR CHARYBDIS AS SHE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DO SO. SHERIFF PLUTO
REQUESTED SCYLLA FOR THE EMAIL ADDRESS AND FAX NUMBER OF CHARYBDIS
WHICH THE LATTER READILY GAVE. SHERIFF PLUTO, IN HIS RETURN OF THE
SUMMONS, STATED THAT "SUMMONS FOR SCYLLA WAS SERVED PERSONALLY AS
SHOWN BY HER SIGNATURE ON THE RECEIVING COPY OF THE SUMMONS. SUMMONS
ON CHARYBDIS WAS SERVED PURSUANT TO THE AMENDMENT OF RULE 14 BY
FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL OF THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT ON DEFENDANT’S FAX
NUMBER AS EVIDENCED BY TRANSMISSION VERIFICATION REPORT AUTOMATICALLY
GENERATED BY THE FAX MACHINE INDICATING THAT IT WAS RECEIVED BY THE FAX
NUMBER TO WHICH IT WAS SENT ON THE DATE AND TIME INDICATED THEREIN."
CIRCE, 60 DAYS AFTER HER RECEIPT OF SHERIFF PLUTO'S RETURN, FILED A MOTION
TO DECLARE CHARYBDIS IN DEFAULT AS THE LATTER DID NOT FILE ANY
RESPONSIVE PLEADING. ON ONE HAND, SCYLLA SEASONABLY FILED HER ANSWER
SETTING FORTH THEREIN AS A DEFENSE THAT CHARYBDIS HAD PAID THE
MORTGAGE DEBT. A.) SHOULD THE COURT DECLARE CHARYBDIS IN DEFAULT? B.)
ON THE PREMISE THAT CHARYBDIS WAS PROPERLY DECLARED IN DEFAULT, WHAT
IS THE EFFECT OF SCYLLA'S ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT?
A:
a) No, the court should not declare Charybdis in default. The amendment to Rule 14 allowing
service of summons by facsimile transmittal refers only to service of summons upon a
foreign private juridical entity [Sec. 12, Rule 14], not to a non-resident defendant [Sec. 15,
Rule 14]. Service of summons by facsimile cannot be effected under Sec. 15 unless leave
of court was obtained specifically permitting service by facsimile transmittal. Here, the
defendant is not a foreign private juridical entity but a non-resident defendant and no
leave of court was obtained to serve summons by facsimile. Hence, there was no valid
service of summons, and thus, the court could not declare Charybdis in default.
b) As an effect of Scylla’s answer to the complaint, the court shall try the case against both
Scylla and Charybdis based on the answer filed by Scylla. Under Sec. 3(c) of Rule 9,
when a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several
defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try
the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence
presented. Here, there was a common cause of action against Scylla and Charybdis since
 both were co-signatories to the mortgage deed. Hence, the court should not render
judgment by default against Charybdis but should proceed to try the case upon the
answer filed and the evidence presented by Scylla.

Q: JUAN SUED ROBERTO FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. ROBERTO KNEW THAT

JUAN WAS GOING TO FILE THE CASE SO HE WENT OUT OF TOWN AND TEMPORARILY
STAYED IN ANOTHER CITY TO AVOID SERVICE OF SUMMONS. JUAN ENGAGED THE
SERVICES OF SHERIFF MATINIK TO SERVE THE SUMMONS BUT WHEN THE LATTER
WENT TO THE RESIDENCE OF ROBERTO, HE WAS TOLD BY THE CARETAKER
THEREOF THAT HIS EMPLOYER NO LONGER RESIDES AT THE HOUSE. THE
CARETAKER IS A HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE AND IS THE GODSON OF ROBERTO.
BELIEVING THE CARETAKER'S STORY TO BE TRUE, SHERIFF MATINIK LEFT A COPY
OF THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT WITH THE CARETAKER. WAS THERE A VALID
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS? DISCUSS THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID
SERVICE OF SUMMONS.
A: Yes, there was a valid service of summons. In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme
Court held that there was a valid substituted service of summons since the defendant was
engaged in deception to thwart the orderly administration of justice. Here, the defendant was
also engaged in deception since he temporarily stayed in another city to avoid service of
summons and his caretaker falsely said he no longer resides in the house [Sagana v. Francisco,
Oct 2, 2009)

According to Sec. 7, Rule 14, the requirements for a valid substituted service of summons are
3. The defendant, for justifiable reasons, cannot be personally served with summons within a
reasonable time.
4. Copies of the summons shall be left at the defendant’s residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Q: [A] BRIEFLY EXPLAIN THE PROCEDURE ON "INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES"

UNDER RULE 25 AND STATE THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO SERVE WRITTEN
INTERROGATORIES. [B] BRIEFLY EXPLAIN THE PROCEDURE ON "ADMISSION BY
ADVERSE PARTY" UNDER RULE 26 AND THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO FILE AND
SERVE THE REQUEST.
A:
(m) The procedure on “Interrogatories to Parties” under Rule 25 is briefly explained as
follows:
(1)A party desiring to elicit material and relevant facts from an adverse party shall file and
serve upon the latter written interrogatories to be answered by the latter;
(2)The interrogatories shall be answered fully in writing and shall be signed and sworn to by
the person making them. The interrogatories shall be answered within 15 days from
service thereof. The answers may be used for the same purposes provided for in Sec. 4 of
Rule 23 on depositions;
(3)Objections to any interrogatories may be made within 10 days after service thereof. The
effect of the failure to serve written interrogatories is that unless allowed by the court for
good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with written
interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court,
or to give a deposition pending appeal.
(n)The procedure on “Admission by Adverse Party” under Rule 26 is briefly explained as
follows:
 (1)At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any other party
a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and
relevant document or the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact;
(2)Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless,
within the period designated in the request, which shall not be less than 15 days after
service thereof, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the
requesting party a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an
admission is requested or setting forth in detail why he cannot truthfully either admit or
deny those matters;
(3)Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court within the period
for and prior to the filing of his sworn statement. The effect of the failure to file and serve
request for admission is that, unless allowed by the court for good cause shown and to
prevent a failure of justice, a party who fails to file and serve a request for admission on
the adverse party of material and relevant facts at issue which are, or ought to be, within
the personal knowledge of the latter, shall not be allowed to present evidence on such
facts.

Q: [A] WHAT IS THE "MOST IMPORTANT WITNESS" RULE PURSUANT TO THE 2004
GUIDELINES OF PRE-TRIAL AND USE OF DEPOSITION-DISCOVERY MEASURES?
EXPLAIN. [B] WHAT IS THE “ONE-DAY EXAMINATION OF WITNESS" RULE PURSUANT
TO SAID 2004 GUIDELINES? EXPLAIN.
A:
(a)The “most important witness” rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines of Pre-trial and Use of
Deposition-Discovery Measures provides that the judge shall, during the pre-trial conference,
determine the most important witnesses to be heard and limit the number of witnesses.
(b)The “one-day examination of a witness” rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines of Pre-trial and
Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures provides that a witness has to be fully examined in
one day only, subject to the court’s discretion to extend the direct and/or cross-examination
for justifiable reasons.

Q: ALDRIN ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT TO SELL WITH NEIL OVER A PARCEL OF

LAND. THE CONTRACT STIPULATED A P500,000.00 DOWN PAYMENT UPON SIGNING
AND THE BALANCE PAYABLE IN TWELVE (12) MONTHLY INSTALLMENTS OF
P100,000.00. ALDRIN PAID THE DOWNPAYMENT AND HAD PAID THREE (3) MONTHLY
INSTALLMENTS WHEN HE FOUND OUT THAT NEIL HAD SOLD THE SAME PROPERTY
TO YURI FOR P1.5 MILLION PAID IN CASH. ALDRIN SUED NEIL FOR SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE WITH DAMAGES WITH THE RTC. YURI, WITH LEAVE OF COURT, FILED
AN ANSWER-IN INTERVENTION AS HE HAD ALREADY OBTAINED A TCT IN HIS NAME.
AFTER THE TRIAL, THE COURT RENDERED JUDGMENT ORDERING ALDRIN TO PAY
ALL THE INSTALLMENTS DUE, THE CANCELLATION OF YURI'S TITLE, AND NEIL TO
EXECUTE A DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF ALDRIN. WHEN THE JUDGMENT BECAME
FINAL AND EXECUTORY, ALDRIN PAID NEIL ALL THE INSTALLMENTS BUT THE
LATTER REFUSED TO EXECUTE THE DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE FORMER.
ALDRIN FILED A "PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION” WITH
PROPER NOTICE OF HEARING. THE PETITION ALLEGED, AMONG OTHERS, THAT THE
DECISION HAD BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO THE
ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION AS A MATTER OF RIGHT. NEIL FILED A
MOTION TO DISMISS THE PETITION ON THE GROUND THAT IT LACKED THE REQUIRED
CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING. SHOULD THE COURT GRANT NEIL'S
MOTION TO DISMISS?
A: No, the court should not grant Neil’s Motion to Dismiss. Under Sec. 5 of Rule 7, a certification
against forum shopping is required only for initiatory pleadings or petitions. Here, the “Petition
for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution,” although erroneously denominated as a petition, and
assuming that it was filed within five (5) years from the date of the entry of the final and
executory judgment, is actually a motion for issuance of a writ of execution under Rule 39.
Hence, the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of certification against forum shopping
should be denied.

Q: TAILORS TOTO, NELSON AND YENYEN FILED A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 FROM AN ADVERSE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) ON THE COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL
DISMISSAL AGAINST EMPIRE TEXTILE CORPORATION. THE PETITIONERS WERE
TERMINATED ON THE GROUND THAT THEY FAILED TO MEET THE PRESCRIBED
PRODUCTION QUOTA AT LEAST FOUR (4) TIMES. IN THE VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING, ONLY TOTO SIGNED THE VERIFICATION
AND CERTIFICATION, WHILE ATTY. ARMAN SIGNED FOR NELSON. EMPIRE FILED A
MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND OF DEFECTIVE VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION. DECIDE WITH REASONS.
A: The motion to dismiss on the ground of defective verification should be denied. The Supreme
Court has held that a lawyer may verify a pleading in behalf of the client. Moreover, verification
is merely a formal and not a jurisdictional requirement. The court should not dismiss the case
but merely require the party concerned to rectify the defect.

The motion to dismiss on the ground of defective certification against forum-shopping should
likewise be denied. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, when all the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the
signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies
with the Rule [Jacinto v. Gumaru, G.R. No. 191906 (2014)]. Here, the petitioners have a
common interest and invoke a common cause of action, that is, their illegal dismissal by Empire
Textile Corporation for failure to meet production quotas.

Q: PLAINTIFF SUED DEFENDANT FOR COLLECTION OF P1 MILLION BASED ON THE

LATTER'S PROMISSORY NOTE. THE COMPLAINT ALLEGES, AMONG OTHERS: 1)
DEFENDANT BORROWED P1 MILLION FROM PLAINTIFF AS EVIDENCED BY A DULY
EXECUTED PROMISSORY NOTE; 2) THE PROMISSORY NOTE READS:
"Makati, Philippines
Dec. 30, 2014
For value received from plaintiff, defendant promises to pay plaintiff P1 million, twelve
(12) months from the above indicated date without necessity of demand.
Signed
Defendant"

DEFENDANT, IN HIS VERIFIED ANSWER, ALLEGED AMONG OTHERS: 1) DEFENDANT

SPECIFICALLY DENIES THE ALLEGATION IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF THE
COMPLAINT, THE TRUTH BEING DEFENDANT DID NOT EXECUTE ANY PROMISSORY
NOTE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF; OR, 2) DEFENDANT HAS PAID THE P1 MILLION
CLAIMED IN THE PROMISSORY NOTE (ANNEX "A" OF THE COMPLAINT) AS
EVIDENCED BY AN "ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT" DULY EXECUTED BY PLAINTIFF
ON JANUARY 30, 2015 IN MANILA WITH HIS SPOUSE SIGNING AS WITNESS. THE
PLAINTIFF FILED A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ON THE GROUND
THAT THE DEFENDANT'S ANSWER FAILED TO TENDER AN ISSUE AS THE
ALLEGATIONS ON HIS DEFENSES ARE SHAM FOR BEING INCONSISTENT; HENCE, NO
DEFENSE AT ALL. DEFENDANT FILED AN OPPOSITION CLAIMING HIS ANSWER
TENDERED AN ISSUE. A.) IS JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS PROPER?

DEFENDANT FILED A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THAT

THERE ARE NO TRIABLE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACTS. B.) SHOULD THE COURT
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT?
A:
a) No, judgment on the pleadings is not proper. Under Section 2 of Rule 8, a party may set
forth two or more statements of a defense, alternatively or hypothetically. The Supreme
Court has held that inconsistent defenses may be pleaded alternatively or hypothetically
provided that each defense is consistent with itself [Baclayon v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 89132 (1990)]. Hence, plaintiff’s contention that defendant’s answer failed to tender
an issue as his defenses are sham for being inconsistent is without merit.
b) Yes, the court should grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Under Sec. 2 of
Rule 35, a defendant may at any time, move with supporting admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor. Here, the plaintiff had impliedly admitted the genuineness and due
execution of the acknowledgment receipt, which was the basis of defendant’s defense, by
failing to specifically deny it under oath. Hence, the defendant may move for a summary
judgment on the basis that the plaintiff had admitted that the defendant had already paid
his obligation amounting to P1 million.

Q: WHAT IS AN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION?

A: It is one in which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right or the
prevention or redress of a wrong [Sec. 3(a), Rule 1].

Q: WHAT IS A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION?

A: It is one in which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right or the
prevention or redress of a wrong but the action has special features not found in ordinary civil
actions. It is governed by ordinary rules but subject to specific rules prescribed under Rules 62-
71 [Riano, 2011].

Q: WHAT IS A CRIMINAL ACTION?

A: It is one by which the state prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law
[Sec. 3(b), Rule 1].

Q: WHAT IS A CAUSE OF ACTION?

A: It is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another [Sec. 2, Rule 2]

Q: DEFINE SPLITTING OF CAUSE OF ACTION.

A: It is the act of instituting two or more suits on the basis of the same cause of action [Sec. 4,
Rule 2]. It is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts of claims
and bringing several actions thereon [Riano, 2014].

The practice of splitting a cause of action is discouraged because it breeds multiplicity of suits,
clogs the court dockets, leads to vexatious litigation, operates as an instrument of harassment,
and generates unnecessary expenses to the parties. It applies not only to complaints but also to
counterclaims and cross-claims [Riano, 2014].
Q: WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF SPLITTING A CAUSE OF ACTION?
A: The filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the
dismissal of the others [Sec. 4, Rule 2].

Q: WHAT ARE THE REMEDIES AGAINST SPLITTING OF CAUSE OF ACTION?

A: File a motion to dismiss, on the ground of litis pendentia or on the ground of res judicata.

Q: WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION?

A:
(1) The party shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties [Sec. 6, Rule 3]
(i) Right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of transaction
(ii) There is common question of law or fact
(2) The joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules;
(3) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC provided one of the causes of action
falls within the jurisdiction of said court and venue lies therein; and
(4) Where claims in all causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test for jurisdiction [Sec. 5, Rule 2].

Q: IS JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION COMPULSORY?

A: No, a joinder of causes of action is only permissive, not compulsory; hence, a party may
desire to file a single suit for each of his claims (Riano, 2014).

Q: WHEN IS THERE A MISJOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION?

A: There is a misjoinder when two or more causes of action were joined in one complaint when
they should not be so joined. This is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause
of action may on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court be severed and proceeded
with separately [Sec. 6, Rule 2].

Q: DISCUSS THE CONCEPT OF RESIDUAL JURISDICTION, AND DIFFERENTIATE

RESIDUAL JURISDICTION IN RULE 41 (ORDINARY APPEAL) AND RULE 42 (PETITION
FOR REVIEW).
A: The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally
deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This
stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the
records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal
[Katon v. Palanca, G.R. No. 151149 (2004)]. Corollary to this, there is no residual jurisdiction to
speak of where no appeal or petition has even been filed [Fernandez v. CA, G.R. No. 131094
(2005)].

In both Rule 41 and Rule 42, the court exercising residual jurisdiction may:
• issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not
involve any matter litigated by the appeal,
• approve compromises,
• permit appeals of indigent litigants,
• order execution pending appeal, and
• allow withdrawal of the appeal.

In Rule 41, the RTC exercises residual jurisdiction prior to transmittal of the original record or
the record on appeal to the CA. [Sec. 9, Rule 41]. In Rule 42, the RTC exercises residual
jurisdiction before the CA gives due course to the petition. [Sec. 8, Rule 42].
Q: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A CIVIL ACTION AND A SPECIAL
PROCEEDING?
A: Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite
adverse parties. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the
Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which “a party sues another for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong” necessarily has definite adverse
parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant. On the other hand, a special proceeding, “by
which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact,” has one definite party, who
petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse
party [Montañer v. Sharia District Court, G.R. No. 174975 (2009)].

Q: STATE THE RULE WHEN IT COMES TO SPLITTING A CAUSE OF ACTION.

A: Institution of more than one suit for the same cause of action constitutes splitting the cause of
action, which is a ground for the dismissal. Thus, in Rule 2:
Section 3. One suit for a single cause of action — A party may not institute more than
one suit for a single cause of action.
Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of — If two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon
the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
[Lanuza Jr. v. BF Corporation, G.R. No. 174938 (2014)]

Q: STATE THE RULE AS TO MISJOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION.

A: Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of
action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with
separately [Sec. 6, Rule 2].

Q: WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF A CLASS SUIT?

A: The requisites of a class suit are
(a) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;
(b) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court;
and
(c) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class
and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
[Sec. 12, Rule 3].

Q: WHAT IS “ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION” IN RELATION TO A CLASS SUIT?

A: An element of a class suit or representative suit is the adequacy of representation. In
determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court
must consider
(1) Whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other
members of the class;
(2) The proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total membership of the
class; and
(3) Any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the
class.
Where the interests of the plaintiffs and the other members of the class they seek to represent
are diametrically opposed, the class suit will not prosper [MVRS Publications v. Islamic Dawah
Council, G.R. No. 135306 (2003)].
Q: DISTINGUISH BETWEEN REAL PARTY IN INTEREST AND LOCUS STANDI.
A: A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. [Sec. 2, Rule 3; David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396 (2006)]
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged. Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to “raise a constitutional
question” when:
(1) He can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
(2) The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) The injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
[Galicto v. Aquino, G.R. No. 193978 (2012)]

Q: WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF NON-JOINDER OF NECESSARY PARTIES?

A: Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined, the
pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should the court
find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted
necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.

The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed
a waiver of the claim against such party.

The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action,
and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary
party [Sec. 9, Rule 3].

Q: WHAT IS THE VENUE OF ACTIONS AGAINST NON-RESIDENTS WHERE (A) THE

ACTION AFFECTS THE PERSONAL STATUS OF THE PLAINTIFF OR (B) ANY PROPERTY
OF THE DEFENDANT IN THE PHILIPPINES?
A: Either (a) the residence of the plaintiff or (b) where the non-resident’s property may be found
[Sec. 3, Rule 4].

Q: WHAT ARE THE RULES ON VENUE WHEN THE PARTIES STIPULATE ON THE SAME?
A: The rules on venue find no application where the parties, before the filing of the action, have
validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. But note that the mere stipulation on the venue
of an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. It must be
shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such
as “exclusively” and “waiving for this purpose any other venue,” “shall only” preceding the
designation of venue, “to the exclusion of the other courts,” or words of similar import, the
stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting
venue to the specified place. [Auction in Malinta v. Luyaben, G.R. No. 173979 (2007)]

Q: WHEN IS A COUNTERCLAIM COMPULSORY?

A: A counterclaim is compulsory if:
(1) It arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence which is
the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim;
(2) It does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction; and
 (3) The court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its amount and nature, except
that in an original action before the RTC, the counterclaim may be considered
compulsory regardless of the amount.
[Metropolitan Bank and Trust v. CPR Promotions and Marketing, G.R. No. 200567 (2015)]

Q: WHAT TESTS HAVE BEEN USED BY THE COURT IN DETERMINING THE NATURE OF
A COUNTERCLAIM?
A: In determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, the following tests have
been used:
(1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same?
(2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule?
(3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the
defendant’s counterclaim?
(4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the
conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court? This test is the
“compelling test of compulsoriness.”
[Metropolitan Bank and Trust v. CPR Promotions and Marketing, G.R. No. 200567 (2015)]

Q: WHAT IS A CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING?

A: It is a sworn statement in which the plaintiff or principal party certifies in a complaint or
initiatory pleading:
(1) That he has not commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in
any court or tribunal, and to the best of his knowledge, no such other action is pending;
(2) That if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and
(3) That if he should learn that the same or a similar action has been filed or is pending, he
shall report such fact within 5 days to the court receiving his initiatory pleading.
[Sec. 5, Rule 7]

Q: WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE

REQUIREMENT FOR A CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING?
A:
Defect
Failure to comply with the requirement
False certification
Non-compliance with any undertaking
Willful and deliberate forum shopping
Effect
Not curable by mere amendment
Cause for dismissal of the case, without
prejudice unless otherwise provided as with
prejudice, upon motion and after hearing
Constitutes indirect contempt, without
prejudice to administrative and criminal
actions
Ground for summary dismissal, with prejudice
Direct contempt
Cause for administrative sanctions

The requirement specific to petitions filed with the appellate court simply provides as a penalty
that the failure of the petitioner to comply with the listed requirements, among them the need for
a certification against forum shopping, “shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition” [Heirs of Juan Valdez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163208 (2008)].

Q: WHAT IS AN ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT?

A: An actionable document is the written instrument upon which the action or defense is based
[Sec. 7, Rule 8].

Q: HOW DO YOU CONTEST AN ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT?

A: (1) By specific denial under oath; and
(2) By setting forth what is claimed to be the facts .
[Sec. 8, Rule 8]

Q: WHEN DOES DENIAL NOT NEED TO BE UNDER OATH?

A:
(1) The adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument, or
(2) Compliance with an order for inspection of the document has been refused.
[Sec. 8, Rule 8]
There must nevertheless be a specific denial in these cases. Only the oath requirement may be
dispensed with.

Q: WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO DENY AN ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT UNDER

OATH?
A: The genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted [Sec. 8,
Rule 8].

Q: WHAT ARE THE THREE MODES OF SPECIFIC DENIAL?

A:
(1) Absolute denial: by specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the
truth of which the defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the
substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his denial;
(2) Partial denial: by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true and
material and denying only the remainder;
(3) Disavowal of knowledge: by stating that the defendant is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the
complaint, which has the effect of a denial.
[Sec. 10, Rule 8; PBC v. Go, G.R. No. 175514 (2011)]

Q: WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AN AMENDED AND A SUPPLEMENTAL

PLEADING?
A:
Amended pleadings Supplemental pleadings
Reason for amendment is available at time of Grounds for supplemental pleading arose
the first pleading after the filing of the first pleading
Either as a matter of right or by leave of court Always by leave of court
Merely supplements, and exists side-by-side
Supersedes the original
with the original
A new copy of the entire pleading must be Does not require a new copy of the entire
filed pleading
Q: WHAT IS SERVICE IN PERSON ON DEFENDANT?
A: Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him [Sec. 6,
Rule 13].

Q: JOE BOMB OWNS A COMMERCIAL BUILDING IN MALOLOS CITY, BULACAN. HE

ENTERED INTO AN ORAL CONTRACT OF LEASE FOR THE USE OF COMMERCIAL
SPACE WITHIN HIS BUILDING TO BOOMBASTIC ELECTRONIC INDUSTRIES. THE LEASE
WAS FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD, WITH A MONTHLY RENT OF PHP150.00 WHICH IS
PAID ON A MONTH-TO-MONTH BASIS. JOE BOMB LATER SUBDIVIDED THE LEASED
PREMISES INTO TWO PORTIONS BY CONSTRUCTING A PARTITION WALL IN
BETWEEN. HE THEN TOOK POSSESSION OF THE OTHER HALF. BOOMBASTIC
ELECTRONIC INDUSTRIES THEN FILED AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES AND FIXING OF
THE TIME OF THE LEASE AT 5 YEARS BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA. JOE BOMB FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS CONTENDING THAT THE ACTION
WAS A REAL ACTION WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED WITH REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MALOLOS WHERE THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS SITUATED.
BOOMBASTIC COUNTERS THAT THE PRESENT ACTION IS CHIEFLY FOR DAMAGES
ARISING FROM AN ALLEGED BREACH IN THE LEASE CONTRACT; HENCE, THE ISSUE
OF RECOVERY OF POSSESSION IS MERELY INCIDENTAL; THEREFORE, VENUE MAY
BE LAID IN THE PLACE WHERE PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT RESIDES AT THE OPTION
OF PLAINTIFF. IF YOU WERE THE JUDGE, WILL YOU GRANT THE MOTION TO DISMISS?
A: Yes, I will grant the motion for dismiss. The action is a real action which shall be filed in the
place where the property in question is located.

While the instant action is for damages arising from an alleged breach of the lease contract, it
likewise prays for the fixing of the period of lease at five (5) years. If found meritorious,
Boombastic will be entitled to remain not only as lessee for another five (5) years but also to the
recovery of the portion earlier taken from him as well. This is because the leased premises
under the original contract was the whole commercial space itself and not just the subdivided
portion. While it may be that the instant complaint does not explicitly pray for recovery of
possession, such is the necessary consequence. The instant action therefore does not operate
to efface the fundamental and prime objective of the nature of the case which is to recover the
one-half portion repossessed by the lessor, Joe Bomb. Indeed, where the ultimate purpose of
an action involves title to or seeks recovery of possession, partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, such an action must be deemed a real action and
must perforce be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof
lies” [Paderanga vs Buissan, G.R. No. 49475 (1993)].

Q: YOU ARE SEEKING TO HAVE YOUR CLIENT DECLARED AS AN INDIGENT LITIGANT.

HOWEVER, YOU DISCOVER THAT HE OWNS A PARCEL OF LAND WITH A FAIR MARKET
VALUE OF PHP 400,000. WOULD IT STILL BE POSSIBLE FOR YOUR CLIENT TO BE
CONSIDERED AN INDIGENT PARTY?
A: Yes, but it would be subject to the discretion of the court using the indigency test.

If the applicant meets BOTH the salary (gross income and that of their immediate family’s do
not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage) and property requirements (does not
own real property with a fair market value of more than PHP 300,000) under Sec. 19 of Rule
141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. Since my client owns real property with FMV
of above PHP 300,000, s/he cannot be mandatorily considered an indigent.
On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the
application should not be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the "indigency test"
under Sec. 21 of Rule 3 (no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter, and
basic necessities) and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for
exemption [Spouses Algura v. LGU of the City of Naga, G.R. No. 150135 (2006)].

Q: BRYAN IS LEASING ONE OF THE UNITS IN THE APARTMENT BUILDING THAT ADAM
OWNS. BRYAN’S GIRLFRIEND, CATHY, FREQUENTLY VISITS AND SPENDS THE NIGHT
THERE. THEY WENT TO THE HOSPITAL ONE DAY BECAUSE THEY HAD NOT BEEN
FEELING WELL FOR SEVERAL DAYS. UPON INVESTIGATION, THE DOCTOR TOLD
THEM THAT THE MOLD IN THE CEILING OF BRYAN’S APARTMENT CAUSED THEM A
SERIOUS ILLNESS. THEY HAD TO TAKE MEDICINE AND WERE FORCED TO TAKE A
LEAVE FROM WORK. BRYAN REFUSED TO PAY THE RENT FOR THAT MONTH. ADAM
SUED BRYAN FOR A MONTH’S WORTH OF RENT. BRYAN ALLEGED IN HIS ANSWER
WITH COUNTERCLAIM, INTER ALIA, THAT THERE WAS MOLD IN THE APARTMENT
WHICH MADE HIM AND CATHY SERIOUSLY ILL, CAUSED THEM TO TAKE LEAVE FROM
WORK, COST THEM MEDICAL EXPENSES AND BROUGHT ANGUISH TO THEIR LIVES.
BRYAN ASKED THE COURT TO ORDER ADAM TO REIMBURSE HIM THE MEDICAL
EXPENSES AND LOST SALARIES AS ACTUAL DAMAGES AND TO PAY HIM MORAL
DAMAGES. THE TRIAL COURT ORDERED CATHY TO BE BROUGHT IN AS A
DEFENDANT. CAN IT DO SO?
A: Yes. According to Sec. 12, Rule 6, “When the presence of parties other than those to the
original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a
counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if
jurisdiction over them can be obtained.” The relief asked in Bryan’s counter-claim consists of
actual and moral damages brought about by the mold in the apartment that Adam leased to him.
Both Bryan and Cathy suffered the actual and moral damages alleged, and they suffered due to
the same exposure to the mold. Hence, granting of complete relief to the determination of the
counter-claim requires Cathy’s presence. Therefore, provided that jurisdiction over the person of
Cathy can be obtained, the court shall order her to be brought in as a defendant.

Q: WHILE ON A DINNER DATE, CATHY BLAMED BRYAN FOR GETTING HER EXPOSED
TO THE MOLD AND THE RESULTING FINANCIAL AND EMOTIONAL COSTS SHE
INCURRED. SHE TOLD BRYAN THAT SHE COULD HAVE AVOIDED GETTING SICK IF
BRYAN HAD ONLY AGREED FOR THEM TO SPEND MORE TIME IN HER APARTMENT.
THEY BROKE UP AFTER THE ARGUMENT. BRYAN SUED ADAM BEFORE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS AND CLAIMED DAMAGES.
ADAM DID NOT FILE AN ANSWER WITHIN 10 DAYS FROM SERVICE OF SUMMONS.
BRYAN, PREOCCUPIED WITH THE BREAK-UP, DID NOT MOVE TO DECLARE ADAM IN
DEFAULT. NEVERTHELESS, THE TRIAL COURT ISSUED AN ORDER DECLARING HIM IN
DEFAULT. WHAT IS ADAM’S REMEDY?
A: Adam’s remedy is to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on the ground that
the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing an Order declaring him in default.

Sec. 3, Rule 9, allows the court to declare the defending party in default only upon motion of the
claiming party with notice to such defending party and proof of such failure. In ordinary
proceedings, the RTC cannot declare parties in default motu proprio. Moreover, Sec. 1, Rule 11
allows the defendant 15 days after service of summons to file his Answer. The facts state that
Adam failed to file within 10 days from service. Therefore, the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disregarding these two provisions of the Rules of Court.
Adam has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Order is an
interlocutory order that cannot be appealed under Sec. 1, Rule 41 because the RTC still has to
decide on the merits of Bryan’s complaint. A motion to set aside the order of default under Sec.
3(b), Rule 9 is not a remedy as well because Adam’s ground in challenging the Order does not
consist of failure to answer due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and
existence of a meritorious defense. His ground is the trial court’s disregard of Sec. 3, Rule 9,
and Sec. 1, Rule 11. Thus, the petition for certiorari is the proper remedy.

Q: IN THE QUESTION ABOVE, SUPPOSE ADAM WAS ABLE TO FILE HIS ANSWER
WITHIN THE ALLOWED PERIOD, BUT NEITHER BRYAN NOR HIS COUNSEL APPEARED
ON THE DATE OF THE PRESENTATION OF HIS EVIDENCE IN CHIEF BECAUSE THEY
WERE PREOCCUPIED WITH BRYAN’S BREAK-UP. THE TRIAL COURT MOTU PROPRIO
DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT. BRYAN FILED ANOTHER COMPLAINT AGAINST ADAM
ON THE SAME CAUSE OF ACTION OF ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS. IF YOU WERE
ADAM’S COUNSEL, WHAT WOULD YOU DO?
A: I will file a motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action is barred by prior
judgment (res judicata). Sec. 3, Rule 17 states that the court may dismiss the complaint if, for no
justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in
chief. The provision also says that such dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon
the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. Bryan failed to appear on the date of the
presentation of his evidence in chief because he was preoccupied with his break-up, which is
not a justifiable cause, thereby allowing the court to dismiss his complaint. Since this dismissal
is on the merits, that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment is a ground to dismiss
Bryan’s subsequent complaint.

Q: HOW SHOULD SUMMONS BE SERVED ON A FOREIGN PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY

THAT IS NOT REGISTERED IN THE PHILIPPINES?
A: According to Sec. 12, Rule 14, the options are as follows, all with leave of court and out of
the Philippines:
(a) Personal service coursed through the foreign court with the assistance of the DFA
(b) Publication AND registered mail to last known address
(c) Facsimile or any recognized electronic means, and
(d) Other means at the discretion of the court.

Q: WHEN CAN THERE BE RESORT TO SUBSTITUTED SERVICE?

A: To warrant the substituted service of the summons and copy of the complaint, the serving
officer must first attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person. Only after the attempt
at personal service has become futile or impossible within a reasonable time may the officer
resort to substituted service. The rule on personal service is to be rigidly enforced.

Being in derogation of the usual method of service, substituted service may be used only as
prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. The impossibility of prompt personal
service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant himself and the fact
that such efforts failed, which statement should be found in the proof of service or sheriff’s
return. Nonetheless, the requisite showing of the impossibility of prompt personal service as
basis for resorting to substituted service may be waived by the defendant either expressly or
impliedly [Macasaet v. Co, Jr., G.R. No. 156759 (2013)].

Q: HOW DO YOU EFFECT SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS?

A: If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected
 (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or
(b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
[Sec. 7, Rule 14]

Q: DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN ACTIONS IN PERSONAM, ACTIONS IN REM AND

ACTIONS QUASI IN REM.
A: Actions in personam, are those actions brought against a person; actions in rem are actions
against the thing itself instead of against the person; and actions are quasi in rem, where an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his or her
interest in a property to the obligation or loan burdening the property [Perkin Elmer Singapore
PTE LTD v. Dakila Trading, G.R. No. 172242 (2007)].

Q WHEN MAY EXTRATERRITORIAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS BE RESORTED TO, AND

WHAT ARE THE MODES OF EFFECTING IT?
A: When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within
the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in
which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines,
service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under
section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such
time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall
be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner
the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time,
which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer
[Sec. 15, Rule 14].

Q: HOW IS SERVICE OF SUMMONS DONE TO A DOMESTIC CORPORATION,

PARTNERSHIP OR OTHER JURIDICAL ENTITY?
A: Service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel [Sec. 11, Rule 14].

The enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is restricted, limited and
exclusive. Substantial compliance cannot be invoked. Service of summons upon persons other
than those officers specifically mentioned above is void, defective and not binding to said
corporation.

However, if one of the persons in the enumeration empowers another to act as his/her agent to
receive summons in representation, while it may be true that there was no direct, physical
handing of the summons to the corporate secretary, the latter could at least be charged with
having constructively received the same, which amounts to a valid service of summons. [Nation
Petroleum Gas v. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 183370 (2015)]

Q: WHAT ARE THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE, IN VARIOUS STAGES OF THE

PROCEEDINGS, TO A PARTY WHO WAS DECLARED IN DEFAULT?
A:
Situation Remedy
After order declaring in default, but before Motion to set aside the order of default, upon

judgment is rendered
After judgment is rendered, but before the
same becomes final and executory
After judgment becomes final
After judgment becomes final, and after the
period to file petition for relief under Rule 38
If grave abuse of discretion attended the
grant of order of default
showing any of the following grounds: fraud,
accident, mistake, excusable negligence
[FAME], and a meritorious defense, before
judgment is rendered
Motion for new trial under Rule 37 on the
ground of FAME, before the judgment
becomes final and executory
Petition for relief from judgment under Rule
38 on the ground of FAME, within 60 days
from notice of the judgment, but within 6
months from entry thereof (must be within
both periods)
Petition for annulment of judgment under
Rule 47 on the ground of extrinsic fraud,
within 4 years from discovery of the extrinsic
fraud
Special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65

Q: WHAT ARE THE GROUNDS FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS?

A: [Sec. 1, Rule 16]
(1)Lack of jurisdiction over the defendant’s person
(2)Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim
(3)Improper venue
(4)Plaintiff’s lack of legal capacity to sue
(5)Litis pendentia
(6)Res judicata
(7)Prescription
(8)Failure to state a cause of action
(9)Extinguished claim
(10) Unenforceable claim under the Statute of Frauds
(11) Non-compliance with a condition precedent

Q: WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO FILE A PRE-TRIAL BRIEF?

A: Sec. 6, Rule 18 mandates that parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party
their pre-trial briefs at least three days before the scheduled pre-trial. Failure to file the pre-trial
brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. Therefore, plaintiff’s failure
to file the pre-trial brief shall be cause for dismissal of the action.

If the trial court has discretion to dismiss the case because of plaintiff’s failure to appear at pre-
trial, then the trial court also has discretion to dismiss the case because of plaintiff’s failure to file
the pre-trial brief. Moreover, whether an order of dismissal should be maintained under the
circumstances of a particular case or whether it should be set aside depends on the sound
discretion of the trial court. [Republic v. Oleta, G.R. No. 156606 (2007)]
Q: JUAN IS A PLAINTIFF IN A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES. AFTER THE LAST PLEADING
WAS SERVED AND FILED, JUAN FAILED TO MOVE THAT THE CASE BE SET FOR PRE-
TRIAL. PEDRO, THE DEFENDANT, FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS STATING THAT PRE-
TRIAL IS MANDATORY AND THE RULES STATE THAT IT IS THE PLAINTIFF WHO HAS
THE DUTY TO MOVE FOR PRE-TRIAL AFTER THE LAST PLEADING IS FILED. PEDRO
CONTENDS THAT FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SUCH DUTY WARRANTS DISMISSAL OF
THE CASE. RULE ON THIS CONTENTION.
A: The Motion to Dismiss must be denied. Although Sec. 1, Rule 18, states that “After the last
pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly
move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial,” the Supreme Court has issued an
administrative rule that if the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the branch
clerk shall issue a Notice of Pre-Trial [AM No. 03-1-09-SC]. Furthermore, failing to move for pre-
trial is not one of the grounds in a motion to dismiss.

Please note the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses
Genuino [G.R. No. 208792 (2015)]: A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, providing that "[w]ithin five (5) days
from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the case be set for
pre-trial conference [and] [i}f the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the
Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial," must be read together with Rule 17,Section 3 of
the Rules of Court on dismissals due to plaintiff’s fault. Plaintiff should thus sufficiently show
justifiable cause for its failure to set the case for pre-trial; otherwise, the court can dismiss the
complaint outright.

Q: Distinguish pre-trial in civil cases and pre-trial in criminal cases.

A:
Civil [Rule 18] Criminal [Rule 118]
After arraignment and within 30 days
after the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused [Sec.
1, Rule 118]

Under the Revised Guidelines, it is

After the last pleading has been
within 10 calendar days from the
When set served and filed [Sec. 1, Rule
court’s receipt of the case in case of
18]
a detained accused, and within 30
calendar days from the date the
court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of a non-detained accused.
[Section 8(a), A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC]
 Civil [Rule 18] Criminal [Rule 118]
After the arraignment, the court
Within five (5) days from date of
shall set the pre-trial conference
filing and serving of the last
within thirty (30) days from
pleading joining the issues (or
arraignment [A.M. No. 03-01-09-SC]
the expiration of time to file such
pleading without it having been
Under the Revised Guidelines, the
filed), the plaintiff must promptly
court shall set the arraignment and
Who moves to move ex parte that the case be
pre-trial on the same day, within 10
set set for pre-trial conference.
calendar days from the court’s
receipt of the case in case of a
If the plaintiff fails to file said
detained accused, and within 30
motion within the given period,
calendar days from the date the
the Branch Clerk of Court shall
court acquires jurisdiction over the
issue a notice of pre-trial [A.M.
person of a non-detained accused.
No. 03-01-09-SC]
[Section 8(a), A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC]
Mandatory Yes Yes
All admissions and agreements shall
Not required to be signed by be reduced and writing and signed
Agreements and
both party and counsel. The by both the accused and counsel;
admissions in
minutes may be signed by either otherwise they cannot be used
the pre-trial
party or counsel [Riano] against the accused. [Sec. 2, Rule
118]

Failure of a plaintiff to appear

results to the dismissal of the
case with prejudice unless Failure of the counsel of the accused
otherwise ordered by the court or the prosecutor to appear without
Effect of failure an acceptable excuse results to
to appear Failure of the defendant to sanctions and penalties on the
appear shall be cause for the counsel/prosecutor [Sec. 3, Rule
plaintiff to present evidence ex 118].
parte and obtain judgment based
thereon [Sec. 5, Rule 18].

Specifically required [Sec. 6,

Rule 18]. Failure to file pre-trial
brief has same effect as failure
to appear

Pre-trial brief In addition to the Pre-trial Brief, Not specifically required.

the Judicial Affidavit Rule now
requires the submission of the
judicial affidavits of the parties’
respective witnesses five (5)
days before the pre-trial.
Q: WHEN MAY DEPOSITIONS OF A WITNESS BE USED FOR ANY PURPOSE?
A: The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any
purpose if the court finds:
(a) that the witness is dead; or
(b) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the
place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence
was procured by the party offering the deposition; or
(c) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment; or
(d) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the
witness by subpoena; or
(e) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it
desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting
the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used
[Sec. 4, Rule 23]

Q: JUAN IS A PLAINTIFF IN A CIVIL CASE AGAINST PEDRO. AFTER JUAN PRESENTED

HIS EVIDENCE, PEDRO FILED A DEMURRER WHICH WAS GRANTED BY THE TRIAL
COURT. UPON APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE APPEAL WAS GRANTED
AND THE COURT OF APPEALS RENDERED JUDGMENT AGAINST PEDRO. PEDRO
FILES A PETITION BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT CONTENDING THAT THE PROPER
ORDER SHOULD HAVE BEEN A REMAND OF THE CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR
PEDRO TO PRESENT HIS OWN EVIDENCE. IF YOU WERE THE COURT, HOW WOULD
YOU RULE ON PEDRO’S ARGUMENT?
A: Pedro’s argument has no merit. If a demurrer is granted but later reversed on appeal, the
appellate court should not remand the case for further proceedings but should render judgment
on the basis of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff [Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Del
Monte Motor Works, Inc., G.R. No. 143338 (2005)]. If the order granting the demurrer is
reversed on appeal, the defendant loses his right to present evidence [Sec. 1, Rule 33; Republic
v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 148246 (2007)].

Q: WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR INTERVENTION?

A:
(1)The intervenor has legal interest:
(a)In the matter in controversy; or
(b)In the success of either of the parties; or
(c) Against both; or
(d)Is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or of an office thereof;
(2)Intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of original parties
(3)Intervenor’s rights may not be fully protected in a separate proceeding
[Sec. 1, Rule 19; Ortega v. CA, G.R. No. 125302 (1998)].

Q: WHAT IS A JUDGMENT COGNOVIT ACTIONEM, AND IS IT VALID?

A: It is one rendered upon confession made pursuant to a clause in a promissory note or
contract that upon default, the holder may confess judgment as the maker’s attorney-in-fact.

This is considered void in our jurisdiction for denying a party his right to a day in court [ PNB v.
Manila Oil, G.R. No. L-18103 (1992)]
Q: WHAT IS A MEMORANDUM DECISION, AND WHEN CAN IT BE CONSIDERED VALID?
A: It is a decision rendered by an appellate court, that incorporates by reference the findings of
fact or the conclusions of law contained in the decision, order or ruling under review.
To be valid, it must:
(a) Provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be
contained in a statement attached to the said decision (and not merely a remote
reference);
(a) Be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties
and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved
that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved.
[Francisco v. Permskul, G.R. No. 81006 (1989)]

Q: WHAT ARE THE GROUNDS FOR QUASHING A SUBPOENA?

A: [Sec. 4, Rule 23]
For quashing subpoena duces tecum:
(a) That the subpoena is unreasonable and oppressive;
(b) That the articles sought do not appear prima facie relevant to the issues;
(c) That the applicant does not advance the cost for the production of the articles desired; or
(d) That there was no tender of witness fees and kilometrage.
For quashing subpoena ad testificandum
(a) That the witness is not bound thereby, or
(b) That there was no tender of witness fees and kilometrage.

In the case of DFA v. BCA International Corp [G.R. No. 210858 (2016)], the Supreme Court
ruled that subpoena may be quashed if “ the documents and records sought to be subpoenaed
are protected by the deliberative process privilege,” like state, diplomatic or military secrets.

Q: WHAT IS THE VIATORY RIGHT OF A WITNESS, AND IS IT APPLICABLE TO BOTH

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES?
A: The viatory right of a witness is the right to not be compelled to attend in court under a
subpoena if s/he resides more than 100 kilometers from his residence to where he is to testify,
in the ordinary course of travel [Riguera, citing 1 Regalado 300]. This viatory right applies only in
civil cases, not criminal cases [Genorga v. Quitain, A.M. No. 981-CFI (1977)].

Q: WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF CONSOLIDATION?

A: [Republic v. Heirs of Oribello, G.R. No. 199501 (2013)]
(1)Quasi-consolidation – where all, except one, of several actions are stayed until one is
tried, in which case, the judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to others; not actually
consolidation but is referred to as such
(2)Actual consolidation – where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate
identity, and become one single action in which judgment is rendered
(3)Consolidation for Trial – where several actions are ordered to be tried together, but each
retains its separate character, and requires the entry of separate judgment

Q: DISTINGUISH A JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS FROM A SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

A: Judgment on the pleadings is a judgment rendered by the court if the answer fails to tender
an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. It is
rendered without a trial, or even without a pre-trial. The grounds are as follows:
(1) The answer fails to tender an issue because of:
(a) General denial of the material allegations of the complaint;
(b) Insufficient denial of the material allegations of the complaint; or
(2) The answer otherwise admits material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading [Sec. 1,
Rule 34]

On the other hand, summary judgment is a judgment which the court may render before trial,
but after both parties have pleaded, upon application by one party supported by affidavits,
depositions, or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may file an opposition
supported also by such documents, should the court find, after summarily hearing both parties
with their respective proofs, that there exists no genuine issue between them. The grounds are
as follows:
(4)There exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, except as to the amount of
damages; and
(5)The party presenting the motion must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law
[Rule 35]

Other differences are as follows [Riguera]:

Judgment on the Pleadings Summary Judgment
May be based on the pleadings as well as
Based on the pleadings only
affidavits, depositions and admissions.
Requires a 3-day notice, same as the general
Requires a 10-day notice. [Sec. 3, Rule 35]
rule for motions [Sec. 4, Rule 15]
No such thing as a partial judgment on the
Partial summary judgment may be allowed
pleadings
May only be prayed for by the claiming party May be prayed for by either claiming or
or plaintiff defending party

Q: DISTINGUISH THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE FROM THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY

OF JUDGMENTS
A:
Final judgment rule Doctrine of immutability of judgment
Applies to final judgments and orders Applies to final and executory judgments and
orders
The final judgment rule as enunciated in Under the Doctrine of Immutability of
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states Judgments,
that appeal may be taken from a judgment or a judgment that has attained finality can no
final order that completely disposes of the longer be disturbed. The reason of two-fold:
case, or of a particular matter therein when 1) To avoid delay in the administration of
declared by these Rules to be appealable. justice, and to make orderly the
Moreover, the remedy from an interlocutory discharge of judicial business; and
order is not an appeal but a special civil action 2) To put an end to judicial controversies
for certiorari. [Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. at the expense of occasional errors.
158239 (2012)] [Riano]

Exceptions to the final judgment rule are as Exceptions to the doctrine of immutability of
follows: [Bersamin, Appeal and Review in the judgment as seen in jurisprudence:
Philippines (2000) p. 120] 1) Correction of clerical errors [Filipinas
1) Statutory exception Palmoil Processing, Inc. v. Dejapa,
a. Partial judgment for or against G.R. No. 167332 (2011)]
one or more of several parties 2) Nunc Pro Tunc entries [Filipinas
b. Partial judgment for or against Palmoil Processing, Inc. v. Dejapa,
one or more separate claims G.R. No. 167332 (2011)]
Final judgment rule
c. Cases under Sec. 1, Rule 109
(special proceedings):
2) Discretionary exception
a. Supreme Court’s plenary
discretion to accept or refuse
invocations of its appellate
jurisdiction
3) Collateral order exception
a. The decision or order
determines a matter collateral
to the rights underlying the
action and which is too
important to be denied review.
Examples of cases where the particular matter
(although not completely disposing of the
case) is specifically declared by the Rules to
be appealable are the following [Riguera 580]:
(1) The order of expropriation in
expropriation cases [Sec. 4, Rule 67]
(2) The order of partition in partition cases
[Sec. 2, Rule 69]
Doctrine of immutability of judgment
3) Whenever circumstances transpire
after finality of the decision, rendering
its execution unjust and inequitable.
[Apo Fruits Corp. v. Land Bank of the
Phils., G.R. No. 164195 (2010)]
4) In cases of special and exceptional
nature, when it is necessary in the
interest of justice to direct modification
in order to harmonize the disposition
with the prevailing circumstances
[Industrial Timber Corp. v. Ababon,
G.R. No.164518 (2006)]
5) In case of void judgments [FGU
Insurance v. RTC Makati, G.R. No.
161282 (2011)]
6) Where there is a strong showing that a
grave injustice would result from an
application of the Rules [Almuete v.
People, G.R. No. 179611 (2013)]
7) When there are grounds for annulment
of judgment or petition for relief
[Gochan v. Mancao, G.R. No. 182314
(2013)]

Q: HOW MAY A FOREIGN JUDGMENT BE ENFORCED?

A: In the Philippines, a judgment or final order of a foreign tribunal cannot be enforced simply by
execution. Such judgment or order merely creates a right of action, and its non-satisfaction is
the cause of action by which a suit can be brought upon for its enforcement. An action for the
enforcement of a foreign judgment or final order in this jurisdiction is governed by Sec. 48, Rule
39.

The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be undertaken in order to enforce a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. But the filing of a civil complaint is an appropriate measure
for such purpose brought before the regular courts.

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment or final order requires only proof of fact of
the said judgment or final order [BPI Securities v. Guevara, G.R. No. 167052 (2015)].

Q: WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, AND HOW MAY THEIR

ENFORCEMENT BE REPELLED?
A: In case of judgment or final order upon a specific thing, it is conclusive upon the thing. In
case of judgment or final order against a person, it is presumptive evidence of a right as
between parties and successors in interest

Foreign judgments in either case may be repelled by the following grounds:

(1) Want of jurisdiction
(2) Want of notice
(3) Collusion
(4) Fraud
(5) Clear mistake of law or fact
[Sec. 48, Rule 39]

Q: WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES AND GROUNDS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND A FINAL WRIT OF INJUNCTION?
A: For a writ of preliminary injunction, the requisites are:
(1) Right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right
(2) Violation of that right
(3) Urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage
[Tayag v. Lacson, G.R. No. 134971 (2006)]

The grounds for issuance of a preliminary injunction are as follows [Sec. 3, Rule 58]:
(1) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and such relief consist in whole or in
part of restraining the commission or continuance of an act or requiring performance of
an act
(2) The commission, continuance, or non-performance would probably work injustice to the
applicant
(3) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, attempting to do, or is procuring
to be done acts probably in violation of rights of the applicant and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual

For a final writ of injunction:

If after the trial, it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the acts complained of
permanently enjoined [Sec. 9, Rule 58]

Q: WHAT IS A STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER, AND DIFFERENTIATE IT FROM A

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION?
A: A status quo ante order is an order to maintain the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested
state of things that preceded the controversy. It is a remedy apart from the provisional remedies
expressly recognized and made available under Rules 56 to 61.

Compared to a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, it can be granted even if

the affected party neither sought such relief or the allegations in his pleading nor did not
sufficiently make out a case for a temporary restraining order. The status quo order was thus
issued motu proprio on equitable considerations. Also, unlike a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction, a status quo order is more in the nature of a cease and desist order,
since it neither directs the doing or undoing of acts as in the case of prohibitory or mandatory
injunctive relief. Further, unlike the amended rule on restraining orders, a status quo order does
not require the posting of a bond [Megaworld Properties v. Majestic Finance, G.R. No. 169694
(2015)].

Q: ON WHAT GROUNDS MAY A PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT BE GRANTED?

A: At the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any
proper party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction
of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:
(a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, other than
moral and exemplary a cause of action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract, delict
or quasi-delict against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to
defraud his creditors;
(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to
his own use by a j public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney factor,
 broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person
in a fiduciary ' capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;
(c) In an action to recover the possession of property unjustly or fraudulently taken,
detained or converted, when the property, or any part thereof, has been concealed,
removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an
authorized person;
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or
incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof;
(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his property, or is about to
do so, with intent to defraud his creditors; or
(f) In an action against a party who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, or
on whom summons may be served by publication.
[Sec. 1, Rule 57]

Q: WHAT IS THE LIFETIME OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION?

A: Under Sec. 14, Rule 39, the lifetime of the writ of execution during the period within which the
judgment may be enforced by motion, that is, within 5 years from entry thereof [Bajet v. Baclig,
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1598 (2002)]

Q: CAN A FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARD BE ENFORCED UNDER SECTION 48 OF RULE 39

OF THE RULES OF COURT? EXPLAIN BRIEFLY.
A: No. A foreign arbitral award cannot be enforced under Section 48 because it is not a foreign
judgment. It may be enforced under Rule 12 of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative
Dispute Resolution, as a petition to recognize or enforce the arbitral award with any of the
following RTCs:
(a) Where the arbitration proceedings were conducted
(b) Where any of the assets to be attached or levied upon are located
(c) Where to act to be enjoined is being performed
(d) Where any of the parties to arbitration resides or has its place of business
(e) In the National Capital Judicial Region
[Riguera 569-570]

Q: HOW MAY A JUDGMENT BE EXECUTED BY MOTION, AND WHEN MAY IT BE BY

INDEPENDENT ACTION?
A: A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from
the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced
by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is
barred by the statute of limitations [Sec. 6, Rule 39].

Q: WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE THAT A MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION IS A PREREQUISITE TO A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI?
A:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable;
 (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved
[Abacan vs. Northwestern University, Inc., G.R. No. 140777 (2005)]

Q: DOES FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BAR RESORT TO A

PETITION FOR PROHIBITION?
A: Yes. The availability of an administrative remedy via a complaint filed before the NEA
precludes the filing a petition for prohibition before the court. It is settled that one of the
requisites for a writ of prohibition to issue is that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. In order that prohibition will lie, the petitioner must first exhaust all
administrative remedies [Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc., et al. vs. Seludo, Jr., G.R. No.
173840 (2012)].

Q: WHAT IS THE PROPER VENUE FOR THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF QUO
WARRANTO?
A: Generally, it should be filed with the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or the RTC
exercising jurisdiction over the area where the respondent or any of the respondents reside. If
filed by the Solicitor General, it should be in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or an
RTC in the City of Manila [Sec. 7, Rule 65].

Note: If the petition for quo warranto is filed under Sec. 1(c), Rule 66 (An association which acts
as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful
authority so to act), original and exclusive jurisdiction is vested on the special commercial courts
[see Sec. 5.2, R.A. 8799]. Hence, in these cases, the venue should be the special commercial
court having jurisdiction over the area where respondent or any of the respondents reside.

Q: WHAT IS INVERSE CONDEMNATION?

A: It is the action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency when
the property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the
power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. It is not an action for
damages. In these cases, reckoning just compensation on the value at the time the owners
commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is warranted [National Power Corporation
v. Makabangkit, G.R. No. 165828 (2011)].

Note: In cases where there was taking before the filing of complaint, the just compensation is
based on the value at the time of taking. The owner is then compensated in those cases by the
award of interest, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of litigation, in view of the
expropriating agency’s deprivation of the owners of the beneficial ownership over their property
without the benefit of a timely expropriation proceeding [DPWH v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No.
179334 (2015)].

Q: DISCUSS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF, THE ISSUANCE
AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT.
A: The distinction is indispensably necessary to determine when jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant should be acquired in order to validly implement the writ of attachment upon his
person. In short, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary only in the
implementation of the writ, hence the requirement of service of summons prior or
contemporaneous to the implementation of the writ.

Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of the remedy “at the commencement of
the action or at any time before entry of judgment.” This phrase refers to the date of the filing of
the complaint, which is the moment that marks "the commencement of the action." The
reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even before
summons issues.

In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals (1991), the Court clarified that whatever be
the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of defendant do
not and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is
eventually obtained by the court. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences
implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a
copy of the applicant’s affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as
explicitly required by Sec. 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as
well as a copy of the complaint.

In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals (1992), the Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy of
attachment involves three stages:
(1) the court issues the order granting the application;
(2) the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ;
(3) the writ is implemented.

For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be
first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power
and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will
not bind the defendant. Thus, it is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, but also upon consideration of fairness, to apprise the defendant of
the complaint against him and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the grounds
therefor that prior or contemporaneously to the serving of the writ of attachment, service of
summons, together with a copy of the complaint, the application for attachment, the applicant’s
affidavit and bond, and the order must be served upon him. The subsequent service of
summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the
law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service. [Torres v. Satsatin, G.R. No. 166759
(2009)].

Q: DEFINE “GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LAW OR EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION.”
A: The term grave abuse of discretion has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can
only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. [Metrobank v.
Tobias, G.R. No. 177780 (2012)]
Q: WHAT IS EQUITY OF REDEMPTION?
A: It is the right of the mortgagor to extinguish the collateral and retain ownership of it exercised
after default in the performance of the condition of the mortgage but before the foreclosure sale
of the collateral by paying the mortgage obligation. The period is no less than 90 days but no
more than 120 days from the entry of judgment [Sec. 2, Rule 68].

Note: This is only applicable to judicial foreclosure.

Q: IN AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE IN THE MTCC, JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED

ORDERING RESPONDENT R TO VACATE PLAINTIFF P’S PREMISES. R APPEALED TO
THE RTC. IN THE RTC, THE COURT ALLOWED PRESENTATION OF TWO MORE
WITNESSES FOR THE RESPONDENT, IN ORDER TO PROVE AN EXTENSION OF THE
LEASE AGREEMENT. IS THIS ACTION PROPER?
A: No. The RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a
rehearing or trial de novo. Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that “[t]he
judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall
decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin
and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the
Regional Trial Court. Hence, the RTC’s action are contrary to the rule by allowing further
presentation of witnesses for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo.
[Manalang v. Bacani, G.R. No. 156995 (2015)].

Q: THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT IN AN EJECTMENT CASE IS IMMEDIATELY

EXECUTORY. HOW DO YOU STAY ITS EXECUTION?
A: The perfection of the appeal by the defendant does not forbid the favorable action on the
plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution. The execution of the decision could not be stayed
by the mere taking of the appeal. Only the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the
deposit with the appellate court of the amount of rent due from time to time, coupled with the
perfection of the appeal, could stay the execution.

The summary nature of the special civil action under Rule 70 and the purpose underlying the
mandate for an immediate execution, which is to prevent the plaintiffs from being further
deprived of their rightful possession, should always be borne in mind [Ferrer v. Judge Rabaca,
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1580 (2010)].

Q: WHAT ARE THE ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER?

A:
(a) The fact of lease by virtue of a contract, express or implied;
(b) The expiration or termination of the possessors right to hold possession;
(c) Withholding by the lessee of possession of the land or building after the expiration or
termination of the right to possess;
(d) Letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and
vacate the premises; and
(e) The filing of the action within one year from the date of the last demand received by the
defendant
[Pasricha v. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 136409 (2008)]

Q: WHAT IS CONTEMPT OF COURT?

A: Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public
authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders
of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or
insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the
respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a
despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic,
embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts [Lorenzo Shipping Corporation
v. DMAP, G.R. No. 155849 (2011)].

Q: COMPARE AND CONTRAST THE TWO KINDS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT.

A: Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the
presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and
constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or
order of the court.

The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate, and no process or evidence
is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae. In contrast, the second usually
requires proceedings less summary than the first. The proceedings for the punishment of the
contumacious act committed outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally need the
observance of all the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written charges, and an
opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed
[Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. DMAP, G.R. No. 155849 (2011)].

In contempt of court, indirect contempt may be initiated (a) motu propio by the court against
which the contempt was committed by an order or any formal charge requiring the respondent
to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt, or (b) by independent action by a party
by filing of a verified petition. Where the charge for indirect contempt has been committed
against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer
appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such court. Where such contempt has been
committed against a lower court, the charge may be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
place in which the lower court is sitting; but the proceedings may also be instituted in such lower
court subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court of such place in the same manner as
provided in section 11 of this Rule. (Sections, 4 and 5, Rule 71)

Q: ATTY. ANDREW BOGADO WAS CHARGED OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT, ON

THE GROUND OF MISBEHAVIOR OF AN OFFICER OF THE COURT FOR CRITICIZING A
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. MAY GOOD FAITH BE USED AS DEFENSE?
A: Yes. Misbehavior means something more than adverse comment or disrespect. There is no
question that in contempt the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith,
or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered. Where the act complained of is
ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party
is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is,
in some instances, held to be determinative of its character. A person should not be condemned
for contempt where he contends for what he believes to be right and in good faith institutes
proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights. To
constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.
The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or
done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety [Lorenzo Shipping
Corporation v. DMAP, G.R. No. 155849 (2011)].
Q: WHAT ARE THE GROUNDS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN DISMISSING AN
APPEAL?
A: An appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion, or on that of the appellee on
certain grounds:
(1) Failure of record on appeal to show on its face that appeal was taken within the period
fixed by the Rules
(2) Failure to file notice of appeal or record on appeal within prescribed period
(3) Failure of appellant to pay docket and other lawful fees as provided in Sec. 4, Rule 41
(4) Unauthorized alterations, omissions, or additions in approved record on appeal as
provided in Sec. 4, Rule 44
(5) Failure of appellant to serve and file required number of copies of his brief or
memorandum within time provided by Rules
(6) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief, or of page references to
record as required in Sec. 13(a), (c), (d), (f) of Rule 44
(7) Failure of appellant to take necessary steps for correction or completion of record within
time limited by the court in its order
(8) Failure of appellant to appear at preliminary conference under Rule 48 or comply with
orders, circulars, directives of the court without justifiable cause
(9) Fact that the order or judgment appealed from is not appealable
[Sec. 1, Rule 50]

Other grounds
(1) Appeal under Rule 41 from the RTC, raising only questions of law;
(2) Appeal by notice of appeal from a decision rendered by the RTC in its appellate
jurisdiction;
(3) Appeals erroneously taken to the CA
[Sec. 2, Rule 50]
(4) By agreement of the parties (i.e. amicable settlement)
(5) Where appealed case has become moot or academic
(6) Where appeal is frivolous or dilatory

Q: WHEN MAY APPEALS BE WITHDRAWN AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, AND WHEN MAY IT

BE WITHDRAWN UPON DISCRETION OF THE COURT?
A: In civil cases, an appeal may be withdrawn as a matter of right at any time before the filing of
the appellee’s brief. Thereafter, the withdrawal may be allowed in the discretion of the appellate
court. [Sec. 3, Rule 50]

In criminal cases, withdrawal of appeal shall be subject to the following rules:

(1) Before the record has been forwarded to the clerk of court of the appellate court, the
MTC or RTC, withdrawal may be allowed
(2) After the records have already been received by the RTC from the MTC, the RTC in its
discretion may allow withdrawal provided a motion is filed before judgment on the appeal
is rendered
[Sec. 12, Rule 122]

Q: MAY DISMISSED APPEALS BE REINSTATED?

A: Yes. The appellate court has the discretion on whether or not to reinstate. The discretion to
reinstate is implied from discretion to dismiss the appeal. The reinstatement should be justified
by a showing of good and sufficient cause. [B.R. Sebastian Enterprises v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 41862 (1992)]
Q: EXPLAIN THE DUAL FUNCTION OF APPELLATE COURTS
A: An appellate court serves a dual function. The first is the review for correctness function,
whereby the case is reviewed on appeal to assure that substantial justice has been done. The
second is the institutional function, which refers to the progressive development of the law for
general application in the judicial system.

Differently stated, the review for correctness function is concerned with the justice of the
particular case while the institutional function is concerned with the articulation and application
of constitutional principles, the authoritative interpretation of statutes, and the formulation of
policy within the proper sphere of the judicial function.

With each level of the appellate structure, the review for correctness function diminishes and the
institutional function, which concerns itself with uniformity of judicial administration and the
progressive development of the law, increases [In Re: Letter complaint of Merlita B. Fabiana
against presiding justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. et al., A.M. No. CA-13-51-J (2013)].

Q: STATE THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE IN APPELLATE DECISIONS

A: No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any
ruling or order, or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground
for granting a new trial or for setting aside, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or
order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial
justice. The court at every stage of the proceedings must disregard any error or defect which
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties [Sec. 6, Rule 51].

We have likewise followed the harmless error rule in our jurisdiction. In dealing with evidence
improperly admitted in trial, we examine its damaging quality and its impact to the substantive
rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight and insignificant, we disregard the error as it will not
overcome the weight of the properly admitted evidence against the prejudiced party. [People v.
Teehankee, G.R. Nos. 111206-08 (1995)].

Q: PEDRO WAS CHARGED WITH THEFT FOR STEALING JUAN'S CELLPHONE WORTH
P10,000.00. PROSECUTOR MARILAG AT THE PRE-TRIAL SUBMITTED THE JUDICIAL
AFFIDAVIT OF JUAN ATTACHING THE RECEIPT FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE
CELLPHONE TO PROVE CIVIL LIABILITY. SHE ALSO SUBMITTED THE JUDICIAL
AFFIDAVIT OF MARIO, AN EYEWITNESS WHO NARRATED THEREIN HOW PEDRO
STOLE JUAN'S CELLPHONE. AT THE TRIAL, PEDRO'S LAWYER OBJECTED TO THE
PROSECUTION'S USE OF JUDICIAL AFFIDAVITS OF HER WITNESSES CONSIDERING
THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY ON THE OFFENSE WITH WHICH HIS CLIENT WAS
CHARGED.
(A) IS PEDRO'S LAWYER CORRECT IN OBJECTING THE USE OF JUDICIAL
AFFIDAVIT OF MARIO?
(B) IS PEDRO'S LAWYER CORRECT IN OBJECTING THE USE OF JUDICIAL
AFFIDAVIT OF JUAN?
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PROSECUTION'S PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE,
PROSECUTOR MARILAG ORALLY OFFERED THE RECEIPT ATTACHED TO JUAN'S
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT, WHICH THE COURT ADMITTED OVER THE OBJECTION OF
PEDRO'S LAWYER. AFTER PEDRO'S PRESENTATION OF HIS EVIDENCE, THE COURT
RENDERED JUDGMENT FINDING HIM GUILTY AS CHARGED AND HOLDING HIM CIVILLY
LIABLE FOR P20,000.00. PEDRO'S LAWYER SEASONABLY FILED A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE DECISION ASSERTING THAT THE COURT ERRED IN
AWARDING CIVIL LIABILITY ON THE BASIS OF JUAN'S JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT, A
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH PROSECUTOR MARILAG FAILED TO ORALLY
OFFER.
(C) IS THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MERITORIOUS?
A:
a) No, Pedro’s lawyer is not correct in objecting the use of judicial affidavit of Mario. The
Judicial Affidavit Rule applies to criminal actions where the maximum of the imposable
penalty does not exceed six years. Here, the penalty for theft of property not exceeding
P12,000.00 does not exceed 6 years. Hence, the Judicial Affidavit Rule applies.
b) No, Pedro's lawyer is not correct in objecting the use of judicial affidavit of Juan. The
Judicial Affidavit Rule applies with respect to the civil aspect of the criminal actions,
whatever the penalties involved are. Here, the purpose of introducing the judicial affidavit
of Juan was to prove his civil liability.
c) No, the motion for reconsideration is not meritorious. A judicial affidavit is not documentary
evidence but a testimonial evidence. It is simply a witness’ testimony reduced to writing in
affidavit form. Sec. 6 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule states that the offer of testimony in
judicial affidavit shall be made at the start of the presentation of the witness. Hence, the
motion for reconsideration on the ground that Juan’s judicial affidavit was documentary
evidence which was not orally offered is without merit.

Q: WHAT ARE THE CONTENTS OF A JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT?

A: The contents of a judicial affidavit are as follows:
(a)The name, age, residence or business address, and occupation of the witness;
(b)The name and address of the lawyer who conducts or supervises the examination of the
witness and the place where the examination is being held;
(c) A statement that the witness is answering the questions asked of him, fully conscious that
he does so under oath, and that he may face criminal liability for false testimony or
perjury;
(d)Questions asked of the witness and his corresponding answers, consecutively numbered,
that: [1.] show the circumstances under which the witness acquired the facts upon which
he testifies; [2.] elicit from him those facts which are relevant to the issues that the case
presents; and [3.] identify the attached documentary and object evidence and establish
their authenticity in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(e)The signature of the witness over his printed name; and,
(f) A jurat with the signature of the notary public who administers the oath or an officer who is
authorized by law to administer the same.
[Sec. 3, A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC]

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Q: DISTINGUISH THE JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT VERSUS THE

FIRST-LEVEL COURTS IN PROBATE PROCEEDINGS.
A: According to Section 19(4), B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, the RTC shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the
gross value of the estate exceeds P300,000 or, in Metro Manila, P400,000. If the gross value
of the estate does not exceed P300,000 or, in Metro Manila, P400,000, the first-level courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction [Sec. 33(1), B.P. 129, as amended]

Q: KYLE DIED TESTATE. HIS HEIRS EXECUTED AN EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF

HIS PROPERTY, ADHERING TO THE TERMS OF THE WILL. THREE YEARS LATER,
ALYSSA, TO WHOM KYLE OWED A DEBT OF P200,000, PRAYED FOR THE
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SETTLEMENT. SHE ARGUED THAT THE
SETTLEMENT DEPRIVED HER OF PARTICIPATION IN KYLE’S ESTATE. THE HEIRS
ARGUED THAT HER ACTION WAS BARRED BY THE TWO-YEAR PERIOD ACCORDING
TO SEC. 4, RULE 74. RULE ON THE CASE.
A: The extrajudicial settlement is void. According to Sec. 1, Rule 74, said settlement is allowed
only when the decedent left no will and no debts and that no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. In this case,
Kyle left a will and a debt to Alyssa. Since the settlement is not binding on Alyssa, her action
has not yet prescribed. The SC ruled in Pedrosa v. CA [G.R. No. 118680 (2001)],”As the
partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial
court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its
execution.”

Q: MAY THE HEIRS DIVIDE AMONG THEMSELVES THE PROPERTIES OWNED BY THEIR
FATHER IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS WILL WITHOUT INSTITUTING PROBATE
PROCEEDINGS IN COURT?
A: They may not. According to Sec. 1, Rule 75, no will shall pass either real or personal estate
unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court

Q: TRICIA FILED A PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF HER WILL. THE COURT FILED AN
ORDER ALLOWING THE WILL. SHE DIED FOUR YEARS LATER. HER EXECUTOR,
ASHLEY, COMMENCED JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT PROCEEDINGS. TRICIA’S CREDITOR,
RONALDO, TO WHOM SHE OWED P2 MILLION, FILED A MOTION SEEKING THE
SETTING ASIDE OF THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. HE ARGUED THAT THE WILL DID NOT
COMPLY WITH THE THREE-WITNESS REQUIREMENT UNDER ARTICLE 815 OF THE
CIVIL CODE SINCE THE NOTARY PUBLIC WHO NOTARIZED THE WILL SERVED AS ONE
OF THE WITNESSES. THE TRIAL COURT ISSUED AN ORDER SETTING ASIDE THE WILL.
ASHLEY APPEALED TO THE CA. HOW SHOULD THE CA RULE?
A: The CA should rule in favor of Ashley. According to Sec. 1, Rule 75, “Subject to the right of
appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.” The order of the
court granting the probate of the will during Tricia’s lifetime was not appealed. Thus, its
allowance has become conclusive and can no longer be assailed on the ground that it did not
comply with any of the requirements for its extrinsic validity under the Civil Code.

Q: IS THE COURT BOUND, IN APPOINTING A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, TO COMPLY

WITH THE ORDER OF PREFERENCE IN APPOINTING A REGULAR ADMINISTRATOR?
A: No, the court is not bound. Appointment of special administrator lies entirely in the sound
discretion of the court [De Gala v. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-30289 (1929)].

Q: WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS OF A CREDITOR HOLDING A CLAIM AGAINST THE

DECEASED SECURED BY MORTGAGE OR OTHER COLLATERAL SECURITY TO
COLLECT THE DEBT IN HIS FAVOR?
A: One, he may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in Rule
86, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate. Two, he may foreclose his
mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator
a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged
premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the
security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in Sec. 6, Rule 86. Or
three, he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the same at
any time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted
as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate [Sec.
7, Rule 86].

Q: X ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT OF SALE OVER A HOUSE AND LOT UNDER HIS
NAME WITH Y. X DIED SHORTLY AFTER. DURING THE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS TO
SETTLE X’S ESTATE, Y MOVED THAT THE CONTRACT IN HIS FAVOR BE APPROVED.
THE ADMINISTRATOR OPPOSED, ARGUING THAT UNDER RULE 89, ONLY HE MAY
MOVE FOR SUCH APPROVAL. IS THE ADMINISTRATOR CORRECT?
A: No, he is not. Sec. 8, Rule 89 mentions only an application to authorize the conveyance of
realty under a contract that the deceased entered into while still alive. The proper party is one
who is to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one who is to be entitled to the avails of the
suit. Sec. 8 should be differentiated from Secs. 2 and 4 of Rule 89, specifically requiring only the
executor or administrator to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise
encumber real estate for the purpose of paying debts, expenses and legacies (Sec. 2); or for
authority to sell real or personal estate beneficial to the heirs, devisees or legatees and other
interested persons, although such authority is not necessary to pay debts, legacies or expenses
of administration (Sec. 4) [Heirs of Sandejas v. Lina, G.R. No. 141634 (2001)].

Q: DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A PRELIMINARY CITATION IN CASES INVOLVING

DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND THE PEREMPTORY WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS.
A: A preliminary citation merely requires the respondent to appear and show cause why the
peremptory writ of habeas corpus should not be granted [Lee Yick Hon v. Collector of Customs,
G.R. No. 16779 (1921)]. Meanwhile, the peremptory writ of habeas corpus directs the officer to
have the body of the person restrained of his liberty before the court or judge designated in the
writ at the time and place therein specified [Sec. 6, Rule 102].

Q: IS THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA AVAILABLE ONLY AGAINST PRIVATE PERSONS

ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF GATHERING, COLLECTING, OR STORING PERSONAL
INFORMATION?
A: No. Nothing in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data suggests that the habeas data protection
shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of
gathering, storing, and collecting of data [Vivares v. St Theresa’s College G.R. No. 202666
(2014)]. Sec. 1 of the Rule refers to “a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information.”

Q: PING FA SHANG, A NATURALIZED FILIPINO, WANTED TO CHANGE HIS NAME TO

PEN FAST, THE NAME WITH WHICH HE HAS BECOME WELL-KNOWN BECAUSE HE
USED IT IN HIS RETAIL BUSINESS. AS HIS COUNSEL, WHAT WOULD YOU ADVISE HE
DO?
A: Should he want to change his first name only, Ping should file a petition before the Local Civil
Registrar for the change of his first name, according to Sec. 1, R.A. 9048 (as amended by R.A.
10172). However, should he want to change his whole name, which includes his first name and
surname, he should file a petition before the RTC for the change of his surname following Sec.
1, Rule 103, and if petition is granted, he may apply for change in name in the Local Civil
Registry, which provides that “no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors, and change of first name or nickname
which can be corrected or changed by the municipal civil register or consul general xxx”

Q: WHAT ENTRIES MAY BE CORRECTED OR CHANGED BY THE CIVIL REGISTRAR

WITHOUT A JUDICIAL ORDER?
A: The Civil Registrar may correct entries containing clerical or typographical errors, and it may
change the first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex of a person
where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry
[Sec. 1, R.A. 9048, as amended by R.A. 10172].

Q: WHAT ARE THE INSTANCES WHEN APPEALS ARE ALLOWED IN SPECIAL

PROCEEDINGS?
A: Orders or judgments which
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of
the estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased
person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of
the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the
appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of
the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial
or for reconsideration
[Sec. 1, Rule 109]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Q: WHAT IS THE RULE ON TRANSFER OF VENUE IN CRIMINAL CASES?

GR: To stress, in criminal proceedings, improper venue is lack of jurisdiction because venue in
criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Unlike in a civil case where venue may be
waived, this could not be done in a criminal case because it is an element of jurisdiction.
X: Be that as it may, Section 5 (4), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Court
has the power to order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
Consequently, where there are serious and weighty reasons present, which would prevent the
court of original jurisdiction from conducting a fair and impartial trial, the Court has been
mandated to order a change of venue so as to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
(Source: Navaja vs Judge De Castro, GR No.182926 [June 22, 2015])

Q: WHERE IS AN APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT FILED?

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where
the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. (Source: Section 2, Rule 126)
Proceedings for applications for search warrants are not criminal in nature and, thus, the rule
that venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto. (Pilipinas Shell v Romars)
Q: WHAT ARE THE INSTANCES IN WHICH AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION MAY BE
FILED BY THE OFFENDED PARTY AND PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY OF THE CRIMINAL
ACTION?
A: According to Sec. 3, Rule 111, the independent civil action may proceed in the following
cases:
(a) Art. 32, Civil Code: violation of constitutional rights and liberties by any public officer or
employee, or any private individual
(b) Art. 33, Civil Code: defamation, fraud, and physical injuries
(c) Art. 34, Civil Code: member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or
protection to any person in case of danger to life or property
(d) Art. 2176, Civil Code: quasi-delict

Q: Discuss the concept of PROBABLE CAUSE in Preliminary Investigation, Issuance of a

Warrant of Arrest and a Search Warrant, and in Warrantless Arrests.
Preliminary Investigation Such facts as are sufficient to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondents are
probably guilty thereof.
Warrant of Arrest The existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that
an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested.
Warrantless Arrest Reasonable ground of suspicion supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged, or an
actual belief or reasonable ground of
suspicion, based on actual facts.
Search Warrant Such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the object sought in
connection with the offense are in the place
to be searched.
[Pestilos v. Generoso, 739 SCRA 336 (2014)]

Q: POLICE RECEIVED A TIP FROM AN ANONYMOUS INFORMANT STATING THAT

ILLEGAL DRUGS WERE BEING SOLD SECRETLY AT A HIGH-CLASS MALL. POLICE
IMMEDIATELY WENT TO THE MALL, WHERE THEY HEARD MURMURS FROM MALL-
GOERS STATING THAT THERE WERE SHABU SOLD AT A CERTAIN JEWELRY STORE.
THEY THEN SAW A MAN WHO HAD BLOODSHOT EYES AND SNORTING WHAT
APPEARED TO BE A POWDERED SUBSTANCE. POLICE APPREHENDED HIM, AND
IMMEDIATELY ASKED HIM WHERE HE GOT THE SUSPECTED ILLEGAL SUBSTANCE,
HE POINTED AT THE JEWELRY STORE. THUS, POLICE INSTANTLY WENT TO THE
STORE AND APPREHENDED THE PEOPLE RUNNING IT, ON THE GROUND OF SALE OF
ILLEGAL DRUGS. THOSE ARRESTED ASSAILED THE VALIDITY OF THEIR ARREST,
ARGUING THAT THEY CANNOT BE ARRESTED SINCE THEY HAD NOT COMMITTED,
WERE NOT COMMITTING, OR ATTEMPTING TO COMMIT AN OFFENSE IN THE
PRESENCE OF THE POLICE AT THE TIME OF THEIR APPREHENSION, THUS THE
POLICE HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS THAT THEY COMMITTED AN
OFFENSE. ASSUMING THAT THE POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE, IS THE ARREST
WITHOUT WARRANT VALID?
A: Assuming there was probable cause, the arrest was valid. Sec. 5(b), Rule 113 states that a
peace officer, or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when an offense has
just been committed and he has personal knowledge he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it. In Pestilos v. Generoso [G.R. No. 182601 (2014)], the SC ruled that personal knowledge of a
crime just committed under Sec. 5(b), Rule 113 does not require actual presence at the scene
while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the
crime is patent and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the
crime. Here, the police had evidence of a crime recently committed in the form of the statement
of the person they earlier arrested that he bought the suspected illegal substance from the
jewelry store. Thus, assuming there was probable cause, the arrest without warrant in this case
is valid, even if the police did not witness the sale.

Q: WHEN IS BAIL A MATTER OF RIGHT AND WHEN IS IT A MATTER OF DISCRETION?

A: Bail is a matter of right for all persons in custody (a) before or after conviction by the MeTC,
MTC, MTCC or MCTC, and (b) before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment [Sec. 1, Rule 114].

Bail is a matter of discretion (i) prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment; (ii) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, and life imprisonment, on application of the accused. If
the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall
be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to
the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated
the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal
[Sec. 5 (par. 3), Rule 114]

Q: If none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 Rule 114 is
present, should an application for bail by an appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial
Court to a penalty of more than 6 years of imprisonment be granted automatically?
A: No, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail
pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending
appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse
of discretion.
On the other hand, [if any of the circumstances is present under Sec 5(par.3) Rule 114], the
appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any
of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except
to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending
appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed. [Leviste v CA, GR 189122 (March
17, 2010)]

Q: REQUIREMENT OF HEARING AND NOTICE TO THE PROSECUTION IN THE

APPLICATION FOR BAIL.
Bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless
there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with
the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of
the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that
the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence
of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
[Enrile v Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847 (August 18, 2015)]

Q: ENUMERATE THE CASES WHERE THERE CAN BE NO PLEA BARGAINING.

A: There are no more cases where plea bargaining is prohibited. Sec. 23 of R.A. 9165, which
prohibited plea bargaining in drug-related offenses, was declared unconstitutional by the SC in
Estipona v. Lobrigo [G.R. No. 226679 (2017)] on the ground that plea bargaining is a rule of
procedure and thus under the exclusive rule-making power of the Supreme Court under Sec.
5(5), Art. VIII, Constitution.

Q: A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT WAS FILED AGAINST X. BECAUSE OF THIS, A WATCH

LIST ORDER AGAINST HIM WAS ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ),
VALID FOR A PERIOD OF 60 DAYS, PREVENTING X FROM LEAVING THE COUNTRY. X
FILED AN ALLOW DEPARTURE ORDER (ADO) WITH THE DOJ BECAUSE SHE NEEDED
TO SEEK MEDICAL ATTENTION ABROAD. HOWEVER, THE DOJ SECRETARY DENIED
X’S APPLICATION FOR ADO. X ALLEGED THAT DOJ HAD NO AUTHORITY TO BAR HER
FROM LEAVING THE COUNTRY ALLEGING THAT SUCH ACT INFRINGES ON HER RIGHT
TO TRAVEL. MEANWHILE, THE DOJ SECRETARY INSISTED THAT THE RIGHT TO
TRAVEL IS NOT ABSOLUTE AND DOJ CAN BAR X FROM LEAVING THE COUNTRY
BECAUSE OF A PENDING CRIMINAL CASE PURSUANT TO AN ORDINANCE IT ISSUED.
RULE ON THE MATTER.
A: The DOJ has no power to restrain the right to travel. To begin with, there is no law providing
for the authority of the Secretary of Justice to curtail the exercise of the right to travel, in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health. It was neither granted the authority
by the legislative to issue DOJ Circular No. 41 which effectively restricts the right to travel
through the issuance of Watch List Orders and Hold Departure Orders. Without a law to justify
its actions, the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 is unauthorized acts of the DOJ of empowering
itself under the pretext of dire exigency or necessity.” [Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930
(2018)]

Q: AAA WAS A SUSPECT IN THE MURDER OF A FAMOUS SINGER. IN THE COURSE OF

THE INVESTIGATION, AAA WAS BROUGHT TO THE POLICE STATION. THE MURDER OF
THE FAMOUS SINGER DREW THE PUBLIC’S ATTENTION AND LOCAL MEDIA
REPRESENTATIVES GATHERED AT THE POLICE STATION. AFTER INVESTIGATION BY
POLICE, AAA WAS INTERVIEWED BY MEMBERS OF THE MEDIA WHERE HE ADMITTED
KILLING THE VICTIM. AAA RECOUNTED HOW HE COMMITTED THE CRIME AND
CONFESSED WHERE HE HID THE VICTIM’S BODY. UPON ARRAIGNMENT, HOWEVER,
AAA PLEADED “NOT GUILTY”. THE COUNSEL OF AAA OPPOSED THE ADMISSION OF
TESTIMONIES OF THE REPORTERS BECAUSE AAA’S CONFESSION DURING THE
MEDIA INTERVIEW WAS MADE WITHOUT ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. RULE.
A: AAA's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of Article
III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another individual. Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news
reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. The
confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any
other investigating officer [People v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437 (1997); People v. Endino, G.R.
No. 133026 (2001)]

Q: WHERE CAN AN APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT BE FILED?

A: General Rule: Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
Exception: For compelling reasons stated in the application, the search warrant can be filed in:
(a) any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or
(b) any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
[Sec. 2, Rule 126]
Exception to the exception:
(a) If the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the
court where the criminal action is pending [Sec. 2, Rule 126]
(b) The Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Manila and
Quezon City are authorized to act on all applications for search warrants involving
heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms
filed by the Philippine National Police (PNP), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) and the Reaction Against
Crime Task Force (REACT-TF) with the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon
City [A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC]

Q: WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES REQUIRED IN DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF A

PROBABLE CAUSE TO JUSTIFY AN ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT?
A: In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge must
examine the complainant and his witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath;
and (3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and
answers. Failure to comply with these requirements will render the search warrant invalid
[People v. Mamaril, G.R. No. 147607 (2004)].

Q: WHAT ARE THE INSTANCES OF A VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH?

A: The following are recognized instances of permissible warrantless searches laid down in
jurisprudence:
 (1) a "warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest,"
(2) search of "evidence in 'plain view,"'
(3) "search of a moving vehicle,"
(4) "consented warrantless search[es],"
(5) "customs search,"
(6) "stop and frisk," and
(7) "exigent and emergency circumstances
[Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370 (2017)]

Q: WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH TYPE OF VALID WARRANTLESS

SEARCHES?
A:
MOVING VEHICLES Extensive search requires a probable cause that EITHER
(a) The motorist is a law-offender [Caballes vs. CA, G.R. No.
136292 (2002)]; OR
(b) Probable cause to believe before the search that the officer
will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in
the vehicle to be searched [People v. Bagista, G.R. No. 86218
(1992); Caballes vs. CA, G.R. No. 136292 [2002])

PLAIN VIEW Requisites

(1) The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which
he can view a particular area;
(2) The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
(3) It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure
[People vs. Doria, G.R. No. 125299 (1999)]

WAIVER or To constitute a waiver, it must first appear that

CONSENTED (1) The right against unreasonable searches exists;
SEARCH (2) The person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and
(3) The said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right
[People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233 (2007)]

STOP AND FRISK The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial
inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and
suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for
possibly concealed weapons [People v. Chua, G.R. No. 136066-67
(2003)]

While probable cause is not required, law enforcers must have a

genuine reason to believe, based on their experience and the
particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity may be
afoot [Veridiano vs. People, G.R. No. 200370 (2017)]
SEARCH A lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his
INCIDENTAL TO belongings [People v. Chua, G.R. No. 136066-67 (2003)].
LAWFUL ARREST
 Two-tiered test of an incidental search
(i) the item to be searched was within the arrestee's custody or
area of immediate control; and
(ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest
[Padilla vs CA, G.R. No. 121917 (1997)]

Q: AAA WAS ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT FOR HIS ALLEGED PARTICIPATION IN

THE MURDER OF BBB. THE LEGAL COUNSEL OF AAA CONTENDED THAT THE
WARRANTLESS ARREST OF AAA WAS ILLEGAL, AND HIS DETENTION WAS INVALID,
AND THUS HE ASKED FOR AAA’S IMMEDIATE RELEASE. HOWEVER, THE TRIAL
COURT SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED A WARRANT OF ARREST AGAINST AAA. DOES THE
SUBSEQUENT WARRANT OF ARREST CURE THE PRIOR INVALID WARRANTLESS
ARREST OF AAA?
A: Yes. Although the original warrantless arrest of AAA was illegal, the trial court lawfully
acquired jurisdiction over his person by virtue of the warrant of arrest subsequently issued after
the illegal arrest. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal. The issuance of the
corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that
detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect [Sanchez vs.
Demitriou, G.R. No. 111771-77 (1993), Note that the Court applied by analogy Sec. 4, Rule
102].

Q: May an injunction be issued by a court to restrain criminal prosecution?

A: The general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction,
preliminary or final. There are however exceptions, among which are:
(1) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
(2) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions;
(3) When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;
(4) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
(5) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
(6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(7) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(8) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(9) Where the charges are manifestly false; and
(10) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied
[Brocka v. Enrile, G.R. No. 69863-65 (1990)]

Q: What are the instances of a valid warrantless arrest?

A: A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
[Sec. 5, Rule 113]
Q: THE DAVAO CITY POLICE RECEIVED A TIP FROM AN INFORMANT THAT AAA WAS
ON BOARD A VESSEL BOUND FOR DAVAO CITY AND WAS CARRYING SHABU. WHEN
AAA DISEMBARKED FROM THE SHIP, HE WAS IDENTIFIED BY THE INFORMANT. THE
POLICE ACCOSTED AAA AND DETAINED HIM. THE POLICE INSPECTED THE BAG HE
WAS CARRYING AND FOUND SHABU INSIDE. AAA WAS CHARGED WITH VIOLATION
OF R.A. 9165. AAA CLAIMS THAT HE WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND SEARCHED
WITHOUT A WARRANT. THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL CLAIMS THAT
AAA’S WARRANTLESS ARREST FALLS UNDER SEC 5(b) OF RULE 113. HOW WOULD
YOU DECIDE THE ISSUE?
A: The warrantless arrest of AAA was not valid. AAA was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so.
What he was doing was embarking from the ship and there was no outward indication that
called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. [People v.
Aminnudin, G.R. No. 74869 (1988)]

Q: CAN AN ACCUSED BE ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE ILLEGALITY OF HIS

ARREST?
A: Yes. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure for the acquisition by the
court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. [People vs. Alunday, G.R. No. 181546 (2008)]

Q: AAA AND BBB WERE IDENTIFIED BY TWO EYEWITNESSES AS THE

PERPETRATORS IN THE KILLING OF CCC DURING A RUMBLE. FOUR DAYS AFTER THE
INCIDENT, NBI AGENTS, RELYING ON THE INFORMATION GIVEN BY EYEWITNESSES,
ATTEMPTED TO ARREST THE TWO SUSPECTS. THE COUNSEL FOR THE ACCUSED
OBJECTED ON THE GROUND THAT THE NBI AGENTS DID NOT HAVE A WARRANT OF
ARREST. THE PROSECUTORS CONTENDED THAT THE ARREST OF THE SUSPECTS BY
THE NBI COULD BE VALIDLY MADE WITHOUT A WARRANT PURSUANT TO RULE 113,
5(b). DECIDE.
A: No, the NBI cannot arrest the two suspects without a warrant since the elements of “personal
knowledge” and that the “crime has just been committed” are not present in this case. What the
NBI had were the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is
insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI [Posadas v. Ombudsman, G.R. No.
131492 (2000)].

Q: WHEN IS PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION REQUIRED?

A: Preliminary investigation is required for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at
least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. [Sec. 1, Rule
112]

Q: WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF ABSENCE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?

A: The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of an information or
render it defective. Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court or constitute a ground for
quashing the information. Instead of dismissing the information, the court should hold the
proceedings in abeyance and order the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation
[Villaflor v. Vivar, G.R. No. 134744 (2001)]

Q: WHERE IS THE PROPER VENUE TO FILE A CRIMINAL CASE OF ESTAFA COMMITTED

BY POSTDATING A CHECK?
A: Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, may be a transitory or continuing offense. A
person who committed a transitory crime may validly be tried in any municipality or province
where the offense was in part committed [People v. Grospe, G.R. No. L-74053-54 (1988)]

Q: WHAT IS AN INQUEST PROCEEDING?

A: Inquest is an informal and summary investigation conducted by a public prosecutor in
criminal cases involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest
issued by the court for the purpose of determining whether or not said persons should remain
under custody and correspondingly be charged in court [Sec. 1, DOJ Circular No. 61]

Q: WHEN DOES AN INQUEST PROCEEDING COMMENCE?

A: The inquest proceedings shall be considered commenced upon receipt by the Inquest Officer
from the law enforcement authorities of the complaint/referral documents which should include:
(i) the affidavit of arrest;
(ii) the investigation report;
(iii) the statement of the complainant and witnesses; and
(iv) other supporting evidence gathered by the police in the course of the latter’s
investigation of the criminal incident involving the arrested or detained person
[Sec. 3, DOJ Circular No. 61]

Q: WHEN IS AN INQUEST PROCEEDING TERMINATED?

A: The inquest proceedings must be terminated within the period prescribed under the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. [Sec. 3, DOJ Circular No. 61]
(a) Crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties: 12 hours
(b) Crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties: 18 hours
(c) Crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties: 36 hours
[Art. 125, RPC]

Q: DISTINGUISH AMENDMENT OF AN INFORMATION FROM SUBSTITUTION.

A:
Amendment Substitution
May involve either formal or substantial Necessarily involves a substantial change
changes from the original charge
If before plea, may be effected without leave of Must be with leave of court as the original
court information has to be dismissed

If only as to form, there is no need for another Another preliminary investigation is entailed
preliminary investigation and the retaking of and the accused has to plead anew to the new
plea of the accused information
An amended information refers to the same
offense charged in the original information or
Substitution requires or presupposes that the
to an offense which necessarily includes or is
new information involves a different offense
necessarily included in the original charge,
which does not include or is not necessarily
hence substantial amendments to the
included in the original charge, hence the
information after the plea has been taken
accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
cannot be made over the objection of the
[Teehankee v. Madayag, G.R. No. 103102
accused, for if the original information would
(1992)]
be withdrawn, the accused could invoke
double jeopardy.
Q: WHAT ARE THE REMEDIES OF AN ACCUSED IN CASE THERE WAS A LACK OF OR
AN IRREGULAR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?
A:
(1) In cases of inquest proceedings, before the filing of the complaint or information in court,
the arrested person has the option to avail of a 15-day preliminary investigation,
provided he duly signs a waiver of Article 125 of the RPC. The decision of the inquest
prosecutor is not appealable to the DOJ, since such remedy applies only in cases
subject of preliminary investigation / reinvestigation.
(2) Once a complaint or information is filed in court, the accused may ask for a preliminary
investigation within five days from the time he learns of its filing.
(3) The accused may also move for a judicial determination of probable cause.
(4) In cases, however, where a reinvestigation was already conducted by the prosecution
upon motion of the private complainant after the filing of the information but before
arraignment, and the accused failed to actively participate in such re-investigation
despite his knowledge of such, the accused is barred from praying for a conduct of
preliminary investigation, there being no substantial distinction between a preliminary
investigation and a reinvestigation.
[Leviste v. Alameda, G.R. No. 182677 (2010)]

Regarding item (3) above, please note that under the Revised Guidelines, a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause no longer allowed. It is a prohibited motion. [Section (2)(b)(i),
A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC]

Q: DURING TRIAL OF A CASE FOR ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, THE ONLY EYEWITNESS
FOR THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO APPEAR AND TESTIFY BECAUSE HE CANNOT BE
CONTACTED OR LOCATED. AFTER A YEAR OF POSTPONEMENTS, THE WITNESS
REAPPEARED, SAYING THAT HIS CONSCIENCE WOULD NOT LET HIM REST AND SO
HE IS READY TO TESTIFY. THE ACCUSED MOVED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE
ON THE GROUND OF VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. IF YOU WERE THE
PROSECUTION, HOW WILL YOU OPPOSE THE MOTION?
A: Under Sec. 3(b), Rule 119, any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of
a witness shall be excluded in computing the time for trial. The absent witness must be essential
and his whereabouts are unknown or cannot be determined with due diligence.

Q: WHEN IS ARRAIGNMENT SUSPENDED?

A: Arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effective
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
thereto.
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department
of Justice, or the Office of the President. (In this case, suspension shall not exceed 60
days from the filing of the petition.)
[Sec. 11, Rule 116]

Q: WHAT IS A DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND WHAT ARE ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL

CASES?
A: A demurrer to evidence is an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law,
to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law
(whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue [Pasag v. Parocha, G.R. No.
155483 (2007)]. It can be filed by the accused after the prosecution rests its case with or without
leave of court.

If filed with leave and the court denies the demurrer, the accused can present evidence in his
defense. On the other hand, if filed without leave, the accused is deemed to have waived his
right to present evidence and the court will render judgment based on the evidence presented
by the prosecution. If the court grants the demurrer it will dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. This amounts to an acquittal for the accused [Sec. 23, Rule 119]

Q: HOW IS THE JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE PROMULGATED?

A: [Sec. 6, Rule 120]
General Rule
Judgment must be promulgated in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in
which it was rendered.
Exceptions/Qualifications
When the judge is absent or Judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
outside of the province or city

if the conviction is for a light Judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his
offense counsel or representative

If the accused is confined or Judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the
detained in another province RTC having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or
or city detention upon request of the court which rendered
the judgment.

If the accused fails to attend Judgment may be validly promulgated in absentia by

the promulgation even if he recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving
was notified thereof, or if he him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his
jumped bail, or if he escaped counsel
from prison

Q: WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF AN APPEAL IN A CRIMINAL CASE?

A: An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it becomes
the duty of the appellate court to correct an error as may be found in the appealed judgment,
whether or not it is made the subject of assignment of errors [People v. Calayca, G.R. No.
121212 (1999)]

Q: WHAT IS THE RULE ON THE IMPLIED INSTITUTION OF THE CIVIL ACTION IN THE
CRIMINAL ACTION?
A: [Sec. 1, Rule 111]
General rule: The civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is
deemed instituted with the criminal action.
Exception: The civil action is not deemed so instituted if the offended party:
(a) Waives the civil action;
(b) Institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action; or
(c) Reserves the right to institute it separately.
Exception to the Exception: Instances where reservation to file the civil action separately shall
not be allowed:
 (1) B.P. 22 cases [Sec. 1 [b], Rule 111]
(2) Cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan [P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249, Sec. 4]
(3) Tax cases [R.A. 9282, Sec. 7 [b][1]]

Q: MR. X WAS ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT, ALLEGEDLY CAUGHT IN

POSSESSION OF 200 GRAMS OF MARIJUANA AFTER A BUY-BUST OPERATION. AFTER
BEING CHARGED BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION
OF DANGEROUS DRUGS, MR. X WANTS TO FILE AN APPLICATION FOR BAIL PENDING
TRIAL, BUT IS CONCERNED THAT HE MAY NO LONGER BE ABLE TO QUESTION THE
VALIDITY OF HIS ARREST. WHAT WOULD YOU SAY TO MR. X IF HE COMES TO YOU
FOR LEGAL ADVICE?
A: I would advise Mr. X to proceed with the filing of the application for bail, considering that
under Section 26 of Rule 114, an application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused
from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from
assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge
against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. [Rule 114, Sec. 26]

Q: MR. X WAS INVITED BY POLICE OFFICERS TO THE POLICE STATION FOR AN

“INTERVIEW” REGARDING AN ALLEGED CRIME WHICH MR. X IS SUSPECTED TO HAVE
COMMITTED. THERE WAS NO COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION FILED BEFORE ANY
PROSECUTOR OR ANY COURT AS OF THE DATE OF THE “INTERVIEW.” HE WAS NOT
ARRESTED; THE POLICE OFFICERS HAVE NO INTENTION OF DETAINING HIM. IS MR. X
ENTITLED TO THE RIGHTS OF A PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7438?
A: Yes. Under Section 2 of R.A. 7438, custodial investigation includes the practice of issuing an
“invitation” to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the “inviting” officer for any violation of law.

Q: R AND E WERE CHARGED WITH FOR THE SALE OF ILLEGAL DRUGS. HOWEVER,
THEY WERE CONVICTED ONLY OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF PROHIBITED DRUGS. IS
THEIR CONVICTION PROPER?
A: Yes. Section 4, Rule 120 provides for the “variance doctrine” which allows conviction for an
offense that is different from the one charged in the Information when the offense proved is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense
proved. Since the sale of dangerous drugs necessarily includes possession of the same, R and
E can properly be convicted of possession of drugs.

Q: Discharge of An Accused as State Witness vs. Witness Protection Program

Discharge of an Accused as State Witness Witness Protection Program

Requisites:
1. Two or more accused are jointly
charged with the commission of an
offense;
2. The motion for discharge is filed by
the prosecution before it rests its
case;
3. The prosecution is required to present
evidence and the sworn statement of
each proposed state witness at a
hearing in support of the discharge;
Requisite for Admission to the Program
a) the offense in which his testimony will be
used is a grave felony
b) his testimony can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
c) he or any member of his family within the
second civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity is subjected to threats to his life or
bodily injury or there is a likelihood that he
will be killed, forced, intimidated,
harassed or corrupted to prevent him
 4. The accused gives his consent to be a
state witness; and
5. The trial court is satisfied that:
a. There is absolute necessity for
the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is requested;
b. There is no other direct
evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the
testimony of said accused;
c. The testimony of said accused
can be substantially
corroborated in its material
points;
d. Said accused does not appear
to be the most guilty; and,
e. Said accused has not at any
time been convicted of any
offense involving moral
turpitude.
Source (Section 17, Rule 119)
from testifying, or to testify falsely, or
evasively, because or on account of his
testimony; and
d) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if
he would be testifying against the other
law enforcement officers. In such a case,
only the immediate members of his family
may avail themselves of the protection
provided for under this Act.
(Source: RA 6981, Sec 3)
Who can be admitted into the State
Program
1. Any person who has knowledge of or
information on the commission of a crime
and has testified or is testifying or is
willing to testify.
2. A witness in a congressional
investigation, upon the recommendation
of the legislative committee where his
testimony is needed and with the
approval of the Senate President or the
Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be.
3. A witness who participated in the
commission of a crime and who desires
to be a State witness.
4. An accused who is discharged from an
information or criminal complaint by the
court in order that he may be a State
witness.
(Source: retrieved from
https://www.doj.gov.ph/witness-protection,-
security-and-benefit-program.html; November
22, 2018)
EVIDENCE

Q: TRUE OR FALSE AND EXPLAIN: EVIDENCE CONSIDERED FRUIT OF THE

POISONOUS TREE IS NEVER ADMISSIBLE FOR ANY PURPOSE IN ANY PROCEEDING.
A: TWO POSSIBLE ANSWERS

True. According to Sec. 3(2), Art.III of the Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of this
(privacy of communication or correspondence) or the preceding section ( right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. To be admissible, evidence
must be relevant and not excluded according to the law or the Rules of Court [Sec. 1, Rule 128].
Since evidence which are fruits of the poisonous tree are excluded according to the Constitution
for any purpose in any proceeding, they cannot be considered admissible.

False. For evidence to be admissible, it must be relevant and not excluded according to the law
or the Rules of Court [Sec. 1, Rule 128]. Evidence considered fruit of the poisonous tree is
relevant and not excluded (i.e., competent) in cases which involve determining the criminal, civil,
and administrative liability of public officers responsible (e.g. police conducting an illegal
search).

Q: SARAH SUED THE CEMETERY WHERE HER FATHER WAS BURIED, ALLEGING
NEGLECT OF HIS TOMB. TO SUPPORT HER ARGUMENT, SHE OFFERED IN EVIDENCE A
PHOTOGRAPH OF HER FATHER’S TOMBSTONE, WHICH WAS BROKEN INTO TWO. THE
CEMETERY OPPOSED THE ADMISSION OF THE PHOTOGRAPH, ON THE GROUND THAT
THE TOMBSTONE ITSELF MUST BE PRESENTED ACCORDING TO THE BEST EVIDENCE
RULE. IS THE CEMETERY CORRECT?
A: No, the cemetery is not correct. The Best Evidence Rule under Sec. 3, Rule 130 applies only
when the contents of a document is in issue. In fact, evidence is considered documentary when
it is offered as proof of their contents, according to Sec. 2, of Rule 130. Here, the photograph of
the tombstone was not offered to prove the contents of the tombstone, but neglect of the tomb.
Thus, the evidence here is not documentary and therefore not subject to the Best Evidence
Rule.

Q: DOES THE RULES OF COURT ALLOW A BROADSIDE OBJECTION TO EVIDENCE?

A: No, the Rules do not. A broadside objection is a general objection interposed without
specifying grounds thereof [Black’s Law Dictionary 100, Abridged 5th Edition]. Sec. 36, Rule 132
requires that the grounds for the objections must be specified.

Q: WHEN IS EVIDENCE NOT REQUIRED?

A: Evidence is not required in the following cases
(1) Judicial Notice [Sec. 1 and 2, Rule 129]
(2) When there is a presumption [Sec. 2 and 3, Rule 131]
(3) Admissions. Judicial [Sec 4, Rule 129]. Extrajudicial [Sec. 26, Rule 130]
(4) Questions of law and not of fact

Q: WHEN IS JUDICIAL NOTICE MANDATORY?

A: A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
(1) existence and territorial extent of states,
(2) their political history,
(3) forms of government and
(4) symbols of nationality;
 (5) the law of nations,
(6) the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
(7) the political constitution and history of the Philippines,
(8) the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines,
(9) the laws of nature,
(10) the measure of time, and
(11) the geographical divisions
[Sec. 1, Rule 129]

Q: WHEN IS JUDICIAL NOTICE DISCRETIONARY?

A: A court may take judicial notice of matters which are
(1) of public knowledge, or
(2) are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or
(3) ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. [Sec. 2, Rule 129]

Please note that in Espanol v. Formoso [G.R. No. 150949 (2007)], the Supreme Court, citing
Gener v. De Leon [G.R. No. 130730 (2001)] courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
the contents of records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or pending in the
same court. Hence, we reiterate that petitioner took judicial notice of the Decision rendered by
another RTC branch and on the basis thereof, concluded that respondents used falsified
documents (such as land title and tax declaration) when Sharcons filed its complaint for
quieting. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that respondents are not guilty of direct
contempt of court.

Q: WHAT SHOULD AN ACCUSED ESTABLISH IN ORDER FOR HIS DEFENSE OF ALIBI TO

PROSPER?
A: For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must establish that:
(1) he was in another place at the time of the commission of the offense; and
(2) he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the
crime, or its immediate vicinity, at the time of its commission.
[People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 186528 (2011)]

Alternatively, he establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for
them to be in the place where the crime was committed [People v. Larranaga, GR No. 138874-
75 (2005)]

Q: WHAT ARE THE CLASSIFICATIONS OF EVIDENCE AS TO FORM?

A: The classifications of evidence as to form are as follows
(1) Object [Sec. 1, Rule 130]
(2) Documentary [Sec. 2, Rule 130]
(3) Testimonial [Sec. 36, Rule 130]

Q: DIFFERENTIATE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION AND EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION.

A:
Extrajudicial Confession Extrajudicial Admission
A declaration of an accused acknowledging
his guilt of the offense charged, or of any An act, declaration or omission of party as to a
offense necessarily included therein [Sec. 33, relevant fact [Sec. 26, Rule 130]
Rule 130]
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment The term admission is usually applied to
of guilt statements of fact by the accused which do
 not directly involve an acknowledgment of his
guilt or of the intent to commit the offense.
An admission may be express or implied, of
A confession is an acknowledgment in express
facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in
terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt
connection with proof of other facts, to prove
of the crime charged
his guilt
In other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is but an
acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a
conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. [People v. Maqueda, G.R.
No. 112983 (1995)]. Note however, that under Sec. 3 of Rule 133, even an extrajudicial
confession made by the accused is not sufficient for conviction unless corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti.

Q: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A JUDICIAL ADMISSION AND AN

EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION?
A:
Judicial [Sec. 4, Rule 129] Extrajudicial [Secs. 26 and 32, Rule 130]
Made in connection with a judicial proceeding
Any other admission as to a relevant fact
in which it is offered
Requires no proof, thus, deemed May be given in evidence, thus, must still be
automatically part of the case formally offered in evidence
May be contradicted by showing that that
either a) it was made through palpable
Rebuttable
mistake or b) that no such admission was
made
Verbal or written. Act, declaration, omission, or silence.

Q: MAY AN ACCUSED INVOKE THEIR RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION WHEN

THEY ARE ASKED TO GIVE THEIR THUMBMARK? MAY HE INVOKE SUCH RIGHT WHEN
ASKED TO MAKE A HANDWRITING SPECIMEN?
A:
No, he may not invoke said right when asked to give a thumbmark. The right against self-
incrimination only applies when a testimony is extracted from the mouth of the witness.

However, he may invoke such right when asked to make a handwriting specimen. A different
rule is applied for handwriting specimens where the right against self-incrimination applies. The
act of writing and creating are testimonial acts which cannot be compelled without violation
against the prohibition on self-incrimination [Beltran v. Samson G.R. No. 32025 (1929)]

Q: IN WHICH SITUATIONS MAY THE PRESENTATION OF AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT BE

DISPENSED WITH, AND WHAT MAY BE PRESENTED IN ITS STEAD?
A:
Situation What to present instead
In the order stated:
(a) By a copy
When the original has been lost
(b) By a recital of its contents in some authentic
or destroyed, or cannot be
document
produced in court without bad
(c) By the testimony of witnesses [Rule 130,
faith on the offeror’s part.
Sec. 5]
When the original is in the In the order stated:
custody or under the control of (a) By a copy
the party against whom it is (b) By a recital of its contents in some authentic
offered, and the latter fails to document
produce it after reasonable (c) By the testimony of witnesses [Rule 130,
notice. Sec. 5]

When the original consists of

numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be
examined in court without great
loss of time, and the fact sought The general result of the whole.
to be established from them is
only the general result of the
whole.

When the original is a public

Certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
record in the custody of a public
thereof
officer or is recorded in a public
office

Q: DIFFERENTIATE THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE FROM THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
A:
Best Evidence Rule Parol Evidence Rule
Contemplates the situation wherein the original
Presupposes that the original document is
writing is not available and/or there is a dispute
available in court
as to whether said writing is the original
Prohibits the introduction of substitutionary
evidence in lieu of the original document Prohibits the varying of the terms of a written
regardless of WON it varies the contents of the agreement
original
Applies only to documents contractual in
Applies to all kinds of documents
nature (Exception: wills)
Can be invoked only when the controversy is
Can be invoked by any party to an action
between the parties to the written agreement,
regardless of WON such party participated in
their privies or any party directly affected
the writing involved
thereby

Q: WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO APPLY?

A: [Sec. 24(B), Rule 130]
(1) There must be a communication made by the client to the attorney or an advice given by
the attorney to his client;
(2) The communication must have been given in confidence;
(3) The communication or advice must have been given either in the course of the
professional employment or with a view to professional employment; and
(4) The client has not given his consent to the attorney’s testimony thereon.

Attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or clerk are also covered by the rule and cannot be
examined concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity
without the consent of the client AND their employer.
Q: THE ACCUSED MADE AN OFFER OF COMPROMISE ON DECEMBER 5, 2000. THE
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF BOUNCING CHECKS LAW WAS FILED
AGAINST THE ACCUSED ON 9 MARCH 2001. MAY THE OFFER OF COMPROMISE BE
USED AGAINST THE ACCUSED?
A: No. It is inadmissible. The Offer of Compromise dated 5 December 2000 was made prior to
the filing of the criminal complaint against her on 9 March 2001 for a violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law. The Offer of Compromise was clearly not made in the context of a criminal
proceeding and, therefore, cannot be considered as an implied admission of guilt [San Miguel v.
Kalalo, G. R. No. 185522 (2012)].

Q: WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE?
A:
(1) Admission by co-partner or agent. The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the
party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or
agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
(2) Admission of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the
party.
(3) Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration.
(4) Admission by privies. Where one derives title to property from another, the act,
declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is
evidence against the former.
[Sections 29-31, Rule 130]

Q: A DEED OF SALE OVER A REGISTERED PARCEL OF LAND WAS EXECUTED IN FIVE

(5) ORIGINAL CARBON COPIES. MAY A PHOTOCOPY OF ONE OF THE ORIGINALS OF A
DEED OF SALE BE USED AS EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE SALE?
A: Generally, no. It is a well-settled principle that before secondary evidence can be presented,
all duplicates and/or counterparts must be accounted for, and no excuse for the non-production
of the original documents can be regarded as established until all its parts are unavailable.
However, the exception is when the opposing party fails to object to the evidence being
presented, the same becomes primary evidence. [Heirs of Dela Cruz v. CA, G.R. No. 117384
(1998)]

Q: WHAT IS THE HEARSAY RULE? DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN HEARSAY EVIDENCE

AND OPINION EVIDENCE.
A: The hearsay rule is a rule of evidence to the effect that a witness can testify only to those
facts which he knows of his own knowledge or derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in the Rules of Court [Sec. 36, Rule 130]
Hearsay Evidence Opinion Evidence
Expert evidence based on the personal
knowledge, skill, experience of the person
Testimony that is not based on personal
testifying [Sec. 49, Rule 130]. It includes
knowledge of the person testifying [Sec. 36,
evidence of an ordinary witness on limited
Rule 130].
matters (as enumerated under Sec. 50, Rule
130).
Q: WHAT ARE INDEPENDENTLY RELEVANT STATEMENTS, AND ARE THEY
INADMISSIBLE DUE TO THE HEARSAY RULE?
A: Independently relevant statements are those statements or writings attributed to a person not
on the witness stand, which are being offered not to prove the truth of the facts stated therein,
but only to prove that such were actually made [People v. Cusi, G.R. No. L-20986 (1965)].
These are statements which are relevant independently of whether they are true or not [Estrada
v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710 (2001)].

Jurisprudence has enumerated two classes of independently relevant statements:

(1) Statements which are the very facts in issue, and
(2) Statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue, which include the
following:
i. Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition,
knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions;
ii. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and the like;
iii. Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of
mind of another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of
the latter;
iv. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and
v. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness.
[Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710 (2001)]

These statements are not covered by the hearsay rule [People v. Cusi, G.R. No. L-20986
(1965)].

Q: THERE WAS AN ALLEGEDLY LIBELOUS STATEMENT IN A NEWSPAPER. AS

EVIDENCE OF THE STATEMENT, PLAINTIFF BROUGHT AN AVID READER OF THE
NEWSPAPER TO TESTIFY AS TO THE CONTENTS OF THE SAME. SHOULD THIS
TESTIMONY BE ALLOWED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE?
A: YES, the witness’ testimony may allowed to prove that the statement was made, but not as to
the contents of the alleged libelous statement. The Best Evidence Rule does not apply in this
case because the issue is not as to the content of the document but rather whether such alleged
libelous statement was made. Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements,
testimony made not as to the truth or falsity of the contents of the document but that such
statement was actually made may be admissible.

Q: LETICIA WAS SEPARATED IN FACT FROM HER HUSBAND ANTONIO FOR OVER A
YEAR. SINCE THEIR ESTRANGEMENT, SHE STAYED WITH HER BEST FRIEND, GINA, IN
THE LATTER’S CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN QUEZON CITY. THEREAFTER, THEY
DISCOVERED THAT ANTONIO WAS IN FACT HAVING AN AFFAIR WITH ANOTHER
WOMAN. GINA CONTINUED INVESTIGATING AND FOUND OUT THAT ANTONIO HAD
FATHERED A CHILD WITH THE SAID OTHER WOMAN. GINA CONFRONTED ANTONIO
ABOUT THE AFFAIR, INDICATING THAT LETICIA HAD BEEN STAYING WITH HER SINCE
THEIR SEPARATION. ONE WEEK LATER, GINA’S CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS SET ON
FIRE, AND AS A RESULT, GINA DIED. LETICIA, WHO SURVIVED BECAUSE SHE WAS AS
A MERE MATTER OF CHANCE, NOT IN THE UNIT WHEN THE FIRE BROKE OUT, CLAIMS
TO HAVE SEEN ANTONIO IN THE LOBBY OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT MINUTES
BEFORE THE FIRE WAS FOUND TO HAVE STARTED. IN A CRIMINAL CASE FOR ARSON
AGAINST ANTONIO, THE PROSECUTOR SOUGHT TO ELICIT THE SAID TESTIMONY
FROM LETICIA. ANTONIO IMMEDIATELY OBJECTS TO THIS, CITING MARITAL
PRIVILEGE AND ARGUING THAT THE DECEASED GINA WAS LEGALLY A STRANGER,
AND THUS NOT AN ASCENDANT OR DESCENDANT SO AS TO FALL WITHIN THE
EXCEPTIONS IN THE RULES. RULE ON ANTONIO’S OBJECTION.
A:
Antonio’s objection is overruled. While it is true that as a general rule, neither the husband or
wife, during the marriage, may testify for or against the other without the consent of the offended
spouse, the rules provide for exceptions in the following cases: (1) In a civil case by one against
the other; and (2) In a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the
latter's direct descendants or ascendants [Sec. 22, Rule 130]. Since the crime of arson was also
committed against the spouse (a private offended party), the marital privilege rule should not
apply in this case.

Moreover, in Alvarez v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439 (2005), the court stated that the marital
disqualification rule does not apply when the marital and domestic relations between spouses
are strained. The court found a situation where the security and confidences of private life which
the law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely leave a void
in the unhappy home. Thus, there is no reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule.

Q: IS A NURSE DISQUALIFIED FROM TESTIFYING ABOUT MATTERS REGARDING A

PATIENT’S TREATMENT?
A:
No, the nurse does not fall under the persons disqualified by Sec. 24(C), Rule 130. According to
the rule, only persons authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot testify.

Q: What are the requisites for the application of the dead man’s statute or survivorship
disqualification rule?
A: [Sec. 23, Rule 130]
(1) Defendant is the executor or administrator or a representative of the deceased or of the
person of unsound mind;
(2) Suit is upon a claim by the plaintiff against the estate of said deceased or person of
unsound mind;
(3) Witness is the plaintiff, or an assignor of that party, or a person in whose behalf the case
is prosecuted; and
(4) Subject of the testimony is as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
(5) Applicable only in civil cases

Q: DIFFERENTIATE BURDEN OF PROOF FROM BURDEN OF EVIDENCE.

A:
Burden of Proof Burden of Evidence
Duty of a party to present evidence on the Duty of the party to go forward with the
facts in issue necessary to establish his claim evidence to overthrow the prima facie
or defense by the amount of evidence evidence against him. [Bautista v. Sarmiento,
required by law. [Sec. 1, Rule 131] G.R. No. L-45137 (1985)]
Shifts from party to party depending upon the
Does not shift as it remains throughout the
exigencies of the case in the course of the
trial with the party upon whom it is imposed.
trial.
Generally determined by the pleadings filed Generally determined by the developments at
by the party. the trial or by the provisions of substantive
law or procedural rules which may relieve the
party from presenting evidence on the fact
alleged i.e. presumptions, judicial notice and
 admissions.

Q: Z WAS ARRESTED IN A BUY-BUST OPERATION. THE PLASTIC SACHET CONTAINING

WHITE SUBSTANCES THAT HE SOLD WAS MARKED BY THE POLICEMAN A WITH HIS
INITIALS “AA”. THE CRIME LABORATORY CERTIFIED THAT THE CONTENTS OF THE
SACHET WERE SHABU. NO OTHER FACTS OR DETAILS WERE PROVEN BY THE
PROSECUTION. CAN Z BE HELD LIABLE FOR SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS?
A: No, because of the substantial gaps in the chain of custody, i.e. the marking of the drugs or
related items was not proven to have been made in the presence of A nor immediately after A’s
arrest, and no records on the transfer of custody from the police station to the laboratory.
[People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 182417 (2013)]

To secure a conviction of the accused charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs as
defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, the State must establish the
concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the transaction or sale took place
between the accused and the poseur buyer; and (b) that the dangerous drugs subject of the
transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.

There is no proven violation when the dangerous drugs are missing, or when there are
substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about
the authenticity of the evidence presented in court.

Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of
the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. [Sec. 1(b), DDB Regulation
No. 1, Series of 2002]

Q: CAN A POLICE OFFICER TESTIFY IN COURT THAT A WITNESS EXTRAJUDICIALLY

IDENTIFIED THE ACCUSED IN A LINEUP EVEN WITHOUT PRESENTING THE WITNESS?
A:
No, the police officer can only testify facts that he knows are of his personal knowledge [Sec.
36, Rule 130]. Observing a witness identify the accused from a lineup still constitutes hearsay
because the officer does not personally know how the witness identified the accused.

Q: WHAT IS THE VALLEJO STANDARD?

A: The Vallejo standard refers to jurisprudential norms considered by the court in assessing the
probative value of DNA evidence. In People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656 (2002), it was held
that in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, among other
things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

NOTE: The Vallejo standard was incorporated in Sec. 7 of the Rule on DNA Evidence, as
follows:
(1) The chain of custody including how the biological samples were collected, how they
were handled, and the possibility of contamination of the samples;
 (2) The DNA testing methodology including the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure, and compliance with the
scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests;
(3) The forensic DNA laboratory including accreditation by any reputable standards-
setting institution and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the
laboratory is not accredited, the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic
casework and credibility shall be properly established; and
(4) The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided.

Q: ARE FACSIMILE OR FAX PRINTOUTS ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE ELECTRONIC

COMMERCE ACT? WHAT IS THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT RULE UNDER THE RULE
ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE?
A: No, unless they are computer-generated faxes. According to jurisprudence, although fax
printouts or transmissions fall under the definition of an electronic data message since it is sent
through electronic means, it is not an electronic document since in ordinary facsimile
transmissions there exists an original paper-based information that is scanned or copied.
Fax transmissions therefore do not fall under the functional equivalent rule. The rule on
electronic evidence considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as a
functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes. A printout must thus first
fall under the definition of an electronic document to be considered a written document. In
ordinary fax printouts, since the original data is not made electronically, then it is inadmissible if
unauthenticated with the original written document [MCC Industrial v. Ssangyong, G.R. No.
170633 (2007)]

Q: MR. B WAS STABBED NEAR THE DEL PAN SPORTS COMPLEX IN BINONDO,
MANILA. HE WAS STILL ABLE TO WALK TO THE HOUSE OF HIS UNCLE TO WHOM HE
TOLD THAT IT WAS MR. S WHO STABBED HIM. MR. B DIED SHORTLY AFTER BEING
ADMITTED TO THE HOSPITAL. CAN MR. B’S STATEMENT TO HIS UNCLE BE ADMITTED
AS EVIDENCE? IF YES, AS WHAT? IF NO, WHY NOT?
A: Yes, it can be admitted both as a dying declaration and as part of res gestae.

As a dying declaration:
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character,
may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely:
(1) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death;
(2) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an
impending death;
(3) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and
(4) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in
which the declarant is a victim.
In this case, Mr. B communicated his ante-mortem statement to his uncle, identifying Mr. S as
the person who had stabbed him. There is ample authority for the view that the declarant was
conscious of the imminence of his death, as this can be shown by the declarant’s own
statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made
in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician.

As part of the res gestae:

A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit:
(1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
 (2) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
Here, the startling occurrence was the stabbing by Mr. S. Mr. B was on board a taxi on the way
to the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Mr. S as the assailant. The
test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act,
declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether
it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony [People v.
Salafranca, G.R. No. 173476 (2012)].

Q: LATE IN THE NIGHT, X SENT A TEXT MESSAGE TO HIS MOTHER NARRATING THAT
HE SUFFERED A FATAL STAB WOUND DUE TO HIS CONFRONTATION WITH HIS
DRINKING BUDDIES, NAMING Y AND Z AS THE PERSONS CAUSING SAID WOUNDS. HE
LIKEWISE. BODE FAREWELL TO HIS MOTHER, THANKED HER FOR EVERYTHING SHE
HAS DONE FOR HIM, AND TOLD HER THAT SHE LOVES HER SO MUCH. X DIED
SHORTLY THEREAFTER. IS THIS TEXT MESSAGE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE IN A
MURDER CASE AGAINST THE NAMED INDIVIDUALS? IS THE MOTHER COMPETENT TO
TESTIFY ON THE MESSAGES?
A: Yes, the text message is admissible as a dying declaration since it came from X who died
shortly thereafter and it concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of his death. His
belief that he is dying is evident from his statement that the wound was fatal, the other contents
of the message, and the fact that he died shortly after he sent the text message.

The mother is competent to testify on the messages. Text messages (which are ephemeral
electronic communications) are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to
the same or has personal knowledge of them. As the recipient of those messages sent from
and to the mobile phone in their possession, the parents are parties to the conversation and
was competent to testify on them. [People v. Enojas, G.R. 204894 (2014) citing Sec. 2, Rule 11,
Rule on Electronic Evidence]

NOTE: The coverage of the Rule on Electronic Evidence was expanded to include criminal
cases in A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC dated 24 September 2002 [Sec. 2, Rule 1].

Q: WHEN IS AN OFFER TO SETTLE CONSIDERED AS AN ADMISSION OF GUILT?

A: In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt. [Sec. 27, Rule 130]

Note, however, that in one case the Court ruled that the testimony of complainant’s father that
the relatives of the accused made two offers to settle with the knowledge of the accused,
should be taken as an implied admission of the guilt of the accused. [People v. Salvador, G.R.
No. 136870-72 (2003)]

Q: WHAT IS THE EQUIPOISE DOCTRINE?

A: The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case is
evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of
the accused. [Malana v. People, G.R. No. 173612 (2008)] In a civil case, when the evidence of
the parties is in equipoise, or when there is a doubt as to where the preponderance of evidence
lies, the party with the burden of proof fails and the petition must thus be denied. [ Marubeni v.
Lirag, G.R. No. 130998, (2001)]
Q: DODI WAS CHARGED WITH QUALIFIED RAPE UNDER ARTICLE 266-B(6) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE AND WAS COMPELLED BY THE COURT TO UNDERGO HIV
TESTING. THE RESULT OF THE TEST SHOWS THAT HE IS HIV POSITIVE. CAN THE
PROSECUTION OFFER SUCH RESULT IN EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE THAT HE KNEW THAT HE WAS AFFLICTED WITH HIV AND THE VIRUS
WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE VICTIM, DESPITE DODI’S OBJECTION TO ITS
ADMISSIBILITY ON THE GROUND OF HIS RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, RIGHT
TO PRIVACY, AND FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE?
A: Yes, the result of the testing can be offered is admissible evidence. Firstly, the right to be
presumed innocent of the crime charged, right to privacy, and against self-incrimination of the
accused are not violated because the compulsory testing is authorized by law. The court may
compel the accused to submit himself to a blood test to determine whether he has HIV under
Section 17(a) of R.A. 8054. Further, the right against self-incrimination refers to compulsory
testimonial compulsion and does not include the body of the accused as evidence when it may
be material [Tijing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125901 (2001]. Secondly, the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine applies only where the primary source is shown to have been unlawfully
obtained, or was the result of an illegal act [People v. Alicando, G.R. No. 117487 (1995)].

Q: IS THE JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES?

A: Yes, it is applicable to criminal actions in the following situations:
(1) where the maximum of the imposable penalty does not exceed six years;
(2) where the accused agrees to the use of judicial affidavits, irrespective of the penalty
involved; or
(3) with respect to the civil aspect of the actions, whatever the penalties involved are.
[Sec 9(a), Judicial Affidavit Rule, A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC]

Q: WHAT IS A LEADING QUESTION AND IS IT ALLOWED?

A: A leading question is a question which suggests to the witness the answer which the
examining party desires is a leading question. [Sec 10, Rule 132]

General Rule: Leading questions are not allowed.

Exceptions:
(1) On cross examination;
(2) On preliminary matters;
(3) When there is a difficulty is getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is
ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;
(4) Of an unwilling or hostile witness;
(5) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party
[Sec. 10, Rule 132]
(6) In all stages of examination of a child if the same will further the interests of justice [Sec.
20, Rule on Examination of Child Witness]

Q: HOW IS AN OFFICIAL RECORD PROVED?

A: The record of public documents when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, it may be
evidenced with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is
kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office. [Sec. 24, Rule 132]

Q: GIVE THE INSTANCES OF CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS.

A:
(1) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led to another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief,
he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted
to falsify it:
(2) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of commencement
of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. [Sec. 2, Rule 131]

SPECIAL RULES

Q: WHAT AMENDMENT WAS RECENTLY INTRODUCED TO THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES?
A: The upper limit for the value of the claim covered by the Rule has been raised to PHP
300,000, to take effect on August 1, 2018. Thus, Sec. 2 of A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC now states that
the Revised Rules shall govern the procedure in actions before the MeTCs, MTCCs, MTCs and
MCTCs for payment of money where the value of the claim does not exceed PHP 300,000
exclusive of interest and costs.

Q: DIFFERENTIATE AND ENUMERATE THE PROHIBITED PLEADINGS UNDER RULES ON

SUMMARY PROCEDURE AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES
A: The prohibited pleadings are generally identical as to both rules, except that motions to
dismiss are not allowed in Small Claims, no matter the ground, as compared to Summary
Procedure which allows MTD if based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or failure to comply
with barangay conciliation.
Small Claims [Sec. 16, Rules of Procedure
Summary Procedure [Sec. 19, Rule on
for Small Claims Cases]
Summary Procedure]
(1) Motion to dismiss the complaint except on (1) Motion to dismiss the Statement of Claims
the [2016 Revised Rules prohibits any motion to
ground of dismiss, unlike the previous rules which
(a) Failure to comply with barangay allowed an exception for the ground of lack of
conciliation proceedings; or jurisdiction]
(b) Lack of jurisdiction over the subject (2) Motion for a bill of particulars;
matter (3) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration
(2) Motion for a bill of particulars; of
(3) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration, a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
or for reopening of trial; (4) Petition for relief from judgment;
(4) Petition for relief from judgment; (5) Motion for extension of time to file
(5) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings,
pleadings, affidavits, or any other paper;
affidavits, or any other paper; (6) Memoranda;
(6) Memoranda; (7) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or
(7) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order
prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;
issued by the court; (8) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(8) Motion to declare the defendant in default; (9) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(9) Dilatory motions for postponement; (10) Reply and Rejoinder;
(10) Reply; (11) Third-party complaints; and
(11) Third-party complaints; and (12) Interventions.
(12) Interventions.

Q: A FILED A CASE IN THE MTCC (UNDER THE RULE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES)
AGAINST ATTY. S, A MEMBER IN GOOD STANDING OF THE BAR, FOR A SUM OF
MONEY AMOUNTING TO PHP 199,999.99. S DID NOT FILE A RESPONSE TO THE CLAIM
THINKING THAT HE CAN CONVINCE A TO WITHDRAW THE CASE AGAINST HIM AND
THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY A IS TOTALLY SPURIOUS, AND LIKEWISE
FAILED TO APPEAR AT THE HEARING, FORGETTING THAT AN EXCEPTION TO THE
RULE THAT LAWYERS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO APPEAR IN HEARINGS EXISTS WHEN
THEY ARE PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT. AS A RESULT THEREOF, JUDGMENT WAS
RENDERED AGAINST HIM FOR THE FULL AMOUNT. HE NOW APPROACHES YOU, A
FELLOW MEMBER OF THE BAR WHO KNOWS MORE ABOUT THE RULE ON SMALL
CLAIMS THAN HE DOES, AS TO THE REMEDY HE MAY TAKE. WHAT REMEDY/IES WILL
YOU ADVISE ATTY. S TO TAKE?
A: I will advise him that the remedy available is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the
RTC.
The Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases expressly states that the decision in small
claims cases shall be final, executory, and unappealable. [Sec. 24]. Given that there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper, provided that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Observing the hierarchy of courts, the petition should be filed in
the RTC. [A.L. Ang v. Mondejar, G.R. No. 200804 (2014)]

Q: WHAT IS A STRATEGIC LAWSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (SLAPP)? WHAT

SHOULD THE PARTIES PROVE IN SUPPORT OF A CLAIM OR IN DEFENSE OF AN
ALLEGATION OF SLAPP?
A: SLAPP refers to a legal action filed to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal
recourse that any person, institution or the government has taken or may take in the
enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental
rights. [Sec. 1, Rule 6, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases].

To support a defense of a claim of SLAPP, substantial evidence must be shown that the acts
for enforcement of environmental laws are legitimate acts for the protection, preservation or
rehabilitation of the environment. The party against whom the defense of SLAPP is invoked
should prove by a preponderance of evidence that the action is not a SLAPP and is a valid
claim. [Sec. 2 and 3, Rule 6, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases].

NOTE: In a criminal case, the invocation of the defense of SLAPP is made in a motion to
dismiss rather than a motion to quash. Moreover, granting a motion to dismiss bars the refiling
of a SLAPP in accordance with the law of the case. In contrast, the grant of a motion to quash
does not bar the filing of a subsequent Information. [Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, Supreme Court Sub-Committee]

Q: May a citizen’s suit under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases claim
damages and other fees?
A: As to damages: No. The only recourse of a party or person who wishes to recover damages
for injury suffered is to file a separate action under Sec. 4, Rule 2. [Annotation to the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, Supreme Court Sub-Committee]

As to attorney’s fees, costs of suit and other litigation expenses: Yes [Sec. 1, Rule 5].

Q: State the precautionary principle, its application, and the situations calling for its
application
A: The precautionary principle states that when human activities may lead to threats of serious
and irreversible damage to the environment that is scientifically plausible but uncertain, actions
shall be taken to avoid or diminish that threat [Sec. 4(f), Rule 1, Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases].

As to its application, the precautionary principle shifts the burden of evidence of harm away from
those likely to suffer harm and onto those desiring to change the status quo. By applying the
precautionary principle, the court may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial action
or inaction, with the goal of preserving and protecting the environment. [ISAAA v. Greenpeace,
G.R. No. 209271 (2015)]

It is a principle of last resort, only when application of the regular Rules of Evidence would
cause in an inequitable result for the environmental plaintiff, for example:
(a) settings in which the risks of harm are uncertain;
(b) settings in which harm might be irreversible and what is lost is irreplaceable; and
(c) settings in which the harm that might result would be serious

When the features of uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm, and the possibility of
serious harm coincide, the case for application of the precautionary principle is strongest
[ISAAA v. Greenpeace, supra]